Here is how a good digest may look like:

Facts: MERALCO, a public utility, is applying for an increase of their rates

in their distribution charge. ERB granted a provisional increase subject to the
condition that should the COA found that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser
increase, all excess amounts collected will either be refunded or credited in
favor of latter’s customers. The COA report found that MERALCO is
entitled to a lesser increase thus ERB ordered the refund or crediting of the
excess amounts in favor of the customers. On appeal of MERALCO, the CA
set aside the ERB decision and denied the latter’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the regulation of the ERB as to the adjustment of the rates of
MERALCO is valid. (The Issue is directly related to the specific topic
because it questions the validity of ERB regulating the rates of MERALCO
which is a public utility.)
Ruling: Yes, because the regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities
is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules
for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof.
When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation.
The regulation is to promote the common good. (The Ruling directly
answers the Issue and explains that the Rationale of regulating public
utilities is founded upon police power in order to promote the common
good. Hence, ERB’s regulating of the rates of MERALCO is an exercise of
police power and thus valid.)

PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de GuzmanFacts:

PT&T initially hired Grace de Guzman as a reliever for an employee who had
amaternity leave from November 1990 to April 1991. From June 10-July 1991
and fromJuly 19-August 8, 1991, she was again engaged by the said company to relieve
anotheremployee who took a leave on both periods. In September of the same
year,Pt&Thiredde Guzman as a probationary employee. In the job application form that
she filled up forthe said hiring, she indicated her civil status to be single even
though she got marriedin May of 1991. It was later found out that de Guzman also
indicated the same civilstatus for her June and July engagements.Petitioner PT&T sent
a memorandum to de Guzman, requiring her to explain theabovementioned
discrepancy. She was reminded about the company s policy of not accepting married
women for employment.In her reply letter, private respondent statedthat she was not
aware of PT&T s policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonethelessremained
unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was dismissed from
thecompany effective January 29, 1992.NLRC held that de Guzman was illegally
dismissed, and ordered her reinstatement andpayment of backwages and COLA.
NLRC denied PT&T s motion for reconsideration.Hence, this case.
Issue:
WON de Guzman may be dismissed on the ground of her marital status
Held:
De Guzman was entitled to reinstatement and the payment of backwages. She
shouldnot have been dismissed because of her marital status.
Ratio Decidendi:
Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is a special contract, the
foundationof the family and an inviolable social institution. Hence, it cannot be
restricted bydiscriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Therefore, it
is unlawfulfor PT&T, and for any employer, to prejudice an employee merely by reason
of marriage.

LazaroRayrayvsChae Kyung Lee

November 20, 2010
Article 45
Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure
a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together
until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2 Americans
and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have
more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for them to do so and that there is no
legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually they pursued their separate
ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of Manila for an action to annul his marriage with
Lee because Lee’s whereabouts cannot be determined and that his consent in marrying
Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known prior that Lee had been living with
other men. His action for annulment had been duly published and summons were made
known to Lee but due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default.
The lower court denied Rayray’s action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in
Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray
is not sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the
case. As far as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex
loci celebracionis. The lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayray’s evidence is not
sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police
clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to marry after her subsequent
cohabitation/s with the other men – which is considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC
ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person who
prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also,
through Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with
other men before to marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if
it were a previous marriage that is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any
subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent could
have been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage because he
would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case.

ZULUETA VS. CA
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered
petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's
clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On

March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by

making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is
a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
The case involves the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its
employees from marrying employees of any competitor company.

FACTS:
Pedro A. Tecson was hired by respondent GlaxoWellcome Philippines, Inc. as medical
representative. As stipulated in the contract signed and agreed by Tecson, The Glaxo provides
that an employee is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies. If
management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential conflict between such relationship and
the employee’s employment with the company, the management and the employee will explore
the possibility of a “transfer to another department or preparation for employment outside the
company after six months.

Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals, a competitor of Glaxo. In 1998,Tecson married Bettsy, whilst constantly
reminded by the District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with
Bettsy might engender. When Tecson failed to resolve the conflicting issue, Glaxo offered
Tecson a separation pay or to be transferred from Camarines to Butuan-Surigao-Agusan sales
area to which the former refused to abide. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a petition to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) which affirmed Glaxo’s policy as valid. CA
affirmed NCMB’s decision, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies
is valid, and whether said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD:
The Court finds no merit in the petition.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor

companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships
of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed
company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures. Glaxo possesses the right to protect its
economic interests. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled
to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

The company policy does not violate the equal protection clause. In the contractual provision
and the policy in its employee handbook, Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against
relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to
cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely
seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out
of such relationships.
Petition is denied.

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL

STARPAPER VS. SIMBOL

G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation, Josephine Ongsitco, and Sebastian Chua

Respondents: Ronaldo V. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia, and Lorna E. Estrella

Ponente: J. Puno

Facts:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 03, 2004
in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The following facts were presented:

(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;

(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of
the company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that
should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated
in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998.

(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee
whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned
company policy. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.

(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of
an illegal company policy.

(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker,
whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated. The company allegedly
could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a
married but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not
separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy.

(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days as
advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21, 1999 but she found out that her
name was on hold at the gate. She was directed to the personnel office and handed a memorandum that
stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to submit an explanation
but she was dismissed nonetheless. She resigned because she was in dire need of money and
resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

On January, 11, 2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration through a Resolution.

On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:

(a) The petitioners’ dismissal from employment was illegal:

(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss
of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and

(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners’ attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the award and the
cost of the suit.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

The issues raised by this petition are:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the
constituional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code:
and

(2) Whether or not the respondents’ resignations were far from voluntary.

Held:

(1) No. The CA did not err in holding that the subject 1995 policy/ regulation is violative of the
constitutional rights towards marriage and the family of employees and or Article 136 of the Labor Code:

(ARTICLE 136. Stipulation against marriage. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage.)
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 165842
November 29, 2005
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to RubylusGaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the
former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last
visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their
meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first
marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense
being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of
imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when
he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against
the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten
years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot
be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive
death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

HELD:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when
he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense
in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law
is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantialegisneminemexcusat. Where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the
present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus,
even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of
the crime.
The court ruled against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with
the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus
declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an
innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,5 Million. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and allowed
Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,5Milion on condition that he will secure “a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the
area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers
residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.” He sought the
reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA,
by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right to bail. He
also contested the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming
that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issues:

1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of petitioner's right against
excessive bail.

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of abode and right to travel.

Held:

1. Right to Bail

The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes

an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The amount should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression
that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we
cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability
which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.

2. Liberty of abode and right to travel

The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the
questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so. (Yap vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June
6, 2001)
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It
appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital AdrenalHyperplasia
which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To
further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued
by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court decided in her
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the
case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.”
The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the
fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by
the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen),
which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity

People vs. Bustamante

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

January 27, 1959

G.R. No. L-11598
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,
 vs.
FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.
Ramon S. Milo for appellant.

FACTS:
1. Federico Bustamante was charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan.
2. The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria Perez
on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of Peace of Binaloan, Pangasinan, a little over a year late, or on
September 16, 195, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria I. Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-
Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as mayor of the said
municipality, while the first marriage was still subsisting.
3. The defendant contended that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was
merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays
stress on the distinction between “Acting Mayor” and “Vice Mayor acting as Mayor”, urging that while the
former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the second marriage was valid.
2. Whether or not the Vice Mayor has the authority to solemnize the second marriage.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage was valid and Vice Mayor Federico Nato, acting as mayor, has the authority to
solemnize the marriage. As acting mayor, he discharges all duties and wields the power appurtenant to
said office. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of the
functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested with it. The case even
concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice Mayor whenever
the latter is in an acting capacity. The word “acting,” when preceding the title of an office connotes merely
the temporary character as nature of the same.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

Facts:

On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugaldwelling.
Two children were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s
residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.

The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of
their children to her.

Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked
by him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was
talking to him.

The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then
filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity.

The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court,
she assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said

marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Ruling:

The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the
day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the
marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.

The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil
Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, are void ab initio. This is
clearly applicable in this case.

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no

longer detain the Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was
solemnized.

Ching Huat v. Co Heong

G.R. No. L-1211 January 30, 1947 HILADO, J.
petitioners

CHING HUAT
respondents
CO HEONG [ALIAS CO HONG, CO YONG]
summary
Daughter of Huat married Heung. He filed for the issuance of a Writ of HabeasCorpus in order to
get custody of her child. Court held daughter was validly marriedto Heong and as a result, she was emancipated
and should live with her husband.
facts of the case
Huat prays for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing any lawful officer to take
from Heong andproduce before the Court his daughter Maria Ching and require the respondent to
justify his right to the custodyof said minor (15 years old). Further, he seeks that he be
awarded said custody of his child.Huat alleges that taking advantage of his confidential and spiritual relation
with Maria Ching as hergodfather, Heung persuaded and induced her by means of stick, promises
and cajolery, to leave the parentalhome and to elope with him to Plaridel, Bulacan where they
were married. Further, he alleges that Heung hadbeen previously married in China to Gue Min, said
marriage being said to be subsisting at the time respondentmarried Maria Ching. Heung on the other hand
alleges that they were married in accordance with Philippinelaw.
issue
WON Huat retains the custody over her minor child? (
NO
)

ratio
The alleged marriage of respondent to Gue Min in China has not been proven. There is no allegation in thepetition,
much less is there evidence, to show that the said supposed marriage was performed in accordancewith the laws
of China in force at the time of its supposed performance, nor even what those laws were.
Courtcited Sec. 19 of CC
1
which is substantially the same as Sec. IV of the former Philippine Marriage Law
2
.As applied: the Philippine marriage between said respondent and Maria Ching before the Justice
of the Peaceof Plaridel, Bulacan, is undisputed. It is also beyond question that marriage was contracted by a man
much over16 years old with a girl 15 years old.
Note: If the supposed prior Chinese marriage had been sufficiently proven, then in order that the
subsequent Philippine marriagecould be valid, it would have been necessary either [a] that the
Chinese marriage should have been previously annulled or dissolved; or[b] that the first wife of
respondent should have been absent for 7 consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without therespondent having news of the absentee being alive; or [c] that the absentee should
have been generally considered as dead and believedto be so by respondent at the time of
contracting the subsequent marriage, in either of which last two cases the subsequent marriage
willbe valid until declared null and void by a competent court, while in the first it will be valid without this
limitation. However, the completeabsence of proof of the supposed former Chinese marriage makes
Sections 29 and 30 of the Marriage inapplicable.
Maria Ching having been validly married on June 21, 1946, she became emancipated. This
emancipationbrought about the loss by the father of the parental authority that he claims. Further,
Article 48 of Chapter V ofthe Spanish Marriage Law of 1870, whose Articles 44 to 8 were, and
are then partly, in force in the Philippinesprovides that the wife has the duty of living in her
husband's company and of following him to wherever hetransfers his domicile or residence

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.

G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.
Facts:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial courtseeking
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.

After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent
was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and
forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

Issue:

Is the action of the husband tenable?

Ruling:

No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by priorjudgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the
same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or
the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved
in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly
concealed the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have
waived any defects therein. The Courtfinds then that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition is
denied for lack of merit.

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524 December 29, 1998

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524

FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the
estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and
the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico
anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to
succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s
Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive
portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld.

ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should
prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that
the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the
Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be
annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be
reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable
marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law
makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate;
and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged
natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel
would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children
conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”

Valdes vs. RTC

October 5, 2016
By Maielle de Lumban

Article 52

Art. 52. The judgement of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third
persons.

COMMENT:

Who are not affected?

Under the Rule provided for under Article 52, third parties shall NOT be affected.
Valdes vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on
the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed
under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which
they prefer.

*Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage , shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.( As amended by E.O. No.227, dated July 17, 1987)

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for
the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on
the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

*prima facie- based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proved otherwise

VALDES vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family.

VALDES vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

FACTS:
The petition for review is purely on a question of law. Petitioner avers that the court has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on
the part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971 and had five
children. In 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code. In 29 July 1994, the court granted the petition. Judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:

 The marriage declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
 The three older children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with. The 2
younger ones shall be in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdes.
 The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the
custody of the other.
 Petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
 of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.

ISSUE:
What will govern the partition of property for annulled marriages on the ground of
psychological incapacity?

HELD:
The Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and
void ab initio. The property regime shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The properties acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through the
joint efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares. They own their ‘family home’ and all
their other properties for that matter in equal shares.

A court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise
clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters such as property
partition.

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first
with Susan NicdaoCarino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and
with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children in their almost ten
year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent
for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee
received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against
Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because
their marriage was solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court
ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack
of marriage license.

Ruling:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and
Carino was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In
the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage
license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of
the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand.
The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of judicial decree of
nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted.
The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired
by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
The decision of the trial court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.

CariñovsCariño
November 20, 2010
Article 40
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan NicdaoCariño. He had 2 children with her. In
1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Cariño. In 1988, prior
to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In
1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim
the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able
to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with
SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but
the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found
out about the previous marriage on SPO4’s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim
presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the
same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by
each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the
full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is
because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but
their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property
relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this
includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other
may not have contributed at all.

Ma.Armida “Amy” Perez-Ferraris

vs Brix Ferraris
November 19, 2010
Article 36: Psychological Incapacity
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that
relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company
of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their
problems began when Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It was only when they started
fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner,
and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida’s
lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix
could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological
expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This
is evidenced by Brix’s
“leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to
spend more time with his band mates than his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality
disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies
during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was not
able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent’s
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder “can be part of his family upbringing” She
stated that there was a history of Brix’s parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is
of course inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.
What is psychological incapacity?
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason
that the Courts rely heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

Case Digest Tevs Te

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, Petitioner
Vs

Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te, Respondent

G.R. No. 161793

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the August 5, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG. R. CV No. 71867.
The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.

Sometimes in January 1996 Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first met respondent
Rowena Ong Gutierrez YuTe in a gathering organized by the Filipino Chinese
association in their college. Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two
understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each
other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless.
Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu
that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchases the boat ticket.

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In
April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house
and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on
telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay
with Rowena at her uncle’s place. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to
a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. Rowena suggested that
he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his
father he told that he will disinherited and insisted that Edward must go home. In June
1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should
live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his
marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. The trial court,
on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.

Issue:

Whether or not the contracted marriage is void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated

Held:

The Psychological test result and evaluation result were both petitioner and respondent
are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their
marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage. Although
there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be
personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the
January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 71867 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.