G.R. No.

127240 March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he
arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and
lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter
of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the
testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present
any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather
surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the
history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that
petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this
reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of
the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of
residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no
known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his
1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also
annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net
income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State
contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married
twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived
with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also
annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by
petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on
February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil
Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife
since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that
when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of

Residence, 10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in
the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to
the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court
held:

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG,"
which name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270.
Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to
include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory
requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come
forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his
application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to
comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government,
upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is
depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of
the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when
he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has
been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without
the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far
from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law",
and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization
...

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an
income tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is
low. . . "It is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that
 there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and
thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are
in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to
them by their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant
cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions
and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT

IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN
APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT
PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER

STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which,
justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered
as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which
provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance
upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable
judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We
are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which
has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which
was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the
case number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number
of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally
unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
appeal. 17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by
the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as
"SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the
authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed
under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any
flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our
conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to
settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the
address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address
appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the
records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to
mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence
containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
constitutes substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating
agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any
community where he may have lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government
and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the
applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of
residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases
defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. 1âw phi 1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and
papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in
her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which,
after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to
pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent,
Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his
knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be
properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and
enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of
respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this
reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix,
Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed
with merit:"2
 On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he
maintains that:

....

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting
Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however
having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued
a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the
trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for
petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be
looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the
legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits
it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For
Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for
legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive
order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by
this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga,
Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of
P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge
of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting
in the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of
said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel
Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their
aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil
Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their
farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed,
Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be
able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt,
Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of
Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the
back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there,
and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend
the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the
house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants,
pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his
wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting
the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were
"reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something
important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went
towards the back of the house of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her
house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor
was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was
still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was
upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While
she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of
her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was
given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor
naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to
offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in
Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and
found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer
Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running
away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw
appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when
Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was
arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as
the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In
his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE

EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
DOUBTFULNESS.
 II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented
necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the
former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the
result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s
highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5)
incised, were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines
to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo
examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be
approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor
mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of
appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej
Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on
the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim.
During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal
could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from
the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested
by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault
on her virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene
type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA
is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a
person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of
hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because
of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notable exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has
been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault
would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be
left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or
furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault.27Forensic DNA
evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim.
If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known
samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this
case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied
exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier
since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of
the analyst who conducted the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution
as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s
testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that
of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that
he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11,
which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists
between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court
during the course of the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that
has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the
introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated
by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal,
the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel
Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by
Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the
house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn
Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty
white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left
when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a
dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a
rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding
from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra,
underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed
sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the
crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H",
compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two
days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of
guilt.35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain

which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is
the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken
from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well
as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood

and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination.
The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement
in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post
facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of
DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the
Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s
house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998
incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be
in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the
same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime,
and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely
weakens his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible
error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on
reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on
mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more
than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
"plus value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of
slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without
"plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the
trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would
result from its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which
the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral
certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the
reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond
reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the
accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence
appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity
of the culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last
saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She
witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of
the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the
latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the
school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five
days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June
25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of
appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According
to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant,
the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will
kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by
appellant.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It
is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of
witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission
of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for
committing it may be inferred.51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason
or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s
lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force,
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means
of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52However, in rape committed by close
kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is
not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy
takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not
negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of
rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch
without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual
abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the
victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his
mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the
house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house.
Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to
have moral ascendancy over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason
or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court
maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional,
and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the

family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral
damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga,
Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for
the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he
be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the
amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The
award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS
TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision1 dated
February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60.

The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject
lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating
(Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.3

On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner
Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject
property was transferred in the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and
1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer
title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging
the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later
discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in
the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7

Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad,
Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.

In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered
the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of
Daniela.9 Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.

Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the
heirs of Daniela.10 The complaint also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff,
he having died intestate and without issue in March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and
Nena as his sole heirs.

In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.
She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court
for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.12

Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive
portion:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969
(Exh. "Q") executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL
and VOID and further ordering:

1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to
issue a new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼)
portion of the property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼)
portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion and Nena Lazalita
Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth (¼) portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the
prescribed fees;

2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in
lieu thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso
portion; Felicidad Tating Marcella, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso
portion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, ¼ Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the
house standing thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons mentioned in
the same proportions as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;

3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱20,000.00 by way of
moral damages, ₱10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, ₱5,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees and ₱3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to

4. Pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.13

Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming
the judgment of the RTC.14

Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22,
2002.15

Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant
case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable
Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not
supported by and is even against the evidence on record."16

At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
CA finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion. On the other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of
jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition for review on certiorari. Hence, in
accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the
Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
especially considering that it was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same.17

As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests
on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because
Daniela’s actual intention was not to dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by
providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the
RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of
Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should
have been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead
when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-
examine her.

Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the
Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered
only after the death of Daniela in 1994.18Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed
simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However,
the fact remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.

Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time
and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also
argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela
and petitioner created a trust relationship between them because of the settled rule that where
the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full effect.

In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show
that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed
judgments; that Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of
sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement
between petitioner and Daniela created a trust relationship between them.

The Court finds for the petitioner.

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is
simulated. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely
simulated) or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).19 The primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties.20 Such
intention is determined from the express terms of their agreement as well as from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.21

In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their
allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is
the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said
sworn statement as part of private respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also
accorded great probative weight to this document.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.23Thus, a particular item of evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence
since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant’s statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial
court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela
is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA
should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that
the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a
trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation
that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject
deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private
respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is
the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his
rights of ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence
clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her
name. Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due
on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon.
While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.32 Such an act
strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.33 On the other hand, private
respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid
taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax
Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in evidence, refers only
to the house standing on the lot in controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains a
notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really
reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never
told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply
chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on
December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her
declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than
ten years later.

It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioner’s
favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in
the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that
ownership and possession are two entirely different legal concepts.35Just as possession is not a
definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first
paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Possession, along with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance.36 Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal
consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the disputed
property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was already able to
perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject property.

As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the validity
of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn
statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not able to
cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.

However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance of evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was
simulated. The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who
impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents failed
to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela was simulated, the presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969
Deed of Absolute Sale stands.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be
valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether
or not a trust relationship was created between them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the

conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible
either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny
Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in
Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA) through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.1

Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge the credibility of the
witnesses who had incriminated him.

The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the
Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away;
that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek
help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to
the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon
eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the
stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13
years, who was in the complex at the time.2

As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long period, despite the
warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the
Manila City Jail.

After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:

The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the
victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanon’s neck stabbing
the latter with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanon’s
death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by Rodolfo
Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that
when he aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from
hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.3

The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how
Salafranca had effected his attack

against Bolanon, observing that by "encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind the victim on
the latter’s neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand," Salafranca did not give
Bolanon "any opportunity to defend himself."4 The RTC noted inconsistencies in Salafranca’s and
his witness’ testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his residence the day after the
incident and had stayed away in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had
he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence,
especially because he was also working near the area.5
The RTC disposed thus:

With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found guilty of
the crime of Murder defined and punished under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other
aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.

His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the Bureau of Correction, National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City Jail Warden of Manila.

He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 representing
death indemnity.

There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby made.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,7 citing the dying declaration
made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive identification
as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home
during the incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained
flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly
indicative of his guilt.10

Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal lacks merit.

Discrediting Mendoza and Estaño as witnesses against Salafranca would be unwarranted. The
RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible and reliable. The
determination of the competence and credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC
as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment during
testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and
candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and
conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court was bound by such assessment
and conclusions,11considering that the CA as the appellate court could neither substitute its
assessment nor draw different conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC
misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that would alter the
result.12 Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the RTC. Hence,
the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the
CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.13

Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive identification by Mendoza
as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such incrimination by
Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled
Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth.14

Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and had "encircled
his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the right(hand) and
coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the
left nipple."15 Relying on Mendoza’s recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the
RTC found treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join
the CA’s concurrence because Mendoza’s eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained
uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca
employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an
aggressive physical control of the latter’s movements that ensured the success of the attack
without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal
Code,16 treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.

The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying
Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony follows:

Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?

A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.

Q What time was that?

A 12:50 a.m.

Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?

A "Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako."

Q What did you do?

A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.

Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?

A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?, and he answered, Rod
Salafranca.

Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How long have you known him?

A "Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami."

Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Will you look around and point him to us?

A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod Salafranca.)

COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?

A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk anymore because he will just
suffer more.

Q What happened when you told him that?

A He kept silent.

Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?

A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that time.

Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?

A He was brought to Emergency Room.

Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?

A He was pronounced dead.17

It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his
uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up
to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital,
Estaño had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño that his
assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be
having a hard time breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about
ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and
had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a
dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized that
the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all
the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an
exception to the hearsay rule.18

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b)
that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estaño,
identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon
was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and,
according to Estaño, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in
the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the
imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion
of his physician.20 Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration
had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for murder
in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.21

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely,
when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would
bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the
assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only
in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned
incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act."22 In a
general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.24 The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.25

We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity of
₱50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by law to more than
such indemnity, because the damages to be awarded when death occurs due to a crime may
include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b)
actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e)
temperate damages.26

We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral damages which were
different from the death indemnity.27 The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to
crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish
and emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.28Although mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the
Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their
moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is reasonable as
moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,29 we are bound to award despite the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental anguish and emotional suffering. The
rationale for doing so rested on human nature and experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when
1âwphi1

a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his
love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has
been done to them.30

The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their non-recognition of the right
of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual damages for
burial and related expenses are not substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least
₱25,000.00 are warranted, for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to
deny them compensation by way of actual damages.31

Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as
part of the civil liability "when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances."32 The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded "by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages."33 Conformably with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have
recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the
attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v.
Catubig:34

The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of
the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender.
In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of ₱30,000.00 is deemed reasonable
and proper,35because we think that a lesser amount could not result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 24, 2005, but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of
₱50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards
shall bear interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.

The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO
ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled "State
Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation." The
questioned decision affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case NO. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the
following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the sum of P150,483.16 with
interest thereon at 30% per annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount
is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and
demandable as attorney's fees and to pay the cost(s) of suit.

SO ORDERED.1

Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27,
1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporation's motion for reconsideration.

The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its chairman,
private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan
from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan
carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining
balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the
payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation
on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters
to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the
promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to
settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was
agreed upon:

1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and
that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the
defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
 2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which
were both received by the herein defendant; and

3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the
latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a
promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity
date on January 12, 1984.2

The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to
the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case
was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear
despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-
examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.

On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.

On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that
the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its
claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no
showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof
was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally,
SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.

On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.

On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.

Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME IT'S
BURDEN OF PROOF.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING

ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private
respondent SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
 (2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorney's fees to
SIHI.

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence through the
testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal knowledge
of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in
violation of Sections 363 and 48,4 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole witness of
SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in evidence executed or written by
SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of Section 2,5 Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and authenticity of private
documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner likewise submits that none
of the signatures affixed in the documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in
evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the requirement of Section 34,6 Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate court to consider
the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production of the originals of the documents
presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of evidence provided for in Section
3 (e),7 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.

Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on scheduled
hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates,
petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its case.
Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to
disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A

witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule,
hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value.8 However, the rule does admit of
an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is
admissible.9 The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-
examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the
matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.10 However, the right to cross-examine may be
waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such
right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other
party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error
was thus committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that
petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for
petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.

Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of
SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his
testimony were satisfied.

Respecting petitioner's other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly found
by the Court of Appeals, petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it
through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial
by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 411 Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

Nor will petitioner's reliance on the "best evidence rule"12 advance its cause. Respondent SIHI
had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission
by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter.
It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence
of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any
evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.
No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having
sustained the trial court'' award of attorney'' fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of
the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where we held that when attorney's
fees are awarded, the reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the
court's decision. Petitioner submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding
the same, the award of attorney's fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court. 1âw phi1.nêt

We find for petitioner in this regard.

It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is
necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within
the exception and justify the grant of the award.13 Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial
court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorney's fees, the same shall be
disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to
explain the award of attorney's fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November 12,
1996 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's
fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.