Judge Emily L.

San Gaspar-Gito
Regional Trial Court
Branch 5, Manila
 
Persons and Family
Relations
 HEIRS OF JOSE OCHOA vs. G & S
TRANSPORT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170071, July 16, 2012
FACTS: 
In 1995, at the Manila Domestic Airport, the late Jose Marcial
K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab owned and operated by G & S
Transport and driven Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home to Teacher's
Village, Diliman, Quezon City.
At about 11:00 p.m., the taxicab, while going up the Boni
Serrano (Santolan) fly-over overtook another cab driven and tried to
pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the narrow
space between the left side railing of the fly-over and the ten-wheeler
truck, Bibiano was unable to pass and because of his speed, he was
unable to control it.
To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to
the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off the
fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below. The forceful
drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two
parts. Ochoa was declared dead on arrival from the accident.
Meanwhile, Bibiano was acquitted in the reckless
imprudence case.
ISSUE: Does the acquittal of the driver in the
criminal case affect the present case for Breach
of contract of carriage?

HELD:
G & S is liable. There is a contract of carriage between G &
S and the deceased Jose. G & S miserably failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence.
The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial
to the instant case for breach of contract. When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter. (Article 31, NCC)
The heirs are entitled to the award of loss of earning
capacity as the Certificate from USAID is a public document and
therefore self-authenticating.
Moral damages of P100,000 was awarded.
 Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz
G.R. No. 201988, October 11, 2017
(psychological incapacity, failure v. refusal)

FACTS:
Maria Victoria Socoro Lontoc-Cruz and Nilo Cruz are
husband and wife. After almost two (2) decades of being together
and with two (2) children, Maria filed for nullification of their
marriage on the ground that Nilo is psychologically incapacitated.
She cited as grounds: his infidelity and his acting like a bachelor,
lack of oneness in their marriage, treatment of her like a
mayordoma, keeping from her his whereabouts, lack of sexual
contact, preference towards the company of friends and even
preference for anal sex.
Nilo retaliated by claiming that Maria was jealous of his
friends, has volatile temperament, impulsive in making decisions,
lacks respect towards him and accuses him of being gay. She even
talk about their sexual problem with her family.
 ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage
should be nullified.
HELD: 
NO, the marriage should not be declared a nullity.

Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting

personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity nor does
failure to of the parties to meet their responsibilities.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability, not merely
difficulty, refusal or neglect.
Nilo’s failure to sexually perform appears to be “selective
impotency” caused by his being turned off by Maria’s disclosure of their
secrets. Nilo has no unresolved oedipal complex; he just got a very
demanding and taxing job. Maria also failed to substantiate alleged
womanizing activities of Nilo.
As to Maria, she appeared for have a well-functioning,
supportive and emotionally healthy family environment. Nilo himself
attested that she is a good wife and good mother. Nilo admitted that her
demand for attention, time and fidelity is normal for a wife.
 Matudan v. Republic
G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016
(one-sided story; no in-depth study)

FACTS: Nicolas and Marilyn were married on October
26, 1976. They have four children. In 1985, Mariulyn left
to work abroad and since then , she had not been seen
nor heard from by her husband and children. On June
20, 2008, Nicolas filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
evidence presented consist of Nicolas Judicial
Affidavit, their daughter Maricel’s Judicial Affidavit
and Dr. Nedy Tayag Judicial Affidavit. The RTC
dismissed the Petition for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not Marilyn is psychologically
incapacitated. (b) Whether or not the totality of
evidence is sufficient.

HELD: Psychological incapacity refers to no less than
mental- not physical– incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage, as expressed in Article 68.

Here the evidence failed to sufficiently establish such

psychological incapacity. Maricel’s testimony could not be of
help as she was only two (2) years old when her mother left.
She could not have witnessed her alleged psychological
incapacity. Dr. Tayag’s findings is also based on one-sided
account. There was not really an in-depth study.
 Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
(presumptive death, efforts to locate not sufficient)


FACTS:
Jose Sareñongon filed a Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her wife Netchie. He alleged that a
month after they got married, he left to work as a seaman
while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For
three (3) months he did not receive any communication with
her.
He did not know her whereabouts. He tried to
contact her parents but they were no longer residing in
Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Her relatives and friends did not
also know where she was. He filed the Petition as he wanted
to contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s effort to locate
his wife Netchie sufficiently support a well-
founded belief that she is probably dead.

HELD:
The “well-founded belief” requisite under Article
41 of the Family Code is complied with only upon a
showing that “sincere honest to goodness efforts” had
indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Here, Jose failed to comply. His efforts are notches
below the strict requirement. Aside from his inquiry
from Netchie’s friends and relatives, he did not call
anyone of them at the witness stand.
 JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC, et al.
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twice — initially under the Islamic laws and, subsequently,
under a civil ceremony. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil
status was indicated as 'divorced.‘ Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano's wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
In 1994, Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf
of the rest of Sen. Tamano's legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity
of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting
when he married Estrellita in 1993
 ISSUE: Shall PD1083 apply to Sen. Tamayo’s marriage?
Can the Muslim Code be applied retroactively as to
affect certain marriages? Did Zorayda and Adib have


legal personalities to file the Petition?

HELD:
PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13 (1) thereof provides
that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims,
or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for
a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and
this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda.
In view of Sen. Tamano's prior marriage which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the
CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to
file the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to
only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in
application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground
is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
 TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, vs.
SPOUSES DAVID
G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010


(disposition without consent)

FACTS:
Manuel and Martha got married in 1957. They
acquired a 602 meter lot in White Plains in 1970. It was
registered in the name of Martha, married to Manuel. In
1976, they separated and lost communication.
In 1995, Manuel was surprised to learn that
Martha sold to Titan the above-mentioned lot.
Manuel filed a complaint for Annulment of
Contract and Reconveyance. He alleged that the sale
was without his knowledge. Titan claimed it is a buyer
in good faith.
 ISSUE: Is the Deed of Sale null and void?
HELD:

Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that
"[a]ll property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or
both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.“

In the absence of Manuel's consent, the Deed of Sale is void.

Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal

partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses. Article
165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership". Likewise, Article 172 of the
Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law".

Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any

disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written
consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
 
PROPERTY
Pen Development Corp, et al., v. Martinez Leyba, Inc.
G.R. No. 211845, August 9, 2017
(builder in bad faith for not minding letters)

FACTS:
Martinez Leyba, Inc. is the owner of 3 contiguous lands. Pen
Development Corp. and Las Brisas Resorts Corp., which merged into one
corporate entity is also the owner of a land adjacent to that of the
former.
In 1967, Las Brisas occupied put a fence on its land. The fence
encroached with that of Martinez. Surveyors confirmed the
encroachment. In 1968, Martinez sent letter to Las Brisas informing it
of the encroachment and requested it to refrain. It did the same thing
twice in the year 1970. In 1971, Las Brisas wrote back stating it could
not trace the origin of Martinez’s land. Martinez sent two more letters.
Depsite notices, Las Brisas continued on developing the property.
In 1997, Martinez filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title,
Cancellation of Title and Recovery of Ownership with Damages.
Las Brisas denied the encroachment.
ISSUES: (a) Whether or not Las Brisas is a
possessor/builder in good faith.
(b) Whether or not Martinez incurred laches in enforcing
its putative rights.

FACTS:
Las Brisas is a builder in bad faith because of its
obstinate refusal to abide with Martinez’s repeated demands
to cease an desist from encroaching on their area.
Martinez is not guilty of laches because as owner of
the land, it has an imprescriptible right to recover possession
thereof from any person illegally occupying its lands.
“prescription and laches cannot apply to registered land
covered by the Torrens system” pursuant to Section 47 of the
Property Registration Decree 1529 which states that “no title
to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.”
 
DONATION
 Republic v. Daclan, et al.
G.R. No. 197115/197267, March 23, 2015
(transmissibility of rights and obligations: deed of donation)

FACTS:
Federico Daclan, et al. donated 13 hectares of land to
the Republic, subject to the condition that it would be used
as a breeding station and shall not be used for any purpose
except with the prior consent of the donors of their heirs.
In 1972, the Agoo Breeding station was established by
the Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of
Animal Industry (BAI), which later on defunct. In 1991, the
powers and functions of the DA devolved to the Province of
La Union.
In 2003, Daclan et. Al. demanded for the return of the
land on the ground that the breeding station ceased
operation and that the land has been abandoned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation should
be nullified as the BAI, the one operating the
breeding station became defunct.

HELD:
Evidence, particularly the testimonies of public
officers, were given credence insofar as they established
that the breeding station is still operational.
Also, the fact that BAI ceased to exists and its
functions were devolved to the LGU, the Province of La
Union, should not result to the nullification of the Deed
of Donation. As a general rule, rights and obligations
derived from contract are TRANSMISSIBLE.
 
CO-OWNERSHIP
Antipolo Ining, et. al v. Leonardo Vega, et al.
G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013
(relative by affinity does not inherit and cannot be a co-owner, he
cannot effect repudiation of co-ownership)


FACTS:
Romana and Gregoria are siblings. In 1997,
Leonardo, the surviving heir of Romana, filed an
Action for Partition claiming that he was entitled to one-
half of the property, being the heir of Romana.
Gregoria’s heirs claimed that he has no cause of action
as they have become the land’s sole owners through
Lucimo Sr. who executed an Affidavit of Ownership of
the Land in 1979. This allegedly resulted to the
repudiation of the co-ownership. Lucimo appeared to
be the husband of Teodora, Antipolo’s daughter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Leonardo’s right
prescribed because 30 years had already
lapsed.

HELD:
NO, Leonardo’s right did not yet prescribe.
Lucimo cannot be considered as a co-owner as he was
just the son-in law of Antipolo, being married to his daughter
Teodora. Lucimo is NOT AN HEIR of Gregoria hence not a
co-owner.
Family relations under Article 150 of the Family code
is confined to husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants and brothers and sisters. It was
Teodora who is the co-owner, not Lucimo as he is merely
related by affinity to the decedent.
 
OBLIGATIONS AND
CONTRACT
 Mackay v. Spouses Caswell et. al.
G.R. No. 183872, November 17, 2014
(contractor to execute in the quality agreed upon)

FACTS:
Spouses Caswell hired Owen Mackay to provide
electrical installation service in their newly-built house in
the amount of P250,000.00.
Thereafter, Owen claimed that the installation
was completed and ready for power service connection.
When Zambales Electrical Cooperative inspected
the installation and tested power distribution, the same
shows defect leading the Spouses Caswell to spend
around P50,000.00 to rectify the mistake.
ISSUE: Whether or not Owen may be held liable for the
reconstruction and repair of the electrical installations.

HELD:
YES, Article 1715 of the NCC provides that the
contractor shall execute the work in such a manner that
it has the qualities agreed upon and has no defects
which destroy or lessen its value of fitness for its
ordinary or stipulated use.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. NO. 168646, January 12, 2011
(dacion en pago, extinguishes the entire obligation)
FACTS: 
Delta, a real estate developer, obtained a loan from Luzon for
the purpose of developing its Delta Homes 1. To secure the loan, it
executed a REM in favor the bank.
Meanwhile, Delta executed a Contract to Sell to Angeles
Catherine Enriquez over a house and lot denominated as Lot 4.When
DELTA defaulted, the BANK instead of foreclosing the REM agreed
to a dacion en pago. Among the properties assigned is Lot 4.
The BANK contends that DELTA could no longer deliver to
Enriquez Lot 4 by virtue of the dacion. It argued that if the BANK
would be required to deliver, DELTA should pay it the amount
corresponding to Lot 4, meaning the dacion en pago should not be
treated to have extinguished the entire obligation.
ISSUE:Whether the dacion en pago
extinguished the loan obligation, such that
DELTA has no more obligations to the BANK.

"The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the
extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by
the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement,
express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as
equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally
extinguished.“
In the case at bar, the Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA
and the BANK indicates a clear intention by the parties that the
assigned properties would serve as full payment for DELTA's entire
obligation.
The BANK cannot complain if, as it turned out, some of
those assigned properties (such as Lot 4) are covered by existing
contracts to sell. As noted earlier, the BANK knew that the assigned
properties were subdivision lots and covered by PD 957.
 
SALES
 Spouses Domingo v. Spouses Manzano
G.R. No. 201883, Nov. 16, 2016
(no double sale when there is no full payment in the other sale)


FACTS: Spouses Manzano and Spouses Domingo entered into
a Contract whereby the latter would pay in installments a
land belonging to the former. After paying the reservation fee
and some of the installments, Spouses Domingo failed to pay
the balance. The land remained in possession of the Spouses
Manzano.
It took Spouses Domingo a while to pay the balance
and by that time, Spouses Manzano no longer accepted their
payment. Spouses Domingo caused the annotation of an
affidavit of adverse claim.
Later, they found out that Spouses Manzano sold the
property to a certain Carmelita Aquino. Spouses Domingo file
a Complaint for Specific Performance and damages, with
prayer that the new titled issued to Carmelita be cancelled.
Issue:(a) Whether or not Spouses Domingo
have a better right than Carmelita.
(b) Whether Article 1544 is applicable.

HELD: NO, Spouses Domingo have no better right than
Carmelita and Article 1544 is not applicable.

In a contract to sell, the full payment of the purchase

price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment
of which prevents that obligation to sell from arising and
thus ownership is retained by the seller.
Without that sale, Article 1544 shall not apply as
there is no case of double sale. There is here only one sale
and that is to Carmelita.
 Nicolas v. Mariano
G.R. No. 201070, August 1, 2016
(mortgagor/seller must be the owner: NHA Grantee)
FACTS: 
Leonora Mariano is an NHA-grantee of a parcel of
land over which she built a five-unit apartment. She
mortgaged half of the land to Luz Nicolas for a loan of
P100,000.
When she could not pay the loan, she mortgaged the
entire land and the house for the amount of around P500,000.
When Mariano again defaulted, she executed an
Absolute Sale in favor of Nicolas for the purchase price of
P600,000.00. Realizing that her tenants actually paid to
Nicolas a total of P600,000, Mariano filed an action for her
release form the second mortgage claiming she had paid her
loan in full through the said rentals.
Nicolas claimed that she did not receive payment from
the tenants and that the property was already sold to her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgage and
the sale are valid and binding.
HELD: 
While the title is in the name of Mariano, she has not yet
completed the payment thereof to the NHA, thus she never really
became the owner of the property. She could not therefore validly
mortgage or sell the same.

Ownership is different from a Certificate of Title. The TCT is

the best evidence but its cannot always be considered as conclusive.
Here, the TCT was not a clean title and had Nicolas exercised
diligence, she would have discovered that the property has not yet
been paid with NHA.

Mariano cannot also recover damages on her alleged losses

because she is as guilty as Nicolas for mortgaging and selling the
property knowing that it was not hers. Both parties are in pari delicto.
Therefore, neither one may expect positive relief from courts. The
court will leave them as they were at the time the case was filed.
Bignay EX-IM Phils. Inc. v. Union Bank of the
Phil., G.R. No. 171590, February 12, 2014
(breach of warranty against eviction)

FACTS:
Union Bank sold to Bignay a foreclosed property subject
of a pending case. The sale was made despite the fact that the
original mortgagor of the foreclosed property, Rosario De Leon,
had filed an action for annulment of mortgage as the foreclosed
property was mortgaged by her husband without her consent. The
mortgage was indeed annulled and Rosario was declared to be the
owner of the undivided half of the property.
Bignay filed a case against Union Bank for breach of
warranty against eviction under Article 1547 and 1548 of the Civil
Code. The RTC held that Union Bank was in bad faith in selling
the property to Bignay. The CA made Unionbank liable for the
amount of the land and building constructed on it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Union Bank is liable to
pay Bignay the cost of the land and the amount
of the building constructed.

HELD:
YES. Union Bank is liable to Bignay. It appears that
Bignay bought the property without knowledge of the
pending case between Union Bank and Rosario. Under the
law, in case of eviction, the vendee (Bignay) shall have the
right to demand of the vendor (Union Bank) the return of the
value which the thing sold had at the time of the eviction, be
it greater or less than the price of the sale; the expenses of the
contract, if the vendee has paid them; and the damages and
interests, and ornamental expenses, if the same was made in
bad faith.
 Spouses Bonrostro v. Spouses Luna
G.R. No. 172346, July 24, 2013
(rescission: contract to sell:improper)


FACTS:
Constancia Luna entered into a Contract to Sell with Bliss
Dev. Corp. over a house. A year after, constancia sold to Spouses
Bonrostro the house for the price of P1,250,000, payable on four (4)
installments. It was stipulated that should Spouses Bonrostro fail
to pay, the Contract to Sell shall be deemed cancelled and
rescinded and 5% of the total price shall be forfeited. After the
execution of the contract, Spouses Bonrostro took possession of the
property but failed to pay the three (3) other installments.
Constantia was compelled to pay to Bliss so that her Contract to
Sell would not be cancelled and she would not be liable for
interest.
Constancia then filed a Complaint for Rescission against
Spouses Bonrostro. The latter claimed that they made a tender of
payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not rescission is the proper remedy for failure
to pay the installments in a Contract to Sell real property. Whether
or not there was a valid tender of payment. Whether or not Spouses
Bonrostro should be liable for the interest paid by Constancia.

HELD:

NO, rescission is not the proper remedy.
In a Contract to Sell, payment of the price is a positive suspensive
condition. Failure of which is not a breach of contract warranting
rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, but rather just an event
that prevents the supposed seller from being bound to convey the title to
the supposed buyer.
Maceda law shall apply.
Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect. [To have
the effect of payment and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation
to pay, the law requires the companion acts of tender of payment and
consignation.
The mere intention to prevent the happening of the condition or
the mere placing of ineffective obstacles to its compliance, without
actually preventing fulfillment is not sufficient for the application of Art.
1186. Lourdes’ directive to Bliss not to receive provided no effective
obstacle.
 SPOUSES TUMIBAY vs. SPOUSES LOPEZ
G.R. No. 171692, June 3, 2013.
(rescission, titling of land despite non-completion f payment)


FACTS:
Spouses Tumibay are the owners of a parcel of land.
They issued a SPA in favor of Reynalda authorizing her to
sell the land. Reynalda sold the land to her daughter
Rowena. Rowena then deposits 22 monthly installments to
the account of Spouses Tumibay and was able to pay around
32% of the purchase price of P800,000.00.
However, despite the fact that the price has not yet
been paid in full, Reynalda, without the consent of Spouses
Tumibay, executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Rowena.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract may be
rescinded.

HELD:
YES, the Contract may be rescinded.
In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the
property until the buyer has paid the price in full. A buyer
who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of the property
prior to the full payment of the price is in breach of the
contract and the seller is entitled to rescission because the
breach is substantial and fundamental as it defeats the very
object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell.
Petitioners are entitled to moral damages and
attorney's fees while respondent Rowena is entitled to the
reimbursement of the monthly installments with legal
interest.
 Moldex Realty Inc. v. Flora Saberon
G.R. No. 176289, April 8, 2013
(lack of license to sell will not render void the contract to sell)


FACTS:
Flora Saberon reserved with Moldex a the lot in
Dasmarinas, as shown by a Reservation Application. The price if
payment is made on installment basis is P583,498.20 at monthly
amortizations of P8,140.97, payable in five years She opted to pay in
installments. For failure to pay, Moldex then sent Flora a Notarized
Notice of Cancellation of Reservation Application and/or Contract to Sell.
Flora filed a Complaint for the Annulment of the Contract to
Sell, Recovery of all her payments with interests, damages, and the
cancellation of Moldex's license to sell.
She imputed bad faith on the part of Moldex in bloating her
unpaid balance and when it sold the subject lot to her in April 1992
o even before it was issued a license to sell in September 1992.
Flora likewise claimed that Moldex failed to register the
contract to sell in the Registry of Deeds.
ISSUE: (a) Will the lack of a certificate of registration and
a license to sell result to the nullification of the contract to
sell? (b) How about the developer’s failure to register the
contract?

HELD:
NO. The lack of a certificate of registration and a license
to sell on the part of a subdivision developer does not result to
the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered
into with a buyer. The contract to sell remains valid and
subsisting.
The same is true with the developer’s failure to register
the contract to sell/document of conveyance with the Register
of Deeds, in violation of Section 17 of PD 957. The Contract to
Sell remains valid.
Flora is entitled to a 50% per cent refund pursuant to the
Maceda Law.
 Maceda Law

Section 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or financing of real
estate on installment payments, including residential condominium apartments but excluding
industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants under Republic Act Numbered
Thirty-eight Hundred Forty-four (3844), as amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty-three
Hundred Eighty-nine (6389), where the buyer has paid at least two years of installments, the
buyer is entitled to the following rights in case he defaults in the payment of succeeding
installments:

(a)To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments due within the total
grace period earned by him which is hereby fixed at the rate of one month grace period for
every one year of installment payments made: Provided, That this right shall be exercised by
the buyer only once in every five years of the life of the contract and its extensions, if any.

(b)If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender
value of the payments on the property equivalent to fifty per cent of the total payments made,
and, after five years of installments, an additional five per cent every year but not to exceed
ninety per cent of the total payments made: Provided, That the actual cancellation of the
contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation
or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of the
cash surrender value to the buyer.

Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be included in the

computation of the total number of installment payments made.
 First Optima Realty Corporation v. Securitron
Security Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015

FACTS:

(earnest money applies to a perfected sale)

Securitron looking to expand business, through its GM,

Antonio Eleazar, sent a letter to First Optima offering to purchase a
property. A series of telephone negotiations ensued between Eleazar
and First Optima’s employees. Eleazar also went to the office of First
Optima and offered to pay in cash but Young refused to accept it
saying she had to speak with her sister and get prior approval from
the Board of Directors. Eleazar agreed to wait.
Securitron then sent a letter, accompanied by a check in the
amount of P100,000. The check was deposited and credited to First
Optima. Securitron then demanded to proceed with the sale.
When First Optima refused, Securitron filed a complaint for
specific performance with damages. First Optima claimed that it did
not agree to sell the property. It happened that the P100,000 was
coursed through a mere clerk who was forced to accept it.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not there was a perfected
contract of sale between First Optima and Securitron.
(b) Whether or not the P100,000 constitutes an earnest
money.

HELD: (a) NO, there is no perfected contract of sale. (b) NO,
earnest money presupposes a perfected contract of sale.
Here, the parties never got past the negotiation stage.
Nothing shows that the parties had agreed on any final
arrangement containing the essential elements of a contract
of sale, namely (1) consent or the meeting of the minds;
(2) object or subject matter of the contract; and (3) the price or
consideration of the sale.
Earnest money applies to a perfected sale. Article
1482 states that “there must be first a perfected contract of
sale before we can speak of earnest money.”
TUAZON, vs. DEL ROSARIO-SUAREZ, ET Al.
G.R. No. 168325, December 13, 2010
(option contract v. right of first refusal)

FACTS:
Lourdes Q. del Rosario-Suarez was leasing her land to
Roberto D. Tuazon During the effectivity of the lease, Lourdes
sent a letter to Roberto where she offered to sell to the latter
subject parcel of land. She pegged the price at P37,541,000.00 and
gave him two years from January 2, 1995 to decide on the said
offer.
More than four months after the expiration of the Contract
of Lease, Lourdes sold subject parcel of land to her only child,
Catalina Suarez-de Leon, her son-in-law Wilfredo de Leon, and
her two grandsons, Miguel Luis S. de Leon and Rommel S. de
Leon (the de Leons), for a total consideration of only P2,750,000.00
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. TCT was thereafter
issued.
The de Leons filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer
against Roberto when he refused to vacate the sold property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter sent by
Lourdes to Roberto is an Option Contract or a
grant of right of first refusal.

HELD:
Option Contract is an agreement in writing to give a
person the 'option' to purchase lands within a given time at a
named price is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell.
In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made
determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would be
dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter
into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms,
including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up.
It is clear that in this case, the letter sent by Lourdes
embodies an option contract as it grants Roberto a fixed period of
only two years to buy the subject property at a price certain of
P37,541,000.00.
 OPTION CONTRACT

Art. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a
certain period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any time before
acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the option
is founded upon a consideration, as something paid or promised.

Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing

for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.

An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate

thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissory if the promise is
supported by a consideration distinct from the price.

It is clear from the provision of Article 1324 that there is a great

difference between the effect of an option which is without a
consideration from one which is founded upon a consideration. If the
option is without any consideration, the offeror may withdraw his offer
by communicating such withdrawal to the offeree at anytime before
acceptance; if it is founded upon a consideration, the offeror cannot
withdraw his offer before the lapse of the period agreed upon.
 

MORTGAGE
 Ruiz v. Dimailig
G.R. No. 204280, November 9, 2016
(Impostor must have succeeded in obtaining TCT in his name)

FACTS: Bernardo Dimailig was the registered owner
of a land, who entrusted the TCT to his brother Jovanie
who in turn gave it to a broker, for its intended sale.
In 1998, the land was mortgaged to Evelyn Ruiz
without the knowledge and consent of Bernardo. Thus,
Bernardo filed an action for the annulment of the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage. (REM) Evelyn claimed that
she was a mortgagee in good faith because Jovanie
assured her that the Bernardo owned the property and
the TCT is genuine. It turned out that the Deed of REM
was forged and Jovanie pretended to be Bernardo.
Issue: Whether or not Evelyn is a
mortgagee in good faith.

HELD: Evelyn is not a mortgagee in good faith.

First, the Deed of REM was established to be a forged

instrument, its nullity conveys no title.

Second, the TCT remained to be registered in the name of

Bernardo. It was not transferred to the impostor’s name when
Evelyn transacted with the latter.

Third, even if the impostor has caused the property to be

titled in his name, Evelyn would still not be deemed a mortgagee in
good faith because she did not take the necessary steps to determine
any defect in the title of the alleged owner. She ignored pertinent
facts that should have aroused her suspicion.
 Bucton v. Rural Bank of El Salvador, et al.
G.R. No. 179625, February 24, 2014
(mortgage executed by agent on his own name)

FACTS:
Nicanora Bucton is the owner of a house and lot.
Erlinda Concepcion borrowed it to show it to an
interested buyer. However, Erlinda mortgaged it with
the Rural Bank for a loan of P30,000.00. Erlinda failed to
pay the loan so the house and lot was foreclosed.
Bucton filed an action for annulment of
mortgage, foreclosure and SPA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bucton is liable on the litigated
mortgage when she did not execute either in person or
by attorney-in-fact the subject mortgage.


HELD:
NO, Bucton cannot be held liable under the
mortgage.
In order to bind the principal by a deed executed by
an agent, the deed must upon its face purport to be made,
signed and sealed in the name of the principal. The mere
fact that the agent was authorized to mortgage the property
is not sufficient to bind the principal, unless the deed was
executed and signed by the agent “for and on behalf of his
principal.”
The REM is void and unenforceable against Bucton
 
MUTUUM
 Bankard v. Alarte
G.R. No. 202573, April 19, 2017
(three contracts in a credit card transaction)

FACTS: Petitioner Bankard, a credit card provider, extended
credit accommodations to its member cardholders for the
purchase of goods and services.

ISSUE: What is the nature of a credit card transactions?

HELD: Credit card transactions are simple loan

arrangements between the card issuer and the card holder. It
actually involves three (3) contracts (a) the sales contract
between the credit card holder and the merchant; (b) the
loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit
card holder; and (c) the promise to pay between the credit
card issuer and the merchant
 THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v.
ANA GARCE ROSALES AND YO YUK TO
G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014
(bank deposits must be returned upon demand)

FACTS:
In 2000,Rosales and Yo Yuk To opened a Joint Peso
Account with Metrobank, Pritil Branch. In May 2002, Rosales
accompanied Liu Chiu Fang, a Taiwanese, in opneing an account
with Metrobank, Escolta Branch. InMarch 2003, Rosales and Yo
Tuk To opened a Jint Dollar Account with Metrobank, Pritil
Branch.
In July 2003, Metrobank issued a “Hold-out Order” against
Rosales and Yo Yuk To’s account. A case of Estafa was filed
against respondent Rosales and an unidentified woman for
unauthorized and fraudulent withdrawal of US$75,000 from Liu
Chiu Fang’s Account.
Rosales and Yo Yuk To filed a complaint for Breach of
Obligation and Contract with Damages.
ISSUE: Whether Metrobank committed a
breach of contract and is liable for damages.

HELD:
YES, Metrobank committed breach of contract and is
liable for damages.
Bank deposits are in the nature of a simple loan or
mutuum and therefore must be paid upon demand by the
depositor.
Also, the “Hold-out” clause in the Application and
Agreement for Deposit Account applies only if there is a valid
and existing obligation arising from any of the sources of
obligation enumerated under Article 1157 of the Civil Code,
such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delict and quasi-delict.
In this case, even the criminal case has not yet even been filed
in court.
 
QUASI-DELICT
 Greenstar Express, Inc. et al. v. Universal Robina
Corporation, et al.,
G.R. No. 205090, October 17, 2016
(vehicle owner not liable for accident involving driver not performing work)

FACTS: Petitioner Greenstar is engaged in public transportation
while Fruto Sayson is one of its drivers. Respondents were
Universal Robina Corporation (Robina), the registered owner of a
Mitsubishi Van, and its subsidiary Nissin URC (Nissin URC), the
employer of Renante Bicomong.
On February 25, 2003, a declared national holiday, the bus
owned by Greenstar and driven by Fruto collided with Robina’s
Mitsubishi van then driven by Bicomong. Bicomong died on the
spot while both vehicles suffered damage.
Greenstar filed a complaint for damages against Robina
and Nissin URC. They claimed that Bicomong was negligent and
therefore his employer should be held liable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Robina and Nissin URC are
liable for the negligence of their driver Bicomong.

HELD:

When by evidence the ownership of the Mitsubishi Van and
Bicomong’ employment were proved, the presumption of
negligence on the part of Robina, et al. attaches as the registered
owner and as an employer. The burden to prove absence of liability
rests on Robina, et al. This, Robina et al., may do so by proving:
1) That they have no employment relationship with
Bicomong; 2) That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned
task; 3) That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of Bicomong.
Robina et al. succeeded as it was proved that (a) Bicomong
was not in the performance of his work but on his way home to
spend holiday with his family, (b) that the Mitsubishi Van does not
belong to his employer Nissin URC but to Robina; and (3) the
vehicle was not assigned to him but to another driver.
 
DAMAGES
 Darines v. Quinoñes
G.R. No. 206468, August 2, 2017
(breach of contract of carriage, when entitled to moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees)


FACTS:
Judith Darines and her daughter Joyce boarded
Amianan Bus Line driven by Rolando Quitan and
operated by Eduardo Quiñones. It crashed into a truck
parked on the shoulder of Kennon Road. As a result
both vehicles were damages and two passengers of the
bus died. Judith and Joyce were injured.
They filed a complaint for breach of contract of
carriage and damages. The CA deleted the award for
moral and exemplary damages given by the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judith and Joyce
were entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.

HELD:
NO, they are not entitled.
In an action for breach of contract of carriage,
moral damages may be recovered only when (a) death
of a passenger results; or (b) the carrier was guilty of
fraud and bad faith even if death does not result.
Neither of these circumstances were present.
Since no moral damages was awarded, there is
no basis for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
(see Articles 1764, 2206 and 2220 of the Civil Code)
Spouses Estrada et al. v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Inc.
G.R. No. 203902, July 19, 2017
(amputation of arm, still no moral damages; only temperate damages)


FACTS:
Spouses Dionisio and Jovita Estrada boarded a
Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Eduardo Saylan.
Eduardo was tailgating a jeepney ahead of him when it
suddenly stopping prompting him to swerve to the
other lane and collide with an Isuzu truck. As a result,
Dionisio’s arm was amputated. The RTC awarded
moral damages, in addition to actual damages ,
attorney’s fees and the cost of suit. The CA deleted the
award of moral damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUES: (a) Whether or not Dionisio is entitled to moral damages.
(b) Should Dionisio be compensated for loss of earning capacity
because of the amputation of arm? (c) Should he be entitled to some
other form of damages?

HELD:

NO, Dionisio is not entitled to moral damages.
NO, Dionisio is not entitled to loss of earning capacity
because it is in the nature of actual damages for which
proof must be presented. No proof was presented. YES,
Dionisio is entitled to temperate or moderate damages.
Article 2224 states that “temperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, form the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.”
 People v. Villar,
G.R. No. 202708, April 13, 2015
(loss of earning capacity)

FACTS:
Victoriano Villar was convicted for the murder
of Jesus Ylarde. Damages, including loss of earning
capacity was awarded to Jesus’ heirs. The widow
testified that Jesus has a net income of P16,000.00 a year
as farmer, sari -sari store owner, driver and operator of
two (2) tricyles and a caretaker of Hacienda Bancod.
Following the computation “2/3 x (80-49) = life
expectancy of 20 years multiplied by the annual net
income of P16,000.00, the heirs were awarded
P320,000.00
ISSUE: Whether or not the computation of the
award for loss of earning capacity is correct.
HELD: 
The computation is wrong because “the formula that has
gained acceptance overtime has limited recovery to “net earning
capacity” meaning LESS THE NECESSARY EXPENSE FOR HIS OWN
LIVING.”

Here, the computation for lost income of P16,000.00 did not

take into account the deceased’s necessary expenses.

Loss of earning capacity is in the form of actual damages, as

such it must be proved by competent proof, not merely by the self-
serving testimony of the widow. EXCEPT:

(1) The victim was self-employed and receiving less than the minimum
wage under the current laws and no documentary evidence is
available in the deceased’s line of business; and
(2) The deceased was employed as a daily wage worker and receiving
less than the minimum wage
 
INTEREST
IBM Phil. Inc. V. Prime Systems Plus Inc.,
G.R. No. 203192, August 15, 2016

(absence of clear stipulation on the interest of 3% per month)

FACTS:
IBM entered into an agreement with Prime for the former
(IBM) to deliver 45 automated teller machines (ATMs) and several
computer hardware to the latter’s (Prime’s) customers for the total
price of around P24 Million.
In 202, IBM filed a complaint for sum of money in the
amount of around P45 million in view of Prime’s failure to pay the
purchase price for the ATMs with 3% per cent monthly interest.
The RTC ordered Prime to pay there being insufficient
proof of payment and it was found out that the checks were all
dishonored.
The CA partly granted Prime’s appeal but the CA found
that there was no showing that the parties actually agreed on the
3% per cent monthly interest for invoices which remained unpaid
30 days from its delivery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBM’s
imposition of 3% monthly interest for
delayed payment is proper.
HELD: 
No. IBM’s imposition of 3% monthly interest for delayed
payment is improper.
For interest to become due and demandable, two (2)
requisites must be present:
(1) there must be an express stipulation for the payment
of interest; and
(2) the agreement to pay interest is reduced in writing.
Here, there was no express agreement as Prime only
requested for a lower interest and did not assent to the letter
imposing the 3%. That Prime still ordered for ATMs despite
receipt of the letter imposing 3% interest doe not imply assent
to such interest. Agreement ought to be express and in writing.
Since there is no clear rate, the legal rate 6% annual interest
shall apply.
 Spouses Silos v. PNB
G.R. No. 181045, July 2, 2014
(modification of contract as to interest rate, needs consent)

FACTS: 
Spouses Silos , to secure a revolving credit line, constituted a
Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over their two lots. They
executed promissory notes and Credit Agreement. The loan
was subject to 19.5% interest.
The Credit Agreement however contained a
stipulation that “the borrower agrees that the bank may
modify the interest rate in the loan depending on whatever
policy the Bank may adopt in the future, etc.”
The Promissory Notes contained a stipulation
granting PNB the right to increase or reduce interest rate
“within the limits allowed by law or by the Monetary Board.”
The REM agreement provided the same right to increase or
reduce interest “at any time depending on whatever policy
PNB may adopt in the future.”
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB is entitled to any
interest except the legal rate from the time of
demand.

HELD:
Any modification in the contract, such as the interest
rate must be made with the consent of the contracting
parties. The rate of interest is a principal condition in a
contract of loan if not the most important component. Article
1956 of the Civil Code provides that no interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
Spouses Silos’ assent to the increases cannot be
implied from their lack of response to the letter sent by PNB
informing them to the increases. NO ONE RECEIVING A
PROPOSAL TO CHANGE A CONTRACT IS OBLIGED TO
ANSWER THE PROPOSAL. Legal rate applies.
 
COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
 Sonley v. Anchor Savings Bank/Equicom Savings Bank,
G.R. No. 205623, august 10, 2016
(remedies in case of breach of a compromise agreement)

FACTS:

Conchita Sonley entered into a Contract to Sell with
Anchor for the purchase of the a foreclosed property. Sonley
defaulted hence Anchor rescinded the Contract. Sonley filed
an action for the court to declare the rescission as null and
void. They however entered into a Compromise Agreement.
The court rendered a Judgment based on the
Compomise Agreement whereby it was agreed that Sonley
would repurchase the property form Anchor. Sonley again
defaulted prompting Anchor to move for execution. It prayed
that (a) the Compromise Agreement be rescinded; (b) it be
allowed to apply the payments as rentals; and (c) Sonley be
evicted form the property.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the trial court has the power to issue a
writ of execution although it was not provided in the Judgment
based on Compromise Agreement. (b) Whether or not there is still a
need to file an action for rescission.


HELD: (a) YES, the trial court has the power to issue a writ
of execution. (b) NO, there is no need to file a separate action
for rescission.
A compromise agreement is the law between the
parties. Its purpose is to put an end to a litigation because of
the uncertainty that may arise from it. Once the compromise
is perfected, the parties are bound to abide by it in good
faith. Should a party fail or refuse to comply with the terms,
the other party could either enforce the compromise by a
WRIT OF EXECUTION or regard it as RESCINDED and so
insist upon his or her original demand.
 Cathay Land, Inc. et al. v. Ayala Land, Inc.
G.R. No. 210209, August 9, 2017
(injunction not provided for under the compromise, execution premature)

FACTS: 
Cathay filed a Complaint for easement of right of way against
Ayala, claiming it denied passage to its personnel. Before trial ensued,
parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Ayala granted easement of right of way in favor of Cathay,
subject to faithful compliance with its undertaking under the
Compromise, such as not to develop “high-rise buildings.”
It was further agreed that Ayala has the right “to withdraw or
suspend the grant of easement of right of way” from Cathay if it “would
fail to rectify its breach within a period of 30 days from receipt of a
notice.” Such right may be enforced by writ of execution, according to
the Compromise.
The Compromise was approved in 2003.
In 2005, Ayala noticed from Cathay’s flyers that it intend to
construct high rise building. Ayala made verbal and written demand to
Cathay to abide with the Compromise.
In 2008, Ayala filed a Motion for Execution with Prayer for
Injunction and TRO.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of execution is void for
giving the Sheriff unbriddled authority to halt any of
Cathay’s construction project which in his personal view
constitutes a high-rise structure.

HELD:
Courts cannot modify, impose terms different from
the term of the agreement or set aside the compromise and
reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties
without gravely abusing their discretion.
Under the Compromise, the remedies of Ayala is first
to notify Cathay of the breach and second to withdraw or
suspend the easement if Cathay failed to rectify such breach
within 30 days.
Ayala has no right to seek injuctive relief.
Ayala also prematurely moved for the execution.
 

Thank you!
 

BREACH OF
PROMISE TO MARRY
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs.COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960
Facts: (WOMAN 10 YEARS OLDER)

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since
1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School
in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than
she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951,
she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the
City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since. One evening in 1953, when after coming from the
movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family
way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our
laws, for breach of promise to marry?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that seduction does not
exist in the present case thus the petitioner is not morally guilty
of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years
of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot,
but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award
of damages.
 BEATRIZ GALANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No.L-17248, January 29, 1962
Facts: (WOMAN BROUGHT TO BAGUIO WHERE SUPPOSED GROOM AND
BRIDE LIVED AS HUSBAND AND WIFE)


Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged,
albeit Rodrigo's mother was opposed to their marriage. On April 15, 1955,
Rodrigo and his father went to her house and her marriage with Rodrigo were
arranged, with the concurrence of her mother. They agreed to have the
marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee,
Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado
Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took them to the
house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and
Rodrigo would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their
lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in
Baguio and to act as their sponsor. After making these arrangements
Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house
where they lived as husband and wife until May 9. In May 9, on the pretext
that he going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left
Colorado Falls and never returned.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are

liable for damages due to the alleged breach of promise
to marry?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the

Court of Appeals for the reason that mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. In the
light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making
body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry, the award of moral damages made by the Court
of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.
 GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. CA
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993

Facts: 
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated
October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach
of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan
where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to
Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then
forced the respondent to live with him in his apartment. Marilou was a
virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even
tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged
her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner
administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told
Marilou to not live with him since he is already married to someone in
Bacolod.
ISSUE:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to
cause for damages.

RULING:

The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses his
promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the
woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s
deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue
and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise
to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the
woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding
preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts
in disregard of the laws of the country.
 WASSMER vs. VELEZ
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
FACTS: (RUN AWAY GROOM)

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the
big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother
opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent
her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is
returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor
was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez
filed no answer and was declared in default.
ISSUE:

Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

RULING:

Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage."
 NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC
G.R. No. 143130, July 10, 2000
FACTS: (REFUSAL TO MARRY BECAUSE OF MISCARRIAGE)


Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up
together in Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective
parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day,
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get
the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for
employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there.
Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once inside, started
kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the
loss of her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant
sometime in June 1992. Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage.
True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his parents, accompanied by
several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and asked
her parents for the hand of their daughter.
When Elsa had a miscarriage, Ronald decided not to marry her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.

RULING: 
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction
was employed by Ronald, much less by his parents. Form the
narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two
became lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also,
the moral seduction contemplated by the Code Commission in
drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is
in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We
fail to see any of these circumstances in this case.
In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans
were in fact arranged between the families of the parties. That their
relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's
miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This
is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.
 ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 181995, July 16, 2012
FACTS: (RETIRING AFTER TRAINING)

Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL) as a commercial pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited
First Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting
program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts.
Subsequently, PAL posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the
new aircrafts. Elegir was one of those awarded with the opportunity.
Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle,
Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary
training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new aircraft. He
completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996
after rendering 25 years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service,
the petitioner applied for an optional retirement authorized under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline
Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP).
ISSUE:

Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from


Elegir’s retirement pay the amount unrecovered from his training.

RULING:

PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of

the New Civil Code, they had the right to demand payment since Elegir
will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of PAL. Unjustly enriching is
unduly profiting one’s self on something which does not meritoriously
belong to him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, “Nemo cum
alterius detrimento locupletari potest.” Elgir has the right to retire since he
has reached a certain number of flight hours which is considered a long
stay in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his subsequent training
sponsored by PAL was put to waste when he decides to have an early
retirement from PAL after his training. It would be unfair for PAL if Elegir
has gained new skills for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL
has still not even recovered the cost of training.
 CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000
Facts: (TAMANG HINALA SI KUYA)


Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are
living in an apartment being leased to them by Florence “Bing” Concepcion,
who also resides in the same compound where the apartment was located.
Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and
private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a
cash or credit basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the
condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit
earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.
Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the
brother of the deceased husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latter’s
apartment and accusing him of having adulterous relationship with Bing.
Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigo’s sick
mother, in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Bing.
 As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and
shame to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also
ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so


much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To make matters
worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the
doubt of fidelity and frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed
her desire to leave her husband. Nestor was forced to demand from
Rodrigo damages and a public apology.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nestor’s right to privacy had been shattered by
Rodrigo and is Nestor entitled to damages.

RULING:
The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the
defendant claims that there was neither violation done that was enlisted
under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which constitute libel,
slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying into the
privacy of another’s residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was
form of that manner.
 “The Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human
personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for

human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of
the culture and civilization of every county, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from
being unjustly humiliated, in short if human personality is not
exalted then the laws are indeed defective, thus, under this
article, the right of persons are amply protected, and damages
are provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind. There is no question that Nestor
suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and social humiliation as a proximate result of
petitioner’s abusive, scandalous, and insulting language. Nestor,
therefore is entitled to damages.”
 
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
 VENUE: Navarro v. Judge Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996.

 Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while
it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
 Republic vs. Dayot
G.R. 175581, May 28, 2008.

• The principle “he who comes to court must come with
clean hands” does not apply to marriages.

• “In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth

the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied
relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot
thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced
invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law.”
 Montañez vs. Cipriano
G.R. No.181089, October 22, 2012.

 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
 
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
 
 Marriage Certificate is not among the essential or
formal requisites of marriage.

 It is the best proof of marriage between a man and a

woman.
 Pugeda v. Trias,
G.R. No. L-16925, March 31, 1962
4 SCRA 849

 Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant
evidence. "Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage,
or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to
be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to
testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals

 “Although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may
be presented to prove marriage."
 
FOREIGN DIVORCE
 ART. 26 Foreign Divorce

• Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

• Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
 GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A.
RECIO
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001


 In 1987, X, a Filipino, married Y, an Australian.
In 1989, a decree of divorce was issued. In 1992,
X became and Australian citizen.In 1994, X
married Z, a Filipina.

 Z filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity on the

ground that her marriage to X is bigamous.
 
 If the previous marriage has already been dissolved by
a valid divorce then the second marriage need not be
nullified on the ground of nullity as the party to the
second marriage may indeed have the capacity to
remarry.
 To be recognized, what must be proved?
 How to prove?
 Remand case to receive evidence as to the Australian
law, X being a naturalized Australian already
 CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

 X and Y got married in 1973. X had an illicit affair thus,
Y filed a petition for legal separation.
 X then left for the U.S. where he divorced Y.
 X then took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his
American wife and never remarried.
 Ruling:

A divorce 
obtained by Filipino
citizens after the effectivity of the Civil
Code is not recognized in this
jurisdiction as it is contrary to State
policy. While X is already an American
citizen, as regards Y who has
apparently remained a Filipino citizen,
the divorce has no legal effect.
 TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCAÑO
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965

 T married E in 1948 in Cebu City.
 E left for the U.S.
 In 1950, E obtained a divorce decree against T.
 In 1954, E married R, an American
 In 1958, she acquired American citizenship
 RULING:


The valid marriage between T and E
remained subsisting and undissolved
under Philippine Law, notwithstanding
the decree of absolute divorce that E
sought in and obtained in the U.S. At the
time the divorce decree was issued, E
like her husband T, was still a Filipino
citizen. 4 She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines
 Llorente v. Court of Appeals and Lorente
GR 124371, November 23, 2000

L was a U.S. enlisted serviceman and a naturalized
American citizen.
In 1937, L married P. Thereafter, L left for the U.S.
Upon L’s return, P was already having an illicit
relation with his brother.
L returned to the U.S. and divorced P.
In 1958, L married A in Manila.
During the probate of his will, L moved that A be
appointed the Special Administratix
The fact that the late L became an American
citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his

divorce from P; (2) marriage to A; (3) execution
of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these
incidents are necessarily governed by foreign
law.
The divorce obtained by L from his first wife P
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity.
 Republic v. Orbecido III
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005.

 The intent of the second paragraph, according to Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985.


• The Supreme Court held that an alien spouse may no
longer be considered the husband of the Filipino spouse
by reason of the divorce he obtained abroad and as such,
he has no more standing to sue as a husband entitled to
exercise control over the conjugal assets. The Supreme
Court held that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law.”
 Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

 The Supreme Court ruled that the alien spouse who
divorced his Filipino wife could no longer commence a
prosecution for the crime of adultery against the latter
as he was no longer considered her husband. Again, the
Supreme Court ruled that the divorce obtained by the
alien spouse may be recognized in the Philippines.
 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010.

• A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in the Philippines provided such decree is
valid according to his or her national law.

• In short, the divorce decree and the governing

personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national
law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law and evidence.
 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

• The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.

• Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
 Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013.

• “Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations.”
 Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013.

• If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part
of the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."

• Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right

becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis
for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry.
Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules Of
Civil Procedure

SECTION 48. Effect of Foreign Judgments or Final Orders. — The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the

judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment

or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by

evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
 Section 3, paragraph (n), Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence

 Disputable Presumption

 “A court, or judge acting as such, whether in the

Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction.”
 Mijares v. Ranada
495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005)

• A petition for recognition of foreign divorce does not
require the courts to litigate the case anew. It does
not have to look on the merits of the divorce. What is
imperative is only that that there must be proof of the
divorce decree and the foreign law.

• “If every judgment of a foreign court were

reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation.”
 
Various Procedural
Vehicles
 Republic v. Orbecido III,
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

A petition for authority to remarry was treated by the
Supreme Court as a petition for declaratory relief.
 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010.


• The Supreme Court recognized the propriety of filing a petition
for recognition of foreign divorce but held that it does not
automatically authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry.

• There is no need to file two (2) separate proceedings, one for

recognition of foreign divorce and another for cancellation of
entry under Rule 108.

• It held that the recognition of the foreign divorce decree maybe

made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceeding is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact.
 Fujiki v. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

 Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
 
Psychological Incapacity
 Art. 36 Psychological
Incapacity

 ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
268 SCRA 198 (1998)


1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favour of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:

(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the

celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment or prior
thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex.

5) 
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68

up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Article 220, 221, and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of

the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given respect by our courts.

8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be
 Santos v. Court of Appeals
240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995

 (a) gravity,
 (b) incurability; and
 (c) juridical antecedence.
*The phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.


* It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support.

*The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most

serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
 
LIBERAL
APPLICATION
 Kalaw v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

 “Courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties.”
 Ngo Te v. Yu Te
G.R. No. 161793, Feb. 13, 2009

 The resiliency with which the concept should be
applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by
the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,
• Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.

Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

• The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the
parties and/or fabrication of evidence.

• The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of

cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence
and incestuous rape. (Ngo Te v. Yu Te)
 Ting v. Velez-Ting
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009
Supreme Court did not abandon Molina in Ngo Te v. Yu Te, it simply


suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements.

“To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular

root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the
verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have
proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to
justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where
these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary
to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The
need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.”

(Explanation of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the

rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
 Marcos v. Marcos
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA
755

• There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity.

• Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert

opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.

• Such psychological incapacity, however, must be

established by the totality of the evidence presented
during the trial.
 
STRICT APPLICATION
 Viñas v. Viñas
G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015

Since the respondent was not interviewed, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing evidence to
prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of
the former’s condition.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant

to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to
the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity,
but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from
complying with what the law requires.
 Malililin v. Jamesolamin
G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015

• Petitioner failed to prove that her disposition of not
cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the
clothes, and propensity for dating and receiving different
male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable
within the parameters of jurisprudence on psychological
incapacity.

• The alleged failure of respondent to assume her duties as

a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to
the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the
nullification of the parties' marriage.
 Republic v. De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014


Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to
assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological
incapacity that would justify the nullification of the
parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or
medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be
reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
 Republic v. Encelan
G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013

• In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation.

• To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be

shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.
 Suazo v. Suazo
G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010

• One-sided story of petitioner not given so much
probative value as to respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

• Given the source of the information upon which the

psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate
the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and
with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and
incurable.
 Baccay v. Baccay
G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010

Mere refusal 
is not psychological
incapacity.

Psychological incapacity must be more

than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a
"neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. An unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void
marriage.
 Bier v. Bier
G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547
SCRA 123, 135.

 Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor — an
adverse integral element in the respondent's personality
structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with his essential marital obligations — had to be shown.
 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Section 2
Who may file?

• SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. (n)
 Rationale
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for

annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs
have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
•
 Juliano-Llave v. Republic
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011

• While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party
who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that
in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and
cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription,
which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to
the marriage.
• Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he
and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
 Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

 The ruling in Ninal Case as to prescription does not
hold true anymore.
 MALLION v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006

• A previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity bars a subsequent petition for declaration
of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.

• Having expressly and impliedly conceded the

validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is
now deemed to have waived any defects therein
 De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro
545 SCRA 162 (2/13/2008)

 A lower court can declare a marriage void in a case
for support even without prior judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage filed in separate action
considering the determination of the issue of
marriage is important in the resolution of the right
of the child to support.
 Mercado v. Tan
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000.

 Chief Justice

Artemio V. Panganiban, with the
concurrence of the majority, categorically declared that
“a judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty
of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier
union is characterized by statute as "void."
 People v. Odtuhan,
G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013.

• The Family Code has settled once and for all
the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
ARTICLE 41. A marriage contracted by any

person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
 The only legalized
“bigamous” marriage.
The only marriage that
may be terminated extra-
judicially.
 Note: after issuance of the judicial
declaration of presumptive death

 Liquidate, otherwise complete separation of property
will apply
For purposes of opening
succession

 10 years under Article 390 of the Civil Code
 If he disappeared after 75 years old, 5 years
 When there is risk of death, 4 years (Article 391 of the
Civil Code)
 If still alive, entitled to the balance of his estate minus
debts through motion
 Republic v. Cantor
G.R. No. 184621, December 10, 2013

Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and
degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the
following reasons:


• (1) the respondent did not actively look for her missing
husband.

• (2) she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she
seek the aid of the authorities to look for him;
•
(3) she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to
locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly
made inquiries, were not even named;

• (4) there was no other corroborative evidence to support the

respondents claim that she conducted a diligent search
(Republic v. Cantor)
 
• Courts judgment in the judicial proceedings for
declaration of presumptive death is final and
executory, hence, unappealable.

• Certiorari is the remedy (Republic v. Cantor)

The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief


The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded
belief.“

It depends upon the circumstances of each particular

case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-
case basis. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
 Republic v. Court of Appeals
513 Phil. 391, 397-398(2005)

• The belief of the present spouse must be the result of
proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends
upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse
 Republic v. Granada
G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012

 The Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove
her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the petition.
 In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother
had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the
absent spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did
not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass
media.
 Republic v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993

In Nolasco, the

present spouse filed a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been
missing for more than four years. He testified that his
efforts to find her consisted of:
• (1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in
England;
• (2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him;
and
• (3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her
whereabouts, which all proved fruitless
The Court ruled that the present spouse’s

investigations were too sketchy to form a
basis that his wife was already dead and
ruled that the pieces of evidence only
proved that his wife had chosen not to
communicate with their common
acquaintances, and not that she was dead .
 Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit

• As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention
that the strict standard required in petitions for declaration
of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the
lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this
Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of
marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of
the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this
situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of
the strict standard this Court requires in cases under
Article 41 of the Family Code.
THE END
