LLAW 11B 180100 

Agravante, Ariane 
Digest on Fisher vs. Robb: G.R. No. 46274 Nov. 2 1939 
Facts of the Case 
As per request of The Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc.’s board of directors, 
the defendant-appellant John C. Robb, an organizer of the said enterprise, went to 
Shanghai for a business trip to study dog racing course operations on September, 
1935. He stayed at the American Club where he met plaintiff-appellee and dog 
racing course manager A.O. Fisher, who became interested in becoming a 
stockholder for Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc. and asked Robb if he could be 
one, which was agreed upon by the defendant-appellant. The plaintiff then sent 
P3,000 to Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc. as payment for the first installment of 
his subscription. Several months after, the board of directors called for payment of 
the second subscription installment. The defendant then called Fisher and P2,000 
was paid. Unfortunately, the enterprise fell flat and was then replaced by The 
Philippine Racing Club during Robb’s absence. To save the investments under the 
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., he transferred the remaining assets to the 
Philippine Racing Club, and out of moral responsibility, he wrote a letter to Fisher 
about the critical condition of the enterprise., and told him of his plans to save the 
stockholders’ paid installments. As a reply, Fisher then wrote a letter requiring 
Robb to reimburse the entire amount paid by him. The defendant-appellant then 
answered him for any loss which he might have suffered, and that he and Mr. 
Hilscher would receive the amounts from the second installment as soon as 
possible, even if it meant coming from their own personal funds. 
Issue 
The main issue is if there was sufficient consideration to justify the promises 
of the defendant-appellant in his letters from Exhibits B and C, wherein he states 
that he personally intends to reimburse the stockholders including Fisher of their 
second installments as he feels morally responsible. 
Decision  
The Supreme Court decided that the promises made by the 
defendant-appellant were insufficient because there was no consent from the 
plaintiff-appellee regarding the reimbursement promise of the defendant-appellant 
amidst moral responsibility, and according to the Articles 1254, 1261, and 1275 of 
the Civil Code, a contract exists when one or more persons consent to be bound 
with respect to another or others to deliver something or render service/s, but the 
contract is insufficient if there is no consent of the contracting parties and 
consideration for the established obligation, even if there is moral obligation by the 
defendant-appellant and contracts without consideration or with an illicit one have 
no effect and are not allowed. The appealed judgement was then reversed and 
costs to the plaintiff-appellee.