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Macroeconomic Scenario 5
* “Guidance to banks on non-performing loans (March 2017)” by ECB, par. 1.2, pag.6 “Scope of this Guidance”and par. 5.1, pag. 47 “Purpose and Overview”
PwC | 5
Thanks to the support deriving from Chart 1: EU main economic drivers
macroeconomic policies, robust job
creation and gradual improvement in 2016 2017F 2018F
world trade, completing four years of
moderate but steady GDP growth, the
economic expansion of the European 8.5 8.0
Union has continued during 2017. 7.7
-4
Current account surplus in Italy is Chart 3: Total investments volume trend
foreseen to be 1.9% in 2017, equal to
the average for European Member
States, but then 1.7% in 2018. Net
exports are expected to marginally
reduce real GDP growth, which,
together with higher prices for 3.6% 3.6% 3.3%
2.7% 2.6%
imported energy, would cause the
gradual drop in the forecasted current 2.9% 2.7% 3.2%
account surplus. 1.6%
-1.5%
Taking into considerations favourable -2.3%
financing conditions and investment
policies efforts, the total investments -6.6
volume trend for Italy is set to
increase by 2.7% in 2017 and 3.3% in 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F
2018, therefore filling the gap with
the EU levels. Italy EU
PwC | 7
Italian Real
Estate Market
Key Message: In H1 2017, the Italian Real Estate
market registered a 3.1% growth compared to
2016, mainly driven by transactions related to
residential assets. Rome and Milan continue
to be the main city markets, representing ca.
49% of total transactions. Investments in Real
Estate reached €5.7 bn in H1 2017, with offices
continuing to represent the major asset class for
investment.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q2 H1 Delta (%)
Asset type Q1 2017 H1 2017
2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2016 H1 16-17
Residential 115.194 143.298 123.476 146.896 121.976 145.529 258.493 267.505 3,5%
Office 2.025 2.413 2.510 3.000 2.362 2.486 4.437 4.846 9,2%
Retail 6.776 7.598 7.188 9.024 6.215 7.176 14.374 13.393 -6,8%
Industrial 2.121 2.897 2.565 3.704 2.328 2.996 5.018 5.325 6,1%
Total 126.116 156.206 135.738 162.624 132.881 158.187 282.322 291.069 3.1%
Appurtenances2 87.554 110.015 94.007 119.427 85.291 101.566 197.569 186.857 -5.4%
Other 3
30.828 38.687 35.719 44.090 12.663 14.464 69.515 27.127 -61.0%
PwC | 9
Table 3: Residential NTN by geographic area
35%
13% €5.7 bn
13%
21%
Source: PwC publication “Real Estate Market Overview – Italy 2017”
*”Other” includes banks, public administration and sovereign funds
PwC | 11
Legal and
regulatory
framework NPL Guidance: The ECB publication of Guidance
on non-performing loans in March 2017 has
update
created a supervisory pressure on banks to
redefine their NPL strategies and operating
model respectively.
New
In this view, the Supervisor puts a pressure on banks to Provisions
redefine their strategies and revise respective operating
models, taking into consideration the principle of
proportionality. In 2017, many banks have shown Respective Prudential
Art. 3 CRR
progress and submitted their strategies, including the Exp. Losses provisioning
reduction plans, with the objective to increase their shortfall backstop
recovery performance and to comply with supervisory
expectations. Some banks, however, still need to improve. Existing
Provisions
ECB continues to closely monitor the progress of NPL
strategic plans, by reviewing the bank’s capability to
intervene in all phases of the NPL life cycle and through
implementation of best market practices. Own funds deductions
Supervisory
(incl. those on banks’ own
demand
initiative)
NPL Operational Model – Key drivers to maximize the NPL Value Chain
Performing
Past Due UTP Bad Loans
Loans
“Triggers” to remain
Review of rules to enter, remain and exit NPL category
in the NPL category
PwC | 13
Banks should report on the compliance with the prudential The Guidelines are consistent with the Guidance
provisioning backstop at least annually and explain published by ECB
deviations to the supervisor.
Less Significant Institutions (LSI) are requested to evaluate
The deviations are acceptable if a bank can demonstrate the adequacy of their organizational structure with respect
that: to given recommendations. Any deviations should be
• the calibration of the prudential provisioning backstop justified upon request of the Supervisory Authority.
is not justified for a specific portfolio/exposure; Banks are expected to have a formalized strategy, defining
• the application of the backstop is not reasonable in the NPL management plan and its integration within the
justified circumstances. bank, comprehensive governance and conflict of interest
management framework and rules of conduct.
The guidelines provide some clear indication to banks
Potential impacts of the Addendum concerning strategies, governance and especially on rules
• Large P&L impact for banks, in terms of provisioning of conduct to be followed.
an amount equivalent to 100% of NPL value
• Facilitation of disposal operations 1 2 3
• Acceleration of recoveries
Rules of
Strategy Governance
Conduct
Potential reduction of the «pricing gap» between
the market and book value of loans • Affordability assessment
Forbearance • Identification of forbearance options
• Monitoring of measures applied
Conclusions
Supervision authorities are monitoring progress on NPL • Indicators to classify loans at default
Loans
reduction, provisioning and developments and on the • Criterias of foreborne exposures
classification • Treatment of group of connected clients
execution of NPL strategies and revisions of operating
models. Impairments • Definition of criterias for impairments
and write offs • Timely write offs of unrecoverable values
Valuation of • Control of independent experts
immovable • Control of property and guarantee value
property at least on an annual basis
• Availability of database to manage the
NPL database NPL data
• Verification of NPL status
“The management strategy of NPL has to be fully integrated in strategic and corporate
management procedures, such as the ones referring to industrial/budget planning, RAF, ICAAP,
recovery plans, and intermediary’s remuneration and incentive policies” Linee Guida per le banche
Less Significant italiane in materia di gestione di crediti deteriorati, Bank of Italy
PwC | 15
Asset Quality
Chart 6 shows that total NPL registered a reduction in the Chart 7 illustrates that net Bad Loans reduced to €71
last year and a half. After reaching its maximum at YE 2015 bn (€87 bn at YE 2016). The Bad Loans’ Net NPL ratio
(€341 bn), the stock reduced to €300 bn in H1 2017. followed the same trend and declined to 4.7%
(5.6% at YE 2016).
Gross bad loans dropped by €10 bn in the last six months
(from €200 bn to €190 bn) while Unlikely to Pay and Past
Due declined reaching €104 bn (from €117 bn at YE 2016)
and €6 bn (from €7 bn at YE 2016).
Amount includes:
• 17.7 bn Unicredit
• 16.8 bn Veneto Banca and Pop. Vicenza
Total NPE (€bn) Gross NPL / Loans to Customers (%) Gross Bad Loans / Loans to Customers (%) • 28 bn MPS
Bad Loans (€ bn) Unlikely to Pay (€ bn) Past Due (€ bn) CAGR
: -8% This column illustrates the projection as at 31
December 2017 of the total NPL volume after
including only NPL outflows incurring from Q3
341 324 2017 onwards (€50 bn). The detail for the market
326 300 transactions is displayed in the last column (€11
2%
: +2 bn UTP and €39 Bad loans).
GR 14
CA 283 12 7
127 6
117 11
237 18 131 104 50
NPL as for YE 2017
194 21 Q3-Q4 2017 market
109 transactions
157 13 39
91
132 12 74 200
85 16 184 200
66 190
57 156 Q3-Q4 2017 market
9 125 transactions
107 UTP Bad loans
33 78 250
59
42
Pro forma YE 2017
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 H1 2017
4.9% 7.8% 9.3% 11.3% 14.3% 17.8% 21.0% 22.0% 21.1% 19.7%
2.5% 3.5% 4.6% 6.3% 7.5% 9.8% 11.8% 12.9% 13.0% 12.5% Source: PwC analysis data of Bollettino Statistico di
Banca d’Italia and ABI Monthly Outlook
62.6%
56.5%
55.6%
54.0%
50.3% 48.7%
89
42.9% 43.7% 87
84
39.7% 80
34.0% 71
62
60
47
39
60
24 5.4% 5.7% 5.6% 4.7% Net Bad Loans (€bn)
2.8% 3.5% 3.8% 5.0%
1.4% 2.3% Net Bad Loans/Loans to Customers (%)
Bad Loans coverage ratio (%)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 H1 2017
1.6%
21.5%
1.4%
8.8%
6.0%
9.9%
2.0%
8.7% 2.8%
1.8%
2.5%
11.8%
5.1%
2.2%
6.4%
>10%
>5% - 10% 1.7%
5.9%
>3% - 5%
<3%
PwC | 17
Chart 9: Breakdown of Gross Bad Loans by counterparty (H1 2017)
20% 20% 20% 20% 19% 18% 16% 16% 17% 18%
9% 8% 8% 7% 8% 8%
12% 11% 10% 9%
67% 69% 70% 70% 71% 73% 75% 74% 73% 73%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 H1 2017
Chart 10: Secured Gross Bad loans trend (% on total Bad loans)
Counterparty
49% Corporate & SME
48%
47% 68%
45%
42% Individual
39% 22%
38% 38%
Family business
8%
36% 36%
Other**
2%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 H1 2017
Chart 11: Breakdown of Gross Bad Loans by macrosector Chart 12: Breakdown of Gross Bad Loans by ticket size
2% 2% 4% 0% 12% 3% 4%
2%
5%
16%
21%
10%
0%
1%
23%
4% 1%
1% 8%
2%
17% 9%
27%
12%
14%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing Accomodation services
Mining and quarrying products Information and communication 50 to 30k € 500k to 1mln €
Manufacturing products Finance and assurance services 30k to 75k € 1mln to 2.5mln €
75k to 125k € 2.5mln to 5mln €
Electricity, gas, steam and Real estate
air-conditioning supply 125k to 250k € 5mln to 25mln €
Waste-management and Professional, scientific and
remediation products technical activities 250k to 500k € More than 25mln €
Construction Administrative and
support services
Wholesale and retail trade Other
Transportation and storage
Source: PwC analysis on data of “Bollettino Statistico” of Bank of Italy. Source: PwC analysis on data of “Bollettino Statistico” of Bank of Italy.
PwC | 19
Focus: UTP Chart 13a: Breakdown of UTP ratio by region* (H1 2017)
6.3%
Looking at the UTP and Past Due stock 7.9%
composition in H1 2017:
4.9%
• the UTP breakdown by region
shows the highest levels in
Lombardy (27.2%) and Lazio 6.4%
4.0%
(12.9%), which correspond to a
7.2%
UTP ratio equal, respectively, to
7.9% and 8.5%; 10.5%
7.6% 8.2%
• Friuli Venezia Giulia, Umbria,
Abruzzo and Molise, Calabria and 7.6% 6.7%
Sardegna own a percentage of UTP
lower than 2%. 8.5%
6.2%
7.1% 9.4%
> 9%
>7% - 9% 6.3%
>5% - 7%
<5% 7.4%
2.5%
27.2%
1.3%
8.4%
3.9%
9.6%
3.4%
7.7% 2.9%
1.5%
1.7%
12.9%
>10%
>5% - 10% 1.0%
>3% - 5%
<3% 4.2%
The most encouraging figure is represented by the robust Chart 15: Bankruptcies by type of company
drop in the number of bankruptcies. During H1 2017, 6,284
1.9% 1.6%
Italian firms went bankrupt, 15.6% less than the same
period in 2016.
This improvement is shared across all Italian regions and -4.1%
The bankruptcies downturn has been going on for the H1 2016 H1 2017
seventh quarter in a row. This reduction pertained to all
firms’ type of company: first, partnerships (-21.4% respect Chart 16: Non-bankruptcy procedures by macrosector
to the same period of 2016), then limited liability companies
(-15.9%) and other types of company (-8.9%).
After a negative trend in 2016, H1 2017 shows a reduction Construction (%) Industrial (%) Services (%) Other (%)
in voluntary liquidations, decreasing at stronger rates H1 2016 H1 2017
with reference to partnerships (-3.8%) and limited liability
companies which operate on the market (-9.2%), which Chart 17: Liquidations by type of company
revert the 2016 trend (+1.6%). Viceversa, the number of
35.5%
liquidations for registered but non operating companies is
increasing (+35.5%).
20.4%
Chart 14: Insolvency procedures
2.2%
1.6%
-2.7% -2.5%
-0.6%
-3.8%
-9.2%
-15.6% -15.9%
Limited liability company (%) Partnership (%) Other (%)
H1 2016 H1 2017
-29.9%
Bankruptcy (%) Liquidation (%) Other procedures (%) Source: Osservatorio su fallimenti, procedure e chiusure di imprese, Cerved
H1 2016 H1 2017
PwC | 21
Italian Banks
Overview
Key Message: Improvements in the European
and Italian banking industry are a different
matter altogether, they require a deeper and
more thorough approach, to be pursued through
structural reforms designed to reduce inefficiencies
and address the issue of non-performing loans.
• After a 10-months stop, at the end of October 2017, MPS • In Q4 2017 several important NPL deals took place.
has returned to be traded at Piazza Affari. A Decree from Banca Carige closed the sale of a €1.2 bn mixed secured -
the Italian MEF on the Treasury is expected to purchase unsecured NPL portfolio with Credito Fondiario together
the MPS’ shares held by the former subordinated with the servicing platform. Banca Etruria, Carichieti,
bondholders, who have seen their bonds being converted Cariferrara and Banca Marche sold their €1 bn secured
into shares after the burden sharing. portfolio to Cerberus. Cassa di Risparmio di Cesena,
Cassa di Risparmio di Rimini and Cassa di Risparmio di
• At the end of June 2017, ISP acquired, at a symbolic price
San Miniato closed with Quaestio Capital SGR the sale of
(€1), part of the assets and liabilities of Banca Popolare
€2.7 bn of NPLs.
di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, excluding their NPL, which
are aimed to be transferred to S.G.A. (Società per la
Gestione di Attività).
Chart 18: Net Bad Loans and Equity for the Top 10 Italian Banks
231%
13.9
11.8
66%
56% 59% 56%
7.0
41% 6.9 Net Bad Loans (€bn)
25%
21% 4.0
3.2 13% Net Bad Loans Equity
26% 2.9
0.3 Ratio (%)
1.2 1.3
UCG ISP MPS UBI BNL BPER Cariparma Credem Banco BPM Carige
Financial Statements as of H1 2017. BNL data as of YE 2016. Data affected by different write-off policies
Chart 19: Gross NPE and Texas ratio for the Top 10 Italian Banks
148%
138%
125%
69.2 114%
104%
106% 101%
54.6
45.5
85%
77%
60% 28.0
Gross NPE (€bn)
14.4 13.1 11.0 Texas Ratio (%)
5.0 1.4 7.2
UCG ISP MPS UBI BNL BPER Cariparma Credem Banco BPM Carige
Source: Financial Statements as of H1 2017. BNL data as of YE 2016. Data affected by different write-off policies
* Texas ratio defined as the ratio between total Gross NPE and the sum of CET1 and provisions
PwC | 23
Chart 20 illustrates the Top 10 Italian Chart 20: Top 10 Italian Banks – NPL Peer Analysis as of H1 2017
banks in terms of the gross NPL Ratio Gross NPL Ratio (%)
and the NPL Coverage Ratio. As
shown the average for the two ratios 70%
considered is respectively 19.1% and
UCG MPS
50.7%. The differences comparing the 65%
Chart 21 shows the gross Bad Loans Chart 21: Top 10 Italian Banks – Bad Loans Peer Analysis as of H1 2017
Ratio and the Bad Loans Coverage
Ratio for the same Top 10 banks. MPS Gross Bad Loans Ratio (%)
reaches the highest gross Bad loans 85%
60% Credem
Banco BPM
Cariparma
55% BPER
50% UBI
45%
Average= 12%
40%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Source: Financial statements as of H1 2017. BNL data as of YE 2016. Data affected by different write-off policies
Banco BPM
28% Carige
BPER
23% Cariparma
18%
Credem
Avarage=6.9%
13%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
Source: Financial statements as of H1 2017. BNL data as of YE 2016. Data affected by different write-off policies
Chart 23 shows the Past Due ratio and Chart 23: Top 10 Italian Banks – Past Due Peer Analysis as of H1 2017
the coverage for the banks analyzed.
MPS records the highest Gross past due Gross Past Due Ratio (%)
ratio (0.6%) while ISP and Banco BPM 40%
the lowest (0.1%). The average stands
at 0.3%. Differently the gap is bigger UCG
35%
considering the past due coverage
10%
Cariparma
BPER
5%
Average= 0.3%
0
0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7%
Source: Financial statements as of H1 2017. BNL data as of YE 2016. Data affected by different write-off policies
PwC | 25
Chart 24 illustrates the movements Chart 24: Top Italian Banks – Bad Loans movements (YE 2016 vs H1 2017)
in the Gross Bad Loans Ratio and the
H1 2017 YE 2016
Bad Loans Coverage Ratio between
2016 and 2017. In H1 2017 the average Gross Bad Loans Ratio (%)
Bad loans ratio is 12.0%, whereas the 80%
40%
Average= 12.0%
35%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Source: : Financial Statements as of H1 2017 and YE 2016. BNL not included as data H1 2017 not available.
Data affected by different write-off policies
Chart 25 shows that, with respect to Chart 25: Top Italian Banks – Unlikely to Pay movements (YE 2016 vs H1 2017)
YE 2016, ISP (-12%), UCG (-11.9%)
and Cariparma (-10.7%) experienced H1 2017 YE 2016
the largest decreases in the Unlikely to Gross Unlikely to Pay Ratio (%)
45%
Pay NPL Ratio, while UBI (+60.3%) UCG
and Carige (-1.6%) had, respectively, MPS
Average= 6.9%
0%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%
Source: Financial Statements as of H1 2017 and YE 2016. BNL not included as data H1 2017 not available.
Data affected by different write-off policies
BPER
Average= 0.3%
0%
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6%
Source: Financial Statements as of H1 2017 and YE 2016. BNL not included as data H1 2017 not available.
Data affected by different write-off policies
Chart 27: Top Italian Banks – Relation between MarketCap/TBV and NPL ratio
160%
MarketCap / TBV
IFIS*
140%
120% CREDEM
100% ISP
80%
60% PopSo
PwC | 27
Focus on UTP
Italian market
Key Message: Unlikely to Pay exposures are the
new challenge for the Italian banks. As at 30
June 2017, the UTP volumes are still lower than
Bad Loans in terms of GBV (€104 bn vs €190 bn).
However, for the Italian banks (which qualify for
77% of total UTP exposures), the UTP volumes
are by now overcoming bad loans in terms of NBV
(€52 bn vs €50 bn). Only by a renewed proactive
management of these exposures, the Italian banks
could find the most effective deleverage solutions
to address the issue of their volumes.
ECB guidelines provide a great opportunity refresh and The proactive management of UTP should cover three main
improve the proactive management of NPE in order to issues: (i) data quality and preliminary strategic portfolio
address the issue of their massive stock. segmentation, (ii) accurate analysis of the borrowers
and integrated single names’ management and (iii)
Moreover the reform of the bankruptcy law and the implementation of the most appropriate strategic option
introduction of the IFRS9, in place from 1 January to identify among forbearance measures, cash injection
2018, will lead to an «early warning» and «forward (equity/ debt) even through third investors, loan sales and
looking» approach, which could likely result in higher liquidation procedures.
reclassification of performing loans to NPE/UTP and
overall higher provisions. In other words, the proactive management of UTP is
without a doubt a complex issue entailing and requiring
Only by focusing the efforts on the proactive management due diligence, data quality, restructuring, turnaround
of their UTP exposures, the Italian banks could aim at management and M&A/special situation expertise.
deleveraging their UTP, through higher collection, higher cure
rates to performing loans, lower danger rates to bad loans.
In H1 2017, the UTP exposure amounted to €104 bn of which 77% is concentrated within the Top 9 Banks
€bn
23% 100%
23.8 104
52% 2% 0%
3%
4% 1.9 0.5
6% 3.2 -4% vs. PY
3.7 n/a vs. PY -17% vs. PY
10%
6.3 -8% vs. PY
+8% vs. PY
10.5
13% -14%vs. PY
13.5
-16% vs. PY
18%
18.8
-14% vs. PY
21%
21.8
-10% vs. PY
UniCredit Intesa MPS Banco UBI BPER Carige Cariparma Credem Others GBV total
Sanpaolo BPM 30Jun2017
31.4% 34.4% 29.6% 37.7% 44.8% 33.7% 44.5% 38.1% 35.8% Gross UTP/Gross NPE
13.9% 12.9% 36.3% 22.6% 14.1% 21.1% 33.9% 11.7% 5.8% Gross NPE Ratio
Source Financial statements as of H1 2017. BNL out of the analysis perimeter due to no publication of 1H financial results
PwC | 29
UTP Coverage ratios vs. Gross
UTP ratios
Chart 25: Unlikely to Pay inflows and outflows from 2014 to 2016 - Top 20 banks FY16 (€bn)
Inflows Inflows
Outflows 52.1 Outflows 41.5
(51.1) (49.9)
(5%) (5%)
10%
9%
(13%) (12%)
13%
8%
(21%)
(23%) (4%) 18%
(4%) 23%
Remain UTP
Remain UTP
56% 57%
Exposure To Collected To bad loans Others From From non Other Exposure To Collected To bad loans Others From From non Other Exposure
31Dec14 performing performing performing inflows 31Dec15 performing performing performing inflows 31Dec16
In/Outflow
% flows =
Initial exposure
(*) Inflows and outflows in 2016 for ICCREA and Banca Findomestic were estimated equal to the flows occurred in 2015 (to date their financial statements as at 31Dec16 are not
yet available)
PwC | 31
Our view on the available strategies for UTP
sa
t re
le
Bankruptcy Law
Deb
r’
to
ro
Intervention
Adoption of short-term measures Adoption of long-term measures
area
• Temporary • Temporary
financial difficulty payment of • Excessively high
• Permanent reduction
of minor entity interest only interest rates for
Interest of interest rates
to be overcome (no capital the debtor
within 24 months reimbursement)
• Temporary
• “Grace period”
financial difficulty • Excessively high
for the payment • Extension of debt
of moderate/ instalments for the
Maturity of interests and maturity
serious entity to debtor
capital
be overcome within
24 mo.
• Voluntary disposal
of collateral by the
Collateral
debtor
PwC | 33
Our view on the requirements arisen from the
adoption of IFRS9 for the Italian banks
Classification Impairment
New classification criteria will lead to 3 new classes • New impairment criteria, based on the “expected loss”
of loans (“Hold to collect”, “Hold to collect and sale”, and “forward looking“ approach, will result in certain
“Trading”). The need to properly classify their exposures portions of the current portfolio classified in loans’
will require the bank to review and strategically refine higher risk categories (e.g. from performing to UTP/bad
their business model associated to the loans’ management: loans).
• On the one hand, for the “portfolio to hold”, banks • Higher impairment (by collective and analytical
should strenghten the internal credit monitoring provisioning) will result through the “forward looking”
functions in terms of expertise as well as of renovated approach which will move up losses to be incurred over
tools of credit risk measurement (e.g. KPI, index, the loans’ lifetime.
advanced CRM solutions).
• Need to foresee the lifetime losses will require the banks
• On the other hand, for the “portfolio to sell”, banks to implement proactive actions to preliminarly assess
should implement specialised units in charge of the borrowers’ likelyhood to pays their debts along with
structuring and execution of loans’ sale transactions avoid further danger rate from performing to UTP and
(e.g. data preparation and remediation, securitisation). bad loans.
PwC | 35
Key dynamics in H2 2017 • diversification opportunities in adjacent credit
management segments:
In H2 2017, the evolution of the credit management sector • unlikely to pay: new focused models able to assure
has continued, based on the key trends we highlighted in a proactive management of NPE advisory;
the mid-year edition our NPL Report. Increasing volumes • delinquency management services for small
of portfolio disposals from banks to Investors and strategic tickets: the “industrial” model well established
outsourcing of NPL banking platforms drive the growth of for the pre-charge off positons of consumer credit
specialized NPL servicers (latest deal, Credito Fondiario: specialists might be applied to small ticket banking
acquisition of NPL Unit and servicing partnership with positions in the early delinquency stages;
Carige). The leaders are gaining market share due to
“jumbo deals”. Many financial and strategic investors • performing loan management: increasing
aim at developing integrated industrial capabilities, opportunities for performing loans portfolio
both through external and internal growth initiatives disposals are likely to generate demand for
(latest deal, Lindorff-Intrum: acquisition of CAF). In the independent servicing offers.
DCA (Debt Collection Agencies) segment, increasing
competition is reducing margins for third parties business, From NPL Servicing to Specialty Finance?
pushing for cost reduction initiatives and business model
evolution. The structure and trends (fragmentation,
decreasing returns) of the servicing market generate fertile In such a context, considering the on-going major changes
conditions for consolidation: opportunities exist for both in the Italian financial and banking environment, the
vertical integration of strategic/financial players (captive Servicing Leaders (in terms of financial and strategic
models) and the development of new ‘independent’ capabilities) have the opportunity to redefine the
servicing platforms. competitive arena in which they operate and develop
new business models. As an example, players that
operate as banking institutions have the chance to
Our outlook for 2018 leverage the regulatory and funding platforms to develop
comprehensive and “sophisticated” approaches in NPL
and UTP, both in financial (from purchase to refinancing)
In our outlook for 2018, we see further consolidation of the and industrial terms (from special to master servicing).
trends mentioned above, with a potential acceleration of New “challengers banks” with a focus on specialty finance
the following dynamics: (including specialized lending and credit portfolio
• strategic sale or outsourcing of NPLs banking management, both performing and non performing) are
platforms, due to market and regulatory pressures: likely to develop attractive and highly profitable value
following Creval, MPS and Carige deals, other banking propositions.
Groups might consider strategic initiatives with
NPL Specialists to extract value, in the short and/or
medium-long term, from their workout units;
• continuing M&A transactions, with increasing focus in
the DCA segment: after intense transaction activities
regarding the leading NPL Servicers in the last 24
months, the next deal phase is likely to involve debt
collection agencies;
• emerging opportunities in new specialized
segments: active real estate services, including
ReoCo management; master and special servicing
specialization in the leasing NPL segment (following
recent changes of the securitization legal framework)
2013
Italfondiario Cerved
Acquisition of a Acquisition of
minority stake Tarida, specialized
in BCC Gestione in consumer finance
crediti from collections vith
ICCREA 1.9bn AuM an
250k tickets
2014
2015
Fortress Lonestar Cerved
Acquisition of Acquisition of Acquisition of 100%
UniCredit captive CAF a servicing of Fin. San Giacomo
servicing platform platform with €7 bn part of Credito
(UCCMB) AuM from private Valtellinese group
shareholders
2016
Cerved + BHW Axactor Lindorff Arrow Kruk doBank Dea Capital
Bausparkasse Acquisition of CS Acquisition of Acquisition of Acquisition of 100% Acquisition of Acquisition of
Long-term Union from Banca CrossFactor, a small 100% of Zenith of Credit Base 100% of 66,3% of SPC
industrial Sistema factoring and credit Service, Italfondiario Credit Management
partnership for servicing platform a master
the management servicing
of 230 €m of platform
NPL originated
by the Italian
branch of BHV
Bausparkassen AG
2017
Kkr Lindorff Bain Capital Varde Cerved + BHW Davidson Cerved + Quaestio
Acquisition of Acquisition of Acquisition of Acquisition of Bausparkasse Kempner Acquisition of the
Sistemia Gextra, a small 100% of HARIT, 33% of Guber Long-term industrial Acquisition of credit servicing
ticket player from servicing platform partnership 44.9% of Prelios platform (a.k.a.
doBank specialized in extension for the and launch of “Juliet”) of MPS
secured loans management of a a mandatory
portfolio of loans of tender offer
1.5 €bn originated
by the Italian
branch of BHV
Bausparkassen AG
PwC | 37
Table 6: Overview of main servicers (data at 30/06/2017) – Ranking by Revenues
Source: PwC analysis on data provided by Servicers as of 30/06/2017; data have been directly provided by Servicers and have not been verified by PwC. Servicers present
highly heterogeneous organizational, industrial and operating structures. Comparing the information presented above requires a correct analysis and understanding of the
competitive landscape and servicers business model
1 Includes both owned and third parties portfolios
2 Includes Unlikely to Pay + Past Due more than 90 days
3 doBank group figures include Italfondiario
4 Sistemia Revenues forecast at 31/12/2017 received has been divided by 2
5 Officine CST is specialised mainly in PA credit servicing
6 Debt purchasing activities are conduced via Special Purpose Vehicles
7 H1 2017 data have not been provided by Servicers, at 31/12/2016 revenues were equal to: Parr Credit 20€m; Serfin 19€m; Zenith Service 12€m; Finanziaria Internazionale
10€m; Link Financial 4.9 €m; Certa Credita 1€m; Not available data for Kruk and Bayview
Note: Double counting may arise when adding NPL AuM as some servicers outsource part of their portfolios to others due to capacity and/or specialization issues
178.0 a a a
31.4 a a a
125.7 a a a
11.9 a a a
n.a. a a a
7.3 a a a
87.7 a a a a
5.4 a a a
n.a. a
4.0 a a
0.3 a a a6
2.4 a
n.a. a a6
n.a. a a
7.8 a 5
4.5 a a
7.8 a a a
7.7 a a
n.a. a a
n.a. a
n.a. a
1.3 a a
0.7 a a
n.a. a a
2.0 a
n.a. a
3.1 a a
2.7 a a
n.a. a
n.a. a
n.a. a a a6
n.a. a
n.a. a
6.5 a a a
11.5 a a a a
- a a
1.0
PwC | 39
Table 7: Breakdown of servicer’ Total Bad Loans AuM1 (data at 30/06/2017) – Ranking by Revenues2
Source: PwC analysis on data provided by Servicers as of 30/06/2017; data have been directly provided by Servicers and have not been verified by PwC. Servicers present
highly heterogeneous organizational, industrial and operating structures. Comparing the information presented above requires a correct analysis and understanding of the
competitive landscape and servicers business model
1 Includes both owned and third parties portfolios
2 Servicers providing mainly Master Servicing activities have been excluded: Centotrenta Servicing, Zenith Service, Finanziaria Internazionale
38% 62%
57% 43%
8% 44% 48%
77% 23%
37% 63%
100%
71% 22% 7%
45% 55%
15% 85%
100%
80% 20%
70% 30%
16% 84%
6% 94%
100%
79% 21%
25% 75%
2% 9% 54% 35%
100%
100%
2% 84% 14%
100%
85% 12% 3%
12%
3 doBank group figures include Italfondiario: 79% refers to “first lien” secured Bad loans
4 Percentages are based on total NPL portfolio: breakdown for Master and Special servicing activities have not been provided
5 H1 2017 data have not been provided by Servicers, at 31/12/2016 revenues were equal to: Parr Credit 20€m; Serfin 19€m; Link Financial 4.9 €m; Certa Credita 1€m; Not
available data for Kruk and Bayview
PwC | 41
Table 8: Geographical NPL breakdown (data at 30/06/2017) – Ranking by Revenues2
In term of AuM
28% 55%
Source: PwC analysis on data provided by Servicers as of 30/06/2017; data have been directly provided by Servicers and have not been verified by PwC; Servicers present
highly heterogeneous organizational, industrial and operating structures. Comparing the information presented above requires a correct analysis and understanding of the
competitive landscape and servicers business model
1 Includes both owned and third parties portfolios
2 Servicers providing mainly Master Servicing activities have been excluded: Centotrenta Servicing, Zenith Service, Finanziaria Internazionale
3 doBank group figures include Italfondiario
100% 100%
100% 100%
91% 9% 3% 97%
55% 28%
4 Includes: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia Romagna
5 Includes: Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio
6 Includes: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna
7 H1 2017 data have not been provided by Servicers, at 31/12/2016 revenues were equal to: Parr Credit 20€m; Serfin 19€m; Link Financial 4.9 €m; Certa Credita 1€m; Not
available data for Kruk and Bayview
PwC | 43
Recent
market
activity and Key Message: Alongside such structural reforms of
the banking sector, the Government has adopted
PwC | 45
Chart 29: Closed NPL transactions in 2017YTD
Performing/Non
Date Seller Volume (€m) Macro asset class Buyer
Performing
2017 Q4 Banca popolare di Bari 320 Bad loans Mixed Secured/Unsecured Davidson Kempner
2017 Q4 Creval 24 UTP Secured Hoist Finance
2017 Q4 Carige 1.200 Bad loans Mixed Secured/Unsecured Credito Fondiario
2017 Q4 Cassa Centrale Banca 570 Bad loans Mixed Secured/Unsecured Seer Capital Management
2017 Q4 Cassa Centrale Banca 315 Bad loans Mixed Secured/Unsecured Locam
2017 Q4 CAF 400 Bad loans Mixed Secured/Unsecured Lindorff-Intrum
2017 Q3 Hypo Alpe Adria Bank 750 Bad loans, UTP & leasing Other Bain Capital Credit
Credit Agricole e Banco
2017 Q3 175 Bad loans Mixed Secured/Unsecured B2Holding ASA
Desio
Palamon Capital
2017 Q3 170 Bad loans Consumer Best Capital Italy
Partners
Banca Mediocredito
2017 Q2 400 Bad loans Secured Bain Capital
FVG
64
0.8
0.0
49.6
30
19 9.3
1.2
1.2
9 5.4
7.5
4 1.5 3.0
5 0.6
0.8
2.6 3.7 7.4 9.7
0.2 1.8 0.2
2.1 4.4 6.5
2.6 3.8 4.0 1.2
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 YTD
Consumer Unsecured Secured Mixed Secured/Usecured Mainly Unsecured Other Total GBV
0.3
61.8 18.7 49.0
62.2 20.4 53.9
YE 2013
YE 2013
YE 2013
UCG
61.0 20.8 53.2
UCG
UCG
73.3 13.6 51.0
74.4 11.8 46.2
62.5
YE 2014
13.0
YE 2014
34.6
YE 2014
62.8 14.2 38.2
ISP
61.8 15.0
ISP
39.2
ISP
60.7 14.9 37.9
60.7 13.9
35.4
YE 2015
YE 2015
YE 2015
21.6
MPS
MPS
26.6
MPS
YE 2016
10.4
YE 2016
64.8 29.4
YE 2016
77.5 7.0
31.2
41.6 3.4
4.0 5.9
38.8
H1 2017
H1 2017
6.6
UBI
38.6 4.3
H1 2017
UBI
UBI
45.1 4.0
4.0 7.3
46.3
7.5
59.1 2.4
62.0 2.7 5.8
BNL
BNL
63.3 3.0 7.1
64.6 8.9
6.9
55.0 2.5
56.5 2.8 5.5
58.2 3.0 6.5
BPER
BPER
57.2 3.0 7.1
BPER
Cariparma
57.9
Cariparma
58.7 1.2 2.9
Cariparma
3.0
58.2 0.3
58.6 0.3 0.7
60.8 0.4 0.8
Credem
59.6 0.3 0.9
Credem
0.3
Credem
60.6 0.9
0.9
41.9 6.7
45.9 7.3 11.5
42.2 7.9 13.6
45.7 7.8 13.8
Banco BPM
Banco BPM
59.9 6.9 14.4
Banco BPM
17.3
56.3 1.2
58.5 1.3 2.7
60.4 1.4 3.1
Carige
Carige
65.3 1.3 3.5
Carige
UCG
UCG
YE 2013
YE 2013
YE 2013
UCG
4.4 10.3
82.9
77.1 3.0 10.3
69.2 2.6 9.3
9.3
YE 2014
YE 2014
3.8
YE 2014
57.6
10.3
ISP
4.2
ISP
63.0
ISP
63.4 4.3 10.3
4.1 9.6
54.6
YE 2015
YE 2015
YE 2015
6.8 14.7
36.1
45.3 7.1 17.0
MPS
MPS
8.7 19.8
MPS
46.9
22.1
YE 2016
YE 2016
9.7
YE 2016
45.8
7.4 24.9
45.5
3.9 6.4
12.7
13.1 4.7 7.3
H1 2017
H1 2017
H1 2017
5.1 7.9
UBI
UBI
13.5
UBI
4.9 8.4
12.5
4.3 7.5
14.1
3.7 8.4
11.0
4.4 10.4
12.3
4.9 12.0
BNL
12.9
BNL
5.1 13.0
13.1
5.3 10.9
10.3
11.0 6.4 13.3
11.4 6.8 14.5
BPER
BPER
BPER
6.6 13.9
11.2
6.2 13.6
11.0
5.5
5.5
3.9 2.7 5.6
5.0 3.1 6.7
3.2 7.1
5.2
3.2 7.2
5.0
Cariparma
Cariparma
3.1 7.1
Cariparma
4.9
1.6 3.6
1.3 3.6
1.5
1.3 3.8
1.4 1.5
Credem
3.5
Credem
1.4 1.5
Credem
1.4 3.6
1.4
5.6 9.0
11.5
6.6 11.1
13.6
7.1 11.3
26.8
7.1 11.9
26.0
Banco BPM
Banco BPM
6.3 14.0
Banco BPM
27.9
4.6 9.6
5.5
5.4 11.7
6.5
6.5 14.4
6.8
Carige
Carige
17.2
Carige
7.1
7.3
7.4 18.4
7.2
PwC | 49
15.6 51.9 41.1
16.9 51.1 42.6
UCG
UCG
YE 2013
YE 2013
YE 2013
16.0 51.1 40.5
UCG
15.6 62.8 28.7
13.9 64.0 24.9
46.0 31.1
YE 2014
YE 2014
15.4
YE 2014
33.6
ISP
17.0
47.5 33.3
ISP
Net NPE volume (€bn)
16.6
30.0
YE 2015
YE 2015
YE 2015
21.6
24.5 41.8 21.0
31.7 48.9 23.1
MPS
MPS
34.8 48.5 24.2
MPS
20.3
YE 2016
55.6
YE 2016
YE 2016
34.5
36.3 65.7 15.6
H1 2017
H1 2017
H1 2017
9.7
UBI
27.8
UBI
15.2
UBI
43.7 6.2
15.9
18.0 48.1 6.4
51.5 6.3
BNL
BNL
19.0 55.3 5.8
37.3 6.4
20.3
40.7 6.5
22.6
44.2 6.4
BPER
23.3
BPER
6.2
BPER
22.1 44.5
46.9 5.9
22.1
5.5
5.5
39.6 2.3
10.2 3.0
38.6
12.6 3.1
40.5
13.3 2.9
42.2
12.4
Cariparma
Cariparma
42.2 2.7
Cariparma
11.7
38.7 0.8
6.3 40.7 0.8
6.0 0.8
44.6
6.0
Credem
Credem
42.5 0.8
5.8
Credem
43.4 0.8
5.8
41.9 6.7
9.0 7.3
45.9
11.1 33.6 17.8
21.9 37.8 16.2
Banco BPM
21.6
Banco BPM
49.0 14.2
Banco BPM
22.6
37.1 3.4
19.8 3.9
40.0
24.6 42.5 3.9
Carige
Carige
Carige
33.8 48.9 3.7
33.9
40.1 114.3 8.2
41.3 34.6 9.1
UCG
YE 2013
UCG
UCG
YE 2013
YE 2013
42.0 35.0 8.5
34.6 115.7 6.4
21.4 27.1 5.5
Net NPE ratio (%)
9.0
YE 2014
YE 2014
29.1 68.9
YE 2014
ISP
31.9 41.8 9.9
31.3 29.8 9.5
ISP
ISP
30.5 35.1 8.2
YE 2015
YE 2015
YE 2015
144.5 129.4 16.0
141.6 366.5 19.3
MPS
21.7
MPS
101.4 89.3
MPS
19.0
YE 2016
161.3
YE 2016
223.1
YE 2016
230.6 512.9 16.4
H1 2017
H1 2017
H1 2017
11.5
UBI
43.0
UBI
49.2
44.4 103.2 9.9
40.7 103.2
37.9 9.0
BNL
BNL
56.2 41.7 9.5
9.5
BPER
BPER
59.9 52.9 13.6
58.8 56.7 12.5
5.5 5.5
21.0 52.9 6.4
23.9 41.5 8.2
23.5 33.1 8.4
24.2 70.0 7.6
Cariparma
Cariparma
Cariparma
24.7 22.2 6.9
15.8
Credem
Credem
14.0
13.4 11.3 3.4
Banco BPM
Banco BPM
Banco BPM
Carige
Carige
PwC | 51
Contacts List / Contributors
PwC | 53
54 | The Italian NPL market - Ready for the breakthrough
PwC | 55
www.pwc.com/it/npl
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