ESPIRITU VS. CIPRIANO G.R. NO.

L-32743 February 15,1974

FACTS:

Spouses Primitivo and Leonora A. De Espiritu filed a petition for certiorari requesting the nullification of
two orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Br. XV/Trial Court. This include (1) Order dated
August 4, 1970 sustaining respondent Ricardo Cipriano’s motion to dismiss on the authority of Republic
Act 6126/Rental Law and (2) Order dated October 16, 1970 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the 1st Order. Respondent/Defendant Cipriano’s house was built on the property of plaintiff/petitioner
spouses Espiritus by virtue of an oral contract of lease. Cipriano was their lessee since 1954. Before 1969
the lease was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being then payable at or before the end of the year.
But from January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was increased to
P30 a month by the lessors. Their dispute emanated on the failure of Cipriano to pay rental since January
1969 at the monthly rate mentioned. This lead to the filing of a complainant of Unlawful Detainer against
Cipriano in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, with a favorable decision for lessors Espiritu. Respondent
Cipriano filed a motion to dismiss said complaint invoking the prohibitory provision of R.A. 6126, which
was upheld by the Trial Court in the 2 Orders assailed by spouses Espiritu.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision of R.A. 6126 has retroactive application?

RULING: SC found the petition of spouses Espiritu meritorious, thus, reversing the Trial Court’s Decision
and ordering the Trial Court for the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M on the merits in
accordance with RA 6031. The increase in the rental was warranted and valid. It has effected in January
1969. The law in question took effect on June 17, 1970 or after 1 ½ years after the increase in rentals had
been effected. The law had a limited period of operation, as stated in Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling
of a unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is located shall, during the period of one year from
March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and the lesses prior to the
approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed three hundred pesos (P300) a month. Hence, the
prohibiton against the increase in rentals was effective on March 1970 up to March 1971. Outside and
beyond that period the law did not, by the express mandate of the Republic Act, operate.

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989 Marcos, petitioner VS. Manglapus, respondent Facts: Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events: 1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders 2. channel 7 taken over by
rebels & loyalists 3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese
arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar 4. Honasan’s failed coup 5. Communist
insurgency movements 6. secessionist movements in Mindanao 7. devastated economy because of 8.
accumulated foreign debt 9. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies Marcos filed for a petition of
mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent
the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the
President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses, such
act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the
laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of
the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. Issue: 1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. 2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Ruling: No to both issues. Petition dismissed. Separation of power dictates that each department has
exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President,
i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23).
Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has
residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore
Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin,
supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and
that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on
the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right
to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied. For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is
whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest
to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The Presi
NELSON P. COLLANTES v. CA, GR NO. 169604, 2007-03-06 Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision dated 10 March 2005 and the
Resolution dated 31 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. Petitioner Nelson Collantes
was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility on February 29, 1996. Then President Fidel V. Ramos
accorded him the rank of Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) II on February 10, 1997. After more
than a year, he was appointed as Undersecretary for Peace and Order of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG). With the change of administration, Collantes allegedly received word from
persons close to President Ejercito Estrada to give up his position so that the President could
unreservedly appoint his key officials. As such, Collantes relinquished his post at the DILG. Ons July 1,
1998, President Estrada appointed Collantes to the controversial post - Undersecretary for Civilian
Relations of the Department of National Defense (DND). Collantes was supposedly ordered by then
Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post in favor of another presidential appointee.
Unfortunately, Collantes was not given any other post in the government, as in fact, he received a letter
from President Estrada terminating his services effective 8 February 1999. On March 24, 1999, Collantes
requested the assistance of the Career Executive Service Board relative to the termination of his services
as Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of the DND invoking his right to security of tenure as a CESO.
President Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in the CES ranking structure, CESO Rank I, on July
1999. But despite this promotion in rank, Collantes did not receive new appointment. Taking definite
action on the matter, Collantes instituted a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus before Us on
January 29, 2001, docketed as C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874. on August 13, 2001, the CSC favorably acted on
Collantes' letter-request issuing Resolution No. 011364 August 30, 2001, We rendered Our Decision in
C.A. G.R. SP No. 62874 dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus filed by Collantes The
controversy reached the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the case was considered closed and terminated.
Thereafter, Collantes moved for the execution of CSC Resolution No. 011364 granted through CSC
Resolution No. 020084 dated 15 January 2002 In a Letter dated 7 February 2002, the Legal Affairs
Division of the DND, through Atty. Leticia A. Gloria, urged the CSC to revisit its Resolutions which were
entirely in conflict with Our 30 August 2001 Decision in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 62874, which has attained
finality pursuant to the Supreme Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 149883 in complete turnabout from its
previous stance, the CSC issued Resolution No. 021482 dated 12 November 2002 declaring that had it
been properly informed that a Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus was then pending before Us, it
would have refrained from ruling on Collantes' quandary.