Vulnerability assessment of lifelines and essential

facilities (WP06): methodological handbook

Appendix 8:
Electric power utility system

February 2003
Report n°GTR-RSK 0101-152av7
Vulnerability assessment of lifelines and essential
facilities (WP06): methodological handbook

Appendix 8:
Electric power utility system
M. ALEXOUDI
with the collaboration of
O. MONGE

February 2003
Report n°GTR-RSK 0101-152av7
 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
with applications to different European towns
RISK-UE – EVK4-CT-2000-00014

Contents
1 EP1: Power – generating facilities ........................................................................ 6
1.1 Description ............................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Classification ............................................................................................................ 6
1.3 Typology................................................................................................................... 9
1.4 Damage, consequences or losses.............................................................................. 9
1.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 11
1.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 14
2 EP2: Electric substation....................................................................................... 15
2.1 Description ............................................................................................................. 15
2.2 Classification .......................................................................................................... 17
2.3 Typology................................................................................................................. 17
2.4 Damage, consequences or losses............................................................................ 18
2.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 19
2.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 24
3 EP3: Transmission and distribution lines .......................................................... 25
3.1 Description ............................................................................................................. 25
3.2 Classification .......................................................................................................... 25
3.3 Typology................................................................................................................. 28
3.4 Damage, consequences or losses............................................................................ 28
3.5 Vulnerability........................................................................................................... 28
3.6 Restoration.............................................................................................................. 30
4 References ............................................................................................................. 31

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List of illustrations
FIGURES

Figure 1: Fragility curves of small power generating facilities with anchored

components subject to ground shaking................................................................... 12
Figure 2: Fragility curves of small power generating facilities with unanchored
components subject to ground shaking................................................................... 12
Figure 3: Fragility curves of medium/large power generating facilities with anchored
components subject to ground shaking................................................................... 13
Figure 4: Fragility curves of medium/large power generating facilities with unanchored
components subject to ground failure..................................................................... 13
Figure 5: Restoration model of power generating facilities (EP1)................................. 14
Figure 6: Schematic diagram (partial) of a typical substation (WAHA et al., 1998)..... 16
Figure 7: Fragility curves of low voltage substation with anchored components subject
to ground shaking. .................................................................................................. 21
Figure 8: Fragility curves of low voltage substation with unanchored components
subject to ground shaking....................................................................................... 21
Figure 9: Fragility curves of medium voltage substation with anchored components
subject to ground shaking....................................................................................... 22
Figure 10: Fragility curves of medium voltage substation with unanchored components
subject to ground shaking....................................................................................... 22
Figure 11: Fragility curves of high voltage substation with anchored components
subject to ground shaking....................................................................................... 23
Figure 12: Fragility curves of high voltage substation with unanchored components
subject to ground shaking....................................................................................... 23
Figure 13: Restoration curves of electric substations (EP2). ......................................... 24
Figure 14: Fragility curves of seismic distribution circuits subject to ground shaking. 29
Figure 15: Fragility curves of standard distribution circuits subject to ground shaking.29
Figure 16: Restoration model of distribution circuits (EP3) .......................................... 30

TABLES

Table 1: Classification for power generation plant. ......................................................... 6

Table 2: Possible consequences of earthquake on power – generating facilities............. 9
Table 3: Classification for electric substation. ............................................................... 17
Table 4: Possible consequences of earthquake on electric substations. ......................... 18
Table 5: Classification for lines...................................................................................... 25
Table 6: Possible consequences of earthquake on distribution circuits. ........................ 28

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PHOTO.

Photo. 1: Different types of power generating facilities................................................... 8

Photo. 2: Different substations in Romania (above) and France (below) ...................... 16
Photo. 3: Different types of transmission lines. ............................................................. 26
Photo. 4: Different types of distribution lines. ............................................................... 26
Photo. 5: Pole – mounted and above ground transformers............................................. 26
Photo. 6: Electric tower damaged by ground failure...................................................... 26

VULNERABILITY MODELS

Vulnerability model 1: EP1, power-generating facilities subject to ground shaking..... 11

Vulnerability model 2: EP2, electric substation subject to ground shaking................... 20
Vulnerability model 3: EP3, distribution circuit subject to ground shaking. ................. 28

RESTORATION MODELS

Restoration model 1: EP1, Power generating facilities. ................................................. 14

Restoration model 2: EP2, electric substation................................................................ 24
Restoration model 3: EP3, Distribution circuits............................................................. 30

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1 EP1: Power – generating facilities

1.1 DESCRIPTION
Power-Generating facilities may be any of the following types (Photo. 1):
- Hydroelectric Plants;
- Combustion-turbine generating plants (Fuelled by gas or oil);
- Steam- Turbine Generating Plants (Coal- fired plants);
- Geothermal generation plants;
- Diesel power Plants;
- Solar generating facilities;
- Wind;
- Compressed air;
- Nuclear generating plants.

1.2 CLASSIFICATION
In order to classify Power Generation Station one or several of the following points
(Table 1) should be considered.

Table 1: Classification for power generation plant.

EP1: power
1 (High) 2 (Medium) 3 (Low)
generation plant
Redundancy
Mainly single In between Mainly redundant
capabilities
Capacity1 ≥ 200MW ≤ 200 MW
Proportion of the
>20% 10-20% <10%
country’s production
Coal- fired
Solar
Hydroelectric3
Level of risk Nuclear2 Wind
Diesel, Gas- Oil4
Compressed air
Geothermal
Usage of plants Hydroelectric, Coal
5
facilities for other Nuclear fired, Gas-oil,
purpose Diesel, Geothermal6

1
The range of values (Megawatt) that define the size of Power Generation Plant can be changed
according to European Inventory
2
Nuclear Plants produce a huge amount of energy and so they are very important to national economy,
although, nuclear disposals can be very dangerous for public health and quite hazardous for the
environment. Strict regulations exist as to ensure the reduction of radiation.
3
Hydroelectric plants generally are combined with dams. A probable damage of the dam can be lethal for
human (inhabitant area can be flooded) or can imbalance the eco-system. Flood of cultivated fields can
lead to direct economical losses in agriculture session in national or local level. Many times dams create
artificial lakes (fish pond) and destruction can harm the local economy.
4
Diesel, Gas- Oil plants can cause explosions with many victims and environmental pollution.
5
Nuclear reactors can be used by military purposes.
6
The energy produced from Hydroelectric, Coal fired, Gas-oil, Diesel, Geothermal plants can be used to
warm the water for housing.

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Radiance International or Hub Mainly National Regional

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Coal – fired plant Hydroelectric power Plant

Geothermal generation plants

Gas-oil generation plant

Solar generating facilities

Solar generating facilities

Photo. 1: Different types of power generating facilities.

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1.3 TYPOLOGY
Power generation plant may be described (Hazus ’99) with respect to whether:
- Its size is small, or medium – large7;
- The subcomponents (equipment and backup power) are anchored8 or unanchored.

1.4 DAMAGE, CONSEQUENCES OR LOSSES

The overall seismic performance of power- generating stations has been generally good
although equipment and facilities have been damaged and some components such as
water and liquid fuel storage tanks have performed poorly. As equipments and facilities
are accounted turbines, steam generators, commercially produced equipment (pumps,
motors, motor control centres and low, medium voltage switchgear), engineered
equipment (coal- handling equipment, cable trays, piping systems, duct work and large
blowers and fans) and structures (SCHIFF, 1999). Most power plants use steel frame
structures. The inherent ductility of these structures contributes enough to their seismic
performance in order to be in acceptable levels (SCHIFF, 1991).
Beyond common damage states (level I), alternate expressions of losses (level II) seem
relevant for power – generating facilities (Table 2):
- Serviceability
o Nominal use, Reduced use or Not usable;
o Usable without repairs, After repairs or Not repairable.
- Replacement value (usually between 0 and 100%).

Table 2: Possible consequences of earthquake on power – generating facilities.

Replacement
Serviceability Damage State description (Hazus ’99)
value (%)
Large horizontal vessels beyond
repair, extensive damage to large
75 – 100 Complete motor operated valves or
building being in complete
Not damage state.
repairable Considerable damage to motor
driven pumps or considerable
Unusable 50 – 75 Extensive damage to large vertical pumps
or building being in extensive
damage state.
Chattering of instrument panels
and racks, considerable damage
Operational
30 – 50 Moderate to boilers and pressure vessels or
after repairs
by the building being in
moderate damage state.

7
Respectively, ≤200 Mw or ≥200 Mw according to Hazus ’99
8
Anchored means equipment designed with special seismic tie downs and tiebacks while unanchored
means equipment with manufactures normal requirements.

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Turbine tripping or light damage

Reduced Slight /
Operational 10 – 30 to diesel generator or by building
use Minor
without being in minor damage state
Normal repair
1 - 10 None None
use

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1.5 VULNERABILITY
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for power-
generating facilities (EP1) are provided (Vulnerability model 1, Hazus ’99) according
to:
- Typology (small or medium / large power-generating facilities, with anchored or
unanchored components);
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.

Damage Median
Typology Serviceability β
state PGA (g)
/ Complete 0.78 0.50
Extensiv
Small, with Not repairable 0.48 0.50
e
anchored components
Usable after
(Figure 1) Moderate 0.21 0.55
repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.55
/ Complete 0.58 0.55
Small, Extensiv
Not repairable 0.42 0.50
with unanchored e
components Usable after
Moderate 0.17 0.50
(Figure 2) repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.50
/ Complete 0.92 0.55
Extensiv
Medium / Large, Not repairable 0.52 0.55
e
with anchored components
Usable after
(Figure 3) Moderate 0.25 0.60
repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.60
/ Complete 0.79 0.50
Medium / Large, Extensiv
Not repairable 0.49 0.50
with unanchored e
components Usable after
Moderate 0.22 0.55
(Figure 4) repairs
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.60
Vulnerability model 1: EP1, power-generating facilities subject to ground shaking.

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Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 1: Fragility curves of small power generating facilities with anchored

components subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 2: Fragility curves of small power generating facilities with unanchored

components subject to ground shaking.

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Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 3: Fragility curves of medium/large power generating facilities with anchored

components subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 4: Fragility curves of medium/large power generating facilities with

unanchored components subject to ground failure.

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1.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 5) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 1, according to ATC-13 in Hazus ’99). However, it is mainly
recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed
model according to each country and organization abilities

EP1: Power
Normal
generating Discrete function
distribution
facilities
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Complete 65.0 30.0 2 2 3 13 80
Extensive 22.0 21.0 16 19 24 65 100
Moderate 3.6 3.6 24 44 83 100 100
Minor 0.5 0.1 100 100 100 100 100
Restoration model 1: EP1, Power generating facilities.

Restoration Curves
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
percent functional

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 5: Restoration model of power generating facilities (EP1).

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2 EP2: Electric substation

2.1 DESCRIPTION
An electric substation (Figure 6, Photo. 2) is a facility that serves as a source of energy
supply for the local distribution area. A substation has the following main functions:
- Change or switch voltage from one level to another.
- Provide points where safety devices such as disconnect switches, circuit breakers,
and other equipment can be installed.
- Regulate voltage to compensate for system voltage changes.
- Eliminate lightning and switching surges from the system.
- Convert AC to DC and DC to AC, as needed.
- Change frequency, as needed.

Transmission and distribution substations have similar types of equipment that serve
similar functions. Substation equipments can be:
- Entirely enclosed in buildings where all the equipment is assembled into one metal
clad unit;
- Located outside the substation building.

Four different type of configuration of Switchyards exist:

- Double-bus-breaker-and-a-half;
- Double-bus-double-breaker;
- Double-bus-single-breaker;
- Ring bus

The substation components usually consist of (SCHIFF, 1999; DIKKERS et al., 1996):
- Circuit breakers;
- Power transformers;
- Bus (conductors used to carry power between equipment and throughout the
substation);
- Bus support structures;
- Control house;
- Disconnect switches;
- Capacitive- coupling voltage transformers;
- Current transformers;
- Lightning arrestors;
- Wave traps;
- Some other equipment

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Figure 6: Schematic diagram (partial) of a typical substation (WAHA et al., 1998).

© transelectrica (www.transelectrica.ro)

© RTE (www.rte-france.com)
Photo. 2: Different substations in Romania (above) and France (below)

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2.2 CLASSIFICATION
Classification should be a result of “urban system analysis” (WP03) whose first
objective is the “classification of elements at risk”. In order to classify Power
Generation Station one or several of the following points (Table 1) should be
considered.

In addition to the bus voltage station’s operational features are important factors of
system importance. High priority should be given to Manned switching centres as the
system is controlled from these locations. The next highest consideration should be
given to Generation sources since they are the supply points for the power system.
Multi- loop stations have greater importance to the network than single loop stations
because much of the system is interconnected at these locations. Lower priority should
be given to tap stations compared with single loop stations due to the smaller number of
customers served.

Table 3: Classification for electric substation.

EP2: Substation 1 (High) 2 (Medium) 3 (Low)
Redundancy
Mainly single In between Mainly redundant
capabilities
Transmission versus
Transmission Sub transmission Distribution
distribution
High voltage Medium voltage Low voltage
Power (kV) (>350 kV) (150- 350 kV) (34.5- 150 kV)
500 kV Substation 230 k V Substation 115 kV Substation
Large Industry Smaller Industry
Housing
Customer type Essential Facilities Commercial
Domestic use
Lifelines Facilities
Manned Switching
Facility Single-loop with Tap (one source)
Multi-loop with Generation with Generation
Station type
Generation Single-loop without Tap (one source)
Multi-loop without Generation without Generation
Generation

2.3 TYPOLOGY
Electric substation may be described (Hazus ’99) with respect to whether:
- Its voltage,
o High voltage (350 kV and above)- 500 kV substations
o Medium voltage (150 kV to 350 kV)- 230 kV substations
o Low voltage (34.5 kV to 150 kV)- 115 kV substations
- The subcomponents (equipment and backup power) are anchored9 or unanchored.

9
Anchored means equipment designed with special seismic tie downs and tiebacks while unanchored
means equipment with manufactures normal requirements.

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2.4 DAMAGE, CONSEQUENCES OR LOSSES

Damage to porcelain members of high-voltage substation equipment has been a
recurring problem. Equipment operating at voltages of 115 kV and below performs very
well when good installation practices of anchorage and conductor interconnection
flexibility followed. Some types of equipment operating at voltage of 220 kv and above
are vulnerable. Generally the higher the operating voltage, the more vulnerable are the
equipments.
One of the main difficulties when substation equipment is damaged is that there are
limited numbers of spare parts or spare replacement equipments. Also repair and
replacement of damage equipment is time-consuming task (SCHIFF, 1999)

Beyond common damage states (level I), alternate expressions of losses (level II) seem
relevant for electric substations (Table 4):
- Serviceability (without repairs, After repairs; Not repairable).
- Replacement value (%);

Table 4: Possible consequences of earthquake on electric substations.

Replacement
Serviceability Damage State description (Hazus ’99)
value (%)
Failure of all disconnected switches (i.e.
misalignment), all circuit, all transformer,
75 – 100 Complete
or all current transformer or by the building
being in complete damage state
Failure of 70% of the disconnected
switches (i.e. misalignment) or failure of
Not repairable 70% of the circuit breakers (i.e. circuit
breaker phase sliding off its pad, circuit
50 – 75 Extensive breaker tipping over or interrupter-head
falling to the ground) or failure of 70% of
current transformer (e.g. oil leaking from
transformer, porcelain cracked) or by the
building being in extensive damage state
Failure of 40% of the disconnected
switches (i.e. misalignment) or failure of
40% of the circuit breakers (i.e. circuit
breaker phase sliding off its pad, circuit
Operational
30 – 50 Moderate breaker tipping over or interrupter-head
after repairs
falling to the ground) or failure of 40% of
current transformer (e.g. oil leaking from
transformer, porcelain cracked) or by the
building being in moderate damage state

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Failure of 5% of the disconnected switches

(i.e. misalignment) or failure of 5% of the
circuit breakers (i.e. circuit breaker phase
Operational Slight /
10 – 30 sliding off its pad, circuit breaker tipping
almost without Minor
over or interrupter-head falling to the
repair
ground) or by the building being in minor
damage state.
1 - 10 None None

2.5 VULNERABILITY
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for electric
substation (EP2) are provided (Vulnerability model 2, Hazus ’99) according to:
- Typology (low, medium or high voltage, with anchored or unanchored
components);
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.

As a more advanced study (level II), a fault tree can be developed for each examined
substation according to:
- Site-specific studies as HWANG and. HUO (1995);
- Substation configuration.

Damage Median
Typology Serviceability β
state PGA (g)
/ Complete 0.90 0.45
Low voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.45 0.45
with anchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.29 0.55
(Figure 7)
Reduced use Minor 0.15 0.70
/ Complete 0.70 0.40
Low voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.35 0.40
with unanchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.25 0.50
(Figure 8)
Reduced use Minor 0.15 0.60
/ Complete 0.47 0.40
Medium voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.20 0.35
with anchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.15 0.45
(Figure 9)
Reduced use Minor 0.11 0.50
/ Complete 0.74 0.40
Medium voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.34 0.40
with unanchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.26 0.50
(Figure 10)
Reduced use Minor 0.13 0.65
/ Complete 0.50 0.40
High voltage,
Not repairable Extensive 0.30 0.40
with anchored components
Usable after repairs Moderate 0.20 0.50
(Figure 11)
Reduced use Minor 0.10 0.60
High voltage, / Complete 0.38 0.35
with unanchored components Not repairable Extensive 0.17 0.35

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(Figure 12) Usable after repairs Moderate 0.13 0.40

Reduced use Minor 0.09 0.50
Vulnerability model 2: EP2, electric substation subject to ground shaking.

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Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 7: Fragility curves of low voltage substation with anchored components

subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 8: Fragility curves of low voltage substation with unanchored components

subject to ground shaking.

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Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 9: Fragility curves of medium voltage substation with anchored components

subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 10: Fragility curves of medium voltage substation with unanchored

components subject to ground shaking.

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Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 11: Fragility curves of high voltage substation with anchored components
subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 12: Fragility curves of high voltage substation with unanchored components
subject to ground shaking.

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2.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves (Figure 13) are continuous (means and
standard deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time
(Restoration model 2, according to ATC-25). The curves estimated in ATC-25, based
upon expert judgment, are not consistent with the detailed system analysis performed by
SHINOZUKA et al. (1994, 1996). However, it is mainly recommended to interview
system manager / owner to adapt or improve the proposed model according to each
country and organization abilities

EP2: Electric Normal

Discrete function
substation distribution
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Complete 30.0 15.0 3 4 7 50 100
Extensive 7.0 3.5 4 13 50 100 100
Moderate 3.0 1.5 9 50 100 100 100
Minor 1.0 0.5 50 100 100 100 100
Restoration model 2: EP2, electric substation.

Restoration Curves
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
percent functional

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 13: Restoration curves of electric substations (EP2).

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3 EP3: Transmission and distribution lines

3.1 DESCRIPTION
Transmission lines connect substations; generating stations in the power network and
carry power at transmission voltages. The transmission voltage varies between utilities.
Utilities that serve less – populated areas may have transmission voltages that can be
found in the distribution system of large utilities.

Transmission lines connect generation plants and high voltage substation. While sub-
transmission lines connect:
- High Voltage Substation – Medium voltage Substation;
- Medium voltage Substation – Low voltage Substation.

Transmission lines may be underground or aboveground supported by tower. Towers

are usually of steel and carry several circuits at high voltages, with one or four feet
(Photo. 3). They are provided with reinforced concrete footings and may be supported
on piles.

Sub-transmission lines can be cables supported to steel structures (towers, pylons) or

can be buried.

The distribution system, which typically operates between 4 kV and 34 kV,

encompasses the lines and the equipments beyond the distribution substation that carry
power to customers (SCHIFF, 1999). Distribution System includes poles (from wood or
concrete, Photo. 4); pole – mounted and above – ground transformers () as well as
underground conductors. Distribution lines connect low voltage substation and
customers.

3.2 CLASSIFICATION
Classification should be a result of WP03: urban system analysis whose first objective
is the “classification of elements at risk”. In order to classify transmission and
distribution lines one or several of the following points should be considered (Table 5).

Table 5: Classification for lines.

EP3: Lines 1 (High) 2 (Medium) 3 (Low)
Redundancy
Mainly single In between Mainly redundant
capabilities
Alternative Routing 1-2 2-4 >4
Transmission versus
Transmission Sub transmission Distribution
distribution
Distance from the
<50 km In between >250 km
customers10
Population of
>150.000 25.000- 150.000 <25.000
connected cities
Customer type Large Industry Smaller Industry Housing
10
Large distance means more cost for energy transmission

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 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
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Essential Facilities Commercial Domestic use

Lifelines Facilities

© RTE (www.rte-france.com)
Photo. 3: Different types of transmission lines.

© La mediatheque EDF (http://mediatheque.edf.fr/)

Photo. 4: Different types of distribution lines.

Photograph by O. MONGE

Photograph by O. MONGE
Photo. 5: Pole – mounted and above ground Photo. 6: Electric tower
transformers. damaged by ground failure.

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 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
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3.3 TYPOLOGY
Distribution lines may be described (Hazus ’99) with respect to whether distribution
circuits are standard or seismic.

3.4 DAMAGE, CONSEQUENCES OR LOSSES

Transmission towers and poles are not very vulnerable to earthquake11. They are mainly
prone to ground failure (Photo. 6).

Table 6: Possible consequences of earthquake on distribution circuits.

Replacement value
Damage State description (Hazus ’99)
(%)
Failure of 80% of all
75 – 100 Complete
circuits
Extensiv Failure of 50% of all
50 – 75
e circuits
Failure of 12% of all
30 – 50 Moderate
circuits
10 – 30
Minor Failure of 4% of all circuits
1 - 10

3.5 VULNERABILITY
Fragility curves (medians and dispersions (β) of lognormal distribution) for distribution
lines (EP3) are provided (Vulnerability model 3, Hazus ’99) according to:
- Typology (seismic or standard distribution circuits);
- Possible damage, consequences or losses;
- Peak Ground Acceleration.

Vulnerability of transmission lines requires a more advanced study, namely an accurate

estimation of PGD and location. Nevertheless, ATC-13 proposed a vulnerability model
for transmission lines based on intensity.

Typology Damage state Median PGA (g) β

Complete 1.10 0.15
Extensive 0.72 0.15
Seismic distribution circuits (Figure 14)
Moderate 0.40 0.20
Minor 0.28 0.30
Complete 0.89 0.15
Standard distribution circuits Extensive 0.58 0.15
(Figure 15) Moderate 0.33 0.20
Minor 0.24 0.25
Vulnerability model 3: EP3, distribution circuit subject to ground shaking.

11
According to FEMA 202

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 An advanced approach to earthquake risk scenarios,
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Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 14: Fragility curves of seismic distribution circuits subject to ground shaking.

Cumulative fragility curves

1
Probability to exceed loss level

0.75

0.5

0.25

0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
PGA (g)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 15: Fragility curves of standard distribution circuits subject to ground

shaking.

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3.6 RESTORATION
According to damage states, restoration curves are continuous (means and standard
deviations of normal distribution) and approximate discrete functions of time for
Distribution circuits (Restoration model 3, Figure 16, according to ATC-13 in
Hazus ’99).
However, it is mainly recommended to interview system manager / owner to adapt or
improve the proposed model according to each country and organization abilities

EP3: Distribution Normal Discrete function

circuits distribution
Damage state Mean (days) σ 1 day 3 days 7 days 30 days 90 days
Complete 7.0 3.0 2 10 50 100 100
Extensive 3.0 1.5 9 50 100 100 100
Moderate 1.0 0.5 50 100 100 100 100
Minor 0.3 0.2 100 100 100 100 100
Restoration model 3: EP3, Distribution circuits.

Restoration Curves
1

0.9

0.8

0.7
percent functional

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
1 10 100 1 000
time (days)

Minor Moderate Extensive Complete

Figure 16: Restoration model of distribution circuits (EP3)

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