Omission

#1 PEOPLE VS. SILVESTRE AND ATIENZA

G.R. No. L-35748 (December 14, 1931)

The issue falls on whether Romana Silvestre can be convicted as an accomplice for the crime of arson that
was committed by his cohabitant Martin Atienza. [Whether or not a person is criminally liable for mere
presence and silence and/or failure to report to the authorities a crime he witnessed]

In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement
to commit the crime in question, her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not
constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit
the crime of arson. There is no law that punishes a person who does not report to the authorities the
commission of a crime which he witnessed, the omission to do so is not a felony. According to article 14
of the Penal Code with connection to Article 13, defines an accomplice to be the one who does not take
a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the
commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates
in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.

#2 PEOPLE VS. TALINGDAN

G.R. No. L-32126 (July 6, 1978)

Can a person be criminally liable for indirectly participating in a crime? [or Is mere cognizance,
acquiescence or approval required for conviction as a co-conspirator or as an accessory to a crime?]

Yes. Under paragraph 3 of Art. 19 of the RPC, a person who performs acts which conceal or assist the
principle of a crime may be considered an accessory to the crime and therefore will incur criminal liability.
[The accused knew the crime was going to be done and did not object. Thus, the court ruled that she is
criminally liable under Art. 19 of the RPC.]

Dolo/deliberate intent

#3 MANUEL VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 165842 (November 29, 2005)

[Is the accused liable under Art. 3 of the RPC?]

According to Article 3 [paragraph 2] of the Revised Penal Code, there is deceit when the act is performed
with deliberate intent. [For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a con􀁍uence
of both an evil act and an evil intent (Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea).] In the case at bar, the
petitioner is presumed to have acted with intent when he married the private complainant without having
his first marriage be declared judicially null which means that the said marriage is presumed to subsist.
[Although, as a general rule, good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for intentional
felonies; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse
because everyone is presumed to know the law (Ignorantia legis neminem excusat).]

#4 PEOPLE VS. PUNO

G.R. No. 97471 (17 February 1993)
Whether accused-appellants committed the crime of kidnapping under Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), or mere robbery [under Art. 293 of the RPC]

[The accused is found guilty of robbery under Art. 293 of the RPC.] In the determination of the crime for
which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant
offenses, the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive
and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon. For the crime of kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty,
and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of
another offense primarily intended by the offenders.

#5 PEOPLE VS. DELIM

G.R. No. 142773 (28 January 2003)

Whether or not the crime of murder absorbs the crime of kidnapping.

For kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of the malefactor
is to deprive the offended party of his liberty and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is
merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. If the
primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim's
liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and
hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.

Mistake of fact

#6 US vs. AH CHONG
G.R. No. 5272 (19 March 1910)

Is malice or criminal intent deemed an essential element for criminal liability? [Whether or not there was
a mistake of fact on the part of the accused]

Malice, or criminal intent, is deemed an essential ingredient of a felony. If the act and intent would have
been lawful and there was no negligence on the part of the accused, thus no malice, no criminal liability
shall be incurred. [In view of the circumstances presented by the defendant, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate
right of self-defense. Mistake of fact is sufficient to negate a particular intent.] Hence, Ah Chong was
acquitted of his wrongful act since he did not have the criminal intention of killing his roommate.

#7 PEOPLE VS. OANIS

G.R. No. 47722 (27 July 1943)

Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incurred criminal liability by reason of mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties

No, the maxim is ignoratia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without
fault or negligence. In the instant case, the appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which
would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even
effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed, according to one eyewitness. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for
appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas, at sight, but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression
is offered by him.

Malum prohibitum as an exception to mens rea

#8 PADILLA VS. DIZON

AC No. 3086 (23 February 1988)

Whether or not respondent Judge Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
holding the accused Lo Chi Fai in violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960

[The respondent judge shown gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law in holding to convict
the accused for violation of CB Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the accused had
the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate
intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses to be punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.]
It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are
already shown by the record, and on credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil
intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of
a respondent is necessary.

#9 MAGNO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96132 (26 June 1992)

Whether or not the petitioner should be punished for violation of Batas Pambansa 22, which is a Special
Law prohibiting the issuance of bouncing checks.

The intent to commit a crime is not necessary in crimes that are punished by special laws, it is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. To “perpetrate” an
act mean that the act was done freely and consciously, as intent to “commit” an act carries a criminal
motive to the action. In cases where there is lack of intent in the performance of a criminal act, even if
the criminal act is punished by a special law, the accused cannot be liable. Hence, the accused is acquitted
of the charges.

#10 GARCIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 157171 (14 March 2006)

[Whether the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) of RA 6646 are classified as mala in se or mala prohibita]

The acts prohibited in Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 are mala in se. [As a general rule, mala in se felonies are
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral,
they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On
the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but
become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden.]

#11 CUENCA VS. PEOPLE

GR. No. L-27586 (June 26, 1970)

Whether or not the illegal possession of firearms, [a crime classified as mala prohibita, is excusable by
good faith.]

In general, crimes that are classified as mala prohibita are punishable because there are laws punishing it.
Mere commission of crimes classified as mala prohibita, even without criminal intent is punishable. Hence,
good faith or lack of criminal intent is not accepted as a defense unless this is an element of a crime.

#12 PEOPLE VS. DELA ROSA

G.R. No. 84857 (January 16, 1998)

Whether or not an accused is guilty of a crime of illegal possession of firearms, which is mala prohibitum
punishable by a special law, even though he has no intention of possessing it.

It is known that good faith and criminal intent is immaterial in mala prohibitum, those punishable under
special laws. A distinction must be made between criminal intent and intent to possess (animus
possidendi) because to be found guilty of violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 the accused should
possess a firearm which he has no authority or license to possess and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. [Mere possession is
sufficient to convict a person for crimes which are malum prohibitum like illegal possession of firearms
but in the case at bar, the accused was acquitted for lack of proof presented by the prosecution.]

#13 (Mark’s file hehe)---

Negligence or lack of foresight

#14 PEOPLE VS. PUGAY

G.R. No. L-74324 (17 November 1988)

Whether or not the accused are both guilty of the crime of murder.

Pugay can only be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide since he failed to exercise due
diligence to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions, who at the time were making fun of the deceased. A man must use common sense, and
exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct,
then through fear of incurring punishment. In the case of Samson, it can be conceded that as of their fun-
making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire which still doesn’t excuse him from
criminal liability. A criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.