Johnson v. McIntosh within the boundaries of the states existing at that time.

It follows that
those natives who lived within such boundaries did not own title to
Citation. 22 Ill.21 U.S. 543, 8 Wheat. 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 (1823)
the land. Therefore, the Plaintiff does not have a title recognizable by
the United States.
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs sought to have certain land grants
purportedly made by Indian tribal chiefs, recognized by the United
States government.

CHAVEZ V. UNITED STATES, 175 U.S. 552 (1899)

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The title of land which has been discovered
and conquered belongs entirely to the conquering nation, subject only
CHAVEZ V. UNITED STATES
to the right of those natives present to occupy the land.

ARGUED OCTOBER 17-18, 1899

Facts. At issue were two purported grants of land by Indian tribes to
private individuals, one in 1773 and the other 1775. The lands
constituted the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations. Here, the Plaintiff
sought to have the United States government recognize the Plaintiff’s
title to the lands, which were alleged to have passed under the grants.
DECIDED DECEMBER 22, 1899, 175 U.S. 552
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF PRIVATE LAND CLAIMS
Syllabus:

Issue. May Indian tribes give a legally recognizable title in land to

In Mexico, in 1831, a departmental assembly or territorial deputation
private individuals, such that the title may be received by the private
had no power or authority to make a grant of lands, and the fact that
person and upheld against any claims by courts of the United States?
the governor presided at a meeting of the territorial deputation at the
time such a grant was made, makes no difference, as the power to
Held. No. The judgment of the District Court of Illinois denying the
make the grant was exclusively in the governor, and the territorial
Plaintiff’s right to assert title to lands purportedly granted is
deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter. The statement of the
affirmed. The rules of property must be drawn from and decided by
case will be found in the opinion of the Court.
the nation in which the property which is the subject matter of the
lawsuit lies. Due to the historical precedents established by the
European discovery of this North America and the subsequent
conquest and division thereof, the rule was that among the nations of G.R. NO. 1413 MARCH 30, 1904
Europe, title properly belonged to the nation which discovered the
new land. ANDRES VALENTON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

Incident to the principle that title belonged to the nation which VS.
discovered the new land, was the subsequent diminishment of the
natives ability to dispose of their land. This impairment of native MANUEL MURCIANO, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

sovereignty was subject to the recognition that the natives could live
on the land, but that they could not grant the land to a private
individual. This was the case because the land itself was subject to the
FACTS:
dominion and control of the nation which discovered and conquered
it.
The case presents, therefore, the important question whether or not
during the years from 1860 to 1890 a private person, situated as the
The remaining question is whether the United States accepted or
plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the State the
rejected the historical principle. According to the treaty ending the
ownership of the public lands of the State by means of occupation.
Revolutionary War, Great Britain relinquished any claim to
The court finds that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in 1860 the
“proprietary and territorial rights of the United States.” Thus, the
lands were vacant and were public lands belonging to the then existing
United States owned the entirety of the lands which were situated
Government. The plaintiffs do not claim to have ever obtained from
the Government any deed for the lands, nor any confirmation of their
possession. Whether in the absence of any special legislation on the
subject a general statute of limitations in which the State was not
expressly excepted would run against the State as to its public lands
we do not find it necessary to decide. Reasons based upon public
policy could be adduced why it should not, at least as to such public
lands as are involved in this case. (See Act No. 926, sec. 67.) We are,
however, of the opinion that the case at bar must be decided, not by
the general statute of limitation contained in the Partidas, but by
those special laws which from the earliest times have regulated the
disposition of the public lands in the colonies.
MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Err., v. INSULAR
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
212 U.S. 449 (29 S.Ct. 334, 53 L.Ed. 594)
MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Err., v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE
FACTS:
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in
the Philippine Islands. This begins with the usual theoretic assertion
that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by
competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that,
for all legal effects, those who have been in possession for certain
times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, twenty years,
uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when
this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the
land by the very terms of the decree. But, it is said, the object of this
law was to require the adjustment or registration proceedings that it
described, and in that way to require everyone to get a document of
title or lose his land. That purpose may have been entertained, but it
does not appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The regulations
purport to have been made 'for the adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals.' (We follow the translation
in the government's brief.) It does not appear that this land ever was
royal land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6 it is provided that
'interested parties not included within the two preceding articles the
articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years may
legalize their possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the
said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in
the following manner.' This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to
those declared already to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8
provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands
of which they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year,
and threatens that the treasury 'will reassert the ownership of the
state over the lands,' and will sell at auction such part as it does not
reserve. The applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt
at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made.
Finally, it should be noted that the natural construction of the decree
is confirmed by the report of the council of state. That report puts
forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the condition
of almost all property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status
by general rules, on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period
legalizes completely all possession; recommends in two articles
twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree; and then suggests
that interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their
possession and acquire ownership by adjustment
At a certain price.
It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5 attributes title to those 'who
may prove' possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook
the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings.
It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that
ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word
of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do
so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree
of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of
adjustment under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not
been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as the
withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was
disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the court of land registration
for another recognition of the common-law prescription of thirty
years as still running against alienable Crown land. It will be perceived
that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition.
We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible
effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress
establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice
require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and
should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those
among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
EN BANC
G.R. NO. L-24066 DECEMBER 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
ANGELA RAZON AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
DEFENDANTS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, APPELLANT.
FACTS:
A complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the
Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole
and absolute owner of the parcel of land; (b) annulling the sale made
by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that
the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon. The Director of Lands
denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special
defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the
Government of the United States under the administration and
control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which
was made in accordance with law. The Court of First Instance of
Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the
possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to her.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold
the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza. After having been in possession thereof for about eight
years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza sold it to Valentin Susi. Before the execution of the
deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered
thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price
of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question,
first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin
Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land. Having
failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question
through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for
the purchase thereof. After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of
Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon and issued the proper
certificate of title to Angela Razon. Angela Razon required Valentin
Susi to vacate the land in question.
ISSUE:
Who is then the rightful owner of the land?
HELD:
SC in their decision favoured Valentin Susi. According to SC there is,
the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for
he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through
his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right
to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII
of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only
a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may
be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient,
under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State,
it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control
of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question
to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void
and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
Oh Cho vs Director of Lands G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

FACTS:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of

land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely
possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for
registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground
that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an alien.

ISSUEs:

Whether or not Oh Cho had title

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be
confirmed under the Land Registration Act.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to
the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of
an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of

registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled to a

decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application
for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was
not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was
mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was
transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory
right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh
Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.