right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending, the defense

First Philippines International Bank vs. C.A. [G.R. No. 115849. January 24, 1996]
of litis pendencia in one case is a bar to the others; and, a final judgment in one would
constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. In either case,
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
forum shopping could be cited by the other party as a ground to ask for summary
FACTS:
dismissal of the two (or more) complaints or petitions, and for the imposition of the
[D]uring the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, Henry Co and
other sanctions, which are direct contempt of court, criminal prosecution, and
several other stockholders of the Bank (petitioner), through counsel Angara Abello
disciplinary action against the erring lawyer.
Concepcion Regala and Cruz, filed an action (Second Case) purportedly a “derivative
[W]hat is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping exists
suit” with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 against Encarnacion,
or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks
Demetria and Janolo “to declare any perfected sale of the property as unenforceable
different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes
and to stop Ejercito from enforcing or implementing the sale. In his answer, Janolo
and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the
argued that the Second Case was barred by litis pendentia by virtue of the case then
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
pending in the Court of Appeals. During the pre-trial conference in the Second Case,
issue. In this case, this is exactly the problem: a decision recognizing the perfection
plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Dismiss the Case Without Prejudice.
and directing the enforcement of the contract of sale will directly conflict with a
Private respondent opposed this motion on the ground, among others, that plaintiff’s
possible decision in the Second Case barring the parties from enforcing or
act of forum shopping justifies the dismissal of both cases, with prejudice. Private
implementing the said sale. Indeed, a final decision in one would constitute res
respondent, in his memorandum, averred that this motion is still pending in the Makati
judicata in the other.
RTC.
[P]etitioners explain that there is no forum-shopping because:

1) In the earlier or “First Case” from which this proceeding arose, the Bank was
impleaded as a defendant, whereas in the “Second Case” (assuming the Bank is the
real party in interest in a derivative suit), it was the plaintiff;

xxx

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is forum-shopping on the part of petitioner Bank.

HELD:
YES. Petition was denied. Assailed decision was affirmed. Petitioner was reprimanded.
Costs against the petitioner.

RATIO:
[W]here a litigant (or one representing the same interest or person) sues the same
party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation of the same
KIRTSAENG VS. JOHN WILEY& SONS Ginsburgdissented, joined by Anthony Kennedy and Antonin Scalia. Kagan's
concurrence suggested that Congress could change the law to reverse the decision.[7]
Facts of the case
Supap Kirtsaeng came to the United States from Thailand in 1997. He obtained an
undergraduate degree at Cornell University before being accepted into a PhD program
at the University of Southern California. To subsidize the cost of his education,
Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of textbooks in Thailand
and to ship those books to him in the United States. Kirstaeng then sold the textbooks
on eBay at a profit. Among the books Kirtsaeng sold, were eight textbooks printed in
Asia by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
Wiley sued Kirtsaeng in district court for copyright infringement under Section
602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act, which makes it impermissible to import a work "without
the authority of the owner." Kirtsaeng asserted a defense under Section 109(a) of the
Copyright Act, which allows the owner of a copy "lawfully made under this title" to sell
or otherwise dispose of the copy without the copyright owner's permission. The
district court rejected Kirtsaeng's argument, and held that the doctrine was
inapplicable to goods manufactured in a foreign country.
Kirtsaeng appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A
divided panel acknowledged that it was a difficult question of statutory construction,
but the majority held that Section 109(a) referred specifically to works that are made
in the United States and did not apply to works manufactured abroad. Kirtsaeng's
request for rehearing was denied, and he appealed the appellate court's decision.

HELD:

In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that Kirtsaeng's
sale of lawfully-made copies purchased overseas was protected by the first-sale
doctrine. The Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to goods manufactured
outside of the United States, and the protections and exceptions offered by the
Copyright Act to works "lawfully made under this title" is not limited by geography.
Rather, it applies to all copies legally made anywhere, not just in the United States, in
accordance with U.S. copyright law. So, wherever a copy of a book is first made and
sold, it can be resold in the U.S. without permission from the publisher.[6]
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion of the court which was joined by five Justices
(Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan).[1] Justice Elena Kagan also wrote a
separate concurring opinion, signed by Samuel Alito. Justice Ruth Bader
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore Held. Yes. Judgment reversed and case remanded.
* Punitive damages may be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Ira Gore, Jr. (Respondent), purchased a new punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition. States have considerable
BMW and later learned that the car had been repainted. In a suit for suppression of a flexibility to protect its citizens by prohibiting deceptive trade practices. State
material fact, the Respondent was awarded $2 million in punitive damages. The sovereignty, however, prevents states from imposing economic sanctions with the
Petitioner, BMW of North America, Inc. (Petitioner), appeals, claiming the punitive intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States. Alabama does not
damages award is grossly excessive. have the power to punish petitioner for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and
had no impact on Alabama.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United * Three guideposts lead the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) to
States Constitution (Constitution) limits the amount recoverable in punitive damages the determination that the $2 million award against Petitioner is grossly excessive: (i)
when the damages constitute grossly excessive punishment for a tortfeasor. the degree of reprehensibility; (ii) the disparity between the harm suffered and the
punitive damage award; and (iii) the difference between this remedy and civil
penalties authorized in comparable cases.
* First, the degree of reprehensibility. Nonviolent crimes are less serious than violent
Facts. The Respondent purchased a BMW sports sedan from an authorized BMW
crimes. Trickery and deceit is more reprehensible than negligence. The harm
dealer in Birmingham, Alabama. After approximately nine months, Respondent took
Petitioner inflicted was purely economic in nature. There is no evidence Petitioner
the car to an independent detailer to have the car detailed. The proprietor of the
acted in bad faith. Petitioner reasonably relied on state disclosure statutes, allowing
independent detailer detected evidence that the car had been repainted. The
the car sales in this case in most states. Based on these facts, Petitioner’s conduct was
repainting was done by BMW to repair acid rain damage that occurred when the car
not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant a $2 million exemplary damages award.
was in transit from Germany. Respondent brought suit against the Petitioner alleging
* Second, the ratio between the harm suffered and the punitive damage award. There
that the failure to disclose the fact that the car had been repainted constituted
must be a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the
suppression of a material fact. At trial, Petitioner acknowledged it had adopted a
compensatory damages. Although the Supreme Court refuses to draw a mathematical
nationwide policy of selling cars as new without advising the dealer that any repairs
bright line, this punitive damages award is 500 times the amount of the actual harm
had been made when the repair cost did not exceed three percent of the suggested
determined by the jury. This exceptional difference raises suspicions.
retail price. At trial, Respondent introduced evidence that his repainted car was worth
* Third, sanctions for comparable misconduct. Substantial deference should be given
less than a car that had not been refinished. In support of a punitive damages claim,
to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue. In
he introduced
this case, the punitive damages were tantamount to that of a severe criminal penalty.
evidence that since 1983 Petitioner had sold nine hundred eighty three refinished cars
This Court believes that based on these three guidelines, the punitive damage award
as new, including fourteen in Alabama. Petitioner disputed evidence that refinished
imposed, violates the constitutional limit of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution.
cars were worth less, argued that its good-faith belief made punitive damages
inappropriate and that transactions other than Alabama had no relevance to
respondent’s claim. The jury found Petitioner liable for $4,000 in compensatory
damages and $4 million in punitive damages. The trial judge denied Petitioner’s
motion to set aside the punitive damages, finding that it was not grossly excessive,
and therefore did not violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the
Constitution. After post-trial motions, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the award
to $2 million on the ground that the jury improperly multiplied Gore’s compensatory
damages by the number of similar sales in all States.

Issue. Was the $2 million punitive damages award to the purchaser of a refinished car
grossly excessive, so as to violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of
the Constitution?
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd whereby the pervasive regulation of the internal order of a ship is not present.
The structural modifications needed under Title III for compliance with its barrier-
Brief Fact Summary. A class action which sought declarative and injunctive relief removal provisions clearly would affect the internal order of the ship because the
against the Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd (NCL) (D) under the Title III of the ADA, which physical aspect of the ship would be altered and some of this is related to safety, which
prohibits discrimination based on disability was filed by disabled individuals (P) and under international law traditionally has been the province of the ship’s flag state. This
their companions (P) who had bought tickets for round-trip cruises from a U.S. port. would not be in consonance with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS) and other similar inconsistencies might exist between the structural
requirements of Title III and the disability laws of other countries. According, the ADA
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not
should not apply to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters.
seek to regulate a vessel’s internal affairs but it is applies to foreign-flag ships in U.S.
waters.
Discussion. Unlike the statute’s unambiguous general terms, the clear-statement rul is
an implied limitation and operates much like other implied rules, which avoid
Facts. With its principal place of business in Miami, Florida, NCL (D), a Bermuda
applications of otherwise unambiguous statutes that would intrude on sensitive
Corporation, operated cruise ships that departed from and returned to port in the
domains in a way that Congress is unlikely to have intended had it considered the
United States. A large chunk of the company’s revenue came from the U.S but almost
matter.
all of NCL’s (D) vessels were registered in other countries. A class action was brought
An all-or-nothing approach to the rule was avoided by the court in this case, under
against the cruise company by disabled individuals (P) and their companions (P) who
which a statute is altogether inapplicable if but one of its specific applications trenches
had purchased tickets for round-trip cruises from a U.S. port.
on the domain protected by a clear-statement rule. This approach taking would
The plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief against NCL (D) under the Title III
change the clear-statement rule from a principle of interpretive caution into a trap for
of the ADA, which prohibit discrimination. Because the ADA does not apply to foreign-
an unwary Congress, which would require the cancellation of the entire statute or of
flag vessels in U.S. territory absent a clear indication of congressional intent to the
some arbitrary set of applications larger than the domain the rule protects.
contrary, the court of appeals dismissed the claim. But the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Issue. Does the Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act seek to regulate a vessel’s
internal affairs and does it applies to foreign-flag ships in U.S. waters?

Held. (kennedy, J.) Yes. The Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not
seek to regulate a vessel’s internal affairs but it is applies to foreign-flag ships in U.S.
waters. It is only when the of the United States or its citizens rather than the interest
internal to the ship are at stake that the general statutes are presumed to apply to
conduct that takes place aboard a foreign-flag vessel in U.S. territory.
The absence of a clear statement of congressional intent is the narrow exception to
this presumption which is based on international comity, and the general statute is
not applicable to foreign-flag vessels as to matters involving order and discipline of the
vessel. If the Title III were to be read to require permanent and significant structural
modifications to foreign vessels, then clear-statement rule would most likely come
into play. Otherwise, Title III is applicable to NCL’s (D) foreign-flag cruise ship. Reversed
and remanded.

Dissent. (Scalia, J) It is when laws interfere with the regulation of a ship internal order
that the clear-statement rule comes into play and this is designed to promote
international comity and avoid international discord. It is not applicable in situation
Pennoyer v. Neff the payments of its citizens, even when the land is owned by a non-resident, without
infringing upon the sovereignty of the state of residency of the landowner.
Citation. 95 U.S. 714, 5 Otto 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Neff was being sued by Mitchell in Oregon for unpaid
legal fees. A default judgment was entered against Defendant for his failure to come
to court or otherwise resist the lawsuit, despite the fact that he was not personally
served with process, nor was a resident of Oregon. Later, in an attempt to collect upon
his judgment, Mitchell attached land located in Oregon belonging to Defendant, and
had it sold to Plaintiff Pennoyer through a Sheriff’s sale.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Proceedings in a court of law to determine the personal rights
and obligations of parties over whom the court has not jurisdiction are invalid for want
of due process of law.
Discussion. Here the Supreme Court of the United States is distinguishing between
suits in personam, and in rem. An in personam suit is a suit against a person, whose
purpose is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendant. An in
rem action, meanwhile, is an action where jurisdiction pertains to property. Thus the
court reasoned that constructive service is sufficient to inform parties of action taken
against any properties owned by them within the forum state, because property is
always in possession of the owner, and seizure of the property will inform the owner
of legal action taken against him.

Facts. Mitchell, a lawyer, sued Defendant, his client, in Oregon state court for unpaid
legal fees. At the time Defendant was a non-resident of the state who was not
personally served with process. Constructive service was issued upon Defendant by
publication. Defendant did not come to court or otherwise resist the lawsuit, and
default judgment was entered against him. After the default judgment, Defendant
acquired 300 acres of land in Oregon. To satisfy his judgment against Defendant,
Mitchell had the sheriff seize and sell Defendant’s land. The land was purchased by
Plaintiff, who received a sheriff’s deed as evidence of title. The sheriff then turned the
sale proceeds over to Mitchell. Shortly after the sheriff’s sale, Defendant discovered
what had happened to his land and brought suit against Plaintiff to recover the land.
This appeal followed after Defendant lost his suit against Plaintiff.

Issue. Can judgments obtained against non-residents who fail to appear in court be
sustained by default judgments where service of process is accomplished solely
through publication (i.e. constructive service)?
Is constructive service sufficient notice to attach property within the forum state
owned by a non-resident?

Held. No. The personal judgment recovered in the state court of Oregon against
Plaintiff was without validity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals overturning that
judgment was affirmed.
When a suit is merely in personam (i.e. against a person), constructive service through
publication upon a non-resident is ineffective.

No state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. However, a state may subject property within its boundaries to
Asiavest Limited v. CA Digest
BANCODO BRASIL VS CA
Rule 14, Section 15 - Banco do Brasil vs Court of Appeals 333 SCRA 545 (June 16,
Facts:
2000)
Ponente: Justice De Leon
1. The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras
praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded
Facts:
by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in
M/V Star Ace a vessel owned and operated by Poro Point Shipping Services (PPSS)
personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the
ran aground in La Union during a typhoon. In 1989, Cesar Urbino, Sr. sued PPSS for
principal debtor.
damages. He also impleaded Banco do Brasil (BDB) for the sole reason that it has a
2. The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized
claim over the ship. BDB is a foreign corporation not engaged in business in the
and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal
Philippines. The Trial court ruled in favor of Urbino. BDB appealed arguing that there
presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.
was no valid service of summons because the same was issued to the ambassador of
3. Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial
Brazil and that summon through publication was inapplicable to it as the action
costs and an increase in attorney's fees with interest until full payment of the said
against them is an action in personam.
obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed the motion and instead
appealed the decision to CA.
Issue: Whether or not the summons were properly issued.
4. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a
non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for
Held: The summons was not properly issued. When the defendant is a non-resident
money recovery. Summons should have been personally served on Heras in Hong
and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in
Kong,
accordance with Rule 14, Section 17 (now section 15) of the Rules of Court. Under
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by
this provision, there are only four (4) instances when extraterritorial service of
evidence of want of jurisdiction due to improper notice to the party
summons is proper, namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status of the
YES.
plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within
the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
1. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
since the stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City,
the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when
Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being
the defendant non-resident’s property has been attached within the
sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong
Philippines." In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal
Kong and the action against him was, ne in personam, summons should have been
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of
personally served on him in Hong Kong.
court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Extrajudicial services
of summons apply only where the action is in rem. However, where the action is in
The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong
validly try and decide the case. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal
court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having
service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over
been rendered without jurisdiction.
the person. This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically present
2. On the same note, Heras was also an absentee,hence, he should have been served
in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. In the present case, the
17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply
relief demanded went beyond the res by making a claim for damages, thus,
because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which
converting the respondent’s action into an action in personam. Bearing in mind
allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from
the in personam nature of the action, personal or, if not possible, substituted service
the country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the
of summons on petitioner, and not extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer
undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good.
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and validly hold it liable to private
respondent for damages.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED vs LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY
G.R. No. 175799
November 28, 2011
FACTS:
On August 30, 2005, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City a Complaint against NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia)
Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between
the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and for damages.
Upon respondent’s motion, the trial court authorized respondent’s counsel to
personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in
Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner.
On October 20, 2005, petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss
praying for the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds that the court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and improper
service of summons; the Complaint failed to state a cause of action; respondent does
not have any against petitioner; and other grounds.
On December 9, 2005, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss
providing that there was a proper service of summons through the Department of
Foreign Affairs on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a
license to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom
summons and other legal processes maybe served. The trial court also held that the
Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion to
Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated during
the trial.
On April 3, 2006, petitioner sought redress via a Petition for Certiorari with the Court
of Appeals, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
its Motion to Dismiss.
On September 8, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing
the Petition for Certiorari.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition assailing the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC is considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on
account of its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
HELD:
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on account
of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner through the
DFA, with respondent’s counsel personally bringing the summons and Complaint to
the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia.
Respondent argues that extraterritorial service of summons upon foreign private
juridical entities is not proscribed under the Rules of Court.
Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision dealing precisely with the service
of summons on a defendant which does not reside and is not found in the Philippines.
Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four instances
wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which
is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or
in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached
within the Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave
of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in
rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. . On the other hand, when
the defendant or respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and
the action involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court
It is likewise settled that an action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation.
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts
between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff
seeks to be freed from its obligations to the defendant under a contract and to hold
said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering into such contract. It is
therefore an action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches a property
within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the action will be
converted to onequasi in rem.
Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the defendant,
petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, the
Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of the impossibility of acquiring
jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily appears in court
In this regard, respondent vigorously argues that petitioner should be held to have
voluntarily appeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and was actually
afforded, specific reliefs from the trial court.
The Court therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial
court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction
Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Petition is DENIED
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
a prohibitive burden of interstate commerce. The trial court found for Washington and
the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, reasoning that the continuous flow of
Defendant’s product into Washington was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
Defendant appealed.
Issue. Is service of process upon Defendant’s agent sufficient notice when the
corporation’s activities result in a large volume of interstate business so that the
corporation receives the protection of the laws of the state and the suit is related to
the activities which make the corporation present?

International Shoe Co. v. Washington Held. Yes. Affirmed. The general rule is that in order to have jurisdiction with someone
outside the state, the person must have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. For a corporation, the “minimum contacts” required are not just
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was an out of state company that employed salesmen continuous and systematic activities but also those that give rise to the liabilities sued
within the state of Washington. Washington sued Defendant to recover unpaid on. Defendant could have sued someone in Washington. It was afforded the
unemployment taxes and served Defendant in two ways: (1) by mail and (2) by serving protection of the laws of that state, and therefore it should be subject to suit.
one of its salesmen within the state. Defendant appealed from a verdict for
Washington, claiming that Washington had no personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Dissent. The state’s power to tax should not be qualified by an ambiguous statement
regarding fair play and substantial justice.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, the defendant must have such minimum contacts with the state so that Discussion. This decision articulates the rule for determining whether a state has
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend “traditional notions of fair personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant via the “minimum contacts” test. In
play and substantial justice.” general, International Shoe demonstrates that contacts with a state should be
evaluated in terms of how “fair” it would be to exercise jurisdiction over an absent
Facts. International Shoe Co., Defendant, was a company based in Delaware with an defendant.
office in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant employed salesmen that resided in Washington
to sell their product in the state of Washington. Defendant regularly shipped orders
to the salesmen who accepted them, the salesmen would display the products at
places in Washington, and the salesmen were compensated by commission for sale of
the products. The salesmen were also reimbursed for the cost of renting the places of
business in Washington. Washington sued Defendant after Defendant failed to make
contributions to an unemployment compensation fund exacted by state statutes. The
Washington statute said that the commissioner could issue personal service if
Defendant was found within the state, or by mailing it to Defendant if Defendant was
not in the state. The notice of assessment was served upon Defendant’s salesperson
and a copy of the notice was mailed to Defendant. Defendant appeared specially,
moving to set aside the order that service upon the salesperson was proper service.
Defendant also argued that it did not “do business” in the state, that there was no
agent upon which service could be made, and that Defendant did not furnish
employment within the meaning of the statute. Defendant also argued that the
statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and imposed
Kulko v. Superior Court
Brief Fact Summary. Appellee separated from appellant and moved to California. After
their children joined her in California, appellee attempted to bring a divorce suit in
California against appellant, who still resided in New York.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order to establish personal jurisdiction a defendant must
have certain minimum contacts with the forum State so as not to offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Facts. Appellant Ezra Kulko married appellee Sharon Kulko Horn in 1959 during
appellant’s three-day stopover in California en route from a military base in Texas to a
tour of duty in Korea. At the time both parties were domiciled in and residents of New
York. Appellee immediately returned to New York after the marriage, as did appellant
after his tour of duty. The two lived in New York for 13 years and then separated.
Appellant remained in New York with their children, while appellee moved to
California. She briefly returned to sign a separation agreement providing the children
would live in New York. Immediately afterward appellee flew to Haiti and procured a
divorce incorporating the terms of the agreement. In 1973 appellant’s daughter told
her father that she wanted to remain in California after her Christmas vacation.
Appellant bought her a one-way ticket. In 1976 appellant’s other child called his
mother and told her he wanted to live with her in California. She sent h
im a plane ticket unbeknownst to his father, and he flew to California and took up
residence with his mother and sister. Less than a month later, appellee commenced
this action against appellant in the California Superior Court seeking to establish the
Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment; to modify the judgment to award her
full custody of the children; and to increase appellant’s child-support obligations.
Appellant appeared specially and moved to quash service of the summons on the
ground that he was not a California resident and lacked sufficient minimum contacts
with the State to warrant assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court
summarily denied the motion to quash, and appellee sought review. The California
Supreme Court sustained the lower court rulings.
Issue. Did appellant have sufficient minimum contacts with California to allow
California to assert personal jurisdiction over him in this matter?
himself of the protections and laws of California by sending his daughter to live there
with her mother.
The Due Process Clause operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts over
nonresident defendants. In order to exercise such jurisdiction certain minimum
contacts must be established so as to not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
In reaching its decision the Court did not rely on the appellant’s glancing presence in
the State or his marriage there, nor could it have. It did not rely on the fact that at
separation appellant ha agreed to allow his children to live in California 3 months per
year because it would discourage parents from entering into reasonable visitation
agreements and it could arbitrarily subject one parent to suit in any State the other
parent chose to spend time while having custody.
The purposeful act of allowing his daughter to spend more time in California than
required under the agreement is insufficient to show that he purposefully availed
himself of the benefits and protections of its laws. California’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction was unreasonable in that it involved an agreement entered into with
virtually no connection to the forum State.
Basic considerations of fairness favor appellant’s State of domicile as the proper
forum. It was the State of the marital domicile where his entire family resided prior to
the separation. The single act of allowing his daughter to spend more time in California
is not one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the substantial financial
burden and personal strain of litigation in a forum 3,000 miles away. Jurisdiction in
such cases would impose an unreasonable burden on family relations.
Discussion. The Court found that the single act of permitting his daughter to spend
more time in California than required under a separation agreement was insufficient
to establish the minimum contacts with California such that it would not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to assert personal jurisdiction
over appellant.

Held. Appellant’s act of permitting his daughter to spend more time in California did
not amount to his purposefully availing himself of the benefits and protections of
California’s laws so as to permit California to assert personal jurisdiction.
The California Supreme Court found that personal jurisdiction may be exercised when
a nonresident defendant caused an effect in that State and jurisdiction over causes
arising from that effect is reasonable. It found that appellant had purposefully availed
Burnham v. Superior Court

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff Dennis Burnham, a New Jersey resident, was served with
process for divorce by his wife in California, while he was visiting California on
business.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define
the due process standard.

Facts. Plaintiff a New Jersey resident, visited Southern California on business, after
which he went to visit his children in the San Francisco Bay area, where his wife
resided. Upon returning the children to his wife’s home, Plaintiff was served with a
California court summons and a copy of his wife’s divorce petition. Plaintiff made a
special appearance in California for the purpose of filing a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The Superior Court denied
the motion, and the California Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief. The Supreme
Court of the United States then granted certiorari.

Issue. Whether the Due Process clause denies a state court jurisdiction over a non-
resident who was personally served with process while temporarily in that state, in a
suit unrelated to his activities in that state.

Held. No. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the California Superior Court.
Jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is
one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process
standard. That standard was developed by analogy to physical presence.

Concurrence. Justice Brennan concurred, in which he was joined by Justices Marshall,

Blackmun, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Justice Brennan differs from the majority
in that he believes physical presence in a state permits jurisdiction not because service
of process occurred on the person in the state, but because by voluntarily coming into
the state, the defendant avails himself of the benefit and privileges of the law of the
state, even if only for a short period of time.
Justice Stevens also concurred. His concurrence only notes that this was a very easy
case to decide given the historical evidence and considerations of fairness.

Discussion. An individual’s physical presence in a state at the time process is served

upon them satisfies traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Thus the
Court rejected the argument that a state lacks jurisdiction unless the litigation arises
out of his activities in the state.
World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs purchased a car in New York and were subsequently
involved in a car accident in Oklahoma. Plaintiffs sued the distributor and retailer of
the car (Defendants) in Oklahoma state court for injuries suffered in the car accident.
Defendants moved to dismiss arguing Oklahoma did not have personal jurisdiction.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A non-resident defendant must purposely avail himself of the
forum state’s privileges and protections for that state to have personal jurisdiction
over him unless the case pertains to a product connected with defendant’s business
that was brought into the forum state by the plaintiff. Foreseeability that the product
might eventually enter the state is irrelevant if there is no purposeful availment of that
state’s privileges and protections.
The foreseeability inquiry asks not whether the manufacturer or distributor can
foresee his product ending up in a particular state, but whether he can foresee being
hailed into court there.
This case is distinguishable from Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Co.,
22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). In Gray, the company delivered its product to
another state with the expectation that consumers in that forum state would purchase
it. This case involved a unilateral activity completely out of the control of Defendants.
Dissent. Justice Brennan: The analysis should be focused on fairness and
reasonableness. The constitutional consideration is not what the best forum is but
whether the defendant is linked to that forum and the burden is not unreasonable.
The focus is on the relation among the parties, the transaction, and the forum state.

Facts. The Robinsons, Plaintiffs, bought a car in New York from Seaway, Defendant. Discussion. The majority opinion shows that a state does not necessarily have personal
Plaintiffs drove the car to Oklahoma where they were in a car accident and injured. jurisdiction over a corporate defendant simply because its product was brought into
Plaintiffs sued Seaway, Audi (the manufacturer), Volkswagen of America (the the forum state. There defendant must still have voluntarily connected himself or
importer) and World-Wide Volkswagen (Worldwide; the regional distributor) as herself with the forum state via the notion that it purposely availed itself of the forum
Defendants in a strict liability action in Oklahoma state court claiming the gas tank and state’s laws.
fuel system were defective. There was no evidence that the retailers and distributors
had ever made any transactions in Oklahoma. The trial court held that it had
jurisdiction over Defendants in Oklahoma and denied World-Wide’s motion for
reconsideration. World-Wide sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma. The writ was denied on the grounds that jurisdiction was authorized by the
Oklahoma long arm statute. World-Wide appealed.

Issue. Can a state exercise in personam jurisdiction on the distributor and retailer of a
product when the distributor and retailer do not utilize the privileges of conducting
activities within that state, and do not distribute their product with the expectation
that it will be purchased by consumers within the state?

Held. No. Reversed.

The two goals of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90
L.Ed. 95 (1945), are to avoid unfair inconveniences for the defendant and to maintain
the system of co-equal sovereignty among the states.

Although the rule in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2
L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), demonstrates that contact with the forum for an out-of-state
defendant is not always inconvenient, jurisdictional boundaries are still relevant.
Contacts with the forum state are still required. The defendant must purposely avail
himself of the laws of the forum state in order for to satisfy the minimum contacts
test.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
Brief Fact Summary. A person injured in a motorcycle accident sued the manufacturer
of the motorcycle’s tire, who then filed a cross-complaint against the manufacturer of
one part of the tire.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The substantial connection between the Defendant and the
forum state necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an
action of the Defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state.
minimum contacts, Justice Brennan still found jurisdiction improper because fair play
and substantial justice would not be achieved. Justice Stevens also concurred, in which
he was joined by Justices White and Blackmun. Specifically, he found that minimum
contacts are not always necessary for a state court to invoke jurisdiction.
Discussion. In analyzing whether jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, the court noted that the burden on the Defendant to
defend the suit would be severe. Moreover, the court noticed that California’s interest
in the suit is slight, since the Plaintiff is not a California resident.

Facts. Gary Zurcher was severely injured and his wife was killed after he lost control of
his Honda motorcycle and collided with a tractor in Solano County, California. Zurcher
filed a products liability in California state court, alleging that the motorcycle tire, tube
and sealant were defective. Zucher’s complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial,
Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube. Cheng Shin then filed a cross-
complaint against Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., the manufacturer of the tube’s valve
assembly. Asahi is a Japanese corporation that manufactures tire valve assemblies in
Japan and sells them to Cheng Shin and others for use as components in finished tire
tubes. Approximately 20 percent of Cheng Shin’s sales in the United States are in
California. A manager of Cheng Shin submitted an affidavit alleging that Asahi was
aware that parts were sold in the U.S. The president of Asahi submitted an affidavit
alleging that Asahi never contemplated that they could be subject to suit in California
through its sales of tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan. Asahi moved to dismiss the
suit against it for want of jurisdiction. California court denied the motion and the
Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari.

Issue. Whether the mere awareness of the part of a foreign Defendant that the
components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would
reach the forum state in the stream of commerce constitutes sufficient minimum
contacts rendering jurisdiction appropriate.

Held. No. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Supreme Court of
California’s ruling upholding jurisdiction. Due Process requires more than that the
Defendant was aware of its product’s entry into the forum state through the stream
of commerce in order for the state to exercise jurisdiction over the Defendant. The
substantial connection between the Defendant and the forum state necessary for a
finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the Defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum state. The placement of a product in the
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the Defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum state. Concurrence. Justice Brennan concurred, in which
he was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Brennan disagreed
with the stream of commerce theory, as well as the court’s conclusion that Asahi did
not purposely avail itself of the California market. However, despite finding sufficient
Societe Nationale Industrielle Areospatiale v. U.S. District Court
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs brought action against manufacturer for a personal
injury arising from the crash of an aircraft that was made in France.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States, France, and 15 other countries have agreed
to The Hague Evidence Convention, which provides procedures by which a judicial
authority in one contracting state may request evidence located in another.
Facts. Plaintiffs brought suit for personal injuries resulting from the crash of an aircraft
built and sold by two corporations owned by France. Initially, the Defendants
answered the complaints without inquiring about the court’s jurisdiction, and
cooperated in initial discovery without objection. However, when plaintiffs served
successive discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
manufacturer filed a motion for a protective order, claiming that the Convention
dictated the exclusive procedures that must be adhered to since petitioners are
French and the discovery sought must be conducted in France. A Magistrate denied
the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied the manufacturers mandamus petition
and certiorari was granted.
Issue. Whether Hague Evidence Convention provides exclusive and mandatory
procedures for obtaining documents and information located in a foreign signatory’s
territory
Held. No. The Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, held that: (1) Hague Evidence
Convention applied to request for information from foreign national which was a party
to the litigation; (2) Hague Evidence Convention did not provide exclusive and
mandatory procedure for obtaining documents and information located within
territorial foreign signatory; (3) first resort to Hague Convention was not required; and
(4) Hague Convention did not deprive district court of jurisdiction it otherwise
possessed to order foreign national party before it to produce evidence physically
located within a foreign signatory nation. Vacated and remanded.
Discussion. When a district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, the Convention
does not apply even though the information sought may be physically located within
the territory of a foreign signatory to the Convention.
Dulay vs Rodrigo Dulay GR No. 158857; 11 November 2005 Ponente: Tinga, J
Facts:
Rodrigo filed a complaint for recovery of his bank deposit alleging that he opened a
trust account with Bank of Boston with a deposit of $230,000, naming Pfeger as
trustee. Five months later, Pfeger went back to the Philippines where he went on a
spending binge. Rodrigo found out and verified the status of his account with Bank
of Boston, only to find that Pfeger already emptied the account. Pfeger denied the
allegations claiming that the money deposited was his own money.Rodrigo filed a
petitioner for the issuance of letters rogatory in order to get the depositions of
several witnesses residing abroad. While Pfeger moved to be allowed to file cross-
examination questions. The trial court granted.The depositions could not be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Massachusetts, but were taken instead before a notary
public in New York. Rodrigo submitted to the trial court his answers to the
interrogatories and cross-interrogatories of petitioners given before a notary public
in the United States.Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion, praying that the written
interrogatories be declared inadmissible and reiterating their prayer for the dismissal
of the complaint. Denied.Petitioners filed before the CA an action for certiorari, which
was dismissed. Hence, motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
W/N the documents submitted by respondent were in compliance with the letters
rogatory ordered by the court and hence admissible.
Ruling:
YES.While the letters rogatory issued by the trial court specifically directed the Clerk
of Court of Boston to take the depositions needed in the case, it became impossible
to follow the directive since the Clerk of Court of Boston merely brushed it aside and
refused to cooperate. Respondent cannot be faulted for the resultant delay brought
about by this circumstance. Neither can the trial court be faulted for allowing the
admission of the depositions taken not in strict adherence to its original directive, nor
for directing the petitioner to have the depositions authenticated. The Court held
that it would be illogical and unreasonable to expect respondent to comply with the
letters rogatory without the cooperation of the very institution or personality named
in the letters rogatory and requested to examine the witnesses.While letters rogatory
are requests to foreign tribunals, commissions are directives to officials of the issuing
jurisdiction. Commissions are taken in accordance with the rules laid down by the
court issuing the commission, while in letters rogatory, the methods of procedure are
under the control of the foreign tribunal. In the present case, the authentication
made by the consul was a ratification of the authority of the notary public who took
the questioned depositions. The deposition was, in effect, obtained through a
commission, and no longer through letters rogatory. It must be noted that this move
was even sanctioned by the trial court by virtue of its Order dated 28 September
2000. the depositions in issue, there is no more impediment to their admissibility.
NAVIDA VS. DIZON
FACTS:
 2 petitions, G.R. 125078 & 125598, assailed the perceived lack of jurisdiction of
RTC over the matter
 Proceedings before the texas courts:
 Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different
texas state courts by citizens of 12 foreign countries, including the
Philippines;
 Thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly
sustained from their exposure to a chemical used to kill nematodes while
working on farms in 23 foreign countries;
 Respondents want the case be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens
 The federal district court granted the motion to dismiss subject to certain
conditions;
 Proceedings in the RTC of General Santos City
 336 plaintiffs from GenSan filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of GenSan.
 They prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and
injuries suffered from DBCP, claiming that they were exposed to the said
chemical even though the defendants knew it was harmful;
 Defendant filed their motion for bill of particulars
 The RTC dismissed the complaints on the following grounds:
 The activity took outside the Philippines territory, hence, outside
Philippine jurisdiction;
 The tort in the complaint, which is “product liability tort” is not the
tor category within the purview of Philippine Law
 That Petitioners coerced into submitting their case in the Philippines
 The voluntary appearance of defendants has little significance;
 Petioners violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia
 The case is barred by “litis pendencia” – SINCE THE CASE IS PENDING
IN THE US COURTS, THE PRESENT COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED
 The petitioners filed a Petition for Review
 Proceedings in the RTC of Davao City
 155 plaintiffs from Davao filed a complaint in the RTC of Davao,
similar to the complaint of Navida etal (GenSan)
 However, the RTC likewise junked the case for the following
reasons:
 That Petitioners would have this court dismiss the case to
pave the way for their getting an affirmance by the supreme
court
 It shares the opinion of legal experts, to wit:
 The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum to file
this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since
the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist
under Philippine laws (Former Justice Secretary
Demetria);
 While a class suit is allowed in the Philippines, the device
has been employed strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify
as a class suit injury within the contemplation of
Philippine statute (Retired Supreme Court Justice
Sarmiento);
 Absence of doctrine in the Philippines regarding
product liability
 Petitioners (Davao) contends that the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case since Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code
are broad enough to cover the acts complained of; and that
the opinions of the legal experts are bereft of basis;
 Motion to withdraw was filed by Respondents asserting that
the Petition for review is moot and academic since they
already entered into an amicable settlement with petitioners
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Court is correct in dismissing the petition due to lack of
jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the matter?
1. That the acts complained of occurred within the Philippines;
2. That Article 2176 of the Civil Code is broad enough to cover the act;
3. That assumption by the US District Court did not divest jurisdiction of the
Philippine courts; and,
4. That the compromise agreement does not justifiably prejudice remaining
respondents.
RULING/S:
ISSUE ON JURISDICTION
1. The court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of jurisdiction.
1. The jurisdiction of court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set
by defendants. What determines jurisdiction of the court is the nature of
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
2. None of the parties actually move for the case based on the RTC jurisdiction but
more on the prayer for damages.
3. The trial court has clearly jurisdiction over the matter.
1. THE RULE IS SETTLED THAT JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
A CASE IS CONFERRED BY LAW AND IS DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS
IN THE COMPLAINT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT. Once
vested by law, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other that
the legislature thru enactment of a law.
4. On whether the act occurred in the Philippines, the Court held YES. Thus, civil
code article 2176 which provides that “whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done..xxx” is applicable in the case at bar and therefore, RTC obviously
has jurisdiction over the matter.
1. Also, the case at bar is a personal case, not a criminal, hence, lex situs
theory is not necessarily applicable.
5. The facts clearly shows that the claim for damages is the cause of action and
that the RTC unmistakably has jurisdiction over the matter.
6. Moreover, the RTC of GenSan and Davao validly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of all the defendant companies.
1. In the case Meat Packing Corp. of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, the
court held that “jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases
is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons..xxx…active participation of a party in
the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of court’s jurisdiction and
willingness to abide in the resolution of the case”.
2. Jurisdiction is different from “exercise of jurisdiction”. Jurisdiction refers
to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered
therein.
3. Where a court has jurisdiction over persons of the defendants and the
subject matter, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is the
exercise of jurisdiction.