Memorandum On Behalf of The Respondent

11TH K.C.
Law National Moot Court Competition,2017 TCR13
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CADBRIDGE

[Petitions filed under Article 32 and Article 139A of the Constitution of Cadbridge]
____________________________________________________
Original Writ Jurisdiction
W.P. (Civil) No._________2017
Filed under article 32 of the constitution of Cadbridge
CNN (Cadbridge National Network)........................................................................Petitioner 1
v.
Union of Cadbridge ...............................................................................................Respondent1
Through its Chief Secretary
Ministry of Finance
Department of Economic Affairs,
Cental Bank of Cadbridge...........................................................................................Respondent 2

Through its Governor
Along with

W.P. (Civil) No._________2017
Honeydukes .............................................................................................................Petitioner 2
v.
Union of Cadbridge ...............................................................................................Respondent 3
Along with
Appellate Writ Jurisdiction

Transfer Petition No._________2017
Filed under article 139A of the constitution of Cadbridge
Mrs. Baher.................................................................................................................Petitioner 3
v.
Union of Cadbridge ...............................................................................................Respondent 4
Along with

W.P. (Civil) No._________2017
Union of Cadbridge ..................................................................................................Petitioner 4
v.
God of Humanity ...................................................................................................Respondent 5
As Submitted to the Chief Justice & other Companion Judges of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of Cadbridge
i
11th K.C. Law National Moot Court Competition, 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATION .......................................................................................................... iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................... iv
Statement of Jurisdiction.............................................................................................................. viii
Statement of questions ................................................................................................................... ix
Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................................... x
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS..................................................................................................... xii
PLEADINGS ADVANCED ........................................................................................................... 1
1. The Current Petition is not Maintainable ............................................................................. 1
A. In Any Case, No Fundamental Rights Are Violated ......................................................... 1
B. Enacted Contrary To A Prohibition In The Constitution ................................................... 2
2. that the fundamental rights have not been infringed by the impugned notification ............ 4
2.1 That the Fundamental Rights under Article 14 Of The Constitution Of Cadbridge Have
Not Been Violated ................................................................................................................... 4
2.2 That The Fundamental Rights Under Article 19 Of The Constitution Of Cadbridge Have
Not Been Violated .................................................................................................................... 8
2.3 That There Was Not Any Violation Of Right To Life Enumerated Under Article 21 .......... 12
3. THAT THE NOTIFICATION DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE 300(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION ........................................................................ 13
4. THAT THE NOTIFICATION DOES NOT SUFFER FROM EXCESSIVE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER ......................................................................... 17
5. THAT THE PRESIDENT PROCLAMATION UNDER ARTICLE 360 CANNOT BE
CHALLENGED. ....................................................................................................................... 20
Prayer ............................................................................................................................................ 30
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page ii

LIST OF ABBREVIATION
¶ Paragraph
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
Hon'ble Honourable
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Art. Article
v. Versus
Factsheet Statement of Facts, 11th K.C. Law

National Moot Court Competition
Problem
H.P. Himachal Pradesh
J. Justice
PIL Public Interest Litigation
CRs Cadbridge Rupees
SCR Supreme Court Report
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
W.B. West Bengal
LIC Life Insurance Corporation
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
FCI Food Corporation of India
Anr. Another
Ors. Others
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
2. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ACT, 1934
3. BANKING REGULATION ACT, 1949
BOOKS
1. Seervai H.M.(2010), Constitutional Law of India, Vol III, 4th Edn., Universal Law Publishing
& Co.
2. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 8th Edn. 2008.
3. Jain M.P.( 2014), INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7th Edn., Lexis Nexis, Gurugram.
4. Jain M.P.(1981), ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Vol. XVII, Eastern Book Co., Lucknow, At- 468
5. Basu D.D (2010), ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 2nd Edn. Kamal Law House, Calcutta. At.- 70.
DICTIONARY
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (9th ed. 2009).
DYNAMIC LINKS
1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.scconline.com
3. www.heinonline.org
4. www.westlawindia.com
5. www.lexisnexis.com
6. www.ebscohost.com
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page iv

CASE LIST
Ahmadabad Urban Development v. Sharad Kumar (1992) 3 SCR 328 19
BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and AIR 2002 SC 350 22,05
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625 05
Bhavesh D. Parish and Ors. v. Union and India and Anr (2000) 5 SCC 471 28
Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 166 12
Chhaganlal Mansukhlal v. The Agricultural Produce Market Comm., Dohad, 1975 GLR 916
19
D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat 1986 Supp SCC 20 3
Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India (1986) SCC 2405 25
Duncans Industries Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Others 2005 5 AWC4437All 29
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 30
14
Essar Oil Ltd v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1834 12
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors 1981
ILLJ 193 SC 22
G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 620 12
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 09
In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, AIR 1979 SC 478 07
J. K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories, (1996) 6 SCC 665 09
Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, Bihar University, AIR 1968 SC 353 08
Jalia Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1436 07
Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 01
Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors 1996 SCALE (5)74
20,16,11
Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel v. Reserve Bank of India, 1962 Supp 3 SCR 632 15
K.Thimnappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR 2001 SC 467 07
Karnataka State Financial Corpn. v. N. Naramsimhaiah, AIR 2008 SC 1797 14
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page v

Khar Gram Panchayati Samiti v. State of W.B. 1987 2 SCR 1207 19
Kihoto Hollohan v Zachollhu 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 62 02
Krishnan Kakkanath v. Govt. of Kerala, (1997) 9 SCC 495 10
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873, 07
Leelavati v. State of Bombay 1957 1 SCR 721 19
M. Seeni Ahamed v. Union of India (2017) 1MLJ1 16
M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors (1997) 7 SCC 592 26
Mafat Lal Industrial Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536 3
Metropolis Theater Co. v. State of Chicago 228 U.S. 61 (1913) 24
Mohd Hussain Gulam v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 97 19
Mohd. Bhai Chhippa v. State of Gujrat AIR 1962 SC 1517 20
Morey v. Doud 354 US 457 [1957] 23
N. Pad manabhan v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 2834 14
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Ors (2000) 10 SSC 664. 28,12
National Council for Teacher Education v. Shri Shyam Shikha Prakashan Sansthan, (2011) 3
SCC 238 (255)
07
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited and Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India AIR
1992 SC 1033 15,25
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI (1992) 2 SCC 343 25
Permian Basin Area Rate cases 390 U.S. 747 (1968) 24
Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujrat (1986) 1 SCC 581 14
Premium Granites and Anr v. State of T.N. and Ors. [1994] 1 SCR 579 24
R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675 25,23
Rajnarayan v. Chairman Patna Admn. AIR 19523 SC 569 17
Ramchand v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 563 (566) 09
Rustom Ji Cooper v Union of India. (1970) 3 SCR 530 21
Schechter Poultry Corpn. v. United States, 295 US 495 21
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page vi

Shrilekha Vidyarthi (Kumari) v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537 : (1991) 1 SCC 212
06
Sivani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 17770, at 1774. 10
Somavathi v. State of Punjab, (1914) L.R. 42 I.A. 44 12
Sooram Pratap Reddy and Ors. v. District Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC
552 13
State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills, AIR 1974 Sc 1300 (1974). 08
State of Kerala v. People’s Union for Civil Liberties, (2009) 8 SCC 46 14
State of M.P. v. Nand lal (1987) SCR 1 22
State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, AIR 1983 SC 803 14
State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhayya Bagga, (1998) 4 SCC 117 06
Sukhannandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902 06
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.,(1993) 3 SCC 499 06
Union of India v. Martin Lottery Agency Ltd., (2009) 12 SCC 209 14
Vimlaben Ajithbai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel, (2008) 4 SCC 649 14
Wednesbury [1948] 1 kb 223 5
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page vii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioners’ in the instant matter have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Cadbridge
under Article 321 of the Constitution of Cadbridge, 1950.
However, the Respondent reserves the right to contest the Maintainability:-
1Article 32 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may
by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution..
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page viii

STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER IS
MAINTAINABLE.
2. WHETHER THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, NAMELY ARTICLE 14, ARTICLE

19 AND ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION IS VIOLATED.
3. WHETHER THE PRESIDENT’S PROCLAMATION UNDER ARTICLE 360 OF

THE CONSTITUTION CAN BE CHALLENGED.
4. WHETHER THE NOTIFICATION SUFFERS FROM EXCESSIVE

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER THEREBY RENDERING IT ULTRA
VIRES TO THE CONSTITUTION.
5. WHETHER THE NOTIFICATION CONTRAVENES THE PROVISIONS OF

ARTICLE 300(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page ix

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The State of Cadbridge is a developing country with rampant corruption problem. The
country uses the currency system of Cadbridge Rupee (CRs.). Various reports from
various sources indicate that there could be presence of ‘Black Money’ in the economy.
2. The ‘Press Trust of Cadbridge’, conducted a survey and found an increase in the number
of people trying to deposit fake currency. In an attempt to curb the growth of this parallel
economy and deal with the issue of unaccounted currency as well curb corruption and
issue of counterfeit currency the Prime Minister of Cadbridge Dr. Moody made an
announcement through a gazetted notification on 3rd January 2017. It was stated that the
notes of the denomination of 500 and 1,500 Cadbridge Rupees that were printed prior to
2015 will cease to be legalised tenders, effective immediately. It included certain
exceptions like petrol pumps and hospitals which would still accept the old currency for a
stipulated period of time to be decided by the government.
3. The process resulted in 90% of notes going out of circulation in the economy, resulting
in lot of chaos among the citizens of Cadbridge. Post announcement, the ATM’s and
Banks were temporarily shut till recalibration. The new-notes of CRs. 500 and CRs. 2000
were rolled out with enhanced security features to prevent corruption.
4. A small and medium sized industry ‘Honeydukes’ has filed a petition in the High Court
of Mansfield Park saying that it is unable to conduct its daily business due to the
restrictions on the withdrawal limit, which resulted in un-availability of petty cash for day
to day business operations. The High Court, however, has decided against them in the
case citing that these restrictions are temporary and in the interest of public good-
Honeydukes has filed an appeal in the Supreme Court.
5. Due to acute cash shortage in the economy, the banks were forced to work over-time.
The Branch Manager of Regional Bank of Caglistun, Mr. Baher succumber to heart
attack due to prolonged period of pressure and fear of an outbreak of riots. The
deceased’s widow filed a suit for compensation in the High Court of Cantebury against
the State of Cadbrige claiming that the present decision had been responsible for Mr.
Baher’s death. The case is pendente lite.
6. A Religious outfit ‘God for Humanity’ has filed a petition in the High Court of Godric’s
Hollow, calling this move discriminatory and since its implementation has been carried
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page x

out during the peak wedding season, lack of funds is creating hindrances for ceremonies
and rituals as they cannot be carried out by the common man. Apart from that a
prominent minister spent almost CRs. 50 crores for his daughter’s wedding. The
petitioners claim malafide intent, excessive delegation and inequitable treatment and have
challenged this move on the grounds that it violates their fundamental rights. The High
Court has ordered an interim stay on the notification, which led to pandemonium among
the citizens. The state has appealed to the Supreme Court.
7. The decision led to widespread pandemonium which forced the President of Cadbridge to
issue a proclamation under Article 360 of the Constitution of Cadbridge applicable
primarily to state of Godric’s Hollow.
8. Apart from the other petitions prominent media houses CNN (Cadbridge National
Network) and the National Consortium of Journalists (NCJ) filed a Public Interest
Litigation based on a sting operation where many ministers were caught giving
assurances to select people of converting the black money to white money.
9. The Supreme Court has instructed the High Courts to refrain from entertaining any of the
petitions pertaining to this matter and have directed that Court will be hearing the matters
as a group petition since they are primarily focused on the same issue.
The laws of the Country of Cadbridge are Pari-Materia to those of the Union of India.
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page xi

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
1. The writ petition filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court is not
maintainable.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is
not maintainable under article 32 of the Constitution. Since first in any case no fundamental
rights have been violated [A]; Second It is not beyond the competence of the Legislature
[B]; Third It is enacted contrary to a prohibition in the Constitution[C];finally It is enacted
without following the procedure laid down in the Constitution [D]; Last but not least It does not
violates the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
2. The fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of

Cadbridge are not violated.
Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons.
Classification to be reasonable should fulfil the following two tests: (1)It should not be arbitrary,
artificial or evasive; (2)The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational
or reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The
additional security features imbibed in the new CRs. 500 and CRs. 2000 notes play a major role
in justifying the objective sought to be achieved, i.e., eliminating black money and tackling
corruption, making the classification highly reasonable and the basis of differentiation majorly
rational.
A regulation of trade and commerce becomes challengeable under Art. 19 (1) (g), if it is shown
that it directly and proximately interferes in praesenti with the exercise of freedom trade. If the
alleged restriction does not directly or proximately interfere with the exercise of freedom of
trade, the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (g) is not violated.
It has been humbly submitted that, in the instant matter, the gazette notification of
Demonetization is not in violation of the Article 21 guaranteed as a fundamental right to the
citizens. The notification was aimed at curbing the widespread problems of corruption, black
money etc. plaguing the country. Thus the present argument is based on the premises of
presence of public purpose..
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page xii

3. The President’s proclamation under Article 360 of the Constitution of Cadbridge

cannot be challenged.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the president proclamation under article
360 is not challengeable. The wisdom and advisability of economic policies of Government are
not amenable to judicial review. It is not for Courts to consider the relative merits of different
economic policies. Court is not the forum for resolving the conflicting clauses regarding the
wisdom or advisability of policy. It will be appropriate to consider some relevant decisions of
this Court in relation to judicial review of policy decisions.
4. The notification does not suffer from excessive delegation of legislative power
thereby not rendering it ultra vires to the Constitution.
The legislatures will not find adequate time to legislate on every minute details and limit
themselves to ‘policy matters and leaving a large volume of area to executives to frame rules to
carry out the purposes of legislation. Thus, the need for delegation became indispensable and it
was sought to be justified on grounds of ‘speed’, flexibility and adoptability’.
5. The notification does not contravene the provisions of Article 300(A) of the
Constitution of Cadbridge.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that the gazette notification of Demonetization
is not in violation of the right to property guaranteed to the citizens under Article 300A of the
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page xiii

11TH K.C. Law National Moot Court Competition,2017 TCR13
PLEADINGS ADVANCED
1. THE CURRENT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is not
maintainable under article 32 of the Constitution of India. Since first in any case no fundamental
rights have been violated [A]; Second It is not beyond the competence of the Authority
[B]; Third It is not enacted to the contrary to a prohibition in the Constitution[C]; finally It is
enacted with following the procedure laid down in the parent Act.
A. In Any Case, No Fundamental Rights Are Violated
The jurisdiction under Article 32 can be invoked only when Fundamental Rights are violated. It
has been held that if a right, other than a fundamental right is claimed to be violated then such
questions can be addressed only in the appropriate proceedings and not on an application under
Art. 32. In the Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Others2 it was observed by J. Pandian as
follows.
"..the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely

no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as proxy of
others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffling
their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the courts by filing
vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts and as
a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves which piquant
situation creates a frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they lose faith
in the administration of our judicial system."
The instant case, it is submitted that no fundamental rights of the Petitioner has been violated,
therefore, this petition must fail.
2 (1992) 4 SCC 305.
1
B. Enacted Contrary To A Prohibition In The Constitution
It has been humbly submitted that in the Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel v. Union of India3, it was
held therein that apart from the question of legislative competence and violation of Article 13 of
the Constitution, a statute could be challenged if its enactment was prohibited by a provision of
the Constitution. It was held a follows, “If by reason of Article 265 every tax has to be imposed
by “law” it would appear to follow that it could only be imposed by a law which is valid by
conformity to the criteria laid down in the relevant Articles of the Constitution. These are that
the law should be (1) within the legislative competence of the legislature being covered by the
legislative entries in Schedule VII of the Constitution; (2) the law should not be prohibited by
any particular provision of the Constitution such as for example, Articles 276(2), 286 etc., and
(3) the law or the relevant portion thereof should not be invalid under Article 13 for repugnancy
to those freedom which are guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution which are relevant to the
subject matter of the law.”
C. Without Following The Procedure Laid Down In The Constitution
7. This view was taken forward in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu4 wherein it was held that the
procedure for enacting a ‘law’ should be followed. Although it is not expressly stated, but it
appears that if the procedure is not followed then the ‘law’ to that extent will have no effect. In
this case, it was held that Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution needed
ratification in terms of clause (b) of the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution. It was
held:“That having regard to the background and evolution of the principles underlying the
Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth
Schedule in the Constitution of India, the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution in terms and in effect bring about a change in the operation and effect of Articles
136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the amendment would require to be
ratified in accordance with the proviso to sub-article (2) of Article 368 of the Constitution of
India.”
3 1962 Supp (2) SCR 1,AIR 1962 SC 104.

4 652 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 paragraph 61 and 62.
Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page 2

At the same time, it has been emphasized by this Court that the possibility of abuse of a
provision of a statute is not a ground for striking it down. An abuse of power can always be
checked through judicial review of the action complained of. In D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of
Gujarat5 it was said:
“Where a statute confers discretionary powers upon the executive or an administrative authority,
the validity or constitutionality of such power cannot be judged on the assumption that the
executive or such authority will act in an arbitrary manner in the exercise of the discretion
conferred upon it. If the executive or the administrative authority acts in an arbitrary manner, its
action would be bad in law and liable to be struck down by the courts but the possibility of abuse
of power or arbitrary exercise of power cannot invalidate the statute conferring the power or the
power which has been conferred by it.”
10. Similarly, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy (speaking for Justice J.S. Verma, Justice S.C. Agrawal,
Justice A.S. Anand, Justice B.N. Kirpal and himself) held in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union
of India6,
“It is equally well-settled that mere possibility of abuse of a provision by those in charge of
administering it cannot be a ground for holding the provision procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. In Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, this Court observed: “The
possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to it any element of invalidity.” It
was said in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, “it must be remembered that merely because
power may sometimes be abused, it is no ground for denying the existence of power. The wisdom
of man has not yet been able to conceive of a government with power sufficient to answer all its
legitimate needs and at the same time incapable of mischief”.
When a statute is challenged on the ground of excessive delegation, there is a presumption in

favour of its vires and if two interpretations are possible, one makes it constitutional is to be
adopted7.
5 1986 Supp SCC 20 in paragraph 50.

6 (1997) 5 SCC 536 in paragraph 88.
7I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eighth Edition, EBC Book Co., Lucknow, 2012.

2. THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS HAVE NOT BEEN INFRINGED BY

THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION
2.1 That the Fundamental Rights under Article 14 Of The Constitution Of Cadbridge Have
Not Been Violated
THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION
Consideration of legitimate expectation forms part of principle of non- arbitrariness under Article
14 of the Constitution. It becomes an enforceable right in case of failure of the State or its
instrumentality to give due weight to it. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or
legitimate is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined
not according to claimant’s perception, but in large public interest wherein other more important
considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the
claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the
requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny.
The plea of legitimate expectation is invoked when the government does not exercise its
discretion on the expected lines. Legitimate expectation is a test of arbitrariness; it is not a right
in itself. Legitimate expectation cannot be invoked against higher public interest of the State
causing higher revenue.
A person may have a ‘legitimate expectation’ of being treated in a certain way by an

administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such
treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the
authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The protection of
legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision, then the decision maker
should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest.
The concept of legitimate expectation is “not the key which unlocks the treasure of natural
justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shut the Court out of review on the merits”
particularly when the elements of speculation and uncertainty are inherent in that concept. For

legal purposes, expectation is not the same as anticipation. Legitimacy of an expectation can be
inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law.8
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is based on the provisions of the Constitution. The
doctrine is a source of procedural as well as substantive rights. The state action have to be in
conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet.
There is no unfettered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use it
for public good.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked if the decision which is challenged in the
Court has some person aggrieved either (1) by altering rights or obligations of that person which
are enforceable by or against him in private law or (2) by depriving him of some benefit or
advantage which either (a) he had in the past been permitted to continue to do until there has
been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given
an opportunity to comment or (b) he has received assurance form the decision maker that it will
not be withdrawn without giving him first opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that
it should not be withdrawn . A false hope that a person is entitled to a certain relief that it should
not be withdrawn. In short legitimate expectation is not a right per se, but gives only a locus
standi and it gives certain rights to a person to be considered.
A change in policy can defeat a substantive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on

Wednesbury9 reasonableness. It means, that the judgment whether public interest overrides the
substantive legitimate expectation of individuals will be for the decision maker who has made a
change in the policy. The choice of the policy is for the decision maker and not for the Court.
The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the Court to find out if the change in
policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one
which no reasonable person could have made. It cannot invalidate legislation.
Recently Supreme Court10 held that in taking of a policy decision in economic matters, the
principles of natural justice have no role to play. While it is expected of a responsible employer
to take all steps into consideration including welfare of the labor before taking a policy decision,
8
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625.
9
[1948] 1 KB 223.
10
Balco Employees Union(Regd) v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 350.

that by itself will not entitle the employees to demand a right of hearing or consultation prior to
the taking of the decision. Merely because the workers may have a right under Articles 14 of the
Constitution, it does not mean that the Government has to give prior notice of hearing before
taking a decision on disinvestment. If the policy decision does not contravene to any law, the
same is valid. Power of judicial review on policy decision is limited to the grounds of illegality,
irrationality, and procedural impropriety. In a case involving the issue of arbitrariness, it was
held that, “the defect of irrationality is obvious.11” Where the policy is found to be arbitrary, it is
open to challenge, but must manifestly arbitrary and wholly unreasonable. When a policy is
based on various circumstances and facts, law including constraints based on resources and also
expert opinion, the court will not interfere unless it is arbitrary or violative of law12.
It was held that when there is a discretion to charge the policy in exercise of executive power
which is not transmitted by any statute or rule, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Art.
14, is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was
done arbitrarily or by an ulterior criteria. It was held that the basic requirement is fairness in
every action of the State, the non-arbitrariness in essence and substance in the heart-beat of fair
play. If the change in Government policy is rational and reasonable, it is valid. 13
In the current situation at hand, the Prime Minister Dr. Moody had announced that from 4 th
January, 2017, the notes of denomination of 500 and 1500 Cadbridge Rupees that were printed
prior to 2015 will cease to be legalized tenders. This step was taken by the government to curb
the growth of parallel economy and deal with the issue of counterfeit currency as well as tackle
the corruption and issue of counterfeit currency.
Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons.
Classification to be reasonable should fulfill the following two tests:
(1) It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible

differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or things
grouped together in the class from others left out of it.
11
ShrilekhaVidyarthi (Kumari) v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537.
12
State of Punjab v. Ram LubhayyaBagga, (1998) 4 SCC 117.
13
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.,(1993) 3 SCC 499.

(2) The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or reasonable
nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.14
Article 14 in its ambit and sweep involves two facets ,viz. it permits reasonable classification
which is founded on intelligible differentia and accommodates the practical needs of the society
and the differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved.Further , it
does not allow any kind of arbitrariness and ensures fairness and equality in treatment. It is the
‘fonjuris’ of our Constitution, the fountainhead of justice. Differential treatment does not per se
amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution and it violates Article 14 only when there is
no reasonable basis and there are several tests to decide whether a classification is reasonable or
not and of the tests will be as to whether it is conducive to the functioning of modern society.15
There must be some rational nexus between the classification and the object intended to be
achieved. Therefore, mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per se amount to
discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract Art.14, it is
necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary; that it does
not rest on any rational basis having regard to the object which the Legislature has in view while
making the law in question. 16As the Supreme Court has explained: “The differentia which is the
basis of the classification and the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must
be a nexus between them.”17
As the Supreme Court has observed in Thimnappa18,
“It is settled law that differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a rational nexus on
the basis of which differentiation has been made with the object sought to be achieved by
particular provision, then such differentiation is not discriminatory and does not violate the
principles of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
It is not necessary that for a classification to be valid, its basis must always appear on the face of
the law. To find out the reasons and the justification for the classification, the court may refer to
14
LaxmiKhandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873, 891. Test for valid classification restated.
15
National Council for Teacher Education v. Shri Shyam Shikha Prakashan Sansthan, (2011) 3 SCC 238 (255).
16
Jalia Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1436.
17
In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, AIR 1979 SC 478.
18
K.Thimnappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR 2001 SC 467.

relevant material, e.g., objects and reasons appended to be a Bill, parliamentary debates,
affidavits of the parties, matters of common knowledge, the background circumstances leading to
the passage of the Act, etc. 19
At times, even administrative necessity or convenience has been upheld as a basis of

classification. This is specially so in matters of taxation and economic regulation, because of the
complexities involved in these areas, e.g., a bewildering conflict of expert opinion exists on
economic matters.20
The Supreme Court has reiterated that the Courts cannot act as an Appellate Authority and
examine the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy nor are courts advisors to the
executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. Judicial review in this
area is confined to the examination as to whether any Fundamental Rights have been violated or
it is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution or any statutory provision or is manifestly
arbitrary.21
In the present scenario, the people of Cadbridge were informed that new paper currency of CRs.
500 and CRs. 1500 would be rolled out with stronger security features that can prevent counter-
feitism and can be detected with sensors from a reasonable distance in order to prevent hoarding.
The object here sought to be achieved was to prevent the circulation of black money and tackle
corruption. In order to achieve the same objective, the Government had come up with a
classification based on an intelligible differentia.
2.2 That The Fundamental Rights Under Article 19 Of The Constitution Of Cadbridge Have
Not Been Violated
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the actions of the government do not
violate Article 19(1)(g) guaranteed to the citizens of Cadbridge.
The fundamental right of a citizen to carry on any occupation, trade or business under Art, 19(1)
(g) of the Constitution is not absolute; it is subject to reasonable restrictions which maybe
19
JagdishPandey v. Chancellor, Bihar University, AIR 1968 SC 353.
20
State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills, AIR 1974 Sc 1300.
21
Seervai H.M.(2010), Constitutional Law of India, Vol III, 4 th Edn., Universal Law Publishing & Co.

imposed by the State in the interests of the general public.22, objects and transactions by the
Legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends.
The expression “reasonable restriction” signifies that the limitation as the right should not be
arbitrary or excessive in nature and it has to strike a proper balance between the freedom under
Art. 19(1)(g) and social control permitted by Art. 19(6).
Cl. (6) of Art. 19 authorizes the State- (i) to impose ‘reasonable restrictions’ upon the freedom of
trade, business, occupation or profession- in the interests of the general public; (ii) to prescribe
the professional or technical qualifications necessary for carrying on any occupation, trade or
business; (iii) to carry on any trade or business by itself or through a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, to the exclusion of private citizens, wholly or in part.
The validity of restrictions has to be tested on certain objective criteria, namely, (1) whether the
appropriate legislature has the legislative competency to make the law, (2) whether the said law
infringes any of the fundamental rights, (3) even if it infringes the freedom under Article 19,
whether the infringement only amounts to “reasonable restriction” on such rights “in public
interest”. By this process of scrutiny, the Court maintains the validity of only such laws in as to
keep a just balance between freedom and social control. The duty of reconciling to fundamental
rights in Art. 19, and the laws of social control is cast upon the courts and the touchstone or the
standard is contained in the said two expressions. The standard is an elastic one; it varies with
time, space and condition. What is reasonable under certain circumstance may not be so under a
different circumstance. 23
Government order issued in public interest overrides individual interest and the question of
public interest must be considered not from the point of view of interest of the person on whom
the restriction is imposed, even if the restriction operates on him harshly.
The object of imposing restrictions under Clause (6) is to strike a balance between individual
freedom and social control.24 Public order is an expression of wide connotation intended to take
care of “public safety”. Public order need not to in case be traced either to the scrutiny of State or
22
Ramchand v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 563 (566) .
23
GolakNath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
24
J. K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories, (1996) 6 SCC 665 : JT 1996 (9) SC 27.

to the law and order. Protecting the deposition from individuals or organization who deal in trade
in finance without authority of law is an action for “public safety” and comes within the
comprehensive meaning of public order.
Reasonableness of a restriction has to be tested both from procedural as well as from substantial
aspects of the law. In order to determine the reasonableness of the restrictions, regard must be
had to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in the trade.
The Court has explained the concept of “reasonableness” as envisaged in Art.19(6) in

Krishnan25,
“The reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the

standpoint of the interests of general public and not from the standpoint of the interests of the
persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract consideration. A restriction
cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly…. In
determining the infringement of the right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g), the nature of right
alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the
prevailing conditions at the time, enter into judicial verdict.”
The Courts have leaned towards the consumers’ interests, while reaching far-reaching
restrictions are imposed on trade and commerce, only rarely will a restriction be held as
unreasonable.
In Shivani26, the Supreme Court has laid down criteria to evaluate the reasonableness of a
restriction under Art. 19(6),
“The Court must take into account whether the law has struck a proper balance between social
control, on the one hand, and the right of the individual on the other. The Court has to take into
account such factors as, nature of the right enshrined, underlying purpose of the restriction
imposed, evil sought to be remedied by law, its extent and urgency, how far the restriction is or
is not proportionate to the evil and the prevailing conditions at that time. The Court cannot
25
Krishnan Kakkanath v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 128 at 135.
26
Sivani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 17770 at 1774.

judge reasonableness of a restriction from the point of view of one person or a class of persons
on whom the restriction may be imposed.”
A regulation of trade and commerce becomes challengeable under Art. 19 (1) (g), if it is shown
that it directly and proximately interferes in praesenti with the exercise of freedom trade. If the
alleged restriction does not directly or proximately interfere with the exercise of freedom of
trade, the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (g) is not violated.27
The reasonableness of a legitimate expectation has to be determined with respect to the

circumstances relating to the trade or business in question. Canalization of a particular business
in favour of even a specified individual is reasonable where the interest of the country is
concerned or where the business affects the whole economy of the country.28
In the present scenario, the limitation imposed upon the industries is not arbitrary or of an
excessive nature beyond what is required by the public Art. 19(1) (g) are not violated by this
measure.
The Demonetization Act, 1978 was challenged in the Supreme Court in the case of Jayantilal
Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India29for violating Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
i.e. the right to carry on trade and commerce. Without much elaboration, the Court succinctly
pointed towards clause 6 i.e. restrictions on Article 19(1)(g), saying that it was evident from the
Preamble to Demonetization Act, that the Act was promulgated in public interest, given its
purpose to control the problem of unaccounted money and thereby, did not in any way mount to
a violation of the contended rights.
Since the process by which demonetization is taking place currently is in adherence to the
Demonetization Act, and in a manner similar to that in 1978, it is highly unlikely that the
Supreme Court would come to a conclusion different from that of 1978 in Jayantilal30 case. The
law that the Supreme Court itself adjudicated in the case will be used again, arriving at the same
conclusion.
27
Sukhannandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902.
28
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625.
29
AIR 1997 SC 370.
30 ibid.

2.3 That There Was Not Any Violation Of Right To Life Enumerated Under Article 21.
It has been humbly submitted that, in the instant matter, the gazette notification of
Demonetization is not in violation of the Article 21 guaranteed as a fundamental right to the
citizens. The notification was aimed at curbing the widespread problems of corruption, black
money etc. plaguing the country. Thus the present argument is based on the premise of presence
of public purpose.
The concept of public purpose was explained by Sen J., in the case of Bhim Singhji v. Union of
India31,
“The concept of public purpose necessarily implies that it should be a law for the acquisition or
requisition of property in the interest of general public, and the purpose of as such a law directly
and vitally subserves public interest.”
Public interest is a rather important facet compared to smaller violation of right to life guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution. Larger public interest of the community should give way to
individual apprehension of violation of human rights and right to life guaranteed under
Article 2132.
In the case of G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India33, the Court observed that,
“…principle that has been ingrained is that if a project is beneficial for the larger public,
inconvenience to smaller number of people is to be accepted. It has to be respectfully accepted
as a proposition of law that individual interest or, for that matter, smaller public interest must
yield to the larger public interest. Inconvenience of some should be bypassed for a larger interest
or cause of the society.
It is submitted the Court in the case of, Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and
Ors34.,
31
(1981) 1 SCC 166.
32
Somavathi v. State of Punjab, (1914) L.R. 42 I.A. 44; Essar Oil Ltd v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti & Ors., AIR 2004
SC 1834;
33
(2013) 6 SCC 620.
34
(2000) 10 SCC 664.

“Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a
democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to
be the concern of a responsible Government.”
Further it is submitted in the case of, Sooram Pratap Reddy and Ors. v. District Collector,
Ranga Reddy Dist and Ors.35, the Supreme Court stated that “public purpose” includes any
purpose wherein even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be
benefited.
Thus it can be contented that a ‘public purpose’ are the purposes that benefits the large section or
even a fraction of the society. The Government wanted to cleanse the system of corruption,
fouled by the presence of evils such as fake currency and unaccounted money. The Government
enacted and announced the notification keeping in mind benefit of the common public. The
whole point of this exercise was to surprise black money hoarders into disclosing their
unaccounted wealth. Apart from that the Government also intended to cut down the funds of the
terrorist groups, which were depended on the presence of fake currency in the economy. Both
these steps were intended to help the public at large.
3. THAT THE NOTIFICATION DOES NOT CONTRAVENE THE

PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 300(A) OF THE CONSTITUTION
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that the gazette notification of Demonetization
is not in violation of the right to property guaranteed to the citizens under Article 300A of the
It is submitted that on 3rd January 2017, the Prime Minister of Cadbridge, Dr. Moody announced
through a gazette notification that all notes of the denomination of 500 and 1,500 Cadbridge
Rupees (hereinafter referred to as CRC) that were printed prior to 2015 will cease to be legalised
tenders36. This decision resulted in 90% of the notes in circulation which were pre-2015 print
being derecognized as legal tenders. To deal with the cash crunch in the economy the people
35
(2008) 9 SCC 552.
36 Factsheet ¶ 5.

were instructed that they would not be allowed to withdraw more than Cadbridge Rupees 3,500
(hereinafter referred to as CR) from their accounts per day until further notice37.
It is also submitted that Article 300A of the Constitution of Cadbridge is not a fundamental
right38 but a constitutional right and a human right39.
NOTIFICATION IS WITHIN AUTHORITY OF LAW
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the action of the respondents no way
affects the right of property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of Cadbridge. The action of
the respondents is well within the four corners of the power conferred upon it under the
provisions of the Reserve Bank of Cadbridge Act (hereinafter referred to as RBC) and the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as BRA) and therefore, is valid.
It is submitted that RBC has the powers to issue directions under Section 35A40 of the BRA to
any banking company in particular or to the banking companies in “public interest” or in the
interest of the banking policy or to prevent the affairs of the banking company being conducted
in a manner detrimental to the interest of its depositors or in a manner harmful to the interest of
the banking company.
The above definition of public interest was used by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujrat41:
“In order to appreciate the contentions of the appellant it is necessary to look, at the object of
the legislation in question as a whole. The object of the Act is not just acquiring a bit or land
here or a bit of land there for some public purpose. It consists of several activities which have as
their ultimate, object the orderly development of an urban area. It envisages the preparation of a
development plan, allocation of land for various private and public uses, preparation of a Town
Planning Scheme and making provisions for future development of the area in question. The
37 Factsheet ¶ 7.
38 State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan, AIR 1983 SC 803 (para 2); Vimlaben Ajithbai Patel v. Vatslaben
Ashokbhai Patel, AIR 2008 SC 2675; Karnataka State Financial Corpn. v. N. Naramsimhaiah, AIR 2008 SC 1797;
39 Union of India v. Martin Lottery Agency Ltd., (2009) 12 SCC 209; Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v.
Super Cassette Industries Ltd. (2008) 13 SCC 30; N. Padmanabhan v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, AIR 2008 SC 2834:
(2008) 15 SCC 517; State of Kerala v. People’s Union for Civil Liberties, (2009) 8 SCC 46;
40 Section 35A- Power of the Reserve Bank to give directions.
41 (1986) 1 SCC 581

various aspects of a Town Planning Scheme have already been set out. On the final Town
Planning Scheme coming into force under Section 53 of the Act there is an automatic vesting of
all lands required by the local authority, unless otherwise provided, in the local authority. It is
not a case where the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have to be set in motion either
by the Collector or by the Government.”
It is further submitted that the BRA envisages action to be taken by the RBI when RBI is
satisfied that circumstances warrant such action. Section 5(ca)42 of the BRA defines "banking
policy" as any policy which is specified from time to time by the Reserve Bank of India in the
interest of the banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound economic growth,
having due regard to the interests of the depositors, the volume of deposits and other resources of
the bank and the need for equitable allocation and the efficient use of these deposits and
resources.
In the landmark judgment of Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI43, it
was observed that:
"The RBI is a “bankers' bank and lender of the last resort”. Its objective is to ensure monetary
stability in India and to operate and regulate the credit system of the country. It has, therefore,
to perform a delicate balance between the need to preserve and maintain the credit structure of
the country by strengthening the rule as well as apparent creditworthiness of the banks
operating in the country and the interest of the depositors. In underdeveloped country like ours,
where majority population are illiterate and poor and are not conversant with banking
operations and in underdeveloped money and capital market with mixed economy, the
Constitution charges the State to prevent exploitation and so the RBI would play both
promotional and regulatory roles. Thus the RBI occupies place of “pre-eminence" to ensure
monetary discipline and to regulate the economy or the credit- system of the country as an expert
body. It also advises the government in public finance and monetary regulations. The banks or
non-banking institutions shall have to regulate their operations in accordance with, not only as
42 “banking policy” means any policy which is specified from time to time by the Reserve Bank in the interest
of the banking system or in the interest of monetary stability or sound economic growth, having due regard to
the interests of the depositors, the volume of deposits and other resources of the bank and the need for
equitable allocation and the efficient use of these deposits and resources
43 (1992) 2 SCC 343; Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnel v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1962 SC 1371.

per the provisions of the Act but also the rules and directions or instructions issued by the RBI in
exercise of the power thereunder, Chapter 3-B expressly deals with regulations of deposit and
finance received by the Residuary Non-Banking Companies (RNBCs') The directions, therefore,
are, statutory regulations.”
Therefore it is submitted that in the present scenario where about 90% of the value of currency in
circulation is being exchanged, liquidity rate has to be maintained in the country and at the same
time funds would also be required to satisfy the normal withdrawals. RBI has the power to
control withdrawals having due regard to the interests of the depositors, the volume of deposits
and other resources of the bank and the need for equitable allocation and the efficient use of
these deposits and resources.
OWNERSHIP OF MONEY IS PRESENT WITH CITIZENS
Further it is humbly submitted that demonetization of currency notes will not lead to the
Government acquiring permanent ownership of the currency notes belonging to an individual.
In the case of Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India & Ors44, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India negatived the contentions raised by the petitioner, where it was argued
that ‘High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Act45’ of 1978 was violative of Article
19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India and with reference to Article 31 of the Constitution of India.
The main contention of the petitioners’ was that the currency notes were the properties of the
persons who are holding the same and demonetization of the same would amount to compulsory
acquisition of the property of the individual. The Court negatived all contentions raised with
reference to Article 19(1)(f) as well as Article 31 of the Constitution of India and dismissed the
challenge made against the said Act. These views were supported by the Madras High Court in
the recent matter of, M. Seeni Ahamed v. Union of India46.
In the present scenario the whole process of demonetization is a temporary one aimed at
eliminating corruption, black money etc. The Government has no intention to acquire the
property of the citizens. The ownership right of the ‘declared currency’ will remain with the
44 681 1996 SCALE (5)741.

45 High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Act of 1978.
46 (2017) 1MLJ1.

citizens’ themselves, as the citizens get a right to exchange their defunct currency notes in lieu of
new ones.
4. THAT THE NOTIFICATION DOES NOT SUFFER FROM EXCESSIVE

DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
It is humbly submitted that the legislatures will not find adequate time to legislate on every
minute details and limit themselves to ‘policy matters and leaving a large volume of area to
executives to frame rules to carry out the purposes of legislation. Thus, the need for delegation
became indispensable and it was sought to be justified on grounds of ‘speed’, flexibility and
adoptability’.47
In the Arvind Singh Case48 court observed that it is not a surprise to find that during the years
(1973-77) spanning a period of 4 years Parliament enacted 300 statutes but the rules framed by
the executive exceeded 25000.
LEGISLATURE PERMITS THE EXECUTIVE.
It is humbly submitted that once the legislature has discharged its essential function by declaring
the legislative policy, it is permissible for it to delegate to an administrative authority ancillary or
subordinate powers which are deemed to be necessary for carrying out that policy or the purpose
of the act49.
Thus it is submitted, there is no unconstitutional delegation where the legislature permits the
executive, at its discretion, to adapt (with incidental change, such as name, place, and the like)
existing statutes and to apply them to a new area without modifying the policy underlying the
statute.50
Section 26(1) of the RBI Act provides that every bank note has a legal tender at any place in
India in payment or on account for the amount expressed therein, and shall be guaranteed by the
Central Government. The Central Government, on the other hand, under sec. 26(2), can declare
that any series of bank notes of any denomination shall cease to be a legal tender.
47
Bentham’s theory of Utility. (theory of legislation) – P.1.
48
AIR 1979 SC 321
49
Mohammad Hussain Gulam Mohammad and Anr v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 97.
50
Rajnarain v. Chairman, Patna Administration, AIR 1954 SC 569.

As per Section 26(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act,
“On recommendation of the Central Board the Central Government may, by notification in the
Gazette of India, declare that, with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification,
any series of bank notes of any denomination shall cease to be legal tender save at such office or
agency of the Bank and to such extent as may be specified in the notification:"
Hence, the Central Government, in exercise of its powers under Section 26(2), notification
declared the value of CRs 500 and 1500 shall be ceased to be legal tender with effect from
03.01.2017.
It is relevant to note that the President by way of its power as prescribed under Article 77(3) of
the Constitution of India has made Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961,
whereby different ministries have been classified and entrusted with separate functions. The
Department of Economic Affairs under Ministry of Finance has been assigned to dispense
functions relating to currency and its designing, printing, production and supply etc. For
reference, the functions of the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance regarding
Domestic Finance is quoted as under:
“22. All matters relating to -
(a) currency and coinage including its (fesigning;
(b) the Security and Currency Printing Presses, the Security Paper Mills and the Mints including
the Assay Department and Silver Refinery, Gold Refinery, and Gold collection-cumdelivery
centres;
(c) production and supply of Currency Note Paper, Currency and Bank Notes and Coins
including Commemorative coins, postal stationery, stamps and vanous security forms/ items.”
It is, therefore, submitted that the Central Government has exercised the power under the RBI act
as a delegate of the Parliament and not in its executive capacity. Therefore, there is no question
of violation of Article 77(1) of the Constitution of India while issuing the aforesaid notifications.

In the matter of Ahmadabad Urban Development v. Sharadkumar Jayanti Kumar51,
“Mr. Goswami has further contended that the Development Authority, unlike other local
authorities, like Municipalities or Panchayats has no power or authority to collect any tax even
though it is essentially necessary to augment its revenue for the desired purpose of development
of the area in question. Precisely for implementing various schemes of development, the
development or betterment fee is required to be imposed and collected. Such imposition of fee,
therefore such imposition of withdrawal limit therefore, must be held to be incidental to the
development activities. In such state of affairs even if there is no specific provision for
imposition of betterment or development fee, such power must be held to be implied under the
Act.”
It is further submitted in the case of Mohammad Hussain Gulam Mohammad v.

The State of Bombay52 , the similar provisions under Sections 4, 4A, 5, 5A and 5AA of
the Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 were under challenge. In the aforesaid
judgment, upholding the validity of the said provision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such
provisions are intra vires and do not impose unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on
trade in the agricultural produce. Further, Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Chhaganlal Mansukhlal v. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Dohad53, reported
in while considering the scope of the provisions under Section 28 and Rule 98 and 54 of the
Rules framed under the said Act, held that rules are only regulatory and do not prohibit trade in
all types of agricultural produce and such Rules 48 and 54 of the Rules are not violative of the
provisions of Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution of India.
In the case of Khargram Panchayat Samiti and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.54 It has
been held by this Court that in a statute conferment of general statutory power also carries with it
incidental and consequential powers.
In the case of Lilawati v. State of Bombay55 this Court in the said decision has indicated when
and under what circumstances the principle of ejusdem generis is to be applied and has indicated
51
[1992] 3 SCR 328.
52
AIR 1962 SC 97.
53
1975 GLR 916.
54
1987 2 SCR 1207.

that the legislature, when it uses the word or otherwise, apparently intends to cover other cases
which may not come within the meaning of provided clauses.
In the case of Muhammadbhai Khudabux Chhipa v. The State of Gujarat56, the said
Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, following the seven Judges' Bench
decision, has held that, the Notification by itself does not impose any fee on any commodity.
What it says is to carry out the terms of Section 11 which require the maxima to be prescribed
subject to which the Market Committee can levy fees on agricultural produce. The imposition of
fees still remains to be made by the Market Committee under the power conferred on it by
Section 11 subject to the maxima prescribed in the Notification and therefore, the notification by
itself cannot be said to be discriminatory in nature.
The Supreme Court in Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India57 upheld the
constitutionality of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetization) Act, 1978 since the
acquisition was for public purpose to resolve the problem of unaccounted money. The Court also
held that a time limit for exchange was a reasonable restriction in view of the purpose of the law
– to clamp down on the circulation of high denomination notes. If a person could at anytime in
future go to RBI and ask for exchange value of such notes, the purpose of the Act would be
frustrated. Therefore, the constitutionality of the 1978 Act was upheld.
5. THAT THE PRESIDENT PROCLAMATION UNDER ARTICLE 360

CANNOT BE CHALLENGED.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the emergency proclaimed by the President
under article 360 is not challengeable. The wisdom and advisability of economic policies of
Government are not amenable to judicial review. It is not for Courts to consider the relative
merits of different economic policies. Court is not the forum for resolving the conflicting clauses
regarding the wisdom or advisability of policy. It will be appropriate to consider some relevant
decisions of this Court in relation to judicial review of policy decisions.
55
1957 1 SCR 721.
56
AIR 1962 SC 1517.
57
AIR1997 SC 370.

It is submitted that DR. AMBEDKAR had presented the provisions to the Assembly with the
explanation that it was necessary in view of the “present economic and financial situation” in the
country. He cited National Recovery Act as a type of measure that might be needed to meet
economic problems in India and pointed out that in the United States this had been declared
unconstitutional58. Rather than risk such an eventuality in India, he said, Art. 280A be included
in the Constitution. K.M. MUNSHI supported Dr. AMBEDKAR when replying KUNZRU’s
speech. “The country is in the brink of a precipice”. He said, as dangerous as that faced by the
United States in 1933 and in France in 1937 and extraordinary powers might be needed by the
Union. K.M. MUNSHI was no doubt referring to the grave financial situation involving the
devaluation of the rupee which the Constitution Assembly (Legislative) had debated several days
previously. The provision was not for normal times, he continued and showed that the economic
life of the nation was indivisible. There is no provincial autonomy; there is no federation by and
far itself. K.M. MUNSHI said: “These are not sacrosanct words.” The assembly adopted the
provision.59
It is further submitted that while considering the validity of the Banking Companies (Acquisition
and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance 1969, this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union
of India60 observed as under,
"It is again not for this Court to consider the relative merits of the different political theories or
economic policies...This Court has the power to strike down a law on the ground of want of
authority, but the Court will not sit in appeal over the policy of the Parliament in enacting a
law..."
While applying the analogy, just as the Court does not sit over the policy of the Parliament in
enacting the law, similarly, it is not for this Court to examine whether the policy of
Demonetisation is desirable or not. Dealing with the powers of the Court while considering the
validity of the decision taken in the sale of certain plants and equipment of the Sindri Fertilizer
Factory, which was owned by a Public Sector Undertaking, to the highest tenderer, this Court in
58
Schechter Poultry Corpn. v. United States, 295 US 495
59
Austin Granville(2005),THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION-CORNERSTONE OF A NATION, Ninth Impression at
pp.215-216 .
60
[1970] 3 SCR 530

Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors61.
while upholding the decision to sell, observed as follows:-
"...We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in
our Montesquieu system of separation of powers. The Court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the
parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the Directorate of a
Government company has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the court cannot, as a
super-auditor, take the Board of Directors to task. This function is limited to testing whether the
administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has
substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration."
In the landmark matter of BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and Ors. 62,
“In taking of a policy decision in economic matters at length, the principles of natural justice
have no role to play. While it is expected of a responsible employer to take all aspects into
consideration including welfare of the labour before taking any policy decision that, by itself,
will not entitle the employees to demand a right of hearing or consultation prior to the taking of
the decision.”
In the matter of, State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors63, the change of the policy
decision taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh to grant licence for construction of distilleries for
manufacture and supply of country liquor to existing contractors was challenged. Dealing with
the power of the Court in considering the validity of policy decision relating to economic
matters, it was observed as follows,
"But, while considering the applicability of Article 14 in such a case, we must bear in mind that,
having regard to the nature of the trade or business, the Court would be slow to interfere with
the policy laid down by the State Government for grant of licences for manufacture and sale of
liquor. The Court would, in view of the inherently pernicious nature of the commodity allow
large measure of latitude to the State Government in determining its policy of regulating,
manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover, the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of
61
1981 ILLJ 193 SC.
62
AIR 2002 SC 350.
63
[1987] 1 SCR 1.

liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the Court would hesitate to
intervene and strike down what the State Government has done, unless it appears to be plainly
arbitrary, irrational or mala fide. We had occasion to consider the scope of interference by the
Court under Article 14 while dealing with laws relating to economic activities in R.K. Garg v.
Union of India.64 We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be
viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion,
etc. We observed that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints because it has to
deal with complex problems which do nor admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-
jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters,
where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the
joints has to be allowed to the legislature.
In the matter of Morey v. Doud65, Frankfurter, J commented,
“In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-
restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the
affirmative responsibility. The Courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When
these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error,
the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled
by events - self limitation can be seen to be the path to judicia wisdom and institutional prestige
and stability.”
“What we said in that case in regard to legislation relating to economic matters must apply
equally in regard to executive action in the field of economic activities, thought the executive
decision may not be placed on as high a pedestal as legislative judgment insofar as judicial
deference is concerned. We must not forget that in complex economic matters every decision is
necessarily empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call 'trial' and error
method' and, therefore, its validity cannot be tested on any ridge 'a priori' considerations or on
the application of any strait-jacket formula. The Court must while adjudging the constitutional
validity of an executive decision relating to economic matters grant a certain measure of
freedom or 'play in the joints' to the executive. "The problem of government" as pointed out by
64
(1981) 4 SCC 675.
65
354 U.S. 457 (1957).

the Supreme Court of the United States in Metropolis Theater Co. v. State of Chicago66. are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may
be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not
discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of
government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercise which
can be declared void. The Government, as was said in Permian Basin Area Rate cases67, is
entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.
The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the State Government merely because it
feels that another policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical.
The court can interfere only if the policy decision is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala
fide. It is against the background of these observations and keeping them n mind that we must
now proceed to deal with the contention of the petitioners based on Article 14 of the
Constitution."
To the same effect are the observations of this Court in Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Limited and Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India68 in which Kasliwal, J. observed,
"The function of the Court is to see that lawful authority is not abused but not to appropriate to
itself the task entrusted to that authority. It is well settled that a public body invested with
statutory powers must take care not to exceed or abuse its power. It must keep within the limits
of the authority committed to it. It must act in good faith and it must act reasonably. Courts are
not to interfere with economic policy which is the function of experts. It is not the function of the
courts to sit in judgment over matters of economic policy and it must necessarily be left to the
expert bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot
be expected to decide them without even the aid of experts".
In the matter of Premium Granites and Anr v. State of T.N. and Ors.69 while considering the
Court's powers in interfering with the policy decision, it was observed,
66
228 U.S. 61 (1913)
67
390 U.S. 747 (1968)
68
AIR 1992 SC 1033.
69
[1994] 1 SCR 579.

"It is not the domain of the Court to embark upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an
exercise to consider as to whether the particular public policy is wise or a better, public policy
can be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the discretion of the executive and legislative
authorities as the case may be..."
It is submitted that the validity of the decision of the Government to grant licence under the
Telegraph Act 1885 to non-government companies for establishing, maintaining and working of
telecommunication system of the country pursuant to Government policy of privatisation of
Telecommunications was challenged in Delhi Science Forum and Ors. v. Union of India and
Anr.70 It had been contended that, telecommunications was a sensitive service which should
always be within the exclusive domain and control of the Central Government and under no
situation should be parted with by way of grant of lance to non-government companies and
private bodies. While rejecting this contention that,
"...The national policies in respect of economy, finance, communications, trade,

telecommunications and others have to be decided by Parliament and the representatives of the
people on the floor of the Parliament can challenge and question any such policy adopted by the
ruling Government..."
The Hon’ble Court then referred to an earlier decision in the case of R.K. Garg v. Union of
India and Ors71 where there was an unsuccessful challenge to a law enacted by Parliament, the
contentions are given herewith,
“What has been said in respect of legislations is applicable even in respect of policies which
have been adopted by Parliament. They cannot be tested in Court of Law. The courts cannot
express their opinion as to whether at a particular juncture or under a particular situation
prevailing in the country any such national policy should have been adopted or not. There may
be views and views, opinions and opinions which may be shared and believed by citizens of the
country including the representatives of the people in Parliament. But that has to be sorted out in
Parliament which has to approve such policies. Privatization is a fundamental concept
underlying the questions about the power to make economic decisions. What should be the role
70
1996 SCC 2405
71
[1982] 133 ITR 239 (SC)

of the State in the economic development of the nation? How the resources of the country shall
be used? How the goals fixed shall be attained? What are to be the safeguards to prevent the
abuse of the economic power? What is the mechanism of accountability to ensure that the
decision regarding privatisation is in public interest? All these questions have to be answered by
a vigilant Parliament. Courts have their limitations - because these issues rest with the policy-
makers for the nation. No direction can be given or is expected from the courts unless while
implementing such policies, there is violation or infringement of any of the constitutional or
statutory provision. The new Telecom policy was placed before Parliament and it shall be
deemed that Parliament has approved the same. This Court cannot review and examine as to
whether the said policy should have been adopted. Of course, whether there is any legal or
constitutional bar in adopting such policy can certainly be examined by the Court".
The Court while considering the validity of the industrial policy of the State of Madhya Pradesh
relating to the agreements entered into for supply of sal seeds for extracting oil in M.P. Oil
Extraction and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors72, the Court held as follows:-
“The executive authority of the State must be held to be within it competence to frame a policy
for the administration of the State. Unless the policy framed is absolutely capricious and, not
being informed by any reason whatsoever, can be clearly held to be arbitrary and founded on
mere ipse dint of the executive functionaries thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution or
such policy offends other constitutional provisions or comes into conflict with any statutory
provision, the Court cannot and should not out step its limit and tinkers with the policy decision
of the executive functionary of the State. This Court, in no uncertain terms, has sounded a note of
caution by indicating that policy decision is in the domain of the executive authority of the State
and the court should not embark on the unchartered ocean of public and should not question the
efficacy or otherwise of such policy so long the same does not offend any provision of the stature
or the Constitution of India. The supremacy of each of the three organs of the State i.e.
legislature, executive and judiciary in their respective fields of operation needs to be
emphasised. The power of judicial review of the executive and legislative action must be kept
within the bounds of constitutional scheme so that there may not be any occasion to entrance
misgivings about the role of judiciary in out stepping its limit by unwarranted judicial activism
72
(1997) 7 SCC 592

being very often talked of in these days. The democratic setup to which the polity is so deeply
committed cannot function properly unless each of the three organs appreciate the need for
mutual respect and supremacy in their respective field."
It is submitted that the validity of the change of Government policy in regard to the
reimbursement of medical expanses to its serving and retired employees cam up for
consideration before this Court in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga and Ors73.
The earlier policy upholding the reimbursement for treatment in a private hospital had been
upheld by this Court but the State of Punjab changed this policy whereby reimbursement of
medical expenses incurred in a private hospital was only possible if such treatment was not
available in any government hospital. Dealing with the validity of the new policy, the Court
observed as follows:-
"Now we revert to the last submission, whether the new State policy is justified in not
reimbursing an employee, his full medical expenses incurred on such treatment, if incurred in
any hospital in India not being a government hospital in Punjab. Question is whether the new
policy which is restricted by the financial constraints of the State to the rates in AIIMS would be
in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. So far as questioning the validity of
governmental policy is concerned in our view it is not normally within the domain of any court,
to weight the pros and cons of the policy or to scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or
equitable disposition for the purpose of varying, modifying or annulling it, based on howsoever
sound and good reasoning, except whether it is arbitrary or violative of any constitution,
statutory or any other provision of law. When Government forms its policy, it is based on a
number of circumstances on facts, law including constraints based on its resources. It is also
based on expert opinion. It would be dangerous if court is asked to test the utility, beneficial
effect of the policy or its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The Court would dissuade
itself from entering into this realm which belongs to the executive. It is within this matrix that it
is to be seen whether the new policy violates Article 21 when it restricts reimbursement on
account of its financial constraints."
73
AIR 1998 SC 1703

The Court judicially examined the matters of economic policy was again emphasised in Bhavesh
D. Parish and Ors. v. Union and India and Anr74, and while examining the validity of Section
45- S of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934, it was held as follows,
"The service rendered by certain informal sectors of the India economy could not be belittled.
However, in the path of economic progress, if the information system was sought to be replaced
by a more organised system, capable of better regulation and discipline, then this was an
economic philosophy reflected by the legislation in question. Such a philosophy might have its
merits and demerits. But these were matters of economic policy. They are best left to the wisdom
of the legislature and in policy matters the accepted principle is that the courts should not
interfere. Moreover in the context of the changed economic scenario the expertise of people
dealing with the subject should not be lightly interfered with. The consequences of such
interdiction can have large-scale ramifications and can put the clock back for a number of years.
The process of rational station of the infirmities in the economy can be put in serious jeopardy
and, therefore, it is necessary that while dealing with economic legislations, this Court, while not
jettisoning its jurisdiction to curb arbitrary action or unconstitutional legislation, should
interfere only in those few cases where the view reflected in the legislation is not possible to be
taken at all".
In the matter of Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Ors75., there was a challenge
to the validity of the establishment of a large dam. It was held by the majority as follows,
"It is now well settled that the Courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into
the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type
of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and
the Courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The Court, no
doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people's
fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the
Constitution..."
74
(2000) 5 SCC 471
75
(2000) 10 SSC 664.

It is submitted that Demonetisation is a policy decision involving complex economic factors. The
Courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic decisions as it has been
recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicative disposition and unless the economic
decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of constitutional or
legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that the Courts would decline to interfere. In
matters relating to economic issues, the Government has, while taking a decision, right to "trial
and error" as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within limits of authority.
In the matter of Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others76, the offer of the highest
bidder has been accepted. This was more than the reserve price which was arrived at by a method
which is well recognised and, therefore, we have not examined the details in the matter of
arriving at the valuation figure. Moreover, valuation is a question of fact and the Court will not
interfere in matters of valuation unless the methodology adopted is arbitrary.
Thus it can be contended that in a democracy it is the prerogative of each elected Government to
follow its own policy. Often a change in Government may result in the shift in focus or change in
economic policies. Any such change may result in adversely affecting some vested interests.
Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or
mala fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the Court.
76
2005 5 AWC 4437 All.

PRAYER
Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is humbly
prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to:
HOLD THAT THE WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF CONSTITUTION

OF CADBRIDGE IS NOT MAINTAINABLE;
HOLD THAT THE IMPUGNED GAZETTE NOTIFICATION IS NOT VIOLATIVE

OFARTICLE 14, 19, 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CADBRIDGE.
HOLD THAT THE IMPUGNED GAZETTE NOTIFICATION IS NOT VIOLATIVE

OFARTICLE 300A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CADBRIDGE.
DECLARE THE GAZETTE NOTIFICATION DATED 3RD JANUARY 2017 AS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID
And pass any other order that this Honourable Court may deem fit in the interests of justice,
equity, and good conscience.
For this act of kindness, the respondent faction shall be Duty bound forever.
All of which is humbly prayed,
Sd/-
Counsel for the Respondent.

Memorandum On Behalf of The Respondent

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11TH K.C.

Law National Moot Court Competition,2017 TCR13

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CADBRIDGE

Cental Bank of Cadbridge...........................................................................................Respondent 2

Original Writ Jurisdiction

Appellate Writ Jurisdiction

Original Writ Jurisdiction

As Submitted to the Chief Justice & other Companion Judges of the

Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page ii

AIR All India Reporter

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Factsheet Statement of Facts, 11th K.C. Law

H.P. Himachal Pradesh

PIL Public Interest Litigation

CRs Cadbridge Rupees

SCR Supreme Court Report

M.P. Madhya Pradesh

W.B. West Bengal

LIC Life Insurance Corporation

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

FCI Food Corporation of India

Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page iii

Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page iv

Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. CTO, (2005) 1 SCC 625 05

Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 166 12

D.K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat 1986 Supp SCC 20 3

Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India (1986) SCC 2405 25

G. Sundarrajan v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 620 12

Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 09

In Re Special Courts Bill, 1978, AIR 1979 SC 478 07

J. K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories, (1996) 6 SCC 665 09

Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, Bihar University, AIR 1968 SC 353 08

Jalia Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 1436 07

Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992) 4 SCC 305 01

K.Thimnappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR 2001 SC 467 07

Karnataka State Financial Corpn. v. N. Naramsimhaiah, AIR 2008 SC 1797 14

Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page v

Khar Gram Panchayati Samiti v. State of W.B. 1987 2 SCR 1207 19

Kihoto Hollohan v Zachollhu 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 62 02

Krishnan Kakkanath v. Govt. of Kerala, (1997) 9 SCC 495 10

Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873, 07

Leelavati v. State of Bombay 1957 1 SCR 721 19

M. Seeni Ahamed v. Union of India (2017) 1MLJ1 16

Mafat Lal Industrial Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 536 3

Metropolis Theater Co. v. State of Chicago 228 U.S. 61 (1913) 24

Mohd Hussain Gulam v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 97 19

Mohd. Bhai Chhippa v. State of Gujrat AIR 1962 SC 1517 20

Morey v. Doud 354 US 457 [1957] 23

N. Pad manabhan v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 2834 14

Permian Basin Area Rate cases 390 U.S. 747 (1968) 24

Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujrat (1986) 1 SCC 581 14

R.K. Garg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675 25,23

Rajnarayan v. Chairman Patna Admn. AIR 19523 SC 569 17

Ramchand v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 563 (566) 09

Rustom Ji Cooper v Union of India. (1970) 3 SCR 530 21

Schechter Poultry Corpn. v. United States, 295 US 495 21

Memorial on behalf of the Respondents Page vi

Sivani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 17770, at 1774. 10

Somavathi v. State of Punjab, (1914) L.R. 42 I.A. 44 12

State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills, AIR 1974 Sc 1300 (1974). 08

State of Kerala v. People’s Union for Civil Liberties, (2009) 8 SCC 46 14

State of M.P. v. Nand lal (1987) SCR 1 22