Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408

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Renewable Energy
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The economics of solar PV self-consumption in Thailand

Sopitsuda Tongsopit a, Siripha Junlakarn a, *, Wichsinee Wibulpolprasert b,
Aksornchan Chaianong c, Phimsupha Kokchang a, Nghia Vu Hoang d
a
Energy Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand
b
Thailand Development Research Institute, Bangkok, Thailand
c
The Joint Graduate School of Energy and Environment, King Mongkut's University of Technology Thonburi, Bangkok, Thailand
d
Independent Renewable Energy Consultant, Ho Chi Minh, Viet Nam

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Declining prices of solar photovoltaic modules and consumers' interest in green electricity production
Received 9 October 2018 are driving the prevalence of electricity “prosumers” worldwide. Prosumers are electricity consumers
Received in revised form who produce electricity for their own consumption, using distributed energy technologies including
21 December 2018
distributed solar photovoltaics (DPVs). Many jurisdictions around the world are adjusting to this
Accepted 23 January 2019
changing energy landscape by reforming their policies to support self-production and self-consumption
Available online 24 January 2019
of electricity. This paper analyzes the economics of electricity self-consumption of DPV electricity in
Thailand. Based on our study, we assess the feasibility of DPV self-consumption schemes for four
Keywords:
Rooftop PV self-consumption
customer groups. Among the three schemes assessed, (no compensation for excess electricity, net
Distributed solar PV metering, and net billing), all customer classes are profitable and net metering offers the most customer
Thailand solar PV policy benefits. However, we recommend net billing for policy adoption, not only because of its sufficient level
Net metering of economic viability but also its flexibility in addressing broad stakeholders' concerns. Our analytical
Net billing approach captures in detail how DPV sizing relative to the load may be impacted by those compensation
Solar economics mechanisms. Our methodology can be replicated by countries that would like to develop or reform their
national-level DPV self-consumption policies during an energy transition.
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction has increased significantly. Prosumers in the industrial sector,

Global solar photovoltaics (PV) development sets another record
year with a 33% growth in new installed capacity in 2017 over 2016
[1]. For grid-connected rooftop solar PV systems, several countries
have made a transition from supporting PV systems in the form of
feed-in tariffs (FITs) towards self-consumption policies. The
increasing economic attractiveness of self-consumption, caused
mainly by declining PV module prices and increasing prices of grid
electricity, has made a strong FIT boost unnecessary in many re-
gions of the world. Examples of countries that have made this
transition in recent years include Italy in 2013 [2], Germany [3],
Malaysia in 2017 [4], and Thailand [5].
Between 2009 and 2013, Thailand led the emerging economies
in the total investment in new solar PV capacity [6], but the ma-
jority of the PV capacity has come from utility-scale installations
[7]. As PV module prices are declining, the number of prosumers
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: siripha.j@chula.ac.th (S. Junlakarn).
which source their power from onsite biomass plants or rooftop PV
systems, have grown approximately 18% annually since 2009 [8].
Therefore, in 2016, the Thai government introduced a rooftop PV
pilot project to test various aspects of a self-consumption support
scheme. Furthermore, as of December 2018, the government has
announced a new policy to support rooftop solar PV systems for
self-consumption in all scales of the PV system, such as homes,
buildings, and factories.
Self-consumption can be described as the consumption of
electricity from locally sited electricity generation facilities, which
helps reduce electricity supplied from the national grid. According
to the International Energy Agency (IEA), self-consumption ratios
can be in the range from a few percents up to fully covering the
demand, depending on the levels of PV production and load. A
consumer who owns a PV system that produces a part or all of his/
her demand can be referred to as a prosumer [9]. Depending on the
policy design, self-consumption support schemes can provide
savings and/or incomes from self-consumed electricity and excess
electricity. In practice, policymakers can fine-tune the details of
self-consumption support schemes to stimulate or slow down the

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2019.01.087
0960-1481/© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
396 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408
rooftop solar market.
There are two broad categories of supporting schemes for self-
consumption: net metering (NM) and net billing (NB). The two
schemes differ in how they compensate excess electricity generated
from the prosumers' sources. Excess electricity is the amount of
electricity that is left after the prosumer consumes the energy from
the local generation and is fed to the distribution grid. An NM
scheme measures the net imported or exported electricity (in
kWh). In NB schemes, the exported and imported parts of the
electricity must be measured separately [10] in order to assign
different rates to them. Further detailed designs of NM and NB can
be found in Refs. [10,11].
Our analysis compared the economics of three potential support
schemes under debate, including NM, NB and another scheme
launched under the government's pilot project. We asked the
following questions: 1) How do different designs of self-
consumption schemes affect the economics of self-consumption?
2) How does the PV production/load ratio affect the economics of
self-consumption under different schemes? 3) Considering all the
related factors, what would be the best scheme for the Thai gov-
ernment to implement?
To inform policy, our study encompassed a range of load pro-
files, retail tariffs and PV sizes to ensure that the analysis could
more accurately reflect the conditions of a broad range of potential
DPV adopters. In this regard, our analysis represented a unique
contribution to the literature on DPV self-consumption due to its
rigorous consideration of stakeholders' perspectives. We also per-
formed sensitivity analyses to measure the impact of various rate
structures and PV-to-load (PV/L) ratios to cover the diversity of load
and PV sizing combinations.
In order to simulate PV production and cash flows, we used the
System Advisor Model (SAM) developed by the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory of the U.S. Department of Energy (NREL). The
indicators for the comparison of support schemes include the lev-
elized cost of energy (LCOE), the net present value (NPV), internal
rate of return (IRR), and the payback period (PB). The analysis was
used to inform policymakers in their design of the support scheme
for rooftop PV self-consumption, which is a follow-on from the Pilot
Project that was launched in 2016.
Our methodology can be replicated by countries that aim to
reform their national-level DPV self-consumption policies. The
methodology involved main stakeholders, particularly state-owned
utilities, in designing compensation schemes and addressed their
diverse concerns, which are significant in an energy transition.
Without the involvement of utilities, they may hesitate to allow an
increasing growth of prosumers in the power grid, since it will
impact on their revenue directly. In addition, for a country
depending on the import of technology like Thailand, energy
storage remains too costly in integrating with DPV for self-
consumption although its price is declining. Therefore, the eco-
nomics of storage battery was not included in our work.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the
solar PV situation in Thailand, the current state of knowledge on the
self-consumption support scheme and the development of support
schemes. Section 3 describes the selected schemes and the detailed
methodology for the economic modeling. Section 4 shows the
economic simulation results. Finally, section 5 discusses and sug-
gests policy recommendations.
2. Background and literature review
2.1. Review of PV situation in Thailand
In 2016, the government ended the FIT program for rooftop solar
PV systems with the view that the investment costs of rooftop PV
had come down enough to cancel the subsidy. At the beginning of
that same year, the National Reform Committee proposed a broad
framework for the adoption of an NM scheme, which stated that
the government should encourage self-generation, self-consump-
tion of rooftop PV electricity and the excess generation from the
rooftop PV systems should be compensated for in the form of NM.
However, there was no detailed study and research from which
detailed policy design and compensation mechanism could be
developed. In addition, different stakeholders understood the term
“net metering” differently. There was no clear understanding of the
various kinds of compensation mechanisms that could be used to
support rooftop PV for self-consumption. Therefore, the Ministry of
Energy commissioned a study with the aim to understand the
economics of solar PV self-consumption for different customer
groups. This paper represents a summary of that study.
2.2. Recent research review
From the consumers' perspective, the feasibility of rooftop PV
investment depends on a combination of factors, including the
location, load characteristics, sizing of the PV system, the
compensation mechanismsand the tariffs to which the customers
subscribe [11,12].
A FIT scheme has been one of the compensation mechanisms
that countries have used to accelerate PV adoption [13e15]. In the
case of Japan [13], rooftop solar PV has been used for a long time,
but its deployment accelerated after the launch of feed-in tariffs
that followed the Fukushima event. The Act on Purchase of
Renewable Energy Sourced Electricity by Electric Utilities (Law No.
108) was enacted in 2011 and new FIT rates, including that for solar
PV, were introduced. The goal is to increase PV installed capacity to
28 GW by 2020 and 50 GW by 2030. Moreover, Japan also sup-
ported R&D activities, resulting in prospering local solar PV
manufacturing companies that became global brands [13].
For Australia, as discussed in Ref. [14] by 2012, subsidies of
residential rooftop PV were (1) Renewable Energy Certificates
(RECs) and (2) FIT. It is found that FIT performed better in increasing
PV adoption as there was a sharp increase of PV installation after
the FIT was introduced. However, according to the FIT scheme,
there was an issue of cross-subsidization between non-solar cus-
tomers and solar customers that have been debatable.
For the UK [15], the FIT scheme is slightly different from others
as the policy consists of three main financial incentives: (1) Gen-
eration tariff; (2) Export tariff and (3) Electricity bill savings. The
first one (generation tariff) is a fixed rate for all PV generation, while
the second one (export tariff) is a set rate for surplus generation
back to the grid. Moreover, if solar customers self-consume PV
electricity on-site, it causes a reduction in electricity bills (elec-
tricity bill savings). This support scheme was successful in
increasing the efficient use of FIT and accelerating PV adoption
level.
However, due to the declining PV module costs, more and more
solar projects are becoming feasible without FIT support. Many
countries have stopped their FIT supporting program or kept it as
an option along with a new program e self-consumption scheme
[16]. Recent studies from countries around the world have shown
that the economics of self-consumption schemes are attractive, but
the detailed design of the schemes will influence their feasibility.
Furthermore, since the economics of self-consumption is influ-
enced by several factors, such as the load profile, PV production
profile, PV sizing, electricity rates and the designs of the support
schemes, past studies have varied a number of these factors to
assess the feasibility of the support schemes of interest.
For instance, Dufo-Lo
pez [10] compared net metering and net
 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408 397

billing policies for Spain and found that a real net metering policy
(PV exports are valued at the retail level) can significantly increase
the level of PV adoption compared to net billing. However, it still
depends on the details of policy design. Profitability of NB schemes
varied according to buyback rates.
Based on the Thai context, Chaianong et al. [17] addressed the
bill savings analysis of rooftop PV customers under two compen-
sation schemes (net metering and net billing) for different
customer groups in Thailand. They found that customer's bill sav-
ings under the net metering scheme are higher than those of net
billing for both small and large customer groups. Additionally, net
metering results in a smaller variation in bill savings among
different individual load profiles. This means solar customers can
be flexible for sizing PV systems, which cannot address utility's
concerns on oversizing PV. On the other hand, with appropriate
buyback rate that makes PV investment feasible, net billing is rec-
ommended as it is economically attractive, and it can help solar
customers limit their PV sizes and mitigate utility's concerns in the
country.
Moreover, focusing on comparing self-consumption with the
FIT, Pacudan [18] evaluated the comparison among three support
schemes, which are FIT, net metering and net billing for rooftop PV
installation in Brunei Darussalam. It is found that both FIT and self-
consumption (net metering and net billing) can increase economic
attractiveness of residential PV investment in Brunei Darussalam at
the same level depending on the policy design. However, self-
consumption schemes cause lower financial burden as they
require lower levels of subsidy.
The comparison of FIT and NM study was also conducted by
Poullikkas for a typical household load. The authors investigated
the effect of PV sizing (1e7 kW) and retail rates under the support
schemes. Based on a combination of schemes, sizing, and retail
rates, 21 different unique systems were developed, and compared
financial feasibility using NPV and IRR. The result showed that NM
produced a better performance for household solar PV. However,
because an electricity consumption pattern of prosumers is limited
to a specific load profile, the results may not capture economic
variability of prosumer types for FIT and NM [19].
Pillai conducted a near term economic assessment for 20 loca-
tions in the UK and 22 in India with a 3-kW system capacity with
the financial support schemes of NM and FIT. In this study, two
residential loads (winter and summer) were considered. Benefits
were assessed based on electricity consumption costs, where were
linked to PV system costs, PV incentives structure, PV generation
and customer demand profiles. The results showed that the
considered financial support mechanisms offered near term eco-
nomic benefits for PV systems in India but not in the UK. However,
the study did not consider NB, TOU electricity rate structure and
other taxes for access, back-up, generation charges [20].
Watts assessed the application of NM and NB for 10 locations in
Chile with 1-kW, 3-kW, and 10-kW PV systems considered. LCOE
was used to compare the benefits of NM and NB schemes on
different electricity rates and time intervals. The study showed that
NM performed better than NB and PB depended significantly on
system locations in the country [21].
Other studies on commercial and industrial scales have also
provided reference methodologies. Ghiani not only compared
benefits between no support scheme and FIT but also suggested
that a match between electricity generation (system capacity) and
consumption (load profile) is important to maximize customer's
benefits. A smaller system will lead to a higher self-consumption
rate and shorter PB, but it is not an optimized system [22]. Ghosh
investigated the profitability of various types of PV systems and
found that for large PV systems, FIT and renewable energy certifi-
cates (RECs) mechanisms offered more profitable than net meter-
ing [23].
Based on the studies reviewed above, they differed significantly
from each other in their selection of PV sizing, load types, retail
tariffs and support schemes. One common feature of these studies,
however, is that each selected either one load profile, or one type of
PV sizing, or one type of retail tariff rate to conduct the economic
simulation as shown in Table 1. In order for such studies to help
influence policy, the system modeled, and the variables applied to
frame the study should be able to encompass the diverse types of
load profiles and PV production profiles.
Therefore, to inform policy, our study encompassed a broader
range of load profiles, retail tariffs, PV sizes and financial self-
consumption support schemes to ensure that the analysis could
more accurately reflect the conditions of a broad range of potential
DPV adopters. As will be discussed in the methodology section, our
study uses a PV/L ratio to cover the diversity of load and PV sizing
combination, representing a unique contribution to this literature.
2.3. Support schemes for self-consumption PV systems
Compensation schemes range over a wide spectrum, from FIT to
simple NM, as shown in Table 2. Historically, FIT was a popular
support scheme in Europe. It assigns a tariff to either total PV

Table 1
Comparison of recent research comparing the economics of rooftop PV self-consumption schemes (and FIT scheme).

Authors Input variables Outputs

PV Sizes PV locations Load profiles Retail tariff rates Support schemes

Poullikkas 1e7 kW 1 Location(Cyprus) 1 Residential load profile 16-24 Vc/kWh FIT NPV
NM IRR
Pillai et al. 3.0 kW 20 Locations in UK and 2 Profiles (winter and summer) 2 Electricity rates FIT Prosumer electricity unit
22 in India in each country for India NM cost
Watts et al. 1 kW 10 Locations in Chile 29 Daily load profiles to 2 Types of retail NM LCOE
3 kW represent 365 days in a year tariff
10 kW NB
Ghiani From 60 to 160 kW for 1 Location (Italy) 2 typical average load profiles 2 Types of retail With FIT NPCa (net present cost) and
commercial business of industrial plant and tariff LCOE
From 60 to 140 kW for commercial business Without FIT
industrial plant
Ghosh et al. 5 Systems: 1 Locations (Bangalore, Depends on specific cases Depends on specific NM LCOE
- 5 kW India) cases REC (renewable
- 250 kW energy credit)
- 30 kW FIT
- 350 W with storage
a
NPC is NPV of all costs associated with the ownership of the PV systems and the total annual electricity bill.
398 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408

Table 2
Compensation schemes for solar rooftop PV.

FIT NM NB

Right to self-consume Depends on the scheme Yes Yes

Revenue from self- N/A Savings on the electricity bill Savings on the electricity
consumed PV bill
Applicability of buyback Typically applied to gross PV No buyback rate or buyback rate for remaining credits at the end of the Buyback rate for
rate for excess production banking period. instantaneous
generation PV export
Banking Option No Depends on the scheme Depends on the scheme
Examples of countries using Japan Some U.S. states, Chile, Mexico
the scheme in 2016 Vietnam Vietnam, Singapore,
Indonesia The Philippines

Source: Adapted from Ref. [9].

production, such as in Denmark, or to excess generation, such as in
the United Kingdom [24] and in the U.S. However, the FIT schemes
are being phased out in many countries due to various reasons,
such as reaching a budget limit and the declining cost of PV systems
in combination with high retail electricity rates [25]. In the U.S.,
residential PV systems are often compensated at the customer's
underlying retail electricity rate through NM [26]. Another popular
scheme is NB, which uses a difference in monetary terms of excess
electricity produced. Examples of countries using NB include Can-
ada, Chile and Italy [9].
It should be noted that in some countries, FIT payment is given
to all the energy produced from the PV systems (Gross FIT),
whereas in other countries, the FIT is given only to the unused
surplus of PV electricity that flows to the grid (NET FIT) [27]. The
section below focuses exclusively on self-consumption schemes.
2.3.1. Components of self-consumption scheme designs
This section focuses on self-consumption schemes for the sup-
port of distributed PV (DPV) systems. We adapt and modify the
definitions of compensation schemes discussed by Refs. [10,11].
Based on these definitions, we lay out the taxonomy of the support
schemes in Fig. 1 and describe the taxonomy according to the
following elements:
2.3.1.1. Compensation. As shown in Fig. 1, the electricity generated
from grid-connected PV systems can be divided into the two parts
of the self-consumed part and the excess generation that is not
consumed and flows back to the grid. Typically, the self-consumed
part can be compensated or not compensated. In most cases, pro-
sumers at minimum enjoy the benefits of this self-consumed
portion of the electricity via savings from not paying to the util-
ity. This means that the self-consumed part of electricity is valued
at the retail rate to which the customer subscribes. In very few
countries, such as China and the UK, additional payment is given to
the self-produced, self-consumed electricity as a way of incentiv-
izing self-consumption [9]. As for the excess portion of electricity,
which is not consumed, the compensation can occur in several
ways, which is what distinguishes NM from NB schemes.
When there is compensation for excess electricity, the
compensation can be done in energy or monetary terms. If the

Total
Rooftop PV
generation

Self- Excess
consumed generation

No With
No With compensat compensat
premium premium ion ion

Storable Real time

credit Buy-back

Credit valued Credit valued

= Retail rate Retail rate

NM with NM with NB with

NM with NB with NB with
monthly rolling rolling
rolling monthly rolling
buyback credit and credit and
credit buyback credit
buyback buyback
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of self-consumption support schemes for rooftop PV.
 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408 399

compensation occurs in an energy term (kWh), the scheme would
be defined as NM, while if the compensation occurs in monetary
terms, the scheme is called NB. In NM schemes, the generation can
directly offset the consumption of each kWh using bidirectional
electromechanical meters or digital meters. In NB schemes, energy
units are converted to a monetary value with different rates for the
imported and exported electricity.
Various forms of NM and NB have been implemented in
different countries and they differ according to the combination of
design elements. The key terminologies of these design elements
are summarized in Table 3 [10,11,21].
2.3.2. Different support schemes for self-consumption
When PV electricity is used for self-consumption and the excess
generation is compensated for, there are two main categories of
self-consumption schemes: (i) NM and (ii) NB, which are discussed
in turn below.
in the NB scheme.
In simple NB, there is no compensation if the cost of all the
energy imported is higher than the compensation value of all en-
ergy exported. However, if the cost of all the energy imported from
the grid is higher than the compensation value of all exported
electricity, the prosumer must pay the difference to the utility.
In other NB types, the excess electricity is banked or compen-
sated or both. In NB with buyback method, the prosumer pays the
utility at retail rate for imported electricity, while the utility pur-
chases electricity from the prosumer at a buyback rate, but no
banking credit is allowed. In NB with rolling credit, the prosumer
gets a rolling credit for any excess electricity generated above their
consumption. This rolling credit can be used to offset electricity
charges in the next billing period, but there is no compensation for
any available credits at the end of the banking period. Finally, when
the prosumer gets paid back for available credits it is called NB with
rolling credit and buyback.

2.3.2.1. Net metering (NM). Different from a self-consumption

scheme, in NM the focus is on the excess electricity produced by
the prosumer. The excess electricity can be compensated and/or
banked, or just simply ignored. There is one bidirectional meter
used for this scheme.
In a simple NM, there is no compensation if there is excess
electricity generated by the prosumer's system. However, if the
level of imported electricity is higher than the level of exported
electricity, the prosumer must pay the difference to the utility. Even
if there is no compensation, it is still beneficial to the prosumer
compared to self-consumption.
Other types of NM are distinguished by how the excess elec-
tricity is banked or compensated or both. In the NM with buyback
method, the prosumer gets paid for the excess electricity exported
to the grid at a buyback rate, and no banking credits are allowed.
However, for the NM with rolling credit, the excess electricity
produced in a set period of time (normally a year) is banked to be
used as a retail credit to offset energy consumption in a subsequent
billing period, but there is no compensation after the specified
banking period. For the case compensation is made after the
banking period expired, it is called NM with rolling credit and
buyback.
2.3.2.2. Net billing (NB). Similar to the NM scheme, the NB scheme
focuses on the excess electricity produced, but the compensation is
made in monetary terms. Note that two separate meters are applied
3. Methodology
This study was designed to understand the factors that affect the
economics of PV self-consumption for four customer groups in
Thailand. We aimed to evaluate and compare prosumers' feasibility
for the current Pilot Project to the feasibility under two other
supporting schemes, which included the buyback rate and/or
rolling credit. We considered four load profiles and three support
schemes as discussed in detail below.
3.1. Types of customers and modeled load profiles
For this study, we considered the four classes that are relevant to
the deployment of rooftop PV in metropolitan areas; namely resi-
dential (RES), small general service (SGS), medium general service
(MGS), and large general service (LGS). These four customer classes
make up approximately 93% of the metropolitan electricity au-
thority (MEA)'s total load in 2015 [28]. The load profiles of the
selected customer groups were then extracted from the load survey
of MEA, which serves the areas of Bangkok, Nonthaburi and Samut
Prakan, for the year 2015. The load data we used for each customer
class is the average consumption from the sampled loads in each
class at 15-min intervals for the whole year. The average load
profiles of the sampled profiles in each customer class are shown in
the appendix.

Table 3
Key terminologies of design elements.

Design element Description

Integration interval
Billing period
Banking option and banking
period
Buyback option and buyback
rate
The time period over which a meter is programmed to compute the net consumption (or net production) of the prosumer. For bidirectional
meters, which records the electricity imported from and exported to the grid separately, the frequency of the reading can be set to a desired
time period (e.g., every 5 min, 30 min or 1 h). How frequently these records are summed up affect the economics of self-consumption. The
meter's integration interval is the length of the time period over which the meter calculates the net electricity flow, which could turn out to
be either the net production or net consumption [15]. For NB, there is a relationship between the integration interval and the buyback rate.
When the buyback rate is lower than retail rate, prosumers may benefit from longer integration intervals. On the other hand, if the buyback
rate is higher than the retail rate, prosumers will benefit from a shorter, or more frequent, integration interval.
In most cases, the billing period is set to repeat on a monthly basis. Therefore, at the end of the month, excess electricity will be
compensated or credited. The crediting can be in energy (kWh) or monetary (e.g., USD) terms.
When banking is an option, the remaining excess generation from each billing period can be kept either as credits or a monetary value and
used to deduct from the consumption in subsequent billing periods. The ‘banking period’ is a finite number of billing periods and typically
1 y in most cases but can be 2 y (such as in Malaysia), or indefinitely (such as in Italy). At the end of the banking period, the utility ignores or
compensates the remaining credit at a buyback rate.
If excess generation is valued in a monetary term, a buyback rate, or sell rate, will be applied to the exported electricity. If the excess
generation is valued in an energy term (kWh), there will be no sell rate, except at the end of the banking period in some cases (see “banking
period”). There are three different rates possible to value the excess electricity. These are (i) at a level below the retail rate (e.g. avoided,
wholesale, or marginal costs), (ii) at the retail rate and (iii) above the retail rate (premium rate). In addition, the buyback rate can be fixed or
dynamic.
400 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408
Table 4
Features of NM vs. NB that impact on the stakeholders' perspectives.
Features NM with rolling credit and buyback
Compensation for excess generation?
Incentivizes consumers? Yes, especially when all net credits are bought at the end
Flexibility for changing compensation rate over time for
new prosumers?
Utility needs to allocate fund to pay prosumers?
Results in utility's revenue losses?
Results in a long-term increase in retail tariffs?
Utilities' accounting adjustment More complex accounting from utilities' perspectives.
Meter type Can use an electromechanical meter (that can turn back) Digital meter with two registers (measuring grid
Ability to monitor electricity back feed No if an electromechanical meter is used
3.2. Self-consumption support schemes
The selection of compensation schemes for modeling was based
on literature review, stakeholders' consultation, and surveys. We
conducted stakeholders' consultation through focus groups and
surveys to understand the stakeholders' preferences for the fea-
tures of self-consumption design schemes [29]. In the question-
naires, we asked respondents to provide their views on a self-
consumed part and excess part of PV electricity for the future
compensation schemes that can be applicable including a
compensation rate and banking period as shown in the appendix.
The survey results showed that MEA wanted excess generation
to be compensated for in real-time, as opposed to being stored as
retail credits, whereas private companies and customers wanted
excess generation to be stored to offset electricity consumption in
subsequent billing cycles. If the compensation for excess generation
is to be purchased in real-time, the majority in each group of
stakeholders wanted buyback rates that were lower than retail
rates [29]. This points to a preference for NB over NM. Further in-
depth interviews [30] showed that the utility prefers NB over NM
because it is concerned about the complexity that could be added to
their accounting systems as well as the foregone tax revenue that
could be caused by an NM scheme. In addition, rapid utility revenue
losses were believed to result from NM. The features of NM vs. NM
that affect stakeholders' preferences are summarized in Table 4.
Based on the consultation and literature review, we compared
three schemes in this analysis, each scheme having unique design
elements on compensation and buyback rates.
3.2.1. Description of the three schemes used in this analysis
3.2.1.1. Scheme 1 e self-consumption scheme (Thailand's rooftop PV
pilot project). Scheme 1 is based on Thailand's 100 MW Rooftop PV
Pilot Project, launched in 2016. The scheme encourages PV elec-
tricity production for self-consumption. Excess electricity that
flows into the grid receives no compensation. The grid code that
accompanies this Pilot Project specifies PV sizing limitations ac-
cording to the voltage level of the line to which the system is
connected. For example, for the low-voltage line, the system size is
capped at 5 kW for connection with a one-phase line and 10 kW for
connection with a three-phase line. Due to these limitations of PV
sizing, PV production may not exceed the load in many cases and
hence the Pilot Project may cause little back-feed to the grid.
3.2.1.2. Scheme 2 - NM with rolling credit and buyback. Under NM
with rolling credit and buyback, at the end of each monthly billing
period, the total consumption was netted against the total PV
production. If the total PV production exceeded the total
NB with real-time buyback
Yes, in kWh Yes, at rate set by policymakers or regulator
Depends on buyback rate
of the year
No Yes. Rate can be >, <, or ¼ retail depending on market
conditions
No Yes (but the total payment is low if the buyback rate is
low)
Yes, at a faster rate than NB. Yes
Yes Yes, but at a slower rate than NM if buyback
rate < retail tariff.
Easy accounting from utilities' perspectives.
or digital meter inflow and outflow)
Yes
consumption in that month, the prosumer received credit at the
retail rate for all excess electricity. Credits could be rolled over to
the following month, or “banked”, until the end of the banking
period. Therefore, excess electricity is valued at the retail rate and
can reduce the prosumer's expenses on electricity that is bought
from the utility. Moreover, with the buyback feature, if there are
still credits left at the end of the banking period, the prosumer gets
paid, and in this simulation, it was set at below the retail rate.
It should be noted that, typically, one would expect that the
credit accrued from each billing period could offset the consump-
tion during all hours in the following billing period. However, some
utilities only allow TOU customers to use peak-period credits to
only offset peak-period consumption, and likewise for the off-peak
period credits. This is the case for ConEdison.1 However, under our
scheme, we assumed that credits can offset consumption at all
hours.
3.2.1.3. Scheme 3 - NB with real-time buyback (no rolling credit).
Scheme 3 involved the real-time valuation of the excess electricity
(e.g., every hour). For each hour, any excess electricity that flowed
back to the grid was valued at a specified buyback rate, which in
this study was set at three rates below the retail rate Three different
rates were selected as a sensitivity analysis. The prosumer's elec-
tricity bill at the end of the month considered the combined
monetary valuation from all hours in the month. This scheme was
applied since we would like to be forward-looking for future con-
ditions, in which there would be a high penetration of DPV. The
buyback rate for residential customers can initially be set to be high
(above or at retail rate) in the beginning to stimulate adoption. At a
high penetration, the buyback rate can be valued at avoided costs to
reflect the value of solar in replacing transmission and distribution
costs, similar to the philosophy in countries such as Singapore and
the Philippines. The three schemes are summarized in Table 5:
3.3. Modeling using SAM and applications of compensation
schemes in SAM
We used the NREL's SAM to run the simulation, which calculated
the technical and economic performance of renewable energy
systems, using inputs, including the parameters related to system
designs, costs, locations, weather, electricity tariffs and compen-
sation mechanisms for the renewable electricity. We used SAM to
calculate the economic feasibility in terms of the IRR, NPV, PB and
LCOE. The underlying relationships between the inputs and outputs
1
Net Metering and Billing FAQ, http://www.coned.com/dg/Net_Metering_
Billing_FAQ.asp.
 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408 401

Table 5
Comparison of different schemes applied in modeling.

Criteria Pilot Project NM with rolling credit and buyback NB with real-time buyback

Number of registers 2 1 2
Compensation type No Physical compensation in electricity unit (kWh) Economic compensation in a monetary unit (e.g. USD)
compensation
Compensation time e Monthly Hourly
frame
Billing period Monthly Monthly Monthly
Banking period No banking Yearly No banking
Rolling credit No rolling Yes (kWh) No rolling credit
credit
Buyback rate applied e Retail rate depending on the customer class (0.0845 and 0.0723 USD/ Specify rates in USD/kWh (0.0286, 0.0571, and 0.0857 USD/
in this study kWh or 2.958 and 2.529 THB/kWh) kWh or 1, 2, and 3 THB/kWh)

are shown in Eqs. (1)e(4). transmission infrastructure which cannot be completely avoided by
excess generation from a rooftop PV, it was reasonable to have a
Pn
0 Cn buyback rate below the retail rate. Furthermore, after consulting
C0 ¼ (1)
ð1 þ IRRÞn with the private sector, we found that such a relatively lower
buyback rate may be acceptable because it is better than the case of
Pn no compensation at all under the Pilot Project.
0 Cn
NPV ¼  C0 (2)
ð1 þ iÞn 3.4. Technical assumptions

Pn For each tariff class, we assigned a system size based on elec-

0 Cn
C0 ¼ PB
ð1 þ iÞ
P Cn
C0 þ n1 ð1iÞ n
LCOE ¼ Pn Q
n
1 ð1iÞn
where C0 is the initial capital cost (USD), Cn is the annual cash flow
at time n (USD) or annual cost for Eq. (4); I is the discount rate (%), N
is the analysis period (y) and Qn is the energy generated by the
system in year n (kWh).
The compensation for excess generation varied depending on
the scheme. Under the Pilot Project, there was no compensation for
excess electricity generation. Under NM in SAM, excess electricity
generation was used to offset against the electricity consumption
within the first month, and if there were remaining credits of
excess generation in the month, they were accumulated for use in
the next month.2 The two buyback rates under NM were calculated
from the average wholesale TOU electricity prices at the lowest and
highest voltage level and included the transmission prices and Ft3.
Under NB, we assigned hourly compensation rates for excess
electricity generation. Based on consultation with stakeholders
(policymakers, utilities and regulators), we found that the gov-
ernment was willing to release a buyback rate that was lower than
the retail rates. Therefore, we chose three buyback rates under NB
for simulation of 0.0286, 0.0571 and 0.0857 USD/kWh. The buyback
rate of 0.0857 USD/kWh or 3 THB/kWh was approximately the
average wholesale TOU electricity prices at the lowest voltage level.
The lower buyback rates of 0.0286 and 0.0571 USD/kWh were
chosen to study the sensitivity impact of the lower buyback rates
on the consumer's investment return.
The fact that the buyback rate was lower than the retail rate may
appear contrary to common sense, or even unfair. However, given
the fact that the retail rate included the costs of distribution and
2
For more information on how SAM rolls over net generation under TOU tariffs,
see SAM Help.
3
Ft is a variable tariff that reflects uncontrolled costs of the utilities such as the
fuel cost.
4
NM and NB in this section have definitions as described in Section 3.2.
(3) tricity demand and popular systems in the market. Module char-
acteristics were taken as SAM's default values. The location of the
systems is in Bangkok, Thailand. The orientation, tilt and azimuth
are chosen to maximize the energy production. The technical de-
(4) tails of system design are summarized in the appendix.
3.5. Economic and financial assumptions
The costs of installing the solar PV systems were based on the
market price survey of EPC contractors during the months of
August and September 2016. Electricity rate structures were those
published by the MEA. Other financial assumptions, such as the
inflation rate and discount rate, reflected the conditions in Thai-
land's market during the time of research. In this study, we
assumed that the systems were purchased using the prosumer's
equity since other forms of financing mechanisms for rooftop PV
are not yet widespread [30]. The economic and financial assump-
tions that were used as inputs into SAM are summarized in the
appendix.
3.6. Sensitivity analysis
We performed a sensitivity analysis of IRRs that resulted from
varying the PV/L ratios. The PV/L ratio is a proxy for the size of the
PV system relative to the size of the load, while the size of the PV
was fixed. It was calculated as the total PV production in kWh/y,
divided by the total load consumption in kWh/y and ranged from
20 to 100%.
4. Results and discussion4
4.1. Residential (RES)
For a base case, the 3-kW PV system, which was estimated from
100% of an annual peak load, yielded 4097 kWh/y of energy pro-
duction and corresponded to a PV/L ratio of 32.1%. The capacity
factor was 15.60% in the first year, and the LCOE was 0.0952 USD/
kWh. By considering the NPV, PB and IRRs (Table 6), an installation
of a 3-kW PV system for RES was profitable even there was no
compensation. Customers with the TOU rate gained more financial
402 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408

Table 6
RES: Comparison of the NPV, PB and IRR with the block rate and TOU rate for the three different schemes.

Tariff Block rate TOU rate

Scheme Pilot Project NM NB Pilot Project NM NB

Buyback rate (USD/kWh) 0 0.0845 0.0286e0.0857 0 0.0845 0.0286e0.0857

NPV (USD) 4628 5012 4772e4909 5293 5719 5386e5573
PB (y) 10.8 10.2 10.3e10.6 10.3 9.7 9.9e10.2
IRR (%) 10.4 11.0 10.6e10.8 11.0 11.7 11.2e11.4

benefits than those with the block rate for all three schemes since
energy generated from PV were consumed during an on-peak
period where an electricity rate is higher than the block rate. NM
offered the most financial benefits among the three schemes, while
the Pilot Project offered the least financial benefits.
By varying PV/L ratios from 20% to 100%, IRRs of RES were in a
range of 4.9%e11.7% across three considered schemes (Fig. 2). For
each type of electricity rates, IRRs at a 20% PV/L ratio for three
schemes were slightly different since the IRRs were not affected by
benefits of excess electricity generation, which was small at this PV/
L ratio. Moreover, the sensitivity results for RES revealed that the
feasibility, in the form of IRRs, generally declined with an increasing
PV/L ratio above 20% for all the schemes except for NM. As PV/L
ratio increased, so did the level of excess electricity generation. This
excess generation earned no compensation under the Pilot Project
12
11
10
9 Pilot project
IRR (%)
and compensation at a rate that was lower than the average retail
rate under these NB schemes. On the other hand, excess electricity
generation received compensation at the full retail rate under NM,
thereby resulting in the consistently higher IRRs across the PV/L
ratios.
At a PV/L ratio of less than 60%, IRRs under NM were insensitive
to the PV/L ratios. However, at a higher PV/L ratio, IRRs under NM
started to decrease because saving on an electricity bill started to
decrease. This was because of the way we accounted for excess
credits. The excess electricity generation during the on-peak period
was used to offset the consumption during the peak period in the
month. If there were remaining credits of excess generation from
the on-peak period, they were used to offset the consumption
during the off-peak period first before rolling over to the following
month. This meant that as the level of excess electricity generation
increased (which usually comes from the on-peak period),
increasing proportions of this excess generation were valued at an
off-peak rate, which was not valued high enough to offset the
higher investment cost of the larger PV sizes, resulting in a lowered
IRR.
4.2. Small general service (SGS)

8 NM For a base case, SGS was assumed to install a 3-kW PV system,

which was approximated from 100% of an annual peak load. This PV
7 NB @ $0.0286
system yielded 4097 kWh/y of energy production and corre-
6 NB @ $0.0571 sponded to a PV/L ratio of 32.1%. The capacity factor was 15.60% in
5 NB @ $0.0857 the first year, and the LCOE was 0.0952 USD/kWh. As shown in
Table 7, the NPV, PB and IRR revealed that SGS with an installation
4
of 3-kW PV system was profitable although customers did not
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
obtain compensation for excess energy. Customers with the TOU
PV/L ratio rate gained more financial benefits than those with the block rate
for all three schemes. NM offered the highest financial benefit
among the three schemes, while the pilot project offered the least
(A)
financial benefit.
As shown in Fig. 3, by varying PV/L ratios from 20% to 100%, IRRs
12 of SGS were in a range of 6.3%e11.7% across three considered
11 schemes. For each type of electricity rates, IRRs at a 20% PV/L ratio
10 for three schemes were almost the same since IRRs were hardly
affected by benefits of excess electricity generation. The IRRs
9 Pilot project
IRR (%)

8 NM
7 NB @ $0.0286
6 NB @ $0.0571
5 NB @ $0.0857
4 of SGS coincided more with PV production. Therefore, the eco-
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
PV/L ratio
generally declined with an increasing PV/L ratio above 20% for all
the schemes except for NM, which started to decrease when the PV
ratios were more than 60%.
In addition, it was worth noting that the financial returns of SGS
were higher than those of RES in all schemes (given an identical
sizing of 3 kW). The difference resulted from the fact that the load
nomics for an investment of SGS relied more on a cost saving on
self-consumption and less on a buyback rate on the excess
generation.

(B)
4.3. Medium general service (MGS)
Fig. 2. RES with (A) the block rates and (B) the TOU rates: Comparison of IRRs across
the three different schemes. For a base case, we assumed that MGS installed a PV system at
 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408 403

Table 7
SGS: Comparison of the NPV, PB and IRRs for the three different schemes.

Tariff Block rate TOU rate

Scheme Pilot Project NM NB Pilot Project NM NB

Buyback rate (USD/kWh) 0 0.0845 0.0286e0.0857 0 0.0845 0.0286e0.0857

NPV (USD) 4877 5012 4910e4977 5548 5719 5582e5648
PB (y) 10.4 10.2 10.2e10.3 9.9 9.7 9.8e9.9
IRR (%) 10.8 11.0 10.8e10.9 11.4 11.7 11.5e11.6

12 system was profitable for three support schemes, and NM offered

11 the most financial benefits. However, the values of NPV, PB and IRR
of these three schemes did not differ significantly because most of
10 the PV generation was used for self-consumption.
9 Pilot project
IRR (%)

As we performed a sensitivity analysis of 20%e100% PV/L ratio,

8 NM IRRs of MGS were in a range of 15.3%e9.4% (Fig. 4). For most cases,
NM was more attractive than NB except at a PV/L ratio of higher
7 NB @ $0.0286
than 80%. Beyond this PV/L ratio, NB with a buyback rate at
6 NB @ $0.0571 $0.08571 offered higher IRR than NM did since there was a rela-
5 NB @ $0.0857 tively high level of excess electricity generation during an off-peak
period and its value was given $0.08571/kWh, which was higher
4
than its value ($0.066/kWh) under NM. Under a TOU rate, an on-
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
peak rate was $0.111/kWh, and an off-peak rate was $0.066/unit,
PV/L ratio while a buyback rate of NB was $0.0857.

(A) 4.4. Large general service (LGS)

For a base case, the 1-MW PV system, which was estimated from
50% of an annual peak load, yielded 1,365,764 kWh/y with a PV/L
12 ratio of 14.2%. The capacity factor was 15.60% in the first year, and
11 the LCOE was 0.0841 USD/kWh. Considering the NPV, PB and IRR as
10 shown in Table 9, LGS with 1-MW PV system was profitable for
three support schemes even the pilot project that does not provide
9 Pilot project
IRR (%)

compensation for excess electricity generation. Among the three

8 NM
7 NB @ $0.0286
6 NB @ $0.0571
5 NB @ $0.0857
4 above 80%. This similarity across schemes was due to the fact that
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
PV/L ratio
(B)
Fig. 3. SGS with (A) block rates and (B) TOU Rates: Comparison of the IRRs across the
three different schemes.
schemes, NM offered the highest financial benefit, but the values of
NPV, PB and IRRs in these three schemes do not differ significantly.
The sensitivity results of IRRs for LGS showed that IRRs were in a
range of 10.0%e16.6% as shown in Fig. 5. Like the case of MGS, NM
was more attractive than NB in most cases, except at a PV/L ratio
most of the PV generation was used for self-consumption. Also, it is
worth noting that a level of financial returns of MGS and LGS were
more sensitive to a level of excess electricity generation than that of
RES and SGS.
Like the studies of Spain [10] and Brunei Darussalam [18], the
economics of NM and NB schemes in Thailand were attractive

16
100 kW which was approximated from 50% of an annual peak load.
This PV system yielded 136,576 kWh/y and the system sizing cor- 15
responded to a PV/L ratio of 14.1%. The capacity factor was 15.60% in
14
the first year, and the LCOE was 0.0928 USD/kWh. Considering the
Pilot project
IRR (%)

NPV, PB and IRR as shown in Table 8, MGS with the 100-kW PV 13

NM
12
NB @ $0.0286
Table 8
11 NB @ $0.0571
MGS: Comparison of the NPV, PB and IRRs for the three different schemes. NB @ $0.0857
10
Pilot Project NM NB
9
Buyback rate (USD/kWh) 0 0.0723 0.0286e0.0857
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
NPV (USD) 95,999 96,345 96,089e96,267
PB (y) 7.5 7.5 7.5 PV/L ratio
IRR (%) 15.6 15.6 15.6
Fig. 4. MGS: Comparison of the IRRs across the three different schemes.
404 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408

Table 9 investment in rooftop PV, which does not address utility's con-
LGS: Comparison of the NPV, PB and IRRs for the three different schemes. cerns on oversizing PV.
Pilot Project NM NB In addition to customer benefits, we considered other stake-
Buyback rate (USD/kWh) 0 0.0723 0.0286e0.0857
holders' perspectives that may favor some elements of the scheme
NPV (USD) 1,091,977 1,093,769 1,092,439e1,093,360 design over others, as discussed in Section 3.2. We concluded that
PB (y) 6.9 6.9 6.9 even though NB yielded lower returns for the customers than NM,
IRR (%) 17.0 17.0 17.0 the returns were still at reasonable levels. Certain features of NB
also make it more favorable from other stakeholders' perspectives,
including easier accounting for the utilities, slower revenue losses,
17 lower impacts on the retail tariff, and better systems for monitoring
electricity infeed into the power grid. In addition, NB with low
16
buyback rates can help solar customers limit their PV sizes to
15 optimize their benefits. We hence recommended NB as part of the
Pilot project inputs into the policy process in Thailand.
IRR (%)

14
NM
13
NB @ $0.0286
12 NB @ $0.0571
NB @ $0.0857
11
10
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
PV/L ratio
Fig. 5. LGS customers: Comparison of the IRRs across the three different schemes.
where a level of attractiveness depends on financial support
schemes and their detailed design of the schemes. Profitability of
NB schemes varied according to buyback rates and when a buyback
rate for NB was set below retail rates, NB would cause a lower
financial burden than NM as it required lower levels of subsidy.
Based on the parameters defined in this study, NM was the most
attractive scheme for all four classes of customers because offset
credits of NM were valued at retail electricity whereas the defined
buyback rates of NB were relatively small (less than the retail rates).
However, even for the less attractive pilot project and NB schemes,
a PV investment was still economically viable. For MGS and LGS,
most sensitivity cases of the pilot project and NB yielded IRRs above
9% and 10% respectively, whereas, for RES and SGS, most sensitivity
cases of the pilot project and NB yielded IRRs above 4% and 6%
respectively.
Preferred IRRs depends on each customer's preferences, and
customers may consider other indicators, including the PB and NPV.
For comparison, if the purpose of PV installation is to gain a good
return on investment, all cases of NM, NB and the pilot project
yielded a better return than if the customer had put the same
amount of money into a bank (average interest rate ¼ 2.4% between
Jan 2008 and 2018) or bought a government's 20-year bond
(average yield ¼ 4% between Jan 2008 and Jan 2, 0185).
Our analysis of the impact of PV/L ratios on IRRs revealed that
sizing of the PV system in relation to the load is an important factor
that affected the feasibility of the project. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment's selection of compensation scheme, whether it is NM or
NB, will impact on the feasible sizing options that consumers can
choose from. In addition to yielding better returns (in terms of PB,
NPVs, and IRRs), NM appeared to give more “room to wiggle”,
meaning that the customer could choose their PV sizing relative to
the load up to a very high PV/L ratio without a significant drop in
the rate of return. The low sensitivity of customers to the PV/L ratios
means that the NM scheme is more likely to induce an over-
We would like to point out that the results are specific to the
current rate design in Thailand. Different rates design in other
settings will definitely change the calculated economic perfor-
mance between different compensation schemes (pilot project, NB,
and NM), customer's rate types (block rate vs. TOU), and different
PV/L ratios. However, the following general principles apply in
other settings. First, all else equal, the economics of PV investment
improves with a more expensive day-time electricity rate (when
the self-consumed output can reduce grid purchase) and a higher
buyback rate for excess PV generation. Second, for a given load
profile, electricity rate, and the PV compensation scheme, having a
larger PV system (higher PV/L ratio) worsens the economics if the
excess electricity is valued at or under the retail rate. These general
findings will be useful for policymakers when designing a PV
compensation policy.
5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
This paper compared the economics of three potential support
schemes for distributed PV self-consumption in Thailand. The
economic attractiveness from the customers' standpoint was
measured in terms of the IRR, NPV and PB. We found that self-
consumption can increase the economic attractiveness of four
customer classes in Thailand. Even there is no compensation for
excess generation, a PV investment for these customer groups was
economically viable as IRRs were above 10% for a large customer
group (MGS and LGS) and above 4% for a small customer group (RES
and SGS). Furthermore, in most cases, NM was more economically
attractive than the existing Pilot Project and NB schemes. However,
even though the NB scheme designed for this study offered a
buyback rate that was lower than the retail rate, the returns on
investment for the customers were still more attractive than
putting money in the bank or buying government bonds.
We also considered the effect of various PV/L ratios on the IRRs.
As the PV/L ratios increased, the IRRs generally declined at a slower
rate for NM and at faster rates for NB. This implied that under an NB
scheme, customers should be more sensitive to the sizing of their
PV systems relative to the load since the excess electricity gener-
ation receives compensation that is lower than self-consumption.
Thus, the NB scheme is better at incentivizing customers to
choose PV sizing more appropriately than the NM scheme.
Taking into consideration diverse stakeholders' perspectives,
including those of the customers, utilities and other ratepayers, our
study recommended NB as the future support scheme to promote
PV installation in Thailand.
Acknowledgments

5
Different interest rates in Thailand's financial markets can be found in the Bank
We acknowledge the support from Thailand's Energy Conser-
of Thailand's database: http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx? vation Fund (ENCON Fund) for this research. We are especially
reportID¼223&language¼eng. grateful to members of the Working Group on the Solar Rooftop
 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408 405

Project for their cooperation on data access and feedback to our Appendix
analysis. Special thanks go to members from utilities, the private
sector, policy-making agencies and regulators, for their participa-
tion and important feedback in workshops and in-depth
interviews.

(A)

(B)
Fig. A. A part of the questionnaires asking stakeholders' views on (A) self-consumed part and (B) excess part of PV electricity for the future compensation scheme.
406 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408

Table A
Average load profiles of the sampled profiles in each customer class used in the analysis

Customer Average load profiles Description

class

RES  Households and places of worship

 Members of this group can choose to subscribe to either of the two types of rates (block rates and TOU
rates).
 Sample size ¼ 119

SGS  Small businesses, government buildings, small industries, office buildings or others with an average
peak in 15-min intervals not exceeding 30 kW
 Members can choose to subscribe to either inclining block rates or TOU rates.
 Sample size ¼ 258

MGS  Businesses, government buildings, industries, office buildings or others with an average peak in 15-
min intervals from 30 to 999 kW and an average electricity consumption in 3 months not exceeding
250,000 kWh/month
 Members can choose to subscribe to either inclining block rates or TOU rates.
 Sample size ¼ 165

LGS  Businesses, government buildings, industries, office buildings or others with an average peak in 15-
min intervals of more than 1000 kW and an average electricity consumption in 3 months not
exceeding 250,000 kWh/month
 Members can only subscribe to TOU rates.
 Sample size ¼ 284
 S. Tongsopit et al. / Renewable Energy 138 (2019) 395e408 407

Table B Table C (continued )

Technical Assumptions for Modeling
Parameters Unit Content/amount
Parameters Unit Content/Amount
151e400 unit USD/unit 0.111
System design Over 400 unit USD/unit 0.117
Module type Standard (Crystalline Fixed charge USD/month 1.092
Silicon) Case 1.2: RES with TOU rate
Nominal efficiency % 15 Peak USD/unit 0.156
Module cover Glass Off-peak USD/unit 0.066
Temperature coefficient of power %/Celsius 0.47 Fixed charge USD/month 1.092
DC to AC ratio 1.1 Case 2.1: SGS with block rate
Inverter efficiency % 96 1e150 unit USD/unit 0.083
Orientation Facing South 151e400 unit USD/unit 0.111
Array type Fixed open rack Over 400 unit USD/unit 0.117
Tilt Degrees 13.7 Fixed charge USD/month 1.092
Azimuth Degrees 180 Case 2.2: SGS with TOU rate
System losses % 14.08 Peak USD/unit 0.156
Case 1: RES Off-peak USD/unit 0.066
Nameplate size (percentage of peak % 100 Fixed charge USD/month 1.092
load) Case 3: MGS with TOU rate
Nameplate size kWdc 3 Peak USD/unit 0.111
Case 2: SGS Off-peak USD/unit 0.066
Nameplate size (percentage of peak % 100 Demand charge (peak period only) USD/kW 3.798
load) Fixed charge USD/month 8.921
Nameplate size kWdc 3 Case 4: LGS with TOU rate
Case 3: MGS Peak USD/unit 0.111
Nameplate size (percentage of peak % 50 Off-peak USD/unit 0.066
load) Demand charge (peak period only) USD/kW 3.798
Nameplate size kWdc 100 Fixed charge USD/month 8.921
Case 4: LGS Electricity growth rate % per year 3.5
Nameplate size (percentage of peak % 50 Buyback rate Depends on scheme
load)
Nameplate size kWdc 1000

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