This article was downloaded by: [Manning, David]

On: 30 July 2009

Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 795184262]
Publisher Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

American Foreign Policy Interests

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713768419

The United States and the Counterinsurgency: The Peace Process in Pakistan
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Online Publication Date: 01 May 2009

To cite this Article Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas(2009)'The United States and the Counterinsurgency: The Peace Process in
Pakistan',American Foreign Policy Interests,31:3,149 — 165
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/10803920902966453
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920902966453

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or
distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents
will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses
should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly
or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
 American Foreign Policy Interests, 31: 149–165, 2009
Copyright # 2009 NCAFP
ISSN: 1080-3920 print=1533-2128 online
DOI: 10.1080/10803920902966453
The United States and the
Counterinsurgency: The Peace
Process in Pakistan
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
Abstract
The phenomenon of the Pakistani government’s
negotiated peace settlements with Taliban
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
militants may seriously endanger stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, simul-
taneously lending tremendous strength to the
Taliban and Al Qaeda movements. The United
States has raised serious reservations about this
peace process, which it sees as a beacon for
militants to regroup, resulting in renewed insur-
gency and terror attacks in Afghanistan and the
Western Hemisphere in general. This article
attempts to contextualize both the peace process
negotiated by the Pakistani government with the
militants and the policy of the United States
regarding the process. Projections for a success-
ful counterinsurgency policy are articulated at
the empirical level.
A History of War
and Peace
The Pakistani government’s counterinsur-
gency policy is inconsistent; ineffective military
operations are followed by negotiations, which
are usually succeeded by a cease-fire. The inter-
mittent cease-fire has tended to be violated by
the warlords, the intervening period ostensibly
being used either to strengthen their positions
or violate the terms of the peace treaty by
capturing security personnel and imposing
their radical laws on the local populace. It
would perhaps be worthwhile to gain a bird’s
eye view of peace deals with the militants.
The government forces first entered the
tribal areas in 2001–20021 in response to
reports of militancy, subsequently discarding
military operations (which sustained high casu-
alties) in favor of negotiated peace. Pakistan
entered into an agreement, one of the first of
its kind, with the militant commander, Nek
Muhammad Wazir,2 in South Waziristan along
the provincial border of Baluchistan. This
agreement was known as the Shakai Accord.3
The agreement broke down within a month
because of Wazir’s death from a missile attack
in June 2004.4 This targeted assassination
was ostensibly carried out because of his
unrelenting pro-Taliban and Al Qaeda activities.
Between March and July 2004,5 the
government imposed a blockade of the Mehsud
area of South Waziristan, encountering
extreme difficulty and protracted resistance.
At the time it entered into hasty negotiations
in February 2005, the military vacated those
areas with a specific undertaking that it would
not carry out similar operations in the future.
This infamous agreement is known as the
Sararogha Accord.6 Although it brought a
semblance of peace to South Waziristan,
the bloodshed continued unabated in North
 150
Waziristan. One bewildered senior government
official at the time recalls having asked his
bosses, ‘‘Whose compulsion is it to strike a deal,
ours or the militants?’’7 Attacks on security
forces were resumed in July 2005, which led
to talks, resulting in another inglorious peace
deal.8 Signed in North Waziristan in September
2006, it was designed to avoid tribal militant
attacks on army convoys and checkpoints. It
also fell apart in the face of renewed militant
insurgence.9 After the agreement, there were
persistent reports of an increase in Taliban
attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan
near the border with Waziristan. The media
reported that U.S. commanders mentioned that
after the accord, there was more than a three-
fold increase in attacks on coalition troops10 in
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
the Afghan districts of Khost and Paktia, which
border Waziristan, compared with the situation
before the Waziristan Accord. The deal was the
precursor of the capture of 242 soldiers by
Baitullah Mehsud’s men in August 2007,11
one of the most humiliating episodes for the
Pakistani Army in recent years. Their ultimate
release was part of an exchange process that
resulted in the government’s surrender of
24 militants to the Taliban. ‘‘This was a bitter
pill that we had to swallow,’’ one senior military
officer said later.12 After the government opera-
tion against the radical ‘‘Lal Masjid’’ seminary
establishment in Islamabad, the accord was
unilaterally revoked by the militants.
A peace treaty was signed in March 200713
between the state and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad,
a close associate of Maulana Sufi Muhammad,
head of Tanzeem-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
(TNSM). Faqir Muhammad is presently working
as the leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) (the Taliban movement in Pakistan) in
Bajaur Agency. As a token of goodwill, the
government released three prominent mili-
tants, namely, Maulana Gul Muhammad,
Maulana Inayat-ur-Rehman, and Dr. Ismael,
along with six other militants of the same
group.14 The peace deal, however, turned sour
when 80 students and Maulana Liaquat,15
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
heading a religious seminary at Chenagai, lost
their lives in an aerial attack supposedly
carried out by a U.S. unmanned drone. Subse-
quent responsibility was accepted by the
Pakistani government.
The Pakistani government also signed a
deal in Khyber Agency after the tribal opera-
tion ‘‘Sirat-e-Mustaqqim.’’16 The fate of this
deal was not very different from the ones
before; after its conclusion, it was violated.
Despite the withdrawal of troops and the
release of militants as tokens of forgiveness,
efforts failed to bear fruit, and Mangal Bagh,
heading the Lashkar-e-Islam in Khyber Agency,
although initially routed, reappeared in
September 2008. His writ seems to run in the
Bara area.17
A sizable military operation was conducted
in Swat during the last half of 2008. Many
attempts at peace in the area were initiated
with the paramount militant commander,
Maulana Fazlullah. They fell into disarray.
There was a lull before Fazlullah sought allegiance
with the Taliban. Then the attacks resumed.
The civilian government in Swat, a coalition
of rival political parties, the Pakistan People’s
party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim
League–Nawaz group (PML–N), remained
embroiled in a power struggle in 2008 that
resulted in a review of President Pervez
Musharraf ’s decision to launch the military
offensive against Fazlullah in November 2007
code-named Operation Rah-e-Haq I.18 Negotia-
tions were initiated with top-ranking militant
leaders. In April–May 2008 the influential
Taliban ideologue Maulana Sufi Muhammad,
head of the outlawed Tehreek-e-Nifaze-Shariat-
e-Muhammadi (TNSM—the Movement for the
Implementation of Mohammad’s Sharia Law),
was released, and shariah was introduced in
the Provincially Administrated Tribal Areas
(PATA) of Swat and Malakand.19
According to the terms of the peace agree-
ment in May 2008, Fazlullah agreed to cease
attacks on Pakistan security forces and other
government installations in the area, deny
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
shelter to foreign militants in the Swat region,
dismantle his militia and terrorist infrastruc-
ture, and end anti-Pakistan and antigovern-
ment propaganda in the region. The Pakistani
government agreed in turn to release Swati
militants from jail, implement Islamic shariah
in the entire region, establish an Islamic
university in Imam Dehri,20 and implement
the withdrawal of troops from the Swat region
once the situation returned to some semblance
of normalcy.
Between June and July 2008, relative calm
in the Swat region prevailed, although attacks
on government installations, girls’ schools,
and the infrastructure for tourism continued
to take place. In June 2008 Fazlullah began to
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
complain about the slow pace of the implemen-
tation of the peace agreement and asked for
the release of his remaining militants and the
withdrawal of troops from the region, as well
as the implementation of shariah in the region.
The government, while considering the imple-
mentation of the peace agreement, faced
legal and political hurdles, a claim that was
not deemed acceptable by Fazlullah. Simulta-
neously the government stated that the
militants’ attacks against security forces and
girls’ schools had not ceased and that Fazlullah
was continuing to run terrorist training camps
in the region and was training suicide bombers
in various parts of Swat. With the number of
attacks growing in Hangu, Swat, Bajaur and
Mohmand agencies, the North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP) government finally requested
the Pakistani armed forces to come to the aid of
the provincial government. At the same time
the Swat militants increased their attacks on
government installations and girls’ schools
and threatened the NWFP government with
suicide attacks.
Fazlullah finally forced the state’s hand
when he abducted 38 Frontier Corps soldiers
and killed 3 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
personnel in July 2008. In response, the
Pakistani Army launched Operation Rah-e-
Haq II in July 2008,21 relying on air power
American Foreign Policy Interests
151
and artillery, again without much success
against the guerrilla tactics of the Taliban.
Meanwhile the Taliban in Bajaur (led by
Mullah Faqir Ahmed, another Sufi Mohammad
protégé) opened another front; the army was
forced to withdraw a substantial number of
troops from Swat to concentrate on the area
contiguous to Durand Line (Operation
Sherdill22). Fazlullah used this time effectively,
reorganizing his forces. Negotiations involving
Sufi Muhammad made no headway, and Opera-
tion ‘‘Rah-e-Haq III’’ was launched in January
2009 to secure the main supply lines to the
district capital, Mingora, in Swat. Formidable
forces were involved; the offensive utilized
the strength of four brigades supported by
the paramilitary FC—almost 15,000 troops in
total covered extensively by aerial and artillery
support.23
At the same time the government’s peace
talks with Baitullah Mehsud hit a snag: Both
sides could not reach a consensus on arriving
at a peace agreement. The resultant military
operations by the Pakistani government in the
Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), as well as arrests of
leading TTP militants in the Hangu district of
NWFP, led the TTP to issue to the NWFP
government threats of violence and suicide
attacks. At the same time Fazlullah, being a
prominent member of TTP, also issued state-
ments saying that any future military opera-
tion in any part of FATA and NWFP would
lead him to cancel the Swat peace agreement.
In July 2008, the TTP leader, Baitullah
Mehsud, asked the provincial government of
NWFP to resign.24 Otherwise, the TTP said
that they would carry out suicide attacks
throughout Pakistan. The ANP-led NWFP
government rejected the demand of the TTP,
reiterating that they would not be blackmailed
by Baitullah Mehsud.25
There is evidence that army operations are
getting bogged down in the difficult terrain.
Also, the extreme methods used by the mili-
tants certainly seem to be sending demoralizing
 152
messages to the soldiers. In October 2007, for
instance, 50 troops went missing during an
operation,26 and the army later confirmed 25
casualties. Local sources quoted by a BBC
correspondent mentioned that all 50 had been
killed and their bodies burned. It is apparently
the norm for beheaded corpses of Pakistani
soldiers to turn up. Moreover, the difficult
terrain and the militants’ knowledge of it play
into their hands; it is certainly not an easy area
in which to fight a guerrilla insurgency. Even
the CIA’s chief at that time admitted: ‘‘This
looks simpler the further away you get
from it.’’ General Haydn also said, ‘‘And the
closer you get to it, geography, history, culture
all begin to intertwine and make it more
complex.’’27
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
The United States has repeatedly voiced
reservations about any further deal making
since agreements of that kind ostensibly have
led to the current scenario in which the
militants seem to be negotiating from a
position of power. The chorus of American
voices calling for action against militants in
Pakistan continues to grow. In separate inter-
views with The Houston Chronicle, three U.S.
representatives revealed that American
commandos were poised to stage ‘‘hot pursuit’’
raids inside FATA to ‘‘stem mounting Taliban
attacks against US troops in Afghanistan and
to disrupt resurgent Al Qaeda operatives’
efforts to map strikes against the US home-
land.’’28 The New York Times reported that
foreign fighters were converging on
Pakistan’s tribal areas to join with militants
already there. The Times noted alarmingly
that ‘‘The flow may reflect a change that is
making Pakistan, not Iraq, the preferred
destination for some Sunni extremists from
the Middle East, North Africa and Central
Asia who are seeking to take up arms against
the West.’’29 This report came on the back of
the news that the U.S. aircraft carrier Abra-
ham Lincoln had moved from the Persian
Gulf to the Arabian Sea to support U.S. opera-
tions inside Afghanistan where the number of
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
attacks had escalated in the east of the
country by 40 percent in 2008 compared to
2007. It is clear that the mounting violence
in Afghanistan had been ratcheting up pres-
sure on the Bush administration, which had
only a few months left in office.30 U.S. Assis-
tant Secretary of State for South and Central
Asian Affairs Richard A. Boucher reiterated
the American stance in response to peace
initiatives taken by the Pakistan government:
He repeatedly went on record to state that the
United States did not support making conces-
sions to violent people like Baitullah Mehsud.
He also said that the United States did not
support releasing terrorists, which gives
them the chance to strike again. ‘‘However,
we support the government’s initiatives of
reaching out to tribes to get [them] on its side
and restore peace in the area,’’ Boucher
added.31
Owais Ahmed Ghani, then the embattled
governor of the North-West Frontier Province,
also repeatedly warned of the inability of local
governments of settled districts abutting the
tribal areas to combat the growing menace of
militancy. ‘‘The government system in settled
districts and the political system in tribal
regions are heading toward a state of collapse,’’
he told a number of journalists.32
Regional concerns have been voiced as well.
Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar
Spanta told the UN Security Council in July
2008 that a key factor behind the worsening
security in his country was ‘‘the de facto truce’’
in Pakistan’s tribal areas. ‘‘One of the main
factors contributing to the deterioration of the
security situation in the country is the de facto
truce in the tribal areas beyond the border,’’ he
said during a council debate on Afghanistan.
‘‘Terrorist sanctuaries and an elaborate system
of financing, recruiting, arming, and systematic
training of suicide bombers are at work outside
our borders to keep the terrorist threat alive,’’
Spanta claimed. Warning that terrorism ‘‘could
not be defeated unless its root causes were
addressed,’’ he said that success would
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
be achieved ‘‘only by a coherent, integrated,
regional and global approach.’’33
There is some sketchy evidence that even
though Mr. Mehsud has collected many of the
splinter jihadist groups under the auspices of
the Tehreek-e-Taliban, he has not entirely
succeeded in keeping some regional and ethnic
militant groups united under him. One of the
aims of the Tehreek-e-Taliban was to coordi-
nate and take joint decisions on talks with
the government. Some militants are in favor
of halting attacks on the Pakistan military in
order to conserve tribal military energy for
the fight against American and NATO forces
across the border. Militants from the Ahmadzai
Wazir tribe in South Waziristan are now
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
progovernment and are staying neutral to the
extent of pushing back attempts by his fighters
to fall back into their area. In North Waziri-
stan, one of the important militant leaders,
Hafiz Gul Bahadar,34 had initially kept to a
cease-fire. Farther north, in another tribal
agency, Bajaur, Faqir Muhammad,35 a fire-
brand figure second only to Mr. Mehsud, had
also been neutral but has now joined the Tali-
ban movement wholeheartedly.
State forces are facing several opponents
in Bajaur. Apart from Faqir Mohammad’s
Taliban, ‘‘there are four other major militant
groups in Bajaur: Jaishul Islami, run by the
militant commander Wali Rahman; Karwan-
e-Naimatullah, headed by Maulvi Naimatullah
and operating from Salarzai tehsil; the Qari
Ziaur Rahman group, headed by an Afghan
Taliban commander Qari Ziaur Rahman and
based in Charmang; and the Dr. Ismail group,
led by Dr. Ismail, leader of the defunct Tanzim
Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM) based in
the Damadola, Mamond subdivision.’’36 One
of them, Qari Ziaur Rahman, is an Afghan
Taliban commander who is fighting U.S.-led
NATO forces in Afghanistan’s Kunar and
Nuristan provinces.37 He was apprehended in
the NWFP capital city of Peshawar by
Pakistani law-enforcement agencies some time
ago, but like several other dreaded militants,
American Foreign Policy Interests
153
he was released in exchange for Pakistan’s
former Ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq
Azizuddin.38 After his release, Qari Ziaur
Rahman set up a separate militant group in
Bajaur with (it has been reported) support from
Arab fighters and is now giving a tough time to
the Pakistani security forces engaged in the
fight against the Taliban militants. He even
claimed responsibility for ambushing the FC
convoy in an infamous action in Loisam and
causing ‘‘heavy losses to the soldiers.’’39
The long-awaited military operation in
Bajaur was finally launched on August 6,
2008, against Maulvi Faqir. Mohammad led
tribal militants under the overall command
of Baitullah Mehsud. This escalation of engage-
ment was precipitated to a great extent when a
multitude of armed Taliban fighters ambushed
a paramilitary FC convoy near Loisam, killing
22 soldiers.40 It is pertinent to mention here
that Loisam is a strategically important point
for militants’ moving between Bajaur and
the rest of the tribal regions and for gaining
easy access to neighboring Afghanistan to
attack the U.S.-led NATO forces.41
The Bajaur operation was pursued much
more vigorously than previous ones had been.
The realization had perhaps dawned in govern-
ment circles that the negotiation process had
not yielded many dividends. There was also
evidence to prove the existence of a link
between the situation in Afghanistan and the
operation in Bajaur. Dawn reported ‘‘. . . the
Bajaur battleground has attracted militants
from other tribal regions and from across the
border, from Afghanistan’s eastern Kunar
Province. It has long been known that there
are foreign militants in Bajaur, but their
numbers have always been thought to be small.
Now, their ranks are swelling, catching by
surprise many veterans in the civil-military
establishment. This supply line from Kunar
to Bajaur has, however, eased the pressure
in Afghanistan. Western diplomatic sources
acknowledge that the level of violence in Kunar
has dropped appreciably since the launch of the
 154
operation in Bajaur, indicating a planning and
operational linkage that overlaps the Durand
Line.’’42
The government’s patience was apparently
exhausted, and the unrelenting pressure by
the Americans acted as a catalyst in ensuring
that operations would be conducted in earnest.
The model of negotiating with the Taliban
moderates43 does not seem to have worked
smoothly in Pakistan, which casts doubts on
the possibility of attempting to implement it
in Afghanistan. Against this backdrop it
seemed that the patience of the Pakistani
government had started to run out by the end
of August 2008. The continuous peace deals
and their unilateral revocation by the militants
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
sapped the negotiating will of the government,
which banned the Tehreek-e-Taliban. The
decision, although largely symbolic, signified
the government’s first indication of its conclu-
sion that it was not possible to negotiate with
the militants. A discernible hardening of the
government stance became evident when
Rahman Malik, the adviser for the Ministry of
Interior, announced that the government was
considering placing head-money on top Taliban
commanders in Pakistan. He insisted that the
militants had to surrender before negotiations
could be conducted with them. The operations
that began in the wake of this paradigmatic
policy shift had much more military muscle
behind them than the previous ones, particu-
larly in Bajaur.44 The militant initiated cam-
paign of suicide bombings also played a role; a
devastating spate of suicide bombings was car-
ried out by the Taliban and allied militants in
Dera Ismail Khan, Wah, Lahore, Islamabad,
and other places. In the Wah ordinance factory
suicide bombing alone, at least 60 people were
killed. More than 80 were injured in 2 suicide
bomb blasts outside Pakistan’s main military
arms factory in Wah Cantonment.45 Similarly,
on September 20, 2008, an explosive-laden
truck rammed into the front gate of the Mar-
riott, the premier hotel in a high-security zone
of Islamabad, setting off what police called the
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
most devastating suicide attack in the capital.
It killed at least 53 people and wounded more
than 260.46 The Czech envoy to Pakistan, Ivo
Zdarek, was killed in the suicide blast.
While the TTP justified bombings such as
those in Wah as reprisals for the military opera-
tions in Bajaur and Swat, the people were out-
raged by the extremely high number of civilian
casualties, which seemed to turn the tide of
public opinion against the militants.
Regarding the question of the extent to
which U.S. pressure shaped the peace negotia-
tions, a multitude of reports attests to the hard-
ening American stance on this issue. A key
Pakistani military commander overseeing
the Bajaur operation revealed the U.S. threat.
‘‘If we had not done it, the forces from across
the border would have come to do this,’’
Peshawar Corps Commander Lt. General
Muhammad Masood Aslam told the Daily
Times.47 An overview of the American policy
toward militancy in Pakistan’s tribal areas
needs to be contextualized to put the U.S. policy
into paradigmatic perspective.
U.S. Concerns
The initial euphoria in U.S. strategic circles
over the rout in Afghanistan seems to be
fading. The sense of insecurity based on the
perception that beyond Kabul the area has
become very unstable is evidenced by the
withdrawal of nongovernmental organization
(NGO) personnel and the issuance of security
advisories for travel outside Kabul. The NATO
command, responding to repeated Pentagon
warnings, has gone on record in stating that
the Taliban will not be allowed to recapture
any new areas, implicitly acknowledging that
militants were starting to boost their presence
in the north and west of the country. ‘‘Undoubt-
edly, the Taliban would like to expand their
influence,’’ Mark Laity, a civilian spokesman
for the NATO forces in Afghanistan, said,
adding: ‘‘But so far this year we assess that
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
we have contained the insurgency to just about
the same areas as in 2007 and 2006. They
would like to expand, but that does not mean
they would succeed,’’ he continued. In the first
six months of 2008, 109 international soldiers
were killed; 43 in the month of June alone.
There has been a tacit acknowledgment of the
fact that the Taliban-led violence, although
mainly focused in southern and eastern
Afghanistan, has spiked. ‘‘There has been an
increase in incidents but in broad terms they
have been happening in the same areas as
before,’’ Laity explained.48
The statement was issued after the Pentagon
said that the rebels were likely to boost their
presence in the north and south, areas where
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
they have been relatively quiet in the past.
‘‘The Taliban will challenge the control of the
Afghan government in rural areas, especially
in the south and east, while it will also attempt
to increase [its] presence in the west and
north,’’ the Pentagon said in its first report to
Congress on security in the country.49
Opinions about the reconsolidation of the
Taliban in Afghanistan remain divided;
General Carlos Branco, the chief military
spokesman for NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), has gone on record
in stating that the Taliban is unlikely to expand
into new areas. Referring to an operation in
Arghandab near Kandahar by Afghan and
ISAF forces against the Taliban, he said: ‘‘The
operation proved [the] Taliban are unable to
hold ground and to face us toe to toe. They
are not expanding their zone of influence.’’50
However, the bolstering of the troops in
Afghanistan by relocating the aircraft carrier
U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln to the Gulf of Oman
was an indication that precautions were being
taken for any eventuality. Moreover, it shortens
the time that the carrier’s strike planes must
fly to support combat in Afghanistan.
In a more candid review of the situation, the
U.S. military conceded in September 2008 that
it was not winning the battle against an
increasingly deadly insurgency in Afghanistan.
American Foreign Policy Interests
155
The tie-in with Pakistan was apparent in a
statement that asserted that the United States
needed to revise its strategy for the region to
include militant safe havens in Pakistan.51
‘‘I’m not convinced we are winning in
Afghanistan. I am convinced we can,’’ Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen
said in testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives Armed Services Committee.
Mullen said he was already ‘‘looking at a new,
more comprehensive strategy for the region’’
that would cover both sides of the Afghani-
stan–Pakistan border. ‘‘We can hunt down and
kill extremists as they cross over the border
from Pakistan, but until we work more closely
with the Pakistani government to eliminate
the safe havens from where they operate, the
enemy will only keep coming,’’ he said.52 He also
warned that time was running out for the West
to demonstrate its willingness to provide
Afghanistan with vital nonmilitary assistance,
including roads, schools, alternative crops for
farmers, and the rule of law. ‘‘We cannot kill
our way to victory,’’ said Mullen.53
At a time when the Taliban is again starting
to be a source of concern for the United States
with 35,000 troops in the militants’ regional
crosshairs, Pakistan’s tribal areas are being
considered a likely source of the next 9=11.
The fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons
can hardly be an encouraging factor in this sce-
nario. The American concern about the mili-
tants’ action in those areas has escalated
exponentially, with repeated demands being
made from the Pakistani establishment for firm
and conclusive action against militants inside
Pakistan.
Meanwhile, it seems that the United States
has been thinking about and preparing for a
situation in which it may have to interfere
directly in FATA. The New York Times reported
that top Bush administration officials drafted a
secret plan in late 2007 to facilitate the
operation of the U.S. Special Operations Forces
inside the tribal areas in Pakistan, but
Washington ‘‘turf ’’ battles and the diversion of
 156
resources to Iraq held up the effort. The Times
quoted a senior Defense Department official as
saying that there was ‘‘mounting frustration’’
in the Pentagon at the continued delay in the
deployment of special operations teams into
the tribal regions where senior Al Qaeda
operatives are thought to be hiding. The Times
report, based on more than four dozen
interviews in Washington and Pakistan, said
that the new safe haven of Al Qaeda in
Pakistan was in part attributed to the adminis-
tration’s accommodation of (ex-) President
Pervez Musharraf, whose advisers long played
down the terrorist threat.
The report concluded that the interviews
revealed a story of infighting between U.S.
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
intelligence agencies and the White House
whose priorities had shifted from the counter-
terrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan
to the war in Iraq. The Times quoted a retired
CIA officer as estimating that the Al Qaeda
training compounds in Pakistan hosted as
many as 2,000 local and foreign militants, up
from several hundred three years ago.54 Infight-
ing within the CIA included turf battles
between field officers in Kabul and Islamabad
and the counterterrorism center at CIA head-
quarters in Virginia; the preference for carrying
out raids remotely, via Predator missiles
strikes, was derided by the field officers as the
work of ‘‘boys with toys,’’ the Times reported.55
Turf battles between CIA officials in
Afghanistan and others in Pakistan have also
impeded progress, the Times reported, with
officers in Kabul expressing alarm at what they
see as a growing threat from the tribal areas
and those in Islamabad, who are prone to
accept the argument of the Pakistani govern-
ment that the tribal areas are beyond the
control of anyone. The level of expertise among
CIA officers in the region was also a drag on
operations, the report said. ‘‘We had to put
people out in the field who had less than ideal
levels of experience,’’ it quoted a former senior
CIA official as saying.56 One reason for that,
two former intelligence officials told the Times,
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
was that the Iraq war had drained away most
of the CIA officers with field experience in the
Islamic world.57 Pakistan’s premier intelligence
agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, has also
been a subject of concern. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen
and Deputy Director of the CIA Stephen
Kappes visited Pakistan on July 12, 2008,
before the Pakistani prime minister’s state
visit.58 They reportedly presented proof of ISI’s
complicity in Jalaludin Haqqani’s network. In
the wake of that revelation, the Pakistani
prime minister, before his departure for
Washington, ordered that notification be issued
to place the ISI under the control of the Interior
Ministry.59 The prime minister’s notification,
however, was ineffectual; it was rescinded in
his absence the very next day,60 reaffirming
ISI’s status as ‘‘the state within the state.’’
Against this backdrop U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen issued
a statement that the United States has the
right to take military action in Pakistan if it
gets reliable and concrete intelligence about
the presence of the top leadership of the
Taliban and Al Qaeda, including Osama bin
Laden. There was an immediate response from
the Foreign Office in Pakistan, retorting that
Pakistan’s sovereignty would not be allowed
to be compromised and any action taken
against militants would be by Pakistan itself.61
There were more than a dozen unilateral
U.S. military strikes in Pakistan’s FATA until
September 2008 compared to three only in the
whole year of 2007. It seemed as if the United
States and its allies, critical of Pakistan for
failing to stop the infiltration of fighters across
the Pak–Afghan border, had decided to carry
out an ‘‘interventionist tactic’’ into the tribal
territory.62 The scale of interventions has
gradually been stepped up. For example, on
Sepember 4, 2008, the United States and, report-
edly, Afghan National Army troops, crossed the
Durand Line to conduct a military operation in
the Pakistani village of Zolalai, near the border
towns of Musa Neeka and Angoor Adda in South
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
Waziristan. Gunships covered the troops as they
fired at 3 houses, killing 17 civilians, among
them 5 women and 4 children. This was the first
large-scale incursion of U.S. ground forces on
Pakistani soil. Unmanned drone attacks have
continued unabated since then.
The United States has consistently justified
its drone piloted and manned attacks in the FATA
region by claiming that someone important in the
Al Qaeda hierarchy was in the crosshairs;
al-Zawahiri has been identified as the sought-
after target. However, it is debatable what the
policy of unilateral incursion into Pakistan will
yield. That question is particularly important in
the context that Asif Ali Zardari, the president
of Pakistan, is currently in quite a precarious
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
political position. He has reiterated the sovereign
nature of Pakistan while maintaining that he is
aware of the danger posed by terrorism to
Pakistan and the region. He came to power
riding a wave of popular support after the assas-
sination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto. Moreover,
U.S. actions may catalyze the disenchantment of
an already disgruntled populace. The scenario
has also exhibited the potential for confrontation
between the United States and the Pakistani
Army, which is indeed what happened during
an operation in Angoor Adda.63
In August 2008 the Pakistani Army chief
General Kayani and Mike Mullen met on board
The Abraham Lincoln to discuss the security
situation in the region.64 General Kayani was
adamant in asserting the territorial sovereignty
of Pakistan, which seemed to demarcate the
limits of cooperation between the armies of the
two countries. Kayani also reiterated his stand
favoring the mustering of public support for
finding a solution to winning the war against
extremism. Strategic circles had projected
earlier that the Zardari-Musharraf nexus (and
after Musharraf, Kayani, his successor) would
unequivocally second American plans. Those
projections proved not to be accurate. The
issue is now the maintenance of the delicate
balance between respecting Pakistani national
sovereignty and combating terrorism.
American Foreign Policy Interests
157
‘‘The Americans are probably right in
claiming that Al Qaeda and the Taliban have
regrouped and are using bases in Pakistan to
launch crossborder raids into Afghanistan,’’
reported the Saudi-based Arab News.65 ‘‘They
are certainly right in thinking that there will
be no peace in Afghanistan while that remains
the case. But they have to let the Pakistanis
deal with the situation. If they continue the
raids, they risk not merely losing what dwind-
ling support they have in Pakistan but, far
worse, alienating the country so thoroughly
that no government even vaguely sympathetic
to the United States and the West can survive
there.’’66
Pakistan’s Daily Times has taken this
argument further by suggesting that if public
opinion decisively turns against the United
States, ‘‘the country will become more vulner-
able to Al Qaeda and we will face unpredictable
odds. According to nuclear theory, Pakistan is a
nuclear power and cannot be attacked. If the
United States attacks Pakistani territory,
battles with the Pakistan Army, stops military
assistance to Pakistan, and thus ends up
making Al Qaeda supreme in Pakistan, the
nuclear theory might then apply to Al Qaeda.’’67
In the Huffington Post, Shuja Nawaz writes
that ‘‘the next time the US physically invades
Pakistani territory to take out suspected
militants, it may meet the Pakistan army head
on. Or it may face a complete cut-off of war
supplies and fuel in Afghanistan via Pakistan.
With only two weeks supply of fuel available
to its forces inside Afghanistan and no alterna-
tive route currently available, the war in
Afghanistan may come to a screeching halt.’’68
Nawaz adds that both Pakistan and the
United States need to rethink their actions.
‘‘Otherwise, the US will not only lose an ally
in Pakistan but ignite a conflagration inside
that huge and nuclear-armed country that will
make the war in Afghanistan seem like a
Sunday hike in the Hindu Kush.’’69
There is also an opinion prevalent among
strategic circles that the U.S. policy toward
 158
the region lacks integration. There are three
forces operating in Afghanistan: NATO forces;
Operation Endurance, being carried out by the
United States; and CIA-directed operations,
reportedly headed by Vice President Dick
Cheney when the Bush administration was in
power. It is asserted that the three operations
lack an integrative approach; the CIA in partic-
ular seemed to act on its own regarding the
Predator strikes in FATA, creating enemies on
the ground instead of eliminating them. For
instance, a prominent tribal chief, Maulvi Nazir
in Wana, was a commander firmly allied with
government forces, but he was disillusioned by
the Predator strikes on his establishment. They
tended to dilute his loyalties to the Pakistani
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
government because he shared the commonly
held perception that the Pakistani government
works hand in glove with the Americans and
thus is complicit in the drone attacks.
The stance of the American leadership has
been consistently hawkish with respect to
Pakistan’s tribal areas; even before the U.S.
presidential elections, Obama focused on
Pakistani militancy as part of his strategic
counterinsurgency strategy.70 He said: ‘‘We
must recognize that the central front in the
war on terror is not in Iraq, and it never was.
The central front is Afghanistan and Pakistan.
It is unacceptable that almost seven years after
9=11, those responsible for the attacks remain
at large. If another attack on our homeland
occurs, it will likely come from the same region
where 9=11 was planned. . . . We should
condition some assistance to Pakistan on their
action to take the fight to the terrorists in their
borders. And if we have actionable intelligence
about high-level Al-Qaeda targets, we must
act if Pakistan will not or cannot.’’71 It seems
that Obama is all set to follow up this counter-
terrorism policy as the president of the United
States with the deployment of an additional
17,000 American forces to Afghanistan72 and
an executive order for increasing drone
attacks in Pakistan73 as significant steps
toward an Afghanistan–Pakistan-oriented
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
counterinsurgency policy. The appointment
of Richard Holbrooke,74 a veteran of South
Asian diplomacy, as Obama’s point man in the
region is also indicative of a more focused
Afghanistan–Pakistan antimilitant policy by
the Obama administration.
Conclusions
Peace with the militants will not produce a
coherent counterinsurgency policy in Pakistan
in the long term, although it will bring relief
to a beleaguered local population in the short
term. From a strategic perspective the
militants have obtained quite a lot of advan-
tages from the many ‘‘agreements’’ between
the militants and government forces. Such
agreements tended to occur when the military,
after initial difficulties, began to regain lost
ground. Talks, usually brokered by third
parties such as jirgas, tended to be proposed
when operations were reaching their peak
offensive capabilities. They seemed to be a
way to break the impasse since the government
needed to address the huge difficulties faced by
local populations as a result of operations. The
exodus of local residents to escape the line of
fire and avoid becoming ‘‘collateral damage’’
resulting from action undertaken by the
government, militants, and U.S. forces has
become a serious dilemma in the tribal areas.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been
displaced from the area, causing one of the
worst humanitarian disasters in the country’s
history. The government, embarrassed by the
refugees created in the wake of operations,
sought solace in the many peace deals
conducted. However, many ‘‘agreements’’ that
seemed to be heading toward success were
interrupted midway along their ‘‘trend lines.’’
The militant policy of capturing govern-
ment forces, who are exchanged for the
militants captured in the area of operations,
negates any headway made by the forces
because the militants are further emboldened
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
by the seemingly compromised position of the
establishment. Prominent militant leaders
have been released in such prisoner swaps (an
example being Sufi Muhammad of TNSM).
Also, hard-won military positions tend to be
surrendered, which negates the military
advantages accruing to the forces. Compensa-
tion for loss of life and property has also been
a part of the deals. The proceeds go into the
militant kitty.
A discernible pattern also emerges when
one examines the evolution of what has become
the political scenario. FATA tribal MNAs75 and
senators have tended to act like important med-
iation entities between the government and the
militants because they seem to recognize that
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
they have to act as the interface between
militants in their area of responsibility and
the government. The assumption of such
responsibility has imperceptibly created a mili-
tant pressure group within the assemblies and
in the form of peace jirgas negotiating between
the government and the militants. That conten-
tion is supported by the fact that more than 600
tribal Maliks have been executed by the mili-
tants in the period 2002–2008. However, not a
single MNA or senator has been dealt such a
fate. The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazlur (JUI-F)
also tends to play an important role as a media-
tor on the floor of the National Assembly or
during subsequent negotiations, which lends
credence to Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s claim
that only he can solve the situation in the tribal
areas. Those pressure groups tend to play a
mediatory role, but the roots of their allegiance
are sometimes doubtful, particularly because
the extremists tend to apply ‘‘permanent’’ solu-
tions to people not towing the militant line.
If peace deals are not sound policy, as U.S.
strategic sources have reiterated, then what is
the solution for the ailments in Pakistan’s
tribal areas? Are U.S. ‘‘interventions’’ designed
to ‘‘take out’’ the Taliban leadership a viable
tactical way forward?
The future will largely be determined by
Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan
American Foreign Policy Interests
159
and India. The assumption made by the
Pakistani establishment is that NATO forces
in Afghanistan will withdraw sooner rather
than later, leaving Hamid Karzai’s purportedly
anti-Pakistani regime to fend for itself.
However, the Pakistani establishment would
like to see a friendly regime in Kabul that would
be willing to manage the oil and gas pipelines
that will serve the newly established Pakistani
port at Gwadar through Afghanistan’s
provinces. One alternative would be to let the
Pakistani Taliban exist as proxy warriors to
take over the power vacuum that may ensue
after NATO’s withdrawal in Afghanistan, much
like the 1994 scenario. There also exists a
feeling that a pro-Islamabad Taliban-type
government in Afghanistan would be instru-
mental in establishing peace in the northern
tribal regions of Pakistan that are primarily
inhabited by Pashtuns and would not be amen-
able to any form of persuasion by Karzai’s
predominantly Tajik-controlled government,
even though Karzai himself is a Pashtun. Most
of the Pakistani Taliban are Pashtuns who will
presumably not rest until their counterparts
across the border are in power in Afghanistan.
As such, peace in that part of Pakistan depends
on who rules Afghanistan. The Pakistani prac-
tice of using proxy warriors to fill gaps in their
capacity to counter India, which has bred many
if not most of the jihadist organizations, also
needs to be reviewed.
The current problem is that the Taliban
cannot be contained since the proverbial genie
has been let out of the bottle. The Lal Masjid
episode is only another aspect of this façade;
it was a militant trial run for the rest of the
country, which has indicated to the jihadist
groups that they need to enforce their version
of shariah by force in the society. On the other
hand, huge demonstrations have been held in
Lahore, Karachi, and other cities throughout
Pakistan. The protests, initially held to support
the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed
Chaudhry, who has become a national hero,
turned into protests against militancy. It is
 160
inarguable that the Taliban in Pakistan are
repeating the same mistake of imposing the
totalitarian, Talibanized shariah, as they did
after the fall of Kabul, which made them
immensely unpopular with the masses. Those
undercurrents are expressions of resentment
against social injustice; in Pakistan it is diffi-
cult to see how militancy can be curbed in the
absence of distributive social justice.
As Asma Jahangir, chairwoman of Paki-
stan’s Human Rights Commission, makes clear,
the country cannot survive its ‘‘deep-seated rot’’
unless the ‘‘unrepresentative organs of the
state—the military, the mullahs, and the all-
consuming intelligence agencies—are brought
under control.’’76 It is not easy to disagree with
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
her assessment of the complex scenario. More-
over, a herculean initiative might have to be
undertaken to devise any scheme of things that
will regulate the conduct of those agents. Only
empirical suggestions can be put forward at
this point. The first would be to recognize
the Pashtuns as the majority population in
Afghanistan and recognize the Taliban as a
party that can ensure peace in the region. Yet
for this to be acceptable to the other Afghan
parties, the Taliban must morph again to
become a purely Afghan Pashtun movement
rather than a nationalist Pashtun-based tribal
insurgency with roots in Pakistan or a radical
Islamist movement with Al Qaeda linkages.
Any semblance of pan-Islamist nationalism on
the part of the Taliban as well as contacts with
Al Qaeda would not establish their credentials
as a Pashtun nationalist movement. Nor would
the United States ignore such an entity.
However, this is a catch-22 situation; the
Taliban’s fundamental condition for negotia-
tions has persistently been the withdrawal of
all foreign forces from Afghanistan, especially
NATO, which will not happen as long as
Islamist linkages continue to be demonstrated
in the region.
The U.S. tactic of using Israeli-style target
extermination raids is not going to be conducive
to a long-term solution of the problem; the
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
United States is not targeting a circumscribed
entity such as the Gaza Strip but rugged
terrain like Tora Bora in Afghanistan, which
allowed bin Laden to escape despite all-out
U.S. offensives. The local populace is armed to
the teeth and fanatically territorial, and the
Taliban is citing the targeted attacks as
evidence of the actions of a remorseless
American Goliath trying to exterminate the
puny Pashtun nationalist tribal David regard-
less of the collateral losses sustained by
innocent men, women, and children. However,
there does appear to be a consensus; though
not publicly admitted in the open source realm,
targeted attacks are presumed to be at the least
a necessary evil. Evidence of that consensus
emerged when a U.S. senator expressed aston-
ishment at the Pakistani government’s remon-
strations about continuing drone attacks,
mentioning that the Predator drones operated
from within Pakistani air space.77 That revela-
tion suggests the Pakistani state’s complicity78
or even approval of the continuance of such
targeted missions, even though the state has
vigorously denied such claims. Realpolitik
dictates that the Pakistani state can ill afford
to admit complicity or, at the very least, logisti-
cal patronage of such attacks because that
would make it subject to a huge anti-American
public backlash. At the same time the damage
stemming from collateral losses produced by
drone attacks needs to be minimized. In that
connection, the new Obama policy of putting
more ‘‘boots on the ground’’ may be helpful.
It is important to understand that there is
still a difference between Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, although they have tended to come
closer together under the duress of aggression
in meeting the common enemy: the United
States. The distinction was drawn by no less a
figure than the Taliban’s supreme leader,
Mullah Omar: ‘‘They [Al Qaeda] have set jihad
as their goal, while we have set the expulsion of
American troops from Afghanistan as our
target.’’79 Thus even though it is undeniable
that there is an Islamist element present, the
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
Taliban was and still is, a nationalist
movement like Hamas and Hezbollah but
unlike Al Qaeda. Of course, they have the cap-
ability (which they have demonstrated) to
develop more extensive transnational terror
links, but that will depend on the trajectory of
circumstances.
Another strategic necessity is to address the
grievances of FATA, where only 3 percent of
women receive education and there is 1 doctor
for every 8,000 people. Operations are a
viable option as initial counterinsurgency
efforts, but unless they are supplemented by
huge socioeconomic investments in rehabilitating
the area, peace will not return, as Afghanistan
has tended to demonstrate. Donald Rumsfeld’s
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
neoconservative doctrine, which preached
imperialism and the plausible denial of
Afghanistan’s socioeconomic situation, cannot
be repeated by Barack Obama and Hillary
Clinton. FATA also needs the healing touch of
democracy and just laws; the draconian Frontier
Crimes Regulation (FCR) needs to go or at least
be drastically modified. However, only a demo-
cratically elected government reflecting the
consensus of the nation can achieve those ends.
The arrival of a civilian government in
February 2008 has not perceptibly improved
the situation; some would say that it has even
worsened. The government has faced tremen-
dous U.S. pressure to step up operations, and
the United States has not hesitated to escalate
the number of unmanned drone incursions into
Pakistani territory. That in turn sparked the
resentment of ordinary Pakistanis. There is
growing bitterness against what the common
man sees as the U.S. administration’s overbear-
ing ways. The intensification of such attacks by
the Obama administration is only going to
increase anti-U.S. sentiments in impoverished
tribal areas, which the militants will use to
heighten anti-U.S. sentiments in order to
increase recruitment.
The common man has also taken a stand
against rising militancy by organizing local
forces in recognition of the fact that the poorly
American Foreign Policy Interests
161
paid local police are no match for Taliban
militias. In the tribal areas to the west of the
Buner district, the Pakistani Army is encourag-
ing tribal militias, known as lashkars, as a
backup force against the Taliban. Such militias
have a long tradition in tribal society. The time
is ripe for a counterinsurgency strategy that
incorporates local lashkars into community
defense as local militias, which can be the first
line of defense in a village.
The issue of aid and development needs to
be resolved as well. As Ahmed Rasheed
remarked: ‘‘The Bush Administration has
essentially run USAID [U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development] into the ground . . .
(which) is a bureaucracy that signs checks . . .
(for) consultancies and companies that have
no essential knowledge about countries like
Afghanistan or Pakistan, and sub-contract
their work to others. . . . FATA is now almost
entirely controlled by the Pakistani Taliban
militias who in turn provide cover, protection,
and sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban and to
Al Qaeda. . . . The last few years the Army has
failed to protect tribal elders, civil society
professionals like teachers and doctors, and
local people who were all opposed to the
Taliban. As a result these people have either
been killed by the Taliban or they have fled. . . .
The result is that the Pakistani Taliban is in
total control and at present it is impossible to
carry out any kind of development work.’’80
FATA’s laws and infrastructure need to be
normalized by the infusion of a slow but
comprehensive aid package dealing with
development issues such as education and jobs.
This requires transparency and a genuine
commitment to this area. With the Pakistani
economy in a perilous state, inflation running
rampant, the currency having lost a third of
its value, and its foreign currency reserves at
serious levels of depletion, Pakistan needs a
bailout package, but this should come with
strings attached so that it caters only for FATA
and is not squandered. Pakistan is a resilient
state and will overcome its problems eventually;
 162
however, the road ahead needs to be paved with
the soundest of policies, failing which, one
would expect to see the problems of militancy
continuing unabated in the country.
About the Author
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi is a lecturer in
policing and criminal investigation at the
University of Central Lancashire, the United
Kingdom. His areas of research expertise are
terrorism and transnational crime prevention,
with particular reference to extremism in Paki-
stan. He is also a senior associate editor of The
Long War Journal.
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
Notes
1. ‘‘Analysis: Pakistan’s Army in the Tri-
bal Areas,’’ Rahimullah Yusufzai, BBC News,
South Asia, Internet edition, at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3020552.stm
2. Nek Muhammad was a pro-Taliban
tribal leader who shot to prominence in the
wake of the Shakai Accord between the Pak
Army and the Wazir tribes under which
amnesty was granted to tribesmen and foreign
militants were supposed to surrender and
register with the political agent, the adminis-
trative representative of the state.
3. ‘‘The Death of Nek.’’ Mumtaz Hamid
Rao, Media monitors network Web site, June
24, 2004, at http://usa.mediamonitors.net/
Headlines/The-Death-of-Nek.
4. Ibid.
5. ‘‘In Pakistan, Doubts Over the Fight in
Tribal Area,’’ Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan,
The New York Times online edition, Asia Pacific
section, February 12, 2008, at http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/asia/12pakistan.
html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&th&emc=th&oref=
slogin
6. ‘‘War and Peace in Waziristan,’’ Amir
Mir, Asia Times, South Asia section, Internet
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
edition, May 4, 2005, at http://www.atimes.
com/atimes/South_Asia/GE04Df03.html
7. Gall and Khan, op cit.
8. Ibid.
9. ‘‘Another Deal with Militants for Peace
in Tribal Areas,’’ Muhammad Amir Rana,
Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies Web site,
Southasianet-Pakistan section, at http://
san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-Pakistan/
SAN-PAK-Article36/San-Pak-Main-A36-D.asp
10. ‘‘U.S. Says Attacks Are Surging in
Afghanistan,’’ David Cloud, Asia Pacific, The
New York Times, Internet edition, January 16,
2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/16/
world/asia/16cnd-gates.html
11. Gall and Khan, op cit.
12. Ibid.
13. ‘‘Pakistan Signs the Bajaur Accord,’’
Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, March 17,
2007, at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2007/03/pakistan_signs_the_b.php
14. Maulana Faqir, ‘‘Govt May Ink Peace
Deal after Eid,’’ Mushtaq Yusufzai, The News,
Internet edition, at http://www.thenews.com.
pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=3803
15. ‘‘80 Die in Air Attack on Bajaur Semin-
ary,’’ The News, Internet edition, Tuesday,
October 31, 2006, at http://www.thenews.
com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=3945
16. ‘‘Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem: As
Straight as a Coil!,’’ Mohammad Malick, The
News, Internet edition, Wednesday, July 2,
2008, at http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_
detail.asp?Id=15696
17. ‘‘A Profile of Mangal Bagh,’’ Syed
Manzar Abbas Zaidi, The Long War Journal,
November 11, 2008, at http://www.longwar
journal.org/archives/2008/11/a_profile_of_mangal.
php
18. For officially communicated details of
this operation, see ‘‘Operation in Swat Wrapped
Up: DGMO,’’ The News, Internet archives,
January 17, 2008, at http://www.thenews.
com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=12355
19. ‘‘Swat Slipping from Pakistan’s Hands,’’
Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti, Observer Research
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
Foundation, at http://www.observerindia.com/cms/
export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/
Swat_1233894953953.pdf
20. The militant headquarters of Maulana
Fazlullah in Swat.
21. ‘‘Swat Slipping from Pakistan’s
Hands,’’ Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti, Obser-
ver Research Foundation, at http://www.
observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/
analysis/attachments/Swat_1233894953953.pdf
22. ‘‘Pakistan Timeline: 2008,’’ Observer
Research Foundation, at http://www.observer
india.com/cms/sites/orfonline/html/assessment/
timeline.html
23. Supra note 20.
24. ‘‘NWFP Govt Refuses to Budge as
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
Taliban Deadline Lapses,’’ Akhtar Amin, Daily
Times, Internet archives, July 22, 2008, at
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=
2008%5C07%5C22%5Cstory_22-7-2008._75
25. Ibid.
26. ‘‘A Profile of Baitullah Mehsud,’’
Manzar Zaidi, The Paksitani Taliban Pages,
September 2008, The Long War Journal, at
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/
09/pakistans_taliban_wa.php
27. ‘‘CIA Places Blame for Bhutto Assassi-
nation,’’ Joby Warrick, Washington Post, online
edition, World section, January 2008, at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/01/17/AR2008011703252.html
28. ‘‘Pakistan Not to Allow Foreign Troops
to Operate on its Soil: Qureshi,’’ The Nation,
Internet edition, July 11 2008, at http://www.
nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-
english-online/Politics/11-Jul-2008/Pakistan-not-
to-allow-foreign-troops-to-operate-on-its-soil-
Qureshi
29. ‘‘Militant Gains in Pakistan Said to
Draw Fighters,’’ Eric Schmitt, Asia Pacific,
The New York Times, Internet edition, July
10, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/
10/world/asia/10terror.html
30. The Dawn, July 11, 2008, http://
www.dawn.com/2008/07/11/top10.htm
American Foreign Policy Interests
163
31. ‘‘Musharraf Is a Non-Issue: Boucher,’’
The News, Thursday, July 3, 2008.
32. Gall and Khan, op cit.
33. The Dawn, July 11, 2008, at http://
www.dawn.com/2008/07/11/top10.htm.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. ‘‘A Different Kind of Homecoming,’’
Mushtaq Yusufzai, The News on Sunday,
Special Report, August 31, 2008, at http://jang.
com.pk/thenews/aug2008-weekly/nos-31-08-2008/
spr.htm
37. Ibid.
38. The ambassador was abducted in
Khyber Agency and was reportedly set free when
a deal was struck between militants and the
Pakistani government, as a result of which many
militants were set free. The state denied this, but
media reports about it were rife. See ‘‘Pak Envoy
to Afghanistan Goes Missing: Believed to Have
Been Abducted in Khyber Agency,’’ Pak Tribune
online, February 12, 2008, at http://www.paktri-
bune.com/news/index.shtml?197285. Also see
‘‘Pakistani Ambassador Goes Missing,’’ BBC
News, online edition, February 11, 2008, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/South_asia=7239555.stm.
For this deal allegedly with Baitullah Mehsud,
see ‘‘Pakistani Militants Savor a Sweet Deal,’’
Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times online, South
Asia, May 20, 2008, at http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/south_asia/JE20Df01.html
39. Supra note 35.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. ‘‘Battle to Be Won or Lost in Bajaur,’’
Ismail Khan, Dawn, September 21, 2008.
43. ‘‘Taliban Talk Offer Bodes Well,’’
Haroun Mir, Asia Times online, South Asia
section, September 14, 2007, http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/II14Df02.html
44. ‘‘Bajaur Operation ‘25 to 35% Intense,’ ’’
Iqbal Khattak, Daily Times, Tuesday,
September 2, 2008.
45. ‘‘Suicide Bombs Kill 59 Outside
Pakistani Arms Plant,’’ Augustine Anthony,
 164
Reuters online, August 21, 2008, at http://
www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSISL713
7320080821
46. ‘‘Dozens Killed in Pakistan Attack,’’
BBC News UK, online edition, September 20,
2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_
asia/7627135.stm
47. Supra note 43.
48. The News, ‘‘Taliban Unable to Expand
Insurgency in Afghanistan,’’ Monday, June 30,
2008.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. The Daily Times, Thursday, September
11, 2008.
52. Ibid.
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
53. Ibid.
54. ‘‘Secret US Military Plan for Pakistan
on Hold: Report.’’ The News, Internet archives,
July 1, 2008, at http://thenews.jang.com.pk/
print3.asp?id=15683
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. ‘‘Mullen’s Unannounced Visit Fuels
Speculation,’’ Qudssia Akhlaque, The News
online archives, Sunday, July 13, 2008, at
http://www.thenews.com.pk/arc_default.asp
59. ‘‘ISI, IB Put Under Interior Division’s
Control.’’ Syed Irfan Raza, Dawn, Internet edi-
tion, July 27, 2008, at http://www.dawn.com/
2008/07/27/top1.htm
60. Ibid. Also see ‘‘Pakistan Flip-Flop Over
ISI Creates Confusion,’’ The Indian News,
online version, July 27, 2008, at http://www.
thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/pakistan-flip-
flop-on-isi-creates-confusion_10076557.html
61. ‘‘Nobody Has Right to Take Action
Inside Pakistan,’’ The News, Friday, July 4,
2008.
62. ‘‘Six Killed in Strike in South Waziri-
stan.’’ Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal, July
28, 2008, at http://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2008/07/six_killed_in_strike.php
63. ‘‘Pakistan: FBI Rules the Roost,’’ Syed
Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times online, October 4,
American Foreign Policy Interests
Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi
2003, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
South_Asia/EJ04Df04.html. Also see ‘‘Upper,
Lower Houses Denounce US Action in Angoor
Adda,’’ Geo website, Thursday, September 4,
2008, at http://www.geo.tv/9-4-2008/24177.htm.
For the potential of the situation to develop into
a standoff see ‘‘Pakistan Retaliates to NATO
Shelling on Angoor Adda,’’ Irfan Burki and
Mushtaq Yusufzai, October 29, 2008, at http://
www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=
18062
64. ‘‘Suicide Bomber Killed Trying to
Attack Pakistan Camp.’’ Reuters report repro-
duced in Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty
Web site, August 29, 2008, at http://www.
rferl.org/content/Suicide_Bomber_Killed_Trying_
to_Attack_Pakistan_Camp/1194760.html
65. ‘‘Editorial: Losing a War and a Sincere
Ally,’’ Arab News, September 13, 2008, at
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&section=0&
article=114256&d=13&m=9&y=2008
66. Ibid.
67. ‘‘Editorial: US Strategy: Excessive and
Unnecessary,’’ Daily Times, Internet edition,
September 13, 2008, at http://www.dailytimes.
com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C09%5C13%
5Cstory_13-9-2008_pg3_1
68. ‘‘Pakistan: Now or Never,’’ Perspectives
on Pakistan, Reuters Blogs, September 14,
2008, at http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/
09/14/facing-up-to-the-war-in-pakistan/
69. Ibid.
70. ‘‘Obama Sees Worsening Security Situa-
tion in Afghanistan,’’ The News, July 9, 2008.
71. News on Sunday, August 2, 2008.
72. ‘‘Barack Obama will Deploy an
Additional 17,000 American Soldiers to
Afghanistan,’’ The Economist, Asia section,
online edition, February 18, 2009, at http://
www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=13136344
73. ‘‘President Obama Orders Pakistan
Drone Attacks,’’ Times online, January 23,
2009, at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/us_and_americas/article5575883.ece
74. Ibid.
 The Peace Process in Pakistan
75. Members of the National Assembly, the
lower parliamentary house in Pakistan.
76. ‘‘Pakistan: The Taliban Takeover,’’
Ziauddin Sardar, The New Statesman, April
30, 2007, reproduced in Web site, at http://
www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/07/wf050107.htm
77. ‘‘Leak by Sen. Feinstein Jeopardizes
War on Terrorism,’’ February 13 , 2009, Proud-
neocon Web site, at http://coldheartedtruth.
com/politics/index.php/2009/02/13/leak-by-sen-
feinstein-jeopardizes-war-on?blog=15
Downloaded By: [Manning, David] At: 15:20 30 July 2009
American Foreign Policy Interests
165
78. Ibid.
79. ‘‘Omar Threatens to Intensify War:
Talks with Karzai Govt Ruled Out,’’ Ismail
Khan, January 4, 2007, Dawn, Internet
edition, http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/04/top4.
htm
80. ‘‘Inside the Pakistan-Taliban Relation-
ship: Six Questions for Ahmed Rashid, Author
of Descent Into Chaos,’’ Scott Horton, Harper’s
magazine online archives, July 30, 2008, at
http://harpers.org/archive/2008/07/hbc-90003347