Tañada vs.
Tuvera 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933,
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in
the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following
presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59,
64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298,
303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360,
361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473,
486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800,
802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050,
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72,
107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205,
209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245,
248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-
289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325,
327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486,
488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599,
600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665,
702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-
940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62,
63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151,
1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595,
1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649,
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762,
1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804,
1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844,
1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868,
1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028,
2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427,
429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553,
560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609,
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-
852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10,
11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-
354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General,
would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or
standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any
tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done
to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since
the subject of the petition concerns a public right and
its object is to compel the performance of a public
duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As
early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule
is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or
some particular right to be protected, independent of
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it
is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public
right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in
the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed.,
sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator
Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the
Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay,
Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general
rule in America were otherwise, we think that it
would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist,
the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the
rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this
case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we
have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of
the Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a
private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
of any other person to initiate the same, considering
that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette
is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord
with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct
only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with
the fact of publication. Considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the
Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time
to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the
Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people
have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people
are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and
deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the
diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
records—no such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo
la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso
de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth
Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality.
The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not
be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters
of instructions which all form part of the law of the
land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of
Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some
members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on
acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is
all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that
the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted
upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and
it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in
Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had
accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk
of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained
since no copies thereof are available. But whatever
their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented
or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy,
refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws
until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even
though some criminal laws provide that they shall
take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the
views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it
would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished
"presidential issuances" to have binding force and
effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite
publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even
aware of the existence of any legislative or executive
act having the force and effect of law. My point is
that such publication required need not be confined to
the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint,
there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow,
however, that failure to do so would in all cases and
under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative
or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette.
There is no such requirement in the Constitution as
Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what
is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as
to what is required for any statute or presidential act
to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur
in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional
doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they
can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In
fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent
that it requires notice before laws become effective,
for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned
Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be
enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice
Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be
in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining
the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does
not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on
such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an
effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such
presidential decree or executive act is made the basis
of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post
facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the
due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged
presidential decree or executive act was issued under
the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to
determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology,
there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified
concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a
legislative or executive act of a general application. I
am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil
Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that
the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it
is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No.
386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of
a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping
conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my
opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier
noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad
Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin
and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera.
The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws
published and ascertainable and of equal application
to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that
"it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a
reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing
the settled principle based on due process enunciated
in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specially informed of said
contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no
basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that
the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of
Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are
silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published
in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of
the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date
is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce
refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant
to the basic constitutional requirements of due
process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it
"shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the
date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary
for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in
the law itself before the completion of 15 days
following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if
a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection
with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity
is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in
the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree
can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they
can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is
the publication of laws in the Official Gazette
required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a
law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law
may provide not only a different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not
support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said
law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication
of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the
authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in
the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to
be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of
laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution,
can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent
that it requires notice before laws become effective,
for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but
reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the
unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature
or general applicability ineffective, until due
publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the
views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice
Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it
would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished
"presidential issuances" to have binding force and
effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite
publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even
aware of the existence of any legislative or executive
act having the force and effect of law. My point is
that such publication required need not be confined to
the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint,
there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow,
however, that failure to do so would in all cases and
under all circumstances result in a statute,
presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and
effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would
lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative
or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of
effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette.
There is no such requirement in the Constitution as
Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what
is decided now applies only to past "presidential
issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my
mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as
to what is required for any statute or presidential act
to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur
in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional
doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they
can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In
fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent
that it requires notice before laws become effective,
for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned
Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be
enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice
Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not
prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be
in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published
therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining
the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does
not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on
such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an
effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such
presidential decree or executive act is made the basis
of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post
facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases
though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the
due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged
presidential decree or executive act was issued under
the police power, the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to
determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology,
there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified
concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a
legislative or executive act of a general application. I
am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil
Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that
the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it
is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is
itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No.
386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of
a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law
can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping
conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my
opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier
noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad
Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate
opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin
and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera.
The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws
published and ascertainable and of equal application
to all similarly circumstances and not subject to
arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that
"it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a
reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey
before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing
the settled principle based on due process enunciated
in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specially informed of said
contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no
basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that
the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of
Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are
silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published
in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of
the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date
is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce
refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant
to the basic constitutional requirements of due
process. The best example of this is the Civil Code
itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it
"shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after
such publication. 2 To sustain respondents'
misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the
date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary
for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render
nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official
Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for
immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in
the law itself before the completion of 15 days
following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if
a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection
with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity
is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes
effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in
the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree
can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no
retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to
constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It
may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected parties before they
can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is
the publication of laws in the Official Gazette
required by any statute as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, if said laws already provide for their
effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a
law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law
may provide not only a different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice.
Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published
elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not
support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws
must be published in the Official Gazette. The said
law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette."
Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication
of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency,
provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the
authority of the Director of Printing in relation
thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in
the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to
be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the
said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of
laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an
earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution,
can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent
that it requires notice before laws become effective,
for no person should be bound by a law without
notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be
by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but
reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the
unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature
or general applicability ineffective, until due
publication thereof.
----
[DIGEST] La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Ramos (Jan. 27, 2004; 421 SCRA 148)
Facts:
In 1987, former President Corazon Aquino issued
E.O. No. 279, which authorized the DENR Secretary
to evaluate proposals from foreign investors or
corporations for either financial or technical
assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals. After such evaluation, the
DENR Secretary should issue a recommendation to
the President, and the latter shall consider the real
contributions of such proposal to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country as well as
the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources that will be promoted by the
proposed contract or agreement. Moreover, the
capital investment for the proposal should cost at
least $50,000,000. In 1995, former President Fidel V.
Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942(Philippine Mining
Act of 1995.) The RA’s purpose was to govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing
of all mineral resources. It also defines the modes of
mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines
the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their
terms and similar provisions govern financial or
technical assistance agreements. The law also
prescribes the qualifications of contractors and grants
them rights for timber, water and easement, and to
possess explosives. It also forbids surface owners or
concessionaires from preventing holders of mining
rights from entering private lands and concession
areas and also regulates the transport, sale and
processing of minerals, and promotes the
development of mining communities, science and
mining technology, and safety and environmental
protection. However, before the effectivity of the
law, former President Ramos entered into a Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with
WMCP (a corporation organized under RP laws)
covering 99,287 hectares of land in South Cotobato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotobato.
In effect, the DENR secretary Victor Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996,
which repealed DAO No. 95-23, s. 1995 or the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7942. Due to the aforementioned actions of
government, petitioners filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. The
petitioners assailed that 100 FTAA applications have
already been filed, which covers an area of 8.4
million hectares, and 64 of the applications came
from fully-foreign owned corporations covering a
total of 5.8 million hectares and at least one by a fully
foreignowned mining company over offshore areas.
The petitioners also assail that RA7942 is
unconstitutional for it violates: (a) Art. XII, Sec. 2(4);
(b) Art. III, Sec. 1; (c) Art. XII, Sec. 2(2) of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, the petitioners also stated the
WMCP is owned by WMC Resources International
Pty., Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Western
Mining Corporation Holdings Limited, an Australian
mining and exploration company. However, WMCP
averred that WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, Inc, which is a 60% Filipino-
owned company.
Issue: W/N R.A. 7942, which the petitioners believe
that it encroaches on the rights of Filipinos to
exclusively utilize our natural resources, is
unconstitutional
Ruling: Yes. The court stated that Art. XII, Sec. 2 of
the 1987 enunciates that FTAA’s should be limited to
technical or financial assistance only and not to
manage or operate the exploitation of the country’s
natural resources. The court stated the latin maxim
“Casus Omissus Pro Omisso” which means that if a
person, object, or thing is omitted in a statute, it must
be held or considered to have been omitted
intentionally. Thus, it can be inferred that such
management or operation of the resources by foreign
individuals or corporations is prohibited by the
constitution. In the contention of respondents that
agreements involving technical or financial assistance
(1987 Constitution) is just another term for service
contracts (1973 Constitution,) the court stated that the
terms are not synonymous with each other because
the CONCOM intended to delete the term “service
contracts” from the 1987 Constitution. The reason for
the deletion of such term by the CONCOM was to
avoid some of the abuses in the past regime in the use
of service contracts to go around the 60-40
arrangement. Moreover, it was also stated by certain
framers of the 1987 Constitution that the reason for
changing such terms in the Constitution was to make
sure that Filipinos will remain to have exclusive
rights on our natural resources and that the
sovereignty of the Philippines will not be affected.
Furthermore, the court also stated that although RA
7942 includes the term technical or financial
assistance, which is in accordance with the 1987
constitution, it is still unconstitutional because RA
7942 still intended it to be for service contracts.
Therefore, the court declared some provisions of RA
7942 unconstitutional for it encroaches on the rights
of Filipinos to exclusively utilize our own natural
resources.
----
Victoria Milling Co. v. Social Security Commission
GR No. L-16704 Mar 17, 1962
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security
Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the
following tenor: .
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in
computing the premiums due the System, will take
into consideration and include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well
as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All
these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or
earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2%
contributions will be based, up to a maximum of
P500 for any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias
Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the
Social Security Commission in effect protesting
against the circular as contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly
excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation
of the employers' and employees' respective monthly
premium contributions, and submitting, "In order to
assist your System in arriving at a proper
interpretation of the term 'compensation' for the
purposes of" such computation, their observations on
Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the
general interpretation of the words "compensation",
"remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of
authority on the part of the Social Security
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of
the President and for lack of publication in the
Official Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security
Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule
or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to be
effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of
the statute, a mere statement of general policy or
opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this
Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or
not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission "to
adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of
the President such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction
between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose
enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body.
When an administrative agency promulgates rules
and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force
and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an
opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative
Law, p. 197; Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194).
Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred
upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the
nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be
enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.
This is so because statutes are usually couched in
general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying
out the law are often times left to the administrative
agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense,
it has been said that rules and regulations are the
product of a delegated power to create new or
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.
(Davis, op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the
procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and
its scope is within the statutory authority granted by
the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement
with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom
(Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best
merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social
Security Commission, in view of the amendment of
the provisions of the Social Security Law defining
the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of
Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment,
reads as follows: .
(f) Compensation — All remuneration for
employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash
except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of
P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses,
allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all
other payments which the employer may make,
although not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of
"compensation" to:
(f) Compensation — All remuneration for
employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash
except that part of the remuneration in excess of
P500.00 received during the month.
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the
amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay
given in addition to the regular or base pay were
expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition
of the term "compensation", such exemption or
exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus
became necessary for the Social Security
Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or
elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to
apprise those concerned of the interpretation or
understanding of the Commission, of the law as
amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not
add any duty or detail that was not already in the law
as amended. It merely stated and circularized the
opinion of the Commission as to how the law should
be construed. 1äwphï1.ñët
The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553,
promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by appellant,
does not support its contention that the circular in
question is a rule or regulation. What was there said
was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in
the form of a circular. Such statement simply meant
that the substance and not the form of a regulation is
decisive in determining its nature. It does not lay
down a general proposition of law that any circular,
regardless of its substance and even if it is only
interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation which
must be published in the Official Gazette before it
could take effect.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850)
also cited by appellant is not applicable to the present
case, because the penalty that may be incurred by
employers and employees if they refuse to pay the
corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc.
which the employer pays to his employees, is not by
reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but
for violation of the specific legal provisions
contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 1161.
We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports
merely to advise employers-members of the System
of what, in the light of the amendment of the law,
they should include in determining the monthly
compensation of their employees upon which the
social security contributions should be based, and
that such circular did not require presidential
approval and publication in the Official Gazette for
its effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the Commission's
interpretation of the amendment embodied in its
Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination
among the exemptions excluded in the old law, of all
bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the
determination of the "compensation" paid to
employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and
overtime pay must now be included in the employee's
remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It
is true that in previous cases, this Court has held that
bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the
wage, salary, or compensation of the employee. But
the question in the instant case is not whether bonus
is demandable or not as part of compensation, but
whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or pay
bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be
considered compensation under the Social Security
Act after they have been received by the employees.
While it is true that terms or words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted
meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or
word is specifically defined in a particular law, such
interpretation must be adopted in enforcing that
particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a
particular phrase or term may have one meaning for
one purpose and another meaning for some other
purpose. Such is the case that is now before us.
Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what
"compensation" should mean "For the purposes of
this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such
definition by deleting same exemptions authorized in
the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial
change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior
executive or judicial construction may have been
given to the phrase in question should give way to the
clear mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution
appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and De
Leon, JJ., concur.
---
Roy v. CA
GR 80718 Jan 29 1988
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare
null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First
Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis
Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al.,
CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution
promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October
1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the
petition outright for not being verified as required by
Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However,
even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive
grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a
burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the
family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal,
a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed
to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch
XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of
which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the
fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30,
1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was
denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R.
No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion
for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this
Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme
Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the
intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53,
August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule
and went further to restate and clarify the modes and
periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained
the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period
from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas
case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule
barring extensions of time to file motions for new
trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for
extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the
grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and
may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for
extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace
period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period
to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is
no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer
in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published
in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals
committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable
under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument
that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners
prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been
applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and
Bidin, JJ., concur.
 DM Consunji, Inc v. CA
357 SCRA 249 (2001)
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a
construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He
was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in
Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de
Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at
around 2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso
Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the
elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building were on board a
platform. Jose was crushed to death when the
platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin,
which was merely inserted to the connecting points
of the chain block and platform but without a safety
lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police
District investigated the tragedy and filed report
dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow
filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the
RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to
P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim
damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
HELD:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering
damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was
unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her
claim for death benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after
she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the
criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to
determine whether the award decreed in its decision
is more than that of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by
the trial court be greater than that awarded by the
ECC, payments already made to private respondent
pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom.
---
Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki
740 SCSRA 345
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
decision[2] dated August 23, 2012 and the
resolution[3] dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.
The Factual Antecedents
In the first week of August 2003, respondent
Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met
with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a
condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by
Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a
Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit
No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) No. 18186][4] and Parking Slot No. 42
[covered by CCT No. 9118][5] were for sale for
P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that
the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean.
After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce
the price to P2,800,000.00.
On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of
the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349[6] for
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
reservation fee.[7] On August 21, 2003, Suzuki
issued Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350,[8]
this time for P2,700,000.00 representing the
remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and
Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 26, 2003[9] covering Unit No. 536 and
Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took
possession of the condominium unit and parking lot,
and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with
Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which
were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez
(Perez, Orion's Loans Officer) for safekeeping.
Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to
deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that
Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify
the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong
City Registry of Deeds.
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118
representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained under
the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding,
Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President
Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid
the purchase price of Unit. No. 536[10] and Parking
Slot No. 42.[11]
CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the
condominium unit had no existing encumbrance,
except for an annotation under Entry No. 73321/C-
10186 which provided that any conveyance or
encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to
approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority
(PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry
No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a
P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently
cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T.
No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage
to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in
possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki then executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim[12] dated September 8,
2003, with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in
CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery
of the titles.[13] Orion, (through Perez), however,
refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to
consult Orion's legal counsel as its reason.
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from
Orion's counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that
Kang obtained another loan in the amount of
P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he
executed a Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003,
in favor of Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion,
however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until
October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42 (covered
by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry
No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking lot's title.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Kang and
Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the
following admissions and stipulations:
That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered
owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
That the mortgage in favor of Orion supposedly
executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186
dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled
by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16,
2000;
That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never annotated
in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax
and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged
Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118,
was never mortgaged to Orion; and
That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to
Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
The RTC Ruling
In its decision[14] dated June 29, 2009, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City
ruled in favor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver
the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the properties
prevailed over Orion's. The RTC further noted that
Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the
properties but he did not find any existing
encumbrance in the titles. Although Orion claims to
have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en
Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months
after he bought the properties because Orion never
bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pago in
CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly
and severally pay Suzuki moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, expenses
for litigation and cost of suit. Orion timely appealed
the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion's
appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld
Suzuki's right over the properties. The CA further
noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186 pertaining to the
withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves as
a warning to an SRRV holder about the implications
of a conveyance of a property investment. It deviated
from the RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award
for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision
but the CA denied the motion in its January 25, 2013
resolution. Orion then filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orion's petition is based on the following
grounds/arguments:[15]
The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of
Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made
with the consent of both spouses;
Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to
check the owner's duplicate copies of the CCTs;
Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No.
73321/C-10186, which prohibits any conveyance or
encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the
alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
Orion should not be faulted for exercising due
diligence.
In his Comment,[16] Suzuki asserts that the issue on
spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal.
Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption of conjugal
ownership.[17] Suzuki additionally maintains that he
is a purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the
protection of the law.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into
conclusions of fact when the
inference made is manifestly
mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review
generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-
evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the
uniform factual conclusions of the trial court and
the appellate court.[18] In the present case, while the
courts below both arrived at the same conclusion,
there appears to be an incongruence in their factual
findings and the legal principle they applied to the
attendant factual circumstances. Thus, we are
compelled to examine certain factual issues in the
exercise of our sound discretion to correct any
mistaken inference that may have been made.[19]
Philippine Law governs the
transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the
issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this
position, however, because the issue of spousal
consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a
well-settled principle that points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal and considered by a reviewing court.[20] To
consider these belated arguments would violate basic
principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the
issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to
lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of
the present petition.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable
property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located.[21] The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property its
immobility. Immovables are part of the country and
so closely connected to it that all rights over them
have their natural center of gravity there.[22]
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition
of real property are determined by what is known as
the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the
mode by which a title can pass from one person to
another, or by which an interest therein can be gained
or lost.[23] This general principle includes all rules
governing the descent, alienation and transfer of
immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.[24]
This principle even governs the capacity of the
person making a deed relating to immovable
property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an
instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land
if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile
and by the law of the place where the instrument is
actually made, his capacity is undoubted.[25]
On the other hand, property relations between
spouses are governed principally by the national law
of the spouses.[26] However, the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving
the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact
to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. [27] He
is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the
forum.[28]
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal
nature of the property shall be governed by South
Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to
prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership of property. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"[29] to prove the existence of Korean Law.
This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof
of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no
showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal
of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule
132.[30]
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven,
the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
Philippine Law.[31]
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang
'married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of
the civil status of Kang.[32] In other words, the
import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the
owner of the properties as they are registered in his
name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook
Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we
have held that registration of the property in the name
of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of
it being conjugal or community property.[33] In
those cases, however, there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one
spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community
properties.[34] Accordingly, we see no reason to
declare as invalid Kang's conveyance in favor of
Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the due execution of the
Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold
to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is
good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil
Code presupposes the existence of two or more duly
executed contracts of sale. In the present case, the
Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003[35] between
Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion[36] and was
properly identified by Suzuki's witness Ms. Mary
Jane Samin (Samin).[37]
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated
August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract of
sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to
deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates himself
to pay a price certain to the seller.[38] The execution
of the notarized deed of sale and the actual transfer of
possession amounted to delivery that produced the
legal effect of transferring ownership to Suzuki.[39]
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in
right under the principle of prius tempore, potior jure
(i.e., first in time, stronger in right), it failed to prove
the existence and due execution of the Dacion en
Pago in its favor.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pago as
Exhibit "5" with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove
the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction in
its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion likewise
offered in evidence the supposed promissory note
dated September 4, 2002 as Exhibit "12" to prove the
existence of the additional P800,000.00 loan. The
RTC, however, denied the admission of Exhibits "5"
and "12," among others, in its order dated August 19,
2008 "since the same [were] not identified in court by
any witness."[40]
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary
evidence, Orion failed to make a tender of excluded
evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. For this reason alone, we are
prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and
its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present
petition.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its
submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition,
the copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimonial and documentary evidence of Orion,
militate against the conclusion that the Dacion en
Pago was duly executed.
First, there appears to be no due and demandable
obligation when the Dacion en Pago was executed,
contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orion's witness
Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang was
in default in his P1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct
examination, he stated:
ATTY. CRUZAT:
Q: Okay, so this loan of P1.8 million, what happened
to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed
interest payment by Mr. Kang and...
Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]
A: We have to secure the money or the investment of
the bank through loans and we have executed a
dacion en pago because Mr. Kang said he has no
money. So we just execute[d] the dacion en pago
rather than going through the Foreclosure
proceedings.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.[41]
A reading of the supposed promissory note, however,
shows that there was no default to speak of when the
supposed Dacion en Pago was executed.
Based on the promissory note, Kang's loan obligation
would mature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can
Orion claim that Kang had been in default in his
installment payments because the wordings of the
promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this
loan and its interest and other charges shall be paid
by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE
PAYMENT LOANS.[42]" There was thus no due
and demandable loan obligation when the alleged
Dacion en Pago was executed.
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the
Dacion en Pago, appears to only have a vague idea of
the transaction he supposedly prepared. During his
cross-examination, he testified:
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion
en pago] Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
xxxx
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all
the penalties, interest and surcharge due from Mr.
Yung Sam Kang?
A: It's just the principal, sir.
Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include
interest, sir. We may actually include that but....
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr.
Witness?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan
to the second party and as of February 10, 2003, the
outstanding obligation which is due and demandable
principal and interest and other charges included
amounts to P1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.
xxxx
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now
includes interest and other charges, based on this
document?
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.[43]
Third, the Dacion en Pago, mentioned that the
P1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage. However, no document was ever presented
to prove this real estate mortgage aside from it being
mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other document
like a supplement to that Credit Line Agreement
referring to this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung
Sam Kang which says that there was a subsequent
collateralization or security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]
Kang for the loan?
xxxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.[44]
Fourth, the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only
two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin demanded the
delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003, and
after Suzuki caused the annotation of his affidavit of
adverse claim. Records show that it was only on
October 9, 2003, when Orion, through its counsel,
Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates first spoke of
the Dacion en Pago.[45] Not even Perez mentioned
any Dacion en Pago on October 1, 2003, when he
personally received a letter demanding the delivery of
the titles. Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter
and opted to first consult with his lawyer.[46]
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained
material inconsistencies in its recital of facts
surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago. In
particular, it mentioned that "on [September 4, 2002],
after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and
was granted a new Credit Line Facility by [Orion] x x
x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,800,000.00)." Perez,
however, testified that there was "no cash movement"
in the original P1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony,
he said:
COURT:
xxxx
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter
of that real estate mortgage for that first
P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: It's a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr.
Yung Sam Kang of this P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
Q: No payments?
A: None sir.
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment,
either by way of payment to the principal, by way of
payment of interest, there was no payment by Mr.
Yung Sam Kang of this loan?
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.
Q: There was no actual cash?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion
Savings Bank still extended an P800,000.00
additional right?
A: Yes, sir.[47]
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the
supposed execution of the Dacion en Pago on
February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of
the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records
shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of
the property even six (6) months after the supposed
date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was
even able to transfer possession of the condominium
unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate
improvements thereon. If Orion really purchased the
condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed
to be its true owner, why did it not assert its
ownership immediately after the alleged sale took
place? Why did it have to assert its ownership only
after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles?
These gaps have remained unanswered and unfilled.
In Suntay v. CA,[48] we held that the most prominent
index of simulation is the complete absence of an
attempt on the part of the vendee to assert his rights
of ownership over the property in question. After the
sale, the vendee should have entered the land and
occupied the premises. The absence of any attempt
on the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion
over the property allegedly sold to it is a clear badge
of fraud. That notwithstanding the execution of the
Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in possession of the
disputed condominium unit from the time of the
execution of the Dacion en Pago until the property's
subsequent transfer to Suzuki unmistakably
strengthens the fictitious nature of the Dacion en
Pago.
These circumstances, aside from the glaring
inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of
Orion's witness, indubitably prove the spurious nature
of the Dacion en Pago.
The fact that the Dacion en Pago is a notarized
document does not support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true conveyance
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave
rise to their execution and are to be considered as
containing all the terms of the agreement.[49] While
a notarized document enjoys this presumption, "the
fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the
validity of its contents."[50] The presumption of
regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary.[51]
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply
because the regularity in the execution of the Dacion
en Pago and the loan documents was challenged in
the proceedings below where their prima facie
validity was overthrown by the highly questionable
circumstances surrounding their execution.[52]

Effect of the PRA restriction on
the validity of Suzuki's title to the
property
Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No.
18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In particular,
Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in
good faith in view of the express PRA restriction
contained in CCT No. 18186.[53]
We reject this suggested approach outright because,
to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect the
conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this particular
point, we concur with the following findings of the
CA:
x x x the annotation merely serves as a warning to the
owner who holds a Special Resident Retiree's Visa
(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he disposes his
property which serves as his investment in order to
qualify for such status. Section 14 of the
Implementing Investment Guidelines under Rule
VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the Philippine
Retirement Park System Providing Funds Therefor
and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the
Philippine Retirement Authority) states:
Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his
investment from the Philippines, or transfer the same
to another domestic enterprise, or sell, convey or
transfer his condominium unit or units to another
person, natural or juridical without the prior approval
of the Authority, the Special Resident Retiree's Visa
issued to him, and/or unmarried minor child or
children[,] may be cancelled or revoked by the
Philippine Government, through the appropriate
government department or agency, upon
recommendation of the Authority.[54]
Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to
successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the
basis of the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the PRA
restriction when it transacted with Kang. Incidentally,
Orion admitted accommodating Kang's request to
cancel the mortgage annotation despite the lack of
payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion,
thus, is estopped from impugning the validity of the
conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the basis of the
PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and
"attempted" to circumvent.
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the
authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason
for the application of the rules on double sale under
Article 1544 of the New Civil Code. Suzuki,
moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence
to establish the validity of conveyance in his favor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the
petition for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner
Orion Savings Bank.
SO ORDERED.
---
Ortigas and Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals
346 SCRA 748 (2000)
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated March 25, 1996, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 39193, which nullified the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 261, in Civil Case No. 64931. It
also assails the resolution of the appellate court, dated
August 13, 1996, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.chanrobles.com.ph : red
The facts of this case, as culled from the records, are
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company
sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as
Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508
square meters, located in Greenhills Subdivision IV,
San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale
provided that the lot:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. . . . (1) be used exclusively . . . for
residential purposes only, and not more than one
single-family residential building will be constructed
thereon, . . .
x x x
6. The BUYER shall not erect . . . any sign or
billboard on the roof . . . for advertising purposes . . .
x x x
11. No single-family residential building shall
be erected . . . until the building plans, specification .
. . have been approved by the SELLER . . .
x x x
14. . . . restrictions shall run with the land and
shall be construed as real covenants until December
31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate . . . 1
These and the other conditions were duly annotated
on the certificate of title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)
enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as
the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National
Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a
commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from
Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills
Subdivision where the lot is located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay
III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P.
Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease contract did not
specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, private
respondent constructed a single story commercial
building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company.
On January 18, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint
against Emilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 261. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 64931, the complaint sought the demolition of
the said commercial structure for having violated the
terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale.
Complainant prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
to prohibit petitioner from constructing the
commercial building and/or engaging in commercial
activity on the lot. The complaint was later amended
to implead Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P. Hermoso
Realty Corp., which has a ten percent (10%) interest
in the lot.
In his answer, Mathay III denied any knowledge of
the restrictions on the use of the lot and filed a cross-
claim against the Hermosos.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. On June 29, 1995, Mathay III
moved to set aside the injunctive order, but the trial
court denied the motion.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Mathay III then filed with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 39193, ascribing to the trial court grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction. He claimed that MMC Ordinance No. 81-
01 classified the area where the lot was located as
commercial area and said ordinance must be read into
the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete
exercise of police power.
Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the
restrictions on the use of the lot were duly annotated
on the title it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said
restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially
since these restrictions were agreed upon before the
passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
On March 25, 1996, the appellate court disposed of
the case as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders are hereby
nullified and set aside.
SO ORDERED. 2
In finding for Mathay III, the Court of Appeals held
that the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 effectively
nullified the restrictions allowing only residential use
of the property in question.
Ortigas seasonably moved for reconsideration, but
the appellate court denied it on August 13, 1996.
Hence, the instant petition.
In its Memorandum, petitioner now submits that the
"principal issue in this case is whether respondent
Court of Appeals correctly set aside the Order dated
June 16, 1995 of the trial court which issued the writ
of preliminary injunction on the sole ground that
MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 nullified the building
restriction imposing exclusive residential use on the
property in question." 3 It also asserts that "Mathay
III lacks legal capacity to question the validity of
conditions of the deed of sale; and he is barred by
estoppel or waiver to raise the same question like his
principals, the owners." 4 Lastly, it avers that the
appellate court "unaccountably failed to address"
several questions of fact.
Principally, we must resolve the issue of whether the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused
to apply MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 to Civil Case
No. 64931.
But first, we must address petitioner’s allegation that
the Court of Appeals "unaccountably failed to
address" questions of fact. For basic is the rule that
factual issues may not be raised before this Court in a
petition for review and this Court is not duty-bound
to consider said questions. 5 CA G.R. SP No. 39193
was a special civil action for certiorari, and the
appellate court only had to determine if the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction. Thus, unless vital to our
determination of the issue at hand, we shall refrain
from further consideration of factual questions.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred in
limiting its decision to the cited zoning ordinance. It
avers that a contractual right is not automatically
discarded once a claim is made that it conflicts with
police power. Petitioner submits that the restrictive
clauses in the questioned contract is not in conflict
with the zoning ordinance. For one, according to
petitioner, the MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 did not
prohibit the construction of residential buildings.
Petitioner argues that even with the zoning ordinance,
the seller and buyer of the re-classified lot can
voluntarily agree to an exclusive residential use
thereof. Hence, petitioner concludes that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the condition imposing
exclusive residential use was effectively nullified by
the zoning ordinance.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In its turn, private respondent argues that the
appellate court correctly ruled that the trial court had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
subject the contract to the MMC Ordinance No. 81-
01. He avers that the appellate court properly held the
police power superior to the non-impairment of
contract clause in the Constitution. He concludes that
the appellate court did not err in dissolving the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court in
excess of its jurisdiction.
We note that in issuing the disputed writ of
preliminary injunction, the trial court observed that
the contract of sale was entered into in August 1976,
while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in
March 1981. The trial court reasoned that since
private respondent had failed to show that MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said
ordinance should be given prospective application
only, 6 citing Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
162 SCRA 390 (1988).
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as
having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the
time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect. 7 A
later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner
changes the intent of the parties to the contract
necessarily impairs the contract itself 8 and cannot be
given retroactive effect without violating the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts. 9
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain
exceptions. One involves police power. A law
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or
govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair
vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to
those already in existence. 10 Non-impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to
the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of
police power to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of
the people. 11 Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid
police power must be read into every contract. 12
Noteworthy, in Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 13 we already upheld MMC Ordinance No.
81-01 as a legitimate police power measure.
The trial court’s reliance on the Co v. IAC, 14 is
misplaced. In Co, the disputed area was agricultural
and Ordinance No. 81-01 did not specifically provide
that "it shall have retroactive effect so as to
discontinue all rights previously acquired over lands
located within the zone which are neither residential
nor light industrial in nature," 15 and stated with
respect to agricultural areas covered that "the zoning
ordinance should be given prospective operation
only." 16 The area in this case involves not
agricultural but urban residential land. Ordinance No.
81-01 retroactively affected the operation of the
zoning ordinance in Greenhills by reclassifying
certain locations therein as commercial.
Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Feati
Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 (1979), the
contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens
Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the
ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from
Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified
as a commercial zone by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the
contract of sale between Ortigas and Hermoso,
limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-
family residential buildings, were deemed
extinguished by the retroactive operation of the
zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced.
While our legal system upholds the sanctity of
contract so that a contract is deemed law between the
contracting parties, 17 nonetheless, stipulations in a
contract cannot contravene "law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy." 18
Otherwise such stipulations would be deemed null
and void. Respondent court correctly found that the
trial court committed in this case a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to treat Ordinance No. 81-01
as applicable to Civil Case No. 64931. In resolving
matters in litigation, judges are not only duty-bound
to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws, 19 they
are also bound by their oath of office to apply the
applicable law. 20
As a secondary issue, petitioner contends that
respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot in
question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is
thus barred from questioning the conditions of said
deed. Petitioner points out that the owners of the lot
voluntarily agreed to the restrictions on the use of the
lot and do not question the validity of these
restrictions. Petitioner argues that Mathay III as a
lessee is merely an agent of the owners, and could not
override and rise above the status of his principals.
Petitioner submits that he could not have a higher
interest than those of the owners, the Hermosos, and
thus had no locus standi to file CA-G.R. SP No.
39193 to dissolve the injunctive writ issued by the
RTC of Pasig City.
For his part, private respondent argues that as the
lessee who built the commercial structure, it is he and
he alone who stands to be either benefited or injured
by the results of the judgment in Civil Case No.
64931. He avers he is the party with real interest in
the subject matter of the action, as it would be his
business, not the Hermosos’, which would suffer had
not the respondent court dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunction.chanrob1es virtua1 law library
A real party in interest is defined as "the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." "Interest"
within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. 21
By real interest is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. 22
Tested by the foregoing definition, private respondent
in this case is clearly a real party in interest. It is not
disputed that he is in possession of the lot pursuant to
a valid lease. He is a possessor in the concept of a
"holder of the thing" under Article 525 of the Civil
Code. 23 He was impleaded as a defendant in the
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 64931. Further,
what petitioner seeks to enjoin is the building by
respondent of a commercial structure on the lot.
Clearly, it is private respondent’s acts which are in
issue, and his interest in said issue cannot be a mere
incidental interest. In its amended complaint,
petitioner prayed for, among others, judgment
"ordering the demolition of all improvements
illegally built on the lot in question." 24 These show
that it is petitioner Mathay III, doing business as
"Greenhills Autohaus, Inc.," and not only the
Hermosos, who will be adversely affected by the
court’s decree.
Petitioner also cites the rule that a stranger to a
contract has no rights or obligations under it, 25 and
thus has no standing to challenge its validity. 26 But
in seeking to enforce the stipulations in the deed of
sale, petitioner impleaded private respondent as a
defendant. Thus petitioner must recognize that where
a plaintiff has impleaded a party as a defendant, he
cannot subsequently question the latter’s standing in
court. 27
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 25, 1996, as well as the assailed resolution of
August 13, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39193 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
---
People v. Valdez, 347 SCRA 594 (2000)
FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is
charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by
R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in
flagrante delicto and without authority of law,
planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown
marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived.
Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely:
SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force,
who testified how the information was received, the
commencement of their operation and its details
under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao.
Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa
hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area
where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two
rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa
hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing
beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of
the said plants was sent to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced
a positive result. The prosecution also presented a
certification from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by
appellant where the growing marijuana plants were
found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was
acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of
the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet
been issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness.
He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm when
he was called by a person whose identity he does not
know. He was asked to go with the latter to see
something. This unknown person then brought
appellant to the place where the marijuana plants
were found, approximately 100 meters away from his
nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and
they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He
was then asked if he knew anything about the
marijuana growing there. When he denied any
knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him
and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted
owning the marijuana. The police team then brought
him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful
search. First, the records show that the law enforcers
had more than ample time to secure a search warrant.
Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an
unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The right against unreasonable searches
and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which
includes his residence, his papers, and other
possessions.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the
marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the
seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in
evidence against the accused.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal
injection is correct.
HELD:
In the instant case, there was no search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause given the fact that police
had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection
against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are
searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of
protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both
innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the
praiseworthiness of their intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants
were evidently obtained during an illegal search and
seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the
admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for
the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of
an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence
against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial
poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on
the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied
upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to
convict appellant.
In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal
prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted
of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed
and that the accused is the author thereof. The
evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must
not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be
credible and competent. Competent evidence is
“generally admissible” evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character
that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is,
allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court’s part to have
admitted evidences against the accused and to have
relied upon said proofs to convict him for said
evidence is doubly tainted.
In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To
justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution
must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to
overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the
required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
---
Systems Factors Corp vs. NLRC,
346 SCRA 149, 152 (2000)
The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolution
dated February 15, 2000 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution dated June 22, 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56849.
Petitioner Systems Factors Corporation is a
corporation engaged in the business of installing
electrical system in buildings and infrastructure
projects wherein it employs electricians, engineers
and other personnel. Private respondents Ronaldo
Lazaga and Luis Singson were employed by
petitioner corporation as electricians in one of its
projects. Private respondents filed a complaint
against petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of backwages, service incentive fees,
premium pay, separation pay and other allowances.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering
petitioners to reinstate private respondents to their
former positions and to pay them backwages. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA-decision.
Petitioners allegedly received the NLRC judgment on
August 10, 1999 and a motion for reconsideration
thereto was filed on August 20, 1999. On November
25, 1999, petitioners received the NLRC-Resolution
dated November 11, 1999 denying their motion for
reconsideration. Hence, on January 24, 2000,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari pursuant to
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. On February 15,
2000, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
denying the petition for failure of petitioners to
comply with procedural requirements, i.e., (1) the
petition was filed out of time, and (2) except for the
assailed NLRC resolutions, the documents and
material portions referred to in the petition were not
certified. On Motion for Reconsideration, the Court
of Appeals, in its Resolution dated June 22, 2000,
applied this Courts ruling in the case of Cadayona vs.
Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 128772, February
3, 2000 and gave weight to petitioners submission
that only the questioned resolution need be certified
and not the entire records. Said motion for
reconsideration was nonetheless denied in view of its
finding that the petition was filed out of time.
The Court of Appeals, in finding that the petition for
certiorari was filed out of time, reckoned the counting
of the period of sixty (60) days, pursuant to Section
4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, from
receipt on August 10, 1999 of the NLRC-resolution
dismissing the appeal which is interrupted by the
filing on August 20, 1999 of the Motion for
Reconsideration; and the remaining period to be
counted from receipt on November 25, 1999 of the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. As
found by the Court of Appeals, the petition was filed
late as petitioners had fifty (50) days remaining or
until January 14, 2000 within which to file the
petition for certiorari. The petition for certiorari was
filed only on January 24, 2000.
In the instant petition, petitioners invoke A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC, which took effect on September 1, 2000,
specifically amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure wherein the sixty-day
period is reckoned from receipt of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration. Thus, from
receipt by petitioners on November 25, 1999 of the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the
filing of the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals on January 24, 2000 would have been within
the reglementary period. Petitioners argue that before
a party can file a petition for certiorari, a motion for
reconsideration is a mandatory pleading and thus, it is
logical to assume that the sixty-day period should be
reckoned from notice of resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners likewise argue
that remedial laws should be construed liberally in
order to give litigants ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims and avoid denial of substantial
justice due to legal technicalities.
On September 18, 2000, this Court issued a
Resolution requiring respondents to comment on the
petition.
Respondents filed their Comment alleging that the
issue in the present petition is not whether liberality
should be applied. They contend that the controversy
sought to be laid to rest would multiply as similar
requests for liberality, leniency and exceptions would
be filed. They argue that the Labor Code mandates
that conflicts in the interpretation of the law and the
rules should be resolved in favor of the working man,
respondents herein. Moreover, the plea of liberality
should be denied as there is no reason other than
neglect of counsel that may compel this Court to treat
this case as an exception to the rule.
We find for the petitioners.
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC amended Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended by
the Resolution of July 21, 1998), which took effect
September 1, 2000 and provides:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. --- The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In
case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice
of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if
it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It
may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days.
We hold that the amendment under A.M. No. 00-2-
03-SC wherein the sixty-day period to file a petition
for certiorari is reckoned from receipt of the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
should be deemed applicable. Remedial statutes or
statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
the general rule against retroactive operation of
statutes.[1 Statutes regulating to the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense
and to that extent. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected.[2
The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to nor arise from procedural laws.[3
The above conclusion is in consonance with the
provision in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure that (T)hese Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.
WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Resolutions dated February 15, 2000
and June 22, 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE and the
case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
---
Guy v. CA, 502 SCRA 151 (2006)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders
dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in
SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen
Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by
their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a
petition for letters of administration5 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138.
The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and
entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino
Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei,
who died intestate in Makati City on October 29,
1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00
consisting of real and personal properties. His known
heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and
children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the
appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise
prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C.
Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate. Attached to private
respondents' petition was a Certification Against
Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty.
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can
be settled without securing letters of administration
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
He further argued that private respondents should
have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against
forum shopping should have been signed by private
respondents and not their counsel. They contended
that Remedios should have executed the certification
on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint
Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs
alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by
reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and
Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to
Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver
of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted guardian
of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of
right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the
rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's
objections on the certification against forum
shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional
Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22,
2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21,
2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED.
Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve
the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the
private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei
and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming
successional rights in the intestate estate of the
deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
disregarded existing rules on certification against
forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of
Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged
the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any
claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do
not have the legal personality to institute the petition
for letters of administration as they failed to prove
their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in
accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's
certification can be considered substantial
compliance with the rules on certification of non-
forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new
issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private
respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure
to comply with the rules on certification of non-
forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver
of Claim precludes private respondents from
claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether
private respondents are barred by prescription from
proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that
the certification of non-forum shopping should be
executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause
for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal
application of the rules is proper where the higher
interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v.
Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition
may have been flawed where the certificate of non-
forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not
by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked
in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the
present controversy where the merits13 of the case
and the absence of an intention to violate the rules
with impunity should be considered as compelling
reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim,
the same does not bar private respondents from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be
attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly
and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of
hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full
settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature
and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino
Guy Susim."15 Considering that the document did
not specifically mention private respondents'
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot
be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly
waived the hereditary rights of private respondents,
such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article
1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of
his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated
persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor
shall belong to the persons designated by the testator
to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in
Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.
This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation
of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in
order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having
been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of
Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as
heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon
which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established
by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not
have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private
respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be
inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary
rights when petitioner claims that they do not have
such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver
on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the
same would be premature considering that private
respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the
Family Code took effect, the governing law on
actions for recognition of illegitimate children was
Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize
the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within
four years from the finding of the document.
(Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family
Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the
Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the
Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall
survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an
illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or
an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, the action for recognition may be brought
by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if
the action is based upon open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or
any other means allowed by the rules or special laws,
it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of
prescription depends on the type of evidence to be
adduced by private respondents in proving their
filiation. However, it would be impossible to
determine the same in this case as there has been no
reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of
facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the
Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents
was a petition for letters of administration, the trial
court is not precluded from receiving evidence on
private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
its recognized powers in handling the settlement of
the estate, including the determination of the status of
each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to
compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not
new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v.
Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the
present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex
action to compel recognition as a natural child and at
the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character
of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must
be answered in the affirmative, provided always that
the conditions justifying the joinder of the two
distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in which that
same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character
of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the
action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a
rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore
explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus,
we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine
must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who
has not been in fact acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs.
Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil.,
62); and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his
deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs.
Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249;
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the
plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
partition suits and distribution proceedings the other
persons who might take by inheritance are before the
court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to
such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the
denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its
Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the
records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
---
Laguna Lake Dev't Authority v. CA,
251 SCRA 42, 56-57 (1995)
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage
dump created by affluence and profligate
consumption and extravagance of the rich or fishing
in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the
Laguna Lake or making a clearing in the forest so
that he can produce food for his family, to understand
why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family
alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental
protection, on the one hand, and the individual
personal interests of people, on the other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology,
navigational safety, and sustainable development,
Republic Act No. 4850 created the "Laguna Lake
Development Authority." This Government Agency
is supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid
declared policy, so as to accelerate the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act
clearly named, within the context of the national and
regional plans and policies for social and economic
development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos amended certain sections of
Republic Act No. 4850 because of the concern for the
rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs
and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined
with current and prospective uses of the lake for
municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation,
fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the
Government and the general public over: — the
environment impact of development on the water
quality and ecology of the lake and its related river
systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig
River, industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes
from developed areas around the lake; the increasing
urbanization which induced the deterioration of the
lake, since water quality studies have shown that the
lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to
check the same; and the floods in Metropolitan
Manila area and the lakeshore towns which will
influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay,
since any scheme of controlling the floods will
necessarily involve the lake and its river systems, —
likewise gave impetus to the creation of the
Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared
to be the national policy to promote, and accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and
towns hereinafter referred to as the region, within the
context of the national and regional plans and
policies for social and economic development and to
carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region
with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation
of the quality of human life and ecological systems,
and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution.1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the
issues in this case, include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further
amended by adding thereto seven new paragraphs to
be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), and
(p) which shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions of existing laws to the
contrary notwithstanding, to engage in fish
production and other aqua-culture projects in Laguna
de Bay and other bodies of water within its
jurisdiction and in pursuance thereof to conduct
studies and make experiments, whenever necessary,
with the collaboration and assistance of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, with the end in
view of improving present techniques and practices.
Provided, that until modified, altered or amended by
the procedure provided in the following sub-
paragraph, the present laws, rules and permits or
authorizations remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay, the Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue new permit
for the use of the lake waters for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said lake including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens,
fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to
impose necessary safeguards for lake quality control
and management and to collect necessary fees for
said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees
collected for fisheries may be shared between the
Authority and other government agencies and
political sub-divisions in such proportion as may be
determined by the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board: Provided,
further, That the Authority's Board may determine
new areas of fishery development or activities which
it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account
the overall development plans and programs for
Laguna de Bay and related bodies of water: Provided,
finally, That the Authority shall subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines
promulgate such rules and regulations which shall
govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de
Bay which shall take into consideration among others
the following: socio-economic amelioration of
bonafide resident fishermen whether individually or
collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore
town development, a master plan for fishpen
construction and operation, communal fishing ground
for lake shore town residents, and preference to lake
shore town residents in hiring laborer for fishery
projects;
(l) To require the cities and municipalities
embraced within the region to pass appropriate
zoning ordinances and other regulatory measures
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Authority
and enforce the same with the assistance of the
Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing laws to the
contrary notwithstanding, to exercise water rights
over public waters within the Laguna de Bay region
whenever necessary to carry out the Authority's
projects;
(n) To act in coordination with existing
governmental agencies in establishing water quality
standards for industrial, agricultural and municipal
waste discharges into the lake and to cooperate with
said existing agencies of the government of the
Philippines in enforcing such standards, or to
separately pursue enforcement and penalty actions as
provided for in Section 4 (d) and Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That in case of conflict on the
appropriate water quality standard to be enforced
such conflict shall be resolved thru the NEDA
Board.2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority
under Republic Act No. 4850, as though Presidential
Decree No. 813 were not thought to be completely
effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land
and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited
natural resources requiring judicious management to
their optimal utilization to insure renewability and to
preserve the ecological balance, the competing
options for the use of such resources and conflicting
jurisdictions over such uses having created undue
constraints on the institutional capabilities of the
Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in
it by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further
defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the
Authority and named and enumerated the towns,
cities and provinces encompassed by the term
"Laguna de Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the
following provisions of Executive Order No. 927
which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and
Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To
effectively regulate and monitor activities in the
Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term
"Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the Provinces
of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San Pablo, Pasay,
Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and Tagaytay; the towns
of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Malvar in Batangas
Province; the towns of Silang and Carmona in Cavite
Province; the town of Lucban in Quezon Province;
and the towns of Marikina, Pasig, Taguig,
Muntinlupa, and Pateros in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby
empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake
water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes
including but not limited to fisheries, recreation,
municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation,
irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that
the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing
with other government agencies and political
subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the
approval of the President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Authority's Board, except
fishpen fee, which will be shared in the following
manner; 20 percent of the fee shall go to the
lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the
Project Development Fund which shall be
administered by a Council and the remaining 75
percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However,
after the implementation within the three-year period
of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management
Plan, the sharing will be modified as follows: 35
percent of the fishpen fee goes to the lakeshore local
governments, 5 percent goes to the Project
Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent
shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that
the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate
funds and shall not be remitted to the National
Treasury as an exception to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in
this manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna
Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer
to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the
lake water when it is at the average annual maximum
lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a
datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water
(M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such
elevation are public lands which form part of the bed
of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of
this law to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to
issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters
because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal
waters and impose rental fees or charges therefor in
accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to erect fish corrals,
oyster, mussel or other aquatic beds or bangus fry
areas, within a definite zone of the municipal waters,
as determined by it; . . . .
(2) Grant privilege to gather, take or catch
bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of other
species and fish from the municipal waters by nets,
traps or other fishing gears to marginal fishermen
free from any rental fee, charges or any other
imposition whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this
Code, grant exclusive privileges of constructing fish
corrals or fishpens, or the taking or catching of
bangus fry, prawn fry or kawag-kawag or fry of any
species or fish within the municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the
authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen
permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the
consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens
and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-
third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing
the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in
1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's
permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all
undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the
Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake
carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore
municipalities of separate independent policies in the
operation of fishpens and fishcages within their
claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and
their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have
already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby
aggravating the current environmental problems and
ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority
served notice to the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His Excellency
PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given on June 23,
1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to Republic Act 4850
as amended by Presidential Decree 813 and
Executive Order 927 series of 1983 and in line with
the policies and programs of the Presidential Task
Force on Illegal Fishpens and Illegal Fishing, the
general public is hereby notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region,
which were not registered or to which no application
for registration and/or permit has been filed with
Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March 31,
1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures so declared as illegal shall be
subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by
the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and
Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall,
without prejudice to demolition of their structures be
criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A
of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for
violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws
carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3
years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or
both at the discretion of the court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures declared as illegal in accordance
with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month
on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before
the LLDA why their said fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures should not be
demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to
the concerned owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
advising them to dismantle their respective structures
within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise,
demolition shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed
injunction cases against the Authority before various
regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil Case No. 759-B,
for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by
Fleet Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil
Case No. 64049, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and
Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp.,
MIRT Corp. and TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No.
566, for Declaratory Relief and Injunction, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila
Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias
Reynaldo M. Tianco; (d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP
Fishing Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for
Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by Blue
Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil
Case No. 554-, for Certiorari and Prohibition,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong, Rizal,
filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and
R.J. Orion Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case
No. 64124, for Injunction, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co.,
Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar
Fishing Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases
against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to
dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile,
temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary
mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos.
64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from
demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in
question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by
the Authority with this court. Impleaded as parties-
respondents are concerned regional trial courts and
respective private parties, and the municipalities
and/or respective Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and
Jala-jala, who issued permits for the construction and
operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The
Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:
(A) Nullification of the temporary restraining
order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil
Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional
trial courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610
(Local Government Code of 1991) did not repeal,
alter or modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as
amended, empowering the Authority to issue permits
for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the Authority
the government agency vested with exclusive
authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the
Authority's consolidated petitions were referred to the
Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the Authority's consolidated
petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A)
LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of
government whose decision or order are appealable
only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter
does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar
as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the
LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna
de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local
Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the
aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved
to and is now vested with their respective local
government units concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the
Authority has returned to this Court charging the
following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-
JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS
AMENDED BY P.D. 813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES
OF 1983 HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC
ACT 7160. THE SAID RULING IS CONTRARY
TO ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND
JURISPRUDENCE OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE
FISHPEN PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS
BEEN DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED
(LAKESHORE) LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy.
Actually, the main and only issue posed is: Which
agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake
Development Authority or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region — should
exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake
Development Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the
said region, including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and
the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160,
the Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to
the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant
fishery privileges in municipal waters. The
Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to
erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic
beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the
municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No.
7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned
laws creating the Laguna Lake Development
Authority and granting the latter water rights
authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not
contain any express provision which categorically
expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to
be conceded that there was no intent on the part of
the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and
its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made
clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority constitutes a special
law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory
construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a
subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions
and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general law are
broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law."3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a
special statute, the special statute should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the
general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is
because implied repeals are not favored and as much
as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of
the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by
mere implication.4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the
Authority should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of
the Authority, which are environmental protection,
navigational safety, and sustainable development,
there is every indication that the legislative intent is
for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of
petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that
"Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water
has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km²
lake surface water, the eight (8) major river
tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain
into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or watershed
transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal
provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of
Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute
one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs
to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are
to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable
development. This is an exhaustible natural resource
— a very limited one — which requires judicious
management and optimal utilization to ensure
renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and
balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the
implementation of a national policy geared towards
the protection, conservation, balanced growth and
sustainable development of the region with due
regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by
the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of
Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they
passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to
govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake
resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to
fragmented concepts of management policies where
lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water.
The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the
lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction
of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not
only that specific portion but the entire 900 km² of
lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and
integrated lake water resource management policy,
therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and
sustainably develop Laguna de Bay."5
The power of the local government units to issue
fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue
purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section
149 of the New Local Government Code empowering
local governments to issue fishing permits is
embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No.
7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The
Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local
Government Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to
grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures is for the purpose of effectively
regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de
Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and
for lake quality control and management.6 It does
partake of the nature of police power which is the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of all State powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority
which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the Local Government Code of
1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures
in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive
Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority
is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding
that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this
Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.
Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306, which we
quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law
provides for another forum. It must be recognized in
this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to
carry out and make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the
LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has
the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes
from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the
aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or
disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed
by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled
rule that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of
its express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in
the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA
to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce,
implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a
"toothless" paper agency.
there is no question that the Authority has express
powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in
respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a
"cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The
Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to
the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against
it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals
cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the
resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of
the Authority as provided for in its charter, the
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that
Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has
not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to
the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and
the authority to exercise such powers as are by its
charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid
licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna
Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this
power would render useless its reason for being and
will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna
Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition,
certiorari and injunction are hereby granted, insofar
as they relate to the authority of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority to grant fishing privileges
within the Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction
issued by Judge Arturo Marave, RTC, Branch 78,
Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC, Branch
70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe,
RTC, Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby
declared null and void and ordered set aside for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region
are hereby prohibited from issuing permits to
construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake
Region, their previous issuances being declared null
and void. Thus, the fishing permits issued by Mayors
Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of Binangonan; Ricardo
D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M. de
la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are
likewise declared null and void and ordered
cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures put up by operators by virtue of permits
issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake
Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet
Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila
Marine Life Business Resources, Inc., represented
by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco; Greenfield
Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and
R.J. Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing
And Trading Corporation, ARTM Fishing
Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt Corporation and
Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation
and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish
Ventures, Inc., represented by its President Alfonso
Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co., Inc., Eastern Lagoon
Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing
Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures
subject to demolition by the Laguna Lake
Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice
R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what
the decision already states, i.e., that the local
government units in the Laguna Lake area are not
precluded from imposing permits on fishery
operations for revenue raising purposes of such local
government units. In other words, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or
activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well
as their regulation, is with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, once the Authority grants a
permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an
additional local permit or license for revenue
purposes of the local government units concerned.
This approach would clearly harmonize the special
law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act
No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also
enable small towns and municipalities in the lake
area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic
viability.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the decision written by Mr. Justice
R. Hermosisima, Jr.. I would only like to stress what
the decision already states, i.e., that the local
government units in the Laguna Lake area are not
precluded from imposing permits on fishery
operations for revenue raising purposes of such local
government units. In other words, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether or not projects or
activities in the lake area should be allowed, as well
as their regulation, is with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, once the Authority grants a
permit, the permittee may still be subjected to an
additional local permit or license for revenue
purposes of the local government units concerned.
This approach would clearly harmonize the special
law, Rep. Act No. 4850, as amended, with Rep. Act
No. 7160, the Local Government Code. It will also
enable small towns and municipalities in the lake
area, like Jala-Jala, to rise to some level of economic
viability.
---
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem 744 SCRA 516 (2014)
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19,
2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu),
which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of
the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503,
for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time
of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16)
years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19,
1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son
was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son in the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is
equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the
son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the
Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9
Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To
date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel,
sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner
filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for
violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also
submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu
and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present,
more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still
continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of
financial support legally due him, resulting in
economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-
Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested
and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed
a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order
to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending
the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19
Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the
herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that
the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged
in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the accused, he being an alien, and
accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523
of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him
liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to
all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the
obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling.
Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a
rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum
of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates
its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national
he is not subject to our national law (The Family
Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to
givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be
charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure
to support his child. Unless it is conclusively
established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who
fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that
he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates
a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists
against the accused herein, hence, the case should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation
to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking
cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that
the same was directly lodged with the Supreme
Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v.
Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which
lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
court may be brought on appeal directly to the
Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of
the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or
involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners
found themselves in when they filed the instant
Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v.
Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of
appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule
41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review
under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction;
and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the
Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the
facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution
involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not
he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant
petition highlights a novel question of law concerning
the liability of a foreign national who allegedly
commits acts and omissions punishable under special
criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights
and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of
the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive
ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a
guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA
would only waste the time, effort and resources of the
courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of
efficiency and economy in the administration of
justice should prevail over the observance of the
hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find
the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the
legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code,
which provides the parent’s obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the
existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not
excused from complying with his obligation to
support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is
no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner
that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to
financial support.32 Respondent also added that by
reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that
petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent,
who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality.
In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and
duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter
that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that
– Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in
position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle
that family rights and duties are governed by their
personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf.
Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is
not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of
the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove
that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support
their child (either before, during or after the issuance
of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national
law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has
not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the
Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
well as its legal effects may be recognized in the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show
that he is notliable to give support to his son after the
divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on
petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of
the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to
support his child is specifically stated,46 which was
not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that
notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their
children or that such obligation is not punishable by
law, said law would still not find applicability,in light
of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the
English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in
Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law
would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order
shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant
case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of
action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is pertinent
— (e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the
same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground
for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law
should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents
of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice
to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself,
respondent is no longer liable to support his former
wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v.
San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife,
the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she
should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that
respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or
failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and
Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any
of the following acts:
xxxx
or her child to engage in conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right
to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting
the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, butnot limited to, the following
acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her children of financial support legally due her or
her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or
denial of financial support to the child is considered
anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently
living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in
criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child with petitioner is committed here in
the Philippines as all of the parties herein are
residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our
courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable
that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument
that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal
basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the
instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling
under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I)
shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section
5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing
at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent
has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this
issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over
the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the
City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court
to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of
the case.
SO ORDERED.
---
Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna,
730SCRA 376 (2014)
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual
under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties
of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as
an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country
lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan
Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100
pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium
unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired
during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as
follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a
name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law
Offices at that time when he was living with his first
wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina
civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace
of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-
Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12,
1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA,
they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria
L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L.
Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario
Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio
Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage,
ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to
live apart from each other in February 1966 and
agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled
"AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12,
1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to
dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a
divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in
Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same
date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new
law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY.
LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa
St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters,
for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for
36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said
condominium unit was to be usedas law office of
LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of
Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was
issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered
bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
(17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently,
8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of
Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium
unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a
new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992
in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON,
married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and
the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners
but the same was still registered in common under
CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the
interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter
established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm
lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12,
1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken
over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out
the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz
who established his own law firm named Renato G.
De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the
extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½
share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net
estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her
in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe
heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna
excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject
properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be
declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an
accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit
pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted;
that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer
the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY.
LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of
the suit to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision
after trial upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing
thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is
adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna
through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry
in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna"
to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been madefor
transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following
errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF
ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION
OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS
NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED
OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID
NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN
BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING
FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following
errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM
OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS
FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE
RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED
AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its
assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of
ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by
ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
(517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds
and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage
of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right
as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of
Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to
"JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are
hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for
review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s approval
of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of
actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of
the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law
books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among
the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit;
and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the
Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether
the second marriage entered into by the late Atty.
Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights
in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of
the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued
to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that
Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality
rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of
bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained
Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12,
1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage
on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both
of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only
two types of defective marital unions under our laws
have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As
such, the remedies against such defective marriages
have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe
marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the
first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18
Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death
on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a
special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and
family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the
respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially
among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded
only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a
ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this
public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists,
no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between
them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition
and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and
executed in connection with the divorce proceedings
before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence,
the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the
Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time
of their marriage, did not specify the property regime
of the spouses in the event that they had not entered
into any marriage settlement before or at the time of
the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation
of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence
of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal
partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of
gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until
terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under
Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna
and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code,
as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration
in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed when
the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has
been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any
petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any
such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard
his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall
take such measures as may protect the creditors and
other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of
partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the
CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal
partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no
question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for
their execution of the Agreement were identical to
the grounds raised in the action for divorce.21 With
the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable
under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine
public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia
subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being
bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the
second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s
subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976
was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that
the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered
by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty.
Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is
considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-
ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil
Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together
as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by eitheror both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
her actual contributions in the acquisition of property.
Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid
v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of
co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were
parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is
without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano
v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the
parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient
proof of coownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor
where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is
not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The
law gives the defendantsome measure of protection
as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after
the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the
plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party
alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently
proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna
had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such
aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded
to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the
purchase of the condominium unit amounting to
₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of
₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that
the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal
funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a
"thank you" note;29 that she had the financial
capacity to make the contributions and purchases;
and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties
on his own due to the meagerness of the income
derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on
the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked
the petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions
through the following findings and conclusions,
namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance
of evidence that her own independent funds were
used to buy the law office condominium and the law
books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof
that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil
Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply –
as to cases where properties were acquired by a man
and a woman living together as husband and wife but
not married, or under a marriage which was void ab
initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the
rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was
not readily applicable to many situations and thus it
created a void at first because it applied only if the
parties were not in any way incapacitated or were
without impediment to marry each other (for it would
be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still
exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife).
This void was filled upon adoption of the Family
Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property
acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be
equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof
of actual contribution was required. The same rule
and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of
money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties
was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if
both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the
exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the
strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in
the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in
the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA
in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she made an actual contribution to purchase the
said property. She failed to establish that the four (4)
checks that she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the
Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00
payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months
before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7"
was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978
in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff,
thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The
third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment
of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit
"M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980.
None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the
acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution
of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is
no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over
the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the
trial court correctly found that the same was acquired
through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering
the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna,
together with his partners in the law firm. The name
of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the
spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the
use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and
Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his
partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show
that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT
No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof
that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium
unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad
L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer.
So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of
books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she
actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical
to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the
law office space and the law books from his earnings
from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly
beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law
firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and
conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not
been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof.
Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being
evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast,
given the subsistence of the first marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty.
Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal
funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained
to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of
his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to
the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
---
Tenchavez v. Escano, 15 SCRA 355 (1965)

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of
the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against
his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees,
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed
"Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are
the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February
1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student
of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion
of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino
family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army
officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain,
Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo
in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of
a previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the
marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in
love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their
matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out
their marital future whereby Pacita would be the
governess of their first-born; they started saving
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their
secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted
another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor
beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they
reconciled. This time they planned to get married and
then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita
Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their
marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her
classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind
of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her
at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she
admitted that she had already married Pastor.
Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because
Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were
disgusted because of the great scandal that the
clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III,
pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño
spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed
to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the
Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration
did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name
he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly
coming from San Carlos college students and
disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the
letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to
a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in
the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter,
Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22
March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her
previous letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a
changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She
fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She
was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but
her letters became less frequent as the days passed.
As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already
estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to
Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by
then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her
marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5").
The case was dismissed without prejudice because of
her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application
that she was single, that her purpose was to study,
and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she
intended to return after two years. The application
was approved, and she left for the United States. On
22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second
Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and
for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October
1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition
with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September
1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her
marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an
American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship
on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having,
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment
of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and
one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a
valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid
marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran;
while her parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed
for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal
separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his
wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño
and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to
the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the
following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not
holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents
Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño
liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and
requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant
parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying
the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant,
Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other,
from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
established by the record before us. Both parties were
then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which
was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain
Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is
nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical
authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary,
as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil
law, not only because of the separation of Church and
State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine
Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at
the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was
thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not
essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this
is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act,
which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal
requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal
requirements of this Act if, when it was performed,
the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that
the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
empowered to do so, and that the marriage was
perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and
hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee
Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil.
442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at
bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing
priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's
parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop
of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission
that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she
contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have
been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even
granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that
contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was
vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did
not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
voidable, and the marriage remained valid until
annulled by a competent civil court. This was never
done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in
the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed
for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid
marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on
21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District
Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." At the time the divorce decree was issued,
Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep.
Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does
not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term,
to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the
matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that
admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of
the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts.
97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent
violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17
of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction
to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give
rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in
favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit
them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces
outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant
Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the
Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy
of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private
parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-
resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the
court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil.
579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there
flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for
her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be
declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her
fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176).
Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation
with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our
law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect
of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord
with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court
on the subject, particularly those that were rendered
under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute
divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature).
As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act
2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of
the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in
effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore,
under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of
particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be
ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could
not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to
participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural
children. The children of adulterous relations are
wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to
include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the
children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo
Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in
the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the
proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for
legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of
the first marriage, that stands undissolved in
Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court
committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous
situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where
the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not
new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was
given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the
Philippine Islands are well known to the members of
the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they
are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that
such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore,
sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his
wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the
late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of
their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her
husband are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by
Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun
(Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp.
270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the
"great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record
shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for
her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded.
Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and
despite their shock at such unexpected event, the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the
marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the
canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of
the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the
refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the
spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce
their daughter to assent to the recelebration but
respected her decision, or that they abided by her
resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of
affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents
sent her money while she was in the United States;
for it was natural that they should not wish their
daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur
in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur.
130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out
of improper motives, aided and abetted her original
suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she
appears to have acted independently, and being of
age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her
and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents,
in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice or
unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good
faith being always presumed until the contrary is
proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or
Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his
child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such
distinction between the liability of parents and that of
strangers is only in regard to what will justify
interference. A parent isliable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct,
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to
leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he
acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and
advises his child in good faith with respect to his
child's marital relations in the interest of his child as
he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating
his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or
the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his
advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate,
although it has been held that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in
good faith take his child into his home and afford him
or her protection and support, so long as he has not
maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away,
from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently
been applied in the case of advice given to a married
daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's
aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover
damages. While this suit may not have been impelled
by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless
in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.
Court actions are not established for parties to give
vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable
by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant
Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account,
against his patently unreasonable claim for a million
pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was
celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on
appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant
had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally
invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ.
Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under
our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble
character of the union that appellant entered into
voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her
divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of
the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000
only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño,
by the court below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit
must have wounded said defendants' feelings and
caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and
has been correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of
any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair.
This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded
to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled
to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither
is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her
co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to
recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections
against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on
their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor
Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation
from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta
Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to
pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
----
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985)
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition,
petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3,
1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent
Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case,
and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal
Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a
citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is
a citizen of the United States; that they were married
in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that
they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and
that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit
against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City,
stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of
the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned
case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil
case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the
trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower
Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go
ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the
petition filed in this case within the exception, and
we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on
the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from
laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because
of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had
no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was
not established through conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce
Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration
of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is
the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the
divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial
of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to
agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility
in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent
him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent
me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the
ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to
be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. 6 In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from
the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and
respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his
Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
----
Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114 (2005)
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves
the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently
novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General
assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of
the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and
by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him
by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court,
are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married
Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and
her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of
law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to
the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there
is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to
remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR
REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship,
obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to
protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity
to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also
ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into
question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case
of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how
this provision had come about in the first place, and
what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear
to govern the situation presented by the case at hand.
It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized,
the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity
to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on
the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference
of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the
validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced
here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American
citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose
of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed
as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as
an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that
the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file
either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious
process, and in this particular case, not even feasible,
considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand,
legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for
it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
separated Filipino spouse would still remain married
to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of
competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization
of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent
herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only
be made properly upon respondent’s submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
---
Fujiki v. Marinay, GR No. 196049, Jun 26, 2013
Topic: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENT Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese
national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January
2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another
Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and
they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from
a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office
of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in
the National Statistics Office (NSO). The RTC ruled,
without further explanation, that the petition was in
"gross violation" of Sec. 2 and Sec. 4 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC). The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5 (4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "failure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." Apparently, the
RTC took the view that only "the husband or the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki. Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered,
the RTC resolved to deny petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable. (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
of bigamy. (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can
recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held: Issue No. (1):
No. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
Remedial Law Fujiki vs. Marinay 2
(1) an official publication or (2) a certification or
copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office. To hold that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition
of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including
the form and contents of the petition, the service of
summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor,
the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of
the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate
the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating
the case on the merits. In
Mijares v. Rañada
, this Court explained that "if every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original
cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring
a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.
They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen
who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48
of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus,
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy
of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,
as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
Since 1922 in
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee
, Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if
they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen
to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a
divorce decree abroad. There is therefore no reason to
disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law,
the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48
(b) of the Rules of Court.
Issue No. (2)
: Yes. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:
Remedial Law Fujiki vs. Marinay 3
Sec. 1. Who may file petition.
— Court. Thus, the "validity of marriage[] . . . can be
Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied) Fujiki has the
personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no
doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances) 68 his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage include the right
to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage. When the right of the spouse
to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the
prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse." Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to
declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is
effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of
the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
Issue No. (3):
Yes. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held
that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage. The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. Braza is not applicable because Braza
does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. To be sure,
a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and
children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention
of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located." In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for
correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of
the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369.A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an
action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a
foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can
R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court. Article 26 of the Family Code confers
jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse" under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does
not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
case for divorce. The second paragraph of Article 26
is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino,
whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in
the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based
on this Court's decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo
which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served." The principle in
Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains
a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a
petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry. Under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce
decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by
filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only
remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to
a criminal prosecution for bigamy. In the recognition
of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a
case was decided under foreign law. They cannot
decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule
of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states
that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right
and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines. However,
the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a
ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago." Since A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees
the need to address the questions on venue and the
contents and form of the petition under Sections 4
and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
----
Republic v. Manalo, GR No. 221029, Apr 24, 2018
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set
aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October
12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion
of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region,
Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo
Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan ,
Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in
substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing
on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of
initial hearing were published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for
Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25,
2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012)
for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the
title and/or caption of the petition considering that
based on the allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended
Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the
Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by
herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings,
a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was
rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce
decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband
are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner
and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry
of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former
Japanese husband's marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore
that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer
married to her, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the
purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese
national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by
virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together
with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her
maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was
scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment.
Among the documents that were offered and admitted
were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the
petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form
and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-
27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-
12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her
former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence
to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the
petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they
are in the country or living abroad, if they are married
to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall
have control over issues related to Filipinos' family
rights and duties, together with the determination of
their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It
held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was
Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree may obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating
him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V.
Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of
the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese
national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her.
For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo
who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited
as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge
Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner
an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA
decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New
Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple,
who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino
signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16
Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July
17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39
of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to
Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted
by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was presented and approved at a
Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts
to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce
case.22 Under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by
the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must
still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid
the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter
is no longer married to the former because he or she
had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by
his or national law.24 The aim was that it would
solved the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered
married to their alien husbands even after the latter
have already validly divorced them under their (the
husbands') national laws and perhaps have already
married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American
citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign
citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed
as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but
their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under
the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity
to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads
for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced
decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil
registry " in order that it would not appear anymore
that she is still married to the said Japanese national
who is no longer her husband or is no longer married
to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden
surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses
executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their
minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US
citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole
custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among
others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction.
The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void,
but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's
alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by
foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v.
Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien
spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x
x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took
into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-
husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino
wife to render an accounting of a business that was
alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared
with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action was barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial
court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband
averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada
court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of
the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case
filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the
effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from
the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the
nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely feed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is estopped by his own representation
before said court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign
divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines
is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her
husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which
declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the
ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a
husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of
the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage included the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights
protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights
recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x
x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and
her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which
was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a
petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to
remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The
RTC denied the petition on the ground that the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a
divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and
Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse must be proven.
Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the
CA for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the
above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and
property relation, it should not stop short in a
likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the
right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When
the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the
civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the
marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality
principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce.
Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is,
without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the
Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will
subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed
in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to
respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it
fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear
and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is
the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the
statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words to have used words
advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute
there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word
"obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the
alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry
out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of
Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately
reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly
literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd
situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the
spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her
countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving
end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In
both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operations of their alien spouses are
severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is
erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of
the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule.
In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the
nationality principle must be disallowed if it would
cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only
if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the
court of justice, such classification may be subjected
to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard
of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny
is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and
the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means
to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are
those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right
to free speech, political expression, press, assembly,
and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49
On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by
history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give
way, such as the promotion of public interest, public
safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially
involves a public right or interest that, because of its
primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the
former to take precedence over the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the
Congress, the same principle applies with respect to
the acts of the President which have the force and
effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court.
In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal
protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the
provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by
the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not
similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they
should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national
who is married to an alien spouse has to contend
with. More importantly, while a divorce decree
obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino
is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made
in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26
is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a
foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained
by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse
would not be recognized even if based on grounds
similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family
Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds,
the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking
foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he
or she should be governed with whatever law he or
she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo
should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may
still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now
existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the
bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed
in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they
specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those
who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that
our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides,
such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to
marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against
their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as
no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he
intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the
presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under
the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e.,
satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other
evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief
that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the
law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has
been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any
illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a
Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed
that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine
love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust
or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact
that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and
conservative in nature and that they are more often
the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And
Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind
Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one
case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and
complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any
attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live
apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and
title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.64
Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose
Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by
Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical
about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that
Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if
it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically
to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be
understood as a prohibition of a general law on
divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not
primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not
necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion
is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical.
Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce
law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our
country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds
of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on
the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of
the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943,
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces
in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter,
the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New
Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for
at least one year prior to the filing of the action,
slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against
the other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and
the Commonwealth Government was restored, it
ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710
again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil
Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino
citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor
from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-
institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the
currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671
106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House
of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B.
No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute
Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018
was submitted by the House Committee on
Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was
approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with
134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under
the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute
divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55
of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic
gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child
with another person other than one's spouse during
the marriage, except when upon the mutual
agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by
in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears
a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the
petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner;
and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial
decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both
spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute
divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article
45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or
over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents
guradian or personl having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with
the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually
transmissible infection found to be serious or appears
to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f
existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for
at least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is
highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as
provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time
of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender
reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for
absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual
as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts
which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated
efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the
Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it
as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that
has looked upon marriage and family as an institution
and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause
restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do.
They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they cause the government to restrict other groups.
To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a
state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow
its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are
good for country.77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which
are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this
aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the
State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not
be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provision. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the
State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development.80
To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce
these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point
that the women and children are almost always the
helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and
violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the
menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No.
9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No
9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in
protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a
basic autonomous social institution, the Court must
not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value
the dignity of every human person, guarantee full
respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign
divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26
and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in
the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes
of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such
"extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a
few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The
irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage
under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities
of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well
as the improvement of the transportation system that
almost instantly connect people from all over the
world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all
marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect
unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate
reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self fulfillment
is not found and achieved in the context of a
marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the
quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten
quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his or her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the
Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by
its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes.
It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted
in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them
so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and
must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one of his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is
always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way
that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law
be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose
of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write
finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition
to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine
courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce
must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. The decree purports to be written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and
(b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the
court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2) the
Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines
Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of
Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce
byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the
Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in
this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a
a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the
OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do
so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still
be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The
power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.96
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden
of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as
well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and
family relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of
their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
---
Bellis v. Bellis 20 SCRA 358
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely
of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No.
37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he
had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will
in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing
two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go
to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis
died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor
of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock
to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial
advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its
administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen
by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00.
In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to
the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven
equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite
notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced
by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by
the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda
and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having
been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on,
nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by
this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749,
January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law
of the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory
(lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount
of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17,
paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil
Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code
as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of
Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It
must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art.
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent
executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article
16 — of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby
affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
---
In the matter of Testate Estate of the Deceased
Edward E. Christensen GR No. L-16759, January 31,
1963
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the
executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to
be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death
without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable
to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance
with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward
E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on
March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about
twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living
ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding
the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in
any way related to me, nor has she been at any time
adopted by me, and who, from all information I have
now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the
sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to
be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney),
now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions
that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of
the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition
was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward
E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are
(a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that
the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because
several foreign elements are involved, that the forum
is the Philippines and even if the case were decided
in California, Section 946 of the California Civil
Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
been declared an acknowledged natural child of the
decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen
was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional
rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his
will are to be governed by the law of California, in
accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because
the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77
Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record
on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this
appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as
follows:
I Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER
JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY
IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING
FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE
IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was
a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also
no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following
facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to
probate, the facts of record show that the deceased
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival
in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the
City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the
United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and
was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was
in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own
country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was
interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in
April 1945, he left for the United States but returned
to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM",
"MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21,
1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once
more to California shortly after the making of his last
will and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March
5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City
of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the
fact that he was born in New York, migrated to
California and resided there for nine years, and since
he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to
California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears
never to have owned or acquired a home or properties
in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in
the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades
of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used
to denote something more than mere physical
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the
citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States (not a state)
until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the
fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired
a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a
place where he has never been. And he may reside in
a place where he has no domicile. The man with two
homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went
on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said
to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the
particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the
merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et
the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar
requires the determination of the meaning of the term
"national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only
within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California
governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of
the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property
by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which
is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of
his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in
appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited
in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on
executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen
was a citizen of the State of California, the internal
law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
case, should govern the determination of the validity
of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will,
such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of
the validity of the testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by
various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural
matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference
to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign
system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus
its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The
Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which
referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle
is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the
reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the
"endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference
back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason
why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that
such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second
reference and at that point applying internal law.
Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the
rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity
will result from adoption of their respective views.
And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if
in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the
renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both
accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will
vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated
above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the
suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they
too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the
courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule
of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus,
a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
be recognized by every court; and every divorce,
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp.
13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a
Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
an application of the law of the deceased's last
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was
France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court
to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show
that if a French court were called upon to determine
how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course
of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-called
renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to
a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in
turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31,
pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law
is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to
be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by
textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved
has been descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung",
or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
many cases result in returning the main controversy
to be decided according to the law of the forum. ...
(16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi",
has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of
renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining
the question before it, must take into account the
whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules
as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the
actual question which the rules of the other
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the
forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur.
296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been
defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in
the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-
531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of
the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the
law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900,
in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims
the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute
shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or
even by the law of the place where the act in question
occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of
law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who
has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the
law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the
law of Belgium would distribute personal property
upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality
— that is the English law — he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code
is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In
re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended
and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State,
but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as
are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters
with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where
he was domiciled at the time of his death will be
looked to in deciding legal questions about the will,
almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted
in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of
the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property.
Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules
of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the
reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the
doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal
property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had
its origin in that international comity which was one
of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two
sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens
residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules
for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code,
then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as
above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if
there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California
Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the
national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law
on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e.,
Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case
will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state
of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of
the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39
Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano
vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs.
Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject
in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state
in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that
there exists in the state of which the subject is a
citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of
the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.
---
Willaware Products Corp v. Jesichris Manufacturing
Corp 734 SCRA 238 (2014)
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated November
24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company
([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint
for damages for unfair competition with prayer for
permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware
Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from
manufacturing and distributing plastic-made
automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly
registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of plastic and metal products, with
principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan,
Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992,
[respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan
plant and distributing throughout the Philippines
plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the
other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and
metal has its office near that of [respondent].
[Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to
[respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that
some of the [respondent’s] employeeshad transferred
to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity
with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic-
made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent]
discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing
and distributing the same automotive parts with
exactly similar design, same material and colors but
was selling these products at a lower price as
[respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to
the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of
plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture
ofautomotive underchassis parts such as spring eye
bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing,
center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s]
manufacture of the same automotive parts with
plastic materialwas taken from [respondent’s] idea of
using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner]
deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of
which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
policy and have caused [respondent] damages in
terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of
TWO MILLION PESOS as of the date of
[respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct
compelled [respondent] to institute this action and
thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorney’s
fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of
the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it
is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that
there’s physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to
[respondent]’s office, and that someof [respondent’s]
employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that
over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity
with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic
made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that
there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-
made automotive parts are mere reproductions of
original parts and their construction and composition
merely conforms to the specificationsof the original
parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus,
[respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use
of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming
for the sake of argument that [respondent] indeed
originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it
still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and
sell these as it has no patent over these products.
Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive
manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts
as there are other establishments which were already
openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of
respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the
rights or interest of respondent by deliberately
copying and performing acts amounting to unfair
competition. The RTC further opined that under the
circumstances, in order for respondent’s property
rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of
manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts
such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the
sameproducts to respondent’s customers, which it
cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds
the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million
(₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One
Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s
fees and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby
permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing
the plastic-made automotive parts as those
manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no
intellectual property protecting a good belonging to
another,the copying thereof for production and
selling does not add up to unfair competition as
competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers.
Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away
respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points
out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are
traded in the market and the copying of these can be
done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be
made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and
patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair
competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the
Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of
unfair competition are present in the instant case as
the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are
contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying
its products and employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA
affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC.
Relevant portions of said decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took
dishonest steps in advancing its business interest
against Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis
for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is
entitled to actual damages as one has duly proven.
The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by
Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed
that there was a discrepancy between the sales of
Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was
mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the
comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-
2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in
comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not
disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive
parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was
unfair competition on the part of Willaware that
prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal
damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize
and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of
attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also
maintained.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-
19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two
Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is
deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration.
However, the same was denied for lack of merit by
the CA in a Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein
petitioner raises the following issues for our
resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under
human relations when the parties are not competitors
and there is actually no damage on the part of
Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition,
should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages
is proper although no rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright
on automotive parts, should it be considered in the
light of the said copyrights were considered to be
void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR
No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue
is: whether or not Jesichris has established
"goodwill?"6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or
not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant
case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on
humanrelations, and not unfair competition under
Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a
damage suit and the products are not covered by
patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent
registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28
is very much broader than that covered by intellectual
property laws. Under the present article, which
follows the extended concept of "unfair competition"
in American jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases
of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery
of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference with the
latter’s business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of
whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting
tounfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil
Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair
competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a
right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being
sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut
the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods
which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage
in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law
prohibits is unfair competition and not competition
where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must
have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve
acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or
otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or
any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method.
The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the
essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both
being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made
automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner
were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as
petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s
formeremployees, deliberately copied respondent’s
products and even went to the extent of selling these
products to respondent’s customers.10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out
that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of
respondent and petitioner’s act of copying the subject
plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair
competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that
[petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the
business of [respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner’s] acts
can be characterized as executed with mischievous
subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the
findings of the RTC, the Court observes that
[petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic
kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of
plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the services
of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of
[respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by
the latter. De Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in
order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic
automotive spare parts were not being made. It
baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits
own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy
its problem. [Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman
indicates that it is banking on his experience gained
from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to
be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent],
was fired because he was blamed of spying in favor
of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get
angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by
[petitioner] for the same position he occupied with
[respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his
employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the
situation with De Guzman.11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair
competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting
his business from manufacturing kitchenware to
plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the
employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ
and trying to discover the trade secrets of the
respondent.12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of
business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but
regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving
his competitor out of business so that later on he can
take advantage of the effects of his malevolent
purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly
observed by the courta quo, the testimony of
petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad
faith in competing with the business of respondent, to
wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William
Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the
business of plastic-made automotive parts until
recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware
Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not?
Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor
ofkitchenware, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: And you said you have known the
[respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have
known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive
products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically
become familiar with these products, plastic
automotive products of Jesichris?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same
products, in terms of color, size, shape and
composition as those sold by Jesichris was due
largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’ employees
to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar
with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our
place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr.
Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact
date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of
Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your
company, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did
they transfer to you?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe
February, this year. And the other one, just one
month ago.
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent]
out of business was buttressed by the testimony of
[petitioner’s] witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware
Product Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the
office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of
January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what
unusual even (sic) transpired between you and Mr.
Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my
wife going to the market and then I passed by the
place where they were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were
drinking at that time?
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Q: And who else was there?
A: William Salinas, sir.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened
when you spotted upon them drinking?
A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and
before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas
uttered something, sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas
to you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa
inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those
words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa
amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na
siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell
this court whom did you gather to be referred to as
your "amo"?
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos
(₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted
and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the
attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and
lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution
dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be
lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
---