G.R. No. 213500. March 15, 2017.*

 
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the FACT-FINDING
INVESTIGATION BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICES (MOLEO),
petitioners, vs. PS/SUPT. RAINIER A. ESPINA,
respondent.

Ombudsman; Findings of Fact; As a general rule, factual

findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).—At the
outset, the Court emphasizes that as a general rule, factual
findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when affirmed by the CA. In this case, except as to the
legal conclusion on what administrative offense was committed by
Espina, the Ombudsman and the CA both found that Espina
signed the IRFs even if there were actually no tires delivered to
the PNP and no repair and refur-

_______________

*  FIRST DIVISION.

 
 

542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

bishment works performed on the LAVs. Accordingly, these

findings of fact are conclusive and binding and shall no longer be
delved into, and this Court shall confine itself to the
determination of the proper administrative offense chargeable
against Espina and the appropriate penalty therefor.
Administrative Cases; Misconduct; Words and Phrases;
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a
rule of law or standard of behavior and to constitute an
administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties
of a public officer.—Misconduct generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose. It is intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior and to
constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate
to or be connected with the performance of the official functions
and duties of a public officer. It is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. There
are two (2) types of misconduct, namely: grave misconduct and
simple misconduct. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must
be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of
an established rule is properly characterized as simple
misconduct only.
Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty, which is
defined as the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity,” is classified in three (3)
gradations, namely: serious, less serious, and simple.—
Dishonesty, which is defined as the “disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity,” is
classified in three (3) gradations, namely: serious, less serious,
and simple. Serious dishonesty comprises dishonest acts: (a)
causing serious damage and grave prejudice to the government;
(b) directly involving property, accountable forms or money for
which respondent is directly accountable and the respondent
shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption; (c)
exhibiting moral depravity on the part of the respondent; (d)
involving a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil
Service eligibility such as, but not limited to, impersonation,
cheating and use of crib sheets; (e) committed several times or in
various
  
 

543

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 543

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

occasions; (f) committed with grave abuse of authority; (g)

committed with fraud and/or falsification of official documents
relating to respondent’s employment; and (h) other analogous
circumstances. A dishonest act without the attendance of any of
these circumstances can only be characterized as simple
dishonesty. In between the aforesaid two forms of dishonesty is
less serious dishonesty which obtains when: (a) the dishonest act
caused damage and prejudice to the government which is not so
serious as to qualify as serious dishonesty; (b) the respondent did
not take advantage of his/her position in committing the
dishonest act; and (c) other analogous circumstances.
Same; The designation of the offense or offenses with which a
person is charged in an administrative case is not controlling, and
one may be found guilty of another offense where the substance of
the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves one’s
guilt.—After a circumspect review of the records, the Court finds
Espina administratively liable, instead, for Gross Neglect of Duty,
warranting his dismissal from government service. At the outset,
it should be pointed out that the designation of the offense or
offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative case
is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense
where the substance of the allegations and evidence presented
sufficiently proves one’s guilt, as in this case. Notably, the FFIB-
MOLEO’s supplemental complaint accused Espina with failure to
exercise due diligence in signing the IRFs, which is sufficient to
hold him liable for Gross Neglect of Duty.
Same; Gross Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; Gross
neglect of duty is defined as [n]egligence characterized by want of
even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
insofar as other persons may be affected.—Gross neglect of duty is
defined as “[n]egligence characterized by want of even slight care,
or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty
to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own
property.” In contrast, simple neglect of duty is the failure of an
employee or official to give proper attention to a

 
 
544

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

task expected of him or her, signifying a “disregard of a duty

resulting from carelessness or indifference.”
Same; Public Officers; Erring public officials may also be held
personally liable for disbursements made in violation of law or
regulation, as stated in Section 52, Chapter 9, Subtitle B, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.—Verily, this Court
has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a “[p]ublic
office is a public trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice and lead modest lives.” This high constitutional
standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric and taken
lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply
with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative
sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service. Erring public officials may also be held
personally liable for disbursements made in violation of law or
regulation, as stated in Section 52, Chapter 9, Subtitle B, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, public officers,
as recipients of public trust, are under obligation to perform the
duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their
ability. Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in this respect.

 
Caguioa, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Civil Service; View that the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) ruling in

this case should not be misconstrued as disregarding the
inescapable realities of government service which the Court had
taken judicial notice of in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309
(1989) — “dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple
assignments and positions.”—While I concur with the ponencia, I
wish to emphasize that the Court’s ruling in this case should not
be misconstrued as disregarding the inescapable realities of
government service which the Court had taken judicial notice of
in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309 (1989) — “dishonest or
negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments and
positions.” In Arias, the Court, recognizing the volume of
documents department heads are required to routinely sign, held
that such heads “have to rely, to a reasonable extent, on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids,
purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.” Therein,

 
 

545

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 545

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

the Court proceeded to rule that a finding of conspiracy to

defraud the government cannot be made to rest on the
department head’s signature alone, in the absence of some reason
or irregularity which would impel further inquiry.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   The Solicitor General for petitioners.
    Kapunan, Garcia and Castillo Law Offices for
respondent.

PER CURIAM:
 
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1
assailing the Decision2 dated February 27, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated July 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 131114, which modified the Joint
Resolution4 dated December 19, 2012 and the Joint Order5
dated July 8, 2013 of petitioner the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in the administrative aspect of
the case, docketed as OMB-P-A-12-0532-G,6 and, thereby,
found respondent PS/Supt. Rainier A. Espina (Espina)
administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.

_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 13-37.

2   Id., at pp. 47-66. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C.
Lantion, with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Nina G. Antonio-
Valenzuela, concurring.
3  Id., at pp. 69-72.
4   Records (Vol. 65), pp. 07529-07636. Signed by the Investigating
Panel created Pursuant to Office No. 248, Series of 2012 and approved by
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.
5  Id., at pp. 07637-07704.
6  The criminal aspect of the case was docketed as OMB-P-C-12-0503-
G.

 
 
546

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

The Facts
 
On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the Fact-Finding
Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices (MOLEO) filed before the Ombudsman an affidavit-
complaint7 and a supplemental complaint,8 respectively,
charging Espina and several other PNP officers and private
individuals for: (a) violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,9
RA 3019,10 RA 918411 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), and Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Public Documents under Article
217 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC); and (b) Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty;
arising from alleged anomalies that attended the
Philippine National Police’s (PNP) procurement of 40 tires,
and repair, refurbishment, repowering, and maintenance
services of a total of 28 units of V-150 Light Armored
Vehicles (LAVs), and the related transportation and
delivery expenses of 18 units of LAVs between August and
December 2007.12 It averred that the PNP did not comply
with the bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184 and
its IRR, in that: (a) copies of the bid documents were not
furnished to possible bidders; (b) no pre-procurement and
prebid conferences were held; (c) the invitation to bid was
not published in

_______________

7   Dated July 10, 2012. Records (Vol. 56), pp. 02658-02667.

8   Dated July 17, 2012. Rollo, pp. 131-156.
9   Otherwise known as the “GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT”
and entitled “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER”
(approved on July 12, 1991).
 10   Entitled “ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT,” as amended
(approved on August 17, 1960).
11  Entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION, STANDARDIZATION
AND REGULATION OF THE PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as “THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT

REFORM ACT” (approved on January 10, 2003).
12  See Records (Vol. 65), pp. 07532-07542.

 
 
547

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 547

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

a newspaper of general circulation; (d) the procuring

agency did not require the submission of eligibility
requirements as well as the technical and financial
documents from the bidders; and (e) no post qualification
was conducted. Further, it claimed that there were “ghost
deliveries,” i.e., the tires were never delivered to the PNP
and no repair and refurbishment works were actually
performed on the LAVs.13 The alleged anomalous
transactions are as follows:

 
Espina, as the Acting Chief of the Management Division
of the PNP Directorate for Comptrollership at the time the
procurements were made,16 was impleaded in the aforesaid
complaints for noting/signing the Inspection Report Forms
(IRFs),17 which confirmed the PNP’s receipt of the tires and
other supplies, and the performance of repair and
refurbishment works on the LAVs. According to the FFIB-
MOLEO, by affixing his signature on the IRFs, Espina
supposedly facilitated the fraudulent disbursement of
funds amounting to P409,740,000.00 when no goods were
actually delivered and no services were actually rendered.18

_______________

13  Id., at pp. 07577-07580.

14   The fund therefor was realigned on December 17, 2007 to “Other
Supplies Expenses.” Id., at pp. 07542-07543.
15  Id., at pp. 07533-07534.
16  Rollo, p. 53.
17   Id., at p. 229. See also the IRFs dated December 14, 18, and 27,
2007; Records (Vol. 21), pp. 36-41.
 18  See Records (Vol. 65), pp. 07612-07613 and 07627-07628.

 
 
548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

In defense, Espina denied any participation in the

bidding and/or procurement process and maintained that
he belonged to the Management Division which is
responsible for the inspection of deliveries made to the PNP
after the bidding and procurement process.19 He also
pointed out that pursuant to the Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) No. XX420 dated November 17, 1993, his
only duty, as the said division’s Acting Chief, was to note
the reports. According to him, it was not his responsibility
to personally inspect and confirm deliveries and go beyond
the contents of the IRFs submitted by his subordinates,
absent any irregularity reported by the property inspectors
who are tasked to check and examine deliveries.21
 
The Ombudsman’s Ruling
 
22
In a Joint Resolution dated December 19, 2012, the
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Espina and
several other PNP officers for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019, Section 65(b)(4) of RA 9184, and for Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification under Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 of the RPC. The Ombudsman also
found them guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious
Dishonesty and, accordingly, recommended their dismissal
from government service.23
Specifically, the Ombudsman held that Espina executed
indispensable acts which led to the completion of the illegal
transactions.24 The Ombudsman likewise found it
incredulous that the repair and refurbishment works on
the LAVs were completed in only seven (7) days, i.e., from
December 20, 2007 to December 27, 2007, considering the
magnitude of the work

_______________

19  Id., at pp. 07563-07564.

20  Rollo, pp. 125 and 127-129.
21  Id., at pp. 228-230. See also Records (Vol. 65), pp. 07563-07564.
 22  Records (Vol. 65), pp. 07529-07636.
23  Id., at pp. 07633-07634.

 
 
549

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 549

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

involved, which included the delivery of the LAVs for

repair, the inspection and acceptance of materials to be
used, the actual conduct of repair and refurbishment
works, and the delivery, inspection, and acceptance of the
repaired and refurbished LAVs.25 The Ombudsman even
noted the admission of one of the experts engaged in the
repair of the LAVs that the repair and refurbishment
works thereon were still ongoing as late as February 2008
until 2010 and, hence, could not have been completed in
December 2007.26
On reconsideration, the Ombudsman, through a Joint
Order27 dated July 8, 2013, dropped the charges against
Espina and several other PNP Officers, for violation of
Section 65(b)(4) of RA 9184, but sustained the other
findings, including their dismissal from service in view of
their administrative liability. In denying Espina’s motion
for reconsideration in the administrative case, the
Ombudsman pointed out that while it was not Espina’s
duty to make his own inspections of the alleged deliveries
and work as the same devolved upon the property
inspectors, “it was incumbent upon [Espina] to affix his
signature only after checking the completeness and
propriety of the documents.”28 Such disregard of duty
paved the way for the consummation of four (4) highly
illegal and irregular transactions, i.e., the disbursement of
government funds despite apparent nondelivery of the
items and nonperformance of works procured.29
Aggrieved, Espina filed a petition for review30 before the
CA, impleading both the Ombudsman and the FFIB-
MOLEO (collectively, petitioners), docketed as C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 131114.

_______________

24  Id., at p. 07628.
25  Id., at pp. 07611-07612.
26  Id., at p. 07612.
 27  Id., at pp. 07637-07704.
28  See Joint Order dated July 8, 2013; id., at p. 07679.
29  Id., at pp. 07681-07682.
30  Not attached to the Rollo.

 
 
550

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

The CA’s Ruling

 
 
In a Decision31 dated February 27, 2014, the CA ruled in
favor of Espina and held that his act of affixing his
signature on the IRFs could not be considered as Grave
Misconduct because he did not: (a) unlawfully use his
official position for the purpose of benefiting himself;32 and
(b) exhibit corrupt or depraved motives, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules. It
observed that Espina had no participation in the bidding
and procurement process as he belonged to the PNP’s
Management Division whose function is to inspect and note
the deliveries to the PNP after the required bidding and
procurement process had taken place. As such, no liability
could attach to him absent a nexus between his functions
as Acting Chief of the Management Division and the
alleged anomalous procurement process.33
The CA found Espina guilty, instead, of Simple
Misconduct, a less grave offense punishable with
suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second
offense. It rejected Espina’s defense of reliance in good faith
on the acts of his subordinates, holding that he had the
obligation to supervise them and ensure that the IRFs and
Work Orders they prepared, as well as every procurement-
related document released by his division, were regular,
lawful, valid, and accurate, considering the significance of
the transaction related to the disbursement of public funds
over which great responsibility attached.34
However, the CA absolved Espina from the charge of
Serious Dishonesty, considering that he did not personally
prepare the IRFs but merely affixed his signatures thereon.
At best, he imprudently failed to check and countercheck
the
_______________

31  Rollo, pp. 47-66.

32  Id., at p. 60.
33  Id., at p. 61.
34  Id., at pp. 63-64.

 
 
551

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 551

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

contents of the IRFs and the Work Orders he signed,

which, however, does not equate to Serious Dishonesty.35
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the CA imposed on Espina a three-month suspension
reckoned from the time he was actually dismissed from
service.36
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration37
which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution38
dated July 15, 2014; hence, the present petition.
 
The Issue Before the Court
 
The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or
not Espina should be held administratively liable for the
charges imputed against him.
 
The Court’s Ruling
 
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court emphasizes that as a general
rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded
due respect and weight, especially when affirmed by the
CA.39 In this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what
administrative offense was committed by Espina, the
Ombudsman and the CA both found that Espina signed the
IRFs even if there were actually no tires delivered to the
PNP and no repair and refurbishment works performed on
the LAVs. Accordingly, these findings of fact are conclusive
and binding and shall no longer be delved into, and this
Court shall confine itself to the determination of the proper
administrative offense chargeable against Espina and the
appropriate penalty therefor.
_______________

35  Id., at p. 64.
36  Id., at pp. 64-65.
37  Not attached to the Rollo.
38  Rollo, pp. 69-72.
39  Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII, 679 Phil. 138, 157-158;
663 SCRA 133, 153 (2012).

 
 
552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

In the case at bar, Espina was charged with grave

misconduct and serious dishonesty before the Ombudsman
which found him guilty as charged, and imposed on him
the supreme penalty of dismissal from government service
with all its accessory penalties, while the CA adjudged him
guilty only of simple misconduct and punished him with a
three-month suspension.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate
or intentional purpose.40 It is intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior
and to constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct
should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a public officer.41 It is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.42
There are two (2) types of misconduct, namely: grave
misconduct and simple misconduct. In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of an established rule must be manifest.43
Without any of these elements, the transgression of an
established rule is properly characterized as simple
misconduct only.44
On the other hand, dishonesty, which is defined as the
“disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity,”45 is classified in three
(3) gradations, namely:

_______________
 40  Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno, 592 Phil. 636, 658; 572 SCRA
272, 293 (2008).
41  Ganzon v. Arlos, 720 Phil. 104, 113; 708 SCRA 115, 124 (2013).
42   Amit v. Commission on Audit, 699 Phil. 9, 26; 686 SCRA 10, 26
(2012).
43  Ganzon v. Arlos, supra.
44   Imperial, Jr. v. Government Service Insurance System, 674 Phil.
286, 296; 658 SCRA 497, 511 (2011).
45   Light Rail Transit Authority v. Salvaña, 736 Phil. 123, 151; 726
SCRA 141, 171 (2014); citation omitted.

 
 
553

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 553

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

serious, less serious, and simple.46 Serious dishonesty

comprises dishonest acts: (a) causing serious damage and
grave prejudice to the government; (b) directly involving
property, accountable forms or money for which respondent
is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent
to commit material gain, graft and corruption; (c)
exhibiting moral depravity on the part of the respondent;
(d) involving a Civil Service examination, irregularity or
fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not limited to,
impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets; (e)
committed several times or in various occasions; (f)
committed with grave abuse of authority; (g) committed
with fraud and/or falsification of official documents relating
to respondent’s employment; and (h) other analogous
circumstances.47 A dishonest act without the attendance of
any of these circumstances can only be characterized as
simple dishonesty.48 In between the aforesaid two forms of
dishonesty is less serious dishonesty which obtains when:
(a) the dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the
government which is not so serious as to qualify as serious
dishonesty; (b) the respondent did not take advantage of
his/her position in committing the dishonest act; and (c)
other analogous circumstances.49
Both grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, of which
Espina was charged, are classified as grave offenses for
which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time
offenders.50
Here, the CA correctly observed that while Espina may
have failed to personally confirm the delivery of the
procured items, the same does not constitute dishonesty of
any form inasmuch as he did not personally prepare the
IRFs but

_______________

46  Id., at p. 173, citing Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No.

060538 dated April 4, 2006, otherwise known as the “Rules on the
Administrative Offense of Dishonesty.”
47  See CSC Resolution No. 060538, Section 3.
48  Id., Section 5.
49  Id., Section 4.
50   See Section 46(A)(1) and (3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS).

 
 
554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

merely affixed his signature thereon after his subordinates

supplied the details therein.
Neither can Espina’s acts be considered misconduct,
grave or simple. The records are bereft of any proof that
Espina was motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
deliberate intent of violating the law, or disregarding any
established rule, or that he wrongfully used his position to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.
However, after a circumspect review of the records, the
Court finds Espina administratively liable, instead, for
Gross Neglect of Duty, warranting his dismissal from
government service.51 At the outset, it should be pointed
out that the designation of the offense or offenses with
which a person is charged in an administrative case is not
controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense
where the substance of the allegations and evidence
presented sufficiently proves one’s guilt,52 as in this case.
Notably, the FFIB-MOLEO’s supplemental complaint
accused Espina with failure to exercise due diligence in
signing the IRFs, which is sufficient to hold him liable for
Gross Neglect of Duty.53
Gross neglect of duty is defined as “[n]egligence
characterized by want of even slight care, or by acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to
their own property.”54 In

_______________

51  See Section 46(A)(2), id.

52  Pia v. Gervacio, Jr., 710 Phil. 196, 207; 697 SCRA 220, 232 (2013),
citing Avenido v. Civil Service Commission, 576 Phil. 654, 661; 553 SCRA
711, 719 (2008).
53  See Rollo, p. 148.
54  See Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr., 745 Phil. 366, 381;
738 SCRA 240, 256 (2014).

 
 
555

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 555

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

contrast, simple neglect of duty is the failure of an

employee or official to give proper attention to a task
expected of him or her, signifying a “disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference.”55
As aptly observed by the CA, Espina had the obligation
to supervise his subordinates and see to it that they have
performed their respective functions in accordance with
law.56 To recall, Espina was the Acting Chief and Head of
the PNP’s Management Division and, as such, had
supervisory powers over the departments or sections
which comprise it, namely: (a) the Internal Control and
Inspection Section (ICIS); (b) the Accountability and
Assistance Section; (c) the Management Improvement
Section; and (d) the Claims and Examination Section
(CES).57 Espina himself admitted that the property
inspectors who were tasked to personally inspect deliveries
to the PNP belong to the ICIS which was under his
management and stewardship.58 In Lihaylihay v. People,59
the Court pointed out that the nature of the public officers’
responsibilities and their role in the procurement process
are compelling factors that should have led them to
examine with greater detail the documents which they are
made to approve.
 Here, while SOP No. XX4 dated November 17, 1993
which Espina cited does not expressly require the Head of
the Management Division to physically reinspect, recheck,
and verify the deliveries to the PNP as reported by the
property inspectors under him, his duty was not simply to
“note” or take cognizance of the existence of the IRFs, but
to reasonably ensure that they were prepared in
accordance with law, keeping in mind the basic
requirement that the goods allegedly

_______________

55  Office of the Ombudsman v. De Leon, 705 Phil. 26, 38; 692 SCRA 27,
38-39 (2013), citing Republic v. Canastillo, 551 Phil. 987, 996; 524 SCRA
546, 555 (2007).
56  Rollo, p. 63.
57  Id., at p. 123.
58  Id., at pp. 84-85.
59  715 Phil. 722, 732; 702 SCRA 755, 765 (2013).

 
 
556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

delivered to and services allegedly performed for the

government have actually been delivered and performed.
As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman in its Joint Order
dated July 8, 2013, “it was incumbent upon [Espina to affix
his signature only after checking the completeness and
propriety of the documents.”60 However, while Espina
claims that all the necessary supporting documents such as
photographs and delivery receipts were attached to the
IRFs at the time they were routed to him for his
signature,61 the Court is hard-pressed to find proof
substantiating such claim to justify his passive attitude
towards them. In this jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that he
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.62 Without
evidence showing otherwise, the Court is constrained to
conclude that the IRFs submitted to Espina for his
signature were without supporting documents and could
not, perforce, be taken at face value and relied upon. As
this Court ruled in Jaca v. People,63 a superior cannot rely
in good faith on the act of a subordinate where the
documents that would support the subordinate’s action
were not even in his (the superior’s) possession for
examination.
Moreover, the timing of the alleged repair and
refurbishment works was suspect. The short seven (7)-day
period in December, 2007 during which the repair and
refurbishment works were made on the LAVs should have
prompted Espina to doubt the veracity of the IRFs. As
correctly observed by the Ombudsman, it is improbable
that the repair and refurbishment works on the LAVs were
carried out from December 20 to 27, 2007, given the
magnitude of the work involved and the fact that such
period included the delivery of the LAVs for repair, the
inspection and approval of the materials to be used

_______________

60  See Records (Vol. 65), p. 07679; underscoring supplied.

61  Rollo, pp. 532-533.
62  Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 989, 1000; 302
SCRA 315, 325 (1999).
63  702 Phil. 210, 250; 689 SCRA 270, 307 (2013).

 
 
557

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 557

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

for the repairs, the actual repair and refurbishment, and

the delivery of the LAVs to the PNP after the repair.64
The foregoing should not have escaped Espina’s
attention had he faithfully discharged the obligations
attendant to his office. Indeed, the Court has pronounced
that a public officer’s high position imposes upon him
greater responsibility and obliges him to be more
circumspect in his actions and in the discharge of his
official duties.65 This particularly applies to the instant
controversy, especially where Espina’s signature was one of
the final steps needed for the release of payment for the
procured items.66 In fact, the disbursement vouchers
prepared by the Logistics Support Service (LSS) Finance
Service were routed back to the CES of the Management
Division under Espina’s supervision for final examination
of all claims.67 With all these considerations, Espina was
expected to employ diligence in ensuring that all claims
were supported by complete pertinent documents. As
succinctly put by the CA, Espina’s duty as Acting Chief was
not merely ministerial and perfunctory as it related to the
disbursement of funds over which a great responsibility
attached.68
More so, considering the sheer magnitude of the amount
in taxpayers’ money involved, i.e., P409,740,000.00, Espina
should have exercised utmost care before signing the IRFs.
It is of no moment that the disbursement of the
P409,740,000.00 was spread over several transactions and
not through a single payment or that only the IRFs relating
to the delivery of supplies were allegedly presented;69 the
fact remains that taxpayers’ money was spent without the
corresponding goods and services having been delivered to
the government. Indeed, no

_______________

64   See Joint Resolution dated December 19, 2012; Records (Vol. 65),
pp. 07611-07612.
65  Supra note 42 at p. 24; p. 23.
66  Rollo, pp. 84-85.
67  See Joint Order dated July 8, 2013; Records (Vol. 65), p. 07682.
68  Rollo, p. 63.
69  Id., at p. 95.

 
 
558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

rule is more settled than that a public office is a public

trust and public officers and employees must, at all times,
be accountable to the people.70
Espina cannot trivialize his role in the disbursement of
funds and bank on the lack of confidential written reports
from his subordinates which would have prompted him to
make further inquiry. As aptly pointed out by petitioners,
Espina was the last person to affix his signature and, as
such, had the power, if not the duty, to unearth and expose
anomalous or irregular transactions.71 Espina cannot
blindly adhere to the findings and opinions of his
subordinates, lest he be reduced to a mere clerk who has no
authority over his subordinates and the sections he
oversees.
 The Court is not unaware of the ruling in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan72 (Arias) that heads of offices may rely on
their subordinates. For the Arias doctrine to apply,
however, there must be no reason for the head of offices to
go beyond the recommendations of their subordinates,73
which is not the case here.
Given the amounts involved and the timing of the
alleged deliveries, the circumstances reasonably impose on
Espina a higher degree of care and vigilance in the
discharge of his duties. Thus, he should have been
prompted to make further inquiry as to the truth of his
subordinates’ reports. Had he made the proper inquiries,
he would have discovered the nondelivery of the procured
items and the nonperformance of the procured services,
and prevented the unlawful disbursement. However, he did
not do this at all. Instead, he blindly relied on the report
and recommendation of his subordinates and affixed his
signature on the IRFs. Plainly, Espina acted negligently,
unmindful of the high position he occupied and

_______________

70  See Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

71  See Rollo, p. 35.
72  259 Phil. 794, 801; 180 SCRA 309, 316 (1989).
73  Id.; See also Jaca v. People, supra note 63 at p. 314; p. 316.

 
 
559

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 559

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

the responsibilities it carried, and without regard to his

accountability for the hundreds of millions in taxpayers’
money involved.
Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-
honored rule that a “[p]ublic office is a public trust [and]
[p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.”74 This high
constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be
mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public
service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or
run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging
from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service.75 Erring public officials may also be held
personally liable for disbursements made in violation of law
or regulation, as stated in Section 52,76 Chapter 9, Subtitle
B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.77
Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust, are under
obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly,
faithfully, and to the best of their ability.78 Unfortunately,
Espina failed miserably in this respect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
The Decision dated February 27, 2014 and the Resolution
dated July 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 131114 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one is
ENTERED

_______________

74  Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

75  Supra note 42 at p. 25.
76   SECTION 52. General Liability for Unlawful Expenditures.—
Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in
violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or
employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
77   Executive Order No. 292, Series of 1987, entitled “INSTITUTING THE

‘ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987’” (approved on July 25, 1987).

78   Peñalosa v. Viscaya, Jr., 173 Phil. 487, 489; 84 SCRA 298, 300
(1978).

 
 

560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

finding respondent Rainier A. Espina GUILTY of GROSS

NEGLECT OF DUTY. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from
government service with all the accessory penalties.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del

Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

 
CAGUIOA, J.:
 
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it holds PS/Supt.
Rainier A. Espina (Espina) liable for Gross Neglect of Duty
under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (RRACCS). I submit this opinion to further
emphasize the exceptional circumstances that render the
doctrine espoused in Arias v. Sandiganbayan1 (Arias)
inapplicable to this case.
The facts are simple.
Respondent PS/Supt. Rainier Espina (Espina) served as
Acting Chief of the Management Division of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Directorate for Comptrollership
(Acting Chief) from September 28, 2007 to February 28,
2008.2
Several months after Espina’s term expired, the Fact-
Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) an affidavit-complaint and a
supplemental complaint charging Espina, several PNP
officers and private individuals of: (i) violation of the
Plunder Law; (ii) violation of

_______________

1  259 Phil. 794; 180 SCRA 309 (1989).

2  Rollo, p. 53.

 
 
561

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 561

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; (iii) Malversation

of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents;
(iv) violation of the Government Procurement Reform Act
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR);3 and
(v) Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty.4 The
charges stem from the transactional anomalies that
attended the repair, refurbishment and procurement of
tires relating to twenty-eight (28) units of V-150 Light
Armored Vehicles (LAVs) owned by the PNP.5
Espina was impleaded in his capacity as Acting Chief,
for signing Inspection Report Forms (IRFs) which falsely
confirmed PNP’s receipt of procured LAV parts and the
completion of the contracted repair and refurbishment
works, thereby facilitating the fraudulent disbursement of
government funds in the amount of P409,740,000.00.6
The Ombudsman initially found probable cause to indict
Espina for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act,7 Section 65(b)(4) of the Government
Pro-

_______________

3  Id.
4  Id., at p. 57.
5  Ponencia, p. 546.
6  Id.
7  Section 3(e) provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

 
 
568

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

curement Reform Act8 and Malversation of Public Funds

through Falsification under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code.9 The Ombudsman likewise found Espina guilty
of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, warranting
the penalty of dismissal from service.10 Subsequently, the
Ombudsman

_______________

8  Section 65(b)(4) provides:

(b) Private individuals who commit any of the following acts,
including any public officer, who conspires with them, shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but
not more than fifteen (15) years:
x x x x
(4) When a bidder, by himself or in connivance with others, employ
schemes which tend to restrain the natural rivalry of the parties or
operates to stifle or suppress competition and thus produce a result
disadvantageous to the public.
In addition, the persons involved shall also suffer the penalty of
temporary or perpetual disqualification from public office and be
permanently disqualified from transacting business with the Government.
9  Article 217 provides, in part:
Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.
—Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
x x x x
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is
less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
x x x
10  Ponencia, p. 548.

 
 

563

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 563

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

dropped the charges for violation of the Government

Procurement Reform Act, but sustained all its prior
findings.
In the CA Decision subject of the instant appeal by
certiorari, the CA ruled that Espina could not be held liable
for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty in the
absence of proof of corrupt motives, intent to violate the
law and flagrant disregard of established rules.11
Consequently, the CA found Espina guilty only of Simple
Misconduct, thus:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Joint Resolution dated 19
December 2012 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, and its
Joint Order dated 08 July 2013 are hereby MODIFIED, as
follows:
(1) The portions in the assailed 19 December 2012 Joint
Resolution and 08 July 2013 Joint Order finding Petitioner
guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) The penalties of dismissal from government service with
forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold
public office meted upon Petitioner are likewise SET ASIDE;
(3) Petitioner is found GUILTY only of Simple Misconduct and the
penalty of SUSPENSION of THREE (3) MONTHS is hereby
imposed on him, to be reckoned from the time of his actual
dismissal from the service.
The period of time that Petitioner remained dismissed from
service shall be credited in the implementation of the penalty of
THREE (3) MONTHS [s]uspension herein imposed.
After service of the aforesaid suspension period, the Petitioner
shall be REINSTATED to his former rank as Police Senior
Superintendent (PS/Supt.) and the retirement benefits as well as
Petitioner’s right to hold public office shall be RESTORED.

_______________

11  Rollo, pp. 60-64.

 
 

564

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

SO ORDERED.12

 
On review before this Court, the ponencia set aside the
findings of the RTC and CA, holding that the petitioners
failed to sufficiently establish Espina’s guilt for Serious
Dishonesty and Misconduct, both grave and simple.13
Instead, the ponencia finds that Espina’s acts constitute
Gross Neglect of Duty under Section 46(A)(1) and (3) of the
RRACCS, meriting the penalty of dismissal from
government service.14
 While I concur with the ponencia, I wish to emphasize
that the Court’s ruling in this case should not be
misconstrued as disregarding the inescapable realities of
government service which the Court had taken judicial
notice of in Arias — “dishonest or negligent subordinates,
overwork, multiple assignments and positions.” In Arias,
the Court, recognizing the volume of documents
department heads are required to routinely sign, held that
such heads “have to rely, to a reasonable extent, on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare
bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.”
Therein, the Court proceeded to rule that a finding of
conspiracy to defraud the government cannot be made to
rest on the department head’s signature alone, in the
absence of some reason or irregularity which would impel
further inquiry.
The ponencia holds that the Arias doctrine cannot be
applied in this case due to the existence of reasons that
should have impelled Espina to go beyond the findings and
recommendations reflected on the face of the IRFs. I agree.
Standard Operating Procedure XX4 (SOP 24) prescribes
the guidelines for inspection and acceptance of deliveries of
supplies, police products, materials and equipment, as well
as the repair, renovation and construction works rendered
in favor of the PNP. It provides:

_______________

12  Id., at p. 65.

13  Ponencia, pp. 551-553.
14  Id., at p. 554.

 
 

565

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 565

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

a. Pre-inspection or inspection before an equipment/

machinery/vehicle is repaired is done in order that the
Technical Property Inspector/Mngmt. Div., DC-Inspector will
have a basis of (sic) determining whether a repair is really
needed, the scope of work to be done could be established and
missing/damaged/
worn-out spare parts to be supplied/replaced be determined.
 Findings of the pre-repair inspection will guide him in the
conduct of post-repair inspection.
b. Pre-repair inspection is [a] prerequisite for preparation and
approval of the corresponding contract.
c. The pre-repair portion of the Request for Pre-Repair
Inspection Form must be duly accomplished by Property
Officer of the Unit/Office concerned x  x  x and shall be
forwarded to the ODC15 (Attn: Mgmt. Div.)[.]
d. The corresponding property card should be made
available for it is the only evidence/
proof that the equipment/vehicle subject for repair is a
(sic) government property.
e. The acquisition date will show if the equipment really warrants
outside services. Manufacturers/
suppliers usually give a guarantee period of one (1) year for
their products. If the equipment is still within the warranty
period, repair should then be made by manufacturer/supplier
concerned.
f. The acquisition cost will serve as basis for determining
the reasonableness of the cost of repair. More than sixty
percent (60%) of the acquisition cost (converted to current rate)
is already considered uneconomical.
g. The date and nature of the last repair will ensure that
repair of the same nature or the same scope of work to
be done is not repeated.

_______________

15  Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership.

 
 
566

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

h. The list of complaints and possible causes related thereto,

including the scope of work to be done[,] are determined by the
agency authorized technician and engineer.
i. The property inspectors (ODC & Technical Inspectors) shall
then inspect and verify the correctness of the complaint and
causes of malfunctioning including the scope and nature of
work to be done to the unit in the presence of the Unit,
technician/engineer and/or property officer.
j. All findings/recommendations of the Technical Inspector/Mgmt.
Div. ODC Inspector shall be reflected on the pre-[repair]
 inspection form and should be noted by Chief-Mgmt. Div, ODC.
k. x x x the accomplished form, together with the approved
Work/Job Order/Contract, supplier’s invoice/billing
account shall be attached to the request for post-repair
inspection.16 (Emphasis supplied)

 
In this case, Espina does not deny that he did not
conduct further inquiry before affixing his signature on the
IRFs in question despite the suspiciously short 7-day
period indicated therein within which the repair and
refurbishment works on the LAVs were supposedly
completed.17 Espina merely claims that he was not bound
to go beyond the findings and recommendations reflected
on the IRFs, as he was merely required to “note” the same.
A holistic reading of clauses (a) to (k) above, however,
shows that in “noting” the findings and recommendations
of the ODC inspectors, the Chief of the Management
Division is bound to ascertain whether (i) the property
subjected to repair constitutes government property, (ii)
the conduct of repair was in fact necessary, and (iii) the
cost expended for the work done is reasonable. Evidently,
these

_______________

16  Rollo, pp. 125-129.

17  Id., at p. 9.

 
 
567

VOL. 820, MARCH 15, 2017 567

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Espina

matters can only be verified through a review of the IRFs

and the supporting documents that must be appended
thereto.
Thus, Espina’s liability for gross negligence arises from
his reliance on the findings and recommendations of his
property inspectors despite the glaring irregularities
appearing on the face of the IRFs.
Notably, while Espina claims that no apparent
irregularities were in fact ascertainable from the IRFs’
supporting documents, he failed to submit these supporting
documents in evidence, nor prove, by any other means, that
 these supporting documents were in fact appended to the
IRFs at the time he affixed his signature thereon. These
evidentiary lapses, whether inadvertent or otherwise, place
Espina’s compliance with SOP 24 in serious doubt. It bears
stressing that his duty to ascertain the propriety of the
repairs conducted on the LAVs and the reasonableness of
the corresponding cost were positive ones spelled out in
SOP 24. It was thus incumbent upon him to show proof
that such duty was in fact complied with, particularly in
this case, where the anomalies behind the transactions in
question could have been easily uncovered, if only he
complied with SOP 24.
For these reasons, the instant Petition is hereby denied.

Petition partly granted, judgment and resolution set

aside. A new one is entered finding respondent Rainier A.
Espina guilty of gross neglect of duty. Accordingly, he is
dismissed from government service.

Note.—Under Section 52(A), Rule IV of the Uniform

Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
dishonesty and gross neglect of duty amount to grave
offenses punishable by dismissal even when committed for
the first time. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Bacani,
688 SCRA 516 [2013])
 
——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.