Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, G.R. No.

11097 July 20 1994

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of casino followed by
Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefore. Petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful
and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and
official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the
youth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.

HELD:

NO. Petition was denied. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed.

RATIO:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing
or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it
without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and
horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. ​The delegate cannot be superior to
the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter​. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PADILLA, concurring

[I]t is my considered view that the national government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate
its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear
that public opinion in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will
the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of
values?

DAVIDE, concurring

The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it
is in contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention
of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No.
1869. They can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be
construed as not applying to PAGCOR.

Lina vs ​Paño
FACTS: On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by
Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on
September 18, 1995. As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint,
respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs:
(1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing
or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to
issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño,
promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.
This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national
government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed
resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto.​In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,
ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as
elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Garcia vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves
into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution
No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the
gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most
fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send
notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the
political minority to equal protection of the law.

RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any
mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system
of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by
Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact
an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of
the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of
initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall
thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities
and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its
membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its
members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in
the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can
control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public
official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot
be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party
system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system.
Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the
minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall
assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall
assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified
majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless
to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall
which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

-Partido Manggawa vs. Comelec, 484 SCRA 671 (’06)

-CIBAC vs. Comelec- G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007

BANAT vs COMELEC; 21 April 2009

Facts:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided
by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the
Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the
COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated
in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic
Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.

Issue:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be
allocated?
 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?

Held:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.

Ratio: Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a
provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating
the party-list elections.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold
unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of
votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second
round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats
of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each
of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits
major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In
fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that
participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of
major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits
the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to
the participation of the major political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct
congruence with theirs, hence
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list
parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list
elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The
results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major
political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated,
the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of
the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties
(including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of
these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total
number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives.
In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties
garnered more than 2%.
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and
underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through
the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution,
our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the
traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we
allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the
voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That
opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling
allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list system.

In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)

However, I wish to add a few words to support the
proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a seat in the
House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement
─ fixed at 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party list system ─ presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats
the declared constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the enabling law, to allow the
people’s broadest representation in Congress,the raison d’etre for the adoption of the party-list system.
Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Court’s
decision in Veterans Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to party-list
representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55) can never be realized, because the 2%
threshold vote requirement makes it mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing
away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was
explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans
Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from
participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the
legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright
constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really
been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able
to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.9
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the
steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative
districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It
does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with
the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in
Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of
implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely
beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront
to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it
involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of
statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision
inoperative and ineffectual.

Mariano v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,
Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati.
The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2,
51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned
sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of
many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would
be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Montejo v. Comelec, GR 118702

Facts:  

Petitioner  Cerilo  Roy  Montejo,  representative  of  the  first  district  of  Leyte,  pleads  for  the  annulment  of  Section  1  of 
Resolution  no.  2736,  redistricting  certain  municipalities  in  Leyte,  on  the  ground  that  it  violates  the  principle  of  equality  of 
representation. 

The  province  of  Leyte  with  the  cities  of  Tacloban  and  Ormoc  is  composed  of  5  districts.  The  3rd  district  is  composed  of: 
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.  

Biliran,  located  in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 

1959.  Said  section  spelled  out  the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, 
Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein. 

On  1992,  the  Local  Government  Code  took  effect  and  the  subprovince  of  Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion 
of  Biliran  into  a  regular  province  was  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  a  plebiscite.)  As  a  consequence  of  the 
conversion,  eight  municipalities  of  the  3rd  district  composed  the  new  province  of  Biliran.  A  further  consequence  was  to 
reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.  

To  remedy  the  resulting  inequality  in  the  distribution  of  inhabitants,  voters  and  municipalities  in  the  province  of  Leyte, 
respondent  COMELEC  held  consultation  meetings  with  the  incumbent  representatives  of  the  province  and  other  interested 
parties  and  on  December  29,  1994,  it  promulgated  the  assailed  resolution  where,  among  others,  it  transferred  the 
municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte. 

Issue:  

Whether  the  unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or 

not. 

Held:  

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.  

The  deliberations  of  the  members  of  the  Constitutional  Commission  shows  that  COMELEC  was  denied  the  major  power  of 
legislative  apportionment  as  it  itself  exercised  the  power.  Regarding  the  first  elections  after  the  enactment  of  the  1987 
constitution,  it  is  the  Commission  who  did  the  reapportionment  of  the  legislative  districts  and  for the subsequent elections, 
the power was given to the Congress.  

Also,  respondent  COMELEC  relied  on  the  ordinance  appended  to  the  1987  constitution  as  the  source  of  its  power  of 
redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:  
Section  2:  The  Commission  on  Elections  is  hereby  empowered  to  make  minor  adjustments  to  the  reapportionment  herein 
made.”  

Section  3  :  Any  province  that  may  hereafter  be  created…The  number  of  Members  apportioned  to  the  province  out  of  which 
such  new  province  was  created  or  where  the  city,  whose  population  has  so  increases,  is  geographically  located  shall  be 
correspondingly  adjusted  by  the  Commission  on  Elections  but  such  adjustment  shall  not  be  made  within  one  hundred  and 
twenty days before the election. 

Minor  adjustments  does  not  involve  change  in  the  allocations  per  district.  Examples  include  error  in  the  correct  name  of  a 
particular  municipality  or  when  a  municipality  in  between  which  is  still  in  the  territory  of  one assigned district is forgotten. 
And  consistent  with  the  limits  of  its  power  to  make  minor  adjustments,  section  3  of  the  Ordinance  did  not  also  give  the 
respondent  COMELEC  any  authority  to  transfer  municipalities  from  one  legislative  district  to  another  district.  The  power 
granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.) 

Bengzon vs HRET; G.R. No. 142840

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he
enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was
questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be
naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this
law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none
of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic
necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 714

FACTS:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958,
when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order
of dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

HELD:
No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the
phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts
in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about
said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His
Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Pp vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of the House of
Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision
of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as
a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence
is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that
of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Santiago vs. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the
duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen.
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority
leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen.
Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
● Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number
out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any
construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said
body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual
meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect
the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a
group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two
unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the
majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all
the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by
petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by
the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or
the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and
House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker,
it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.
All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of
its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is
of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of
no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will,
upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as
it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters
for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into
that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and
uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings
of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast
and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a
clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail.
Osmena vs. Pendatun

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House
making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a
Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of
the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in
case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by
the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it
infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance
to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was
issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity
for speeches

Ruling: NO.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.”
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any
other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that
he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside
of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of
what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

● Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-a-vis Congress' prerogative to

discipline its own members: the former is not punitive, the latter is

FACTS:

A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam
Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of several
disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective for 90 days.

ISSUE:
● Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive
suspension against a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official
charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support. xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if

acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’ Prerogative to

Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be,
upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.