RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION 1

IN RE EDILLION

Facts:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership
fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute
an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to
practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and
void.

Issue:WON it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the

respondent.

Ruling:
The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations
that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The
IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are
subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment
of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of
regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional
rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its
existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the
rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.
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MALABAN v RAMENTO
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a
general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Sciencebasketball court (VMAS), the
place indicated in such permit, not in thebasketball court as therein stated but at the second floor
lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The
same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They
were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal
assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive
suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity thereof
was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against private
respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. Respondent Ramento
found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which was characterized by the
violation of the permitgranted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The
penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinaryaction and the penalty imposed, there
was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.

Ruling:
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Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if
during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But with
the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present
danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking
ofdisciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there
be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however,
by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired
being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power
to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of
work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION v LAGUESMA

Facts:
The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the
union filed a petition for certification on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial
employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of
the Labor Code, which provides: Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees-Managerial employees are not eligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own.
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Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the
first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far declares managerial employees to be
ineligible to form, assit or join unions, contravenes Article III, Section 8 of the 1987
Constitution which provides: The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.

Issue:WON Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or
assisting labor unions, violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution.

Ruling:
Art. 245 do not violate Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution. The real intent of Article
III, section 8 is evident in Lerum’s proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to
organize of government workers, supervisory employees and security guards to be
constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional rights to organize
for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 of the Constitution infringed by
a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8
is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for the purposes “not contrary to law.” In
the case of Art 245, there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining labor organization. For the reason that these managerial employees would belong to or
be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The union also becomes company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership
 RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION 5

ACOSTA V COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in metro manila. On various dates in
September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead, participated in
mass actions by public school teachers at the liwasang bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning
the government for redress of their grievances. On the basis of reports submitted by their
respective school principals that petitioners participated in said mass actions and refused to
comply with the return-to-work order issued September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D.
Cariño of the department of education, culture and sports (DECS), petitioners were
administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to
perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to answer the charges. Secretary
Cariño found petitioners guilty as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the
service. Is hereby meted out the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. Petitioners
appealed that respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed
resolutions of CSC.

Issues: WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed
resolutions of the civil service commission that wrongly penalized petitioners whose only
“offense” was to exercise their consitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances?
WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed resolutions of
the civil service commission that wrongly denied petitioners their right to backwages?

Ruling:
No. Petition denied. In Bangalisan v. Court of appeals, petitioners, are being penalized not
because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances
but because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse
effects upon their students for whose education they are responsible. The actuations of
petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
punishable under the civil service law, rules and regulations.as aptly stated by the solicitor
general, “it is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceable
assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in
the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in
metro manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass
actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not
rendered any service. While there recognized instances when backwages may be awarded to a
suspended or dismissed public official who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners
in citing bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar impel the Court to rule
otherwise.