G.R. No.

L-74324 November 17, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-
appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and
BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Cavite, under an information which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting
one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their
superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible
liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused
his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed
Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the
means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of
the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After
trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of
murder but crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y
Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating
the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison
term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with the accessories of the law for both of them. The accused are
solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P13,940.00
plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and
assigned the following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING
THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS
ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends.
Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening
of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There
were different kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris
wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and
Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they
were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started
making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly
took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents
on the body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in
the process of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire
making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others
wrapped the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and
other police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident.
Upon inquiring as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around
spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime,
the police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the
Rosario municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the
written statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released.
The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-
appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave
their written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement,
Exhibit F, that he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents
thereof was water and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused
Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline
on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact
that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the
commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written
statements alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police
maltreated them into admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a
concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were
mentioned and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were
not utilized as the sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said
court categorically stated that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's
straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the
uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p.
247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of
other eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other
persons investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during
the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons
raises the presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the
crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of
one Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing
the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the
accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as
prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would
be merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption
that evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does
not apply to the suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil.
797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the
prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not
only was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the
prosecution in exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony
that he was reading a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human
behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him
to testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise
testified that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time
when the instant case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was
his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no
previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely
against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay
pour gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the
accused-appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling
Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and
that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics
when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson.
How could you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and
burned later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from
doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a
matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if
that is true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you
come to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that
actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to
you to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay
tell you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline
that is why you prevent him?
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got
hold of a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the
process of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book;
that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the
deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the
ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the
body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw
Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or
unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately
before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and
the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was
accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make
fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective,
and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al.
13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped
his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty
to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts
which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his
own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed
to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the
Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper
considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just
been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely
helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do
not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some
reason to kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate
evidence showing that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For
the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured
on the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not
have committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the
benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended
to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind
of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying
circumstances, the accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and
penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to
credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such
conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and
Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp.
16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one
ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by
Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the
P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the
court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs
against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-2873 February 28, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant-appellant.
Dominador A. Alafriz for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Rafael P. Cañiza for
appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant, being 17 years of
age at the time of at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8
years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery of which he was found guilty. He was
also sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly and severally with the other accused,
the sum of P85 as indemnity.
Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing
from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or
care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being
convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor
General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2 of
article 68 of the Revised Pena Code, which provides that when the offender is over
fifteen and under eighteen years age, "The penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period."
There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are against the
Government's contention.
One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so
that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting intention in
the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court
by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)
This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read
together as whole. "An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original
statute has been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had
been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any
action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted
in its amended form the amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had
always been contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of
contractual relations between the state and others. Where an amendment leaves
certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with
the same meaning and effect they had before the amendment. So where an
amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in
the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or
substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new
enactment." (59 C. J., 1096, 1097.)
We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it nowstands and
article 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting accused of the
ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age
of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. In other words, there is no
inconsistency between sending defendants of certain ages to prison and giving them a
penalty lower than the imposable one on adults under the same or similar
circumstances. Let it be remember that the privilege of article 68, supra, is not by its
nature inherent in age but purely statutory and conventional, and that this privilege is
granted adult offenders under given conditions.
At least there is no clear intention on the part of the Congress to amend article 68.
Indeed the rational presumption is that if there had been such an intention the
lawmakers should have said so expressly, instead of leaving the change to inference.
One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied repeal or
amendment is that penal law is to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the
state. "Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be
enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In
other words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms
in order to carry into effect the general purpose for which the statute was enacted. Only
those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt,
will be considered within the statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the
spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be
resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in
doubt will be resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty is sought." (Statutory
Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.)
The offense charged in the information of which the appellant was found guilty is
punishable under article 294, case No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 6 of Republic Act No. 18, with prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. The penalty one degree lower than this is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. There being
no modifying circumstance, the appropriate penalty in the present case is from 6
months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 2 years and 4 months ofprision
correccional. Being entitled to an indeterminate penalty as provided in section 1 of Act
No. L-4103 as amended, the accused should be, and he is hereby sentenced to
imprisonment of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not more than 2 years and
4 months of prision correccional. In all other respect the appealed judgment is affirmed.
The appellant will pay the costs of this appeal.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

April 12, 1950

TUASON, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision.
The main theme of the Solicitor General's argument is that articles 13 (2) and 68 (2) of
the Revised Penal code "complement each other;" that "the application of article 68
takes place only when the court has to render judgment and impose a penalty upon a
minor who has been proceeded against in accordance with article 80 and who had
misbehaved or is found incorrigible," and that "article 80 must be applied first before
article 68 can come into operation, and the court can not apply the latter article in total
disregard of the former." In short, as we infer from this line of reasoning, what article 80
does not touch, article 68 can not touch.
We do not think the premise and conclusion of the motion are correct. There seems to
be a confusion of ideas.
It may do us well to make brief review of the legislation, past and present, relative to
juvenile offenders and dissect and analyze its various provisions and the differences
between them and the role assigned to each. .
Article 68 of the Revised Penal code provides:.
Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules
shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than
that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed but always in the proper period.
Sub-paragraph 1 and 2 of the foregoing article are a reproduction of article 85 of the
Spanish Penal Code.
Into the Revised Penal Code, the Juvenile Delinquency Act was incorporated. It has
become in the new code article 80, the first paragraph of which provides that "whenever
a minor under 18 years of age, of either sex, be accused of a crime, the court . . . shall
commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or
charitable, institution, etc." And in the paragraph immediately preceding the last, it is
further provided that "In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the
regulation of the institution to which he has been committed, or with the conditions
imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in
case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be
inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the
judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him."
The latest legislation on the subject was Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80
of the Revised Penal Code so as to reduce to below 16 the age of minors coming within
its purview.
A close examination of articles 68 and 80 will disclose that article 68, according to its
main paragraph, is to lay off and watch while the minor is in the hands of a charitable
institution or person mentioned in article 80 trying to reform him or her. This has to be
so because article 68 is a rule for the application of penalties, and there is no penalty
when there is no judgment when the delinquent is in Welfareville or other place of
similar character or entrusted to the care of a private person. However, if and when the
minor turns out to be hopeless or incorrigible, he is returned to the proper court and the
court passes sentence on him or her. In other words, article 80 withdraws, as it were,
and sub-paragraph 1 and 2, as the case maybe, of article 68 takes control.
From this it will be seen that article 68 is not dependent on article 80, nor do these
articles complement each other if by complement is meant that they are two mutually
completing parts so that article 68 could not stand without article 80. It is more
appropriate to say that article 68 merely adjusts itself to article 80 but is, in all other
respects, self-sufficient and independent of the latter. Parts of one system of penology
and working in coordination with each other, they pursue different ends. It is to be
noticed that article 68 falls under section 2 of Chapter IV entitled "Application of
Penalties," while article 80 comes under section 1 of Chapter V entitled "Execution and
Service of Penalties." Two different subjects, these.
It will also be seen that article 68, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code do not function at the same time and are designed for different purposes.
Each has its assigned, separate sphere of action without in any way intermingling with
the other. When article 80 operates, article 68 keeps out of the way; article 68 steps in
when article 80 steps out.
While a minor is in the process of being reformed he is, in a manner of speaking, in an
intermediate or indeterminate state, neither in prison nor free. Through repentance and
by observing good conduct, he is rewarded with freedom, released upon reaching the
age of majority or before, but if he shows no promise of turning a new leaf, Bilibid claims
him.
It is the minors so situated; it is selection of two should be committed to are formatory
school or to the custody of a private person with which article 80 has to do, and no
more. Article 80 does not concern itself with what should be done with minors when
they are consigned to jail because of misbehavior; much less is it concerned over
minors who, after the passage of Republic Act No. 47, are condemned to prison without
having been under the custody of a benevolent institution or private person like youths
between 16 and 18. On the other hand, article 68 is intended for minors who are sent to
jail, a matter foreign to the province of article 80.
To press the argument further, article 85 of the original Penal Code conferred upon
minors under 18 the right to a penalty. Then came the Juvenile Delinquency Act giving
additional concession to juvenile delinquents. When, later, Republic Act No. 47
amended article 80 so as to eliminate from its beneficent provisions minor of the age of
16 or over and under 18, the logical effect of the amendment can no other than to
correspondingly reduce the age of minors regarding whom the suspensory inhibition on
article 68 is to be confined. Only to the extent and within the limits that article 80 applies
is article 68 bound to defer to that article. Where article 80 does not apply article 68 is
supreme. When article 80 says that it will deal only with minors below 16, it relinquishes
authority over minors above that age in favor of article 68. When and if article 80 should
by amendment further reduce the age to 15, to that extent the operation of article 68 will
be correspondingly enlarged.
In fact, if Republic Act No. 47, instead of limiting the operation of article 80 to minors
under 16, had totally abolished the scheme of juvenile reformation, sub-paragraphs 1
and 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal Code would, in our opinion, remain intact, with
the only difference that, as before, they would have full sway, unhampered by any
consideration of suspended judgment. The predecessor of article 68 was in the original
Penal Code since that code was put in force in Spain in 1870 and in the Philippines in
1884, long before the idea embodied in article 80 was conceived. Before the Revised
Penal Code went into effect, article 85 of the old Penal Code and the Juvenile
Delinquency Act worked in the manner herein set forth although there was not any
express provision coordinating their operation. It can safely be said that the main
paragraph of article 68 was inserted merely to explain in clear and express terms when
it should stand aloof and when it should play its role. The Revised Penal Code merely
states the obvious as befits a scientific system of law.
In conclusion, when Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code
by reducing the age of persons who may be placed on probation under that article, the
amendment did not change in any form or manner the degree of punishment that should
be meted out to those who are to be committed to jail or how they are to treated. After
the minor is turned over to the court for sentence, article 80 ceases to have any interest
in him or her. In saying that the 16-and 18-year old should no longer be given a trial or
placed on probation in a reformatory institution but should go straight to prison upon
conviction, Republic Act No. 47 does not, by implication or otherwise, connote that such
minors should also be deprived of a reduced penalty. In no standard of statutory
construction is there support for the proposition that the mitigating circumstance which
minors between 16 and 18 enjoyed before Republic Act No. 47 came into
being, notwithstanding the fact that they had shown evidence of incorrigibility, should be
denied them now for no other reason than that the right to be committed to a
reformatory school has been taken away from them; now that they are confined in jail
without having committed any fault other than the crime for which they were prosecuted
in the first instance.
Let it be remembered that by virtue of the amendment minors between 16 and 18 do not
now come under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80.
Of course, the effect of a law amendment would different if the amendatory law had
absorbed the law which it had amended. In that case, the original law become part and
parcel of the new law, with the result that if the amendatory law be later repealed, both
that law and the law which it had superseded or amended would be considered
abrogated. There was no law of its own force could survive. But, as we have indicated,
article 68 as well as its predecessor is an independent provision and has not been
merged with article 80 or any other article of the Revised Penal code. It is an
independent provision inoperative only during the suspension of the sentence but
possessing all the vigor which article 85 of Spanish Code had, when the minors are
sentenced to jail.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we emphasize the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled
so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting
intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced
upon the court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.) The motion for
reconsideration has not pointed to any conflict, and we can not find any, between the
retention of the privileged or special mitigating circumstance in favor of minors below 18
and over 16 and the fact that such minors are not entitled to the benefits of article 80
under any circumstances. The motion for reconsideration is conspicuous for its silence
on any incongruity or absurdity that might result from our ruling on the scope and extent
of Republic Act No. 47.
The sole consideration that might commend itself in favor of the Government's position
is the general welfare. For the good of society it may have been better if Republic Act
No. 47 had amended articles 13 and 68 also by correspondingly reducing the age of
accused minors entitled to a mitigating circumstance by reason of age. But it is write to
say that we are not authorized to insert into a law what we think should be in it or to
supply what we think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called
to the omission. This is specially true in penal legislation which, as we have repeatedly
stressed in our decision, has to be construed strictly. But there is not even room for
construction in this case. The preamble or explanatory note to Republic Act No. 47 can
not be used as basis for giving it an meaning not apparent on its face. A preamble or
explanatory not is resorted to only for clarification in cases of doubt. There is no
ambiguity in Republic Act No. 47.
The motion and the request to set it for oral argument are denied.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

TUASON, J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla took part in the deliberation of this motion and voted to
deny the same.
G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006
ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of
Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No.
6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995
senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc
and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information
reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May
8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election
Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School
District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary,
respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators
Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the
votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine
hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in
the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said
municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and
008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass with
Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for
insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b)
for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP
Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower
which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to
probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and
she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is
ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at
Metro Manila, until further orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6)
months to one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal
assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT
COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO
DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY
RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE
ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO
READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE
TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE
ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE
WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF
CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT
WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on
speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there
was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation
of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.
The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified
under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid
defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even
if they are punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On
the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently
immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With
these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses
enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the
following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who
tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or
any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the
correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors
and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the
volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors
and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to
punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or
decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is
done with malice and intent to injure another.
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which
the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith
as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of
Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the
results thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for
canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded
in the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the
figures appearing in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as
secretary of the Board, entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the
appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each
candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were
entered by accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the
accused Palisoc and de Vera with the use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine
tapes were handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each
candidate in the precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then]
records the subtotal in the proper column in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc
and de Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was
reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the
figure read by appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14
Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV)
for each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in
the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the
subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159
precincts in SOV No. 008423.15The grand total of the votes for private complainant,
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the
number of votes private complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the
Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who
announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray
in his capacity as secretary of the board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the
one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind,
preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the
erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioner’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had
no idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had
only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers, petitioner’s concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of
the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves
not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal
responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private
complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate
does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The
mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already
punishable under the said provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate
court. The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of
the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal,
particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the
matter coincide.21
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members
of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their
part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal
board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be
thoroughly scrutinized.22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private
complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a
difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due
to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes
and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record
unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from
one document to another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining petitioner’s conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her
sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM,
MANUEL DELIM alias BONG (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and RONALD
DELIM alias BONG, accused-appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,1 dated January 14, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City, finding accused-appellants Marlon
Delim, Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The court also
ordered accused-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the sums
of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias Bong and
Robert, all surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder under an Information dated May
4, 1999 which reads:
That on or about January 23, 1999, in the evening at Brgy. Bila, Sison, Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
short firearms barged-in and entered the house of Modesto Delim and once inside with
intent to kill, treachery, evident premedidation (sic), conspiring with one another, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab, hold, hogtie, gag with a piece of
cloth, brought out and abduct Modesto Delim, accused Leon Delim and Manuel Delim
stayed in the house guarded and prevented the wife and son of Modesto Delim from
helping the latter, thereafter with abuse of superior strength stabbed and killed said
Modesto Delim, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Only accused-appellants Marlon (Bongbong), Leon and Ronald, all surnamed Delim,
were apprehended. Accused Robert and Manuel remain at-large.
At their arraignment, Marlon, Ronald and Leon, with the assistance of their counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
At the trial, the prosecution established the following relevant facts3cräläwvirtualibräry
Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and
Ronald Delim. Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He
took the surname Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel and
Robert. However, Modestos wife, Rita, an illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy,
continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname. Modesto, Rita and Randy considered
Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their relatives. Manuel and Leon were the
neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit Modesto and his family.
Modesto and his family and the Delim kins resided in Barangay Bila, Sison,
Pangasinan.
On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were
preparing to have their supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and Ritas two
young grandchildren, aged 5 and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when
Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged into the house and closed the door. Each
of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon poked his gun at
Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A
piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.4 Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded
Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan. Rita and Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon
and Manuel, who were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the
house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay where they were. Leon and
Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January
24, 1999.
As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin
Nio, at Sitio Labayog, informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his
help for the retrieval of Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police
authorities. However, Randy opted to first look for his father. He and his other relatives
scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail. They proceeded to Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from Modestos house, to locate Modesto but
failed to find him there. On January 25, 1999, Randy and his relatives returned to the
housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan to locate Modesto but again failed to find
him there. On January 26, 1999, Randy reported the incident to the police authorities.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his
relatives, Nida Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the
housing project in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under
thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was bloated and in
the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and
feasted on the cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to the police station
to report the incident and to seek assistance.
When informed of the discovery of Modestos cadaver, the local chief of police and
SPO2 Jovencio Fajarito and other policemen rushed to the scene and saw the cadaver
under the thick bushes. Pictures were taken of the cadaver.5 Rita and Randy divulged
to the police investigators the names and addresses of Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon
and Manuel, whom they claimed were responsible for the death of Modesto. Rita and
Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and
Randy gave their respective sworn statements to the police investigators.6 Police
authorities proceeded to arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to
find them in their respective houses. The police officers scoured the mountainous parts
of Barangays Immalog and Labayog to no avail.
The cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Maria Fe L. De Guzman who prepared her autopsy
report, which reads:
SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
- Body - both upper extremities are flexed
- both lower extremities are flexed
- (+) body decomposition
- (+) worms coming out from injuries
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, pre-auricular area, right
- 20 x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular areas, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right
- 10 x 10 ml. GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE)
- 30 x 40 ml. GSW, mid parieto occipital area (POEx)
- 2 x 1 cms. lacerated wound, right cheek
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, axillary area, left
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect M/3rd, left arm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm
- #3; 1 x 1 cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left
forearm
- 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect, D/3rd, left forearm
- 10 x 6 cms. Inflamed scrotum
- penis inflamed
SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL FINDINGS:
- no significant internal findings
CAUSE OF DEATH:
GUN SHOT WOUND, HEAD.7cräläwvirtualibräry
The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive
wounds. The police investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert,
Leon and Manuel had no licenses for their firearms.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show
that Marlon had pending cases for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in
Criminal Case No. 16193-R, and for robbery in band in Criminal Cases Nos. 9801 and
9802 pending with the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan.9cräläwvirtualibräry
To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and Leon interposed denial and
alibi.10cräläwvirtualibräry
Ronald claimed that on January 23, 1999, he, his wife and children, his mother, his
brothers and sisters were in their house at Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan about two
kilometers away from Modestos house.
He denied having been in the house of Modesto on January 23, 1999 and of abducting
and killing him. He theorized that Rita and Randy falsely implicated him upon the
coaching of Melchor Javier who allegedly had a quarrel with him concerning politics.
Leon for his part averred that on January 23, 1999, he was in the house of his sister,
Hermelita Estabillo at No. 55-B, Salet, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte where he had been
living since 1997 after leaving Asan Norte, Sison, Pangasinan. Since then, he had been
working for Sally Asuncion at a hollow-block factory in that city where he was a stay-in
worker.
Sally Asuncion corroborated Leons alibi. She testified that Leon Delim never went home
to his hometown in Pangasinan during his employment. His sister, Hermelita Estabillo,
likewise averred that on January 23, 1999, his brother was at her house to give her his
laundry. She claimed that the distance between Laoag City and Bila, Sison, Pangasinan
can be traversed in six hours by bus. Leon presented a Barangay Certificate to prove
that he was a resident of Laoag City from January 1998 up to February
1999.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Marlon asserted that he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998
up to January 29, 1999. During his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim.
Upon his return to Manila on January 29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to
visit his cousin. Marlon denied setting foot in Bila, Sison, Pangasinan after his sojourn in
Dumaguete City.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants guilty of murder. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION beyond reasonable doubt is hereby
rendered against Ronald Delim, Marlon Delim and Leon Delim (for) the commission of
Aggravated Murder, an offense defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 and the Court sentences Marlon Delim, Ronald
Delim and Leon Delim to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be implemented in the manner
as provided for by law; the Court likewise orders the accused, jointly and solidarily, to
indemnify the heirs of Modesto Delim the sum of P75,000.00 as moral damages, plus
the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case
to the Honorable Supreme Court, and to prepare the mittimus fifteen (15) days from
date of promulgation.
The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Urdaneta District Jail,
Urdaneta City is hereby ordered to transmit the persons of Marlon, Ronald and Leon, all
surnamed Delim to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, fifteen days from receipt of
this decision.
SO ORDERED.12cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and of taking
advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon, in
their appeal brief, assail the decision alleging that:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED
IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI.13cräläwvirtualibräry
Before resolving the merits of the case at bar, we first resolve the matter of whether the
crime charged in the Information is murder or kidnapping. During the deliberation, some
distinguished members of the Court opined that under the Information, Marlon, Ronald
and Leon are charged with kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
not with murder in its aggravated form in light of the allegation therein that the
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab(bed), h(e)ld, hog-tie(d), gag(ged), with
a piece of cloth, brought out and abduct(ed) Modesto Delim (while) Leon Delim and
Manuel Delim stayed in the house (and) guarded and prevented the wife and son of
Modesto Delim from helping the latter. They submit that the foregoing allegation
constitutes the act of deprivation of liberty of the victim, the gravamen in the crime of
kidnapping. They contend that the fact that the Information went further to charge
accused with the killing of the victim should be of no moment, the real nature of the
criminal charge being determined not from the caption or the preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated these
being conclusions of law but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
They further submit that since the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of
Marlon, Ronald and Leon to kill Modesto, they are not criminally liable for the death of
the victim but only for kidnapping the victim.
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is charged in an information, the
material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the
penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is
determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the
information and proved by the prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v.
Isabelo Puno, et al.,[14] that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual specific intent of the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty
and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the malefactor. This Court further
held:
x x x. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, and consistently reiterated
thereafter, it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims
by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate
purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other
offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims
liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.15cräläwvirtualibräry
If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental
deprivation of the victims liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is
merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the
killing of the victim.16 The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.
What is primordial then is the specific intent of the malefactors as disclosed in the
information or criminal complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused is
charged with--that of murder or kidnapping.
Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific
intent as an essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to
describe a state of mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender
actively desired certain criminal consequences or objectively desired a specific result to
follow his act or failure to act.17 Specific intent involves a state of the mind. It is the
particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited act. Specific intent must
be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a crime
requiring specific intent.18 Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.
Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may
be inferred from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the
evidence on record.19cräläwvirtualibräry
Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the
reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is
not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the
same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged
does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the
innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.20 The history of crimes
shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively
trivial.21 Crime is rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In
kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no
motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping.22 In kidnapping
for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of
a loved one, the motive is revenge.
In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the
malefactors in barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized
precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the
malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary purpose of
killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary
intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing
him was merely incidental to kidnapping.23 Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the
Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping
under Article 268 thereof.
The threshold issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the prosecution mustered
the requisite quantum of evidence to prove that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty of
murder.
In criminal prosecutions, the prosecution is burdened to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond cavil of doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The proof against the accused
must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.24cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which
consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendants agency in the
commission of the act.25 Wharton says that corpus delicti includes two things: first, the
objective; second, the subjective element of crimes.26 In homicide (by dolo) and in
murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to
be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the
deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that
defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the
act which produced the death.27 To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must
be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately
killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors
before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because
of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.28cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the prosecution adduced the requisite quantum of proof of corpus
delicti. Modesto sustained five (5) gunshot wounds. He also sustained seven (7) stab
wounds,29 defensive in nature. The use by the malefactors of deadly weapons, more
specifically handguns and knives, in the killing of the victim as well as the nature,
number and location of the wounds sustained by said victim are evidence of the intent
by the malefactors to kill the victim with all the consequences flowing therefrom.30 As
the State Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in Cupps v. State:31cräläwvirtualibräry
This rule, that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally
act deliberately and by the determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of
blind passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the contrary
appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances
of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental,
it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the
burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
The prosecution did not present direct evidence to prove the authors of the killing of
Modesto. It relied on circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden of proving the guilt
of accused-appellants of murder. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral
facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
according to reason and common experience.32 What was once a rule of account
respectability is now entombed in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the
following requisites concur:
x x x if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences
are derived have been established; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.33cräläwvirtualibräry
The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact
mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of
the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the
guilt of accused for the offense charged.34 For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient
to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.35 If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove
the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused to controvert the evidence of the prosecution.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of circumstantial
evidence to prove that accused-appellants, in confabulation with their co-accused,
conspired to kill and did kill Modesto:
1. Randy Bantas testified that Marlon and Ronald barged into the house of Modesto,
each armed with a handgun. Marlon poked his gun on Modesto while Ronald hog-tied
Modesto. They then seized Modesto and herded him out of his house:
FISCAL TOMBOC: What were you doing then at that time in your house?
A We were eating, sir.
Q You said we, who were your companions eating then at that time?
A My father, my mother and the two children and myself, sir.
Q While taking your supper that time, do you recall if there was anything unusual that
happened at that time?
A When we were about to start to eat three armed men entered our house.
Q Do you know these three armed men who entered your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are they, name them one by one?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim.
Q Are these three persons inside the courtroom now?
A Two of them, sir.
Q Who are these two who are inside the courtroom?
A Marlon and Ronald, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point to them?
A (Witness is pointing to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when
his name was asked answered Marlon Delim. Likewise, witness is pointing unto a
person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his name was asked he
answered Ronald Delim).
Q You said that these two armed persons entered your house, what kind of arm were
they carrying at that time?
A Short handgun, sir.
Q When these three armed persons whom you have mentioned, armed with short
firearms, what did they do then when they entered your house?
A They took my father, sir.
Q Who took your father?
A Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Ronald Delim, sir.
Q When these three persons took your father, what did you do then?
A None, sir.
COURT: How did they get your father?
A They poked a gun and brought him outside the house, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Who poked a gun?
A Marlon Delim, sir.
Q Again, Mr. Witness, will you point to the person who poked a gun?
A (Witness is pointing to Malon (sic) Delim, one of the accused).
Q After bringing your father out from your house, what transpired next?
A Manuel Delim and Leon Delim said, Stay in your house, and guarded us.
COURT: You said your father was taken out, who?
A Marlon, Robert and Ronald, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Where did these three persons bring your father?
A I do not know where they brought my father, sir.
COURT: Was your father taken inside your house or outside?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q You said that Marlon poked a gun at your father, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did Ronald and Robert do while Marlon was poking his gun to your father?
A Ronald and Robert were the ones who pulled my father out, sir.36cräläwvirtualibräry
Randys account of the incident was corroborated by his mother, Rita, who testified:
PROSECUTION TOMBOC: You said during the last hearing that on January 23, 1999
at around 6:30 in the evening while preparing for your supper three (3) armed men
entered inside your house, who were these three (3) men who entered your house?
A I know, Marlon, Bongbong and Robert, sir.
ATTY. FLORENDO: We just make of record that the witness is taking her time to
answer, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR TOMBOC: You said that Marlon Delim, Robert Delim and Bongbong
entered your house, are these three (3) persons who entered your house in Court now?
A They are here except the other one, sir.
Q Will you please step down and point to the persons who entered your house?
A Witness is pointing to Marlon Delim, Robert Delim is not in Court and Bongbong is
Ronald Delim.
Q After these three (3) armed men entered your house, what happened then?
A My husband was brought out, sir.
Q What is the name of your husband?
A Modesto Delim, sir.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. Randy said that when Marlon and Ronald barged into their house, Leon, armed with
a handgun, acted as a lookout when he stood guard by the door of the house of
Modesto and remained thereat until 7:00 a.m. of the next day:
FISCAL TOMBOC: When your father was pulled out from your house by these three
persons, what did you and your mother do while these three persons were taking out of
your house?
A We did not do anything because Manuel and Leon Delim guarded us.
COURT: Where, in your house?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: From that very time that your father was pulled out by these three
persons Marlon, Robert and Ronal (sic), where were Leon and Manuel then?
A They were at the door, sir.
COURT: Why do you know that they were guarding you?
A Because they were at the door, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: What was their appearance that time when these two persons were
guarding you, these Leon and Manuel?
A They were armed, sir.
Q What do you mean by armed?
A They have gun, sir.
Q What kind of firearm?
A Short firearm, sir.
Q By the way, where are these Leon and Manuel now, if you know?
A Leon is here, sir.
Q About Manuel?
A None, sir.
Q Will you please stand up and point at Leon, Mr. Witness?
A (Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who when his
name was asked, answered, Leon Delim).38cräläwvirtualibräry
3. Rita and Randy were ordered by Leon not to leave the house as Ronald and Marlon
left the house with Modesto in tow. Rita and Randy were detained in their house up to
7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 to prevent them from seeking help from their relatives
and police authorities.
4. Randy likewise testified that on January 27, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., the cadaver of
Modesto was found under the thick bushes in a grassy area in the housing project
located about 200 meters away from the house of Modesto. The cadaver exuded bad
odor and was already in the state of decomposition:
Q So what did you do then on January 27, where did you look for your father?
A The same place and at 3:00 oclock P.M., we were able to find my father.
COURT: Where?
A At the housing project at Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, sir.
FISCAL TOMBOC: Do you have companions at that time when you were able to look
for your father on January 27, 1999 at 3:00 oclock P.M.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My Aunt, sir.
Q What is the name of your Aunt?
A Nida Pucal, sir.
Q Who else?
A Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, sir.
COURT: When you found your father, what was his condition?
A He was dead, sir.
COURT: Go ahead.
FISCAL TOMBOC: You said that he was already dead, what was his appearance then
when you saw him dead?
A He has bad odor, sir, in the state of decompsition (sic).39cräläwvirtualibräry
The testimony of Randy was corroborated by Dr. de Guzman who testified that the
cadaver of Modesto was in a state of decomposition, with tiny white worms crawling
from his wounds, and that his penis and scrotum were inflamed. The victim sustained
five gunshot wounds and defensive wounds on the left arm and forearm:
PROS. TOMBOC:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court your findings, Doctora?
WITNESS:
A First finding: Upon seeing the cadaver, this is the position of the body, both upper
extremities are flexed and both lower extremities are flexed (Nakakukot).
Q How many days had already elapsed when you autopsied the cadaver of the victim,
Doctora?
A Four (4) days upon the recovery of the body, sir.
Q And what was your findings Doctora?
A The body was already under the state of decomposition, sir, with foul odor and there
were so many worms coming out from the injuries, there were tiny white worms, sir.
Q What else did you observe Doctora?
A Upon seeing the cadaver I asked the relative to refer it to the NBI sir. Actually the
victim was an igorot (sic) and they have tradition that they will bury immediately.
Whether they like it or not I should do it, sir.
Q What else Doctora?
A And the penis was inflammed (sic), the scrotum was also inflammed (sic), sir.
And for the head injuries there was 10 x 10 ml. GSW pre-auricular area, right; there was
also 20 ml x 20 ml. GSW, mandibular area, right; I cannot also determine the exit.
Q So there were two (2) gunshot wounds (GSW) Doctora?
A Yes sir.
And there was also 10 x 10 ml. GSW, maxillary area, right; there was also 10 x 10 ml.
GSW, below middle nose, directed upward (POE); and there was also 30 x 40 ml.
GSW, mid parieto-occipital area (POEx).
Q How many all in all are the gunshot wound?
A Five (5) sir.
And also there was 2 x 1 cms. Lacerated wound, right cheek; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound,
axillary area, left; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, lateral aspect M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm.
stabbed wound lateral aspect D/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect
M/3rd, left arm; 1 x 1 cm. stabbed wound, medial aspect D/3rd, left arm; and #3; 1 x 1
cm. in line with each other, stabbed wound, medial aspect, M/3rd, left forearm.
Q How many stabbed wound are there Doctora?
A There were seven (7) stabbed wounds, sir.
Q Those stabbed wounds were defensive wounds, Doctora?
A Yes sir.40cräläwvirtualibräry
The state of decomposition of the cadaver, with tiny white worms swarming and feasting
on it and the distention of his scrotum and penis are evidence that the cadaver was in
the stage of putrefaction and that the victim had been dead for a period ranging from
three to six days.41 Admittedly, there are variant factors determinative of the exact
death of the victim. An equally persuasive authority states:
Chronological Sequence of Putrefactive Changes Occurring in Tropical Region:
Time Since Death Condition of the Body
48 hours Ova of flies seen.
Trunk bloated. Face discolored and swollen. Blisters present.
Moving maggots seen.
72 hours Whole body grossly swollen and
disfigured. Hair and nails loose.
Tissues soft and discolored.42cräläwvirtualibräry
The lapse of two or three to four days from the seizure of the victim in the evening of
January 23, 1999 to the discovery of his cadaver which was already in the state of
putrefaction in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, about 200 meters away from his
house, is consistent with and confirmatory of the contention of the prosecution that the
victim was killed precisely by the very malefactors who seized him on January 23, 1999.
5. When police authorities went to the residences of all the malefactors, the latter had
flown the coop and were nowhere to be found:
COURT: In connection with this case, you investigated the wife and son of Modesto
Delim?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the course of the investigation did you come to know who were the suspects?
A Yes, sir, she elaborated that the suspects were their neighbors, Marlon Delim and his
brothers, sir.
Q What are the names of the brothers?
A Manuel Delim, Leon Delim I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q By reason of that information were you able to apprehend any of them for
investigation?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because when we were dispatched by the Chief of Police no Delim brothers could be
found, they all left the place, sir.
Q In what place did you look for the brothers Delim?
A Within the vicinity, sir.
Q In what place?
A Brgy. Bila and the place where the crime was committed in Brgy. Bila and the place
where the cadaver was found in Paldit, sir.
Q Where did you look for the Delim brothers?
A Nearby barangays, Immalog, sir.
Q Wherelse (sic)?
A Labayog, Sison, sir.
Q Wherelse?
A In mountainous part of Immalog, part of Tuba Benguet, sir.
Q What was the result?
A Negative result, sir.43cräläwvirtualibräry
6. Leon was the neighbor of Modesto and Rita while Marlon and Ronald used to go to
the house of Modesto and Rita:
COURT: These Leon and Manuel Delim are they known to you prior to that day,
January 23, 1999?
A Yes, sir, I know them.
Q Why do you know Manuel and Leon prior to January 23, 1999?
A They are my neighbors, sir.
Q How about Marlon, Robert and Bongbong do you know them before January 23,
1999?
A I know them, sir.
Q Why do you know them?
A They used to go to our house, sir.
Q I noticed that Marlon, Bongbong, Robert, Manuel and Leon are all Delims and your
husbands name is Modesto Delim are they related with each other?
A Yes, sir.44cräläwvirtualibräry
The sudden disappearance of Marlon, Ronald and Leon from their houses in Barangay
Bila, Sison is strong circumstantial evidence of their guilt for the death of Modesto.
Although flight after the commission of an offense does not create a legal presumption
of guilt, nevertheless, the same is admissible in evidence against them and if not
satisfactorily explained in a manner consistent with their innocence, will tend to show
that they, in fact, killed Modesto.45cräläwvirtualibräry
It is true that the prosecution failed to prove motive on the part of the malefactors to
abduct and kill Modesto. Indeed, Randy and Rita testified that they were not aware of
any misunderstanding or grudge between Modesto on the one hand and Marlon,
Ronald and Leon and their co-accused on the other before the incident, or any
motivation on the part of the three malefactors to cause harm to Modesto. Nonetheless,
it cannot thereby be concluded that a person or persons other than Marlon, Ronald and
Leon were criminally responsible for the death of the victim. It is a matter of judicial
notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at
all.46 In this case, the inscrutable facts are that Marlon and Ronald, each of whom was
armed with a handgun, forcibly took Modesto from his house at the gunpoint, hogtied,
put a piece of cloth in his mouth and after Ronald and Marlon had left the house with
Modesto in tow, Rita heard three gunshots or so and the cadaver of Modesto was found
concealed under the bushes and already in a state of putrefaction in the afternoon of
January 27, 1999. Modesto sustained several gunshot wounds and died because of a
gunshot wound on the head. The criminal acts and the connection of Marlon, Ronald
and Leon with said acts having been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt, the act itself furnishes the evidence, that to its perpetration there was some
causes or influences moving the mind.47 The remarkable tapestry intricately woven by
the prosecution should not be trashed simply because the malefactors had no motive to
kill Modesto.
Ranged against the evidence of the prosecution, the burden of evidence shifted on
Marlon, Ronald and Leon to rebut the same and explain what happened to the victim
after taking him from his house in the evening of January 23, 1999. They may have
freed the victim shortly after taking him, or the victim may have been able to escape and
that thereafter a person or some other persons may have killed him. However, Marlon,
Ronald and Leon failed to give any explanation. Instead, they merely denied having
seized and killed the victim and interposed alibi as their defense.
Leon is equally guilty for the death of Modesto because the evidence on record shows
that he conspired with accused-appellants Marlon and Ronald and accused Robert and
Manuel in killing the victim.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it.48 Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the
felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not
presumed. It may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy is deducible from the acts of the malefactors before, during and after the
commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiment.49 To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be
proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.50 It is sufficient if,
at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution. If conspiracy is established, the act of one is deemed the
act of all. It matters not who among the accused actually shot and killed the
victim.51 This is based on the theory of a joint or mutual agency ad hoc for the
prosecution of the common plan:
x x x The acts and declarations of an agent, within the scope of his authority, are
considered and treated as the acts and declarations of his principal. What is so done by
an agent, is done by the principal through him, as his mere instrument. Franklin Bank of
Baltimore v. Pennsylvania D. & M. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28, 33 (1839). If
the conspiracy be proved to have existed, or rather if evidence be given to the jury of its
existence, the acts of one in furtherance of the common design are the acts of all; and
whatever one does in furtherance of the common design, he does as the agent of the
co-conspirators. R. v. OConnell, 5 St.Tr. (N.S.) 1, 710.52cräläwvirtualibräry
In the eyes of the law, conspirators are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak
one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and declaration of
each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and declarations of
all.53cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, Marlon, Ronald and Leon arrived together in the house of Modesto,
each armed with a handgun. Marlon and Ronald barged into said house while Leon
stood guard by the door thereof. After Marlon and Ronald had left with Modesto in tow,
Leon stood by the door and warned Randy and Rita not to leave the house. Leon stood
guard by the door of the house until 7:00 a.m. of January 24, 1999 when he left the
house. The overt acts of all the malefactors were so synchronized and executed with
precision evincing a preconceived plan or design of all the malefactors to achieve a
common purpose, namely the killing of Modesto. Irrefragably, the tasks assigned to
Leon in the commission of the crime were (a) to act as a lookout; (b) to ensure that Rita
and Randy remain in their house to prevent them from seeking assistance from police
authorities and their relatives before their mission to kill Modesto shall have been a fait
accompli as well as the escape of Marlon and Ronald.54 Patently, Leon, a lookout for
the group, is guilty of the killing of Modesto.55 Leon may not have been at the situs
criminis when Modesto was killed by Marlon and Ronald nevertheless he is a principal
by direct participation.56 If part of a crime has been committed in one place and part in
another, each person concerned in the commission of either part is liable as principal.
No matter how wide may be the separation of the conspirators, if they are all engaged in
a common plan for the execution of a felony and all take their part in furtherance of the
common design, all are liable as principals. Actual presence is not necessary if there is
a direct connection between the actor and the crime. 57cräläwvirtualibräry
Ronald, Marlon and Leon, however, assail the testimonies of Randy and Rita alleging
that the same were marred by inconsistencies:
1. Randy initially stated that he did not know where the assailants brought his father.
Later however, Randy claimed that the malefactors proceeded to the direction of Paldit,
Sison, Pangasinan;
2. Rita on the other hand identified Leon, Marlon and Ronald as those who barged into
their house. She later changed her testimony and declared that it was Robert, together
with Marlon and Ronald who barged into the house;
3. Rita likewise testified that two men stood outside the house guarding them. Later, she
testified that after the three men brought out the victim, the two other accused entered
the house and guarded them there;
4. Rita claimed that she went out to look for her husband the next day, or on January
25, 1999, and she was accompanied by her son Randy. However, Randy testified that
he was alone when he looked for his father from January 24 to 26,
1999.58cräläwvirtualibräry
We do not agree with Marlon, Ronald and Leon. Case law has it that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from its findings
are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of its
unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct
of the witnesses as they give their testimonies before the court. In the present case, the
trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of
the prosecution. Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Randy and Rita were
moved by any improper or ill motive in testifying against the malefactors and the other
accused; hence, their testimonies must be given full credit and probative weight.59 The
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rita and Randy do not render them incredible or
their testimonies barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that human
memory is not as unerring as a photograph and a persons sense of observation is
impaired by many factors including the shocking effect of a crime. A truth-telling witness
is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and
the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes
on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses
credibility nor the veracity of his testimony.60 Variations on the testimony of witnesses
on the same side with respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the
weight of their united testimony to the prominent facts.61 Inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses
for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.62cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, the testimony of a witness should be construed in its entirety and not in
truncated terms and the true meaning of answers to isolated questions propounded to a
witness is to be ascertained by due consideration of all the questions propounded to the
witness and his answers thereto.63cräläwvirtualibräry
Randys testimony that he did know where the malefactors brought his father is not
inconsistent with his testimony that Ronald and Marlon brought his father towards the
direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Randy may not have known the destination of
accused-appellants but he saw the direction to which they went. While it may be true
that when asked to identify the three who barged into their house, Rita pointed to Leon
as one of them, however, Rita had been consistent throughout her testimony that those
who barged into their house were Ronald and Marlon. Leons counsel never cross-
examined Rita and impeached her testimony on her identification of Leon as one of
those who barged into their house to give her an opportunity to explain her perceived
inconsistency conformably with Rule 132, Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Evidence
which reads:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to
him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he
must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If
the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.64cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence, the presentation of the inconsistent statements made by Rita is insufficient for
the desired impeachment of her.65 As to whether Rita and Randy were together in
looking for Modesto or Leon merely stood guard by the door of the house or entered the
house are inconsequential. The fact is that Leon stood guard throughout the night to
prevent Rita and Randy from seeking assistance for the seizure and killing of Modesto.
This Court is convinced, as the trial court was, that the respective testimonies of Randy
and Rita bear the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Despite intense and grueling cross-
examination, they responded with consistency upon material details that could only
come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which unfolded before their
eyes. The Court thus finds no cogent reason to disregard the findings of the trial court
regarding their credibility.
Marlon, Ronald and Leon contend that the trial court committed a reversible error in not
giving credence and probative weight to their evidence to prove their defense of alibi.
They aver that their collective evidence to prove their defense is strong.
We do not agree. Case law has it that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest of
defenses in criminal prosecution because the same is easy to concoct between
relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender.66 It is hard for the
prosecution to disprove. For alibi to merit approbation by the trial court and this Court,
Marlon, Ronald and Leon are burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence
that they were in a place other than the situs criminis at the time of the commission of
the crime; that it was physically impossible for them to have committed the said
crime.67 They failed to discharge their burden. Moreover, Rita and Randy positively and
spontaneously identified Marlon, Ronald and Leon as the culprits. The house of Ronald,
where he claimed he was when the crime was committed, was only two kilometers
away from the house of Modesto and can be negotiated by a tricycle. Leon failed to
adduce any documentary evidence to prove his employment by Sally Asuncion. The
barefaced fact that he was a resident of Laoag City does not constitute proof that he
was in Laoag City on the day of the commission of the crime. With respect to Marlon, he
failed to adduce evidence aside from his self-serving testimony that he resided in, left
Dumaguete City and arrived in Manila on January 29, 1999.
The trial court convicted Marlon, Ronald and Leon of murder with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in the killing of Modesto. The trial court likewise appreciated
nighttime and abuse of superior strength and the use of unlicensed firearms as separate
aggravating circumstances. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that indeed
treachery was attendant in the killing of Modesto. Hence, Marlon, Ronald and Leon are
guilty of murder defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide
defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be
alleged and proved clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures,
suppositions or presumptions are utterly insufficient and cannot produce the effect of
qualifying the crime.68 As this Court held: No matter how truthful these suppositions or
presumptions may seem, they must not and cannot produce the effect of aggravating
the condition of defendant.69 Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove the following elements:
(a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; (b) the means of execution is deliberately or
consciously adopted.70 Although the victim may have been defenseless at the time he
was seized but there is no evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and
killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.71 In this case, the victim
was defenseless when seized by Marlon and Ronald. However, the prosecution failed to
present any witness or conclusive evidence that Modesto was defenseless immediately
before and when he was attacked and killed. It cannot be presumed that although he
was defenseless when he was seized the victim was in the same situation when he was
attacked, shot and stabbed by the malefactors. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked.72 What is primordial, this Court held in People v. Rogelio
Francisco73 is that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the crime. It is necessary to show that the malefactors
cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength.74 In
this case, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that Marlon and Ronald
deliberately took advantage of their numerical superiority when Modesto was killed. The
barefaced facts that the malefactors outnumbered Modesto and were armed while
Modesto was not does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their
numerical superioty and their handguns when Modesto was shot and
stabbed.75cräläwvirtualibräry
In sum then, we believe that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of Homicide
defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal in its full period.
Although the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearms was
proven during the trial, there is no allegation in the Information that Marlon, Ronald and
Leon had no license to possess the firearm. Lack of license to possess a firearm is an
essential element of the crime of violation of PD1866 as amended by Republic Act No.
8294, or as a special aggravating circumstance in the felony of homicide or
murder.76Neither can dwelling, although proven, aggravate the crime because said
circumstance was not alleged in the Information as required by Rule 110, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Court.77 Although this rule took effect on December 1, 2000, after
the commission of the offense in this case, nonetheless it had been given retroactive
effect considering that the rule is favorable to the accused.78cräläwvirtualibräry
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of homicide, Marlon, Ronald
and Leon should be meted an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which shall be
taken from the entirety of prision mayor, ranging from 6 years and one day to 12 years
and the maximum period of which shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and 4 months.
Consequently, the award for damages in favor of the heirs of the victim should be
modified. The sum of P75,000.00 awarded as moral damages should be reduced
to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.79 The amount
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.80 In addition, civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded without need of proof, likewise in consonance
with prevailing jurisprudence.81cräläwvirtualibräry
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Marlon Delim, Ronald Delim and Leon Delim are
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide defined in and
penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime, each of accused-appellants is hereby
meted an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayorin its maximum period as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. Accused-
appellants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Vitug.
R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the
testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from
the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other
evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We
think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the
evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any
doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the record may be taken
to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort
Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached
house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was
occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of
which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which
communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a
heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the
porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the
room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received
for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the
room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and
was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of
the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you."
At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which
it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was
employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when
either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with
his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his
friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers'
quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk
at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual
going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting
on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to
No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of
the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that
he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the
door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests
itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese
roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to
give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being
attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by
the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six
years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a
wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be
entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal
blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous
thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-
repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in
his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to
discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That
neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in
real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful
aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and
resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend his
person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which
he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question
we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there
is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was
not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of
the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes
intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of
the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he
intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim.
Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240;
Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509;
Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question
worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or
ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the
Penal Code. It has been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as
most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly declare
that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the commission of
the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the
express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true
that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the
definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime,
nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice,
or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein
defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and
acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act
committed is different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed
that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction,
except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is
done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of
the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition
to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other.
Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the
criminal shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion
to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime
follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature
does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been otherwise stated,
the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether
the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary"
as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act,
and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention)
there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words
"con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the
code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use
in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary."
(Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said
to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be
done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence,
nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.)
And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more
apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our
code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for
example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be
the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that,
whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the
appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because
of the lack of the necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every
action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their
absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a
necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial
court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also
from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice,
would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a
less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence
or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their
discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the
crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which
case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider
proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words
"criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of
the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence,
and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate
in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a
form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means
little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent
a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it
signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as
employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without
reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other
words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice,"
"malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more
purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;"
the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a
particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the
definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice
aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal
intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with
the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent must
combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from
the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to
the intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing
was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal
mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment
is the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our
legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on
this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum
nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were
so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is
not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs
from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention,
we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or
misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man
guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent."
The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of
excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the
innocent is cast down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice that where
the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no
one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind,
destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment
which the community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it
elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the
want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost
confidence that the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these
facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the
doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the
law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is
wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from
this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule
that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which
justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same
doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid,
in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional
cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so
construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the
law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because
"the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the
thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases
cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with
the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a
sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake
of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must
depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C.,
387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y.,
509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55
Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is
to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might
reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other
wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe
them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the
life of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with
reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the
doctrine of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified
in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is
misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise,
and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law,
sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this
rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a
lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands
his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack
is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property
are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts
were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the commission of
any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of
the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime
of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake
of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or
criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of
homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in
article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a
felonious design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be
either manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used
and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case,
Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as
he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club
in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and
of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the
real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who
hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the
assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely
take away the essential right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury
who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of
his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep.,
p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada,
a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to
those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the
man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person
whom he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion
on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the
stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow,
knocking him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving
the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person
was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his
identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting
from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant
relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating
great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility,
as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in paragraph 4,
article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found
that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and that there did not
exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance with
articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was
acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the
facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from
behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked,
struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have
executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed
demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and
child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended
himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not
exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally
necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he killed was the one which
he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of
the house and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it
was not given him to known or distinguish whether there was one or more assailants,
nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and
considering that the lower court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed
rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of
article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain,
February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a
retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice
of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol,
distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a
different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance,
finding the body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake,
or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply,
and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having
acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8,
Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only
found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the
reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, condemned
the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was
acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person
calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc.,
the means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme
court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by
a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window
and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money,
otherwise his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley
adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he
fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same
spot. Shall this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in
just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of
law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor
of the accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility,
but not that of reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the
accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon
appeal, the supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing
at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening robbery
and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family.
(Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief
that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he
would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness
in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail
bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that,
according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence,
defined and punishes in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the
victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or
criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed by
the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the erroneous
belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor;
the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person who
was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the
accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision
correctional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an
indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances,
thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
'
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.November 29, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal
Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO
P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to
Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal. [4] He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer
Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to
visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite
Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed
marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought
his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them that their
son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They
were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. [5]It appeared in their marriage contract that
Eduardo was 'single.

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their
joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City.
However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house
only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her. [6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his
clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. [7] She was so
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when they exchanged their own vows. [8]

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she
worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He
informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to
marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed
that she had a 'love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified
that he declared he was 'single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed
in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in
1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw
her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
(6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and
directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount
of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit. [9]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that
Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife's
20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the
ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu, [10] the trial court further ruled that even if the
private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter
would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable
for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith
and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the
private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer
subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there
must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by
malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should
have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the
appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v. Pealosa [11] and Manahan,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals. [12]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of good faith
and reliance on the Court's ruling in United States v. Enriquez [13] were misplaced;
what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the
Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco, [14] the OSG further
posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to
marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be
permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover,
the OSG maintained, the private complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would
not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against
the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court
was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41
of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaa's presumptive death
as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan [15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals [16] to support its ruling. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002
is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED. [17]

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting
that:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED
DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE
41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO
BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW. [18]

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the
felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He
avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been 'absent for 21 years
since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one
who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph
refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by
operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the absentee is dead.
He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975
and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence,
under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present.
The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of
the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective.
Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a
judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He
further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the
requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a 'GRO
before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved
and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an
illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming
the petitioner's conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on
record. To bolster its claim, the OSGcited the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco. [19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. ' The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el
anterior, ser castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie
of marriage established by law. [20] The phrase 'or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings' was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the
law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the
presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. [21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent
marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. [22] It
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. [23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage
must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential
element of a felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that
there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not
been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical
effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. [25] As the Court
ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals [26] and Mercado v. Tan, [27] under the Family
Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a
defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and
declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a
new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. [28] He
explained that:

' This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in
the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal
Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the
subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by
very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute
a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-
founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed
since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her,
cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent
which is one of the essential elements of the crime. [29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a
felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot
exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary. [30] Although the words 'with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word 'voluntary. [31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal
excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission
defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused,
the law presumes it to have been intentional. [33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of
law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in
the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. [34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both
an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. [35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is
presumed to subsist. [36] The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the
private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a
valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would
negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase 'or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings' in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse
present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of
good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the 'State shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. [37] The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general
welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of
the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and
an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and
the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an
invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the
law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive
evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse [38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is
the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a
well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, 'men readily believe what
they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to
vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals. [39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
permit second marriages. [40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but
upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, [41]namely,
a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal
for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide '

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any
necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse . [43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code, [44] the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus,
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, [45]without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio: [46]

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a)
The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive
years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose
the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to
Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed
merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the
acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil
law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned
by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela [47]that, for purposes
of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that
the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code
has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of
the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. [48] In In Re
Szatraw, [49] the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in
seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration
is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court
stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous
and meaningless act. [50]The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other
spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines, [51] the Court declared that the words 'proper
proceedings' in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized
by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration
or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the
Philippines, [52] the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under
Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death
of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw,
Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that 'the provision of Article 349
or 'before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment reached in the proper proceedings' is erroneous and should be considered as
not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has
not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared
presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is
bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true. [53] A second marriage is
bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil
Code are not present. [54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view
that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of
absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute
bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should
not give rise to bigamy. [55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of
the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of
bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage. [56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of
bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. [57] Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he
cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

' Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that
the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the
present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latter's reappearance. This provision is intended to
protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses
presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
marriage is already established. [58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice)
who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive
death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not
be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if
the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an
absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause 'before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded
because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need
to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy. [59]

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority

on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead,
there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made
only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. [60] Before such declaration, it
was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith. [61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling
in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears
to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary
hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other
spouse can remarry.

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under
Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code. [62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains
that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219
of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the
appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc, [63] where an award of
moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the
private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding
that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while
bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is
not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court
ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque
el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en
los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin
incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal
para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados. [64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and
the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v.
Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. [65] An award
for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must
be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code. [66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases
enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous
cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of
this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases
where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been
any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 [67] and analogous cases
(which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some
others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.) [68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, 'every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. The standards are
the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good
faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised
in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [69]

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. [70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article
20 provides that 'every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21
provides that 'any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy 'the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law
depends upon the circumstances of each case. [71]

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house
of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance ' that he
was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even
stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful
husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were
married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery and
heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous
series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to
the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium,
attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured
mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful
husband. [72]

The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during
and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with
malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is
not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab, [73] the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries,
damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the
actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031
(1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than
negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences
though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v.
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div.
1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant's conduct was not merely negligent,
but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became
entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF.
Note, 'Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The
plaintiff testified that because of the defendant's bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and 'ashamed to go out but 'couldnt
sleep but 'couldnt eat, had terrific headaches' and 'lost quite a lot of weight. No just
basis appears for judicial interference with the jury's reasonable allowance of $1,000
punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117
A.2d 298 (App. Div. [74] 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest
and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's perfidy, she
is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public
policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald: [75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act

which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor
immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the
person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having
done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass.
370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced
to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that
the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by
cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for
enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband
and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and
ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v.
Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant's misrepresentation. The
criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental
results of the defendant's fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage
relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388,
114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324;
Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829,
33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her
illegal action was induced solely by the defendant's misrepresentation, and that she
does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such
considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the
enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.
Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958. [76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award
of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED .