CASES IN CO-OWNERSHIP
"xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the
1. HEIRS OF PROTACIO V. SERVACIO
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse
without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of
17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.).
Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of
1
Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father,
Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land
(the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and
2
mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B.
Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of
3
5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00. On March 2,
4
2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to
5
heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, they
sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte
(RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null
6
and void.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property
7
because he had purchased it with his own money.
8
On October 3, 2002, the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there
were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina);
that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being
heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when
the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was
9
grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that:
other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is
10 11
valid." Quoting Tolentino’s commentary on the matter as authority, the RTC
opined:
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino, says" [sic]
"Alienation by the survivor. — After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is
necessary to sell any portion of the community property in order to pay outstanding
obligation of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the
formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of the
deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property
affected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion
that belongs to the vendor as determined in the liquidation and partition. Pending the
liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited only to the contingent share
or interest of the vendor in the particular property involved, but not to the corpus of
the property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or
disposal of the conjugal property without the required formality, is not however, null
ab initio, for the law recognizes their validity so long as they do not exceed the portion
which, after liquidation and partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse who made
the contract." [underlining supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on the provisions of
the New Civil Code and the Family Code on the alienation by the surviving spouse of
the community property that jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation
made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly
void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent of
what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because why
invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property that
will eventually be his/her share in the final partition? Practically there is no reason for
that view and it would be absurd.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140 square-
meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less than what vendors Protacio Go and his
son Rito B. Go will eventually get as their share in the final partition of the property.
So the sale is still valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to cost and damages.
12
SO ORDERED.
13
The RTC’s denial of their motion for reconsideration prompted the petitioners to
appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and
that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito both
argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the
liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid
to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and
that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering
that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the
vendors were entitled to as heirs.
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Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during
marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity
of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of
the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be
subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute
that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal
partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal
15
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of
Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
16
liquidation following its liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was
17
governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s
share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific
portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or
18
abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
19
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio,
Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
20
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. This result
conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat
21
quantum valere potest).
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the
rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision
gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a
declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of
Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.
22
In their separate comments, the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already
received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and
Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did not
present any public document on the allocation among her heirs, including themselves,
of specific shares in Marta’s estate. Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties
had already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition among
the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether the extent of the property sold
adversely affected the interests of the petitioners might not yet be properly decided
with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an action
23
for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION
of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-
owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].1avvphi1
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely
of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under
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Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her
vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following
observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the
share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there
really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction
is null and void.1âwphi1 But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or
mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half
should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid,
and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined only at
the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the
surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal
properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements.
The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that
portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers
of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the
benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be
barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al.,L-11764,
Jan.31, 1959.)
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WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
2. BALOLOY V. HULAR
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
1
Court, as amended, of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
2
51081, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch
51, in Civil Case No. 93-5871.
The antecedents are as follows:
On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of
title of real property with damages against the children and heirs of
Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and
Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in his
complaint that his father, Astrologo Hular, was the owner of a parcel of
residential land located in Sitio Pagñe, Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon, with an
area of 287 square meters, and that such lot was part of Lot No. 3347 of the
Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that Iluminado Baloloy, the
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure a Free Patent over
the property through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of which the
Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16540 in
his name. The respondent later discovered that in the cadastral survey of
lands in Juban, the property of his father, which actually consisted of 1,405
square meters was made to form part of Lot No. 3353, the property of
Iluminado Baloloy. According to the respondent, even if the residential land
was made to form part of Lot No. 3353 registered under the name of
Iluminado Baloloy, he had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive
prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in continuous,
uninterrupted and open possession of the property in the concept of owners
for more than 60 years.
The respondent prayed for alternative reliefs that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:
a) Declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in
question;
b) Ordering the defendants to perpetually refrain from disturbing
plaintiff in his peaceful possession in the land in question;
c) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses in the land in
question, and to declare OCT No. P-16540, and whatever paper,
form, document or proceeding the defendants may have, as null
and void and without any effect whatsoever as far as the land in
question is concerned as they cast cloud upon the title of the
plaintiff;
 d) In the alternative, defendants be ordered to reconvey the title in
favor of the plaintiff as far as the land in question is concerned;
e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; ₱5,000.00 as
attorney’s fee plus ₱500.00 for every appearance or hearing of his
lawyer in court; ₱1,500.00 as consultation fee; ₱5,000.00 as
incidental litigation expenses; ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and to pay the costs.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief [as are] just and equitable in the
3
premises.
The Evidence of the Respondent
The respondent adduced evidence that the Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin
were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban,
Sorsogon, designated as Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the
property, where a house of strong materials was constructed, was agricultural, while
the rest was residential. The respondent also averred that the Spouses Estopin
declared the property in their names under Tax Declaration No. 4790. On the north of
the agricultural portion of the property was the road leading to Biriran, while north of
the residential portion was a creek (canal) and the property of Iluminado.
When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of
4
Absolute Sale on November 11, 1961 over the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347,
which had an area of 15,906 square meters, more or less, in favor of Astrologo Hular,
married to Lorenza Hular. Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 1961, Lagata executed
5
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the residential portion of the property with an area of
287 square meters, including the house constructed thereon, in favor of Hular. Hular
and his family, including his son, the respondent, then resided in the property. In 1961
or thereabouts, Iluminado asked Hular’s permission to construct a house on a portion
of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed. In l977, Lorenza Hular, wife of
Astrologo, declared the residential land in the latter’s name under Tax Declaration No.
6
6841.
Earlier, or on August 14, 1945, Irene Griarte had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over a coconut land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, with an area of 6,666 square
meters in favor of Martiniano Balbedina, with the following boundaries: North,
Alejandro Gruta; South, Lino Estopin; East, River Pagñe; West, Pedro Grepal and
7
Esteban Grepal. Subsequently, after a cadastral survey was conducted on lands in
Juban, the property of Balbedina was designated as Lot No. 3353, with the following
boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion), Alejandro Gruta; South: Lino Estopin;
West: Lot No. 3349; East: creek. A trail was then established between Lot No. 3353
and Lot No. 3347 resulting in the decrease of Lot No. 3353 owned by Balbedina to
4,651 square meters. He declared the property under his name under Tax
Declaration No. 191 with the following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion)
8
Alejandro Gruta; South: trail; East: creek; West: Lot No. 3349.
On June 4, 1951, Balbedina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 3353
9
with an area of only 4,651 square meters in favor of Iluminado. The latter declared
10
the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5359. Iluminado filed an
application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the entirety of Lot No.
11
3353 on January 5, 1960. He indicated in his application that the property was not
occupied by any person and was disposable or alienable public land. In support
thereof, he executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he purchased about one-
half portion of the property in 1951 based on a deed of absolute sale attached to said
affidavit; that in 1957, he purchased the other one-half portion, but "for economic
reasons," no deed of sale was executed by the parties. He also alleged that the
12
improvements on the land consisted of coconut trees. The Bureau of Lands
processed the application in due course.
In the meantime, Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 near
the trail (road) leading to Biriran. He and his family, including his children, forthwith
resided in said house.
On March 1, 1968, the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources approved
Iluminado’s application and issued Free Patent No. 384019 covering Lot No. 3353
with an area of 9,302 square meters, on the basis of which OCT No. P-16540 was
thereafter issued by the Register of Deeds on March 1, 1968.
13
On August 2, 1975, Alejandro Gruta had executed a deed of absolute sale over a
portion of Lot No. 3353 with an area of 4,651 square meters in favor of Estelito Hije,
14
the husband of petitioner Adelina Baloloy, one of Iluminado’s children.
Before he left for employment in Saudi Arabia in 1979, respondent Hular had his
house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a
15
big portion of Lot No. 3353.
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children
continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of
Iluminado’s children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased father.
When Astrologo died intestate on December 25, 1989, he was survived by his
children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among
16 17
others, who continued to reside in their house.
Sometime in l991, the respondent’s house helper was cleaning the backyard, but was
prevented from doing so by petitioner Adelina Baloloy who claimed that their father
Iluminado owned the land where the respondent’s house was located. To determine
the veracity of the claim, the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed by Geodetic
Engineer Rodolfo Cunanan on February 16, 1993, in the presence of Balbedina,
Antonio Baloloy and petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy. Cunanan prepared a Special Sketch
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Plan of Lot No. 3353 showing that the house of Iluminado was constructed on Lot
19 20
No. 3353 near the road behind the houses owned by Astrologo and Alfredo. The
engineer discovered that the residential area deeded by Lagata to Hular had an area
21
of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square meters only.
In their Answer to the complaint, the heirs of Iluminado Baloloy averred that
Iluminado’s house was built in 1962 on a portion of Lot No. 3353, which the latter
purchased from Balbedina, and not on a portion of Lot No. 3347 which Hular
purchased from Lagata. They alleged that Hular constructed his house on a portion of
Lot No. 3353 after securing the permission of their father Iluminado, and that the
respondent had no cause of action for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and
OCT No. P-16540 because only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
may file a direct action to annul the said patent and title; and even if the respondent
was the real party in interest to file the action, such actions had long since prescribed.
The heirs of Baloloy prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to
DISMISS this case pursuant to paragraph 15, et seq., hereof, and/or
DECIDE it in favor of the defendants by UPHOLDING the sanctity of OCT
No. P-16540 and ordering plaintiff to:
1. RESPECT defendants’ proprietary rights and interests on the
property in question covered by OCT No. P-16540;
2. VACATE it at his sole and exclusive expense, and never to set
foot on it ever again;
3. PAY defendants:
a) MORAL DAMAGES at ₱50,000.00 EACH;
b) ACTUAL DAMAGES and UNREALIZED PROFITS at
₱1,000.00/MONTH COMPUTED UP TO THE TIME OF
PAYMENT PLUS LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST;
c) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of ₱50,000.00
d) ATTY’S FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES of
₱100,000.00; and
e) THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT.
DEFENDANTS pray for all other reliefs and remedies consistent with law
22
and equity.
The Evidence for the Petitioners
Sometime in 1982, Hular asked permission from Iluminado to construct his house on
Lot No. 3353 near the road leading to Biriran. Iluminado agreed, in the presence of
his daughter, petitioner Adelina Baloloy. As per the plan of Lot No. 3353 certified by a
Director of the Bureau of Lands on November 6, 1961, Lot No. 3353 had an area of
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9,302 square meters.
As gleaned from the Sketch Plan of Lot Nos. 3347 and 3353 prepared on February 7,
1991 by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Balilo, the houses of the Baloloy siblings and
24
those of Astrologo and Alfredo were located in Lot No. 3353. In the said sketch plan,
Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters, while Lot No. 3347 had an area of
15,905 square meters. When apprised of Hular’s claim over the property, the
petitioners and their co-heirs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal
Trial Court of Juban, docketed as Civil Case No. 331. The case was, however,
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On December 4, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent.
The fallo of the decision reads:
a/ Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question,
consisting of 1,405 square meters, more or less, and entitled to the
peaceful possession thereof;
b/ Ordering the defendants to reconvey the title to the plaintiff as far
as the land in question is concerned within fifteen (15) days
counted from the finality of the decision, failing in which, the Clerk
of Court is hereby ordered to execute the necessary document of
reconveyance of the title in favor of the plaintiff after an approved
survey plan is made;
c/ Ordering defendants to remove their houses from the land in
question at their own expense within fifteen (15) days after the
decision has become final;
d/ Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the
amount of ₱5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. ₱5,000.00 as incidental
litigation expenses;
e/ To pay the costs.
25
SO ORDERED.
The trial court ruled that the property subject of the complaint, with an area of 1,405
square meters, was part of Lot No. 3347 which the Spouses Estopin owned, and
which they later sold to Astrologo Hular. The trial court also held that Iluminado
committed fraud in securing the free patent and the title for the property in question,
and that when Victoriana Lagata executed the deed of absolute sale on the
residential portion of Lot No. 3347, she did not know that it formed part of Lot No.
3353. It further held that the action of the plaintiff to nullify the title and patent was
imprescriptible.
The petitioners filed on December 8, 1995 a motion to reopen the case to admit Tax
Declaration Nos. 6957 and 4790 covering Lot No. 3347, under the names of
Astrologo Hular and Victoriana Lagata, respectively, in which it was declared that Lot
No. 3347 was coconut land. The trial court ruled that the motion had been mooted by
its decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial
court, and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Present Petition
The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property, filed their petition for
review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The issues for resolution are:
(1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the
respondent in the trial court;
(2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against the petitioners
for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; for
reconveyance and for possession of the subject property; and for damages;
and
(3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the property
through acquisitive prescription.
The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and is even decisive of
the outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by this
26
Court.
We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for: (a) reinvidicatoria, to
declare the respondent the absolute owner of the subject property and its
reconveyance to him as a consequence of the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019
and OCT No. P-16540; (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the other heirs of
Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to him; and
(c) damages and attorney’s fees.
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by Lagata to
his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced evidence that when his parents died
intestate, they were survived by their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena,
Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides
that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the
same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession,
including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such
an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
27
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the
court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse,
the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-
owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over
the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is
no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or
conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in
the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole
owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s
siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to
implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent
failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent
sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent
No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the
Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to
28
the filing of the complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondent’s
siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof,
including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.
29
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we rule that he
failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint against the petitioners; and
that he is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the requisite quantum of
evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by law or under a contract of sale, he
must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the evidence of that of his
30
opponent. He who claims a better right to real estate property must prove not only
31 32
his ownership of the same but also the identity thereof. In Huy v. Huy, we held that
where a property subject of controversy is duly registered under the Torrens system,
the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given weight and in the
absence of strong and compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should
be considered as the owner of the property until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action. A Torrens Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to
33
property in favor of the person in whose name appears therein. Such holder is
entitled to the possession of the property until his title is nullified.
The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses Estopin was coconut,
and not residential, land. The petitioners contend that, under the deed of absolute
sale, Victoriana Lagata executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular,
she sold the residential portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter constructed his
house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 which Iluminado had purchased from Balbedina,
now covered by OCT No. P-16540. The petitioners assert that along with their mother
Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy, they constructed their houses on a part
of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their father Iluminado; hence, they could not be
dispossessed of the said property. The petitioners posit that, whether the house of
Hular was constructed on a portion of Lot No. 3353 of the property of Balbedina or
Gruta is irrelevant because both properties are now covered by OCT No. P-16540
under the name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the subject property, which
turned out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold the same to Hular. In contrast, the
RTC declared in its decision that while under the deed of absolute sale executed by
Irene Griarte in favor of Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 6,666 square meters,
Griarte actually owned only 4,651 square meters; a portion of the lot was actually
owned by Lino Estopin. Hence, Balbedina sold only 4,651 square meters to
34
Iluminado because he was aware that he owned only 4,651 square meters of the
land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion of Lot No. 3347 was declared as
part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban were surveyed. The trial court
concluded that Lagata erroneously declared, under the deed of absolute sale
executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular, that the property was part of Lot
No. 3347.
The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.
The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that the boundary of
the property on the south is "con camino, Lino Estopin," while the English version of
the deed, indicates that the property is bounded "on the south by Lino Estopin." Being
an earlier document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties therefore should
prevail. Conformably to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in Tax Declaration No.
40
5359 under his name that the property is bounded on the south by a trail, and not by
Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin.
The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove how the
Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property. The respondent’s reliance on the
testimonies of Melissa Estopin, the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on Porfirio
Guamos as well as the May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and the deed
of sale executed by Victoriana Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor of Astrologo
Hular to corroborate his claim over the lot in question, is misplaced.
First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the respondent, Lino
Estopin purchased the disputed property in 1941 from Irene Griarte and insisted that
there was a deed of sale evidencing the sale:
Atty. Dealca:
Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim that way back
in 1944 the owner of the land was Lino Estopin; ’41 to ’44?

The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with an area A 1941.
35
of 6,666 square meters, more or less. When she sold the property to Martiniano
Balbedina on August 14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the property of Lino Q And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase?
Estopin. There was no trail yet between the property of Griarte on the south and of
Lino Estopin on the north. In the meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran A That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the property.
was established between the property of Balbedina on the south and that of Lino
Estopin on the north. Thereafter, a cadastral survey of the lands in Juban was
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The property of Balbedina was designated as a Q My question is whether you know because you testified earlier that Lino
portion of Lot No. 3353, while that of Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347. The Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase; do you confirm that?
other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,561 square meters, belonged to
Alejandro Gruta. Because of the construction of the road, the property of Balbedina, A Yes, Sir.
which was a part of Lot No. 3353, was reduced to 4,651 square meters. Balbedina
declared, under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot No. 3353 had an area of 4,651
36 Q From whom?
square meters and was coconut land and that his property was bounded on the
south by a trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No. 3347 under his name for
taxation purposes, in which he stated that his property was bounded on the north by A From Irene Griarte.
37
the trail going to Biriran. Clearly, then, Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a
common boundary – the trail (road) going to Biriran. Q Were you present when that sale was consummated?

Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of A I was not there.
38
4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951. Under the deed of
absolute sale, the property was bounded on the south by the trail (road) owned by
39 Q So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino Estopin from Irene
Lino Estopin. The English translation of the deed of sale attached as page 85 to the
Griarte?
RTC Records, which both the trial court and the appellate court relied upon, is
incorrect.
A No, Sir. Witness:

Q You do not know whether a document to that effect was actually drafted A I did not see.
and executed?
Atty. Dealca:
A There was.
Q You said that that document was used when the property was sold by Lino
Q Have you seen the document? Estopin to Alfredo Hular. . .

41
A I did not see but there was a document. A In 1961. Yes.

Q You maintain there was a document but you did not see a document, is
that it?
A In my belief there was a document.
Q In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you did not see a
document?
A I insist there was a document.
Q That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a document?
A Well, during the sale that document was used.
Q How was it used when you did not see that document?
A When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the document, but I
insist there was a document.
Q That’s why, how were you able to say before the court that there was a
document when you contend that you did not see any?
A There was basis in the sale … the sale was based on a document. You
cannot sell a property without document? (sic)
Q Is that your belief?
A Yes, Sir.
Q But you did not see any document?
Atty. Diesta:
Already answered.
However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed or even an
authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any justification for his failure to
adduce the same in evidence. As against the respondent’s verbal claim that his father
acquired the property from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado Baloloy must
42
prevail.
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax declarations over
the disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte and/or Lino Estopin, or realty
tax payment receipts in their names from 1941 to November 1961. The documents
are circumstantial evidence to prove that Irene Griarte claimed ownership over the
disputed property and that Lino Estopin acquired the same from her. After all, such
tax declarations and tax receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when
43
accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for acquisitive prescription.
Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration No. 4790
covering the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim
that Lot No. 3347 consisted of agricultural and residential lands. We note that the
petitioners appended a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the
name of Victoriana Lagata over Lot No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case. In
the said declaration, Lot No. 3347 was described as coconut land; this is contrary to
the respondent’s claim that the said lot was then residential, and that the boundary of
the property on the north was the road to Biriran which, in turn, is consistent with the
44
petitioners’ claim. Unfortunately, the trial court denied the said motion on the ground
that it was mooted by its decision.
Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and that of
Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property, were designated as Lot No. 3353 with a
total area of 9,302 square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin was
designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of 15,906 square meters. Iluminado Baloloy
applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3353, including the disputed property, under his
name. The respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the Spouses Estopin
and/or Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or Iluminado’s claim of ownership of
Lot No. 3353 during the survey and after the filing of the application. A propos is our
45
ruling in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals:
As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in assessing the totality of the
evidence –
 We do not agree with defendants that they are also the occupants and
possessors of the subject lot just because it "is adjacent to their titled
property." Precisely, the boundaries of defendants’ titled property were
determined, delineated and surveyed during the cadastral survey of Dipolog
and thereafter indicated in their certificate of title in order that the extent of
their property will be known and fixed. Since the subject lot was already
found to be outside their titled property, defendants have no basis in
claiming it or other adjacent lots for that matter. Otherwise, the very purpose
of the cadastral survey as a process of determining the exact boundaries of
adjoining properties will be defeated.
Defendants’ own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose Aguirre and
Cristina Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of occupation and possession
over the adjacent subject lot. Examining said title, we note that: (1) the
cadastral survey of Dipolog was conducted from January, 1923 to November
1925; (2) defendants’ titled property was one of those lots surveyed and this
was designated as Lot No. 2623; (3) during the survey, it was already
determined and known that Lot No. 2623 is bounded on the northeast,
southeast, southwest and west by Lot No. 4443 (as we have seen in our
narration of facts, the subject lot is a subdivision lot of Lot No. 6552 which
was originally identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.:
hence, the subject lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357
was issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment rendered
on July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756.
From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923 when the
cadastral survey was started, the boundaries of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443
were already determined and delineated. Since the subject lot was surveyed
to be part of Lot No. 4443, it means that during that time defendants’
predecessors-in-interest never claimed ownership or possession over the
subject lot. Otherwise, they would have complained so that the subject lot
could be excluded from Lot No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623, they
being adjacent lots. It is obvious then that defendants’ predecessors only
claimed Lot No. 2623 and they pursued their claim in Cadastral Case No. 6,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 756 until O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to them.
The contention of defendants that they and their predecessors-in-interest
occupied and possessed the subject lot since time immemorial therefore is
46
not true.
Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, Lagata sold to
Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No. 3353. In Veterans Federation of the
47
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and enforceable
and that it was perfected at the very moment that the parties agreed upon
the thing which was the object of the sale and upon the price. The parties
herein had agreed on the parcel of land that petitioner would purchase from
respondent PNR, and the same was described therein; thus, petitioner VFP
cannot conveniently set aside the technical description in this agreement
and insist that it is the legal owner of the property erroneously described in
the certificate of title. Petitioner can only claim right of ownership over the
48
parcel of land that was the object of the deed of sale and nothing else.
Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961, Victoriana Lagata sold
Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4790. The deed does not state that what was sold was only a portion
of Lot No. 3347, excluding therefrom the disputed property. This is understandable,
since the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by Alejandro Gruta and
Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana Lagata. Lagata could not
have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she does not own. As the Latin adage
goes: "NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET."
Seventh. The Balbedina’s Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the respondent to
prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners.
Balbedina did not testify; as such, the petitioners were deprived of their right to cross-
examine him. The said affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of probative weight. The
affidavit varies the contents of the deed of absolute sale which he (Balbedina)
executed in favor of Iluminado more than forty years earlier. In the said affidavit, it
was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado on June 4, 1951 only a portion
of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters, when under the said deed of
absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted of 4,651 square meters. The
affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
...
It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by Balbedina in
favor of Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the Peace who was an Ex-
Officio Notary Public; hence, entitled to full probative weight.
Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic Engineer
49
Rodolfo P. Cunanan cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan even
buttressed the case for the petitioners because it shows that the subject property is a
portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by OCT No. P-16540 under
the name of Iluminado Baloloy, the deceased father of the petitioners.
Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot No. 3347
under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, unaware that the property
was a part of Lot No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises.
Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property of
Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said property in addition to
his own. As such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such free
patent, as well as OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decisions of
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint of the respondent is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
3. LACBAYAN V. SAMOY
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan
against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004
1 13
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had
2 14
affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties
involved in this suit and awarding to him ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in
1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until
petitioner gave birth to respondent’s son on October 12, 1979.
3 without any contribution from petitioner.
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more
4
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company. Five parcels of
land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and
respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described
as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon
City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."
5 that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon
City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses
6
Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan."
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon
City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
7
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon
City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S.
8
Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights,
Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of
9
Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In
1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in
Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St.,
also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don Enrique
10
Heights.
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways
sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and
11
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don
Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other
12
properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling
aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties
before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together
as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as
business partners, acquiring real properties amounting to
15 16
₱15,500,000.00. Respondent, in his Answer, however, denied petitioner’s claim of
cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds
17
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24
hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in
18
the wee hours of the morning. Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said
real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent
19
established.
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his
20
personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions. He countered
the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent
the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy
21
gambler. Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as
investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of
a new building.
22
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
23
lack of merit. In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give
considerable weight to petitioner’s own admission that the properties were acquired
not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services
24
company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro
indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial
court’s decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral
attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper
25
to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.
Unimpressed with petitioner’s arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal,
explaining in the following manner:
Appellant’s harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject
realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates
which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what
the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the subject realties – itself an
issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which
appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover,
that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to
subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in
litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even
more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in
the parties’ name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellant’s imputation of reversible error against
the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action
for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming
to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the
plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is
indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second – assuming
that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first – the issue of how the property is to be
divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially
settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an
order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the existence of
co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would
be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial
26
court did when it discounted the merit in appellant’s claim of co-ownership.
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission
against respondent’s interest as to the existence of co-ownership between
the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of
repudiating co-ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive
ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be
outweighed by respondent’s self-serving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been
squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem
it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any
showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that
questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction in petitions under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be
summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of
ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally
attacked in the action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the
subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
28
Our disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia is definitive. There, we explained
that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the
resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination
of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff
is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting
of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree
upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the
parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their
29
just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties
based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties.
Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of
co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a
30
partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even lie
if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over
31
the subject properties.
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the
disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
32
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally
33
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is
that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the
title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by
34
that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as
a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence
35
of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of
land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of
36
ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee,
or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the
37
issuance of the certificate of title. Needless to say, registration does not vest
ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof.1avvphi1
Finally, as to whether respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as
an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the
existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts
38
alleged by him. Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to
the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.
39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that
the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law,
basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s
argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but
that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over
the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his
lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may
be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
40
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters.
Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she
intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial court’s
view that respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not
commiserate with respondent’s predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent
was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest
as to entitle him an award of ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. But we note that in the
first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a
right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondent’s act of representing himself
and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and
escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but
himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of
the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed
properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file
against him. The award of ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees in respondent’s favor is
DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. CRUZ V. CATAPANG
1
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision dated September 16, 2003
2
and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
3
69250. The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, which had earlier affirmed the
 4 th
Decision dated September 20, 1999 of the 7 Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of entirely different recourse with the appropriate forum. The Court of Appeals disposed,
Taal, Batangas ordering respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a portion of thus:
the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows. hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 22 October 2001 as well
as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Taal,
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a Batangas, Branch 86, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu
parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay thereof, another is entered DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry
5
Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the docketed as Civil Case No. 71-T.
aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot
13
adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house SO ORDERED.
6
intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned property.
After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the property Resolution dated June 11, 2004, she filed the instant petition.
and was surprised to see a part of respondent’s house intruding unto a portion of the
co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish Raised before us for consideration are the following issues:
the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The
7
respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.
I.
8
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against
th
respondent before the 7 MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO-OWNER
petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT TO
defendant’s construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE PREMISES OWNED PRO-
9
question. The dispositive portion of the MCTC decision reads: INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-
OWNER[.]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant or any
person acting in her behalf to vacate and deliver the possession of the area II.
illegally occupied to the plaintiff; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
reasonable attorney’s fees of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED
EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT
SO ORDERED.
10 OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO
HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
14
PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNER.
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the MCTC’s ruling in a
Decision dated October 22, 2001, the dispositive portion of which states:
III.
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is hereby
affirmed in toto. . . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF
15
11 SIMPLE STRATEGY.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the Court of Appeals’
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, respondent filed a decision.
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision. The
Court of Appeals held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case
because respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given by co- Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by a co-owner of a
owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or parcel of land to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the
12
stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person.
decision further held that petitioner’s remedy is not an action for ejectment but an
 16
In her memorandum, petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-
owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic
principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until partition.
17
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum counters that the complaint for
forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through
strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that
since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not
just possession de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of
co-owners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the
dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who
was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held
that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the
18
prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to
another to build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to
devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he
does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such
a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other
co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-
ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all
would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or
more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the
courts may afford adequate relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he
does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house
on the co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent
other co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the
co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the
making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in
common. Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any
19
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The
construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it
is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent
from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned
property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the
absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any
right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under
the classification "through strategy or stealth."
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondent’s entry
into the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her
by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion.
Respondent’s entry into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear
to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya
whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as
20
possession by stealth. Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of one
co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the
constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order
to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible
entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year
period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time
21
the petitioner learned about it. Although respondent constructed her house in 1992,
it was only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the
property. Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the
premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on
January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned
of the construction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 16, 2003
and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
69250 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is REINSTATED. Costs against
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
5. SANCHEZ V. CA
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well
as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her
parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-
owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to
Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez
1
married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez. On 20 February 1995, the lot was
registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June
2 3
1995 by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Petitioner claimed that she did not affix
her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus
prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of
possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan
City sometime in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private
respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the
other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the
Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this order, nor even
inform her of the developments in her case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading
with the RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the
MeTC.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of
execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4
November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon
petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without
any special permit of demolition from the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was
forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the house’s toilet
and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the
RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed
to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the Petition and
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit.1âwphi1 On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the
Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies the
acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the
specific action for the procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this Court
must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds exist before it gives due course to
a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and
(b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to this
petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the merits to effect
substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of
4
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in
the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal
construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect
5
substantial justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
6
merits and not on mere technicalities.
Verily, the negligence of petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of
petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have been
7
unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client. Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears from the records that counsel was
negligent in not adequately protecting his client’s interest, which necessarily calls for
a liberal construction of the Rules.
8
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals -
This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation
where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to
appellant’s failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court
suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained
jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has
been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now
constrained to do in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and
review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements
that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other
9
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity
was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides,
substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the
present controversy that was brought about by the absence of any partition
agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in question.
Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall put an end to the dispute on the
property held in common.
10
In People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco we held:
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is
notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt
dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked into
and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the court’s
desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly,
dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer
to sell one’s rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of
the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one
should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his
clients.
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership.
Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-
11
ownership was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this controversy in
the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be granted to cure this
grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as "the right of common dominion which two
or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically
12
divided. Manresa defines it as the "manifestation of the private right of ownership,
which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things
subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to
13
which it refers is one and the same."
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-
owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object
which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects,
and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of
14
the co-owners.
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary
in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-
owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so
that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may
15
not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to
create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-
16
ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can
claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
17
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property
the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly
lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-
18
owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate
part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by
19
a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds
of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of
Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the
property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her
definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be
done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of
the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No.
289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer and the
PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to effect
the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion
appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be
RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
6. UY V. ESTATE OF FERNANDEZ
1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
2
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision dated November 26, 2010 and
3
Resolution dated January 24, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 04481.
Facts
Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay (Vipa) is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated
in Lopez Jaena Street, Jaro, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
4
26576 (subject property). Vipa and her husband, Levi Lahaylahay (Levi), have two
children – Grace Joy Somosierra (Grace Joy) and Jill Frances Lahaylahay (Jill
Frances).
5 4.
Sometime in 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy
(Rafael) over the subject property and the improvements thereon, pursuant to which,
Rafael bound himself to pay Vipa, as consideration for the lease of the property, the
amount of P3,000.00 per month, with a provision for a 10% increase every year
6
thereafter.
On March 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever. Grace Joy
became the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. After Vipa's death, Levi lived
in Aklan.
7 of the subject property, an arrangement that Rafael took advantage to avoid paying
8 by Rafael in the total amount of P16,000.00 are not valid since there was no prior
In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, on June 12,
9
2003, the Estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City against Rafael. It was
alleged therein that, as of June 1998, Rafael was already bound to pay rent at the
amount of P3,300.00 per month and that his last payment was made in May 1998.
Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the Complaint, Rafael's unpaid rents amounted
10
to P271,150.00. The Estate of Vipa claimed that despite repeated demands, Rafael
11
refused to pay the rents due.
12
In his Answer, Rafael denied that he refused to pay the rent for the lease of the
subject property. He claimed that sometime in June 1998 Patria Fernandez-Cuenca
(Patria), Vipa's sister, demanded for the payment of the rents, claiming that she is the
13
rightful heir of Vipa. Since he had no idea on who is entitled to receive the rent for
the subject property, he deposited the amount of P10,000.00 with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City on November 20, 1998
14
and that Grace Joy was informed of such consignation. He claimed that a case for
the settlement of the Estate of Vipa was instituted by Patria with the RTC, which was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 6910. He averred that he is willing to pay the
rent on the leased property to the rightful heirs of Vipa and that he made another
15
consignation with the RTC in the amount of P6,000.00.
16
On June 12, 2008, the MTCC rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing ratiocination, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the [Estate of Vipa] and against [Rafael], ordering the latter, to wit:
1. to vacate the premises subject of this case and covered by TCT
No. T-26576 and to peacefully turn over the possession of the
same to the [Estate of Vipa];
2. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php271,150.00 as
payment for the unpaid rentals with 12% interest per annum from
the last demand on May 3, 2003 until the whole amount is paid;
3. to pay the [Estate of Vipa] the amount of Php3,000.00 per month
with 12% interest per annum for the use and occupancy of the
premises computed from the date of the filing of this case on June
12, 2003 until fully paid;
to pay the [Estate of Vipa] attorney's fees in the amount of
Php20,000.00; [and]
5. to pay the costs of suit.
17
SO ORDERED.
The MTCC found that after Vipa's death in 1994 until 1998, Rafael was paying the
18
rent for the lease of the subject property to Grace Joy. That the real reason why
Patria claimed to be the heir of Vipa is because she owed Rafael money which she
could not pay. Patria then charged the debt she owes to Rafael from the monthly rent
Grace Joy the monthly rents. The MTCC further opined that the consignations made
tender of payment.
19
20
On appeal, the RTC, in its Decision dated April 15, 2009, reversed the MTCC's
Decision dated June 12, 2008 and, thus, dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer filed by the Estate of Vipa. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE; and the herein complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; and
further DISMISSING [Rafael's] counterclaim for failure to substantiate the same.
21
SO ORDERED.
The RTC opined that Grace Joy was actually the plaintiff in the case and not the
Estate of Vipa. It then pointed out that Grace Joy failed to bring the dispute to the
22
barangay for conciliation prior to filing the complaint for unlawful detainer.
The RTC further held that the MTCC erred in including the entire subject property as
part of the Estate of Vipa. The RTC explained that the subject property was acquired
by Vipa during the subsistence of her marriage with Levi and, as such, is part of their
conjugal properties. That after Vipa's death, the conjugal partnership was terminated,
23
entitling Levi to one-half of the property. The RTC then pointed out that Levi sold his
24
share in the subject property to Rafael, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated
25
December 29, 2005. Accordingly, the RTC ruled that Rafael, as co-owner of the
subject property, having bought Levi's one-half share thereof, had the right to possess
26
the same.
27
The Estate of Vipa sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated April 15, 2009,
28
but it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated July 28; 2009.
29
The Estate of Vipa then filed a Petition for Review with the CA. On November 26,
30
2010, the CA rendered a Decision, which declared:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED and the April 15, 2009 Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 08-
29842 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the June 12, 2008
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 03-208 is
hereby REINSTATED.
31
SO ORDERED.
The CA held that there was no necessity to bring the dispute before the barangay for
conciliation since the Estate of Vipa, being a juridical person, cannot be impleaded to
a barangay conciliation proceeding. The CA likewise pointed out that any allegations
against Grace Joy's authority to represent the Estate of Vipa had been laid to rest
when she was appointed as administrator of the Estate of Vipa in Special
32
Proceedings No. 6910 pending before the RTC.
Further, the CA held that Rafael raised the issue of ownership of the subject
property, i.e., Levi's sale of his one-half share in the subject property to Rafael, only
for the first time in his appeal with the RTC. Accordingly, it was error on the part of the
33
RTC to have resolved the issue of ownership of the subject property. Furthermore,
the CA agreed with the MTCC that Rafael's consignation of the rent to the RTC is
ineffective. It ruled that Rafael made the consignation only twice and the amount
34
consigned was patently insignificant compared to the amount of rent due.
35 36
Rafael's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
January 24, 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
Rafael maintains that Grace Joy has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and,
when she filed the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC, she did so in her
personal capacity. Thus, Rafael claims that the dispute should have been brought to
37
the barangay for conciliation before the complaint was filed in the MTCC. He further
claims that the CA erred in . reversing the RTC's ruling on the issue of ownership of
the subject property. He insists that he already purchased Levi's one-half share in the
38
subject property.
39
On the other hand, the Estate of Vipa, in its Comment, avers that the supposed lack
of authority of Grace Joy to file the complaint for unlawful detainer and the ownership
of the subject property were never raised in the proceedings before the MTCC and,
hence, could not be passed upon by the RTC in the appellate proceedings. In any
40
case, it pointed out that the RTC's Decision dated October 28, 2005 in Special
Proceedings No. 6910, which appointed Grace Joy as the administrator of the
intestate estate of Vipa, recognized that the latter and Jill Frances are legitimate
children of Vipa and Levi.
Issue
Essentially, the issue set forth for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in
reversing the RTC's Decision dated April 15, 2009.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Rafael's claim that the complaint below should have been dismissed since Grace Joy
has no authority to represent the Estate of Vipa and that there was lack of prior
barangay conciliation is untenable. Unlawful detainer cases are covered by the Rules
41
on Summary Procedure. Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure provides that affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded in the answer
shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rafael failed to plead in the answer he filed with the MTCC that Grace Joy has no
authority to represent the Estate of Vipa. Neither did he raise therein the lack of
barangay conciliation between the parties herein prior to the filing of the complaint for
unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the foregoing defenses are already deemed waived.
In any case, the issue of the supposed lack of authority of Grace Joy to represent the
Estate of Vipa had already been rendered moot with the RTC's appointment of Grace
Joy as the administrator of the Estate of Vipa in Special Proceedings No. 6910.
Also, there was no need to refer the dispute between the parties herein to the
42
barangay for conciliation pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. It bears
stressing that only individuals may be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings
either as complainants or respondents. Complaints by or against corporations,
partnerships or other juridical entities may not be filed with, received or acted upon by
43
the barangay for conciliation. The Estate of Vipa, which is the complainant below, is
a juridical entity that has a personality, which is separate and distinct from that of
44
Grace Joy. Thus, there is no necessity to bring the dispute to the barangay for
conciliation prior to filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC.
The CA, nevertheless, erred in hastily dismissing Rafael's allegation as regards the
ownership of the subject property. In disregarding Rafael's claim that he owns Levi's
one-half undivided share in the subject property, the CA ruled that the said issue was
raised for the first time on appeal and should thus not have been considered by the
RTC, viz.:
On the second issue, the records show that [Rafael] raised the issue of ownership
only for the first time on appeal; hence, the [RTC] erred in deciding the appeal before
it on the findings that part of the subject premises is owned by petitioners, allegedly
having bought the same from [Levi], the husband of [Vipa].
The Court is not unmindful that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the MTC
may rule on the issue [of] ownership in order to determine the issue of possession.
However, the issue of ownership must be raised by the defendant on the earliest
opportunity; otherwise, it is already deemed waived. Moreover, the instant case was
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which expressly provide that
affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived,
except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, the [RTC] erred in
45
resolving the issue of ownership for the first time on appeal. (Citations omitted)
It is true that fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties should not raise for
the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial.
However, before a party may be barred from raising an issue for the first time on
appeal, it is imperative that the issue could have been raised during the trial. What
46
escaped the appellate court's attention is that the sale of the one-half undivided share
in the subject property to Rafael was consummated only on December 29, 2005,
more than two years after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the complaint for
47
unlawful detainer on July 18, 2003. Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his
acquisition of Levi's share in the subject property as an affirmative defense in the
answer he filed with the MTCC.
Moreover, Rafael's ownership of the one-half undivided share in the subject property
would necessarily affect the property relations between the parties herein. Thus, the
CA should have exerted efforts to resolve the said issue instead of dismissing the
same on the flimsy ground that it was not raised during the proceedings before the
MTCC.
48
Levi and Vipa were married on March 24, 1961 and, in the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains governs their property
49
relations. It is presumed that the subject property is part of the conjugal properties of
Vipa and Levi considering that the same was acquired during the subsistence of their
50
marriage and there being no proof to the contrary.
When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically
51
terminated. Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property,
upon its dissolution due to the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the
absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal partnership property is void. Thus:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be
void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (Emphasis ours)
Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established between the spouses prior to the effectivity of the Family Code pursuant
to Article 105 thereof, viz.:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during
marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws as provided in Article 256. (Emphasis ours)
Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the subject property in consideration of
52
P500,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated December 29, 2005. At that
time, the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated.
However, such disposition, notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of the conjugal
partnership properties, is not necessarily void.
It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband
53
and wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership. Thus, upon
the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse,
the surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the
properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until
54
liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership. With respect, however, to the
deceased spouse's share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied ordinary
co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the
55
deceased.
Thus, upon Vipa's death, one half of the subject property was automatically reserved
in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The
other half, which is Vipa's share, was transmitted to Vipa's heirs – Grace Joy, Jill
Frances, and her husband Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child. The ensuing implied co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis ours)
Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace
Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion
thereof without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement
or by judicial decree. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or
56
thing.
Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half
undivided share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-
owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the
subject property. It must be stressed that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat
57
quantum valere potest).
However, Rafael became a co-owner of the subject property only on December 29,
2005 – the time when Levi sold his one-half undivided share over the subject property
to the former. Thus, from December 29, 2005 Rafael, as a co-owner, has the right to
possess the subject property as an incident of ownership. Otherwise stated, prior to
his acquisition of Levi's one-half undivided share, Rafael was a mere lessee of the
subject property and is thus obliged to pay the rent for his possession thereof.
Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the subject property since
he is already a co-owner thereof. Nevertheless, Rafael is still bound to pay the unpaid
rentals from June 1998 until April 2003 in the amount of P271,150.00. In Nacar v.
58
Gallery Frames, et al., the Court pointed out that pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board, the interest rate of loans or
forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation shall be six percent (6%) effective
only from July 1, 2013. Thus, prior to July 1, 2013, the rate of interest on loans or
forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation, is still 12%. Accordingly, the
amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals shall earn interest at the
rates of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand on May 3, 2003 until June
30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
Further, Rafael is likewise bound to pay reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of
the subject property from May 2003 until December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00
per month with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the last
demand, i.e., the filing of the complaint with the MTCC on June 12, 2003, until June
30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
The award of attorney's fees of P20,000.00 is likewise proper. Attorney's fees can be
awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically:
Article 2208. x x x
xxxx
(2) Where the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest[.]
Certainly, because of Rafael's unjustified refusal to pay the rents due on the lease of
the subject prope1iy, the Estate of Vipa was put to unnecessary expense and trouble
to protect its interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code. In unlawful
detainer cases, where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed
59
P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review
on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 2010 and
Resolution dated January 24, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
04481 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rafael C. Uy is hereby
directed to pay the Estate of Vipa Fernandez the following:
1. The amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals, with interest at
the rates of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the last
demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid;
2. Reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May
2003 until December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00 per month with
interest at the rates of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of the
last demand, i.e., the filing of the complaint for unlawful detainer on June 12,
2003, until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013
until fully paid; and
3. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
7. ABECEDO V. ABESAMIS
The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by
respondents-heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to
sell the remaining portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval
as a probate court, is being challenged in the case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties
located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of
about P30 million. Said estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon
City;
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel
Acebedo, and the incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo;
and
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein,
and the others are the private respondents.
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen
years, respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989.
The said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City, and
form part of the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos
and by that time, they already had a buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that
respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of the six (6)
million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of
P6,000,000.00 is more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate.
Thus, they prayed for the Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo
(referred to as petitioner-administrator hereafter):
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the
Estate; and
3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the
Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to
Approval of Sale", to wit:
1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold
some real estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak,
Quezon City, without the knowledge of the herein administrator,
without the approval of this Honorable Court and of some heirs, and
at a shockingly low price;
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection
to the approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even
render the proponents of the sale liable for punishment for
contempt of this Honorable Court;
3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable
Court to authorize the sale of the above mentioned property of the
Estate to generate funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and
with the approval of this Honorable Court if warranted, to give the
heirs some advances chargeable against theirs (sic) respective
shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein Administrator,
and the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a
broker, to look for a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject
1
always to the approval of this Honorable Court.
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45)
days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a
price higher than P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date,
petitioners have not found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the
Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in extendible period of thirty days to look for a
buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public
document against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26,
1990. He initiated this complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused
the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-
administrator's signature was made to appear. He also learned that after he
confronted the notary public of the questioned document, the latter revoked his
notarial act on the same.
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration
by the Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute
Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer,
petitioner Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several
periods within which to look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-
administrator filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990,
maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the
coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties should be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and
Lease some of the Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an
Opposition on the following grounds : that the motion is not proper because of the
pending motion to approve the sale of the same properties; that said conditional sale
was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed a receipt for
P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of the sale would mean Yu Hwa
Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts
and thus, the intestate administrator may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of
2
which, stated, among others, to wit:
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989,
praying that the new administrator be directed to sell the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of
Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some
properties of the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to
the approval of the Court.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the
parties to a conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the
parties were unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was
continued, wherein the parties actually agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their
shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price already agreed upon, while
herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the
Deed of Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the
dispositive portion of which states, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted,
reconsidered and set aside, and another one is hereby issued as
follows:
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989,
executed by the heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining
to their respective shares in the properties covered by TCT Nos.
155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City;
2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the
remaining portions of the said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa
Ping at the same price as the sale executed by the herein heirs-
movants;
3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total
remaining balance of the purchase price for the said lots within
TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in
contempt of court, resulting from his failure to submit the owner's
3
copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and 120145 is hereby denied.
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price
for the properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of
P6,500,000.00.
Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21)
days thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court
reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents filed their
4
Opposition.
Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by
the respondent Court on August 23, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
hoping for the last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order
dated March 29, 1991 in effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and
beyond its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration for "lack of merit".
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order
dated March 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this
Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the
jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving
the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court
approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said
properties?
We answer in the positive?
5
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it
is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a
deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa:
to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action. "Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the
whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him,
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a which remains undivided'."
special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which
probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order is unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents'
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale. right to alienate the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should
be dismissed for lack of merit.
We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said
conditional sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
made conditional, the condition being that the same should first be approved by the
probate court. SO ORDERED.
6
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. It is 8. FERNANDEZ V. SPOUSES TARUN
settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent's estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the
substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or
7
co-ownership among the heirs.
The right of redemption may be exercised by a co-owner, only when part of the
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell community property is sold to a stranger. When the portion is sold to a co-owner, the
whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under right does not arise because a new participant is not added to the co-ownership.
administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate
8
court. The Case

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us challenges the July 7, 2000 Decision
9 1
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55264, which reversed the Regional
2
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City (Branch 44) in Civil Case No. D-3815. The
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where assailed Decision disposed as follows:
there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
10
partition, owned in common by such heirs. "WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and a NEW ONE is entered:

The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this "1. Ordering the partition of Lot 2991 in the proportion stated in Transfer
11
right. Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his Certificate of Title No. 24440, that is: Angel Fernandez, married to Corazon
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or Cabal – 7,114.46 sqm; spouses Carlos Tarun and Narcisa Zareno – 1094.54
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the sqm.
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
12
upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other words, the law does not prohibit a "The costs of the subdivision shall be equitably shared by plaintiffs-
co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in appellants and defendants-appellees.
13
common.
"2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City to issue a separate
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of transfer certificate of title each to plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-
property under administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et appellees corresponding to their respective shares upon completion of the
3
14
al., it was said that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject partition."
to the result of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such
administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the Old Civil Code, Article The Facts
440 and Article 339 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively,
The antecedent facts of the case are narrated in the assailed CA Decision as follows:
"An 8,209-square meter fishpond situated at Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City is disputed
by [Respondents] Carlos Tarun and Narcisa Zareno, and [Petitioners] Corazon Cabal
vda. de Fernandez and her children Oscar, Gil and Armando, all surnamed
Fernandez.
"The property is known as Lot No. 2991 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan. It was
originally covered by OCT No. 43099, subsequently cancelled by TCT No. 24440.
The brothers Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel Fernandez, together with their
4
uncle Armando, co-owned this property to the extent of 1/6 thereof. It was
subsequently increased to 1/5 on account of the 1/6 share of Armando, who died
single and without issue, which accrued in favor of the five remaining co-owners.
"On June 4, 1967, Antonio Fernandez sold his share of about 547.27 square meters
5
to [the Spouses] Tarun (Exh. I). On June 18, 1967, Demetria Fernandez, also sold
her share on the same fishpond consisting of 547.27 square meters to
6 8
[respondents]. Thus, the total area sold to [respondents] is 1094.54 square meters,
more or less. The two sales were registered and annotated on OCT No. 43099.
"On November 14, 1969, the co-owners of the subject fishpond and another fishpond
covered by TCT No. 10944 executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of two parcels
of registered land with exchange of shares. Among the parties to the deed are
Antonio, Santiago, Demetria and Angel, all surnamed Fernandez.
"It was stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect the sale of a
portion of Lot 2991 consisting of 1094.54 square meters previously sold by Antonio
and Demetria Fernandez in favor of [respondents]. This portion was excluded in the
partition.
"Likewise, by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Angel B. Fernandez
exchanged his share on the other fishpond covered by TCT No. 10944 to the shares
of his co-owners on the remaining portion of [L]ot No. 2991 covered by TCT No.
10945, making Angel B. Fernandez and [respondents] as co-owners of Lot No. 2991.
"By virtue of the terms and conditions set forth in the Deed, TCT No. 24440 of the
Registry of Deed[s] of Dagupan City, (Exh. ‘A’) was issued in favor of Angel B.
Fernandez and [respondents]. From the time the latter bought the 1094.54-square
meter portion of the fishpond, they had been paying the realty taxes thereon.
However, it was Angel B. Fernandez and later on his heirs, [petitioners], who
remained in possession of the entire fishpond.
"When Angel B. Fernandez was still alive, [respondents] sought the partition of the
property and their share of its income. Angel Fernandez refused to heed their
demand. After the death of Angel Fernandez, [respondents] wrote [petitioners] of their
desire for partition but this was rejected by [petitioners]. Hence, this suit for partition
7
and damages."
Ruling of the RTC
On August 1, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, ruling that,
under Articles 1620 and 1621 of the Civil Code, they were entitled to redeem the
property that they had sold to respondents. It further held that the sale was highly
iniquitous and void for respondent’s failure to comply with Article 1623 of the same
code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that petitioners were not entitled to redeem the
controversial property for several reasons. First, it was Angel Fernandez who was its
co-owner at the time of the sale; hence, he was the one entitled to receive notice and
to redeem the property, but he did not choose to exercise that right. Second, the
execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was a substantial compliance with the
notice requirement under that law. Finally, it was too late in the day to declare the
exchange highly iniquitous, when Angel Fernandez had not complained about it. As
his successors-in-interest, petitioners were bound by the terms of the agreement.
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
9
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:
"1. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to exercise their right of legal
redemption.
"2. Whether or not the transaction is one of equitable mortgage.
"3. Whether or not the deed of extra-judicial partition is void and
inefficacious.
"4. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to damages, attorney’s fees and
costs.
"5. Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it substituted it surmises, conjectures
and guesswork in place of the trial court’s findings of fact borne by the
10
evidence on record."
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Entitlement to Legal Redemption
Petitioners aver that the sale to respondents is void, because it did not comply with
the requirements of the Civil Code. According to them, they were not notified of the
sale, but learned about it only when they received the summons for the partition case.
They claim their right to redeem the property under the following provisions of the
Civil Code:
"Article 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
"Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common."
"Article 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption
when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is
alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.
"The right is not applicable to adjacent lands which are separated by brooks, drains,
ravines, roads and other apparent servitudes for the benefit of other estates.
"If two or more adjoining owners desire to exercise the right of redemption at the
same time, the owner of the adjoining land of smaller area shall be preferred; and
should both lands have the same area, the one who first requested the redemption."
xxx xxx xxx
"Article 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
We disagree with petitioners. True, the right to redeem is granted not only to the
original co-owners, but also to all those who subsequently acquire their respective
11
shares while the community subsists. However, it must be stressed that this right of
redemption is available only when part of the co-owned property is sold to a third
person. Otherwise put, the right to redeem referred to in Article 1620 applies only
when a portion is sold to a non-co-owner.
In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners’ co-owners. The sale of
the contested property to Spouses Tarun had long been consummated before
petitioners succeeded their predecessor, Angel Fernandez. By the time petitioners
entered into the co-ownership, respondents were no longer "third persons," but had
already become co-owners of the whole property. A third person, within the meaning
12
of Article 1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner.
13
In Basa v. Aguilar, this Court has unequivocally ruled that the right of redemption
may be availed of by a co-owner, only when the shares of the other owners are sold
to a third person. " Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law
partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the
redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or [an]
inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th. Ed., 317.)
It is intended to minimize co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of
the said right of redemption when the shares of the other owners are sold to a ‘third
14 15
person."’ There is no legal redemption, either in case of a mere lease and if the
16
purchaser is also a tenant.
Equally unavailing is petitioners’ contention that the sale was void, because the
vendor had not sent any notice in writing to the other co-owners as required under
Article 1625 of the Code. Indeed, the Code merely provides that a deed of sale shall
not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit that a
written notice has been given to all possible redemptioners. However, it does not
state that, by reason of such lack of notice, the sale shall become void.
Jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the subject of varying
17
interpretations. Conejero v. Court of Appeals held that a written notice was still
required, even if the redemptioner had actual prior knowledge of the sale. However, in
18
Distrito v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that written notice was not necessary, if
the co-owner was actually aware of the sale. While the law requires that the notice
must be in writing, it does not prescribe any particular form, so long as the reasons for
19
a written notice are satisfied otherwise. Thus, in a civil case for collection of a share
in the rentals by an alleged buyer of a co-owned property, the receipt of a summons
by a co-owner has been held to constitute actual knowledge of the sale. On that
basis, the co-owner may exercise the right of redemption within 30 days from the
20
finality of the decision.
Applying the presently prevailing principles discussed above, petitioners’ predecessor
-- Angel Fernandez -- is deemed to have been given notice of the sale to respondents
by the execution and signing of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Exchange of
Shares. As correctly held by the CA, the law does not require any specific form of
21
written notice to the redemptioner. From such time, he had 30 days within which to
redeem the property sold under Article 1623. The Deed was executed November 4,
1969; hence, the period to redeem expired on December 4, 1969. Consequently, the
right to redeem was deemed waived, and petitioners are bound by such inaction of
their predecessor. The former cannot now be allowed to exercise the right and adopt
a stance contrary to that taken by the latter. Otherwise stated, the right to redeem had
long expired during the lifetime of the predecessor and may no longer be exercised
by petitioners who are his successors-in-interest.
Second Issue:
Sale or Equitable Mortgage?
Petitioners contend that the sale was only an equitable mortgage because (1) the
price was grossly inadequate, and (2) the vendors remained in possession of the land
and enjoyed its fruits. Since the property is situated primely within the city proper, the
price of P7,662 for 1,094.54 square meters is supposedly unconscionable. Moreover,
since June 4, 1967 up to the present, the vendees (or herein respondents) have
allegedly never been in actual possession of the land.
The contention is untenable. On its face, a document is considered a contract of
equitable mortgage when the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 of the Civil
Code are manifest, as follows: (a) when the price of the sale with the right to
22
repurchase is unusually inadequate, and (b) when the vendor remains in
23
possession as lessee or otherwise. Although it is undisputed that Angel Fernandez
was in actual possession of the property, it is important to note that he did not sell it to
respondents. The sellers were his co-owners -- Antonio and Demetria Fernandez --
who, however, are not claiming that the sale between them was an equitable
mortgage. For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise, one must first
satisfy the requirement that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a
contract of sale, and that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of
mortgage.
24
Furthermore, mere alleged inadequacy of the price does not necessarily void a
contract of sale, although the inadequacy may indicate that there was a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation, mortgage, or some other act or
25
contract. Finally, unless the price is grossly inadequate or shocking to the
26
conscience, a sale is not set aside. In this case, petitioners failed to establish the
fair market value of the property when it was sold in 1967. Hence, there is no basis to
conclude that the price was grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience.
Third Issue:
Validity of the Extrajudicial Partition
Petitioners also assail the partition as lopsided and iniquitous. They argue that their
predecessor stood to lose 5,498.14 square meters under the extrajudicial partition.
We are not convinced. It is a long-established doctrine that the law will not relieve
parties from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous agreement they entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what they were doing.
Courts have no power to relieve them from obligations they voluntarily assumed,
simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise
27
investments. Neither the law nor the courts will extricate them from an unwise or
undesirable contract which they entered into with all the required formalities and with
28
full knowledge of its consequences. On the other hand, petitioners herein are bound
by the extrajudicial partition, because contracts not only take effect between the
29
parties, but also extend to their assigns and heirs.
Moreover, if petitioners intended to annul the extrajudicial partition for being "lopsided
and iniquitous," then they should have argued this in a proper action and forum. They
should have filed an action to annul the extrajudicial partition and claimed their rightful
share in the estate, impleading therein the other signatories to the Deed and not just
herein respondents.
In any event, a perusal of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Exchange of Shares
reveals that the partition of Lot nos. 2991 and 2924 was done equally and fairly.
30
Indeed, 1,641.80 square meters of Lot No. 2991 and 10,971.80 square meters of
31
Lot No. 2924-B were originally given to all the co-owners -- except Antonio,
Demetria and Santiago Fernandez, who had already sold parts of their share to third
persons. However, Angel Fernandez agreed and stipulated in the same Deed that he
had traded his share in Lot No. 2924-B for the entire Lot No. 2991, except the portion
32
already sold to respondents.
Taking these stipulations into consideration, we are inclined to believe that the
swapping of shares by the heirs was more favorable to the late Angel Fernandez,
because his ownership became contiguous and compact in only one fishpond,
instead of being merely shared with the other co-heirs in two different fishponds.
33
Fourth Issue:
Damages and Attorney’s Fees
Petitioners’ claim that they are entitled to P50,000 as attorneys fees and damages
deserves scant consideration. It has been clearly established that respondents are
co-owners of the subject property. Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common. Hence,
respondents’ action for partition was not an unfounded suit. Verily, it was founded on
a right given by law.
Fifth Issue:
Factual Findings of the CA
Petitioners insist that the CA made some factual findings that were neither in
conformity with those of the RTC nor borne by the evidence on record. They assert
that the appellate court erred in ruling that the extrajudicial partition had been freely
and willfully entered into when, in fact, Angel B. Fernandez had been shortchanged
by 5,498.14 square meters. They also contend that the registration of the two Deeds
of Sale in favor of respondents was not valid, because it was not accompanied by an
affidavit that written notice had been served to all possible redemptioners.
We are not persuaded. We do not find any factual or legal basis to conclude that the
extrajudicial partition was iniquitous, and that the sale of Antonio and Demetria’s
share in Lot no. 2991 is void. Factual findings of the CA supported by substantial
34
evidence are conclusive and binding, unless they fall under the exceptions in
35
Fuentes v. Court of Appeals and similar cases.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
9. TRINIDAD V. CA
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and
filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the
1 2
Court of Appeals Decision promulgated December 1, 1994 and Resolution
3
promulgated on February 8, 1995 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner's action for partition and damages.
4
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint for partition and
damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad,
5
before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. On October 25, 1982, Felix
6 three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual
died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party.
7
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of the
petitioner, in which it ruled:
8 In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is
the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit
the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels
of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had
testified that he had been receiving [his] share from said land
before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence
introduced as to what year he stopped receiving his share and for
how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground
that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were
legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in.
The assailed Decision disposed:
9 Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioner's]
complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
10
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads:
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants' motion for
reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There
are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the
modification of the decision.
11
Hence, this petition.
The Facts
12
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court
of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of
four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of
Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land.
Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to
his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970,
plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into
share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before
plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with
them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the
complaint had been in their possession since the death of their
father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the
produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three
(3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio
died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4)
parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of
twenty three (23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded
from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be
partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-
third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants
refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court
13
hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial court's decision:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old,
(at the time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of
barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before
being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio
council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member of the] board
of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and
she knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father of
the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato;
both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife
died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in
Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the
birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters
away from plaintiff's parents['] house and she used to go there 2 or
3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are
also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle
and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of
the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes,
Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad
who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4
parcels subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels
of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4
parcels of land, witness answered and mentioned the respective
adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to
Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of
Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his
death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and
Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided
among the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and
she identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes
Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as
Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was
pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad.
When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix
Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix
and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case,
witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness
for identification. She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes
Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child
which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked
by the court when . . . the picture [was] taken, counsel for the
plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was
baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of
his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism
marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as
Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit
C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The
signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in
question very well as she used to pass by it always. It was located
just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she
merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer
who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness
answered she does not know as she was not present during the
picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture
as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he
was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-
defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72
years old and a widow. She testified having known Inocentes
Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix
and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was
Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she knew
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of
Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a
protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she
knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as
a farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite
Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting
season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the
three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and
usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio.
That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in
possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes
any share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers,
namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and
usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness
testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and
cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until
Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was growing up,
he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being
taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later
on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father's share but
Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness.
He testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his
aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father. That
the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad
and Anastacia Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad,
and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in
Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25
years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism which had been
previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was
burned during World War 2 hut he has a certificate of loss issued
by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with
them being their nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiff's
mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and
provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At
the age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on his
own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they
were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife
and children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his
family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live
with them, he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B
where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's
daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture
according to him. Another family picture previously marked Exhibit
A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's son.
According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife
and children were living with the defendants. That a few years after
having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the
house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He
moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified
there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an
upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit
bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost
of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are: East-Federico
Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and
South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only
1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are: East-Ambrosio Trinidad;
North-Federico Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad and South-
Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to
Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants and
Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The
harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are:
East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico
Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only
Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the subject of
litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by
Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the owners of the
land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half
share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-
174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title
is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio
Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the
name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637
for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his
mother they were getting the share in the produce of the land like
coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is
Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were
married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay.
When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New
Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because
he was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death
certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime.
That after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when
his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants
in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother
receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both
defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they
have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioner's] highest
educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years
old, unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He
testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and
Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister
and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the
brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead. According to
the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his
death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact
because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then
residing with his aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to Anastacia Briones
who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as
well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of
Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his
aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before 1940 for only
3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited
with anybody before his death, he answered, "That I do not know",
neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato.
Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of
Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said
Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro
Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in
Manila working. That after the war, he had gone back to the house
of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her
every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he
knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to
be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered:
"I do not know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born
in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he stated to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as
the hereditary property of their father was located there. When
asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject
matter of this case before the court, witness answered that he does
not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio
Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death
of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross
examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That
according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead
before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew
where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940,
witness answered that he was buried in their own land because the
Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted
with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the plaintiff and
the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture,
which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and
the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is
Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself,
LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single
and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother
and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he
had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to
Tigayon in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941
his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he
died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not
aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in
Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she
knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she
knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon.
However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and
wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she
said, "Yes," but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with
them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the
defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of
Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died
already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance
when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness
answered, he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to
visit her in her house, witness also said, "He did not."
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes
Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio
Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad
and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead,
she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad
and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that
her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the
same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a
wife and children. She herself testified that she does not have any
family of her own for she has [no] husband or children. According to
her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in
their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it
was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the
Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not
be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war
broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time,
the witness could not answer the question. When she was
presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein
she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she
answered; "Yes." and the child that she is holding is Clarita
Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her, she was only
requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because
she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish
church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered;
"Maybe there was." When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is
herself in the picture carrying the child, witness identified herself
and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the
church and that the picture taken together with her brother and
Arturio Trinidad and the latter's child was taken during the time
when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She
likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as
Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being
carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff,
witness answered she does not know because her eyes are
already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in
the picture who was at the right of the child held by her brother,
Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify
because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same
reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that
the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by
the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness
testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON
who testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her
neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed
Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that a few
months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their
lola's house whose names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further
testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in
Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in
Manila because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1
1/2 months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died.
She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad
Molato had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad. According to
her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her
she was horn in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when
the war broke out. When asked if she can remember that it was
only in the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese
occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further testified
that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because
Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody
would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who
was 76 years old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness
testified that . . . she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private
respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200
meters from them. When asked if it is true that according to
Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941
and he lived only for 15 days and died, witness testified that he did
not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that
Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a
house which is only across the street from her house. According to
the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died
single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato
whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan. That
she knew this fact because she was personally present when
couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when
Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good physical
condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was
solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the
sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also
present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal
witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his
parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued
by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that
records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New
Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Court's Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes
14
Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled:
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced
sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate
son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final
judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument,
or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified
for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died
single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for
the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in
New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor
of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding
ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no
preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes'
acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21,
1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs.
Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the interested parties openly
and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-
 ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958)
acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497).
Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the parcels
of land involved in the concept of owners since their father died in
1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff
attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for
more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by
acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The Issues
15
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by
preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced
sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants)
Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,]
the decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated
on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August
3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a legitimate child can be
attached collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not of private respondent (defendants-appellants)
have acquired ownership of the properties in question by
acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his
filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action
for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's
16
estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born
during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother
(Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was
successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision
and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate
and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore
17
over the records and the evidence adduced in this case.
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were
validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This,
according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
18
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias ruled that when the question of whether a
marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public
and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and
the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such
19
nuptial in subsequent documents.
20
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost,
burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact,
however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered
the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof
that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.
21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel
Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and
Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who
testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage.
Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of
the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house
22
twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. On July 21, 1943,
Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She
23
also attended petitioner's baptismal party held at the same house. Her testimony
24
constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. It further gives rise
to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
25
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also
presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were
26
named as the child's father and mother.
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record
of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document
or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding
article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of
status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document,
final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
27
28
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification that records relative to his birth were
either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed
to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two
family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardo's testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second
daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2)
carrying petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is
another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioner's first child
(Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they
do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was
accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that
Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she demurred
that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was
29
baptized. When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother — but not
petitioner, his wife and the couple's children — slyly explaining that she could not
30
clearly see because of an alleged eye defect.
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of
"the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show
31
pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence of
proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the
Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988
ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family
32
by either consanguinity or affinity, her testimony does not constitute family
reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish
petitioner's legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates
over private respondents' self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents' thesis
is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents'
witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the
estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery
in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however,
is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and
33
his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive:
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court
if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes
Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said "them", to whom are you
referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did
you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and
his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death,
Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he
had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
 Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad
Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of
Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody
with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila
working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone
back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How often did you go to the house of your
aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you
know if there was anybody who has stayed with
the defendants who claimed to be a son of
Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified, that when the
Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to
Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia
Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half
months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a
34
resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes
35
dies in March 1941. The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2,
36
1942; thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only
then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery In Kalibo,
37
because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area.
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without
objection from private respondents — a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes'
38
legitimate child.
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
39
outweighs that of the adverse party. Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly
written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner failed to
prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the
preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
40
their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility. Applying this rule, the
trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in
petitioner's favor. It declared:
. . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with
defendants enjoying the status of being their nephew . . . before
plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where
later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his
father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the
defendants . . . is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A &
B. These family pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not
broached the idea of getting his father's share. . . . His demand for
the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the
defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. . . . In this
case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of
the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants
themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded
for the partition . . . as he was already having a family of his own. . .
..
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent
herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being
her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among
them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio
captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had
been a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded
person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the
witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew of
Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant,
Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor
41
children.
42
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. Rather than rely on this
axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents'
marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to
petitioner's cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the
co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession — in the
concept of owners — of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they
acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the
property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one
benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-
43
ownership. Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner,
in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the
produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by
private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their
repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land.
Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's name. Although
private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still,
they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of
44
Appeals, the Court held:
. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents
with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly
or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the
co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin
vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-
ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs.
De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches
(Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an
action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of
a determinate portion of the property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165
SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding
that petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
10. GALVEZ V. CA
The factual antecedents of this case reveal that Timotea F. Galvez died intestate on
1
28 April 1965. She left behind her children Ulpiano and Paz Galvez. Ulpiano, who
2
died on 24 July 1959, predeceased Timotea and was survived by his son, Porfirio
Galvez. Timotea left a parcel of land situated at Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La
3
Union, covered by Tax Declaration No. 39645 and more particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated at Brgy. Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La
Union under Tax Declaration No. 39645, series of 1957, with an area of 4,304.5
square meters, more or less bounded on the North by Valentin and Isidoro
Sobrepeña; on the East by Nicolas Ducusin; on the South by Victor Ducusin; and on
4
the West by the National Highway.
Considering that all the other compulsory heirs of Timotea already received their
5
respective shares, the property passed by succession, both to Timotea's daughter,
Paz Galvez, and to the former's grandson, Porfirio, the latter succeeding by right of
representation as the son of Ulpiano.
6
Porfirio Galvez was surprised to discover that on 4 May 1970, Paz Galvez executed
an affidavit of adjudication stating that she is the true and lawful owner of the said
7 8
property. Tax Declarations No. 15749 and No. 12342 were then issued in the name
of Paz Galvez. On 22 June 1992, without the knowledge and consent of Porfirio
Galvez, Paz Galvez sold the property to Carlos Tam for a consideration of Ten
9
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Carlos Tam
thereafter filed an application for registration of said parcel of land under Land
Registration Case No. 2278 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
La Union. On 21 January 1994, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2602 of the Registry
of Deeds of San Fernando, La Union, was issued in the name of Carlos
10
Tam. Subsequently, on 27 September 1994, Carlos Tam sold the property to
Tycoon Properties, Inc. through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the former in
11
favor of the latter. As a result, the title of Carlos Tam over the property was
12
cancelled and a new one, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-40390 was
issued in favor of Tycoon Properties, Inc.
On 12 May 1994, Porfirio Galvez filed Civil Case No. 4895 before the RTC, Branch
26, of San Fernando, La Union, for Legal Redemption with Damages and
 13
Cancellation of Documents against Paz Galvez and Carlos Tam. The Complaint
was later amended to implead as additional defendant, Tycoon Properties,
14
Inc. When Tycoon Properties, Inc. filed its Answer, it also filed a cross-claim against
15
Carlos Tam. In a decision dated 15 December 1999, the trial court held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. declaring null and void the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by defendant PAZ
GALVEZ dated May 4, 1970;
2. declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property originally
covered by Tax Declaration No. 39645 executed by PAZ GALVEZ in favor of
CARLOS TAM;
3. the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2602, in the name of CARLOS TAM be
considered cancelled;
4. The Deed of Sale between CARLOS TAM and TYCOON PROPERTIES, Inc. is
hereby ordered cancelled with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40390, being null
and void;
5. That CARLOS TAM shall receive from the Clerk of Court, San Fernando City, La
Union the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, as redemption of the
property pursuant to law;
6. That the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40390, be
reconveyed (whole property) to PORFIRIO GALVEZ, he having redeemed one-half ('
) of the property from CARLOS TAM and other half of the property belongs to him as
co-heir of TIMOTEA FLORES GALVEZ.
7. Defendant PAZ GALVEZ and CARLOS TAM shall be liable solidarily for the actual
damages of the plaintiff in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos as well
as moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, together with
attorney's fees in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos acceptance fee
16
and Five Hundred (P500.00) per appearance fee.
Petitioners Paz Galvez, Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc. appealed the
17
decision to the Court of Appeals. In a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
18
August 2002, the appellate court resolved to affirm the decision of the trial court.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated
19
14 April 2003.
Not contented with the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners are now before
this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc. separately filed their
20
Memorandum but raised the same issues to wit:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO HOLD
THAT RESPONDENT'S CLAIM OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, WHICH IS
BASED ON AN IMPLIED TRUST, HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED BECAUSE THE
ACTION WAS FILED 24 YEARS AFER PETITIONER REPUDIATED THE SAID
TRUST.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THAT RESPONDENT'S CLAIM IS ALREADY BARRED BY LACHES
BECAUSE HE FAILED TO ASSERT HIS ALLEGED RIGHT FOR ALMOST TWENTY
FOUR (24) YEARS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
PETITIONERS [CARLOS TAM AND] TYCOON PROPERTIES ARE BUYERS IN
GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE AND HAS THE RIGHT TO RELY ON THE FACE
21
OF THE TITLE.
In assailing the decisions of the trial and appellate courts, petitioners cite Article
22
1451 of the Civil Code and claim that an implied or constructive trust which
prescribes in ten years, was established between Paz Galvez and Porfirio Galvez. It
is petitioners' unflinching stand that the implied trust was repudiated when Paz Galvez
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication on 4 May 1970, registered the same before
the Register of Deeds of La Union on 4 June 1970 and secured a new tax declaration
in her name. From 4 May 1970 to the time the complaint was filed on 12 May 1994,
24 years have passed, hence, the action is clearly barred both by prescription and
laches.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
23
Ostensibly, this case is governed by the rules on co-ownership since both Paz
Galvez and Porfirio Galvez are obviously co-owners of the disputed property having
inherited the same from a common ancestor. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides
that "[a] prescription shall not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share
24
of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In Santos
25 26
v. Santos, citing the earlier case of Adille v. Court of Appeals, this Court found
occasion to rule that:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is
subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an
act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period
required by law.
For title to prescribe in favor of a co-owner there must be a clear showing that he has
repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and the latter has been categorically
advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question. The rule
requires a clear repudiation of the co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
27
owners. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of
prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of
28
their own title if they do not seasonably defend it.
To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was
originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-
owners were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and
29
exclusive ownership before the alleged prescriptive period began to run.
30
In Salvador v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the possession of a co-owner is like
that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owner but in
fact beneficial to all of them.
31
The case of Huang v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the creation of trust
relationships.
Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence
of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it
for the benefit of another. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in
whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of another person is
known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has been created is
referred to as the beneficiary or cestui que trust. Trust is either express or implied.
Express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trust
comes into being by operation of law. The latter kind is either constructive or resulting
trust. A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is
subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the property
arises because it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or
through breach of a fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of another's
property. On the other hand, a resulting trust arises where a person makes or causes
to be made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference
that he does not intend that the person taking or holding the property should have the
beneficial interest in the property. It is founded on the presumed intention of the
parties, and as a general rule, it arises where, and only where such may be
reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to
be established.
Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse
insofar as co-owners are concerned. Thus, Salvador v. Court of Appeals reiterated
what acts constitute proof of exclusive ownership amounting to repudiation,
emphasizing that the act must be borne out of clear and convincing evidence of acts
of possession which unequivocably amounts to an ouster or deprivation of the right of
32
the other co-owner. The case of Pangan v. Court of Appeals enumerated the
following as constituting acts of repudiation:
Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property, or
for recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute an
act of repudiation of the trust reposed on him by the latter.
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation
of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and adverse possession as
owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription.
An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes within 10 years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the
effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitation is counted.
The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners repudiated the
trust relation in 1955 upon the filing of the complaint for recovery of possession
against private respondents so that the counterclaim of the private respondents
contained in their amended answer wherein they asserted absolute ownership of the
disputed realty by reason of the continuous and adverse possession of the same is
well within the 10-year prescriptive period.
There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of
property causes the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the apparent
beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title in his own name.
It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in question,
executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of
the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein they
appear as the new owners of a definite area each, thereby in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs over his alleged share in the entire
lot, that the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted
by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their
rights thereunder.
In this case, we find that Paz Galvez effected no clear and evident repudiation of the
co-ownership. The execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication does not constitute
such sufficient act of repudiation as contemplated under the law as to effectively
exclude Porfirio Galvez from the property. This Court has repeatedly expressed its
disapproval over the obvious bad faith of a co-heir feigning sole ownership of the
property to the exclusion of the other heirs essentially stating that one who acts in bad
faith should not be permitted to profit from it to the detriment of others. In the cases of
33 34
Adille and Pangan where, as in this case, a co-heir was excluded from his legal
share by the other co-heir who represented himself as the only heir, this Court held
that the act of exclusion does not constitute repudiation.
On the issue of prescription, while admittedly prescription operates as a bar to
recovery of property, the ten-year period commenced to run from date of registration.
In this case, Carlos Tam obtained his title to the property on 21 January 1994. Since
the complaint of Porfirio Galvez was filed on 12 May 1994, the same was well within
the ten-year period to file the action.
On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and
its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to
35
defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be
used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been
36
fraudulently registered in the name of another. The equitable remedy of laches is,
therefore, unavailing in this case.
Finally, petitioners claim that if the sale would be nullified, the nullification should
37
extend only to the one-half share of Porfirio Galvez but not to the share of Paz
Galvez, who, by her overt act of selling the property, manifested her intention to
dispose of her part.
Notably, Porfirio Galvez's complaint was captioned "legal redemption with damages,
38
cancellation of documents and reconveyance of share." In his prayer, he sought for
the reconveyance of his one-half share in the property and at the same time be
subrogated to the other half pertaining to Paz Galvez and sold to Carlos Tam after
reimbursement of the amount which the latter paid for the property.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on legal redemption are as follows:
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by
purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is
transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common.
39
In the case of Hermoso v. Court of Appeals, this Court, in interpreting the provision
of the law on legal redemption, held:
The purpose of Article 1067 (of the old Civil Code, now Article 1088 of the present
Civil Code) is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the
case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing
and in a position to repurchase the share sold (De Jesus v. Manlapus, 81 Phil. 144).
While there should be no question that an heir may dispose his right before partition
(Rivero v. Serrano [CA] 46 O.G. 642; Wenceslao v. Calimon, 46 Phil. 906; Hernaez v.
Hernaez, 32 Phil. 214), a co-heir would have had to pay only the price for which the
vendee acquired it (Hernaez v. Hernaez, Ibid.).
It is a one-way street. It is always in favor of the redemptioner since he can compel
the vendee to sell to him but he cannot be compelled by the vendee to buy the
alienated property.
In another case,
40
this Court reiterated that:
Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of
public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford
him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or [an] inconvenient association into
which he has been thrust. (10 Manresa, 4th Ed., 317.) It is intended to minimize co-
ownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of redemption
when the shares of the other owners are sold to a "third person."
The rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the
property and the policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat him in the exercise of his
right of redemption.
41
Thus, petitioners cannot be accommodated in this respect and we agree with the trial
court when it held:
The provision of Art. 1088 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is very clear on the
matter.
Art. 1088, provides: "Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the
period of one (1) month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor."
There was no written notice sent to Porfirio Galvez by Paz Galvez when she sold her
share over the land to Carlos Tam. Porfirio Galvez only discovered on May 12, 1994
that the land was sold to Carlos Tam. Art. 1620, Civil Code of the Philippines,
provides:
Art. 1620. "A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
share of all the other co-owners or any of them are sold to a third person. If the price
of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable
one."
No written notice of the sale was given by Paz Galvez (vendor) to Porfirio Galvez, the
co-owner as required under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The written notice is
mandatory. Hence, the right to redeem commenced when plaintiff sought to exercise
it by instituting the complaint in the instant case on June 12, 1994. The complaint of
legal redemption may be filed even several years after the consummation of sale
(Zosima Verdad v. Court of Appeals, et al.; G.R. No. 10972, April 29, 1996).
42
As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc.'s claim that they are buyers
in good faith, same fails to persuade.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair
price before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the
same property. So it is that the "honesty of intention" which constitutes good faith
implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on
43
inquiry.
Suffice it to state that both the trial and appellate courts found otherwise as "Tam did
not exert efforts to determine the previous ownership of the property in
44 45
question" and relied only on the tax declarations in the name of Paz Galvez. It
must be noted that Carlos Tam received a copy of the summons and the complaint on
22 September 1994. This notwithstanding, he sold the property to Tycoon Properties,
Inc. on 27 September 1994. Significantly, Carlos Tam is also an owner of Tycoon
46
Properties, Inc. to the extent of 45%. A notice of lis pendens dated 8 July 1997 filed
with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of La Union was inscribed on TCT No. T -
47
40390. Despite the inscription, Tycoon Properties, Inc. mortgaged the land to Far
48
East Bank and Trust Company for the sum of P11,172,600. All these attendant
circumstances negate petitioners' claim of good faith.
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
August 2002 and its Resolution dated 14 April 2003 are Affirmed. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners proceed to describe when the period is reckoned and state that this occurs
(1) when the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made
known to the cestui que trust, and (3) the evidence thereon is clear and positive.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree, Section
113 provides:
SEC. 113. Recording of instrument relating to unregistered lands. - No deed,
conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not
registered under the Torrens system shall be valid, except as between the parties
thereto, unless such instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein
prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
land lies.
(a) the Register of Deeds for each province or city shall keep a Primary Entry book
and a Registration book. The Primary Entry Book shall contain, among other
particulars, the entry number, the names of the parties, the nature of the document,
the date, hour and minute it was presented and received. The recording of the deed
and other instruments relating to unregistered lands shall be effected by way of
annotation onthe space provided therefor in the Registration Book, after the same
shall have been entered in the Primary Entry Book.
(b) If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is sufficient in law, the Register
of Deeds shall forthwith record the instrument in the manner provided herein. In case
the Register of Deeds refuses its admission to record, said official shall advise hte
party in interest in writing of the ground or grounds for his refusal, and the latter may
appeal the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration in accordance with the
provisions of Section 117 of this Decree. It shall be understood that any recording
made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
(c) After recording on the Record Book, the Register of Deeds shall endorse, among
other things, upon the original of the recorded instruments, the file number and the
date as well as the hour and minute when the document was received for recording
as shown in the primary entry book, returning to the registrant or person in interest
the duplicate of the instrument, with appropriate annotation, certifying that he has
recorded the instrument after reserving one copy thereof to be furnished the
provincial or city assessor as required by existing law.
(d) Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens, adverse claim and other
instruments in the nature of involuntary dealings with respect to unregistered lands, if
made in the form sufficient in law, shall likewise be admissible to record under this
section.
(e) For the services to be rendered by the Register of Deeds under this section, he
shall collect the same amount of fees prescribed for similar services for the
49
registration of deeds or instruments concerning registered lands.
50
In the case of Alzona V. Capunitan cited by the petitioner Tycoon Properties, while
admittedly, the Court made a pronouncement therein that an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the court found
that there was in the said case an express repudiation of the trust by the defendants-
appellees who had consistently repudiated the trust. The case therein dealt with a
property registered under the Torrens system. Similarly, Medina v. Court of
51
Appeals, again cited by petitioner Tycoon simply made a pronouncement regarding
the prescriptibility of action based on implied or constructive trust but does not involve
an unregistered land such as in the case at bar.
In the same manner, the citation by petitioner Tycoon of the case of Gonzales v.
52
Intermediate Appellate Court, and the case of Vda. De Esconde v. Court of
53
Appeals, we find inapplicable as well, as the property involved therein is registered
under the Torrens System.
11. PAULMITAN V. CA

1 after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio
2 extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091,
Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato Sagario Paulmitan, et al." which affirmed the decision of
the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial
District, Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
3
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left the two following
parcels of land located in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an
area of 1,946 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-
8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters and covered by
OCT No. RO-11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now
deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who
4 Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the
also died in 1953, apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and Donato
Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's
daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual
Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the respondents, who are
his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all
surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles
to the two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on
August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of
Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that
he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO-
8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 35979 in Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the
5
same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was
forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the
6
Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental.
On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial
7
Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09.
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan
filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an
affirmative defense, contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years
consequence of the registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she
acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in
her favor by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption
from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No.
757, the trial court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as
to the said property upon finding merit in petitioners' affirmative defense. This order,
which is not the object of the present petition, has become final after respondents'
failure to appeal therefrom.
trial court decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial
court, the respondents, as descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled
to one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato
Paulmitan to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not prejudice their rights.
And the repurchase by Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial Government
of Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over the entire land
but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the
property. The trial court ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners
Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P. Fanesa to pay private respondents certain amounts
representing the latter's share in the fruits of the land. On the other hand, respondents
were directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in the redemption
price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause
of action pleaded in the complain as follows:
1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar
as the one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to
vest ownership over said half portion in favor of defendant Juliana
Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while the remaining half
shall belong to plaintiffs, pro-indiviso;
2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros
Occidental, now covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered
partitioned. The parties must proceed to an actual partition by
property instrument of partition, submitting the corresponding
subdivision within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, and
should they fail to agree, commissioners of partition may be
appointed by the Court;
3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental is ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-

11653 (N.A.) covering Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue
in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs and
defendants, one-half portion each,pro-indiviso, as indicated in
paragraph 1 above;
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant
Juliana Fanesa the amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal
rate from May 28, 1974 until paid;
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan
Fanesa are ordered to account to plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly
and severally, the value of the produce from Lot 1091 representing
plaintiffs' share in the amount of P5,000.00 per year from 1966 up
to the time of actual partition of the property, and to pay them the
sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees as well as the costs of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well
to review, initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan. When Agatona died in 1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato
and Pascual. A few months later in the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven
children, the private respondents. On the other had, Donato's sole offspring was
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona
Sagario Paulmitan, her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children.
It is, thus, tempting to apply the principles pertaining to the right of representation as
regards respondents. It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did no
predecease his mother, 8 thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil
9
Code on the right of representation with respect to his children, the respondents.
When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons Donato
and Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil
Code that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
10
of the decedent," the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of Pascual,
over their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of
law vested in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the
children of Donato and Pascual did not yet have any right over the inheritance since
"[i]n every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
11
ones." Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit from
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing
away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of
the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
12
payment of debts of the deceased." Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were,
therefore, co-owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's
right of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children,
who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato
over the disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two
transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan;
and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial of Negros Occidental after it
was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana
P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell
13
that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. The
sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of
the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire
land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the
14
property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is
15
partitioned. In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, the Court, through Justice Irene
R. Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the
co-owners, thus:
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified
in Article 493 of the Civil Code, Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale
[Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under
the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition
affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned
in common [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)].
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and
Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale
to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby
became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held
 by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of
substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy,
14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of
the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter
ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2)
undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question
with the respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of
the fact that when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land
after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes, she redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor
give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same
16
issue raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, resolved the
same with the following pronouncements:
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire
exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject
of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join
him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on
the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of
the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand
redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect
to his share alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889),
art. (1514.). While the records show that petitioner redeemed the
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did
not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to
end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is
no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Under the Civil Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-
owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the
expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code,
"may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality
does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the
co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607).
But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right
to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating
a co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of
the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for
half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the
17
subject property for the amount due her.
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the
partition of the estate which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits
of the land. According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year
only. This assigned error, however raises a factual question. The settled rule is that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings
of fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
18
cannot be reviewed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
12. MARIANO V. CA
Before Us is a petition foe review of the decision, dated May 13, 1991 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 13122, entitled Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. v. Leonardo
Mariano v. Amparo Gosiengfiao 1 raising as issue the distinction between Article
2 3
1088 and Article 1620 of the Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
It appears on record that the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the
registered owner of a residential lot located at Ugac Sur,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, particularly described as follows, to wit:
"The eastern portion of Lot 1351, Tuguegarao
Cadastre, and after its segregation now
designated as Lot 1351-A, Plan PSD-67391, with
an area of 1,1346 square meters."
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416 recorded in
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.
The lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural
Bank of Tuguegarao (designated as Mortgagee bank, for brevity)
on several occasions before the last, being on March 9, 1956 and
29, 1958.
On August 15, 1958, Francisco Gosiengfiao died intestate survived
by his heirs, namely: Third-Party Defendants: wife Antonia and
Children Amparo, Carlos, Severino and herein plaintiffs-appellants
Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina (represented by
daughter Pinky Rose), and Jacinto.
The loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the
mortgagee bank and in the foreclosure sale held on December 27,
1963, the same was awarded to the mortgagee bank as the highest
bidder.
On February 7, 1964, third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-
Ibarra redeemed the property by paying the amount of P1,347.89
and the balance of P423.35 was paid on December 28, 1964 to the
mortgagee bank.
On September 10, 1965, Antonia Gosiengfiao on her behalf and
that of her minor children Emma, Lina, Norma together with Carlos
and Severino executed a "Deed of Assignment of the Right of
Redemption" in favor of Amparo G. Ibarra appearing in the notarial
register of Pedro (Laggui) as Doc. No. 257, Page No. 6, Book No.
8, Series of 1965.
On August 15, 1966, Amparo Gosiengfiao sold the entire property
to defendant Leonardo Mariano who subsequently established
residence on the lot subject of this controversy. It appears in the
Deed of Sale dated August 15, 1966 that Amparo, Antonia, Carlos
and Severino were signatories thereto.
Sometime in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of
the sale of said property by the third-party defendants. She went to
the Barangay Captain and asked for a confrontation with
defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to present her claim to
said property.
On November 27, 1982, no settlement having been reached by the
parties, the Barangay captain issued a certificate to file action.
On December 8, 1982, defendant Leonardo Mariano sold the same
property to his children Lazaro F. Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale notarized by Hilarion L. Aquino as
Doc. No. 143, Page No. 19, Book No. V, Series of 1982.
On December 21, 1982, plaintiffs Grace Gosiengfiao, et al. filed a
complaint for "recovery of possession and legal redemption with
damages" against defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano.
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that as co-heirs and co-owners
of the lot in question, they have the right to recover their respective
shares in the same, and property as they did not sell the same, and
the right of redemption with regard to the shares of other co-owners
sold to the defendants.
Defendants in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has (sic) no
cause of action against them as the money used to redeem lot in
question was solely from the personal funds of third-party
defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who consequently became
the sole owner of the said property and thus validly sold the entire
property to the defendants, and the fact that defendants had
already sold the said property to the children, Lazaro Mariano and
Dionicia M. Aquino. Defendants further contend that even granting
that the plaintiffs are co-owners with the third-party defendants,
their right of redemption had already been barred by the Statute of
Limitations under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, if not by laches.
4
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch I, rendered a
decision dated September 16, 1986, dismissing the complaint and stating that
respondents have no right of ownership or possession over the lot in question. The
trial court further said that when the subject property foreclosed and sold at public
auction, the rights of the heirs were reduced to a mere right of redemption. And when
Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the lot from the Rural Bank on her own behalf and with
her own money she became the sole owner of the property. Respondents' having
failed to redeem the property from the bank or from Amparo G. Ibarra, lost whatever
5
rights the might have on the property.
The Court of Appeals in its questioned decision reversed and set aside the ruling of
the trial court and declared herein respondents as co-owners of the property in the
question. The Court of Appeals said:
The whole controversy in the case at bar revolves on the question
of "whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with
 her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property
and terminates the existing state of co-ownership."
Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the
decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the
period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption
of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole
ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-
owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-
ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it is undisputed and supported by records, that
third-party defendant Amparo G. Ibarra redeemed the propety in
dispute within the one year redemption period. Her redemption of
the property, even granting that the money used was from her own
personal funds did not make her the exclusive owner of the
mortgaged property owned in common but inured to the benefit of
all co-owners. It would have been otherwise if third-party defendant
Amparo G. Ibarra purchased the said property from the mortgagee
bank (highest, bidder in the foreclosure sale) after the redemption
period had already expired and after the mortgagee bank had
consolidated it title in which case there would no longer be any co-
6
ownership to speak of .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is supported by a long line of case law which
states that a redemption by a co-owner within the period prescribed by law inures to
the benefit of all the other co-owners.
7 A. I asked him about the Deed of Sale which Mrs.
The main argument of petitioners in the case at bar is that the Court of Appeals
incorrectly applied Article 1620 of the Civil Code, instead of Article 1088 of the same
code which governs legal redemption by co-heirs since the lot in question, which
forms part of the intestate estate of the late Francisco Gosiengfiao, was never the
subject of partition or distribution among the heirs, thus, private respondents and
third-party defendants had not ceased to be co-heirs.
On that premise, petitioners further contend that the right of legal redemption was not
timely exercised by the private respondents, since Article 1088 prescribes that the
same must be done within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.
According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between Article 1088 and Article 1620 is
that when the sale consists of an interest in some particular property or properties of
the inheritance, the right redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that
recognized in Article 1620. On the other hand, if the sale is the hereditary right itself,
fully or in part, in the abstract sense, without specifying any particular object, the right
8
recognized in Article 1088 exists.
Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case,
respondents failed to exercise their right of legal redemption during the period
provided by law, citing as authority the case of Conejero, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et
9
al. wherein the Court adopted the principle that the giving of a copy of a deed is
equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption.
We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case. However, the facts in
the said case are not four square with the facts of the present case.
In Conejero, redemptioner Enrique Conejero was shown and given a copy of the
deed of sale of the subject property. The Court in that case stated that the furnishing
of a copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written notice required by
11
law.
The records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the sale being
given whatsoever to private respondents. Although, petitioners allege that sometime
on October 31, 1982 private respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao was given a copy of the
questioned deed of sale and shown a copy of the document at the Office of the
Barangay Captain sometime November 18, 1982, this was not supported by the
evidence presented. On the contrary, respondent, Grace Gosiengfiao, in her
testimony, declared as follows:
Q. When you went back to the residence of Atty.
Pedro Laggui were you able to see him?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. When you saw him, what did you tell?
Aquino had told me and he also showed me a
Deed of Sale. I went over the Deed of Sale and I
asked Atty. Laggui about this and he mentioned
here about the names of the legal heirs. I asked
why my name is not included and I was never
informed in writing because I would like to claim
and he told me to better consult my own attorney.
Q. And did you go?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What kind of copy or document is that?
A. It is a deed of sale signed by my mother, sister
Amparo and my brothers.
Q. If shown to you the copy of the Deed of Sale
will you be able to identify it?
 11
A. Yes, sir.
Thereafter, Grace Gosiengfiao explicitly stated that she was never given a copy of the
said Deed of Sale.
Q. Where did Don Mariano, Dr. Mariano and you
see each other?
A. In the house of Brgy. Captain Antonio Bassig.
Q. What transpired in the house of the Brgy.
Captain when you saw each other there?
A. Brgy. Captain Bassig informed my intention of
claiming the lot and I also informed him about the
Deed of Sale that was not signed by me since it
is mine it is already sold and I was informed in
writing about it. I am a legal heir and I have also
the right to claim.
Q. And what was the reply of Don Mariano and
Dr. Mariano to the information given to them by
Brgy. Captain Bassig regarding your claim?
A. He insisted that the lot is already his because
of the Deed of Sale. I asked for the exact copy so
that I could show to him that I did not sign and he
said he does not have a copy.
12
The above testimony was never refuted by Dr. Mariano who was present before Brgy.
Captain Bassig.
The requirement of a written notice has long been settled as early as in the case
13
of Castillo v. Samonte, where this Court quoted the ruling in Hernaez v. Hernaez, 32
Phil., 214, thus:
Both the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by
including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by
registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal
notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or
reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the
said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice
14
or information was sufficient.
Moreover, petitioners themselves adopted in their argument respondents' allegation
In their complaint that sometime on October, 1982 they sought the redemption of the
property from spouses Leonardo Mariano and Avelina Tigue, by tendering the
15
repurchase money of P12,000.00, which the spouses rejected. Consequently,
private respondents exercised their right of redemption at the first opportunity they
have by tendering the repurchase price to petitioners. The complaint they filed, before
the Barangay Captain and then to the Regional Trial Court was necessary to assert
their rights. As we learned in the case of Castillo, supra:
It would seem clear from the above that the reimbursement to the
purchaser within the period of one month from the notice in writing
is a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of
legal redemption; the bringing of an action in court is the remedy to
enforce that right in case the purchaser refuses the redemption.
The first must be done within the month-period; the second within
16
the prescriptive period provided in the Statute of Limitation.
The ruling in Castillo v. Samonte; supra, was reiterated in the case of Garcia
v. Calaliman, where We also discussed the reason for the requirement of the written
notice. We said:
Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related
provision (Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had
stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of
the sale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner,
notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as
exacted by the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its
terms and its validity, and to quiet and doubt that the alienation is
not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the
method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does
not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive
method written notification of redemption (Conejero et al. v. Court
of Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v. Court of
Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No.
17
75069, April 15, 1988). (Emphasis ours)
We likewise do not find merit in petitioners' position that private respondents could not
have validly effected redemption due to their failure to consign in court the full
redemption price after tender thereof was rejected by the petitioners. Consignation is
not necessary, because the tender of payment was not made to discharge an
obligation, but to enforce or exercise a right. It has been previously held that
consignation is not required to preserve the right of repurchase as a mere tender of
payment is enough on time as a basis for an action to compel the vendee a retroto
resell the property; no subsequent consignation was necessary to entitle private
respondents to such
18
reconveyance.
Premises considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the
absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not
even begun to run.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
13. SAME WITH CASE NO. 3 (LACBAYAN V. SAMOY)
14. HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON V. TAMAYO
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 1993.
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his five children
Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and Natividad as surviving heirs. Among the
properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, with an area of 2,188 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title
1
No. 10384.
On January 8, 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3,000 to his
sister Salud Dizon Salamat. The sale was evidenced by a private document bearing
2
the signatures of his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses.
On June 2, 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary rights for the sum of P4,000
to his sister Salud. The sale was evidenced by a notarized document which bore the
3
signature of Eduardo Dizon and a certain Angela Ramos as witnesses. Gaudencio
died on May 30, 1951 leaving his daughters Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D.
Jocson as heirs.
Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial
partition of real properties registered in the name of Agustin Dizon with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Malolos, Bulacan. The action was prompted
by the refusal of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to agree to the
formal distribution of the properties of deceased Agustin Dizon among his
heirs. Respondent's refusal stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the
parcel of land covered by OCT 10384 where she presently resides, claiming that
her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the conformity of the other
heirs. The subject property is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 10376 in the name of respondent.
The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was made orally by the
deceased Agustin Dizon to herein respondent partook of the nature of a
donation which required the observance of certain formalities set by law.
Nevertheless, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the partition of the estate of Agustin
Dizon is in order, let a project of partition be drawn pursuant to
Sec 2, Rule 69, Rules of Court assigning to each heir the
specific share to which he is entitled taking into consideration
the disposition made in favor of Salud Dizon Salamat and the
adjudication of Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D owned by
Natividad Dizon Tamayo, together with the improvements
thereon, in her favor and the house owned by Valenta Dizon
Garcia, executing, if necessary, proper instruments of
conveyance for confirmation and approval by the Court.
Parties are enjoined to draw the prospect of partition as
equitably and equally as possible with the least inconvenience
and disruption of those in possession or in actual occupation
of the property. Should the parties fail to come up with an
acceptable of partition, the Court will appoint commissioners
as authorized by Sec 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court, who will be
guided by the dispositive portion hereof.
All costs and expenses incurred in connection with the
partition are to be shared equally by the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, Cad 304-D, described and covered by OCT
10384 in the name of the heirs of Agustin Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while
respondent claims that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the
consent of her co-heirs. In support of her claim, respondent Natividad
presented a private document of conformity which was allegedly signed and
executed by her elder brother, Eduardo, in 1936.
Petitioners, however, question the authenticity of the document inasmuch as it
is marred by unexplained erasures and alterations.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the RTC, stated that
notwithstanding the unexplained erasures and alterations, a cursory reading of
the signed statement of Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, showed
that there was an oral donation of the litigated land from Agustin Dizon to
4
Natividad Dizon Tamayo in 1936.
The Court of Appeals further stated that the attestation by Eduardo, of the oral
donation of the subject land made by his father to respondent Natividad, in
1936, coupled with the tax declaration and payment of taxes in respondent's
name would show that the trial court did not err in ruling that the subject land
should pertain to Natividad Tamayo as inheritance from her parents.
We reverse.
Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or
in a separate public document, unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to
another cannot take effect as a donation unless embodied in a public
document.
The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and not executed in a
public document. Moreover, the document which was presented by respondent
in support of her claim that her father donated the subject parcel of land to her
was a mere private document of conformity which was executed by her elder
5
brother, Eduardo in 1956. It may not be amiss to point out that the brothers
Eduardo and Gaudencio had already ceded their hereditary interests to
petitioner Salud Dizon Salamat even before 1950.
The Court of Appeals, however, placed much reliance on the said document
and made the dubious observation that ". . . a cursory reading of the signed
statement of Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, shows that there
was an oral donation . . . ."
Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of Appeals could hardly
satisfy the requirements of the rule on ancient documents on account of
unexplained alterations.
An anciert document refers to a private document which is more than thirty (30)
years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by alteration or circumstances of suspicion.
6 respondent presently resides while the other is a house built by respondent's
To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by Eduardo was marred
by unexplained erasures and alterations. While the document was originally
penned in black ink, the number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was superimposed on
the number fifty-six (56) to make it appear that the document was executed in
1936 instead of in 1956. Moreover, a signature was blotted out with a black
7
pentel pen and the three other signatures of the alleged witnesses to the
execution of the document at the lower portion of the document were dated
June 1, 1951. This could only mean that the witnesses attested to the veracity
of the document 5 years earlier, if the document was executed in 1956 or 15
years later, if we are to give credence to respondent's claim, that the document
was executed in 1936. Curiously, two of the signatories, namely, Priscila D.
Rivera and Maria D. Jocson signed the document as witnesses two days after
the death of their father Gaudencio, who, as earlier mentioned, had already sold
his hereditary rights to his sister Salud in 1949.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent,
albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim ownership over the property. While it
is true that a void donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into
8
title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession of the property. It
is undeniable that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are
co-owners of the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a
9
trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other and possession of a co-
owner shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owner but in fact is
beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the
inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all,
entitled to possession of the property.
10
In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals, we had occasion to state that a
mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from
the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees
thereon and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he
exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
The elements in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to
the cestui que trust or the co-owner are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-
owners (2) that such positive acts or repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust or other co-owners and (3) that the evidence thereon must
11
be clear and convincing.
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case at bar. There are
two houses standing on the subject property. One is the house where
sister Valenta. Records show that the house on Lot 227 where the respondent
lives is actually the ancestral house of the Dizons although respondent has
remodelled it, constructed a piggery and has planted trees
12
thereon. Respondent herself testified:
xxx xxx xxx
 Q: Now who is in possession of this particular
residential land in Bo. San Nicolas, Hagonoy,
Bulacan?
A: I am in possession of that land, Sir.
Q: Do you have your residential house there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said that you have your
residential house there, since when have you
stayed there?
A: I was born there, Sir.
Q: And you are staying there up to the
present?
A: Yes, Sir.
15. HEIRS OF RESTAR V. HEIRS OF CICHON
In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory
heirs, namely: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria,
Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria
Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
In 1960, Restar's eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint
Affidavit [1] he executed with one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax
Declaration No. 6696 [2] in Restar's name covering a 5,918 [3] square meter parcel of
land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was among
the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his
name.
Flores died on June 10, 1989.

13
On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restar's
xxx xxx xxx.
Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No.
It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never made unequivocal 11134 [4] in his name.
acts of repudiation, she cannot acquire ownership over said property through
acquisitive prescription. The testimony of her son that she merely allowed her
14
sister Valenta to build a house on the lot is pure hearsay as respondent On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores' sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta.
herself could have testified on the matter but chose not to. Maria, and Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores' surviving
sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a
Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in
the name of respondent who pays realty taxes thereon under Tax Declaration Complaint [5] against Flores' heirs for 'partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of
No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction before the Regional
15
payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan.

As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned

lot, the parties should be guided by Article 500 of the Civil Code which states Flores' brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being
that: "Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received unwilling co-plaintiffs.
and reimbursements for expenses made. . . ."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. Lot

2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384
is hereby declared to belong the estate of Agustin Dizon. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores,
they were given their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to
1991; after Flores' death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to
hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children, to which they (the plaintiffs)
agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it would be
divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the
defendants Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners
thereof as they had inherited it from Flores.
By Answer [6] filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of
Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for
more than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial.
And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon
Flores' death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to
finance her children's education, they contending that by 1977, the children had
already finished their respective courses. [7]
The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the
'new Tax Declaration in 1945, Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands
situated in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from the estate of
their father Restar; [8] and an extra-judicial partition was subsequently executed on
September 28, 1973 by Restar's heirs, which was notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc,
dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land. [9]
The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer, [10] alleged that the complaint did
not state a cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to the
partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar.
As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer [11]acknowledged
Flores as the owner of the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square meters, was
sold to him as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981. [12] He thus
prayed that, among other things, an order for the partition of the lot among Restar's
heirs be issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores. [13]
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores' share in Restar's
estate was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless, the
trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute
repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by
prescription. [14]
Respecting the defendant Policarpio's claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him,
the trial court discredited the same upon noting that Flores' signature in the purported
Deed of Sale differed from those appearing in other documents submitted by the
parties; in 1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged to have been executed,
Flores was admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could not have written his name in
a 'straight manner, as in fact his signature appearing in at least two documents dated
1980 was 'crooked, and there existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores' wife's
signature which read 'Esmea in the deed, and not as 'Esmenia. [15]
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999. [16]
'On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate
court, by Decision of October 29, 2002. [17] reversed the decision of the trial court, it
finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the
lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from a separate conveyance
to them by Restar.
The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his
other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there
a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that
barred the plaintiffs' claim of ownership. [18]
And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately
take legal action to protect their rights on account of forbearance towards their eldest
brother who had asked them to continue cultivating the lot to support his children's
education. [19]
Respecting the defendant Policarpio's claim that part of the lot had been sold to him
by Flores, the appellate court sustained the trial court's rejection thereof.
Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED
in so far as plaintiffs-appellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are
concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant Policarpio
Restar. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 3, dated June 30, 1999 is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said
court that the heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership by
 adverse possession of the land in question, Cadastral Lot No.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-
6686, is hereby REVERSED.
owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription [21] where there exists a clear
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original) repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of
adverse and exclusive ownership. [22]
The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants
Heirs of Flores filed the present petition, assigning the following errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER COURT extraordinary. 'Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
THAT THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES
RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and just title,
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires
QUESTION.
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN

NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN QUESTION
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF FLORES
RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY AS
1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real
PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS
POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
YEARS. [20]
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of
ten years.

The petition is impressed with merit. ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides: without need of title or of good faith.

ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned extraordinary prescription, the appellate court held in the negative.
in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court
xxx
from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on the record. [23]
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.

Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply support
petitioners' claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription had been duly
met.
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot
by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less
asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for
partition subject of the present petition.
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of
dominion thereon ' tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and
enjoying the produce thereof.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960
when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his
name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot.
And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the
adverse claim. [24]
Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after
the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New
Civil Code.
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Court's approval.
The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar
adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share
from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with
one Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial
Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name. It was
admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the
basis of the transfer of Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar
to Flores Restar. So that from 1960 the land was declared in the
name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10). This was the first concrete act of
repudiation made by Flores of the co-ownership over the land in
question. x x x
Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one
parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also
had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo
and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit '20'). If
they were able to demand the partition, why then did they not
demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once
and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar,
considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight
heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing
of the extra-judicial partition?
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all
the chances (sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of
29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed
the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years
after Flores' death.
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse
possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax
declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive
prescription started to run from this date. Hence, the adverse
possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years.
Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the
action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar
and his heirs. [25]
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do
not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they
constitute evidence of great weight [26] and can be the basis of a claim of ownership
through prescription. [27]
As for respondents' claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce of
the land, it was correctly discredited by the trial court.
[P]laintiffs' claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas
each as their shares in the produce cannot be sustained. A few
gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of
palay produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at
least six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding expenses for
cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their
whole 7/8 share of the produce would total two cavans, six gantas
only at the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan. [28]
Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial court's findings of SO ORDERED.
facts which must, as a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect,
they must remain. Respondents have not, however, proffered any reason warranting
the disturbance of the trial court's findings of facts.

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the
cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing
another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and
possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real estate tax and
irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and
continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents.
And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The appellate court's crediting of respondents' justification for failing to immediately

take legal action to protect their rights ' forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who
asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support their children's education ' does
not impress. For assuming such justification to be true, why did not any of
respondents assail Flores' continuous possession after his children completed their
college education in 1977?

The trial court's finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38
years possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept
of owner − which length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or
disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by substantial evidence,
he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription. It is
unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court
is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.