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BUGTAS, Camille C September 30, 2018

2017-0475 CIV PRO HW no. 1

1. Distinction of Stare Decisis, Conclusiveness of Judgment, and Law of the Case

A. STARE DECISIS
The Latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means “stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm.” This principle commands adherence by lower courts to the doctrinal rules
established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument. It is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues which are necessary for two
simple reasons—economy and stability. This principle is well-entrenched in Article 8 of our Civil
Code, which states:
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The general rule with regard to the principle of stare decisis is that where a judgment
over the same facts and issues has already been made, the subsequent cases should also be
decided in the same manner. To deviate from the precedent rulings would run counter to the
principle of stare decisis and will result to the relitigation of the same issues, thereby wasting
time and effort exerted by the previous courts. This will compromise the need to afford the parties
the speedy disposition of the case that they deserve, hence the delayed justice.
As the rule on stare decisis evolved, certain exceptions have been established, namely:
(1) it would not be followed if it were “plainly unreasonable”; (2) where courts of equal authority
developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the “actual principle
or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.”
There are two major kinds of stare decisis, namely: vertical stare decisis, and horizontal
stare decisis. The vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions
of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The horizontal stare decisis, on the other
hand, requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. The horizontal stare decisis has
two kinds—Constitutional stare decisis, involving judicial interpretations of the Constitution,
and the second, Statutory stare decisis, which involves interpretations of statutes.
The following are recent cases explaining the principle of stare decisis.

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION


v. DSWD
G.R. No. 199669 April 25, 2017

FACTS: The case at bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation
(petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development , the National Council
for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the
Department of Finance and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which
sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise
known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which
amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on
the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and
treating them as tax deduction. which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern
Luzon Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development
, the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (now National Council on Disability
Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance and the Bureau of: Internal Revenue (collectively,
the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32
of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the
granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with
disability (PWD),: respectively, and treating them as tax deduction due to the reason that
claiming it affects the profitability of their business.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of drugstore operation
in the Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to
monitor compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and
regulations for their effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring
establishments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case constitute Stare Decisis

RULING: No. The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare
decisis to the instant case, not because of the petitioner's submission of financial statements
which were wanting in the first case, but because it had the good sense of including questions
that had not been raised or deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of
the 20% discount granted to PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442
and violation of the equal protection clause.

ROBERT CHUA V. PEOPLE


GR No. 196853, Jul 13, 2015

FACTS: Petitioner Robert Chua (Chua) was charged with 54 counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) for issuing checks which were dishonored for either being drawn
against insufficient funds or closed account. Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were
long-time friends and neighbors. On different dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several
postdated PSBank checks of varying amounts to See pursuant to their rediscounting
arrangement at a 3% rate. However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were
dishonored either due to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to
make good the checks. Hence, See filed on December 23, 1993 a Complaint for violations of BP
22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. He attached thereto a demand letter
dated December 10, 1993.
The prosecutor found probable cause and recommended the filing of charges against
Chua. Accordingly, 54 counts of violation of BP 22 were filed against him before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. The MeTC convicted Chua of 54 counts of violation of BP 22
after it found all the elements of the offense obtaining in the case.
Aggrieved, Chua appealed to the RTC where he argued that: (1) the complaint was
prematurely filed since the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 had not yet been sent to him
at the time of filing of the Complaint; (2) the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 has no
probative value since it lacked proof of the date when Chua received the same; and, (3) since
Chua was acquitted in two other BP 22 cases involving the same parties, facts and issues, he
should likewise be acquitted in the present case based on the principle of stare decisis.
Anent the defense's invocation of the principle of stare decisis, the RTC found the same
inapplicable since there is a distinction between the present case and the other cases where
Chua was acquitted. In the instant case, the prosecution, as mentioned, was able to establish
the second element of the offense by way of the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 duly
received by Chua. Whereas in the other cases where Chua was acquitted, there was no proof
that he received a demand letter. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not stare decisis is applicable

RULING: Yes. In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following
essential elements must be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." [33] "Of the three (3) elements, the
second element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22
creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after
it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days
from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment. In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua
asserts that the absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993 prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from
arising. On the other hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua's actual receipt of the
subject demand letter is not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received the same on the
date of the demand letter (November 30, 1993). Moreover, the lower courts banked on the
stimulation entered into by Chua's counsel as to the existence of the demand letter anki of Chua's
signature thereon. By reason of such stipulation, they all held that Cljiua could no longer impugn
the said demand letter. In Danao v. Court of Appeals, the Court discussed the importance of
proving the date of actual receipt of the notice of dishonor, viz.:
In King vs. People, this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a
person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew 'at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment.' Because this element involves a state of mind
which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge, as follows:
'SEC 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds - The making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker
or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment
in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.
Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption
that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a
notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the
check or make arrangement for its payment."
Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an
opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This
opportunity, as this Court stated in Lozano vs. Martinez, serves to mitigate the harshness of the
law in its application. In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not
sent to the maker or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was
received by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2 of
B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day
period."
FRANCISCO v. ROJAS
723 SCRA 423 April 23, 2014

FACTS: [Respondent] Emiliana M. Rojas is the widow of the late Jose Rojas, while the other
[respondents] are the children of the spouses. On the other hand, Rosalina V. Francisco,
[petitioner] Rodolfo V. Francisco, and Carmela V. Francisco, hereafter collectively referred to as
the Franciscos, are the applicants for registration in Land.
Subject of the controversy is a portion of 3,181.74 hectares, vast track of land, known as
the Hacienda de Angono, in Angono, Rizal. The entire hacienda used to be owned by one Don
Buenaventura Guido y Santa Ana upon whose death left a portion thereof, to his two (2) sons
Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido.
Sometime in September 1911, Decreto No. 6145, covering the same hectare portion of
Hacienda de Angono was issued in favor of the brothers Francisco and Hermogenes. On the basis
thereof, Original Certificate of Title over the same hectares was issued in the names of the two
(2) brothers.
Nine (9) years later, or sometime in 1942, the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes
adjudicated among themselves the same hectares and transferred the one-half (1/2) portion
thereof to Jose A. Rojas, predecessor-in-interest of the [respondents] Rojases.
Confusingly, some few months thereafter, the heirs of Guido y Santa Ana requested the
then Land Registration Commission (now, Land Registration Authority) to issue the
corresponding original certificate of title.The request, however, was denied by the said office.
Subsequently, the entire parcel of land covered by Decreto No. 6145 was subdivided into
twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of title were issued in lieu of the
reconstituted TCT No. 23377.
Thereafter, the heirs who executed the aforesaid document of extrajudicial settlement,
including the now spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, sold the property to Pacil Management
Corporation (Pacil, for short), and new titles were issued in favor of Pacil on June 26, 1976. Three
(3) months later, or on August 26, 1976, Pacil reconveyed all the 21 lots to the former owners.
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the Franciscos are the true and absolute
owners of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. The aforequoted decision having become final and executory, the
Franciscos filed with the same court a petition for the issuance of a decree of registration. The
court directed the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue the desired decree.
To complicate matters, it appears in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, the Republic
of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
of Decreto No. 6145 and the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377 against the heirs of
Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido, the spouses Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, the Pacil
Development Corporation and Interport Resources Corporation, it being alleged in the same
complaint that both the Decreto No. 6145 and the owner’s copy of TCT No. 23377 were false,
spurious and fabricated
The Court held that, a decree of registration binds the land and quiets title thereto, is
conclusive upon all persons and cannot be reopened or revived after the lapse of one year after
entry of the decree. The CA likewise DENIED the appeal. The Petitioner assailed the decision of
the CA saying that it runs counter to the principle of stare decisis, and that it should have
followed the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 77764.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is correct in assailing the decision of the CA as contrary to
the principle of Stare Decisis
RULING: We do not agree. The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is well entrenched in Article 8 of
the Civil Code, which states that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." The doctrine embodies the
legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court
of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded
on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity of or
privity of parties. In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts
bind the lower courts; the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other; and the one
highest court does not bind itself, it being invested with the innate authority to rule according to
its best lights. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. Thus, a ruling of a particular division of
the CA, while may be taken cognizance of in some cases, cannot bind or prejudice a ruling of
another division thereof, the former being a co-ordinate authority and, relative to Us, is still
considered as a lower court albeit empowered with an appellate jurisdiction.

B. CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT
The term “conclusiveness of judgment” can properly be defined by first determining the
meaning of the principle of Res Judicata. The term Res Judicata is a Latin term which means “a
matter already judged.” This is a legal doctrine meant to bar or preclude continued litigation of
such cases between the same parties, which is different between the two legal systems. The
elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) The former judgment must be final; (2) Judgment
must be on the merits of the case; (3) The former decision is rendered by the court having
jurisdiction over the subject; and (4) There is similar identity of parties, subject matter and cause
of action for both cases. The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) "bar by prior
judgment" and (2) "conclusiveness of judgment."

The discussion with regard to the application of “bar by prior judgment” and
conclusiveness of judgment” can be properly illustrated in the case of Sps. Antonio v. Vda De
Monje, GR 149624: There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the
judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case
constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well
as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before the same or other tribunal.

However, where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity
of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept
of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether
or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties
to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues
to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority
on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again be litigated
in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest,
in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different
cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of
the principle of conclusiveness of judgment (Sps. Antonio v. Vda. De Monje, 2010).

The following are cases that further explains the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION


vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
G.R. No. 170007, April 7, 2014

“First, the petition is barred by res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment.
The concept of conclusiveness of judgment is explained in Nabus v. Court of Appeals as
follows: The doctrine states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit, and was
there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or
their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same
or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper
authority. The only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x
x are identity of parties and identity of issues.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that
the issues be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties [or their privies] will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. x x x.
The Decision dated June 8, 2005 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the labor
dispute over which he assumed jurisdiction, OSEC-AJ-0033-04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-09-048-
04/NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-02-004-05, has long attained finality. The union never denied this.”

Aboitz v. Po

G.R. No. 208450 June 5, 2017

Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii) conclusiveness
of judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, paragraphs
(b) and (c):

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final
order, may be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon
its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.

Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another action
based on "the same claim, demand, or cause of action."157 It applies when the following are
present: (a) there is a final judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it
was "rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties"; and (d) there
is "identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action" between the first and second
actions.

Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an


identity of issues in two (2) cases between the same parties involving different causes of
action.159 Its effect is to bar "the relitigation of particular facts or issues" which have already been
adjudicated in the other case. 160 In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City:

The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that a fact or question which
was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to
that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or
their privies, it is essential that the issue[s] be identical. If a particular point or question is in
issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required
but merely identity of issues.

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES V. CUAL

G.R. No. 207684, July 17, 2017

Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely
put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that
action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind
them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a
timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be
litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-
in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or
for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the
operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar
by former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the
parties from raising in a later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and
were determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. In other words, the dictum laid down in the
earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the
same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that
judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court in a
later case; the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated
in a later case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier
case.

C. DOCTRINE OF LAW OF THE CASE

The term “law of the case” is defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has
once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in
other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should
not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But
the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby
adjudicated in the former appeal. (DBP v. Guarina, 2014).

The following rulings of cases further explained the law of the case doctrine.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. GUARINA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY


DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 160758, January 15, 2014

The doctrine of law of the case did not apply herein. DBP insists that the decision of the
CA in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP already constituted the law of the case. Hence, the CA could not
decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491 differently. Guarina Corporation counters that the
ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not constitute the law of the case because C.A.-G.R. No.
12670-SP concerned the issue of possession by DBP as the winning bidder in the foreclosure
sale, and had no bearing whatsoever to the legal issues presented in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491.

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means,
more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon, an American case,
thusly:

The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe
the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but
they become and remain the law of the case in all other steps below or above on subsequent
appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule there
would be no end to criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would
be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties litigants were allowed to speculate on
changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely
ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case. An itch to reopen
questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the foolishness of the inquisitive youth
who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to act like
ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a
practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has
once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in
other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should
not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But
the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby
adjudicated in the former appeal.

The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP’s
insistence to be unwarranted.

To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP’s application for the issuance of the writ of
possession was entirely independent from the judicial demand for specific performance herein.
In fact, C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP, being the interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the
writ of possession while the main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any legal
issue properly raised and litigated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal to determine
whether or not DBP’s foreclosure was valid and effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R.
No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of law involved herein because this case for specific
performance was not a continuation of C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP (which was limited to the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of DBP), and vice versa.

SPOUSES MANUEL SY and VICTORIA SY, v.


GENALYN D. YOUNG

G.R. No. 169214 June 19, 2013

The present action is barred by the law of the case. In denying the petition, we necessarily
must reiterate our ruling in Young which constitutes as the controlling doctrine or the law of the
case in the present case.

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means
that whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.

We point out in this respect that the law of the case does not have the finality of res
judicata. Law of the case applies only to the same case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties
or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. In law of the case, the rule made
by an appellate court cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case.
Furthermore, law of the case relates entirely to questions of law while res judicata is applicable
to the conclusive determination of issues of fact. Although res judicata may include questions of
law, it is generally concerned with the effect of adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.

The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties
satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and
decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal.
Without it, there would be endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate on changes in
the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on
solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case.

BUAYA V. STRONGHOLD

GR. No, 139020 October 11, 2000

FACTS: Stronghold filed a case against Buaya who is the manager of its Cebu branch for
recovery of un-remitted collection of money. The lower court ruled on Stronghold’s favor. Buaya
appealed before the CA which ruled in his favor remanding the case back to the lower court.
Subsequent hearings were set with failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear many times until
Stronghold filed a petition to reinstate the previous decision of the court. The court decision
becomes final and executory and it denied all other appeals made before it. Buaya thus herein
files a motion for certiorari.

ISSUES: (1) Can a decision from the lower court that is annulled by the appellate court be
reinstated by the same court that rendered the decision;

(2) When the appellate court annuls the decision of the lower court on grounds of failure
to give notice to Buaya at pre-trial and remanded it back to the said lower court, does the
proceeding in the lower court merely requires presentation of evidence by Buaya alone without
requiring Stronghold to present its evidence for cross examination by Buaya.

RULING: (1) On annulled decision, the court correct that the CA did not annulled the lower
court’s decision but merely set aside to allow petitioner to present his evidence. There is nothing
wrong when the court reinstated its decision after failure of petitioner to present evidence despite
the ample time given for him to do so. It is also required for the petitioner to attach an authentic
copy of the original decision to support his claim that the CA annulled the lower court’s decision.
Failure to comply said requirement is a ground for dismissal of petition.

(2) On final and executory judgment, it becomes the law of the case regardless of claims
that it is erroneous. Final judgments are decisions rendered by court with competent jurisdiction
acting within its authority and its judgment cannot be altered even at risk of occasional legal
infirmities of errors it may contain. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. In view of
efficient and effective administration of judgment once a decision has become final, the prevailing
party should not be deprived of the favorable judgment rendered upon them on suits involving
the same issues and parties.

2. Analysis of the Continuous trial in Civil Cases; Suggestions.

The continuous trial system is a tool for the expedient disposition of cases. It ensures that
the cases will be resolved in the speediest manner possible without compromising the different
rights of the parties. Such system is encapsulated in the Rules of Court, to wit:
Rule 119 Sec. 2 Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. –
Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as
practicable until terminated.
It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause. The
court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense
counsel, set the case for continuous trail on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized
by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding
section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.

However, the problem is that this provision is only applicable to criminal cases. There is
an absence of a provision of similar import with respect to civil cases. This is the reason why civil
cases could go on for longer periods, thereby denying the right of the parties to be afforded justice
at the fastest time possible. Most civil cases could go on for long periods of time, and it could
happen that the parties to the case have already died even before their civil cases have been
resolved. There are a lot of dilatory pleadings that could be filed so as to delay the resolution of
the case, hence the prolonged burden of both parties to the case.

Considering the aforementioned dilemma of civil cases, I think that the most effective way
to address this problem is to strictly enforce the rule with regard to the period of time when the
cases should be resolved. Dilatory pleadings should also be allowed only when there is showing
that there is an extreme need for them to be filed. If possible, I think it would be better if there
are more court employees in every court so that there will be more people working on the cases
and assisting the judges, thereby producing more accomplished works and lesser time of waiting
for the promulgation of judgments of the cases.

3. Analysis of Rule 18 and the circular on Pre-Trial

Pre-trial is an answer to the call for speedy disposition of cases. It is a procedural device
held prior to trial for the court to meet the following ends: (a) The possibility of an amicable
settlement or a submission of alternative modes of dispute resolution; (b) The simplification of
issues; (c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (d) The possibility of
obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof; (e)
The limitation of the number of witnesses; (f) The advisability of preliminary reference of issues
to a commissioner; (g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary
judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground be found to exist; (h) The advisability
or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and (i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt
disposition of the action (Sec. 2, Rule 18, Rules of Court).

Pre-trial promotes efficiency of case proceedings by allowing the parties to stipulate on


facts and admissions that no longer need proof, and to agree on key issues, among other things.
It protects the right of the parties to speedy trial without compromising substantial justice (BPI
v. Genuino, 2015).

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the new Guidelines To Be Observed By Trial Court Judges And
Clerks Of Court In The Conduct Of Pre-Trial And Use Of Deposition-Discovery Measures, which
took effect on August 16, 2004, aims to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition
of cases and decongest court dockets. It provides additional rules to supplement and further
interpret the provisions in the Rules of Court with regard to pre-trial.

One important area that should be looked into is Sec. 3 Rule 17 of the Rules of Court in
relation to provision in the said Guidelines on Pre-trial with regard to the setting of the case for
pre-trial by the plaintiff, and Sec. 1 of Rule 18. Sec 3 Rule 17 states:

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable cause,


the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

On the other hand, the Guidelines state:

Pre-Trial

“…Within 5 days from the date of the filing of the reply, the plaintiff must
promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial conference. If the
plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch clerk of
court shall issue a notice of pre-trial.”

Lastly, Sec. 1 of Rule 18 states:

Sec. 1. When conducted—After the last pleading has been served and
filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to move ex parte that the case be set
for pre-trial.

Perusal of the aforementioned provisions will show that Section 1 Rule 18 imposes upon
the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under
Section 3 Rule 17, failure to comply with the said duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal
for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules.

Nonetheless, nowhere in the text of the Guidelines does it remove the duty of the plaintiff
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 18 to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been
served and filed. It does not repeal Section 3 Rule 17, which allows dismissals due to the
plaintiff’s fault, including the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Rules for n justifiable cause.
It does not impose sole burden on the trial court to set the case for pre-trial.

Upon examination of the Guidelines together with Section 3 Rule 17 and Section 1 Rule
18 of the Rules of Court, it shows that it accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint
upon the plaintiff’s failure to show justifiable reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within
the period provided by the Rules. Hence, lower courts must consider the facts of each case. The
Supreme Court has allowed cases to proceed despite failure by the plaintiff to promptly move for
pre-trial when it finds that “the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might not be
warranted.”

It was also held in the case of BPI v. Genuino:


“It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for pre-
trial without any justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of
dismissal of the complaint might not be warranted if no substantial
prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and
compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified.

….

While “heavy pressures of work” was not considered a persuasive reason


to justify the failure to set the case for pre-trial in Olave v. Mistas, however,
unlike the respondents in the said case, herein respondent never failed to
comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the trial court at any other
time. Failing to file a motion to set the case for pre-trial was her first and
only technical lapse during the entire proceedings. Neither has she
manifested an evident pattern or a scheme to delay the disposition of the
case nor a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the
parties are given the full opportunity to litigate their claims and the real
issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. Besides,
petitioners would not be prejudiced should the case proceed as they are not
stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.

This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with.
However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in
their application. Indeed, on several occasions, the Court relaxed the rigid
application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully
ventilate the merits of their cases. This is in line with the time-honored
principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the
chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural
imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions.”

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