OSMENA V. PENDATUN (109 PHIL.

863)

FACTS:

In a privilege speech entitled: A message to Garcia, Osmena made

allegations of bribery against the Garcia administration.

House Resolution no. 59 followed the creation of a special committee to

investigate the allegedly groundless charges made by Osmena against the
Garcia administration.

House Resolution no. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly

behavior and thereby suspending him for 15months.

ISSUES:

WON his suspension was constitutional

HELD:

Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed

RATIO:

Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary

immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary
immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression
without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his
words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof.

The question of whether Osmena’s speech constitutes disorderly conduct is

for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual circumstances
of which the house knows best.
On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot
or academic. Because no preliminary injunction was issued, the special
committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved
the suspension order.

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA (277 SCRA 268)
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the
House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to
the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at
8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected
to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of
the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep.
Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum,
although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened
thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21,
1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify
the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I
want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the
Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for
the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for
one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock,
Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until
four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November
21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos
on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and/or
challenging the validity of RA 8240.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which
will therefore be a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal
proceeding of the House.
HELD:
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated
in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of
the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.
Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when
the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved. But what happened is
that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking,
“What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of
the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of
the House making the passage of the bill to a law in accordance with the law.
The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be
taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances:
upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the
Constitution was shown.

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to
look into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House as
long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.
 show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear
and unambiguous respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous
UNITED STATES VS. PONS (34 PHIL. 725) evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.

FACTS: In the instant case, the journal says that the Legislature adjourned at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and the court did
Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were convicted of the crime not err in declining to go behind the journals.
of illegal importation of opium. It was alleged in the information that the
accused, conspiring together, plotting among themselves did, knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country
and import and introduce in the City of Manila 520 tin cans containing 125
kgs of opium. Each were found guilty of the charged. The accused appealed,
but Beliso withdrew his appeal and the judgment has been final to him. On
appeal, counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special
session of the Philippine Legislature for 1941 was on February 28; that the
Act 2381, under which Pons must be punished was not passed or approved
on the 28th but on March 1 of that year; that the same is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused may be convicted under Act 2381.

Whether the adjournment of the legislature be proved by legislative journals
or by extraneous evidences.

DECISION:

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.

RATIO:

Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of Commission shall perform the
duties which would properly be required of the Recorder of the Commission
under the existing law. Under Rules 15 and 16 of Legislative Procedure of
Philippine Commission “the proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly
and accurately stated in the journal.” Furthermore, on page 793 of the
Commission Journal, it is stated that:

“The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914 was approved. Adjournment
sine die of the Commission as a Chamber of the Philippines. The hour of
midnight having arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the Philippine
Legislature adjourned sine die.”

The Courts of the Philippines are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the
law is, and to enable them to determine whether the legal requisites as to the
validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as well as their
duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. When the legislative journal

ABBAS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (166 SCRA 651)
FACTS:
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution states that the Electoral Tribunal
“shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court...and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the HOR, as the case may be.” On October 9, 1987, Petitioners filed before
the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-
87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed
senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections. The respondent
tribunals was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme
Court and six (6) senators.
On November 17, the petitioner filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion
for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the
hearing and resolution of the above case on the ground that all of them are
interested parties, and respondents. This mass disqualification, in effect,
would leave only the three Justices to serve as Members of the Electoral
Tribunal. The Motion was denied and hence, this petition for certiorari.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and norms of fair play
and due process require the mass disqualification. Further, necessity dictates
that an amendment of the Tribunal’s Rules of procedure permitting the
contest to be decided by only three Members is a practicable and
unconstitutionally unobjectable solution.
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed membership
of the SET is 2 to 1 – an unmistakable indication that the “legislative
component” cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of
the Constitution.
The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
the tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body
can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of senators.
The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six
of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes
of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal.
Refrain from participation must be distinguished from complete absence.
Indeed, an individual Member of the Tribunal may recuse himself from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. But a
Tribunal cannot legally function as such absent its entire membership of
Senators or Justices.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Senate Electoral Tribunal composed of only three (3)

Justices of the SC is a valid Electoral Tribunal under the Constitution

HELD:

NO. The suggested device is unfeasible and repugnant to the Constitution.

REASONS:

Looking into the wording and intent of Section 17 of Article VI of the

Constitution, it is clear that in creating a Tribunal composed by Justices of
the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, both “judicial” and
“legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of all
BONDOC VS. PINEDA (201 SCRA 792)
FACTS:
Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr.
Ermigidio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were rivals in the congressional
elections held on May 11, 1987. Pineda was the proclaimed winner, but
Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET). The said tribunal is composed of nine (9) members, 3 of
whom are Justices of the Supreme Court, and the remaining six (6) are
members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from political parties and party list. A decision has
been reached by the HRET where Bondoc won over by Pineda; thus the LDP
members in the tribunal insisted on a reappreciation of votes and recount of
ballots delaying the finalization of the decision at least four months. The
reexamination resulted in increase of Bondoc’s lead over Pineda from 23 to
107 votes. It shall be noted that Congressman Camasura, a member LDP,
voted with the Supreme Court Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the
contest; hence, HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation No. 25 declaring
Bondoc as the winner. Subsequently, Congressman Cojuanco informed
Camasura and Bautista that the LDP expelled them from the party on the
ground of betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP.
Thereafter, Cojuanco informed the House Speaker Mitra of the ouster of the
said Congressmen and their decision to withdraw the nomination and rescind
the election of Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal issued a Resolution
canceling the previous decision on the ground that without the vote of
Congressman Camasura, who was relieved from the Tribunal, the decision
lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Sec. 24 of the Rules of
Tribunal, and therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
A Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Bondoc
seeking the following reliefs:
1.) to annul the decision of HRET to withdraw the nomination of Camasura to
the HRET.;
2.) issue a writ of prohibition restraining whoever may be designated in place
of Camasura from
assuming, ossupying, and discharging functions as a member of the HRET,;
1.) writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to return and discharge
his functions as a member of
the HRET;
In his answer, Pineda asserts that the Congress being the sole authority that
nominates and elects the members of the HRET; hence, it has the power to
remove any of them whenever the ratio in representation of the political
parties materially changed.
ISSUE:
Whether of not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
party, change the party’s representation in the House Representatives
Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by
the said tribunal in an election contest pending therein.
DECISION:
SC ruled in favor of Bondoc.
RATIO:
(Read Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution)
The tribunal was created to function as a non partisan court although two-
thirds of its members are politicians. The purpose of the constitutional
convention creating the Electoral Tribunal was to provide an independent
and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office,
devoid of partisan consideration and to transfer to that tribunal all powers in
matter pertaining to contested election of its members. The Tribunal is a
body separate from and independent from the legislature.
Resolution of House of Representatives violates the independence of HRET.
The Resolution of House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to LDP, because he cast a vote in
favor of Nacionalista party, is a clear impairment of the constitutional
prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between
Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference would reduce the HRET
as a mere tool for the advance ment of a party in power.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence—even independence from political party to which they belong.
In expelling Camasura from HRET for that ground, the HRET committed
grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution.
Such resolution is therefore null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as judges, are entitled to security of tenure, just as
members of judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec
2.,Art VIII, 1987 Constitution). Membership in the HRET may not be
terminated except for just cause, such as, expiration of the members’
congressional term of office, death, permanent disability, resignation from
political party which he represents, formal affiliation with anither political
party, removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. The records shows that
Camasura has not formally affiliated with another political group; thus, his
termination from HRET was not for valid cause, hence, it violated his right to
security of tenure.
 PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689) OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY,
DURING HIS TERM OF OFFICE. HE SHALL NOT INTERVENE IN ANY
FACTS: MATTER BEFORE ANY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HIS
PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ACT
The accused was a member of the lower House when he was convicted of ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE.
rape. He was confined in the National Penitentiary while his appeal was
pending. He was re-elected. He argued that he should be allowed to attend
legislative sessions and committee hearings; because his confinement was
depriving the electorate of his district of their voice in Congress and that he
has a duty to attend the sessions in Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress?

HELD:

No. Election to high government offices doesn’t free the accused from the
common restraints of general law. The constitution provides that a member
of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is
punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment. The accused has not
given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this
provision. Section 11, Article 6 of the Constitution states that a the members
of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if
the reason if a legitimate one. Confinement of a congressman charged with
a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional
foundations. Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of
his district reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his
freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of
Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one
or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the question of
equal protection. Election to the position isn’t reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement.

Instant motion is denied.

SECTION 14.
NO SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR AS COUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF
JUSTICE OR BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, OR QUASI-
JUDICIAL AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES. NEITHER SHALL
HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BE INTERESTED FINANCIALLY IN ANY
CONTRACT WITH, OR IN ANY FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGE
GRANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY,
OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY GOVERNMENT-
 DAZA V. SINGSON (180 SCRA 496)

FACTS:
From the May 1987 elections, Raul Daza was chosen as one of the members
of the Commission on Appointments (CA) as a representative of the Liberal
Party (LP).

In September 1988, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was organized

resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives (HR). 24
members of the LP shifted to LDP resulting to the swelling of the latter with
159 members and leaving only 17 members with the former.

HR revised its representation in the CA withdrawing the seat occupied by

Daza and giving this to the newly formed LDP in the person of Luis Singson.
The petitioner challenges this reappointment and the court issued a TRO for
Daza and Singson from serving in the CA.

ISSUE:

WON the reappointment of members of the CA is constitutional

HELD:

Yes. Petition Dismissed

RATIO:

Sec 18 Art VI of the constitution provides that there shall be a Commission

on Appointments consisting of, among others, 12 members of the HR elected
by the House on the basis of proportional representation. Since there was a
shift in the number of members of the LP to maintain proportional
representation the House reconstituted CA and awarded LDP the seats.
The petitioner argues that LDP is not a stable and permanent party so it is
not entitled for seats in the CA. Court held that when COMELEC granted the
registration of LDP as a registered political party, LDP is qualified to have
seats in the CA maintaining proportional representation.
 PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO (227 SCRA 703)
FACTS:
This is a petition to declare the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7354.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of RA 7354 as implemented by
the Philippine Postal Corporation.
SEC. 35. Repealing Clause. – All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulation or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, republic acts Numbered 69,
180, 1414, 2087, and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice-
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse
or unauthorized use thereof.
These measures withdraw the franking privilege (free mail) from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices.
The first objection is based on Art. VI, Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution, which
provides that “Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” RA 7345 is entitled “An
Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, functions
and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith”. It is the submission of the petitioners that
Sec. 35 of RA 7345 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary
is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
The second objection was that the second paragraph of the repealing clause
was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill
No. 4200. It appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition
violates Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, which provides that:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately after, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Petitioners stress that Section 35 was never a subject of any disagreement
between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been
validly added as an amendment.
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal
protection clause. It is alleged that RA 7345 is discriminatory because while
withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for
the President of the Philippines, Vice-President, Senators and Members of
the House of Representative, COMELEC, former Presidents of the
Philippines, widows of former Presidents, National Census and Statistics
Office, and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices
or officers. Equal protection of the laws, embodied in a separate clause in
Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution, simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The respondents argue that the considerable
volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn
from it.
ISSUES:
Whether or not RA 7345 is unconstitutional on the grounds that:
(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purposes [Article VI Sec. 26(1)];
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among
the members before its passage [Article VI Sec. 26(2)];
(3) and it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary [equal protection of laws in Article III Sec. 1].
HELD:
YES. The petition is partially granted. The franking privilege of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices shall
be restored.
On the first objection, the title of the challenged act does not violate the
Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of
the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. According to Cooley, author of Constitutional Limitations, “the
repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject
matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing
section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on
the subject”. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such
repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not
the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.

On the second objection, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the

Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from
the presiding officers of Congress. The Court declines to look into the
petitioners’ charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of
the bill that eventually became RA 7354 and that the copies thereof in its final
form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted in accordance with Article VI Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.

On the third contention on equal protection of laws, the argument of the

respondents that the considerable volume of mail of the Judiciary justifies the
withdrawal of its franking privilege, is self-defeating. The respondents are in
effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who
do not need it very much, if at all (like the widows of former Presidents) but
not to those who need it badly. The Court states, “at this time when the
Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this
serious problem”. The Court is unable to disagree with the respondents that
Section 35 of RA 7345 represents a valid exercise of police power. On the
contrary, the Court finds its repealing clause to be discriminatory and that it
denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated.

In sum, the Court sustains RA 7345 against the attack that its subject is not
expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. However, the Court annuls Section 35 of the law as
violative of Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution that no person shall “be
deprived of the equal protection of the laws”.
 3. The item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, JR. (191 SCRA 452) conditions or restrictions

FACTS: 4. The power of augmentation in article 6, section 25 (5) of the

constitution has to be provided for by law, which means the congress
Petition for prohibition/mandamus attacking the constitutionality of has also the power to determine restrictions
presidential veto of section 55.
The veto power of the president can be found in article 6, section 27, of the
Section 55 of the General Appropriations Bill FY 1989 constitution.

Sec. 55. Prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations ISSUE:
disapproved and/or reduced by congress: no item of appropriation recommended by the
president in the budget submitted to congress pursuant to article VII, section 22 of the Whether or not the veto by the president of section 55 of the 1989
constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this act shall be restored or increased by
the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriations bill and subsequently of its counterpart section 16 of the 1990
appropriation for any purpose recommended by the presided in the budgetshall be deemed to appropriations bill, which are all provisions, is unconstitutional and without
have been disapproved by congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is effect.
provided in this act.
DECISION:
Dec 16, 1988; congress passed general appropriations bill for FY 1989. Dec
29, 1988; president signed the bill into law but vetoed 7 special provisions
Petition dismissed. The questioned presidential veto is constitutional.
and section 55 which is a general provision. The reason of the president in
vetoing such section is because it violates Article 6, Section 25 (5) of the
RATIO:
constitution. Furthermore, section 55 not only nullify the constitutional and
statutory authority of the president, but also the senate president, speaker of
The argument that the president may not veto a provision without vetoing the
the house, chief justice, and the heads of the constitutional commissions to
entire bill disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The same argument also
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Feb 2,
overlooks the constitutional mandate that such provision is only limited in its
1989; congress mentioned in a resolution that the veto by the president of
operation to some particular appropriation which it relates as stated in article
section 55 is unconstitutional which means section 55 will be in effect. April
6 section 25 (2) of the constitution.
11, 1989; petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed. A similar provision was
vetoed by the president. It appears in the general appropriations act of 1990.
The constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative, and in this
Instead of section 55, such provision was located in section 16 of the said
respect it is a grant of power in the executive. The legislative has the
bill. It must be noted that the 1989 appropriations act, the “use of savings”
affirmative power to enact laws; the chief executive has the negative power
appears in section 12, separate and apart from section 55; whereas in the
by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the
1990 appropriations act, the “use of savings” and the vetoes provision have
legislature. It follows that the chief executive must find his authority in the
been comingled in section 16 only, with the vetoed provision made to appear
constitution. Thus, such act of the president is constitutional and does not
as a condition or restriction.
hamper with the legislative function.
The petitioners cause is anchored on the following:
Settled is the rule that the executive is not allowed to veto a condition or
restriction of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand.
1. The president’s veto power does not Cover provisions, that she
For this rule to apply, conditions or restrictions should be such in the real
exceeded her authority when she vetoed sec 55 (FY 89) and sec 16
sense of the term, not some matter which are more properly dealt with in a
(FY 90) because they are provisions
separate legislation. Restrictions or conditions in an appropriations bill must
2. When the president objects to a provision, she cannot item-veto but exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule
instead veto the entire bill of expenditures.
With this, section 55 (FY 89) and section 16 (FY 90) are held to be
inappropriate conditions. They are general law measures more appropriate
for separate legislation. They do not show the necessary connection with a
schedule of expenditures. Considering that section 55 (FY 89) and section 16
(FY 90) are not really conditions, they can be vetoed by the president.

If the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the
executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the constitution is
crystal clear. A presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-thirds
of members of congress as stated in article 6, section 27 (1) of the
constitution.

SECTION 28.

1. THE RULE OF TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND

EQUITABLE. THE CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVE A
PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION.

2. THE CONGRESS MAY, BY LAW, AUTHORIZE THE

PRESIDENT TO FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED LIMITS, AND
SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS
IT MAY IMPOSE, TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT
QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND OTHER
DUTIES OR IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE
GOVERNMENT.

3. CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND

PERSONAGES OR CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO,
MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS,
BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS, ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY,
AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE,
OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
TAXATION.

4. NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE

PASSED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY
OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIQUEZ (235 SCRA
506)
FACTS:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of
1994) entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the
Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for
other Purposes” was approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category
claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of
constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void
a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the
President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of
Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.)
Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of
the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special
provision in the appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition
and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the
constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the
GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s,
DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is
constitutional and valid?
HELD:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling.
Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The
said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They
are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for
the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for
Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other
SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in
pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo
works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set
forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is
not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance
& cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior
approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is
the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a
separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff
to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the
Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific
law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of
special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres.
requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No.
1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to
repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
SECTION 26.
1. EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL
EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE
EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF.
2. NO BILL PASSED BY EITHER HOUSE SHALL BECOME A
LAW UNLESS IT HAS PASSED THREE READINGS ON
SEPARATE DAYS, AND PRINTED COPIES THEREOF IN ITS
FINAL FORM HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ITS MEMBERS
THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, EXCEPT WHEN THE
PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS
IMMEDIATE ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAMITY
OR EMERGENCY. UPON THE LAST READING OF A BILL,
NO AMENDMENT THERETO SHALL BE ALLOWED, AND
THE VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY
THEREAFTER, AND THE YEAS AND NAYS ENTERED IN
THE JOURNAL.
TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO, JR. (237 SCRA 324)
FACTS:
These are two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in
G.R. No. 109298, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, known as
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT), amending the certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, and in G.R.109466, the
validity of Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations, promulgated by public respondents
pursuant to the said law.
G.R. No. 109289
Petitioner claims that the enactment of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
Article VI Sec. 26(1) – Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Article VI Sec. 28(1) – The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall embrace evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Article III Sec. 1 – No person Shall be deprived of x x x property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.
The full text of the title of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme reads:
“An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For the Self-
Employed and Professionals Engaged In the Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Revenue Code, as Amended.”
Section 21(f) Tax on Citizens and Residents indicate, “a tax is imposed upon
the taxable net income” of self-employed and/or professionals engaged in the
practice of their profession in accordance to the tax schedule provided by the
law. The Schedular approach is a system employed where the income tax
treatment varies and made to depend on the kind or category of taxable
income of the taxpayer. Section 29 Deductions from Gross Income indicate
specific direct costs that are allowed to be deducted from the taxable income.
Petitioner asserts that RA 7496 attempts to tax single proprietorship and
professionals differently from the manner it imposes tax on corporations and
partnerships and thus violates Article VI Sec. 28(1) of the Constitution. The
Court views the legislative intent of the amendatory law to increasingly shift
the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income
taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by large, the present global
treatment on taxable corporations. Global treatment is a system where the
tax treatment views indifferently the tax base and generally treats in common
all categories of taxable income of the taxpayer.
Petitioner gives an extensive discussion on the merits of the law, illustrating,
what he believes to be an imbalance between the tax liabilities of those
covered and those who are not by the amendatory law.
G.R. No. 109446
The questioned regulation reads:
Sec. 6. General Professional Partnership – The general professional
partnership (GPP) and the partners comprising the GPP are covered by RA
7596. Thus, in determining the net profit of the partnership, only the direct
costs mentioned in said law are to be deducted from partnership income.
Also, the expense paid or incurred by partners in their individual capacities in
the practice of their profession which are not reimbursed or paid by the
partnership but are considered direct costs, are not deductible from his gross
income.
The objection of the petitioner lies is focused on the administrative
interpretation of public respondents that would apply RA 7496 or SNIT to
partners in general professional partnerships.
According to the National Internal Revenue Code, partnerships are either
“taxable partnerships” or “exempt partnerships”. The GPP is an example of
an “exempt partnership” and that it cannot be similarly identified as
corporations nor even considered as independent taxable entities for income
tax purposes. The Code states that a general professional partnership must
be formed for the sole purpose of exercising a common profession, no part of
the income of which is derived from its engaging in any trade business;
otherwise, it is subject to tax as an ordinary business partnership or, which is
to say, as a corporation and thereby subject to the corporate income tax. A
general professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership
(which is treated as a corporation for income tax purposes and so subject to
the corporate income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer. Here, partners
themselves, not the partnership (although it is still obligated to file an income
tax return [mainly for administration and data]), are liable for the payment of
income tax in their individual capacity computed in their respective and
distributive shares of profit.
ISSUES:
In G.R. No. 109289, whether or not RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme is unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 109446, whether or not public respondents have exceeded their
authority in promulgating Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations, to carry out RA 7496.
HELD:
NO. Petitions are dismissed.
Under the Tax Code, the general professional partnership is deemed to be
no more than a mere mechanism or a flow-through entity in the generation of
income by, and the ultimate distribution of such income to, respectively, each
of the individual partners. Section 6 of the Revenue Regulation, alleged to
carry out RA 7496, did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above standing
rule as now so modified by RA 7496 on basically the extent of allowable
deductions applicable to all individual income taxpayers on their non-
compensation income.

G.R. No. 109289
Article VI Sec. 26(1) of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to
prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature
who favor any one of unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b) to
avoid surprises or even fraud upon the legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise
the people, through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made,
of the subjects of legislation. The above objectives of the fundamental law
appear to us have been sufficiently met.
There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory
legislation, to place in unequal footing or in significant variance the income
tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions
individually and of those who do it through a general professional
partnership.

The contention that RA 7496 violates Article VI Sec. 28(1) clearly forgets that
such a system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even
prior to RA 7496. Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges
and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend classification as long as: (a) the
standards that are used are substantial and not arbitrary, (b) the
categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (c) the law
applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (d)
the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same
class. This classification implied in the legislative intent of the amendatory
law to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular
approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by
large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations is not arbitrary
and inappropriate.

On the point raised by the petitioner on what he views as an imbalance

between the tax liabilities of those covered and not covered by the
amendatory law, the court cannot freely delve into those matters which, by
constitution fiat, rightly rests on the legislative department. With the
legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object
(purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects), and situs (place) of taxation.

The due process clause may be correctly invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of tax
power. No such transgression is so evident to the Court.

G.R. No. 109446