Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil.
199 (1930) The election protests against the duly proclaimer Mayor (Cabili)
FACTS: In the general elections held on December 14, 1937,
respondent Agripino Ga. Del Fierro and petitioner Ireneo Moya were
contending candidates for the office of the mayor of the
Municipality of Paracale, Camarines Noret. After canvass of the
returns, the Board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the
elected mayor with a majority of 102 votes. However, respondent
filed a motion of protest and judgment was rendered in favor of
respondent, declaring him as the candidate-elect with a majority of
3 votes over his rival. Petitioner now seeks said judgment for review
alleging the ff:
a. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8
ballots either inadvertently or contrary to the controlling
decisions of this Honorable Court
b. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3
ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
c. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7
ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
d. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72
ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s contentions are tenable
HELD: NO
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a
representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the
ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his
Government and whenever called upon to act in justifiable cases, to
give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason
for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with
utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever
might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule
or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if
that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of
the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the
suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots which
are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election Code
(Commonwealth Act No. 357).
Badelles v. Cabili, G.R. No.L-29333, 27 February 1969
FACTS: Protestant Badelles and protestee Cabili were the duly
registered candidates for the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan City.
Badelles impugns the election of Cabili on the ground that there
were “flagrant violatiOn of mandatory provisions of law relating to
or governing elections…”.
What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by
those not qualified to do so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an
approximately equal number, who were duly registered with the
Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the
above circumstances. The proclamation then could not have
reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the mayor
elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant
consisted of only 2,344 votes.
1
were dismissed by the CFI of Lanao del Norte. In such order of
dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as
misconduct on the part of election officers were alleged in the
election protests filed, there was however an absence of an
allegation that they would change the result of the election in favor
of the protestants and against the protestees, that such
irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots
cast, or that the protestees knew of or participated in the
commission thereof. For the lower court then, the lack of a cause of
action was rather evident.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court in ordering the dismissal
of the election protests
HELD: YES. The seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to
have the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such
irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to
who were the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be
stressed, would have to be accepted at their face value for the
purpose of determining whether there is a cause of action, a motion
to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus
pleased. Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal
would amount to judicial abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire
into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of
misconduct and misdeeds of such character.
NOTE: That if the grievance relied upon is the widespread
irregularities and the flagrant violations of the election law, the
proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.
Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, 21 January 2004
FACTS: Following the appointment of Sen. Teofisto Guingona as VP
of the Phils., the Senate passed Resolution No. 84 calling on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. The
resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering
the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Sen. Guingona.
Petitioners now seek the nullification of the special election and the
declaration of the 13th elected senator (Honasan) for (1) having
failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in as
required under Sec. 2 of RA 6645; (2) having failed to require
senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently,
(3) having failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the
candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA
6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Special Election should be nullified for
failure to give notice by the body empowered
HELD: NO. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a
statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall
be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election.—The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the
time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature
directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
indispensable to the election’s validity. In a general election, where
the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without
any call by the body charged to administer the election. In a special
election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next
general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be
held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an
election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the
fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the
election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold
the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the
election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with
knowledge of the time and place of the election. Conversely, where
the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election
but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the
happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the
giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to
the failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want
of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official
notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed
that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a
small percentage of voters would be void. The required notice to the
voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two
matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a
vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the
regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that
COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving
the 13th highest number of votes in the special election
NOTES: The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate. (Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution)
Section 2 of R.A. 6645 provides for the procedure in calling a special
election.—In case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year
before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing
the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty
(60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the
vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things,
the office or offices to be voted for.
DISSENTING OPINION- JUSTICE PUNO
An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of
the democratic space giving the people greater power to exercise
their sovereignty
Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the people can directly exercise
their sovereign authority through the following modes, namely: (1)
elections; (2) plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and (5) referendum.
The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law.
Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons as are
most likely to exercise it for the public good.” The existence of the
right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment
2
of all other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most
sacred parts of the constitution
The purpose of election laws is to safeguard the will of the people,
the purity of elections being one of the most important and
fundamental requisites of popular government
As worded in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to
information is self-executory
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political,
moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free
exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution.
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey
to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated . . . x x x x x x x x x .
Notice to the electors that a vacancy exists and that an election is
to be held to fill it for the unexpired term, is essential to give
validity to the meeting of an electoral body to discharge that
particular duty, and is also an essential and characteristic element
of a popular election. Public policy requires that it should be given
in such form as to reach the body of the electorate. Here there had
been no nominations to fill the vacancy, either by the holding of a
special primary election, or by nomination by county political
conventions or party committees. The designation of the office to
be filled was not upon the official ballot. As before noted, except
for the vacancy, it would have no place there, as the term of office
of the incumbent, if living, would not expire until January 1, 1947.
Purisima v. Salanga, 15 SCRA 704 (1965)
FACTS: In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and
Gregorio Cordero were among the candidates for any of the three
offices of Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Sur. Purisima noted
that during the canvass, the returns of 41 precincts showed on their
faced that the words and figures for Cordero’s votes had been
“obviously and manifestly erased” and superimposed with other
words and figures. Purisima requested for suspension of the canvass
however, the Board of Canvassers denied said request. The BOC
continued and finished the canvass and consequently, proclaimed
Cordero the winner. Purisima filed a petition for recount under Sec.
163 of the Revised Election Code. The petition for recount was
dismissed. In dismissing the petition for recount, respondent Judge
stated that some of the requisites were not present, namely: first,
that it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that a
discrepancy exists; second, that said discrepancy is between the
copy submitted to the board and another authentic copy thereof;
third, that said authentic copy must also be submitted to the board
ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Purisima may file the petition for
recount by himself
2) Whether or not the BOC has the duty to suspend canvass in light
of the events
HELD: 1) YES. A candidate affected can file a petition for recount
alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers
(Cawa vs. Del Rosario, L-16837-40 May 30, 1960). From the fact,
therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has not petitioned
for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were not convinced a
discrepancy existed
Where a candidate was prevented from securing the Commission on
Elections' copies of the returns to establish a discrepancy between
them and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the failure to submit the
said copies to the board should not prejudice his right to petition for
recount before the court
2) YES. Where, as in the case at bar, there were patent erasures and
superimpositions in words and figures on the face of the election
returns submitted to the board of canvassers, it was imperative for
said board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of
authentic copies and recourse to the courts (Javier vs. Commission
on Elections, L22248, January 30, 1965). A canvass or proclamation
made notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting proper
remedies, is null and void (Ibid.).
Patent erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the
votes stated in the election returns strike at the reliability of said
returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with
the other copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only
way to remove grave doubts as to the correctness of said returns as
well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the people.
Cauton v. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 911
FACTS: Petitioner Lucas Cauton and respondent Pablo Sanidad were
2 of the candidates for the Office of Representative in the 2 nd
congressional district of Ilcos Sure. During the canvass by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sure, respondent Sanidad
brought to the attention of the Board the fact that the entries of
votes for the candidates for Representative in those copies of the
election returns that came from the envelopes presented by the
provincial treasurer differed from the entries appearing in the copies
of the returns from the same election precincts that were in the
possession of the Liberal Party. He then filed a petition with the
COMELEC praying for the opening of the ballot boxes in all the
precincts of Candon, Santiago, and Sta. Cruz. Respondent COMELEC
then issued an order directing the opening of the ballot boxes of said
municipalities. Petitioner, however, contends that COMELEC is
without jurisdiction to issue the resolution in question and the same
is null and void and should not be given legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC resolution is void.
HELD: NO. The Commission has the power to decide all
administrative questions affecting elections, except the question
involving the right to vote. The Commission on Elections has the
power to investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the
canvass of election returns made by the board of canvassers. The
power of the Commission in this respect is simply administrative and
supervisory. It is intended to secure the proclamation of the winning
candidate based on the true count of the votes cast.
Once the Commission on Elections is convinced that the election
returns in the hands of the board of canvassers do not constitute the
proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the elections. it is duty
bound to take the necessary steps in order that the proper basis for
the canvass is made available. It would be absurd to say the
3
Commission has a legal duty to perform and at the same time it is
denied the necessary means to perform that duty.
Where the three copies of the election returns outside the ballot
box do not constitute a reliable basis for a canvass, then the
Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer
and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections, may order
the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy inside
each ballot box, corresponding to each precinct, is also tampered
like the three copies outside the ballot box. The Commission may do
this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the proper party. That
order does not affect the right to vote or the validity of the votes
cast.
NOTE: The ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election
contest. They may also be opened, even if there is no election
contest, when their contents have to be used as evidence in the
prosecution of election frauds. Moreover, they may be opened
when they are the subject of any official investigation which may be
ordered by a competent court or other competent authority. The
competent authority must include the Commission on Elections
which is charged with the administration and enforcement of the
laws relative to the conduct of elections.
Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, 10 September 2009
The Court, in its September 10, 2009 Decision, dismissed the
petition and the petition-in-intervention on the following main
grounds:
(1) RA 8436, as amended, does not require that the AES procured or,
to be used for the 2010 nationwide fully automated elections must,
as a condition sine qua non, have been pilot-tested in the 2007
Philippine election, it being sufficient that the capability of the
chosen AES has been demonstrated in an electoral exercise in a
foreign jurisdiction;
(2) Comelec has adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism to
ensure compliance of the PCOS with the minimum capabilities
standards prescribed by RA 8436, as amended, and its
determination in this regard must be respected absent grave abuse
of discretion;
(3) Comelec retains under the automation arrangement its
supervision, oversight, and control mandate to ensure a free,
orderly, and honest electoral exercise; it did not, by entering into
the assailed automation project contract, abdicate its duty to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections
and decide, at the first instance, all questions affecting elections;
and
(4) in accordance with contract documents, continuity and back-up
plans are in place to be activated in case the PCOS machines falter
during the actual election exercise.
The bottom line is that the required 2007 automation, be it viewed
in the concept of a pilot test or not, is not a mandatory requirement
for the choice of system in, or a prerequisite for, the full automation
of the May 2010 elections.
PUNO (C.J.), Separate Concurring Opinion:
A touchstone of our Constitution is that critical public policy
judgments belong to the legislative branch, and the Court must not
unduly intrude into this exclusive domain. In enacting RA 8436
(Election Modernization Act) on December 22, 1997, the legislature
has clearly chosen the policy that an AES shall be used by the
COMELEC for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation of results of the national and local
elections. It decided to put an end to the manual conduct of our
elections that has frustrated the honest casting of votes by our
sovereign people. In the pursuit of its objective, the legislature
defined what it considered an AES and provided the standards for its
implementation. It further determined the minimum functional
capabilities of the system and delegated to the COMELEC the
development and adoption of a system of evaluation to ascertain
that the minimum system capabilities would be met.
10 February 2010 (Motion for Reconsideration)- DENIED
By Decision dated September 10, 2009, the Court denied the
petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al. for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election
Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic).
Theories, issues, and arguments not raised in the original
proceedings cannot be brought out on review. Basic considerations
of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not speedy,
justice frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on the
practice of parties of going to trial haphazardly
Arroyo v. DOJ and Comelec, G.R. No. 199082, 18 September 2012
FACTS: The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the
creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ),
which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007
elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating
and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the
2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation
cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its
initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of
the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces
of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein
petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a
resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral
sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against
Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of
COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid
HELD: YES. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized
legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and
to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance
4
of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint
within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the office of the fiscal [public prosecutor], or with
the Ministry [Department] of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted. Under the above provision of law, the
power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with
the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision
of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 34
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants are given continuing authority as deputies to
conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under election laws and to prosecute the same. The
complaints may be filed directly with them or may be indorsed to
them by the petitioner or its duly authorized representatives.
The grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of
election offenses to the Comelec was not by virtue of the
Constitution but by the Omnibus Election Code which was eventually
amended by Section 43 of R.A. 9369. Thus, the DOJ now conducts
preliminary investigation of election offenses concurrently with the
Comelec and no longer as mere deputies. If the prosecutors had
been allowed to conduct preliminary investigation and file the
necessary information by virtue only of a delegated authority, they
now have better grounds to perform such function by virtue of the
statutory grant of authority. If deputation was justified because of
lack of funds and legal officers to ensure prompt and fair
investigation and prosecution of election offenses, the same
justification should be cited to justify the grant to the other
prosecuting arms of the government of such concurrent jurisdiction.
Arroyo v. DOJ and Comelec 23 July 2013
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary
investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not
exercise concurrent jurisdiction
2) Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines
the decisional independence of the Comelec.
HELD:
1) NO. In Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections, 595 SCRA 477 (2009), the constitutionality of
Section 43 of RA 9369 had already been raised by
petitioners therein and addressed by the Court. While
recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such
intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment
that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369.
Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other
prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now
exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and
prosecution of election offenses.
2) NO. Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction,
the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a
provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the
resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause
for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec
 in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. With
more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the
creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.
Ongsioko Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013
FACTS: On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the
Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on
the ground that it contained material representations. On March 27,
2013, the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013,
COMELEC en banc denied her MR. However, on May 18, 2013, she
was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5,
2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and
Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office
before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her
term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013.According to
petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was
duly proclaimed20Â because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the
“sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELLEC has jurisdiction over petitioner
HELD: YES. As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995),
the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a
member of the House of Representatives, to wit: As to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May
8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate
has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner
not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious
that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites:(1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office;
The term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives
begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.” Thus, until such time, the Commission on Elections retains
jurisdiction.
Ongsioko Reyes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264, 22 October 2013
In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); That the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional
provision. The special action before the COMELEC which was a
5
Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was a summary
proceeding or one “heard summarily.”
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the
pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the
qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is
original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered
by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been
terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding
Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are
unconstitutional. Petitioner raises three principal questions for
contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency
requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list
representatives, including the President and the Vice-President,
violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same
section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the
COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is
unconstitutional
2) Whether or not Section 18.5 is unconstitutional
3) Whether or not Section 25 is unconstitutional
HELD: 1. NO. The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling
or enfranchising act; The affidavit is not only proof of the intention
of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin.
Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
“resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three years from approval of his/her registration,” the
Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for
citizenship in another country.
Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino
who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage
YES. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a
power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by
petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the
votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim
the winners for the said positions.” The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as
part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation
must remain in the hands of Congress.
The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of suffrage by
reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question.
The manifest purpose of such restriction is to preserve the purity of
elections. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of
felony is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold a public
office. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
The exclusion from the exercise of suffrage must be adjudged a
mere disqualification imposed for protection and not for
punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a
personal right. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)

1) YES. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, .

amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.

People v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945 (1936)

FACTS: Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general

elections held on June 5, 1934. He was convicted on the ground that
he had voted while laboring under a legal disqualification under
Section 2462 in connection with Section 432 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which reads:

The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:

(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to
suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such
disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him
to the United States.
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons.
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding
section who, after failing to make sworn statement to the
satisfaction of the board of inspectors at any of its two meetings for
registration and revision, that they are incapacitated for preparing
their ballots due to permanent physical disability, present
themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective of
whether such incapacity be real or feigned.

Appellant was sentenced by final judgment to suffer 8 years and 1

days of presidio mayor and no evidence was presented to show that
prior to said elections, he had been granted a plenary pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State has the right to deprive

appellant the right of suffrage by reason of conviction of a crime

HELD: YES. The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting

is a function of government. It is a right created by law, not a natural
right.

Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such person or classes

as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. For reasons of
public policy, certain classes of persons are excluded from the
franchise. Among the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots,
paupers, and convicts.