Narratives

Constitutional Law II

Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola

2005

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 Table of Contents

People vs. dela Cruz [GR L-5790, 17 April 1953] … 1

People vs. Borja [GR L-22947, 12 July 1979] … 1
Veniegas vs. People [GRs L-57601-06, 30 July 1982] … 3
People vs. Dacuycuy [GR L-45127, 5 May 1989] … 4
State of Louisiana vs. Resweber [329 US 459, 13 January 1947] … 5
Ford vs. Wainwright [477 US 399, 26 June 1986] … 6
People vs. Camano [GRs L-36662-63, 30 July 1982] … 7
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice [GR 132601, 19 January 1999] … 8

This collection contains eight (8) cases

summarized in this format by
Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student)
during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006
in the Political Law Review class
under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012.

Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002

and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006.
He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

berneguerrero.wordpress.com
 Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

354 People vs. dela Cruz [GR L-5790, 17 April

1953] En Banc, Bengzon (J): 8 concur

Facts: In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the store of Pablo de al Cruz in
Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six- ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. As the
purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz, the matter
reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution. Executive Order 331 (issued by
authority of Republic Act 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity. Having
retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial,
in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for 5 years, and to pay a fine of P5,000 plus costs. He
was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for 5 years. De la Cruz appealed.

Issue: Whether 5 years and P5,000 are cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-
centavo profit to the accused.

Held: The Constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted." The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never
existed in America or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance those inflicted at
the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like.
Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. However, there are respectable authorities
holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may
be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. These authorities explain, nevertheless, that to
justify a court's declaration of conflict with the Constitution, the prison term must be so disproportionate to the
offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the
circumstances. Seldom has a sentence been declared to be cruel and unusual solely on account of its
duration. The Court does not regard such punishment (5 years adn P5,000) unusual and cruel, remembering
the national policy against profiteering in the matter of foodstuffs affecting the people's health, the need of
stopping speculation in such essentials and of safeguarding public welfare in times of food scarcity or similar
stress. The damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused,
inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of
price controls. However, considering that the modest store -owner has a family to support, and shall serve in
Muntinglupa a stretch of 5 years, for having attempted to earn a few extra centavos, the Court exercised its
discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment by reducing the imprisonment to 6 months
and the fine to P2,000; thus skirting the constitutional issue yet executing substantial justice.

355 People vs. Borja [GR L-22947, 12 July 1979]

En Banc, Abad Santos (J): 8 concur, 1 voted for affirmance of death penalty, 1 filed separate
concurring opinion, 1 took no part

Facts: On 18 December 1958, the Anderson Fil-American Guerrillas (AFAG) held a general meeting at the bahay-
pulungan of the religious sect known as Watawat Ng Lahi at Barrio Buragwis, Legaspi City. The locale of the
meeting was so chosen because many AFAG members are also Watawat members. One of the accused, Pedro
Borja, presided over the meeting, which was attended by more than a 100 members, announcing that their backpay
was forthcoming at the rate of P36,000 for a ranking officer, and a lesser amount for those of lower rank. Borja, who
has the rank of a full colonel, is the AFAG head for the entire Bicol region, which is said to have 36,000 members.
When the meeting ended, Borja called an exclusive conference among selected officers and members, including
Rufino Pavia, Inocencio Demen, Pedro Fustigo, Felipe Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, Alejo Balimbing, and
Tito Oljina. At the secret meeting, Balimbing proposed to Borja that they conduct a raid the following morning at the
Hacienda San Miguel, located at San Miguel Island, across the bay from Tabaco, Albay. With the conference over,
all 8 men slept in the bahay-pulungan.

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When they woke up the next day, the 8 men held an early-morning conference, with Balimbing airing to Borja his
grievances against Santiago Gancayco, Jr. the manager of the hacienda. That same morning, the 8 men left by bus
for Tabaco, via Legaspi City. In Tabaco, the group went to Barrio San Jose. Upon Borja's instruction, Balimbing
hired a motorboat operated by Mariano Burac. Crossing the bay, the group disembarked at the hacienda, and at a
seashore conference, they agreed to pose as members of the Philippine Constabulary, ostensibly on a mission to
inspect the firearms of the hacienda. Borja herded the men of the hacienda inside the bodega, where they were
guarded by Benavides and Fustigo. Therein, Balimbing accused Gancayco of killing Balimbing's cousin, and
demanded that Gancayco produce the .45 caliber pistol which he claimed was used to perpetrate the death.
Gancayco explained that it was not he but Solon Demetrio who accidentally shot Balimbing's cousin, and that
Gancayco had no such pistol. Pavia, as well as Demen, fired upon Gancayco. Demen aimed rapid fire at
Salustiano Isorena, the hacienda overseer, who fell flat on the balcony floor. Gancayco, bloodied, rushed out of the
bodega. He was pursued by the gunmen. While the pursuers tracked their prey, Emilio Lanon, a security guard and
barrio lieutenant of the hacienda, left the bodega by the back door and went to Gancayco's house, where Mrs.
Gancayco instructed him to close all the windows and take the children downstairs, to which he complied. Lanon
left the house and looked for Gancayco whom he found in the abaca plantation. Gancayco, his wife, and children,
Isorena, and some other personnel of the hacienda, were able to rendezvous at the seashore. They got into a
waiting motorboat and sped away towards Tabaco, in the hope of taking the wounded men to the hospital there.
Gancayco died enroute, in the arms of his wife. While events unfolded on Tabaco Bay, the group of 8 men reached
the seashore and chanced upon a motorboat anchored there. When they discovered that the motorboat did not
have enough gasoline, they looked for another and dragooned Bienvenido Taller into transporting them. The men
alighted at the lighthouse at Malinao and immediately afterwards, Taller reported to the police authorities of the
town. However, he was advised to report to the police authorities of Tabaco, who had jurisdiction over the case. The
8 men reached the poblacion of Malinao. Borja instructed Pavia and Demen to make their separate way towards
Barrio Buragwis. The remainder of the group boarded a passenger bus going to Tiwi. As the bus stopped near the
market at Tiwi, another car overtook it and policemen from Tabaco, headed by Chief of Police Ceferino Firaza,
alighted and surrounded the bus. Firaza in a loud voice called for the surrender of all those in the bus responsible
for the killing at the Hacienda San Miguel. He was suddenly fired upon by Borja and then by Balimbing. The
fusillade hit him on the right cheek, and he ordered his men to return fire. The encounter resulted in the death of
Balimbing and Oljina; the capture of Benavides and de los Santos; and the escape of Borja and Fustigo. The
encounter in Tiwi took place in the afternoon of 19 December 1958. Subsequently, the rest of the band fell one by
one into the hands of the law. Pavia, Demen, Fustigo were arrested, and Borja, the last one to fall, was captured on
27 February 1959 after a nationwide manhunt. Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe
Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, John Doe and Richard Doe (Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina being the last
two), were charged for murder in Criminal case 2578 and for frustrated murder in Criminal Case 2590 before the
Court of First Instance of Albay. On 8 September 1960, the court, in Criminal case 2590, found Borja, et. al. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, as principals, and sentenced each to imprisonment
ranging from 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, 10 months, and 21 days
of reclusion temporal as the maximum; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to indemnify Salustiano Isorena in
the sum of P5,000.00, as moral and exemplary damages, severally and jointly, and to pay the costs. The court also,
in Criminal Case 2578, founf Borja, et. al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder, and sentenced
each of them to the maximum penalty of death; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to indemnify the offended
parties, Mercedes Chuidian Vda. de Gancayco and her children in the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of Santiago
Gancayco, Jr., and another amount in the sum of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, both severally and
jointly, and to pay the costs. In the decision, the trial court — pursuant to the Revised Penal Code, Article 5 —
recommended to the President, through the Secretary of Justice, with respect to the accused Dominador de los
Santos, "that executive clemency be extended to him, or that at least his death penalty be minimized or commuted
to life imprisonment." The court so recommended because "the testimony of the accused had contributed in a large
measure to the Court in its pursuit of truth and justice in these cases." Borja, et. al. appealed.

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Issue: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court, in light of the aggraviating circumstances, be reduced
from the penalty from death and its accessory penalties, to reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties.

Held: Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos do not deny their culpability for the offenses
charged, but prayed for the reduction of the penalty from death and its accessory penalties, to reclusion
temporal and its accessory penalties. They admitted with candor: "The finding of facts in the decision of the
trial court having been found to be a faithful narration of the incident as related during the trial of the case and
given in the two ocular inspections of the premises where the shooting happened, it would seem a useless
endeavor to reiterate said findings of facts." The five accused controverted the findings of the trial court that
there were five aggravating circumstances in the case for murder. Instead, they contended that the trial court
should have appreciated only three aggravating circumstances. The trial court correctly considered that either
treachery or evident premeditation qualifies the crime to murder, and hence the other alternative
circumstance should be considered as aggravating. The trial court found five aggravating circumstances
against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos, to wit: (1) the crimes of murder and frustrated
murder were committed by a band, or with the aid of armed men; (2) means were employed to weaken the
defense, wherein is included taking advantage of superior strength; (3) craft, fraud and/or disguise were
employed; (4) there was promise of backpay in the commission of the crimes; and (5) there was treachery or
evident premeditation, depending upon whatever is used to qualify the crimes to murder and frustrated
murder. With respect to Pedro Borja in both cases, the trial court considered against him four aggravating
circumstances as above excluding the promise of backpay. It found another aggravating circumstance in the
case of frustrated murder, i.e. dwelling. Hence, in the case of frustrated murder, it found six aggravating
circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos; and five aggravating
circumstances against Borja. It msut be noted, however, that the circumstance of band and aid of armed men,
cannot be taken separately from the circumstance of use of means to weaken the defense, and advantage of
superior strength. All these circumstances are absorbed in treachery and may not be considered
independently. Treachery absorbs the circumstance of craft, fraud and disguise. Nonetheless, this leaves the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, which applies to all the accused; and the aggravating
circumstance of promise of backpay, which applies to all the accused, except Borja. In disposing the case, the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case 2590 in toto; while modifying
Criminal Case 2578 in respect of the principal penalty from death to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary
votes, and in respect of the civil indemnity from P6,000 to P12,000.00.

356 Veniegas vs. People [GRs L-57601-06, 30 July 1982]

Resolution En Banc, Abad Santos (J): 10 concur, 2 reiterate positions in Nunez vs.
Sandiganbayan, 1 took no part

Facts: The Sandiganbayan convicted Lazaro Veniegas of 6 counts of malversation and 6 counts of
falsification. Veniegas assailed the decision as violative of due process and the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment in the petition before the Supreme Court. He alleged that he was
convicted without evidence of his guilt; that having been convicted of malversation he should not be
convicted of falsification; that he was made to answer several times for a single offense; and that
for the 12 convictions he would be made to serve 92 years of imprisonment.

Issue: Whether the decision imposed cruel and unusual punishment because for the 12
convictions, he would be made to serve 92 years of imprisonment.

Held: The decision imposing 92 years of imprisonment for the 12 convictions is not cruel and unusual
punishment, and not "shocking to the moral sense, an offense to the constitution." The provisions of Article
70, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which mandates that "Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule
next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of

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 Narratives (Berne Guerrero)

time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he
may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period."

357 People vs. Dacuycuy [GR L-45127, 5 May

1989] En Banc, Regalado (J): 14 concur

Facts: In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on 4 April 1975, Celestino S. Matondo,
Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal
Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case 555 thereof for violation of Republic Act 4670. The case was set for
arraignment and trial on 29 May 1975. At the arraignment, Matondo, et. al. pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion
to quash was subsequently reduced to writing on 13 June 1975. On 21 August 1975, the municipal court
denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. On 2 September 1975, Matondo, et. al. filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of RA 4670 is null and void for
being unconstitutional. In an undated order received by the counsel for Matondo, et. al. on 20 October 1975,
the motion for reconsideration was denied. On 26 October 1975, Matondo, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII (Civil
Case B-622), to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from
proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of
Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended petition alleged the
additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is
Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely
left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. On 30
March 1976, having been advised that the petition of Matondo, et. al. was related to Criminal Case 1978 for
violation of PD 442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunato B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said petition to the latter
branch for further proceedings (Civil Case 5428). On 15 March 1976, the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte filed an
opposition to the admission of the said amended petition but Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy denied the same
in his resolution of 20 April 1976. On 2 August 1976, the Provincial Fiscal filed a supplementary memorandum
in answer to the amended petition. On 8 September 1976, Judge Dacuycuy rendered the decision holding in
substance that RA 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for
preliminary investigation. On 25 September 1976, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration.
Likewise, Matondo, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision but the same was
limited only to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32 of RA 4670. Judge Dacuycuy
denied both motions for reconsideration in a resolution dated 19 October 1976. The Provincial Fiscal filed the
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Section 32 of RA 4670, by not providing a determinable term of imprisonment,

renders the penalty excessive, cruel and unusual.

Held: The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual
or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Based on this
principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of
fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual. "The Constitution directs that
'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The prohibition of cruel

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and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in America, or which
public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in
the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment
would not thus be within the prohibition. That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an
insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that
the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In addition, what
degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate
determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a
penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive." However, Section 32 of RA 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by
the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment,
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, from one minute
to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty
essentially legislative in nature and which does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the
non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has to yield. On the
foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of RA 4670, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be declared unconstitutional.

358 State of Louisiana vs. Resweber [329 US 459, 13 January

1947] Reed (J): 2 concur

Facts: Willie Francis is a colored citizen of Louisiana. He was duly convicted of murder and in September
1945, sentenced to be electrocuted for the crime. Upon a proper death warrant, Francis was prepared for
execution and on 3 May 1946, pursuant to the warrant, was placed in the official electric chair of the State of
Louisiana in the presence of the authorized witnesses. The executioner threw the switch but, presumably
because of some mechanical difficulty, death did not result. He was thereupon removed from the chair and
returned to prison where he now is. A new death warrant was issued by the Governor of Louisiana, fixing the
execution for 9 May 1946. Applications to the Supreme Court of the state were filed for writs of certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus, directed to the appropriate officials in the state. By the
applications Francis claimed the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
ground that an execution under the circumstances detailed would deny due process to him because of the
double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the
Eighth Amendment. These federal constitutional protections, Francis claimed, would be denied because he
had once gone through the difficult preparation for execution and had once received through his body a
current of electricity intended to cause death. Execution of the sentence was stayed. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana denied the applications on the ground of a lack of any basis for judicial relief; i.e. the state court
concluded there was no violation of state or national law alleged in the various applications.

Issue: Whether the imposition of death, or to prepare the accused for electrocution once again, is a
cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense.

Held: The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the
execution of the death sentence. Prohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our law from
the Bill of Rights of 1688. The identical words appear in our Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth would
prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in a cruel manner. Francis' suggestion is that because
he once underwent the psychological strain of preparation for electrocution, now to require him to undergo
this preparation again subjects him to a lingering or cruel and unusual punishment. Even the fact that Francis
has already been subjected to a current of electricity does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel
in the constitutional sense than any other execution. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any

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method employed to extinguish life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented
the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot add an element of cruelty to a subsequent
execution. There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the
proposed execution. The situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had
suffered the identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such as
a fire in the cell block. The Court cannot agree that the hardship imposed upon Francis rises to that
level of hardship denounced as denial of due process because of cruelty.

359 Ford vs. Wainwright [477 US 399, 26 June

1986] Marshall (J): 3 concur

Facts: Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted of murder in 1974 and sentenced to death in a Florida state court.
There is no suggestion that he was incompetent at the time of the offense, at trial, or at sentencing. But
subsequently he began to manifest changes in behavior, indicating a mental disorder. This led to extensive
separate examinations by two psychiatrists at his counsel's request, one of whom concluded that Ford was
not competent to suffer execution. Counsel then invoked a Florida statute governing the determination of a
condemned prisoner's competency. Following the statutory procedures, the Governor appointed three
psychiatrists, who together interviewed Ford for 30 minutes in the presence of 8 other people, including
Ford's counsel, the State's attorneys, and correctional officials. The Governor's order directed that the
attorneys should not participate in the examination in any adversarial manner. Each psychiatrist filed a
separate report with the Governor, to whom the statute delegates the final decision. The reports reached
conflicting diagnoses but were in accord on the question of Ford's competency. Ford's counsel then
attempted to submit to the Governor other written materials, including the reports of the two psychiatrists who
had previously examined Ford, but the Governor's office refused to inform counsel whether the submission
would be considered. The Governor subsequently signed a death warrant without explanation or statement.
After unsuccessfully seeking a hearing in state court to determine anew Ford's competency, his counsel filed
a habeas corpus proceeding in Federal District Court, seeking an evidentiary hearing, but the court denied
the petition without a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue: Whether the execution of a convict gone insane is cruel and unusual.

Held: Since the Court last had occasion to consider the infliction of the death penalty upon the insane, the
Court's interpretations of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment have evolved substantially.
Now that the Eighth Amendment has been recognized to affect significantly both the procedural and the
substantive aspects of the death penalty, the question of executing the insane takes on a wholly different
complexion. The adequacy of the procedures chosen by a State to determine sanity, therefore, will depend
upon an issue that the Court has never addressed: whether the Constitution places a substantive restriction
on the State's power to take the life of an insane prisoner. There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of
punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.
Moreover, the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the
common law in 1789. Not bound by the sparing humanitarian concessions of our forebears, the Amendment
also recognizes the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." In addition
to considering the barbarous methods generally outlawed in the 18th century, therefore, the Court takes into
account objective evidence of contemporary values before determining whether a particular punishment
comports with the fundamental human dignity that the Amendment protects. The Eighth Amendment prohibits
the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the
condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from
the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.
Ford's allegation of insanity in his habeas corpus petition, if proved, therefore, would bar his execution. The
adequacy of a state-court procedure is largely a function of the circumstances and the

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interests at stake. In capital proceedings generally, the Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a
heightened standard of reliability. This especial concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution
is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different. Florida law directs the Governor,
when informed that a person under sentence of death may be insane, to stay the execution and appoint a
commission of three psychiatrists to examine the prisoner. Ford received the statutory process. The Governor
selected three psychiatrists, who together interviewed Ford for a total of 30 minutes, in the presence of 8 other
people, including Ford's counsel, the State's attorneys, and correctional officials. The Governor's order specifically
directed that the attorneys should not participate in the examination in any adversarial manner. This order was
consistent with the present Governor's "publicly announced policy of excluding all advocacy on the part of the
condemned from the process of determining whether a person under a sentence of death is insane." After
submission of the reports of the three examining psychiatrists, reaching conflicting diagnoses but agreeing on the
ultimate issue of competency, Ford's counsel attempted to submit to the Governor some other written materials,
including the reports of the two other psychiatrists who had examined Ford at greater length, one of whom had
concluded that the prisoner was not competent to suffer execution. The Governor's office refused to inform counsel
whether the submission would be considered. The Governor subsequently issued his decision in the form of a
death warrant. That this most cursory form of procedural review fails to achieve even the minimal degree of
reliability required for the protection of any constitutional interest is self-evident. The first deficiency in Florida's
procedure lies in its failure to include the prisoner in the truth-seeking process. A related flaw in the Florida
procedure is the denial of any opportunity to challenge or impeach the state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions.
Perhaps the most striking defect in the procedures is the State's placement of the decision wholly within the
executive branch. Under this procedure, the person who appoints the experts and ultimately decides whether the
State will be able to carry out the sentence that it has long sought is the Governor, whose subordinates have been
responsible for initiating every stage of the prosecution of the condemned from arrest through sentencing. The
commander of the State's corps of prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality that is necessary for reliability
in the factfinding proceeding. Having identified various failings of the Florida scheme, the Court must conclude that
the State's procedures for determining sanity are inadequate to preclude federal redetermination of the
constitutional issue.

360 People vs. Camano [GRs L-36662-63, 30 July 1982]

En Banc, Concepcion Jr. (J): 12 concur, 1 opined that intoxication and voluntary surrender
should mitigate the guilt of the accused, 1 dissented

Facts: Three years prior to 17 February 1970, Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor had a misunderstanding
with Filomeno Camano while fishing along Sagñay River. During this occasion it appears that Camano requested
Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This
refusal greatly offended and embittered Camano against the Pascua and Buenaflor. No less than 10 attempts were
made by Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were refused.
Instead, Camano when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge Buenaflor to a fight, and announce his evil intention
to kill them. On 17 February 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of Camarines Sur,
between the hours of 4 to 5 p.m., after Camano had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice Pascua with a bolo,
called in the vernacular Bicol "palas" while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost infront of the
store of one Socorro Buates. Pascua sustained two mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously. After hacking
and stabbing to death Pascua, Camano proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on finding Buenaflor leaning
at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head
stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the
ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when Camano
gave him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest, causing instant death. Buenaflor sustained eight
wounds. After killing the two victims, he returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to Policemen
Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, and Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by said peace officers for him to surrender. When
brought to the Police Headquarters of the town for investigation he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was
hidden

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by him under the table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and recovered the
weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to the Chief of Police was still stained with human blood from
the base of the handle to the point of the blade. And when asked as to who was the owner of said bolo, the
accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. However,
when he was asked to sign a statement, he refused. For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor,
Filomeno Camano was charged, under 2 separate informations, with the crime of murder attended by evident
premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. Camano admitted killing
Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. The Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur found Camano guilty of the crimes charged in Criminal Cases T-20 and T-21, and
sentenced him to death. Hence, the mandatory review.

Issue: Weather death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the present case, considering Art. IV,
Sec. 21 of the 1973 Constitution which provides that: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishment inflicted."

Held: The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons
(81 Phil. 741, 747) the Court said that "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.
In Ex-Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.' It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Still, since the offense was attended by the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable
penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Camano should be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.

361 Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice [GR 132601, 19 January 1999]

Resolution En Banc, Puno (J): 10 concur, 2 took no part, 2 filed separate dissenting opinions

Facts: [Acquired from GR 117472, 25 June 1996; People vs. Echegaray (En Banc, Per curiam: 15 concur]
Rodessa is a 10-year old girl, a fifth-grader, and the daughter of Rosalie and Leo Echegaray. Sometime in the
afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers (aged 6, 5 and 2) in their house as her
mother attended a gambling session in another place, she heard her father order her brothers to go out of the
house. As soon as her brothers left, Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the
room. Before she could question Leo, the latter immediately, removed her panty and made her lie on the floor.
Thereafter, Leo likewise removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently,
Leo forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain. After satisfying his bestial
instinct, Leo threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would
be killed by Leo, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of Leo because the latter,
most of the time, was high on drugs. The same sexual assault happened 5 times and this usually took place when
her mother was out of the house (her mother was pregnant during those times). However, after the fifth time,
Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother.
Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she
suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed an affidavit. From there, she was
accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination. At first, her mother was
on her side. However, when Leo was detained, her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo,
nakakulong." Lo Echegaray was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, in a complained
formulated as "The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
'That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of
force and intimidation did then and

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there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, his
daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.' Contrary to law." Upon being arraigned on 1 August 1994, Leo, assisted by his counsel de
oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty." On 7 September 1994, tge RTC, Branch 104, found Leo guilty of
the crime of rape, aggravated by the fact that the same was commited by the accused who is the
father/stepfather of the complainant, and thus sentenced him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as
provided for under RA 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the sum of P50,000.00 as
damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104 when the case was raised to the Supreme Court in automatic review.

[Acquired from GR 117472, 7 February 1997 (Resolution En Banc, Per Curiam: 14 concur)] On 25 June 1996, the
Court rendered its decision affirming the conviction of Leofor the crime of raping his 10-year old daughter. The
crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994 during which time RA 7659, commonly known as the Death
Penalty Law, was already in effect, Leo Echegaray was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. On 9
July 1996, Leo timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. On 6 August
1996, Leo discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty
Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG). On 23 August 1996, the Court received
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on Leo's behalf. The motion raises the
following grounds for the reversal of the death sentence, i.e. (1) Leo should not have been prosecuted since the
pardon by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his criminal
prosecution; (2) The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint and
throughout trial prevented Leo from preparing an adequate defense; (3) The guilt of the accused was not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) The Honorable Court erred in finding that Leo was the father or stepfather of the
complainant and in affirming the sentence of death against him on this basis; (5) The trial court denied Leo of due
process and manifested bias in the conduct of the trial; (6) Leo was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of counsel; and that (7) RA 7659, reimposing
the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
(a) for crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and excessive
penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) The death penalty is cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

[Acquired from GR 132601, 12 October 1998 (En Banc, Per curiam: 13 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on official leave)]
On 25 June 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the
10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime. Leo duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of RA 7659 (the death penalty
law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape. On 7 February 1998, the Supreme Court denied
Leo's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly
complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not
unconstitutional. In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty
from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed RA 8177 (An Act designating Death by Lethal Injection as the
method of carrying out Capital Punishment, amending for the purpose Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 24 of Republic Act 7659). Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177 ("implementing rules") and directed the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. On 2 March 1998, Leo filed a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of the
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of Leo under RA 8177 and its implementing
rules as these are

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unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se as well as by reason
of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines'
obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an
unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of
delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to Director. On 3 March 1998, Leo, through counsel, filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition
attached thereto, invoking the additional ground of violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
104, in order to enjoin them from acting under the questioned rules by setting a date for Leo's execution. On
10 March 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement Petition. After
deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition. Subsequently, the Supreme Court
denied the petition insofar as Leo seeks to declare the assailed statute (RA) as unconstitutional; but granted
the petition insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177 are
concerned, which were declared invalid because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of
the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel. The Secretary of Justice
and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons were enjoined from enforcing and implementing RA 8177 until
Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177 are appropriately amended, revised
and/or corrected in accordance with the Court's Decision.

[Present case] On 28 December 1998, at about 11:30 p.m.. Leo filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO
He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b)
that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law
authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be granted to
Leo and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by 13 other senators; (b.2) Senate President
Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review of the death
penalty law; (b.3) Senator Raul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman
Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and 35 other congressmen are demanding review of the same law. When the Very Urgent
Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume session on 18 January
1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on 4 January 1999 17 at 10.
a.m. to deliberate on Leo's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had 5 hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he
was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether Leo's allegations
about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. Thus, on 4
January 1999, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution temporarily restraining the execution of Leo Echegaray. The
Secretary of Justice filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the said Resolution, and a Supplemental Motion
to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The Secretary, et. al. averred that "(1) The Decision in this case having
become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The
issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority; (2) The issuance of the
temporary restraining order creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there
is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law. (3) Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the
death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the
present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated
upon. (4) Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at
the past, the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.

(5) At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or
modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit: (a) The public pronouncement of
President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes; (b) The
resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; and (c) The fact that
Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel." In their

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Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Secretary, et. al. attached a copy of
House Resolution 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of
the House of Representative to reject any move to review RA 7659 which provided for the re-imposition
of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
House of Representatives on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by 113 congressmen.

Issue: Whether the execution of the convict may be stayed by the Supreme Court.

Held: An accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can
be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction
cannot be executed while in a state of insanity, as it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent the
government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution. The
suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the
death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend RA 7659 by reducing the
penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But
by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as
a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that
there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been
enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been
upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. To contend that only
the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.The extreme caution taken by the Court
herein was compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of Leo
Echegaray will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at stake, the Court refused
to constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that
the legislature will not change the circumstance of Leo Echegaray as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that
law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens. The
temporary restraining order of the Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether
Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. Posterior events negated beyond doubt the possibility that
Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law, i.e. (a) The public pronouncement of President Estrada that
he will veto any law repealing the death penalty involving heinous crimes; (b) The resolution of Congressman
Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law; (c) The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the
law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel." On the other hand, House Resolution No. 629
introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives to
reject any move to review RA 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representatives on this matter and urging
the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law," was signed by
113 congressmen as of 11 January 1999. The House of Representatives, on 18 January 1999, with minor
amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House "does not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has
stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in view of the prevalence of heinous crimes in
the country. In light of these developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and
humanitarian purpose. The Court thus ordered the trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of Leo Echegaray in accordance with
applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.

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The Resolution of 7 February 1997 is better suited to discuss the matter involving
the sentence of death as supposed to be “a severe and excessive penalty, or cruel
and unusual punishment, in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution.” The 1999 Resolution is better suited for Constitutional Law I issues
such as the separation of powers, especially as to the issue of reprieve in execution.

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