EN BANC

J. KING & SONS COMPANY, INC., Adm. Matter No. RTJ-03-1802

represented by its President, Richard L.
King, Present:
Complainant,
DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA, and
JUDGE AGAPITO L.HONTANOSAS, JR., Presiding CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.,
Judge of RTC, Branch 16,
Cebu City, Promulgated:
Respondent.
September 21, 2004
x----------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a complaint filed by J. King & Sons Company, Inc., represented by its President, Richard L.
King, against Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu City (RTC for brevity).

Complainant alleges: It is the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with Damages with Prayer for Writ
of Preliminary Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-27870,[1] pending before the RTC presided over by
respondent. On July 2, 2002, respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment
upon applicants filing of a bond in the amount of P35,973,600.00. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of
preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent on July 5, 2002 and on the same day,
respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order dated July 5, 2002 was issued sans
proper notice and hearing as required by section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Respondent
approved defendants counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding companys Supreme Court Clearance was
not valid and the maximum net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of P22,541,463.69. At a meeting in
his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants offer to pay P250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5,
2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondents favorite hang-
out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities gratis et
amore.

In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his Comment, dated August 22,
2002, wherein he vehemently denies soliciting money from the King brothers. He contends that complainant is merely
a dissatisfied litigant which cannot accept an unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders relative to Civil
Case No. CEB-27870 were issued by him in the exercise of lawful judicial discretion in accordance with the rules of
procedure, the evidence on record, and with the dictates of justice and equity.

Complainant then filed a Reply where it pointed out that respondent failed to squarely meet the issues of the
administrative complaint. It emphasized that there was actually no hearing on the motion to lift the writ of attachment
allegedly conducted on July 5, 2002.

Respondent filed a Supplemental Comment alleging that complainant has also filed a complaint against him
with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), attaching his counter-affidavit thereto. He further claims that it is clear

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that Richard King and Atty. Renecio Espiritu sought another forum to further expose him to public ridicule thru the
print media and air waves thereby eroding public trust and confidence of the people in the judiciary.

The Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), had forwarded to this Court the complete records of King vs.
Hontanosas, pursuant to Section 23(2) of Republic Act No. 6670.

On September 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring the herein administrative matter to Associate
Justice Jose Reyes, Jr., Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Investigating Justice conducted hearings where complainant presented the testimonies of witnesses,
Richard L. King, Rafael L. King, and the waiters at complainants karaoke bar, namely: Antonio Cabigon and Axel
Reyes.

Richard King testified that he is the president of complainant corporation. He adopted the joint affidavit
executed by him together with Rafael King as part of his direct examination. In said joint affidavit, Richard states as
follows: He and Rafael are the President and Treasurer, respectively, of J. King and Sons Co., Inc., the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. CEB-27870 pending before herein respondent. On July 2, 2002, respondent issued the writ of
preliminary attachment against the defendants in the aforementioned case for specific performance. Thereafter,
respondent approved the counter-bond despite knowledge of the fact that the clearance was valid only until June 28,
2002, the maximum net retention of the bonding company was only P13,432,136.31, thus, causing a deficiency
of P22,541,436.69. On July 5, 2002, respondent lifted the writ of preliminary attachment without notice and hearing in
violation of Rule 13 and 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.The calendar of cases of the court showed that the
motion to lift attachment filed by defendants in the subject case was not scheduled for hearing on said date of July 5,
2002. The minutes presented by respondent showing that there was a hearing held after 11 oclock and before 12
oclock of July 5, 2002, could be easily manufactured. Previous to the aforementioned incidents, respondent had been
a frequent visitor of the corporations music lounge where respondent would entertain himself, his guests and friends
for free; Rafael King would entertain respondent when he visited said music lounge; on July 5, 2002, Rafael received
a telephone call from respondent, telling him to see him (respondent) at his residence. Richard and Rafael King
obliged but they were shocked when respondent asked them to equal the defendants offer of P250,000.00 so he
would reconsider his order lifting the attachment. The King brothers told respondent they could not comply with said
demand since they are suffering a financial crisis. Thus, respondent denied the motion for reconsideration filed by J.
King & Sons Company, Inc.[2] Richard King further testified that they filed a motion to inhibit respondent from further
hearing the subject case and when said motion was granted, the case was re-raffled to a new judge who then
reinstated the writ of attachment against the defendants in the subject case.

On cross-examination, Richard testified: Respondent and his brother, Rafael, are friends. At the behest of
respondent, he and his brother went to the house of respondent at around 7 or 8 oclock in the evening. Due to the
fact that Rafael and respondent were friends, respondent frankly told Rafael that he (respondent) needed money and
if Rafael could match the offer of the opposing party and come up with P250,000.00, respondent would reverse his
order lifting the attachment upon complainants filing of a motion for reconsideration. Their conversation lasted no
more than twenty minutes and because Richard and Rafael were shocked by respondents actuation, they
immediately left respondents house. Richard King further pointed out that he is a very busy businessman and by the
filing of the present administrative case against respondent, he has nothing to gain. [3]

Witness Rafael King likewise adopted the joint affidavit he executed with his brother, Richard King, as part of
his direct testimony. Rafael further stated that respondent had been his friend for 3 to 4 years and in that span of time,
he had never asked for any favors from respondent regarding cases of complainant corporation pending before the
sala of respondent. Respondent did not ask for money from him for the granting of the writ of attachment. However,
after the order lifting the attachment had been issued on July 5, 2002, at around 2 or 3 oclock in the afternoon,
respondent called him up on the phone and asked him to go to his (respondents) house. Since this was the first time
that Rafael would go to respondents house, it was even respondent who gave him (Rafael) directions on how to
reach said house. Rafael denied respondents claim that he was the one who called respondents son, Butch, to ask
for a meeting with him. Rafael admitted that he knows the wife of respondent since she often uses the music lounge
owned by complainant corporation. Before July 5, 2002, respondent had often called Rafael on the phone to tell the
latter that he and his family will use said music lounge. Upon the Investigating Justices questioning, Rafael stated that
they filed the present administrative case against respondent because it was an injustice for respondent to demand
money from them.[4]

Antonio Cabigon and Axel Reyes, corroborated each others testimonies. They testified that: they work as
waiters at the karaoke bar owned by complainant and they often saw respondent and his wife, sometimes also with
some of their friends, at said bar; respondent and his wife did not have to pay for the use of the facilities of said bar,

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per instruction of the bars management; however, for record purposes, they would still give the bill or order slips to
respondent for his signature, but it was respondents wife who signed the same in their presence.

Respondent, on the other hand, testified as follows: A hearing on the defendants motion to lift the
preliminary attachment was actually held on July 5, 2002 between eleven oclock in the morning and twelve oclock
noon as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during said hearing. He held the hearing because the
motion was urgent in nature, and he did it in the spirit of equity and justice. Furthermore, he asked from counsel for
defendants whether counsel for complainant had been notified of the hearing and the former assured respondent that
counsel for complainant had been notified of the hearing. With regard to the claim that he demanded P250,000.00
from the Kings, he denied ever calling Rafael King or demand any money from the Kings; instead, it was Rafael King
who called up his (respondents) son Butch and asked that they be allowed to meet with him at his residence. While
the Kings were at his house, the Kings tried to bully him into reconsidering his Order dated July 5, 2002, but he told
them to just file a motion for reconsideration. Complainant filed the motion for reconsideration but after hearing the
same, he denied the motion in his Order dated July 17, 2002. He pointed out that at the hearing on the Motion for
Reconsideration, the defendants were able to present a Certification from the Supreme Court that the authority of the
bonding company was up to August 3, and so he denied the Motion for Reconsideration. With regard to the claim that
he frequently used complainants karaoke bar without paying for said facilities, respondent insisted that his wife
offered to pay but the bars management would not allow her to pay. [5]

On June 14, 2004, the Investigating Justice submitted his Investigation Report together with his
recommendation which reads as follows:
RECOMMENDATION:

The complaint may be divided into four (4) issues. First, would be the alleged demand
for P250,000.0 in exchange for a favorable action regarding complainants motion for
reconsideration. The second, the use of complainants karaoke bar at the Metropolis Hotel by
respondent and his family for free. The third, the alleged impropriety regarding the issuance of the
Order of July 5, 2002, and lastly, the sufficiency of the counterbond.

A. AS TO THE ALLEGED DEMAND FOR P250,000.00

The investigating justice finds that the same had not been sufficiently substantiated. Other
than the bare assertion of Rafael and Richard King there was no other evidence
presented. Although the visit of the King brothers to the house of respondent in the evening of July
5, 2002 is admitted, this by itself would not prove that a demand for money was made.

However, the investigating justice finds that it was inappropriate for respondent to have
entertained a litigant in his home particularly when the case is still pending before his sala. As held
in De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison (355 SCRA 69 [2001]) patronizing with litigants tarnishes the
appearance of propriety, to wit:

It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he

must also appear to be impartial. Hence, the judge must, at all times, maintain
the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued. A judges conduct must be above reproach. Like Caesars wife, a
judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. A judges private as well as
official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and
be beyond reproach.

Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It was, thus, held

that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the
presence of the complainant. (at 89-90)

B. AS TO THE USE OF COMPLAINANTS KARAOKE BAR AT THE METROPOLIS HOTEL

The investigating justice notes that this was not denied by respondent but interposes the
defense that during the time he used the bar, his friends would pay the bill (See: TSN, April 27,
2004, p. 29). He also claimed that at one time the owners of the karaoke bar would not allow his
wife to pay. He testified, thus:

Atty. Cortez:

3
 Mr. Respondent, the complainant thru its witnesses Richard King and Rafael
King have accused you of taking advantage of the amenities in their
karaoke joint and according to them you were not charged, what can
you say to this? Did you abuse?

Witness:
I did not. Because that is an open place. I went there together with my wife to
entertain some judge friends and then my wife was suppose to pay and
the management did not allow my wife to pay. (TSN, April 27, 2004, p.
20)

Although there is a question of whether or not respondent had used the facilities free of
charge, the investigating justice nevertheless finds that respondent judge should have not
frequented the place to prevent any appearance of impropriety considering that, as admitted by
respondent, there are at least three (3) cases filed by complainant which are pending before his
court. This is a violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Thus, it has been held time and again that the judges must avoid all appearances of
impropriety. In Calilung v. Suriaga (339 SCRA 340 [2000]), it was held:

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that both the reality and the
appearance must concur. Case law repeatedly teaches that judicial office
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of
restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted
position in the administration of justice. The irresponsible or improper conduct of
a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. It is thus the duty of the
members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the
image and integrity of the judiciary.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and
regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-
liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples
sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should remain free from any
appearance of impropriety and should be beyond reproach.

Given the factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court does
not hesitate to conclude that respondent Judge tainted the image of the judiciary
to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it all times unsullied and
worthy of the peoples trust. A judge should conduct himself at all times in a
manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people
for he is the visible representation of the law. (at 361-362)

C. AS TO THE ALLEGED IMPROPRIETY REGARDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF

JULY 5, 2002

For clarity, the undisputed facts leading to the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction are
reiterated, thus: On July 2, 2002, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On July 5, 2002
defendants filed an urgent motion to lift writ of preliminary injunction and on the same day an order
lifting the writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

...

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 Respondent on the other hand, countered in his testimony that he granted the motion to
lift the writ of preliminary attachment because he thought that it was the most equitable thing to
do . . .

The investigating justice is not persuaded by respondents explanation. As held in the case
of Peroxide Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 882 [1991]) before a writ of
attachment may be lifted, a hearing and an opportunity to oppose the motion should be given to the
attaching creditor, to wit:

Now, it is undeniable that when the attachment is challenged for having been
illegally or improperly issued, there must be a hearing with the burden of proof to
sustain the writ of being on the attaching creditor. That hearing embraces not
only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the
claims of the opposing parties and meet them. The right to submit arguments
implies that opportunity, otherwise the right would be a barren one. It means a
fair and open hearing. And, as provided by the aforecited Section 13 of Rule 57,
the attaching creditor should be allowed to oppose the application for the
discharge of the attachment by counter-affidavit or other evidence, in addition to
that on which the attachment was made. (at 890)

In the present administrative case, no opportunity was given to complainant to even

oppose the motion to lift attachment. Respondent failed to persuade the investigating justice of the
alleged urgency to grant the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment as a justification for
granting the motion without a full-blown hearing. It may also be said that the July 5, 2002 Order
may have been too hastily issued considering the fact that a copy of the said motion was mailed
only on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit 5). Hence, as argued by complainant, the motion could not have been
set for hearing earlier than July 6, 2002 without doing violence to the 3-day notice rule.

The respondent judge, having ignored settled jurisprudence, is GUILTY of gross

ignorance of law.

As held in Gozum v. Liangco (339 SCRA 253 [2001]):

When the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it

constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (at 259)

There could be nothing more basic under Philippine Law than the
aforementioned 3-day notice rule:

D. AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE COUNTER-BOND

In this regard, complainant alleged that:

That there is no better evidence of the insufficiency of the counter-bond

submitted and lack of clearance from the Supreme Court on the date the counter-
bond was approved on July 4, 2002 than the Certification of the Clerk of Court VII,
Joeffrey S. Joaquino, Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City, that the said
counter-bond its (sic) Supreme Court Clearance was valid up to June 28, 2002.
That its maximum net retention is only P13,432,136.31, but was issuing a
counter-bond worth P35,973,600.00 to answer for damages to petitioner. What is
material was the date the counter-bond was approved not any other date
thereafter. (Rollo, pp. 15-16)

Respondent, upon the other hand, testified that he did not notice that the clearance had already
expired and that the bond was over the legal retention . . .

On this matter, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge was negligent. The
Indorsement issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu dated July 5, 2002 contained the
following Information (Exhibit F).

a) The signature of the bonding officer is genuine as compared to his

specimen signature on file.

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 b) The companys Supreme Court Clearance is valid until June 28, 2002.
c) The companys Maximum Net Retention Per Subject of Insurance is only
THIRTEEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY SIX & 31/100 PESOS (P13,432,136.13), per its OIC
Form No. 1 on file with this Office.

Had respondent carefully examined the aforesaid Indorsement it would have been immediately
apparent to him that the insurance companys clearance had already expired and that the bond
issued exceeded its net retention. Because of this negligence, damage resulted to the litigant in the
case. The position of a judge is a sensitive one, he should have been more circumspect and careful
in his actions, granting that his actions may have been motivated with the desire to act equitably.

To recapitulate, the investigating justice finds that respondent judge is GUILTY of:

a). IMPROPER CONDUCT when he entertained the litigant in his residence as well as when he
used complainants karaoke bar;

b). GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW when he failed to hold a hearing regarding the lifting of the writ
of preliminary attachment as mandated in the case of Peroxide Philippines Corporation v.
Court of Appeals(supra) as well as when he heard the motion to lift the writ of preliminary
attachment in violation of the 3-day notice rule; and

c). NEGLIGENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY when he approved the patently
defective counter-bond.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent

judge be SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay and be issued a warning that a more
severe penalty shall be imposed in case of another infraction. [6]

We do not fully agree with the evaluation and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.

On the alleged demand for P250,000.00.

The Investigating Justice finds that the charges of extortion had not been sufficiently substantiated because
other than the bare assertions of Rafael and Richard King there was no other evidence presented. The following
questions come to mind. May we, considering that we are not a trier of facts, review the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses? Should the testimonies of both Rafael and Richard King be automatically disregarded simply because
there is no other evidence presented by complainant? May the testimonies of such witnesses suffice to establish the
guilt of respondent?

It is a well-entrenched rule that the trial judges, in this case, the investigating justices findings of facts and
assessment of the credibility of witnesses are accorded finality. However, such rule is not without exceptions. Such
findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court
may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of
the case.[7] Among the circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to reexamine the
trial court or appellate courts findings of facts are, when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. [8]

In the present case, we find that such circumstances exist to make this case come under those
aforementioned exceptions. A re-assessment of the Investigating Justices ruling on the sufficiency of evidence
against respondent is warranted. We find that the Investigating Justices inference that the evidence on record is
insufficient to hold respondent liable is erroneous, a patent mistake. The Investigating Justice seriously overlooked
the fact that to require the King brothers to present evidence other than their corroborating testimonies that
respondent made such a demand would be unrealistic. Human experience tells us that extortion would be done in
utmost secrecy, minimizing possible witnesses. Hence, respondent required the King brothers to meet him at his
house, where everything would be under his control. In this case, complainant is quite fortunate to even have two
witnesses to corroborate each other. Verily, to require that there be any documentary evidence or a paper trail of the
commission of extortion would be quite absurd for, naturally, respondent would not allow such incriminating evidence
to exist. In Velez vs. Flores,[9] we observed that being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough

6
to document his extortion activities on paper. Therefore, the King brothers testimonies cannot be automatically
disregarded simply because there is no additional evidence presented by complainant.

It should be noted that the Investigating Justice did not categorically state that the King brothers are not
credible witnesses or that their testimonies are not worthy of belief. Thus, we closely examined the testimonies of
Richard and Rafael King and found the same to be very candid, forthright, unwavering, and bereft of any material or
significant inconsistencies. Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Richard King, they actually have nothing to gain from
the filing of the present administrative case. If anything, their having to appear at the hearings of this case was even a
burden, as they had to squeeze in such hearings into their already busy schedules. They even had to travel from
Cebu City, where they reside, to Manila just to give their testimonies before the Investigating Justice. Moreover,
respondent failed to present evidence that Richard and Rafael King had any ill motives in leveling such grave
accusations of extortion against him. Furthermore, respondents admission that he did entertain the King brothers at
his home bolsters the credibility of their averment that he demanded P250,000.00 from them for a favorable ruling on
the motion for reconsideration that they would file. Thus, we find the King brothers testimonies to be entitled to full
faith and credit and sufficient proof that respondent demanded P250,000.00 in exchange for a ruling in their favor.

In Avancena vs. Liwanag,[10] we considered the mere testimony of complainant that respondent judge
therein was demanding P1,000,000.00 for a favorable judgment in her favor and the testimony of an NBI agent that
they tried to entrap respondent therein but their operation was unsuccessful, as sufficient evidence to find respondent
therein guilty of extortion. Imposing the penalty of dismissal on respondent therein, we held that:
. . . in the instant proceeding, respondent is being held to account for serious misconduct
or malfeasance in office in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The quantum of proof required to establish respondents misconduct in
the administrative complaint is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, which
is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.

Again, in Office of the Court Administrator vs. Morante,[11] we emphasized that:

. . . in administrative proceedings only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conviction, is
required. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, as the standard of
integrity demanded of members of the Bench is not satisfied which merely allows one to escape the
penalties of criminal law.

In Villaros vs. Orpiano,[12] we found the testimony of complainant therein and his mother that respondent
Stenographer and Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 32, had solicited
P1,500.00 from them, as sufficient evidence to hold him guilty of improper solicitation, and held thus:
The Court finds the respondent administratively liable for improper solicitation and thus
imposes the penalty prescribed by prevailing rules and jurisprudence, which is dismissal from
service on the first offense.
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with
a heavy responsibility.Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in
order to merit and maintain the publics respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all
court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness.
The respondents act of demanding money from the complainant hardly meets the foregoing
standard. Improper solicitation from litigants is a grave offense that carries an equally grave penalty.

In the present case, we likewise hold that the credible testimonies of the King brothers meet the required
quantum of evidence which justifies our conclusion that respondent indeed demanded P250,000.00 from them. Such
conduct is a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct, which provide
that:
Canon 1 A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary

Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.

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 Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities

Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.

On the Investigating Justices finding of gross ignorance

of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the
motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day
notice rule.

We agree with the Investigating Justices finding that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule.

Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. - . . .

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

A perusal of the motion to lift attachment shows that a copy of the same was mailed to plaintiffs counsel only
on July 3, 2002. The courts receiving stamp showed that said motion was filed in court only at 11:02 in the morning of
July 5, 2002, despite the fact that the notice of hearing for said motion stated that said motion would be set for
hearing at 8:30 in the morning of July 5, 2002.The proximity of the date of mailing of the copy of the motion to the
other party and the hearing date indicated in the notice of hearing clearly shows that it is impossible for the other
party to receive said motion at least three days before the date of hearing. Evidently, the party filing the motion to lift
attachment had already violated the three-day notice rule. Such circumstances should have already warned
respondent that plaintiff in the subject case had not yet been apprised of the filing of such a motion, much less the
holding of a hearing for said motion. Yet, despite said patent defects in the motion, respondent consented to hold a
hearing on the motion at 11:20 of the very same morning of July 5, 2002. Although Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the court, for good cause, may set the hearing on shorter notice, the rule is
explicit that notice of the hearing cannot be altogether dispensed with. In this case, common knowledge dictates that
it would be impossible for a copy of the motion, mailed only on July 3, 2002, to be delivered by registered mail to
counsel for the plaintiff on or before July 5, 2002. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had no notice whatsoever of the
filing of the motion and the hearing date for the same.

Section 12, Rule 57[13] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, also provides that the court shall, after due
notice and hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if the movant makes a cash deposit, or files a counter-
bond executed to the attaching party with the clerk of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to
that fixed by the court in the order of attachment.Although it is true that respondent was able to present a transcript of
stenographic notes[14] to prove that a hearing on the motion to lift attachment was conducted on July 5, 2002, the
same only highlighted the fact that respondent failed to give herein complainant, the plaintiff and attaching party in
subject case, due notice and the opportunity to be heard, as mandated by the aforementioned rule. The
transcripts of stenographic notes of July 5, 2002, in fact shows that respondent already had strong suspicions that the
plaintiff had not yet been notified of the filing of the motion when he propounded the following questions to the
counsel of defendants in the subject case, to wit:
COURT:
Where is the proof that the counsel for the plaintiff received this?

ATTY. SENO:
It was mailed, Your Honor. Our basis that he received this is the registry receipt which is
the proof of mailing, and there is an explanation why no personal service could be made because
of time constrained (sic), Your Honor. As we can recall, we filed our Answer last July 3, Your Honor,
and it was about that time that we received the summons and it was also about that time that we
filed this motion, Your Honor. At any rate, this is only a counterbond which is a mere ministerial
procedure. It is just a matter of paying the surety of the counterbond and to submit it to the
Honorable Court to prove that there is already a bond which may answer for any loss that the
plaintiffs may suffer.

COURT:

8
 But are you sure that Atty. Navarro was aware of that?

ATTY. SENO:
Yes, because we met him, Your Honor. He had a case here and we met at the
hallway. Before he left, I told him that I filed a motion and he was furnished a copy through mail,
Your Honor.

COURT:
You should have let him signed (sic) this pleading here as a copy furnished, since you
were already talking to him at that time.

ATTY. SENO:
Yes, Your Honor, precisely there is an explanation why no personal service could be
had. Under the rules, if no personal service could be had, then it should be mailed by registered
mail. But there is already an explanation why no personal service could be made and we believe
that is already sufficient, Your Honor.

COURT:
Because this is a very urgent motion and considering that the counsel for the plaintiffs was
around, you should have furnished him a copy and let him sign to prove that he received a copy. At
that time, was he willing to receive the copy? Perhaps, he was not willing to receive a copy.

ATTY. SENO:
No, no, we had a talk, Your Honor. He may not be willing to receive the copy at that time,
but we have mailed to him already a copy and we believe that it is already suffice (sic), Your Honor.

COURT:
But it was easy for you to serve him a copy personally. Why do you have to mail it, when
you could have serve (sic) it to him personally?

ATTY. SENO:
No, because my office, Your Honor, is in Mandaue City. The office of Atty. Navarro is in
Capitol and its so hard to travel from Mandaue to Capitol in just a matter of 30 minutes especially
during school days, Your Honor. As a matter of fact, we can even file an ex-parte motion, Your
Honor.

COURT:
Anyway, the incident is now considered submitted for resolution.

Despite such misgivings on the lack of due notice on counsel for plaintiff in subject case, respondent still conducted
an ex-parte hearing on the motion and hastily considered the same submitted for resolution and on the very same
day of July 5, 2002, respondent approved the counter-bond. Complainant is not quite accurate in stating that
respondent approved said counter-bond on July 4, 2002.The stamp of approval of the bond was affixed onto the bond
without any date thereof. The date of execution by the President of the bonding company was July 4, 2002; but this
does not mean that respondent also approved said counter-bond on the same date of July 4, 2002. The Indorsement
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City was dated July 5, 2002, thus, respondent could not have
received subject counter-bond any earlier than the date of said indorsement.
Just the same, respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on the motion to lift
attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in considering the same submitted for resolution, and in
issuing the order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day of July
5, 2002, without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter. We agree with the Investigating Justice
that respondents defense that he immediately heard the motion even in the absence of counsel for the other party
because of the urgency of the lifting of the attachment, is not persuasive. The transcripts of stenographic notes for the
hearing on July 5, 2002 shows that counsel for defendants in subject case presented no argument whatsoever
showing the urgency of the motion.

It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered by him in good faith, or in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.[15] However, it has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is
subject to disciplinary action.[16] The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that respondents inability to
accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this case, we believe that respondents actuations reek of
malice and bad faith. Thus, we find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice

9
rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard on the matter as mandated by
Section 12, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On respondents negligence
in the performance of his duty

As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly failed to exercise due care in examining the
supporting papers therefor. The respondent should know the basic requirements before approving a surety bond or a
judicial bond such as counter-bond. In Mangalindan vs. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court enumerated the requirements
for accepting a surety bond as bail. Since surety bail bonds are closely analogous to judicial bonds and counter-
bonds required for the issuance of writs of attachment or the lifting thereof, the respondent should know that the
requirements for acceptance of said surety bail bonds are the same for all other bonds such as acceptance bonds or
counter-bonds except the requirement for photographs of the accused. Said requirements are: (1) affidavit of
justification, including a statement that the company has no pending obligation demandable and outstanding in any
amount to the Government or any of its agencies as of the last day of the month preceding the date the bond is
issued or posted; (2) Clearance from the Supreme Court, valid only for thirty days from the date of issuance; (3)
Certificate of compliance with the Circular from the Office of the Insurance Commissioner; (4) Authority of the agent in
case the bond is issued through a branch office or through an agent; and (5) current certificate of authority issued by
the Insurance Commission with the financial statement showing the maximum underwriting capacity of the
company.[18] The Court imposed these requirements for very good reason, and that is, to ensure that the bonding
company has the capacity to pay whatever liability it may have under the bond it issued. The bonding companys
ability to pay is all too important in this case where the counter-bond it issued is supposed to answer for whatever
amount may ultimately be adjudged in favor of the party who applied for the writ of attachment. It is, therefore,
indispensable for a judge to review these documents before he approves the bond.

Notably, among the requisites for the bond to be acceptable are a clearance from the Supreme Court and the current
certificate of authority showing the maximum underwriting capacity of the company.

The Clerk of Courts Indorsement dated July 5, 2002, clearly showed that the bonding companys Supreme Court
Clearance was valid only until June 28, 2002, and its Maximum Net Retention is only P13,432,136.31. A simple
perusal thereof would have alerted respondent that at the time the counter-bond was submitted to him for approval on
July 5, 2002, the bonding company did not have enough properties to answer for the counter-bond it issued in the
amount of P35,973,600.00. Thus, we agree with the Investigating Justice that respondent acted negligently in
approving the counter-bond.
On respondents improper conduct in entertaining
litigants at his home and using litigants karaoke bar for
free.

It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his home and to frequent
the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use thereof for free. Respondent thereby received benefits from
a litigant appearing in his court. Respondents defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of
the karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at said bar are quite clear that
respondents wife would sign the order slips, but no payment was ever given by respondent or his wife. Respondent
should have insisted on paying, especially considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending before his
court. Nothing on record shows that respondent even exerted any effort to so insist. He appeared only too ready and
willing to enjoy the facilities of complainants karaoke for free. In Caeda vs. Alaan,[19] we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid
not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.

[Respondents] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any
appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an
impression of indecorum.
.........

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has
to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely
venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public

10
 or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach.(Emphasis supplied),

By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by said litigant, respondent miserably failed to live
up to the standards of judicial conduct.

A judge must assiduously protect the image of his exalted office as we have previously emphasized in Spouses
Makadaya Sadik and Usodan Sadik vs. Judge Abdallah Casar,[20] to wit:

It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to promote justice. However, the
reality of justice depends, above all, on the intellectual, moral and personal quality of the men and
women who are called to serve as our judges. In a piece written by Rosenberg, this point was
emphasized, thus:

Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe Pound

remarked, men count more than machinery. Assume the clearest rules, the most
enlightened procedures, the most sophisticated court techniques; the key factor
is still the judge. In the long run, There is no guarantee of justice except the
personality of the judge. The reason the judge makes or breaks the system of
justice is that rules are not self-declaring or self-applying. Even in a government
of laws, men make the decisions.

In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin E. Arceo, the Court
emphasized the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial system, thus:

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community
that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner
by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create
confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to
create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and
justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural
aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity,
probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private
lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this
country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial
system.

Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable qualifications for judicial

office reflect an awareness in the legal profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done
to the legal order by judicial corruption. The rationale for this was succinctly put by Jones, thus:

If a physician or a professor or a businessman is discovered to be a

thief or an influence peddler, the disclosure will not put medicine, higher
education, or business into general disrepute. But judges are different and more
representative; revelations of judicial corruption create suspicion and loss of
confidence in legal processes generally and endanger public respect for law.

Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of exceptional integrity and
honesty. The special urgency for requiring these qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for
the judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen. Hence, being in a
position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must conduct himself in
a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. [21]

Finally, it cannot be said that complainant is guilty of forum-shopping in filing a criminal complaint against respondent
before the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas). We held in Bejarasco, Jr. vs. Judge Buenconsejo[22] that:

. . . it is a settled rule that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings,
and may continue despite the dismissal of the latter charges. As the disciplining arm of the judiciary,

11
 it is the Courts duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in complaints
against judges and to mete the necessary penalties therefor.

In sum, we find respondent guilty of the serious charges of two counts of Gross Misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1, and Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8(3) of Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, for demanding P250,000.00 from complainant and using
complainants karaoke bar and entertaining litigants at his home. Respondent is likewise guilty of Gross Ignorance of
the Law or Procedure under Section 8(9) Rule 140 of the same Rules for failing to accord complainant the due notice
and hearing it was entitled to under the rules. Lastly, respondent is guilty of the less serious charge of Simple
Misconduct under Section 9(7), also under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, for his negligence in
approving the subject counter-bond.

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits.

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

while Section 11(B) of said Rule, dealing with sanctions that may be imposed on the respondent found guilty of less
serious charges, provide thus:

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall
be imposed:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) or
more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

Consequently, we find the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent be suspended for
only three (3) months without pay to be inappropriate.

We note further that respondent had been previously administratively sanctioned in City Government of
Tagbilaran vs. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.[23] for violating Circular No. 4 issued on August 27, 1980, enjoining judges of
inferior courts from playing in or being present in gambling casinos. Thus, the fact that respondent is guilty of three
counts of serious offenses, i.e., two counts of Gross Misconduct and one count Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure, and also of one count of Simple Misconduct, further aggravated by the finding of guilt in a previous
administrative case against him, justifies the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of two counts of
Gross Misconduct, one count of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure, and, Simple Misconduct. He
is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except as to accrued leave credits and disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further ordered to cease and desist from
discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personnel
records of respondent.

Further, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2002, respondent is required to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law for conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar.
SO ORDERED.

12
 [A.M. No. RTJ-03-1793. February 5, 2004]
ATTY. GLORIA LASTIMOSA-DALAWAMPU, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAPHAEL B. YRASTORZA, SR.,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The administration of justice is primarily the joint responsibility of the judge and the lawyer. The judge expects
the lawyer to properly perform his role in this task, in the same manner that the lawyer expects the judge to do his
part. The people expect of them a sense of shared responsibility which is a crucial factor in the administration of
justice.[1] Their relation should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the
other. Only in this manner can each minimize occasions for delinquency and help attain effectively the ends of
justice.[2]
Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu filed a complaint for serious misconduct[3] against respondent Judge
Raphael Yrastorza, Sr., the incumbent presiding judge of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, with the
Office of the Court Administrator.
The complaint alleged that on January 14, 2002, Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu appeared as counsel for the
accused before the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. CBU-58947 entitled, People of the Philippines versus
Gina and Bob Villaver. After her client, Bob Villaver, was arraigned, Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu moved for the re-
setting of the pre-trial conference in view of absence of the trial prosecutor assigned to Branch 14. However, before
she could finish her statement, respondent judge purportedly cut her off by saying, If you cannot handle this case,
Atty. Dalawampu, you better give this case to another lawyer. When complainant answered that she can handle the
case, respondent again cut her off saying, Do not give me so many excuses, Atty. Dalawampu! I dont care who you
are! When complainant was about to leave the courtroom, she heard respondent say, I dont care who you are. You
can file one thousand administrative cases against me. I dont care.
According to the complainant, the foregoing incident was not the first time that she was berated by the
respondent judge. On October 11, 2000, when she appeared as private prosecutor in Criminal Case CBU-49515, she
was scolded by respondent judge for failure to file the pre-trial brief even if a pre-trial brief is not compulsory in
criminal cases.
Complainant was unable to attend the pre-trial conference on October 12, 2000, but she prepared and filed the
pre-trial brief and informed the public prosecutor, Rustico Paderanga, that she had to attend a hearing before the
Sandiganbayan in Manila. Complainants client, Consuelo Aznar, was present during the pre-trial. Complainant did not
advise her client to bring the original documents to be presented in the case because she stated in the pre-trial brief
that the marking of exhibits will be done as the trial progresses and that photocopies of these documents already
formed part of the record. This notwithstanding, respondent judge ordered Consuelo Aznar to produce the original
documents in five minutes, or the case would be dismissed. Consuelo Aznar frantically got the documents from her
house, but the travel time from the court house to the house of Consuelo Aznar and back required at least 30
minutes.[4] Respondent judges action towards Consuelo Aznar is oppressive.
In his Comment,[5] respondent judge claimed that complainants allegations are pure exaggerations. His remark
that complainant should let another lawyer handle her case if she was busy with her other cases was occasioned by
complainants failure to submit a pre-trial brief, and his other remark that he was not deterred by administrative cases
against him was not necessarily to the complainant but to the public. Respondent explained that he did not mean to
insult complainant or her clients as he only wanted to expedite the proceedings. [6]
In a Resolution[7] dated August 6, 2003, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
Prior to the date of first hearing before the Investigating Justice, complainant filed a motion [8] to withdraw
complaint, alleging that sometime in September 2003, she and the respondent judge have ironed out their differences
in a Bench and Bar dialogue, and the pendency of her complaint against respondent judge poses a block to a
harmonious relation between them.
Thereafter, complainant failed to appear during the investigation of the case. At the hearing on October 21,
2003, respondent judge filed a motion to dismiss [9] on the ground of lack of interest and failure to prosecute.
On November 6, 2003, Justice Buzon submitted her report to the Office of the Court Administrator
recommending the dismissal of the administrative case against respondent judge due to the failure of the complainant
to prove the allegations in her complaint.
Prefatorily, the Court must reiterate the rule that mere desistance on the part of the complainant does not
warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint against any member of the bench and the judiciary. [10] The

13
Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that knows no bounds.[11] Hence, instead of
dismissing the charge as recommended, the Court, in the exercise of its power of administrative
supervision,[12] resolves to reprimand respondent judge for his failure to exercise greater circumspection in dealing
with the complainant.
Upon his assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He becomes the visible representation
of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.[13] A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and
justice.[14]
It appears that as Atty. Lastimosa-Dalawampu, the complainant in this case, was about to leave the sala of the
respondent judge, the latter, after berating her in public, uttered, I dont care who you are. You can file one thousand
administrative complaints against me. I dont care! Respondent, in his comment, admitted that he indeed made such
an utterance although the same was not directed at the complainant but to the public. This notwithstanding, the
utterance was definitely uncalled for.
The tenor of respondents statement can easily instill in the minds of those who heard them that as a judge he is
above the law. Such a remark creates an impression on the public that whatever administrative case they will file
against respondent or against any judge will only be a futile exercise. Statements such as those made by respondent
judge erode the publics confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Respondents unwarranted statement is a clear
derogation of his duty to be faithful to the law[15] which he swore to uphold as a member of the judiciary.
Furthermore, respondents unfounded act of insulting the complainant in open court and cutting her off in mid-
sentence while she was still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard by respondent of his duty [16] to be
patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct proceedings in court with fitting dignity and
decorum.[17] Respondent cannot justify his action by a desire to hasten the proceedings before him. In Ruiz v.
Bringas,[18] it was ruled:

The duty to maintain respect for the dignity of the court applies to members of the bar and bench alike. A judge
should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to those appearing before him. He can hold
counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients and the public without being petty, arbitrary,
overbearing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember that courtesy
begets courtesy. Above all he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason for reproach.

A judges duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not limited to lawyers. The said duty also
includes being courteous to litigants and witnesses. Respondents conduct towards Consuelo Aznar leaves a lot to be
desired. As stated in the complaint, respondent ordered Consuelo Aznar to go back to her house to get the original
documents in five minutes or he would dismiss the case. [19]Respondent did not offer any explanation to this charge
against him. Respondents act in this instance smacks of judicial tyranny. A judge anywhere should be the last person
to be perceived as a petty tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain. Thus, the role of a judge in relation to
those who appear before his court must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. [20]
Judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and existing administrative
policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice. [21] Any act which falls short of the
exacting standard for public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary,
shall not be countenanced.[22]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza is hereby REPRIMANDED for discourtesy against
complainant. He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

14
 [A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488. October 13, 2004]
ADARLINA G. MATAGA, complainant, vs. JUDGE MAXWELL S. ROSETE, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Santiago City and Process Server GASAT M. PAYOYO, Municipal Trial Court, Cordon,
Isabela, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court is to maintain its good name and standing as
a temple of justice.[1] The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability or tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[2]
In a verified complaint dated June 12, 2002, Adarlina G. Mataga, a retired Court Stenographer 1 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, charged Judge Maxwel S. Rosete and Process Server Gasat M.
Payoyo with Dishonesty and Misconduct in connection with the encashing of the check representing her terminal
pay.[3]
Complainant alleged that she applied for disability retirement because she was suffering from Organic Brain
Syndrome Moderate to Severe Secondary to Cerebro-Vascular Accident (Thrombosis).Complainants application was
approved on January 30, 1996,[4] and consequently, Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-03-8924[5] for One Hundred
Sixty Five Thousand Five Hundred Thirty and 8/100 Pesos (P165,530.08) and the corresponding Land Bank Check
No. 37021[6] were prepared in the name of complainant. The check was released to respondent Payoyo who turned it
over to Judge Rosete.[7]
Sometime in March 1996, respondent Payoyo brought complainant to the house of respondent Judge Rosete,
where she was given the amount of P44,000.00 as her terminal pay. It was only subsequently that complainant came
to know that the disability retirement benefit granted to her was in the amount of P165,530.08, which respondents did
not deliver to her.
When asked to comment,[8] respondent judge denied the complainants allegations. He stated that complainant
has not been to his house in Quezon City, nor has he given the complainant the sum of P44,000.00 as her terminal
pay. Respondent judge, however, admitted that the check representing the retirement benefits of the complainant
was indeed turned over to him by the Supreme Court security guard after it was misplaced by his co-respondent,
Payoyo. Upon his receipt of complainants check, respondent judge immediately handed the same to Payoyo because
he knew that complainant had requested the latter to follow up her check.
For his part, respondent process server Payoyo denied the accusations against him. He claimed that he did not
know complainant personally. Respondent judge instructed him to claim complainants disability check, which he
did. Respondent judge then told him to encash the check at the Land Bank of the Philippines, Taft Avenue Branch
and to proceed to the formers house to meet complainant and her son. There, he turned over the full amount of
complainants disability benefit.
The case was referred to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation, report and recommendation. [9] On July 9, 2003,
Judge Madrid submitted her report,[10] wherein she recommended that the complaint be dismissed in view of the
admission of the complainant that she has received the full amount of her benefits as early as March 17, 1996, as
evidenced by a receipt which bore her signature.[11]
After noting the report of Judge Albano Madrid, we resolved to refer the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. [12] The OCA recommended that, in view of the failure
to thresh out the material contradictions between the allegations of the complainant and the assertions of the
respondent, the case be returned to the investigating judge for further investigation, report and
recommendation.[13] On December 10, 2003, we resolved to return the case to Judge Albano Madrid.[14]
After conducting another investigation of the case, Judge Albano Madrid submitted her report, stating that
during the second investigation, complainant made it clear that she had no more complaint against respondent judge
provided that the latter will give her the money. Rather, the complaint was directed at the dishonesty of respondent
Payoyo in his dealings with the complainant.
After reviewing the records of this case, we hold that the complaint against respondent judge should be
dismissed.

15
 Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its
consequential effect are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of
dismissal or disbarment.[15] Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the
same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should
be competent.
When an administrative charge against a judge is determined to have no basis whatsoever, we will not hesitate
to protect him against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial process. We will not shirk from our
responsibility of imposing discipline upon employees of the Judiciary but neither shall we hesitate to shield the same
employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[16]
On the other hand, respondent Payoyo should be held administratively liable. As correctly pointed out by the
investigating judge:
xxxxxxxxx

From the conduct and actuations of Mr. Gasat Payoyo, together with his confusing testimony, it is clear that he was
not honest enough when he gave the proceeds of the terminal leave benefits of the complainant. He was able to
collect P165,530.00. He lost the check. It was found and given to the security guard of the Supreme Court who in turn
gave it to Judge Rosete who gave it back to Gasat Payoyo who he knew was the one authorized by Ms. Mataga to
release it from the Supreme Court. By virtue of his special power-of-attorney Mr. Payoyo encashed the check but he
did not give all of it to the complainant. But the complainant must have accepted the amount given to her pursuant to
an agreement she had with Mr. Payoyo. It is hard to imagine that Ms. Mataga authorized Mr. Payoyo to follow-up her
retirement benefits without any consideration whatsoever.

Six years later the complainants daughter complained why her mother accepted a lesser amount than what was
indicated in the check. She urged her mother to file a complaint with the Supreme Court against both Gasat Payoyo
and Judge Rosete. The daughter must have suspected that Judge Rosete had something to do with the lesser
amount delivered to her mother because she found out that the lost check had been given to Judge Rosete and yet
the latter did not give the check to her mother but instead returned it to Payoyo for encashment.

When Gasat Payoyo was apprised that the complaint was scheduled for investigation, he got scared. Before the
scheduled date of hearing on June 11, 2003 he went to talk to the complainant and agreed to give her P100,000.00
provided she will sign a receipt antedated March 17, 1996 to show that he actually delivered the full amount of the
check to her. He presented this as evidence during the investigation. Because of their agreement about the receipt,
the complainant gave a vague and confusing testimony regarding it.

It is clear that the complainant did not receive the full amount of her terminal leave benefits. As to how much she
received, the complainant said she only received P40,000.00. But Gasat Payoyo said he gave it all. Nevertheless
there was an agreement between the complainant and Payoyo regarding the amount received by the complainant
which was satisfactory to both of them. Thus Ms. Mataga should not have any cause to complain. But her daughter
believed that her mother was taken advantage of because of her illness.

Judge Maxwell Rosete denied any participation in the follow-up and encashment of the check representing the
terminal leave benefits of the complainant. There is no reason to doubt this inspite of the statements given by Gasat
Payoyo in his supplemental affidavit which he admitted were not true. To absolve himself, the respondent Payoyo by
himself or upon the advice of others, tried to put the blame on Judge Rosete. x x x

Subsequently M. Payoyo became more worried and became more scared of what he did. He could not face Judge
Rosete. So he refused to appear in the scheduled investigation. But finally he appeared and admitted that the
contents of his supplemental affidavit are not true.

The Investigating Judge believes that it was the initial dishonesty of the respondent Mr. Gasat Payoyo in not
delivering to the complainant the full amount of her terminal leave benefits minus only a reasonable amount for his
efforts in following it up, that led to the filing of the complaint. His efforts to cover up what he did by paying the
complainant and falsifying the date of a receipt compounded his fault. He aggravated it more when he attempted to
maliciously implicate his co-respondent in the commission of his dishonesty. x x x. [17]

The behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. [18]The image of a court,

16
as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat.
Judicial personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of official duties to preserve
at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. [19]
The acts of the respondent Payoyo in not giving to the complainant the full amount of her terminal leave benefits
minus reasonable expenses that he incurred in making a follow-up of its release; his efforts at covering the same by
paying the complainant and by falsifying the date of the receipt for such payment and his aborted attempt to
maliciously implicate his co-respondent judge, all fall short of the measure of uprightness expected of judicial
personnel. For respondent Payoyos dishonesty, he should be suspended for a period of six months.
WHEREFORE, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Maxwell S. Rosete is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Respondent Process Server, Gasat M. Payoyo, is found GUILTY of Dishonesty and is SUSPENDED for a
period of SIX MONTHS. Respondent Payoyo is WARNED that a repetition of this or any similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.

17
 A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818 February 13, 2013
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-2265-MT J-P]
ATTY. MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MICHAEL M. AMDENGAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Angono, Rizal, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

Complainant Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. (complainant) is the lawyer and attorney-in-fact of Olivia G. Merced, the
plaintiff in the ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 001-09. The case is pending before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), Angono, Rizal, presided by respondent Judge Michael M. Amdengan (respondent judge).

The Facts of the Case

The plaintiff Merced filed with the MTC an ejectment Complaint against the defendant Nelson Cana on 23 January
2009. 1 Summons was duly served on the defendant on 02 February 2009 per certification of the lower court's
process server.2 Despite the summons, the defendant did not file an Answer to the Complaint. As a result, the plaintiff
filed a Motion for Judgment3 asking for the grant of the reliefs prayed for in her Complaint. The Motion was opposed
by the defendant and, on 22 July 2009, was denied by the MTC, which considered him to have voluntarily submitted
to its jurisdiction. Consequently, it granted him 10 days to file his Answer, 4 which he did on 17 August 2009, stating
therein his affirmative defenses.5

The preliminary conference of the parties was originally set by the MTC on 25 September 2009, but was later reset to
16 October 2009. During the preliminary conference, respondent judge referred the case for mediation. Due to the
inability of the parties to arrive at a settlement, the case was referred back to the MTC for trial on the merits. On 04
December 2009, respondent ordered the parties to file their respective position papers within 30 days, after which the
case was to be submitted for resolution. 6 On 04 January 2010, the parties simultaneously filed their Position Papers
under the Rules of Summary Procedure.7

It was only on 17 February 2010 that respondent judge issued an order submitting the case for decision. 8 On 03
March 2010, he promulgated his ruling,9 in which he noted that the plaintiff had failed to refer her Complaint to
the Lupon for the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings as required under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. Thus, her ejectment Complaint was dismissed without prejudice.10

On 07 April 2010, complainant filed the instant administrative case charging respondent judge with (1) gross
inefficiency and negligence and (2) gross ignorance of law and jurisprudence. Complainant specifically alleged that
respondent was guilty of gross inefficiency for failing to resolve the ejectment case within a period of 30 days as
mandated under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Likewise, the latter was charged with gross ignorance of law for
having dismissed the case on the ground of failure to comply with the barangay conciliation procedure.

On 06 May 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent judge to file his Comment on the
Complaint-Affidavit within 10 days. In the Comment he filed on 06 July 2010, he answered the first charge of gross
inefficiency by admitting that after the ejectment case was deemed submitted for resolution on 04 January 2010, he
indeed failed to resolve it within the prescribed 30-day period. Although he offered no excuse for that lapse, he
prayed that whatever sanction would be given to him must be tempered and mitigated by mercy and compassion,
given that he was already 69 years old and already blind in his left eye. 11

On the second charge of gross ignorance of the law, he believed that in the event his ruling was not in accordance
with law and jurisprudence, complainant should have availed himself of the proper remedies under the rules, instead
of resorting to an administrative Complaint,12 which should thus be dismissed. On 30 July 2012, complainant rebutted
these allegations in his Reply to the Comment of respondent judge. On 19 August 2012, the latter filed his Rejoinder

The Findings of the OCA

On 31 August 2010, the OCA promulgated its report and recommendation on the case. It found respondent judge
guilty of gross inefficiency for having failed to resolve the ejectment case within the prescribed 30-day period after the
filing of the parties’ respective Position Papers, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and the 1991 Revised

18
Rules on Summary Procedure. As he had incurred a one-month delay in resolving the ejectment case, it
recommended that he be fined P20,000 pursuant to Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.13

The OCA found no merit in the charge of gross ignorance of the law allegedly committed by respondent judge for
dismissing the ejectment Complaint on the ground that it had not been referred to the Lupon. It noted that
complainant was already assailing the propriety of the Order, which it deemed to be judicial in nature. It held that the
proper remedy for correcting the actions of judges should rest on judicial adjudication, and not on the filing of
administrative complaints against them. Thus, the second charge was dismissed for being judicial in nature.

The OCA noted that respondent had previously been fined ₱20,000 for gross ignorance of law and/or procedure in
the administrative case Atty. Pablo B. Francisco v. Judge Michael M. Amdengan, docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-09-1739.
In that ejectment case, respondent entertained a motion to suspend proceedings similar to a Motion for
Postponement, a prohibitive pleading under the Rules on Summary Procedure. 14

Our Ruling

After a thorough review of the records, we AFFIRM the OCA findings in part.

It was sufficiently established that respondent judge committed undue delay in rendering a Decision in the subject
ejectment Complaint. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10 of which
provides:

Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment.- Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an
order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said
matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the
receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the judgment.

This provision is mandatory, considering the nature of an ejectment case as we have explained in Teroña v. Hon.
Antonio de Sagun.15 We quote below the pertinent portion of that Decision:

The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP [Rules on Summary Procedure] is due to the
essence and purpose of these rules. The law looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally
dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency presented by this situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious
and inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful possessor to the enjoyment of the subject property. This fulfills the
need to resolve the ejectment case quickly.

Despite the simultaneous submissions of the parties’ respective Position Papers on 04 January 2010, respondent
judge – through an Order dated 17 February 2010 – still submitted the case for decision. By that time, the mandatory
period of 30 days within which to render judgment on the case had already lapsed. By issuing the Order dated 17
February 2010 purportedly submitting the case for decision, he was subverting Section 10 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure. Respondent considered his Order the start of the 30-day period within which to render a decision. The
ruling was already due on 04 February 2010, reckoned from the date the parties last filed their respective Position
Papers. He could not have extended the period by the mere issuance of an Order, when the rules clearly provide for
a mandatory period within which to decide a case. Hence, he was guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order is classified as a
less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one ( 1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P1 0,000 but not exceeding P20,000. 16 We take into
consideration his candid admission and acceptance of his infraction as factors in imposing only a fine. We also take
into account his age and frail health, although these factors do not in any way absolve him from liability or excuse him
from diligently fulfilling his duties.

19
As for the dismissal of the charge of gross ignorance of the law, we sustain the OCA's recommendation. Indeed,
complainant is already assailing the propriety of the Decision rendered by respondent judge. The administrative
Complaint, however, contains no allegation that the dismissal of the ejectment case was marred by unethical
behavior on his part. Thus, an administrative complaint against him is not the proper remedy to assail his judgment.

In Rodriguez v. Judge Rodolfo S. Gatdula, 17 we have explained that administrative complaints against judges cannot
be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or
judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate
thereto, where such review is still available to the aggrieved parties and the case has not yet been resolved with
finality. In the instant case, complainant had the available remedy of appeal when her ejectment Complaint was
dismissed. Hence, the OCA correctly dismissed the second charge against respondent judge.

WHEREFORE, we. AFFIRM the findings of the OCA and ADOPT its recommendations with modification, as follows:

1) Finding respondent Judge Michael M. Amdengan GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering a

Decision and accordingly FINE him in the amount of PI 0,000 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely; and

2) DISMISSING the charge of gross ignorance of the law for being judicial in nature.

SO ORDERED.

20
 A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3492-RTJ December 4, 2013

NARCISO G. DULALIA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

For resolution is the administrative complaint filed by Narciso G. Dulalia (complainant) charging Judge Afable E.
Cajigal (respondent judge), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City with gross ignorance of the law and
gross inefficiency.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The complaint stemmed from Special Proceedings(SP) No. Q-01-45101, entitled In the Matter of the Joint Settlement
of the Inestate Estate of Sps. Emilio Z. Dulalia and Leonarda G. Dulalia and for Issuance of Letters of
Administration; SP No. Q-01-45814, entitled In the Matter of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Leonarda Garcia
Dulalia; and SP No. Q-02-46327, entitled In the Matter of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Emilio Zuniga Dulalia.
Complainant is one of the petitioners in the aforecited special proceeding cases pertaining to the joint settlement of
the testate and intestate estates of his parents wherein he and his sister, Gilda Dulalia-Figueroa, vied for appointment
as special and regular administrator. Complainant claimed that since respondent judge’s appointment as presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, the latter has displayed gross inefficiency by failing to resolve within the
prescribed period the following incidents:1

(1) Manifestation and Motion dated 18 July 2005; (2) Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve dated 29 May 2006; (3)
Urgent Motion to Resolve Pending Incident (to appoint Narciso G. Dulalia as special administrator pending litigation)
dated 25 April 2002; (4) Omnibus Motion dated 4 June 2007; (5) Comment/Opposition with Application for
Appointment as Special Administrator dated 22 June 2007; (6) Reply to Comment/Opposition with Application for
Appointment as Special Administrator dated 10 July 2007; (7) Urgent Motion to Resolve the Application of Narciso G.
Dulalia as Special Administrator dated 3 April 2008; and (8) Urgent Motion for the Appointment of Narciso G. Dulalia
as Interim Administrator dated 8 September 2009. On 12 January 2010, respondent judge issued an
Order2 appointing Gilda Dulalia-Figueroa as special administratrix of the estate. Aggrieved, complainant filed on 18
February 2010 a Motion for Reconsideration. The motion was set for hearing on 25 February 2010. Complainant
averred that from the filing of the motion until the filing of the instant complaint, respondent judge has yet to resolve
the motion. Complainant alleged that respondent judge is liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to resolve the
pending incident within the required period. According to complainant, respondent judge not only failed to resolve the
subject motion on time, he likewise ignored the basic rules and jurisprudence in the appointment of special
administrators in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Co v. Rosario. 3

Thus, he maintained that respondent judge should also be held liable for gross ignorance of the law.

On 27 August 2010, respondent judge was required by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to comment on
the verified complaint. In his comment,4 respondent judge vehemently denied the allegations in the complaint. He
averred that the complaint, which was filed by a disgruntled party who did not get a favorable action in his court, is
purely personal and meant only to harass him. It has no basis in law and in fact, he claims. Respondent judge
maintained that he is not liable for gross ignorance of the law. He insisted that when he issues an order in a case, he
sees to it that it is rendered within the mantle of the law and within the bounds of the rules. He alleged that he never
incurred bad faith or abuse of authority in resolving legal issues filed before his sala. He submitted that he is also not
liable for gross inefficiency considering that the matter submitted before him cannot be resolved outright in view of the
conflicting claims of the complainant and his siblings. The matter regarding the appointment of special administrator
cannot be issued on a silver platter by the court without any hearing being conducted. He reiterated that the several
motions filed by the complainant praying for his appointment as special administrator can be acted upon only after
hearing the side of the other petitioners and after assessment of the fitness and qualifications of the applicants for
appointment as regular administrator. Respondent judge noted that on 12 January 2010, he issued an order
appointing complainant’s sister, Gilda Dulalia-Figueroa, as special administratrix in order to preserve the estate in the
meantime until a regular administrator is appointed. In view of the order issued, complainant filed a motion for

21
reconsideration. Earlier or on 28 January 2008, complainant filed a petition for indirect contempt against his sister
Gilda Dulalia-Figueroa, allegedly for the latter’s violation of several orders of the court. Respondent judge claimed
that in the hearing of the petition for indirect contempt, he considered as incorporated the motion for reconsideration
filed by complainant. But since the hearing was focused mainly on the petition for indirect contempt, the motion for
reconsideration was left unresolved. He alleged that such omission was neither deliberate nor done with malice. It
was only due to inadvertence that the motion was not specifically resolved. He honestly believed that preferential
attention should be given to the petition for indirect contempt before the court can focus itself on the estate
proceeding, particularly the appointment of a regular administrator. Due to the supervening event, the estate
proceeding remained untouched. As regards the other motions assailed in the complaint, respondent judge reported
that these were already resolved in view of the appointment of the special administratrix of the estate. Hence, there is
no gross inefficiency to speak of.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

In its Report5 dated 18 March 2013, the OCA concluded that the charge of gross ignorance of the law should be
given scant consideration considering that as complainant himself has admitted, the propriety of respondent judge’s
decision was already raised in the motion for reconsideration. The OCA, however, found respondent judge liable for
undue delay in resolving the motion for reconsideration filed by complainant and recommended that he be fined in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

OUR RULING

First, we find the charges of ignorance of the law bereft of merit. It is clear that the respondent judge’s order was
issued in the proper exercise of his judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative disciplinary action;
especially considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the part of respondent judge. Well
entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the absence
of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice
on his or her part.6

Complainant assails the propriety of the decision rendered by respondent judge. Complainant should be reminded
that unfavorable rulings are not necessarily erroneous. Should he disagree with the court’s ruling, there are judicial
remedies available under the Rules of Court. As a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for
any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 7

Moreover, we have explained that administrative complaints against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with
the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former.
Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is
still available to the aggrieved parties and the cases have not yet been resolved with finality.8

In the instant case, complainant had in fact availed of the remedy of a motion for reconsideration prior to his filing of
the administrative complaint. On the charge of undue delay in resolving the motion for reconsideration, we find merit
in the explanation of respondent judge. The Court is aware of the complexity of estate proceedings and the numerous
motions filed in those cases. In the absence of any evidence to show any improper motive or reason that could have
compelled respondent judge to delay the resolution of the motion, the delay could only be attributed to inadvertence,
especially considering the overlapping motions filed by complainant. It is significant to note the report of respondent
judge that he has already resolved the other motions assailed by complainant. Be that as it may, respondent judge
admitted that he may have inadvertently failed to categorically address the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the
inescapable fact is that there was delay in the resolution of the pending incident. The rules and jurisprudence are
clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. 9

The penalty to be imposed on the judge varies depending on the attending circumstances of the case. In deciding the
penalty to be imposed, the Court takes into consideration, among others, the period of delay, damage suffered by the
parties as a result of the delay; complexity of the case; number of years the judge has been in the service; the health
and age of the judge; and the caseload of the court presided over by the judge.

22
In the instant case, we find it proper to mitigate the penalty to be imposed on respondent judge taking into
consideration that this is his first infraction in his more than 15 years in the service; his age; the caseload of his court;
and his candid admission of his infraction.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the complaint of gross ignorance of the law against Judge Afable E. Cajigal,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City is DISMISSED for lack of merit. For his delay in resolving the pending
motions in his court, Judge Cajigal is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the exercise of his judicial functions.
He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future shall merit a more severe sanction from
the Court. Judge Cajigal is reminded to be mindful of the reglementary periods for disposing pending incidents in his
court to avoid delay in the dispensation of justice.

SO ORDERED.

23
 A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438 MTJ) February 27, 2013
ANONYMOUS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis
Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is an anonymous letter-complaint,1 dated August 2, 2010, alleging immorality and conduct
unbecoming of a judge against respondent Judge Rio C. Achas (Judge Achas), Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental.

The letter calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and alleges that: (1) it is of public
knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond
his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he
comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary
consideration; and (6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.

In the Indorsement,2 dated September 30, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the matter to
Executive Judge Miriam Orquieza-Angot (Judge Angot) for Discreet Investigation and Report.

In her Report,3 dated November 26, 2010, Judge Angot found that Judge Achas had been separated from his legal
wife for quite some time and they are living apart; and that he found for himself a young woman with whom he would
occasionally go out with in public and it was not a secret around town. Anent the allegations that Judge Achas was
living beyond his means and was involved in illegal activities, Judge Angot reported that she could not be certain
whether such were true, and only ascertained that he had established friendships or alliances with people of different
social standings from around the city. Judge Angot opined that the allegation that Judge Achas would come to court
untidy and dirty was a matter of personal hygiene and in the eye of the beholder. Lastly, she found the charge that
Judge Achas decided cases unfairly in exchange for consideration to be vague and unsubstantiated.

In his Comment,4 dated February 4, 2011, Judge Achas denied all the allegations against him and claimed that they
were hatched to harass him, pointing to disgruntled professionals, supporters and local candidates who lost during
the May 2010 elections. He asserted that after 28 years in the government service, he had remained loyal to his work
and conducted himself in a righteous manner.

In the Resolution, dated December 14, 2011, the Court resolved to redocket the case as a regular administrative
matter and to refer the same to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City for investigation,
report and recommendation.

In her Report,5 dated April 4, 2012, Executive Judge Salome P. Dungog (Judge Dungog) stated that an investigation
was conducted. Judge Achas and his two witnesses testified in his defense, namely, his Branch Clerk of Court,
Renato Zapatos; and his Process Server, Michael Del Rosario. The anonymous complainant never appeared to
testify. During the investigation, Judge Achas again denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and only
separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income,
having inherited such from his forefathers. Judge Dungog found that "it is not commendable, proper or moral per
Canons of Judicial Ethics to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife,"6 and for him to be involved in
rearing game cocks.

In its Memorandum, dated December 17, 2012, the OCA recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the
charge of immorality. It was further recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to cockpits or avoid such
places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
The other charges were recommended to be dismissed for lack of merit.

The Court agrees, with modification.

Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they must
be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration

24
by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative
proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what
is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his defense.7

In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no
public records were brought forth during the investigation. Respondent Judge Achas denied all the charges made
against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared fighting cocks.

The charges that he (1) lives beyond his means, (2) is involved with illegal activities through his connection with
the kuratongs, (3) comes to court very untidy and dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material
and monetary consideration were, therefore, properly recommended dismissed by the OCA for lack of evidence.

The charges that (1) it is of public knowledge that he is living scandalously with a woman not his wife and that (2) he
is involved with cockfighting/gambling are, however, another matter.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently provides:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Angot’s discreet investigation revealed that the respondent judge found "for himself a suitable young lass
whom he occasionally goes out with in public and such a fact is not a secret around town." 8 Judge Achas denied this
and no evidence was presented to prove the contrary. He did admit, however, that he had been estranged from his
wife for the last 26 years. Notwithstanding his admission, the fact remains that he is still legally married to his wife.
The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding that it is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to
be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to
that of the Judiciary.

For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by the above-cited Canons
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.

25
Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear evidence.1âwphi1 Judge Achas denied
engaging in cockfighting and betting. He admitted, however, that he reared fighting cocks for leisure, having inherited
the practice from his forefathers. While gamecocks are bred and kept primarily for gambling, there is no proof that he
goes to cockpits and gambles. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a
crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must
impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly.

The Court further notes that in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564,9 Judge Achas was charged with immorality for cohabiting with
a woman not his wife, and with gross misconduct and dishonesty for personally accepting a cash bond in relation to a
case and not depositing it with the clerk of court, and for maintaining a flock of fighting cocks and actively participating
in cockfights. The Court, in 2005, found him guilty of gross misconduct for personally receiving the cash bond and
fined him in the amount of P15,000.00 with a stern warning. The charge of immorality was dismissed for lack of
evidence. Although the Court, at the same time, noted that the charge of maintaining a flock of fighting cocks and
participating in cockfights was denied by the respondent judge, it made no ruling on the charge.

Seven years later, similar charges of immoral cohabitation and cockfighting have again been levelled against Judge
Achas. Considering that his immoral behaviour is not a secret around town, it is apparent that respondent judge has
failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived to be above reproach by the reasonable observer, and has failed
to avoid the appearance of impropriety in his activities, to the detriment of the judiciary as a whole.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office.
Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding
the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond
reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge
degrades the institution he represents.10

Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming
conduct" is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than
Pl,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; ( 4) admonition with warning. The Court,
thus, finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 and reprimand are proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Rio Concepcion Achas
is REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), ADMONISHED not to
socially mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

26
 [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1270. January 23, 2001]
GERMAN WENCESLAO CRUZ, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE DANIEL C. JOVEN, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Sipocot, Camarines Sur, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

German Wenceslao Cruz lodged an administrative complaint against Judge Daniel C. Joven of the Second
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Sipocot-Lupi, Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for gross negligence, abuse of authority,
dereliction of duty and failure to render decision within thirty days as so prescribed in the rules on summary
procedure.
Complainant averred that he was the representative of the plaintiff estate in Civil Case No. 548 (Estate of
German Cruz vs. Gregorio Batalla) for unlawful detainer. The complaint was initiated on 22 February 1996 and,
although summons and a copy of the complaint were served on the defendant on 28 February 1996, no answer was
filed within the reglementary period provided therefor. Instead, counsel for the defendant filed a motion for extension
of time within which to answer the complaint and for the inhibition of respondent Judge from further taking cognizance
of the case on the ground that said defendant had charged respondent Judge before the Ombudsman. In his order,
dated 08 March 1996, respondent Judge denied the motion for extension of time to answer the complaint for being a
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure but granted the motion for inhibition so as to
assure the parties of the impartiality and cold neutrality of the court. The order of inhibition, however, was later denied
by then Executive Judge Salvador G. Cajot of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch 29, and
respondent Judge thereupon proceeded with the case. Complainant filed a number of motions, e.g., for judgment on
the pleadings, to present evidence, and for judgment, but the matters remained unresolved. Finally, in his order of 26
March 1997, respondent Judged declared that no answer having been filed by the defendant in the ejectment suit,
judgment on the case would be rendered within thirty days in accordance with Section 10 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Still, no decision came down. Instead, after a new Executive Judge (Hon. Thelma C. Villareal)
assumed her post, respondent Judge issued another order, dated 22 April 1997, where he again inhibited himself
from presiding over the case.
In his 2nd Indorsement in answer to the complaint, respondent Judge admitted that he had failed to resolve the
motion to present evidence filed by complainant because he inadvertently overlooked the same. He justified his
second order for inhibition by asseverating that the case filed against him by the defendant might affect his
impartiality and cold neutrality as the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 548, and he felt it to be both his right and his
duty to excuse himself therefrom. He claimed to have received word that complainant was reporting that the
ejectment suit would be decided in his favor because respondent Judge, a close friend of complainants father, owed
the family a great deal of gratitude.
Following its review of the instant matter, and finding it to be impressed with merit, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint be so re-docketed as an administrative case. The Court, in its
resolution of 29 March 2000, approved the recommendation of the OCA and required the parties to manifest whether
or not they would prefer to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records already extant on
file. Complainant, in his manifestation of 06 May 2000, responded in the affirmative. Respondent Judge made no
compliance with the Court resolution.
The Court sustains the findings of the OCA and adopts its recommendations.
It was inexcusable for respondent Judge to allow the unlawful detainer case, filed on 22 February 1996, to drag
on end. It was not right for respondent Judge to recuse himself from hearing the case simply because the defendant
had previously charged him before the Office of the Ombudsman. The inhibition order was aptly denied by then
Executive Judge Cajot, who forthwith directed respondent Judge to continue with the case, and to hear, try, and
decide it, in the way that the Court, in People vs. Serrano, intimated. Thus-

x x x Neither is the mere filing of an administrative case against a judge a ground for disqualifying him from hearing
the case, for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in
order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the
basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be
enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the court. [1]

Instead of resolving the case as Executive Judge Cajot so directed, respondent Judge awaited the appointment
of a new executive Judge, upon whose assumption to office, respondent again inhibited himself from the proceedings

27
on the same ground he had invoked in his first attempt to divorce himself from the case. Respondent Judge thusly
showed little respect to his bounded duty.
Perhaps, it would be unnecessary to still give any reminder that it is the grave task of courts to provide litigants
with speedy and inexpensive resolution of their disputes. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a
municipal trial court judge, more than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that
trust is carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical
data that influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts.
WHEREFORE, Judge Daniel C. Joven is found to have been remiss of official duty, and he is imposed a FINE
in the amount of Ten thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with most severely. Judge Joven is further directed to resolve Civil Case No. 548 within thirty (30)
days from notice, and to submit to the Court a copy of his decision, if he has not as yet done so.
SO ORDERED.

28
 A.M. No. RTJ-12-2335 March 18, 2013
(Formerly OCA I.P.l. No. 12-3829-RTJ)
ANNA LIZA VALMORES-SALINAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, Respondent.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the verified complaint1 filed by petitioner on January 16, 2012 charging respondent Judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Conduct Unbecoming a Judge, Bias, Manifest Partiality and Impropriety relative to (1) TPO
Case No. 2011-04-04, entitled Anna Liza V Salinas v. Roy Y Salinas, for Violence Against Women and their Children;
and (2) Civil Case No. 2011-08-60, entitled Roy Y. Salinas v. Anna Liza D. Valmores-Salinas, for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.

The facts follow.

Petitioner filed a case for Violence Against Women and their Children (VA WC) with a Petition for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO), docketed as TPO Case No. 2011-04-04, against her husband Roy Salinas before
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City which was presided by respondent Judge. Subsequently, respondent Judge
rendered a Decision denying the petition for the issuance of a TPO filed by petitioner.

Meanwhile, respondent Judge heard Civil Case No. 2011-08-60, particularly Roy Salinas’ prayer for a TRO and
preliminary injunction.

After a chamber conference with both parties’ counsels, respondent Judge immediately issued an Order appointing
Mervyn Añover as the administrator of the spouses’ community properties. Petitioner avers that she did not agree to
the appointment of an administrator. In fact, during the chamber conference, her counsel had reservations regarding
the qualifications of the administrator and reserved the right to question the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate on
the properties, considering that there was no list of properties attached to the petition.

Despite the foregoing, a Letter of Administration was still issued and released with an order motu proprio appointing
Mervyn Añover as the administrator. Petitioner asserts that she and her counsel were not furnished copies of the
order and the letter of administration. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order appointing
Mervyn Añover as the administrator.

In response, Roy Salinas’ counsel filed his comment on the motion, with motion to cite petitioner for indirect contempt
for her defiance to the order of the court by disallowing Mervyn Añover to take over the management of Royal Grand
Suites.

In an Order2 dated December 14, 2011, respondent Judge summarily held petitioner in contempt of court for violating
the court’s order by disallowing the administrator to perform his duty and violating the injunction of the court to desist
from getting the income of the businesses. Thus, petitioner was ordered to suffer a 5-day imprisonment.

Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant complaint alleging that the December 14, 2011 Order was in direct violation of
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, since there was neither an order nor any formal charge requiring
her to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt. She asserts that no verified petition was initiated
and there were no proceedings to determine whether her act was indeed contumacious.

In his Comment, respondent Judge explains that the court appointed the administrator to preserve the properties of
the spouses, considering that some of the properties were already dissipated by petitioner and the amortizations to
the Development Bank of the Philippines on the rest of the properties have not been paid. Respondent Judge alleges
that petitioner filed the instant administrative case to harass him and to prevent the implementation of the court’s
Orders appointing Mervyn Añover as administrator and enjoining the Salinas spouses from managing their
businesses and finding petitioner guilty of contempt of court.

In its Report3 dated September 11, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended as follows:

29
It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:

(1) the administrative case against Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Tacloban City,
be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and

(2) respondent Judge Bitas be found GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW OR PROCEDURE,
and, accordingly, be FINED in the amount of Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000.00) with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.4

We sustain the findings of the Court Administrator.

To begin with, jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of
his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed
through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial
remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by
their erroneous orders or judgments.5

Given this doctrine, the Court fully agrees with the OCA’s report that the propriety of the decision denying petitioner’s
Petition for the Issuance of a TPO and the Order appointing Mr. Mervyn Añover as an administrator are judicial
matters which are beyond the scope of administrative proceedings. If there were indeed errors in their issuance,
petitioner should have resorted to judicial remedies and not to the filing of the instant administrative complaint. In fact,
it is a matter of policy that it is only when there is fraud, dishonesty or corruption that the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 6

Nevertheless, respondent Judge may be held administratively liable for summarily holding petitioner in contempt of
court.

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. − Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to
a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is clear that the following procedural requisites must be complied with before petitioner may be
punished for indirect contempt: First, there must be an order requiring the petitioner to show cause why she should
not be cited for contempt. Second, the petitioner must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against her.
Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider petitioner’s answer. Finally,
only if found guilty will petitioner be punished accordingly. What is most essential in indirect contempt cases, however,
is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his
defenses.7

Here, it appears that Roy Salinas did not file a verified complaint, but instead initiated the indirect contempt through
his Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Cite Defendant for Indirect
Contempt.1âwphi1 Regardless of this fact, however, respondent Judge still issued an order peremptorily holding
petitioner in contempt of court. Moreover, assuming that the contempt charge was initiated motu proprio by the Court,

30
respondent Judge still failed to abide by the rules when he did not require petitioner to show cause why she should
not be punished for contempt.

Plainly, respondent Judge's obstinate disregard of established rules of procedure amounts to gross ignorance of the
law or procedure, since he disregarded the basic procedural requirements in instituting an indirect contempt charge.

However, this Court deems it proper to reduce the recommended fine imposed, considering that this is respondent
Judge's first offense and that it is not uncommon for judges, even lawyers, to make unambiguous distinctions
between direct and indirect contempt, and how the same are treated. Thus, it is but fair to reduce the recommended
penalty from P21,000.00 to P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge CRISOLOGO S. BITAS is found GUILTY OF GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW OR PROCEDURE, and accordingly, FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

31
 A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 March 19, 2013
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2226-RTJ)
CARMEN P. EDANO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA and STENOGRAPHER MYRLA DEL PILAR
NICANDRO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:

In a Decision dated 26 July 2007, this Court found Quezon City Regional Trial Court Judge Fatima G. Asdala
(respondent) guilty of insubordination and gross misconduct unbefitting a member of the judiciary. Accordingly, she
was dismissed from service. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Respondent Judge Fatima G. Asdala GUILTY of gross insubordination and gross misconduct unbefitting a member
of the judiciary and is accordingly DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave
credits to which she may be entitled.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.

On 17 August 2007, respondent filed with this Court a letter 1 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Puno)
and the Associate Justices of the Court. In her letter, she pleaded for mercy and prayed that she be given one last
chance to redeem herself, and that the harshness of her dismissal be tempered with the grant of some of the benefits
and leave credits she had earned in her almost 25 years of service in the government.

Before the Court could act on the foregoing letter, respondent wrote another letter2 to Chief Justice Puno, which was
received by this Court on 10 September 2007. In this letter, respondent begged that she be given the chance to
redeem herself within the institution, to wit:

Your Honor, if only I will be given the chance to redeem myself within the institution, I will do everything to prove that I
am worth your trust, the position. Please give me the chance Your Honor, at least to stay until I turn 60, for a chance
to rebuild my life. x x x.3

Treating the 17 August 2007 letter as a Motion for Reconsideration, the Court issued its 11 September 2007
Resolution4 with the following dispositive portion:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court Resolves to DENY respondent’s motion for reconsideration with FINALITY. The
Court further Resolves to GRANT respondent Asdala, the money equivalent of all her accrued sick and vacation
leaves. The dispositive portion of our Decision July 26, 2007 is MODIFIED accordingly.

In another Resolution dated 26 November 2007, this Court resolved to note without action respondent’s 10
September 2007 letter, "considering that the respondent’s motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality
in the resolution of September 11, 2007."5

On 16 November 2007, the office of Chief Justice Puno received a Memorandum 6 from then Assistant Court
Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches stating that in the process of securing the necessary clearance for the Court’s 11
September 2007 Resolution, "the Legal Office of the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a list of the several
administrative cases against respondent (Annex "B") that are still pending." Thus, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) requested that Chief Justice Puno allow it to retain a portion of the monetary leave benefit of
respondent "to answer for any liability that may be adjusted against her in the eight (8) administrative charges."

32
In a Resolution dated 4 December 2007, this Court ordered the OCA to make a recommendation as to how much to
retain from the money equivalent of the accrued leave credits of respondent.

On 5 December 2007, respondent wrote another letter7 to the OCA praying that the Resolution granting her the
money equivalent of all her accrued sick and vacation leaves be implemented as soon as possible. She further added
that she was "agreeable to a retention of P80,000.00 (inclusive of pre-imposed fine in RTJ-05-1916 (P40,000); RTJ-
00-1546 (P2,000) from the cash equivalent of my 302.941 leave credits."

In a Resolution dated 11 December 2007,8 this Court granted respondent’s request that P80,000 of the money
equivalent of her accrued leave credits be retained by the OCA.

On 13 October 2011, another letter9 was written by respondent to then Chief Justice Renato Corona. In this letter she
revealed that eight months after she was dismissed from service, her husband died. So now she prays that "at least
the punishment be tempered by granting me the retirement benefits due me for 24 years and 7 months hard work and
dedicated government service." Attached to the foregoing letter was a Motion for Reconsideration 10praying that this
Court reconsider its 26 July 2007 Decision.

Respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration was denied by this Court with finality through a Resolution 11dated
29 November 2011. We ruled therein that she had already "admittedly waived her right to ask for the reconsideration
of her dismissal."

A year after her second Motion for Reconsideration was denied, respondent filed another 10 October 2012 letter 12to
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno. Respondent now requests that she be given half of the retirement benefits
that were forfeited in the 26 July 2007 Decision of this Court. She also prays that the P100 monthly deductions from
her salary for her personal contributions to the GSIS retirement program be returned to her. Supposedly, the GSIS
had stopped collecting from the Supreme Court the personal contributions of special members (including judges)
since January 1998. Yet, respondent’s pay slips revealed that the P100 monthly deductions continued until October
2001.

Respondent cites this Court’s 9 February 2010 Decision in Lledo v. Lledo 13 to support her claim for a refund. In that
case, we ordered the GSIS to return to a dismissed government employee his premiums and voluntary deposits plus
interest of three per centum per annum. Consequently, respondent herein further requests that her personal
contributions to the GSIS from July 1995 to December 1997 be returned to her.

In a Memorandum14 submitted by the OCA on 30 January 2013, it recommended the following:

1. That the request of respondent for the restitution of one-half of her forfeited benefits be denied

2. That the GSIS be ordered to comment on the letter, as the personal monthly contributions of respondent
from July 1995 to December 1997 were directly remitted to it

3. That, with respect to the amounts deducted from the salary of respondent from the period January 1998
to October 2001, these were deposited in a separate account being maintained by the OCA and are
currently the subject matter of a separate request made by respondent in a case now pending with the OCA

It is clear that the 13 October 2011 letter of respondent is in effect her third Motion for Reconsideration. Thus,
it .should be denied outright if not expunged from the records. Due to the novelty of some of the issues she raised
therein, however, this Court deems it proper to explain why this motion should be denied.

As regards her P100 personal monthly contributions to the GSIS from July 1995 to December 1997, considering that
these amounts have already been remitted to the GSIS, respondent erred in demanding from this Comi the refund of
her personal contributions. She should have addressed her letter request/demand to the GSIS, which is the proper
forum to decide whether or not she is entitled to the refund of the personal contributions she made from July 1995 to
December 1997.1âwphi1

With respect to the amounts deducted from respondent from the period January 1998 to October 2001, it appears
from the records of this Court that she has already filed a separate case with the OCA. This specific issue is now best
threshed out in the aforesaid matter.

33
Lastly, it appears to this Court that respondent, in filing multiple Motions for Reconsideration in the guise of personal
letters to whoever sits as the Chief Magistrate of the Court, is trifling with the judicial processes to evade the final
judgment against her.

WHEREFORE, the instant third Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings
shall be entertained.

Respondent Fatima Gonzales-Asdala is WARNED not to file any further pleading. A violation hereof shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

34
 A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 April 8, 2013
SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN PILI, CAMARINES
SUR, Respondent.
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His acceptance of an
appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in the private practice of law, regardless of the beneficiary of the
activity being a member of his immediate family. He is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge otherwise.

Antecedents

The complainants have lodged an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge against Hon. Nilo A.
Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines Sur. 1

In their joint complaint-affidavit dated April 10, 2007,2 the complainants averred that complainant Rey C. Decena had
brought an administrative case in Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission in Legaspi City, Albay
against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer
of the Province of Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge
Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case; and that
the events that then transpired were as recounted in the joint complaint-affidavit, to wit:

3. During the early stage of the hearing when the hearing officer, Atty. Dennis Masinas Nieves, brought up the matter
regarding Dr. Malanyaon’s manifestation or motion (to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction), Judge Malanyaon
coached her daughter in making manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of
paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission
from the officer to speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or glancing on the paper given by Judge
Malanyaon. At one point, Judge Malanyaon even prompted her daughter to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, the
collaborating counsel of our principal counsel, Atty. Mary Ailyne Zamora, be required to produce his PTR number.

4. When our principal counsel, Atty. Zamora, arrived and took over from Atty. Loria, she inquired regarding the
personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyer’s bench beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then
proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel". Atty. Zamora
proceeded to raise the propriety of Judge Malanyaon’s sitting with and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a
member of the judiciary, to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any particular rule that prohibits
him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers’ bench. He insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who
"just passed the bar", defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself. Pertinent portion of
the records of the proceedings are as follows:

xxxx

Atty. Nieves : First, she has to enter her appearance. Okay?

Atty. Zamora : Anyway, … I don’t think, I do not memorize my PTR number, I don’t remember my PTR number, but
aside from that Your Honor, I think this Honorable Hearing Officer could take judicial notice that Atty. Ed Loria is
indeed a lawyer in good standing in IBP. And moreover, Your Honor, I would like to inquire as to the personality of the
gentleman next to the lawyer of the defendant or respondent, Your Honor?

Judge Malanyaon: I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the respondent’s counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am
assisting her. And so what?!!

Atty. Zamora : Ah, you are the counsel of the … (interrupted)

Atty. Nieves : There’s no need to be belligerent… let’s calm down…

35
Atty. Zamora : Your Honor, Your Honor, we all do not know each other, and with due respect to the judge, there is
also a hearing officer here Your Honor, and I think Your Honor the Hearing Officer here deserves due respect. I mean,
the word "So what?!", I don’t think that would be proper Your Honor in this Court.

Judge Malanyaon : I am sorry your Honor, because the … is out of turn, out of turn.

Atty. Nieves : This is not necessary, actually, this is not necessary. So we might as well proceed with our hearing
today. I’ve already made a ruling regarding the, the query regarding PTR. Okay, at this stage it is not proper
considering that Atty. Loria only entered his appearance during the start of the hearing. Okay. So, we have to
proceed now.

Atty. Zamora : I am accepting Your Honor the delegation again of Atty. Loria. I am entering my appearance as the
lead counsel for this case, Your Honor, as counsel for the complainant.

Atty. Nieves : Okay.

Atty. Zamora : And may I be clear that the judge will be the collaborating counsel for the respondent or the counsel of
record of the respondent?

Atty. Nieves : … of the judge is … I’m sorry?

Atty. Zamora : He manifested Your Honor that he is the counsel of the respondent.

Atty. Malanyaon : No, the counsel of the counsel of the respondent.

Atty. Nieves : He has not, he has not entered his appearance in this case.

Atty. Zamora : Would that be proper for him Your Honor, considering that he is a judge Your Honor? Would that, ah,
there will be undue influence, or whatever, Your Honor? We are just trying to avoid any bias or undue influence in this
court, Your Honor.

Atty. Nieves : Okay, it will not, considering the fact that he has not entered his appearance for the respondent.

Judge Malanyaon : If Your Honor, please, the respondent is my wife. Counsel for the respondent is my daughter. She
just passed the bar! I’m assisting her. Is it not my right, my duty to assist my daughter? And to assist my wife defend
herself? I am only sitting with my daughter! I’m not acting for the respondent!

Atty. Zamora : I don’t think Your Honor under the rule, the counsel needs a counsel. Only the one charged or the one
being charged needs a counsel.

Atty. Nieves : Okay, let’s settle this now. Judge Malanyaon has not entered his appearance. It will not in any way …

xxxx

The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of his wife’s administrative case
in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines
Judiciary.

On June 21, 2007, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock required Judge Malanyaon to comment on the
complaint.3

On July 15, 2007, Judge Malanyaon filed his comment, refuting the allegations of the complaint thusly:

1. Complainants are the sister and nephew of my wife, Amelita C. Malanyaon, there is bad blood between them
arising from divergent political loyalties and family differences;

36
2. There is no reason for complainants to take offense at my sitting beside my daughter Ma. Kristina, when she
appeared for my wife in the first hearing of the administrative case Rey C. Decena filed against my wife; the hearing
officer himself could cite no rule disallowing me from sitting beside my daughter, in the counsel’s table, and he did not
ask me to vacate where I sat beside my daughter; the transcript does not support complainants’ claim;

3. It is true I snapped at Atty. Zamora, when she asked about my personality – but she was speaking out of turn as all
I was doing was sitting beside my daughter when she came as the transcript will show, I apologized to the hearing
officer, who graciously let the matter pass;

4. My daughter is a new practitioner; her law partner and lead counsel could not make it on time, and as her
consultant, I did not speak, nor enter my appearance for my wife – to lend a helping hand to a neophyte lawyer,
defending her mother in an administrative case, is not unethical, nor does it constitute the proscribed practice of law;

5. It is petty for my sister-in-law and for my nephew to complain of my presence during the hearing; it is my filial duty
to lend my wife and daughter, moral and legal support in their time of need; indeed, it is strange for complainants to
take offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood
between my wife and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal problems gratis et amore and
they did not complain of my practicing law on their behalf, indeed, one of the crosses a judge must carry is the cross
of base ingratitude.4

On March 27, 2008, then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño recommended to the Court that: (a) the complaint
be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross misconduct; and (c)
Judge Malanyaon be fined P50,000.00.5

On September 16, 2009, the Court required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the records or pleadings filed. 6

The complainants complied on November 13, 2009, stating their willingness to submit the case for resolution after a
formal investigation or hearing was conducted, and after they were given time to file their respective position papers
or memoranda.7

On January 11, 2010, the Court resolved: (a) to re-docket the administrative case as a regular administrative matter;
(b) to await Judge Malanyaon’s compliance with the September 16, 2009 resolution; and (c) to refer the
administrative matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.8

After Judge Malanyaon did not submit any compliance with the September 16, 2009 resolution, the Court ordered him
on February 10, 2010 to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure,
and further directed him to still comply with the resolution.9

On February 15, 2010, Judge Malanyaon’s counsel informed the Court that Judge Malanyaon had meanwhile
suffered a massive stroke on September 2, 2009 that had affected his mental faculties and made him unfit to defend
himself here; and prayed for the suspension of the proceedings until Judge Malanyaon would have been found
competent to comprehend and stand the rigors of the investigation.10

On April 12, 2010, the Court deferred action on the case, and required Judge Malanyaon to submit a medical
certificate.11

Judge Malanyaon submitted a medical certificate dated May 27, 2010, issued by the Philippine General Hospital,
certifying that he had been confined thereaft from September 2, 2009 to October 19, 2009 for the following reason, to
wit:

Cerebro Vascular disease, Hypertension Intra Cerebral Hematoma Left Thalamus with obstructive Hydrocephalus;
DM type II, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary disease; Pneumonia; lleus (resolved); Neurogenic bladder, Benign
Prostatic Hypertrophy; Grave’s disease; Arthritis.

OPERATION PERFORMED:

37
Bilateral tube ventriculostomy12

Judge Malanyaon submitted two more medical certificates, the first dated October 5, 2010, 13 certifying that, among
others, he was undergoing regular check-up, and the other, dated January 24, 2011,14 certifying that his functional
and mental status had been assessed as follows:

The severity and location of the hemorrage in the brain resulted in residual epoliptogenic focus (Post-gliotic seizures)
and significant impairment of cognition, memory judgment behavior (Vascular Dementia). He has problems with
memory recall, analysis of information, events and situations which may make defending himself difficult, if necessary.
Although he is independent on ambulation, he requires assistance even in basic activities of daily living. 15

The Court required the complainants to comment on Judge Malanyaon’s medical certification dated October 5, 2010.

On July 18, 2011, however, Dr. Amelita submitted a manifestation and urgent motion to dismiss, seeking the
dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Malanyaon upon the following grounds, to wit:

xxxx

2. Unfortunately, in a "Medical Certification" dated June 15, 2011 the original of which is attached hereto as Annex "1",
the attending neurologist of my husband has pronounced him permanently mentally impaired. x x x.

xxxx

3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot intelligently appoint his counsel or communicate coherently with
him. He cannot testify in his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses. Indeed, he cannot
properly avail himself of his rights in an adversarial administrative investigation;

4. Given the progressive mental impairment afflicting my husband, he has permanently lost the capacity to defend
himself. Thus, to continue the administrative investigation against my husband who is no longer in any position to
defend himself would constitute a denial of his right to be heard (Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon,
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395 dated 19 February 2002).16

Even so, on September 26, 2011, we required the complainants to comment on the manifestation and motion of Dr.
Amelita.17

Subsequently, Dr. Amelita submitted another motion dated January 23, 2012,18 praying for the dismissal of the case
against Judge Malanyaon.

On February 6, 2012, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez reiterated the recommendation made on March 27,
2008 by then Court Administrator Elepaño by recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter; and (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross misconduct and fined P50,000.00.19

On May 3, 2012, the Court received the complainants’ compliance dated February 1, 2012, 20 as their response to the
show cause order issued in relation to their failure to submit the comment the Court had required on September 26,
2011.21

On September 4, 2012, the Court received from Dr. Amelita an urgent ex parte motion for immediate resolution,
praying that the motion to dismiss dated July 18, 2011 be already resolved. 22

Issues

For consideration and resolution are the following issues, namely: (a) whether or not Judge Malanyaon would be
denied due process if the administrative case was not dismissed; (b) whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon
complained of constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge; and (c) if Judge Malanyaon was guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, what should be the correct sanction.

38
Ruling

We now discuss and resolve the issues accordingly.

1.

Respondent’s right to due process

is not violated by resolution of the case

In her manifestation with urgent motion to dismiss,23 Dr. Amelita stressed that proceeding against Judge Malanyaon
despite his present medical state would violate his right to due process. She stated:

3. As a consequence, my husband has permanently lost the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot intelligently appoint his counsel or communicate coherently with
him. He cannot testify in his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses. Indeed, he cannot
properly avail himself of his rights in an adversarial administrative investigation.24

Opposing, the complainants argued that Dr. Amelita’s concern was unfounded considering that Judge Malanyaon
had not only been given the opportunity to be heard, but had been actually heard on their complaint.

The complainants’ argument is well taken.

On August 3, 2007, or prior to his suffering the massive stroke that impaired his mental faculty, Judge Malanyaon
already submitted his comment containing his explanations and refutations of the charge against him. His comment
asserted that during the hearing of the administrative case of his wife in the Regional Office of the Civil Service
Commission, the hearing officer did not even cite any rule that prohibited him from sitting beside his daughter who
was then acting as the counsel of Dr. Amelita therein, or that inhibited him from assisting his daughter in the defense
of his wife. He pointed out that although he had then lost his temper after the opposing counsel had inquired about
his personality in that hearing, he had ultimately apologized to the hearing officer, who had in turn graciously let the
matter pass.

Under the circumstances, Judge Malanyaon was accorded due process. In administrative cases, the requirement of
due process is satisfied whenever the parties are afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy,25 either through oral arguments or through pleadings. 26 That is what happened herein. Accordingly,
Dr. Amelita’s motion was bereft of basis, and should be denied.

2.

Actuations of Judge Malanyaon

rendered him guilty of

conduct unbecoming of a judge

The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge.

First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the
hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his clear intention to thereby exert his
influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife’s cause.
That impression was definitely adverse against the Judiciary, whose every judicial officer was presumed to be a
subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and
should have acted with greater circumspection and self-restraint, simply because the administrative hearing was
unavoidably one in which he could not but be partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any
form of suspicion of his motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC judge by not
going to the hearing himself.

39
Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his daughter on what to
do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly introduced
himself as the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel" upon his presence being challenged by the adverse counsel,
stating that his daughter was still inexperienced for having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse,
seemingly grounded on a "filial" duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough reason for him to
forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that
hearing, being all too aware that his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of
law.

Section 3527 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging
in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, 28 Canon 4 (Propriety),29 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in
the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public
policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to
ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their
own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives
are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 31

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of
the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his
incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in
court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of
legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal
rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings. 32

To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wife’s
administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer, and
preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, collaborating
counsel of the complainants’ principal counsel, should produce his privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so
voluntarily and knowingly, in light of his unhesitating announcement during the hearing that he was the counsel for
Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his response to the query by the opposing counsel why he
was seated next to Atty. Malanyaon thereat.

Third was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that he had already engaged in the private practice of law even before the
incident now the subject of this case by his statement in his comment that "it is strange for complainants to take
offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood
between my wife and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal problems gratis et amore and
they did not complain of my practicing law on their behalf."33 He thereby manifested his tendencies to disregard the
prohibition against the private practice of law during his incumbency on the Bench.

Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical injunction to conduct himself in a manner that would
give no ground for reproach is always worthy of condemnation. 34 We should abhor any impropriety on the part of
judges, whether committed in or out of their courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. The Court has
fittingly emphasized in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.:35

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge,
in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence. Thus:

Being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both
in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.

40
Fourth was Judge Malanyaon’s display of arrogance during the hearing, as reflected by his reaction to the opposing
counsel’s query on his personality to sit at the counsel table at the hearing, to wit:

I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the respondent’s counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And
so what?!!

Judge Malanyaon’s uttering "And so what?" towards the opposing counsel evinced his instant resentment towards
the adverse parties’ counsel for rightly challenging his right to be sitting on a place reserved for counsel of the parties.
The utterance, for being made in an arrogant tone just after he had introduced himself as a judge, was unbecoming of
the judge that he was, and tainted the good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all times. 36 It is true that
the challenge of the opposing counsel might have slighted him, but that was not enough to cause him to forget that
he was still a judge expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with self-restraint. He thereby ignored the
presence of the hearing officer, appearing to project that he could forsake the decorum that the time and the occasion
rightly called for from him and the others just because he was a judge and the other side was not. He should not
forget that a judge like himself should be the last person to be perceived by others as a petty and sharp-tongued
tyrant.

Judge Malanyaon has insisted that his actuations were excused by his filial obligation to assist his daughter, then
only a neophyte in the Legal Profession. We would easily understand his insistence in the light of our culture to be
always solicitous of the wellbeing of our family members and other close kin, even risking our own safety and lives in
their defense. But the situation of Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial officer who came under the
stricture that uniformly applied to all judges of all levels of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the
private practice of law during his incumbency, regardless of whether the beneficiary was his wife or daughter or other
members of his own family.

3.

What is the proper penalty?

Judge Malanyaon had been previously sanctioned by the Court on the following three occasions, namely: (a) A.M. No.
RTJ-93-1090, with admonition for gross ignorance of the law and unreasonable delay in resolving motions; 37(b) A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1444, with reprimand for failure to resolve motions; 38 and (c) A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, with a fine
of P20,000.00 (coupled with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely) for conduct unbecoming of a judge.39 He had other administrative cases that were dismissed.40 Of the three
administrative cases that merited sanctions, however, only the third should be considered as aggravating herein
because it involved the similar offense of conduct unbecoming of a judge for which he had been given the stern
warning of a more severe penalty upon a repetition.

However, our uniform treatment of administrative sanctions as having the nature of liabilities akin to those in criminal
cases now brings us to offset such aggravating circumstance with the apparent fact that the actuations of Judge
Malanyaon complained of had not been motivated by bad faith, or by any malice towards another. Indeed, he did not
intend to thereby cause any prejudice to another, having so acted from a sincere, albeit misplaced, desire to go to the
help of his wife and daughter.

Accordingly, the Court deems it condign and proper to mitigate the fine of P50,000.00 recommended by the Court
Administrator by imposing on Judge Malanyaon a fine of P40,000.00. With his disability retirement from the Judiciary
having been earlier granted by the Court, the fine shall be deducted from his remaining retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes
him with a fine of P40,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

41
 A.M. No. P-06-2223 June 10, 2013
(Formerly A.M. No. 06-7-226-MTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
LORENZA M. MARTINEZ, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Candelaria, Quezon. Respondent.
DECISION

PER CURIAM: J.:

This administrative case arose from the financial audit conducted by the Court Management Office (CMO), Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), in the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, Quezon (MTC). The audit covered the
accountabilities of Lorenza M. Martinez (Martinez), Clerk of Court, from March 1985 to November 2005.

In September 2004, the salaries of Martinez were withheld. Beginning December 2005, she was excluded from the
payroll because of her failure to submit the monthly reports of collections and deposits as required by SC Circular No.
32-93.

The audit disclosed that Martinez incurred cash shortages in the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) in the amount
of P12,273.33 and in the Fiduciary Fund (FF) in the amount of P882,250.00. The breakdown of Martinez’ cash
accountabilities were as follows:

Judiciary Development Fund

Total Collections P 917,847.69

Less: Total Remittances 905,574,36

Balance of Accountabilities P 12,273.33

Fiduciary Fund

Total Collections P 4,288,212.50

Less: Total Withdrawals 3,020,712.50

Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund as of November 30,

2005 P 1,267,500.00

Less: Bank Balance per LBP SA No. 2611-0011-02

net of unwithdrawn Interest of P816.98, as of
November 30, 2005 385,250.00

Balance of Accountabilities P 882,250.001

The audit team discovered that the shortages were due to the following manipulation of Martinez:

1. There were collections without the date of collection appearing on the face of either the duplicate or triplicate
official receipt and were found undeposited, viz:

OR No. Case No. Amount

11445587 01-214 P75,000.00

11445589 01-218 6,000.00

11445590 01-257 2,000.00

42
 11445592 01-245 2,000.00

11445593 01-306 5,000.00

11445594 01-306 5,000.00

11445595 01-306 5,000.00

11445596 01-305 2,000.00

11445597 01-284 10,000.00

11445598 02-16 6,000.00

11445599 02-17 2,000.00

Total P120,000.00

There were also collections with different dates appearing on the face of the original and triplicate copies of
OR2(Annexes 1.1 to 1.5), as follows:

OR No. Date of Date of Date of Case No. Amount

Original Triplicate Deposit
OR OR

11445553 12-21-00 1-5-01 1-5-01 00-267 P5,000.00

11445554 12-21-00 1-29-01 1-30-01 00-268 5,000.00

9972352 6-7-99 7-1-99 7-1-99 99-107 12,000.00

9972357 9-21-99 10-11-99 10-14-99 99-228 10,000.00

27420 &
9972388 5-10-00 5-20-00 5-25-00 4,000.00
27421

Total P36,000.00

In all cases, the duplicate and triplicate copies of OR will be carbon reproductions in all respects of whatever may
have been written on the original. However, this was not observed by Ms. Martinez, instead she issued official
receipts for collections received with the date of actual receipt posted on the original OR, while the duplicate and
triplicate copies were left undated. She first used the money received as collections and when she regained it, the
same was deposited, and that was the time when she posted a date on the duplicate and triplicate OR which is
different from the date of the original OR. This was to cover her practice of delaying the remittance of collections.
There were also times that the collections were not remitted at all, and the duplicate and triplicate ORs were
remained undated up to date, as what had happened to the above undeposited collections of P120,000.00.

2. Ms. Martinez used a single OR for both JDF and FF collections, the original OR was used for FF and its
corresponding duplicate and triplicate copies were used for JDF (Annexes 2.1 to 2.11), viz:

43
 OR No. JDF FF

Date of Date of
Amount Case No. Amount
Collection Collection

9972099 12-10-98 P10.00 6-6-95 4470 P6,000.00

14392168 10-17-01 10.00 10-18-01 01-234 5,000.00

99-103
11445533 11-9-00 10.00 5-21-99 30,000.00
to 106

9972266 5-7-99 10.00 2-23-99 99-50 30,000.00

9972267 5-7-99 10.00 2-24-99 99-50 30,000.00

9972789 4-18-00 10.00 11-20-99 99-235 40,000.00

9972410 7-9-99 10.00 5-15-99 99-97 15,000.00

9972265 5-7-99 10.00 1-20-98 5561 10,000.00

9972838 5-24-00 10.00 11-12-96 5098 2,000.00

11445534 11-9-00 10.00 10-7-98 5619 10,000.00

14392156 10-12-01 10.00 6-27-01 01-128 10,000.00

15381554 7-10-02 10.00 6-7-02 02-135 12,000.00

15381257 2-4-02 10.00 2-1-02 01-28 30,000.00

Total 130.00 P230,000.00

Verification revealed that the P130.00 collections for JDF were reported and deposited. On the other hand,
the P230,000.00 collections for FF were unreported and undeposited. This practice was a clear violation of the
following provisions of Circular No. 22-94 dated April 8, 1994:

xxxx

3. A total of P90,000.00 were accounted as bonds that were withdrawn twice. Details are as follows:

OR No. Case No. Date of 1st Date of 2nd Amount

Withdrawal Withdrawal

4491458 4320 4-21-95 9-19-02 P12,000.00

4491470 4290 & 4295 4-28-95 7-16-97 6,000.00

5129970 4557 8-10-00 12-15-00 3,000.00

44
 6419483 5089 6-9-00 2-28-02 12,000.00

9972398 00-88 8-16-00 2-8-01 10,000.00

7557979 5090 8-10-00 9-26-02 12,000.00

7557997 99-97 7-9-99 12-7-99 15,000.00

9972356 99-227 5-25-00 3-14-01 10,000.00

9972357 99-228 5-25-00 3-14-01 10,000.00

Total P90,000.00

The above double withdrawals were made possible because only Ms. Martinez signed the withdrawal slips, in
violation of Circular No. 50-95 dated October 11, 1995 which requires both the signatures of the Executive
Judge/Presiding Judge and the Clerk of Court in making withdrawals of FF. Hon. Felix A. Caraos, Presiding Judge,
when informed on this matter, immediately wrote a letter to the manager of LBP, Candelaria Branch (Annex 3),
notifying the same that he will be jointly allowed to withdraw from the FF account of the court with Mr. Apolonio M.
Sugay, designated Officer-in-Charge on December 6, 2005.

4. The bonds posted in Case Nos. 5528 and 5529 entitled "PP. vs. Amelita Ramilo for Violation of BP 22" amounting
to P26,000.00 each were reported as withdrawn on November 1999. However, records revealed that there were no
court orders that were issued to support the withdrawals. Therefore, the withdrawals made were unauthorized. The
signatures of Ms. Ramilo on the herein attached acknowledgement receipt (Annex 4) were clearly forged as these
were totally different to her signatures that were retrieved on the casefolders of the above cases (Annex 5.1 to 5.2).

5. The bond posted in Case No. 00-88 under OR No. 9972398 in the amount of P10,000.00 was withdrawn on
August 16, 2000. However, through a fictitious court order (Annex 6), the same was again withdrawn on February 8,
2001. Said fictitious court order was accomplished by altering the Case No. from 5662 to 00-88. All the entries in the
herein attached court order of Case No. 5662 (Annex 7) were the same with the entries in the fictitious court order
except that of the case number. Also, the signature in the acknowledgment receipt of Ms. Lerma M. Mediavillo
(Annex 8), the accused of Case No. 00-88 and not Ms. Nila Carreon as appearing in the fictitious court order, was
forged because this was entirely unlike her signature that was retrieved on the casefolder of Case No. 00-88 (Annex
9).3

Acting on the report and recommendation4 of the OCA, the Court, in its Resolution,5 dated August 2, 2006, directed
Martinez to (1) explain her failure 1.a] to collect fees accruing to the General Fund and Mediation Fund, 1.b] to
present the JDF official receipts and monthly reports covering the period from March 1985 to December 1995, and
1.3] to deposit her collections on time; (2) explain the discrepancies of the entries in the original and triplicate copies
of the official receipts of the FF collections; (3) explain why she used the original OR for the FF collection and its
corresponding duplicate or triplicate copies for the JDF collections; (4) explain the double withdrawal of the bonds
and their withdrawal without the necessary court orders; and (5) restitute her shortages. The Court also ordered her
suspension pending resolution of the case and issued a hold departure order against her to prevent her from leaving
the country.

In a letter,6 dated September 4, 2006, Martinez averred that the shortage only amounted to P540,273.33 and denied
responsibility for the shortage in the JDF as it was the court’s Clerk II who did the transactions. Martinez asked for a
reconsideration of her suspension citing her 28 years of service as basis and begged for the release of her withheld
salary.

On August 22, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued an order directing the issuance of the hold departure order
against Martinez.7

45
As of January 30, 2012, Martinez had failed to explain and restitute her shortages as required in the Court’s August 2,
2006 Resolution.8 Consequently, the Court issued a resolution 9 requiring her to show cause why she should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.

In a letter,10 dated May 8, 2012, Martinez explained that her failure to restitute the shortages was due to her lack of
means to do so because she had been suspended from the service since August 2004. She manifested that if the
Court would permit her to resign effective May 8, 2012, she would apply her benefits or separation pay to her
shortages and would settle the remaining balance in staggered payments.

The said letter was referred to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a Memorandum,11 the OCA recommended that:

1) Ms. Lorenza M. Martinez, Clerk of Court, MTC, Candelaria, Quezon, be DISMISSED from the service for
gross dishonesty resulting in malversation of judiciary funds, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government office, including
government- owned and controlled corporations;

2) the Office of the Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), be DIRECTED
to COMPUTE the balance of earned leave credits of Ms. Lorenza M. Martinez, and forward the same,
together with her Official Service of Records and Notice of Salary Adjustments (NOSA), to the Financial
Management Office (FMO), OCA, for the processing of her terminal leave pay;

3) the Financial Management Office, OCA, upon receipt of the records and documents from the OAS, OCA,
be DIRECTED to COMPUTE and APPLY the withheld salaries and the monetary value of the earned leave
credits of Ms. Lorenza M. Martinez to the cash shortages incurred in the Fiduciary Fund;

4) Mr. Apolonio M. Sugay, Officer-in-charge, MTC, Candelaria, Quezon be DIRECTED to DEPOSIT the
check representing the total amount of the withheld salaries and monetary value of the earned leave credits
of Ms. Lorenza M. Martinez to the Fiduciary Fund account, as partial payment of the cash shortages
incurred, within five (5) days from receipt of the check from the Checks Disbursement Division, FMO, OCA,
and FURNISH immediately the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office, OCA, with a machine
validated copy of the deposit slip;

5) Hon. Judge Felix A. Caraos, MTC, Candelaria, Quezon, be DIRECTED to STRICTLY MONITOR Mr.
Apolonio M. Sugay, Officer-in-Charge, MTC, Candelaria, Quezon, to ensure strict compliance with the
circulars and issuances of the Court, particularly in the handling of judiciary funds, otherwise, he shall be
held equally liable for the infractions committed by the employee/s under his command/supervision; and

6) the Legal Office, OCA, be DIRECTED to proceed with the filing of the appropriate criminal case against
Ms. Lorenza M. Martinez.

The Court substantially agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Doubtless, Martinez violated OCA Circular No. 26-97, which directs judges and clerks of court to strictly comply with
the provisions of the Auditing and Accounting Manual, particularly Article VI, Sections 61 and 113 thereof, which
require collecting officers to promptly issue official receipts for all money received by them. She likewise violated OCA
Circular No. 50-95 which mandates all clerks of court to deposit, within 24 hours from receipt, all collections from
bailbonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections.

These directives are mandatory and designed to promote full accountability for government funds. 12 Clerks of Court,
as custodians of the court funds and revenues, are obliged to immediately deposit with the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) or with any authorized government depository, their collections on various funds because they are
not authorized to keep funds in their custody.13

In this case, Martinez failed to present a satisfactory explanation regarding her cash shortages, her improper use of
official receipts and the withdrawal of cash bonds. Her contention that it was the cash clerk who was responsible for
the JDF fund is untenable. As Clerk of Court, she was the court’s accountable officer. It was not the cash clerk. It was

46
her duty to supervise and monitor her subordinate to ensure that the proper procedures were followed in the
collection of the court’s funds. Being the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises,
she was liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.14

Time and again, the Court reminds that "those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges
to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. A public servant is expected to
exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity, and should be made accountable to all those whom
he serves. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct
and integrity. The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would
diminish, or even just tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the Judiciary." 15

In one case, Re: Financial Audit on the Books of Account of Ms. Laura D. Delantar, Clerk of Court, MTC, Leyte,
Leyte,16 the Court dismissed the clerk of court for misappropriating the court’s collection, for tampering the official
receipts and cash book, and for failing to record and remit collections and to submit the necessary monthly reports.

Also, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Nacuray,17 the clerk of court falsified the official receipts and
the monthly report of collections and withdrawals. The Court found her guilty of gross dishonesty and grave
misconduct and imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal. In OCA v. Santos, 18 a clerk of court suffered a similar fate
for the same reasons.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Lorenza M. Martinez, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria,
Quezon, GUILTY of Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and Grave Misconduct, the Court hereby orders her
DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all her benefits and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in
the government service.

Martinez is ORDERED to immediately RESTITUTE the shortages in the Judiciary Development Fund in the total
amount of P12,273.33 and in the Fiduciary Fund in the total amount of P882,250.00.

The Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator, is ORDERED to compute the balance of the
earned leave credits of Martinez and to forward it to the Finance Division, Financial Management Office, Office of the
Court Administrator, including the certified true copies of her computerized service records and notices of salary
adjustment.

The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is DIRECTED to compute and process the
monetary value of leave credits and other benefits due to Martinez, including her withheld salaries and allowances,
and apply the same to her accountabilities.1âwphi1

Lorenza M. Martinez is also DIRECTED to deposit, within a non-extendible period of one (1) month from receipt of
notice, any remaining balance of the indicated shortages to the corresponding fund accounts, after the total money
value of her leave credits and withheld salaries and allowances (net of deductions) have been applied to her
accountabilities, and to furnish the Chief, FMD, CMO-OCA, copies of the corresponding machine-validated deposit
slips.1âwphi1

The Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is DIRECTED to immediately file appropriate criminal and civil
proceedings against Martinez upon receipt of the Report from the FMD, CMO-OCA, that she failed to restitute the
portion of their shortages not covered by the money value of their leave credits and the withheld salaries and
allowances (net of deductions).

Mr. Apolonio M. Sugay, Officer-in-Charge, Municipal Trial Court, Candelaria, Quezon, is DIRECTED to deposit to the
respective fund accounts (as instructed by the FMD, CMO-OCA), the checks to be sent to him by the FMO-OCA, to
settle the accountabilities of Martinez and furnish the latter and the Chief, FMD, CMO-OCA, copies of the machine-
validated deposit slips.

Judge Felix A. Caraos, Municipal Trial Court, Candelaria, Quezon, is DIRECTED to closely monitor the financial
transactions of the court, otherwise, he shall be held equally liable for the infractions committed by the employees
under his supervision, and to study and implement procedures that will strengthen the internal control over financial
transactions.

47
 A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406 February 18, 2015
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3638-RTJ]
BENITO B. NATE, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LELU P. CONTRERAS, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes (then Clerk of
Court, RTC-Iriga City), Respondent.
DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This administrative case concerns allegations that respondent Judge Lelu P. Contreras committed three counts of
grave misconduct while she was still holding the position Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court in Iriga City,
Camarines Sur (RTC-Iriga City). According to the complaint, respondent allegedly notarized an administrative
complaint; certified a document (a labor complaint) as a true copy of the original; and appeared as counsel for her
father in a hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Clerks of court are indeed authorized to act as
ex officio notaries public under the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of
Court.1 On the other hand, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees 2 prohibit
public officials and employees from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The 2004 Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel3 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice4 were not yet in force when respondent committed the
purported offenses.

THE CASE

Complainant Atty. Benito B. Nate callsthe attention of this Court to the supposed grave misconduct of respondent
Contreras while she was still clerk of court and ex officio provincial sheriff of RTC–Iriga City. According to him, there
were three instances in which respondent abused her authority.

First, respondent Contreras allegedly notarized an administrative complaint that was prepared by her own father and
filed with this Court sometime in June 2003.5 Complainant Nate stresses that respondent could not have legally
notarized a document. He points out that Section 3, Rule 4 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice disqualifies notaries
from performing a notarial act if they are related to the principal within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity. Furthermore, he argues that respondent acted beyond her authority when she notarized in Iriga City a
document that was signed in the Municipality of Buhi, which was outside that city. We note that complainant was the
subject of the administrative complaint filed by respondent’s father. Next, complainant Nate claims that respondent
certified a document as a true copy of the original, and that her sister-in-law later on used the certified document in a
labor case then pending with the National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City.6 He points out that respondent,
as an ex officio notary public, was empowered to authenticate only those documents that were in her custody. Since
the document – an amended labor complaint – was not a document pending before the RTC–Iriga City, respondent
allegedly went beyond her authority when she authenticated it.

Finally, purportedly without this Court’s prior written authority, respondent Contreras appeared as her father’s counsel
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. 7 Complainant Nate alleges that respondent herself admitted
during the proceedings before the IBP that she had not yet obtained a written authority.

Respondent Contreras admits to all of these allegations. However, she maintains that her actions were allowed under
the Manual for Clerks of Court. As regards the first act, she stresses that as ex officio notary public, she was
authorized to administer oaths and notarize documents so long as no private document was involved. She then
argues that the administrative complaint against a lawyer, which was eventually filed with this Court, was not
considered a private document. In fact, it was her ministerial duty as clerk of court to sign the jurat portion of the
complaint regardless of her relationship with the principal. Furthermore, she explains that the municipality of Buhi was
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC–Iriga City.

With respect to the second act, she explains that the Manual for Clerks of Court allowed her to authenticate copies of
documents, especially since the RTC in Iriga City did not have human resource management officers. Furthermore,
she stresses that the power of clerks of court to authenticate documents as true copies of the original is not limited to
copies of documents that are in their custody. Rather, she argues that a clerk of court may certify the authenticity of
the copies so long as they are shown to be faithful reproductions of the original after a presentation and comparison
of the documents.

48
Regarding the last act, respondent Contreras points out that the intended first hearing before the IBP was suspended,
precisely because she informed the hearing officer that she had not yet received authority to appear as counsel for
her father. She clarifies that the proceedings pushed through only when she was able to present her written
authority8 from this Court.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agrees with complainant as regards the first and the second acts. The
OCA reiterates that as clerk of court and ex officio notary, respondent Contreras may notarize documents or
administer oaths only when these are related to the exercise of her official functions. It then explains that there was
no connection between her official functions and the administrative complaint of her father or the labor complaint of
her sister-in-law. On the other hand, with regard to the third act, the OCA is of the view that respondent did not
commit any irregularity, since she was authorized by this Court to represent her father in the administrative case he
had filed.

THE ISSUES

Whether Contreras is administratively liable for the following acts:

1. Affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint prepared by her father

2. Authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor complaint

3. Appearing as counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father

THE RULING

Clerks of court are authorized to act as ex officio notaries public under Sections 41 9 and 4210 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 in relation to Section D(1),11 Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.

Historically, justices of the peace courts, judges of municipal courts, and clerks of courts – as public officers and by
virtue of their respective offices – were authorized to perform any act within the competency of regular notaries
public.12 This meant that they had the power –

to administer all oaths and affirmations provided for by law, in all matters incident to his notarial office, and in the
execution of affidavits, depositions, and other documents requiring an oath, and to receive the proof or
acknowledgment of all writings relating to commerce or navigation x x x, and such other writings as are commonly
proved or acknowledged before notaries; to act as a magistrate, in the writing of affidavits or depositions, and to
make declarations and certify the truth thereof under his seal of office, concerning all matters done by him by virtue of
his office.13 (Emphases supplied)

One of the main reasons why these public officers were allowed to perform any notarial act was that there were still
rural areas in the country that did not have regular notaries public. 14 While some areas had notaries, not all of them
kept regular office hours.15 Thus, residents of these communities had to travel to the provincial capital or to larger
towns where they could find lawyers who also practiced as notaries. 16 Consequently, in the interest of public service
and in order for the people to have a more convenient and less expensive option, these public officers were
appointed ex officio notaries public with the authority to perform any act within the competency of regular notaries
public.17 As such, their services and the notarial fees they charged were for the account of the government. 18

As more lawyers and regular notaries public populated far-flung areas, the need for ex officio notaries public
diminished as did their power. Thus, ever since this clarification was made by the Court in the 1980 case Borre v.
Moya,19 the power of ex officio notaries public have been limited to notarial acts connected to the exercise of their
official functions and duties.20 This means that since the promulgation of that ruling, they have no longer had the
authority to notarize documents that do not bear any relation to the performance of their official functions, such as
contracts and other acts of conveyance,21 affidavits,22 certificates of candidacy,23 special powers of
attorney,24pleadings,25 sworn applications for business permits,26 or other similar instruments. To repeat, the
notarization of documents that have no relation to the performance of their official functions is now considered to be
beyond the scope of their authority as notaries public ex officio. 27 Any one of them who does so would be committing
an unauthorized notarial act,28 which amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice of law29 and abuse of
authority.30

49
Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to perform acts within the competency of regular
notaries public – such as acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessing, copy certifications,
and other acts authorized under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice 31 – is now more of an exception rather than a
general rule. They may perform notarial acts on such documents that bear no relation to their official functions and
duties only if (1) a certification is included in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any other lawyer or
notary public in the municipality or circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged will be for the account of the government
and turned over to the municipal treasurer.32

To delve deeper into the question of what constitutes an action "connected to the exercise of their official functions
and duties" as ex officio notaries public, clerks of court in particular may refer to the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks
of Court. Under the manual,33 they have general administrative supervision over court personnel. As officers of the
court, they serve as custodians of court funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises. Thus, they generally
act as its treasurer, accountant, guard, and physical plant manager. In other words, they take charge of the
administrative aspects of the court’s business and chronicle its will and directions, aside from performing their more
obvious function of attending court sessions. Further, they keep the records and the seal, issue processes, enter
judgments and orders, and give – upon request – certified copies of the court’s records.

According to the manual, below are the general functions and duties of a Clerk of Court VI in a multiple-sala court:

D. GENERAL FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF CLERKS OF COURT AND OTHER COURT PERSONNEL

1. CLERKS OF COURT

1.1. Office of the Clerk of Court of a Multiple Sala Court

1.1.1. Clerk of Court

1.1.1.1. is the administrative officer of the Court under the supervision of the Executive
Judge;

1.1.1.2. has control and supervision over his personnel, all properties and supplies in his
office;

1.1.1.3. acts on applications for leave of absence and signs daily time records of his staff,
as well as the security and janitorial service personnel;

1.1.1.4. determines docket fees;

1.1.1.5. assists in the raffle of cases to the branches and judicial notices/summons to
accredited publishers;

1.1.1.6. issues clearances in appropriate cases;

1.1.1.7. acts as ex-officio notary public;

1.1.1.8. acts as ex-officio sheriff;

1.1.1.9. represents the Court in administrative dealings with the local government units
and other agencies; and

1.1.1.10. performs and discharges such duties as may be assigned by the Executive
Judge.

Proceeding now to the first act complained about, we agree with the OCA findings that respondent’s act of affixing
her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct relation to her
work as the then clerk of court of RTC–IrigaCity. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the proceedings involving

50
the disbarment and discipline of attorneys shall be conducted before the IBP. 34 This means that clerks of court are
not among the touch points in the regular procedure pertaining to complaints against an attorney. Neither may a
pleading in a case involving lawyers be filed with the RTC.

Respondent defends her actions by arguing that she was guided by the test of whether or not the instrument she
notarized was considered a private document. While we agree with her that ex officio notaries public are not
authorized to perform a notarial act in relation to private documents, the applicable test is not based merely on the
nature of the transaction as private, but also on the relationship between the document and the official functions and
duties of the ex officio notary public.35 For clerks of court, a failsafe guideline for determining the coverage of their
authority as ex officio notaries public is to refer to the functions and duties of their position as outlined in the 2002
Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.

We apply the same legal reasoning to the second act of respondent being complained about; that is, her certification
of a copy of her sister-in-law’s labor complaint.1âwphi1 Respondent herself admits that the document was filed
before the National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City, not the RTC–Iriga City. Thus, in the regular course of
her duties, she would not have come across, encountered, or been in custody of the document. While we agree with
her that clerks of court are allowed to perform the notarial act of copy certification, this act must still be connected to
the exercise of their official functions and duties – meaning to say, it must be done in connection with public
documents and records that are, by virtue of their position, in their custody.

With regard to the third act, we reiterate that the primary employment of court personnel must be their full-time
position in the judiciary,36 which is the chief concern requiring their dutiful attention. Nevertheless, we recognize that
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees does allow for limited exceptions.
Section 7(b)37 thereof in relation to Rule X, Section 1(c)38 of its implementing rules, provides that public officials and
employees are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution, law, or regulation; and under the condition that their practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their
official functions.

Thus, pursuant to the Court’s administrative supervision over all court personnel,39 we have on a number of
occasions, but on a case-by-case basis,[[40 granted41]] requests of court personnel to appear as counsel on behalf
of their immediate family members. This grant is premised on the strict condition that their representation will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. Furthermore, they must not use official time in preparing for the
case and must file a leave of absence every time they are required to attend to the case.

Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she was granted authority by this Court to "represent her father in
Administrative Case No. 6089 provided that she files the corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of
hearing of the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for the case." 42 We thus agree with the OCA
recommendation that she did not commit any irregularity when she represented her father before the IBP.

The Court has, in the past, sanctioned judges43 and clerks of court44 for notarizing – as ex officio notaries public –
documents that were later found to be unconnected with the exercise of their official functions and duties. In Astorga
v. Salas,45 the Court fined a clerk of court in the amount of P5,000 for notarizing several documents and
administering oaths involving matters unrelated to her official duties. In Cruz v. Centron, 46 we imposed a fine on the
clerk of court who notarized one document – a deed of sale – but the fine was in the lower amount of P2,000, since
the act was her first offense. All of them were given a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense
would be dealt with by the Court more severely. Considering, however, that the documents notarized by respondent
Contreras do not involve a private or commercial undertaking, and that this is the first time that she has been charged,
we agree with the recommendation of the OCA that the penalty of reprimand, instead of a fine, is more appropriate
under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Lelu P. Contreras is found LIABLE for the unauthorized notarization of documents
unrelated to her office duties while she was serving as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court in Iriga City. She
is hereby REPRIMANDED, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

51
 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 June 10, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ]
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAÑA,
DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.
DECISION

PER CURIAM :

Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case emphasizes the need
for members of the judiciary and those within its employ to exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in
pending cases.

Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge Marino
Rubia.

The first case is an intestate proceeding. 1 Complainant filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate
estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This was opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.2

The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias.3 Evelyn Tanael, the guardian
appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report that included not only the properties of Romelias
Almeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of complainant’s late husband. 4

The third case is a civil action5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties filed by Romelias
Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among others.6

In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and part of the estate of
complainant’s husband was involved.7

Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of
administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the
daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna.8

Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr., 9 met with respondent Pecaña on
February 20, 2010.10 During this meeting, complainant informed respondent Pecaña of the delay in the publication of
the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaña to check the
status of the publication of the notice.11 Respondent Pecaña asked for complainant’s number so that she could inform
her as soon as any development takes place in the case. 12 Enrique13 and Perlito14 executed affidavits to corroborate
these allegations.

Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan, Laguna. 15 Complainant went there
with Enrique.16 Respondent Pecaña then informed complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent
Judge Rubia had already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael. 17

Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because these concerned the
properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.18 She was only concerned with the administration of the
properties of her late husband, to which respondent Pecaña replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."19

Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaña sent her a text message on March 2, 2010 20 asking complainant to call
her. Complainant called respondent Pecaña who informed her that respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to
her.21 Complainant agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent
Pecaña would be present as well.22

52
On March 3, 201023 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecaña at 6750 Ayala Avenuein Makati
City. They proceeded to Café Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said that respondent
Judge Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel. 24

Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner meeting, respondents allegedly
asked complainant inappropriate questions. Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still
connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. 25 Complainant was then informed that respondent
Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias.26 This disclosure
surprised complainant,as she was under the impression that opposing counsel and respondent JudgeRubia had no
business discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending cases. 27

Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed involvement with another man and
other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-Barias.28 She was asked about the hospital where she brought her
husband at the time of his cardiac arrest.29

These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course of the trial.30Thus,
she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside
of the court proceedings.31 The impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a
position in favor of Atty. Zarate.32

To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to Atty. Zarate, counsel for the
oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant was appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] ‘Why will I
talk to him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un.’"33

After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that respondent Judge
Rubia had made insinuations that she was awaiting the company of another man. 34

From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the courtroom until August 8,
2010.

In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that showed manifest partiality
in favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their
counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate.35

On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion for consolidation filed by the
oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of the hearing on such motion being set on June 18,
2010.36 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia did not even consider the comment/opposition to the
motion for consolidation filed by her counsel, which stated that since two of these cases were special proceedings,
they could not be consolidated with an ordinary civil action. Respondent Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the
totality of the different issues involved in the three distinct cases under one court proceeding. 37 As such, complainant
alleged that the main issues of the special proceedings were consolidated with matters that were properly the subject
of a separate civil action.38 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue Orders 39 that would
have allowed her to comply with her duties as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate. 40 This included
the order to conduct an inventory of the properties, rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the authority of the
administrator.

In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her request for subpoena duces tecum
and ad testificandum that she had prayed for to compel Evelyn Tanael to produce the documents showing the
accrued rentals of the parcel of land belonging toher late husband. 41 As such, complainant raised that respondent
Judge Rubia’s refusal emboldened Evelyn Tanael and oppositor Romelias Almeda-Barias to interfere in the
management of the estate of complainant’s late husband. 42 Because of this refusal, she asserted that respondent
Judge Rubia failed to adhere to the duty of the court to ensure a proper inventory of the estate. 43

Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of respondent Judge Rubia. She
alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael
and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their noncompliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were postponed,
Tanael and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default.44 She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that
the burden to prove ownership of the property was on complainant, when in fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and
Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof to show that the land was fraudulently transferred to her late husband.45

53
Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner meeting she had with respondents. 46 It was
Enrique who allegedly told complainant’s lawyers about it when he went to the lawyer’s office to pay some
bills.47 Complainant said that her lawyer immediately admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge
Rubia. Complainant then texted respondent Pecaña on August 8, 2010 on her lawyer’s reaction concerning the
March 3, 2010 meeting. The following exchanges took place via text message:

COMPLAINANT:

Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My brother went to hm today to pay som bills.
Sa kakadaldal na mention s lawyr my meeting wid u n judge rubia. My lawyr ws mad dat m nt suppose to do dat
w/out hs knowledge. I cnt understand anymore wat he ws sayng kanina kse nga galit. He wil file yata somtng abt dat
n I dnt knwwat? Pls. Help me. (August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]:

Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010, 3:48 p.m.)

COMPLAINANT

M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something. I hav to talk to hm n person para mas
claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad bcoz f our meetng nga, dats wat struck hm. Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M
going to col kuya tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to buy foncard pa. (August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa dn. (August 8, 2010, 4:28 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka sminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case. (August 8,
2010, 4:29 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30
p.m.)48(Emphasis supplied)

On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubia’s inhibition. This was denied on October 6,
2010. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an order 49 dated November 15, 2010.50

On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit 51 before the Office of the Court Administrator charging
respondent Pecaña for gross misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct. 52

The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for comment. 53

In her comment,54 respondent Pecaña did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010 through the
introduction of Enrique Sison.55 However, she claimed that the alleged meeting between complainant and respondent
Judge Rubia was merely a chance encounter.

Respondent Pecaña alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March 2010," 56 when she was on her way to
Makati City to meet her sisters for coffee, complainant invited her for dinner. Respondent Pecaña hesitantly agreed
after complainant had insisted.57 Complainant picked her up at Starbucks 6750 in Makati City, and they proceeded to
Café Juanita in Burgos Circle for dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle, respondent Pecaña saw respondent Judge
Rubia’s car parked near Café Juanita.58

54
At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecaña said that she saw respondent Judge Rubia together with some
companions walking toward his car.59 She stepped out of the restaurant and greeted him. Complainant allegedly
followed respondent Pecaña and so the latter was constrained to introduce complainant as an employee of Philippine
Airlines to respondent Judge Rubia.60 After the introduction, respondent Judge Rubia went to his car and left.
Complainant and respondent Pecaña returned to the restaurant to finish their food and pay the bill. 61

Complainant drove respondent Pecaña back to Makati City. During the drive, complainant allegedly asked her help
regarding the cases filed in court and inquired as to what she could give to respondent Judge Rubia because her
lawyers instructed her to bribe him. Respondent Pecaña only said that respondent Judge Rubia does not accept
money and that he is financially stable.62

After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to respondent Pecaña concerning her case
filed in court.63 Respondent Pecaña admitted to the exchanges through text messages she had with complainant on
August 8, 2010 regarding the filing of administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia. 64

Respondent Pecaña denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate. 65 She maintained the position that she should not be
held administratively liable for what she construed to be primarily judicial matters, such as the bases for respondent
Judge Rubia’s decisions and orders in court.66

Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment67 on January 17, 2011.

Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and his co-respondent Pecaña together with
complainant was a mere chance encounter.68 He denied any pre-arranged dinner meeting, stating that after the brief
encounter with complainant, he had to rush home to attend to his ailing wife. 69 He stated that he was only introduced
to complainant because she was an employee of Philippine Airlines where he was a former executive. 70 Respondent
Judge Rubia argued that if the alleged meeting with complainant did take place, it should have been mentioned in the
first motion for inhibition.71 Further, he emphasized that it took complainant eight (8) months since the alleged dinner
meeting to file a motion for inhibition and an administrative case. 72

Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping for a favorable outcome of the cases
filed, initiated contact with respondent Pecaña. The filing of the administrative case against him was only to compel
him to inhibit from the cases to seek a friendlier forum. 73

Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged between complainant and
respondent Pecaña as well as any active advocacy in favor of opposing counsel, Atty. Zarate.74

As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases filed, respondent Judge Rubia argued
that the best forum to ventilate complainant’s allegations was not through an administrative proceeding but through
judicial recourse.75

Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended the referral of the administrative complaint to a Court of Appeals Justice for investigation,
report, and recommendation.76

On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative complaint to a Justice of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. 77 The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.

On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for Intervention 78 allegedly due to the implication of his name
in the administrative complaint.79

Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because the orders
issued by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the complaint were assailed in a petition for certiorari. 80

Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and he was not closely associated with
them.81 He asserted that the records were replete with incidents where he and respondent Judge Rubia engaged in
heated discussions on legal matters.82 He maintained that he did not foster any closeness or personal affinity with
respondent Judge Rubia that would substantiate complainant’s allegations. 83

55
In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents’ narration of the events on the alleged dinner
meeting.84 He argued that if the dinner meeting did take place, this incident should have been the ground for the
motion for inhibition filed.85

Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened, there was nothing "wrong, improper or
illegal"86 about it. It could have been reasonably interpreted as an extrajudicial means initiated by respondent Judge
Rubia to assuage the parties in the contentious litigation.87

The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan. 88

On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared before Justice Gaerlan. It was agreed that
respondents would file their respective supplemental comments and complainant her reply to the comment.
Complainant manifested that she would present three (3) witnesses: herself and her two brothers. Respondent
Pecaña would testify for herself and present Semenidad Pecaña, her aunt, as witness. Respondent Judge Rubia
manifested that he would testify on his behalf and present respondent Pecaña as witness. 89

Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña filed their respective supplemental comments dated December 15, 2011 90and
December 16, 2011,91 respectively. Complainant filed her consolidated reply on January 17, 2012. 92

A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where complainant testified on the
dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.

During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone calls showing that she called
respondent Pecaña on March 2 and 3, 2010.93 Counsel for respondent Pecaña stipulated that these calls were made
to her.94

The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24, 2012.

In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaña testified to the allegations in her comment and judicial affidavit.
She alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting with complainant happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.

On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter, was presented
as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a
meeting on March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Judge Rubia attended the
meeting as shown in the attendance sheet identified by Rodel.

Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge Rubia walked together toward the
parking area. When they were nearing Burgos Circle where their cars were parked, Rodel allegedly saw complainant
and respondent Pecaña approaching them.95 He then saw respondent Pecaña introduce complainant to respondent
Judge Rubia.96 After the introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia go to his car and drive away. 97

Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and judicial affidavit filed. 98 He alleged that
the encounter with complainant at Burgos Circle was on March 10, not March 3, 2010. 99

Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012,100 the parties filed their respective memoranda.

Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012. 101 In his report, Justice Gaerlan
recommended that no penalty be imposed against respondents. 102 He was "convinced that the meeting at Burgos
Circle was just a chance encounter"103 and found that complainant failed to prove her claim with substantial evidence
that would justify the imposition of a penalty on respondents.104

Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the uncorroborated testimony of complainant. 105

Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months before she filed the administrative
complaint.106 He stated that the deliberate concealment of the meeting was inconsistent with her resolve to prove
respondent Judge Rubia’s alleged partiality toward the counsel of the opposing party. 107

56
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that the administrative case was not
the proper recourse for complainant.108 The proper action for her was to pursue remedial action through the courts "to
rectify the purported error"109 in the court proceedings.

The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.

The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable.

This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge
Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable for their actions. The findings of fact of an investigating
justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar with the weight given to a trial court judge’s since an
investigating justice personally assessed the witnesses’ credibility. 110 However, this rule admits of exceptions.

In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr., 111 this court held:

Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower
court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the
result of the case. Among the circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-
examine the trial court or appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the interference made is manifestly mistaken;
when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate
court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. 112(Citations
omitted)

These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainant’s testimony and relying on the
testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubia’s witness, Justice Gaerlan said:

While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the incident on all material points,
complainant miserably failed on this regard. The Investigating Justice who had the untrammeled opportunity to
observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondent’s witness, Rodel Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds
his forthright narration of facts credible and rang with truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez
that the incident that transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent any ulterior
motive for him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner meeting between Judge Rubia
and Barias did not [take] place. A testimony is credible if it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been
delivered in a spontaneous, natural, and straightforward manner.

Not only that. Cortez’[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of evidence, such as the Program of
Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest which tend to prove that at that particular
date and time Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting and was not dining with Rubia and Pecaña. These evidence,
when taken together, debase the uncorroborated version of incident as narrated by Barias. Barias[’] self-serving
declarations have no evidentiary value when ranged against the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative
matters.113 (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlan’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their
testimonies.

Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat of the Rotary Club of
Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a "disinterested" witness.

A disinterested witness’ testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in the outcome of the
case.1âwphi1 This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness’ testimony more believable. To actively take part in
litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous and exacting nature of most judicial
proceedings. The disinterested witness’ candor and submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility
and believability to the content of his or her testimony.

To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances that surround his or her testimony.

The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, employed Rodel in 1989. 114 He was appointed
Secretariat in 1994 where respondent Judge Rubia was a former President and remains an active member.115

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The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the reputation of the organization that
the witness has been serving for more than 20 years. It would be a definite blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club
of Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President were to be found guilty of the offenses that complainant imputed
upon respondent Judge Rubia. The possibility of Rodel testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his
loyalty to the latter and the Rotary Club puts into question the characterization that he is disinterested. The substance
of Rodel’s narration of events should also be scrutinized.

Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent Pecaña, and respondent Judge Rubia took
place on March 3, 2010, as indicated in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The record shows that the
Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of Exhibit A, which was complainant’s judicial affidavit establishing the
date of the dinner as March 3, 2010 in Café Juanita. 116 Complainant also alleged in her complaint that respondent
Judge Rubia came from Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting. 117

The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance meeting of respondent
Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaña took place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos
Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa
Restaurant, on their way to the parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do
not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant, since the meeting of the Rotary Club
and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place on different dates. Assuming that the alleged chance
meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents,
this does not discount the veracity of complainant’s allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter
dinner and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could
have allowed respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary Club
of Makati.

The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet 118 and the program of meeting that Rodel submitted
corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the attendance sheet and on the program of meeting was March
10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time of arrival or departure of the attendees.
Neither was there an indication of the time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the program
of meeting, by themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of Rodel’s testimony, do not discount the distinct and
tangible possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the other hand, we find the
allegation that the dinner meeting took place on March 3, 2010 more credible.

Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January to March 2010. 119 She identified
her cellular phone number120 as well as respondent Pecaña’s.121 Respondent Pecaña admitted that the number
identified by complainant was her number.122 On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaña’s
number.123 Respondent Pecaña admitted that she had received a call from complainant before the latter picked her
up at 6750 Makati City.124 However, no calls to respondent Pecaña were recorded on March 10, 2010 in the
document presented.125 On the other hand, the calls made to respondent Pecaña as shown in the document
coincided with complainant’s allegations.

Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested that he would testify for himself
and present respondent Pecaña as witness. 126 He did not manifest that he would be presenting Rodel or any
participant in the Rotary Club meeting as his witness.

The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge Rubia and Rodel’s narration of
events.

The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan.
The report failed to mention that complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia arrived late precisely because he
came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to
respondents’ claims. They only put into question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence.

This court has held:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondent’s malfeasance is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting versions of complainant and

58
respondent, the Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her witnesses who
testified clearly and consistently before the Investigating Judge. 127 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her allegations, we find her
account of the event to be genuine and believable.

Complainant’s narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading up to the
dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by complainant that took place with
respondents during the meeting was replete with details.

The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainant’s allegations was the exchange of text messages
between complainant and respondent Pecaña regarding the dinner meeting. These text messages were admitted by
respondent Pecaña.128 However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This
fact was not included in his investigation report. 129

The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaña belied respondents’ claim that the alleged dinner meeting in
Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Bkt xa galit kngmkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case. (August 8,
2010, 4:29 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]

Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30
p.m.)130(Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Pecaña used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to "have a meeting." "Mkpg kta" can in no
way mean a chance encounter.

Further, respondent Pecaña’s text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of an innocent chance encounter.
She said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry after complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file
an administrative case against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset because of
the possibility of administrative liability if an innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting.
However, if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant, this would have logically led to a hostile reaction from
respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.

In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecaña gave the following testimony:

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that you received a text coming from
Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her because of that meeting, isn’t it?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia in March 2010, isn’t it?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

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Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from you and this is: ["]ha anong ipafile
baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["] And another message says "bakit siya...another...did you do something to pacify
her lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]? EILEEN PECAÑA:

Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining the context of these messages?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Alin po doon?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"

EILEEN PECAÑA:

The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an administrative case is filed against
us[,] we will be investigated like this, and our benefits and promotion chances we will be disqualified.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an administrative case because you
simply thought that it was a chance meeting?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Ano po sir?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

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You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a chance meeting?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I have to explain?

....

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?

EILEEN PECAÑA:

No more, sir.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad becauseit was only a chance
meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131

Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because respondent Pecaña, while having dinner
with complainant, stepped out of the restaurant to greet respondent Judge Rubia on the side street of Burgos Circle.
Since complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaña out of the restaurant, the latter introduced complainant to
respondent Judge Rubia.

This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following admissions:

1. Respondent Pecaña described her relationship with Judge Rubia as "[w]ala naman po masyado. My
dealing with the Judge is only in relation with my work because during flag ceremonies he always reminds
us not to act as go between or not to be involved in the cases filed in the court." 132

2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecaña as the latter is in the Office
of the Clerk of Court.

3. Respondent Pecaña was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a pending case before
respondent Judge Rubia.

4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings with litigants.

There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to greet respondent Judge Rubia. In fact,
after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees should not have any dealings with litigants,
respondent Pecaña should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.

The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaña would meet respondent Judge Rubia by pure coincidence are
highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons may take place, but a chance meeting between a
litigant in the company of a court employee who acceded to assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding that
case is outside the realm of common experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The
sheer improbability of such an occurrence already puts into question the truth of respondents’ allegations.

Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be afforded greater
evidentiary weight.

Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense

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The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the alleged dinner meeting
and the filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of
no consequence.

Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its veracity or credibility.
There are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative case against judges and court
personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative
complaint has been filed is high.

Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late husband’s estate.
He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.

Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require additional time
and resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant
might have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal
that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint.

Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are
always cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court personnel.

In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are not subject to
a fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v. Judge Santos,133 this court held that:

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring
lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape
the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench
and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.134 (Emphasis supplied)

If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more than twenty years prior to the
filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot prejudice the complainant.

The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense was officially reported
cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of complainant’s allegations. This court’s mandate to discipline
members of the judiciary and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are disciplined
based on whether their actions violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. 135 Court personnel are also governed by
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel136 and are appointed in accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided
for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for administrative discipline mandates a
period within which a complaint must be filed after the commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines
with finality the liability of erring members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an administrative offense
cannot be diminished by a delay in the filing of a complaint.

To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore the distinct and tangible
possibility that the offense was actually committed. The commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of
revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to
the offense, which does not apply in administrative charges.

Respondent Pecaña’s actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel

"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the strict
standards of integrity and morality."137

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The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel for the opposing
parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent Judge Rubia. Because of respondents’ actions,
complainant and all who will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary and its
processes. For this alone, respondents should be held administratively liable.

For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could cause suspicion toward
her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.

As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to interact with litigants in a way that could
compromise the confidence that the general public places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaña should have refused
to meet with complainant in her home. She should have refused any other form of extended communication with
complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication
between complainant and respondent Pecaña makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of
propriety mandated of court personnel.

Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the former’s knowledge of the
pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the text messages exchanged between
them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper
authority of complainant’s attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña failed to do so. Instead, she
continued to communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an
administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.

Respondent Pecaña violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:

CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY

....

SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not allow
kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official acts or duties.

....

SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious
manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.

Respondent Pecaña’s actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court personnel uphold integrity
and prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano: 138

Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration
of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be
guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in
the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity,
honesty and uprightness.139

Respondent Pecaña should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.

Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his office. He was already
made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña’s actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the
time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the
Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. 140 As a judge, he had the authority to

63
ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the
esteem of their office.

Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all court employees not to
intercede in any case pending before any court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge. 141 However, nothing in the
record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent Pecaña’s interactions with
a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting
her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.

For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable. Furthermore, the evidence on
record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala,
took place. Respondent Judge Rubia’s mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative
liability.

In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance
of impropriety in all activities.

To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s activities, it has often been
held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a
deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official
functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always
under constant observation.143 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live
up to the standards of his office. By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña
for her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Canon 1 INDEPENDECE

Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall
therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and
in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure,
threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.

Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a
dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence
in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

Canon 2 INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view
of a reasonable observer.

Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

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In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,144 this court explained the necessity of a judge’s integrity:

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of
morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also
through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s personal
behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be
beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:

While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to
abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith
of the people in the administration of justice.145

In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr.,146 this court held:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There
is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both
in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.147 (Citations omitted)

In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:

. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is not only
required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.

. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5,
Cebu City, that:

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial."
Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate
decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions,
but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties.

They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people’s sense of justice. Thus,
their official conduct should be beyond reproach.148 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty. Zarate stated that even if respondent
Judge Rubia was present at the dinner meeting, it was merely an attempt to reconcile the parties and reach an
extrajudicial solution.149

This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting nature of judicial propriety. Instead of
being outraged by respondent Judge Rubia’s meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge
Rubia’s actions.

65
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have been done in open
court with the record reflecting such an initiative.

As to complainant’s questioning of respondent Judge Rubia’s actions in the issuance of the orders in her pending
cases and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial
remedies. This, however, does not negate the administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to
assure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge."150Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
Impartiality:

CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to
the process by which the decision is made.

Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.

Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will
be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any comment
that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue.

Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio151 where this court held:

Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice. Membership in the
judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and imposes upon him a number of inhibitions, whose faithful
observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching
public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
people's faith in the judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the standards of
conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we
require them to abide strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous standards. Whether or not he purposely went to
the Manila Hotel on November 25, 1998 to meet complainant or only had a chance meeting with him, his act of trying
to convince complainant to agree to his proposal is an act of impropriety. It is improper and highly unethical for a
judge to suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in
collusion with one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges
are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of
reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a just decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and its integrity. Respondent's conduct in the instant case inevitably invites
doubts about respondent's probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach. In the judiciary, moral integrity is
more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of impartiality or the mere appearance of bias
would cause resentment if the party who refused the judge's proposal subsequently lost his case. It would give rise to
suspicion that the judgment was "fixed" beforehand. Such circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and
brings to it public contempt, disrepute, and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that respondent violated Rule
2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His misconduct is not excused but rather made more glaring by the fact that the
controversy involving complainant was pending in his own sala. 152 (Citations omitted)

The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of integrity and impartiality
essential to a judge.

66
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:

CANON 4. PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice
regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism
or partiality.

On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen 153 that: Indeed, the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be
models of propriety at all times.

....

A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of
a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system. 154

Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge Rubia violated the
notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was
a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.

Respondent Judge Rubia’s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings inside and outside the
courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety
fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.

Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary and its personnel.
Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its integrity. In effect, both respondents are guilty of gross
misconduct. This court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." 155 In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of
Appeals,156 this court held that "[m]isconduct has been defined as ‘wrong or improper conduct’ and ‘gross’ has been
held to mean ‘flagrant; shameful’. . . . This Court once held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and
not a mere error of judgment."157

Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is also guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either. As a litigant, she is enjoined
to act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the
subject of these proceedings. To ensure that these actions will no longer be committed by any party, respondents
must be sanctioned accordingly, in keeping with the court’s mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity in
society. WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket the case as a regular administrative matter. Respondent
Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including
government owned or -controlled corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross
misconduct. This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia is further ordered to cease and desist
from discharging the functions of his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personal
records of respondents.

67
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON
SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.

- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced
during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by
an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's
power of administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary. 1

Factual Antecedents

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus
foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance
Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest
actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other
individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-
Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly
transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal
detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story
about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly
tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one
receiving and distributing the money.

Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29,
2013, part of which reads:

32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities visit our
offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other special occasions. 33. These
personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon,
Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary
Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director
Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto),
Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could take four
to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at
matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

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 35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She
was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay together. She said "kahit
maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."

xxxx

38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman
ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay
madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang
pera."3(Emphasis supplied.)

The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles
Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the
main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had
interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably
taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also
supposedly admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context;
nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising
Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of
the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 4

On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " 5 wherein she gave details
regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events,
thus:

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit
mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o
special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking
pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga
bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:

xxxx

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre,
Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.

x x x x6

In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her
statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.

Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte."
May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

69
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent
meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate,
particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet
cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the
year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the
circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada
during the party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:

(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event hosted by Mrs.
Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our court, or while she already had a pending case with our
court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses.
(Emphasis supplied.)

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as
claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo
L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were
decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the
decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being
required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the
Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."

On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major
Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the
intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:

SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?

xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung
TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxxx

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

70
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's
power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to
notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with
Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam). 9

Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his comment and
directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court
received respondent's Comment.10 Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and
explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether respondent is
indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs.
Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs.
Napoles actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of
the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the
Office of the Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula
and others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do all
that she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if
Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in
order to convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."

As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and
having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada
where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the
miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs.
Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain
access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was
undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape the Black
Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or
exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to
receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank
her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit when
she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.

Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at
the time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his
knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his
Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with
the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-
14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26,
2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days
from notice hereof.

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The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of
Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3,
2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there
is no more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on the supervisory
history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the following findings
and conclusions:

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification
of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged were
several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her
mother Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and
her (Napoles') three employees.

These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the questionable purchase
of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of P3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or
companies owned by Napoles.

The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment although there was
yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were
made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.

Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued by the
Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.

Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public
Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.

Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.

The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even if she owns the
bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the
crimes charged x x x."

xxxx

THE INVESTIGATION

xxxx

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing the Medical
Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as
Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her
office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business
activities.

In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then
pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.

72
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur
declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:

Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision
ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po
yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi
ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers
kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being
asked from you?

xxxx

A Yes po.

Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain
connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking about, if you remember?

Witness Luy

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?

A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam
kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo
na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.

Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and respondent
were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be
in her favor:

Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni
madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory
Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin
ni Ms. Napoles.

Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the
Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:

"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot
Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."

73
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan case
wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such
amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only P3.8 million. She explained that she gave
various amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the
decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount.
Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.

Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon
dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before
us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by that "inayos"?

A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista
ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng
kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na
nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

xxx

Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?

A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-
keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya
ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.

xxx

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q To you?

A Yes, madam.

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung
decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.

xxx

Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.

Witness Luy

Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po
sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang P3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100
million na ang nagastos mo?"

Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?

A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May P5 million sa
ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.

74
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?

A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong, but she never
mentioned the amount.

Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles' office at the
Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to
Benhur and her other employees.

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money being placed at the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13%
interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO
check of P25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's P25.5
million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks,
each amounting to P282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of P3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon
Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11)
checks, thus:

Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?

Witness Luy

A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet
Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms.
Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa
kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho
raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q
Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?

A Opo.

Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako
kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi
yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po
nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...

Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na inissue ...

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI,
sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang
muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa
nan1in madam, P25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas P282,000.00 or P283,000.00
or P281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa P282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So
eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa
nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si
madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po
sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang P25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time
nag-issue siya ng checke na P282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or
August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.

75
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the interest was
paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice
Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa
Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered Chinese food for
him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention respondent's
name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued P282,000.00 (the
amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer,
Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties included the
formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase
of cars, and others.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime in 2012.

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on September 26,
2013, quoted as follows:

The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)

Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May
kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxx

Ms. Sula

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

The Chairman

Gregory Ong?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Sa Sandiganbayan?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

76
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the Sandiganbayan in the
event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and
the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Witness Sula

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Okay, again?

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi
niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa
Sandiganbayan.

Q Yung PDAF?

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-
uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa
lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron
naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Is that in your affidavit?

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na
meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam
namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.

Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will
help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa
kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the
Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay
huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

xxxx

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph [of respondent
beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to protect his source.

When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

77
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the division that handled
the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to
practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be
going to a party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not
be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.

Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about the photo." The
next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must
have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the
woman in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such
picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public
figures.

xxxx

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never
met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was
decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other
members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are
independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to
tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from
Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the
Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so, thus:

At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him and introduced
herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent
replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence against her, she
would have been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building churches
and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying
until she mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.

Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since he was a little boy.
Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if
one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate
cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with
Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo
Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That
was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That was his first visit.

Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally after
two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about
30 minutes and had coffee.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of eleven (11)
checks in the amount of P282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of P25.5 million which she
deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In
fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that
Napoles could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained that

78
he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter
or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is P3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.

6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told
her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the
Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact
in the Sandiganbayan.

With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1. That there was
irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;

2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed
all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about
legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body
and that he never interceded on her behalf.

EVALUATION

xxxx

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that Napoles fixed or
"inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula
corroborated Benhur's testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and everything they say
are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent
and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under
investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable
that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against respondent.

Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and categorical
manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.

In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two
whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and
trustworthy witnesses.

The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case considering that Napoles'
mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.

Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she would avail of every
possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his Division are independent-
minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.

xxxx

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is no need to
stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the
consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million

79
incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years;
and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:

Justice Ong

Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and Sula, these were
only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told
to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..

xxxx

Justice Gutierrez

That is your prerogative.

Justice Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I
should be hung or I should not be hung.

xxxx

Atty. Geronilla

I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.

However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They did not present
Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is
likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding
their role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.

x x xx

Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the
Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

xxxx

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led the undersigned to
conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his
story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent P3,
102,000.00 as advanced interest.

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for him to wear the
Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent
could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest
of P3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?

80
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function. It is not
misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of
the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports
Benhur's assertion that he received money from Napoles.

Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges must
ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.

Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.

xxxx

...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office considering that the
visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.

Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety
of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities .

. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for him to wear the
robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply
calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an
extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily
confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as the visible
personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also
outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a
number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.

xxxx

On the photograph showing respondent

with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

xxxx

This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from
judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.

In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach by reason of
impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present before the
Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived her appearance. Respondent's
explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for
arraignment.

Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged administratively. In
"Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez
and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of
PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal
cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the Division,

81
respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

xxxx

...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the
questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question
and that there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The
Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents; (2) that she was
in charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to P3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets
were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of
Napoles.

Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the acquittal of
Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.

xxxx

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable Court, that
respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

xxxx

The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-
supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the
respondent, as follows:

1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;

3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles
in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total
of P3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal
account; and

5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles. 11

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the
Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said
case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had
actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social
event hosted by her.

82
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." 12 We agree with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of
direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 13

The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila")
during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to
her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case.
She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case
involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident
that she will be acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she
was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically
testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason
for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan,"
which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her association with respondent was confirmed when she
was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued
by Napoles in 2012.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal knowledge of the
matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's
testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence,
it could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles
never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations
Napoles even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer
agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present received.14 Ajudge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a
serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it
has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly
and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.15

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of
evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a
grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. 16 Concededly, the evidence in this
case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not
witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case.
Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his
association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of
such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of
anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent
exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision
which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust
generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking
place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged.
Thus, even in the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations
of what they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.

The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close relationship to
Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork
Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the
Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against

83
the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying
as "candid, straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their previous
testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.

It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by
reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.17 The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and
criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's
assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply
telling lies about his association with Napoles.

Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in
the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was
understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to
respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made
statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The
following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome
of the Kevlar case:

Atty. Benipayo

Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her involvement in the
Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula

A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay
Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa
Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-
clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga
empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati
yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa
kaso.

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the case and Janet
Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?

A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng
probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation period.

xxxx

Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa
kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother and sister-in-law
were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles
helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into
the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and
violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.

84
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes
this appearance.20 Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.21

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation
of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but
even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have
been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to
distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.

xxxx

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an
exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)

On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with persons
who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr. 23 where this Court did
not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:

Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both RTC judges
stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to
Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.

In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or parties with official
court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are
witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been
to his house on several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila.
He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.

We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was insufficient, viz.:

"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also
present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives
lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff
could see that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo.
A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes
requests which are not in any manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics provides:

'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in
social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at
the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such

85
action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.'"

The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a colleague or
lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and
which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges,
in pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in
resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal
level while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony
expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time,
the Kevlar case had already been terminated.

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and
impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants
and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not
expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be
desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in
worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives
of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously
careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could
influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave
in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity
and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge.
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for
acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's
association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially
involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less
than a Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of
indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious repercussions, as
shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you to just go to the
Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?

Justice Ong

You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of the Mahal na Poon.
Nobody can do that, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request. Why did you not do
that?

Justice Ong

86
I don't know, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee of the Black
Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the
Black Nazarene?

Justice Ong

Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation. Had I known that,
siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.

Justice Gutierrez

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very, very careful
about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her who was an
accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings
that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of the
Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the
Church of Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the
public with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.

Justice Ong

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that
I should not have associated, you know, with a former respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted
that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even
before you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time?
That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?

Justice Ong

Your honor, talking about ....

Justice Gutierrez

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Justice Ong

A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office
remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her
suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of
respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly,
respondent denied having issued a BDO check for P25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent)
did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as
previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon orders of
Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.

87
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00 supposed advance interest for respondent's
check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar
case.1âwphi1 Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO million just to
"fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office the
second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly
merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with
Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles
extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case?
Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-
offs taking place in the courts.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the
commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice
where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he
had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not
disclose his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the
"contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This
is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x." 27).

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was
filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray."28 Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary. 29

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized
as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or -
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Considering that respondent is not a first
time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his
unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of
GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

88
 A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 September 24, 2014
[formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ]

CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, represented by ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue City,
Cebu, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the administrative complaint1 filed by Conrado Abe Lopez (complainant) charging Judge Rogelio S.
Lucmayon (respondent), Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue City, Cebu, with Dishonesty, Corruption
and Malpractice relative to a land dispute involving their families.

The Antecedent Facts

In a verified complaint-affidavit dated December 12, 2011, the complainant, through his counsel Atty. Romualdo M.
Jubay, alleged that when he was eight years old, he inherited from his adoptive father Restituto Lopez one-half (1/2)
of Lot No. 1718 with an area of 355 square meters located in Balamban, Cebu, evidenced by a document entitled
"Katapusan Panugon" (Testamente). He claimed that while the document mentioned Lot No. 1718, he ended up
receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696 with a total land area of 49,817 square meters, that became the object of an
extrajudicial settlement involving him, his adoptive mother Honorata Lopez, and the relatives of the respondent in
December 1978. Half of Lot No. 1696 was cultivated by his adoptive mother until the latter’s death in 1982. He took
over the cultivation of the land after he retired as a seafarer in 1988.

The complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and the respondent met in a waiting shed located in front
of the house of the latter’s grandmother in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu. At that meeting, the respondent allegedly
deceived him into signinga Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of Lot No. 1696 to the prospective
buyer, Aboitiz Group of Company. Unknown to the complainant, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-
called "Waiver of Rights" that the respondent had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of Lot No.
1696. After signing the document (notarizedby a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata (Atty. Mata) without the complainant’s
presence), the respondent allegedly told the complainant that he no longer had any right over the property. In March
2005, the father of the respondent, Pedro Lucmayon (Pedro), ordered him to cease cultivating the land because of
the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.

The complainant also asserted that the respondent had caused Pedro and his siblings to execute a document entitled
"Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Moises Legaspino and Victoria Lopez" to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant and his adoptive mother. He alleged that in the extrajudicial settlement, his name and
the name of his adoptive mother were excluded. They claimed that as legal heirs of the late Restituto Lopez
(Restituto) who, in turn, had inherited the property from his late mother Victoria Lopez (the co-owner of the property),
their exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement was anact of dishonesty to which the respondent should be held
administratively liable.

In his comment2 dated March 8, 2012, the respondent vehemently denied that he convinced the complainant to sell
his shares in the property; he claimed that it was the complainant who was interested in selling his shares after he got
tired of cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived the complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights. He
contended that the filing of the administrative case against him was intended to embarrass and harass him.

The respondent further stated that the signing of the Waiver of Rights was done after he discovered that the
complainant was not legally adopted. He added that since there had been no legal adoption, the complainant could
not be considered as a legal heir and was not entitled to any portion of the land. He stated, too, that his participation
in the sale transaction was limited to informing his parents and relatives that the complainant is not a legal heir of
Resitituto.

The Report and Recommendation of the OCA

89
In its evaluation report3 dated October 23, 2012,the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) noted that the allegations
in the administrative complaint are basically the same allegations the complainant raised in the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents he filed against the respondent, which complaint the Office ofthe City Prosecutor of
Cebu City dismissed. The City Prosecutor found that the complainant’s allegations lacked merit and evidentiary proof.
It also found that the complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving the respondents’ administrative liability
and recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation reads:

"RECOMMENDATION: It is therefore respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that the
administrative complaint against Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon, Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City,
Cebu, be DISMISSED for lack of merit."

On December 5, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution4 adopting and approving the OCA’s findings of fact, conclusions
of law and recommendation, and dismissed the complaint against the respondent.

The complainant sought reconsideration5 contending that the OCA’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. He
pointed out the OCA failed to appreciate and consider the other circumstances that clearly showed the respondent’s
dishonesty, corruption and malpractice. He reiterated that the respondent made him sign three (3) SPAs and
deceived him into signing the Waiver of Rights at the bottom portion of the third SPA, which SPA was allegedly
notarized by Atty. Mata withouthis presence. He also stated that the respondent’s allegation that he was not a legally
adopted son of Restituto is baseless; since as shown in Restituto’s Testamente, he had been adopted and
considered as Restituto’s true child.

The Court referred back the complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

In its Memorandum6 dated July 23, 2013, addressed to Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the OCA recommended
that the administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that the respondent be held
administratively liable for acts of impropriety. The OCA held that while the respondent’s act of asking the complainant
to sign the SPAs may not constitute dishonesty, corruption or misconduct, his other actions (specifically requiring the
complainant to sign the SPAs and allowing Atty. Matato notarize the Waiver of Rights without each other’s presence)
as well as his appointment as the complainant’s attorney-in-fact, violate Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct7 and amount to impropriety.

Asked to comment, the respondent insisted that the complainant still failed to adduce substantial evidence
establishing his administrative liability. He pointed out that contrary to the complainant’s contention, Atty. Mata never
admitted that he notarized the Waiver of Rights outside the complainant’s presence. He also alleged that the mere
fact that the complainant appointed him asattorney-in-fact does not ipso factotaint his actions with impropriety.

The Court’s Ruling

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondent’s comment, and the findings of the OCA, we find that the
respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Codeof Judicial Conduct ("Code") and Impropriety.

Respondent Violated Rule 5. 06 of the Code

As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary.
The intent of the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the
risk of conflict with his judicial duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his
official functions. When a member of the bench serves as administrator of the properties of private individuals, he
runsthe risk of losing his neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with those of
the litigant who comes before his court.8

The only exception to this rule as set forth in Rule 5.06 is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a
member of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will
not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. The Code defines "immediate family" as being limited
to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity.9

90
In this case, since complainant clearly does not fall under respondent’s "immediate family" as herein defined, the
latter’s appointment as the former’s attorney-in-fact isnot a valid exception to the rule.

Furthermore, by serving as attorney-in-fact, the respondent not only allowed himself to be distracted from the
performance of his judicial duties; he also undertook to perform all acts necessary to protect the complainant’s
interest. In effect, the respondent acted as the complainant’s fiduciary, in direct and patent violation of the prohibition
against judges.

As held in Ramos v. Barot:10

Being and serving as an attorney-in-fact is within the purview of "other fiduciary" as used in Rule 5.06. As a noun,
"fiduciary" means "a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to that of a trustee, in respect
to the trust and confidenceinvolved in it and the scrupulous good faith and candor which it requires." A fiduciary
primarily acts for another's benefit, pursuant to his undertaking as such fiduciary, in matters connected withsaid
undertaking x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)

As a judge who is expected to observe the ethical rules that govern judicial conduct both in public and private affairs,
the respondent should have been more circumspect in accepting the appointment as an attorney-infact of the
complainant. He should be reminded that the Code of Judicial Conduct – which, among others, prohibits members of
the bench from engaging in extra-judicial activities that tends to create a conflict with their judicial duties– must be
strictly complied with.11 We conclude that for violation of the rules, the respondent should be sanctioned.

Respondent is Guilty of Impropriety

On the charge of impropriety, wehave repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to keep their conduct beyond
reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, both in the
discharge of their official duties and in their everyday lives.12

Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01: A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

By the very nature of their work, judges should observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. For no position
exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. 13

In Vedana v. Valencia,14 this Court pointedly stated that:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties,but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There
is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote publicconfidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service.1âwphi1 The personal behavior of a
judge, both inthe performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. (Emphasis Supplied).

In the present administrative complaint, we agree with the OCA that the respondent’s acts of: (1) making the
complainant sign at least two (2) documents – consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights – without the presence of a
counsel; and (2) allowing the notarization of the documents outside the presence of the executor, amount to
impropriety. While no evidence directly shows that the respondent had deceived the complainant into signing these
documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the documents the respondent himself prepared greatly prejudiced
the complainant. We also note that the Waiver of Rights benefitted the respondent and his family. As a judge who is

91
more learned in the law than the complainant, the respondent, at the very least should have taken the appropriate
steps (e.g. advise the former to engage the services of a lawyer who could lend him unbiased legal advice regarding
the legal effects of the waiver) to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in his dealings. This step, the
respondent failed to take. In these lights, the Court finds the respondent guilty of impropriety.

The Applicable Penalty

Under Section 11(B), in relation toSection 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,15 violation of
Supreme Court rules constitutes a less serious charge punishable by any of the following sanctions:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

On the other hand, Impropriety which constitutes as a light charge is punishable by:

1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or;

2. Censure;

3. Reprimand;

4. Admonition with warning.

Considering the nature and extent of the respondent's transgressions, we find it proper to impose on him the following
penalties: (1) a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code; and (2) a fine of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for impropriety. WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City, Cebu is found GUILTY of (1) violating Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct; and (2) impropriety. We hereby impose the total fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) for
these offenses, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

92
 A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 January 12, 2015
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO,
JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S.
SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S.
PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B. ISON Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose Occidental
Mindoro, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and serious violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct &
Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, against Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Complainants Antonio Ascafio, Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo, Julieta D. Toledo,
Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S. Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G. Santos, Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo,
Igmedio L. Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and Marivel B. Ison (collectively, complainants) were
allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market ofOccidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the
Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor)
allegedly wanted to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect the new "San
Jose Commercial Complex."2 Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent
Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against
the Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to
respondent’s sala.

Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings for the determination of the
propriety of extending the TRO or issuing the WPI against the Municipality were scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012.
Mayor Villarosa waived his right to present his evidence and submitted the case for resolution. 3

While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case, were all allowed inside the
courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing,4 only 12 out of the more than 500 members accompanying complainants
on that day were allowed to enter.5 Worse, upon the motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of
the courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled to giveher testimony that day.6

Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by respondent to their witnesses "were all geared towards
establishing" that they should have no right to oppose the Mayor’s plan, as "this will be good for all and the progress
and development of the municipality."7

After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court Order stating that "the Court is not inclined to extend for
seventeen (17) days the said TRO."8

At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited through
the door used by the judge and the employees of the court. 9 According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to
anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when respondent
suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important appointment.10

Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO.11

Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent "argued, berated, accused,
scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis or justification." 12 They further claimed that respondent
judge asked complainants "confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to
the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary."13

Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter. 14 They

93
also alleged that all cases in the RTC before respondent involving Mayor Villarosa or his relatives, political allies,
supporters, and close friends were decided in favor of the Mayor or his relatives and supporters. 15 Thus,
complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of
Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several cases in which he issued an order/ruling against
Mayor Villarosaand the latter’s supposed supporters. 16

In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this Court referred the Complaint to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals, Manila (CA) "for raffle among the Justices thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation." The case
was raffled to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24 February 2014. This Court received his Report and
Recommendation (Report)18 on 9 June 2014.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice Corales.

Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough.19 Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and
partiality.20 The circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his judicial functions, as required by Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO.

This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact that
he did not allow the "more than 500 members" who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the
courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this
huge group could have been accommodated inside. 21 With respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while
Julieta Toledo was giving her testimony, this is sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 22

We now go to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated, scolded, confused and admonished their witnesses
without basis or justification. According to the investigating justice, respondent failed to submit the transcript of notes
for the 3 July 2012 hearing without plausible reason. 23 As regards what transpired in the 2 July 2012 hearing, the
investigating justice found that apart from raising his voice when addressing Toledo and making "abrasive and
unnecessary statements to her,"24 respondent also made the following"insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy
statements"25 in open court:

1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to go to the market, because he might be mistreated by
petitioners.26

2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke na nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman nila alam ang kanilang
ginagawa."27

3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying: "[B]asta na lang kayo pirma pirma na gawa naman ng
abogado niyo."28

4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about that ‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto sa inyo,’ is that not a
violation to your lease contract that you are allowing somebody to occupy your portion so that they can also
engage in business? Is this not an additional earning on your part and you are violating your lease contract?
Is that not depriving the coffer of the Municipal Government?" 29 The investigating justice found that the
foregoing statements "definitely imperiled the respect and deference" 30 rightly due to respondent’s position.

We agree.

As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’
witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,32 which reads:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.

94
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction
or control.

A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court,33 viz:

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and
restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken,
with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech
increases his persuasiveness.34

This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which read:

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it isperceived to be so inview of a
reasonable observer.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.1âwphi1 The above
provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance
of impropriety.35 This is because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions. A
judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above suspicion. 36

In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave while the trial
was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the
abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does
not deny this in his Comment.37 It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining
why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.38 Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their
conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in
their personal behavior and everyday life.39

The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge.1âwphi1 He gave
petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent
must have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the
Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that.
Thus, respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal p rofession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.

95
We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr., 40 this Court has already found Respondent Judge Jacinto liable
for his failure to supervise his personnel closely and for issuing orders relayed over the phone. Judge Jacinto was
found guilty of violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by failing to compel his Clerk of Court to issue official
receipts for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing case, respondent judge was fined in the sum of P11,000
and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Under Section 10 in
relation to Section 11(C), paragraph 1 of Rule 140 41 of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is
classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000, but not
exceeding P10,000; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) admonition with warning. 42

Considering that this is respondent judge's second infraction already, the Court finds that the penalties of a fine in the
amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition with warning, as recommended by the investigating justice, are proper under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of unbecoming conduct and is hereby
FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000) and REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

96
 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360 November 19, 2014
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3010-RTJ)
DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17, Respondent.
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case stems from an Amended Administrative Complaint 1 dated October 6, 2008 filed by
Dorothy Fe MahArevalo (complainant), Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch
17 (RTC), before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against Judge Celso L. Mantua (respondent) of the
same court, accusing him of Disgraceful/Immoral Conduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
Violation of Republic Act No. 3019,2 Gross Violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct, Abuse of Authority, and Gross
Ignorance of the Law.

The Facts

In the said complaint, it was alleged that respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his chamber, as his
residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as observed by all of his staff, especially by a former Utility Worker
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuñez (Nuñez); (c) used the court process server,
Benjamin Pepito (Pepito), as his personal driver; (d) delegated his work load tohis legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape
(Atty. Mape), because he could no longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e) committed gross ignorance of
the law when, in one criminal case that he handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to
testify in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel, and furthermore, extorted money from the
accused in the amount of P200,000.00; (f) asked for gasoline, personal allowance, and other benefits from the local
government; and (g) failed to decide cases within the prescribed 90-day period because he was waiting for litigants to
offer him monetary consideration.3

In response to the OCA’s 1st Indorsement4 dated February 13, 2009 directing him to comment on the complaint,
respondent submitted an undated comment5 denying all accusations against him. In particular, respondent
maintained that he: (a) could not be residing at the Hall of Justice as he was already renting a vacant house near the
same during his tenure as judge of the RTC; (b) had no mistress, explaining that the woman that often goes inside his
office was his caterer who brought him food; (c) merely requested to hitchhike with Pepito from Palompon to Ormoc
City and viceversa on Mondays and Fridays since the latter synchronized his process serving to litigants and lawyers
of Ormoc City on such days; (d) personally prepared his decisions as Atty. Mape only assisted him with legal
research; (e) indeed allowed trial to proceed without the accused being assisted by counsel in that criminal case
pointed out by the complainant, but only because the accused violated the three (3)-day rule of filing postponements
and failed to inform the adverse party of such intention, and that he never extorted money from the accused; and (f)
never asked for gasoline allowance, but nevertheless affirmed that he, like all other local officials, received
allowances from the local government. Further, respondent averred that as of January 9, 2009, he had already been
separated from service due to compulsory retirement.6

The OCA and CA Proceedings

Pursuant to the OCA’s Memorandum7 dated September 8, 2009, the administrative case was referred to an
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 8

In an undated Report9 received by the OCA on July 6, 2010, the Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.0110 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and accordingly, recommended that he be fined in
the amount of 25,000.00. Giving credence to complainant’s consistent and spontaneous answers as well as her
demeanor in the witness stand during her testimony, the Investigating Justice concluded that respondent indeed
made his chamber in the Hall of Justice as his residence, 11 a prohibited act under SC Administrative Circular No. 3-
9212 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.13 Similarly, the Investigating Justice also believed Nuñez’s testimony that respondent
indeed brought his mistress and slept with her inside his chamber, finding no reason for Nuñez to fabricate a story.14

The Investigating Justice, however, exonerated respondent from the other charges for failure of the complainant to
substantiate the same.15

97
In view of the foregoing, the Investigating Justice noted that respondent’s acts would have warranted the latter’s
suspension and even dismissal from service, if not for his compulsory retirement on January 9, 2009. In lieu thereof,
respondent was instead meted a fine in the aforesaid amount.16

Pursuant to such report, the OCA issued a Memorandum 17 dated August 5, 2013 finding respondent guilty of
Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92,and accordingly increased the recommended fine to
40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the retirement benefits due him. Similar tothe Investigating Justice,
the OCA found respondent to have violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC when heused
his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residence.18 The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of Immorality for
bringing his mistress to his chambers and using the same as their "love nest." 19

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and
violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 inrelation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings of the Investigating Justice and the OCA.

SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for functions related to
the administration of justice and for no other purpose: SC ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-92, AUGUST 31,
1992

TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes directly
related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all
as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.

Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nelly Kelly Austria v. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving
unauthorized and improper use of the court’s premises for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which
the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper
conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the service and imposed on him the
penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the court’s premises inevitably degrades the
honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage.

FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

Similar thereto, Section 3, PartI of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for similar restrictions regarding the use of the
Halls of Justice, to wit:

PART I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

xxxx

Sec. 3. USE OF [Halls of Justice] HOJ.

98
Sec. 3.1. The HOJ shall be for the exclusive use of Judges, Prosecutors, Public Attorneys, Probation and
ParoleOfficers and, in the proper cases, the Registries of Deeds, including their support personnel.

Sec. 3.2. The HOJ shall be used only for court and office purposes and shall not be used for residential, i.e., dwelling
or sleeping, or commercial purposes.

Sec. 3.3. Cooking, except for boiling water for coffee or similar beverage, shall not be allowed in the
HOJ.20(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used his chambers in the Hall of
Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA,
respondent’s defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his
residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and physically residing in
another.

Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality.1âwphi1 Immorality
has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.’"21 It is a serious charge which may be punishable by any of the following: (a) dismissal from
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; (b) suspension from office withoutsalary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.22

In the case at bar, it was adequatelyproven that respondent engaged in an extramarital affair with his mistress. The
respective testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full
view of his colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to fiestas and other public places,
without any regard to consequences that may arise as a result thereof.Worse, respondent even had the audacity to
use his chambers as a haven for their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every memberof the judiciary is expected to observe.23 There is no doubt
that engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of the members and
employees of the judiciary but is alsoa desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court abhors
and is, thus, punishable.24

Finally, the Court agrees with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA that since
respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended from office on account of his compulsory retirement on January
9, 2009, he should be fined instead.25 In this light, the Court deems that given the circumstances herein discussed, it
is proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of finein the amount of P40,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Celso L. Mantua of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 is
found GUILTY of Immorality and violation of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
Accordingly, he is hereby meted the penalty of a FINE in the amount of P40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted
from the retirement benefits due him.

SO ORDERED.

99
 A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359 October 23, 2013
(Formerly O.C.A. IPI No. 12-3851-RTJ)
ATTY. JEROME NORMAN L. TACORDA for: ODELL. GEDRAGA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO B. CLEMENS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

The instant case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit dated 21 February 2012 filed by Atty. Jerome Norman Labor
Tacorda (Atty. Tacorda) charging Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens (Judge Clemens), Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court of Calbayog City, Branch 31, Western Samar for gross ignorance of the law and alleged violation of the Child
Witness Examination Rule.

In the Complaint-Affidavit, Atty. Tacorda claimed that on 9 January 2012, he presented Odel Gedraga (Gedraga) as
witness, then fifteen (15) years old, in Criminal Case No. 6433 entitled People of the Philippines v. Belleza pending
before the sala of respondent Judge Clemens. The criminal case involved the alleged murder of Beinvinido Gedraga,
Gedraga s father. Atty. Tacorda alleged that the Child Witness Examination Rule was not properly followed by Judge
Clemens, based on the following events that had transpired during the trial on 19 January 2012:

First, the trial in open court when Gedraga was presented lasted from 8:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., with only a two-minute
break.

Second, Atty. Tacorda alleged that in the course of the proceedings Judge Clemens made certain rulings that were
not implemented. In his Complaint-Affidavit, Atty. Tacorda cited a single example: Judge Clemen’s alleged failure to
castigate defense counsel Atty. Allan Mijares (Atty. Mijares) for standing beside the witness despite Judge Clemen’s
earlier order to Atty. Mijares and the court stenographer to keep their distance. Due to this incident, Gedraga felt
humiliated and exhausted.

Third, although the Calendar of Scheduled Cases showed several other cases to be heard, Judge Clemens
continued the hearing for three (3) hours, during which Gedraga was subjected to the long ordeal and rigors of trial.
Judge Clemens knew that the witness was a minor.

Fourth, Atty. Tacorda claimed that despite his manifestation to let the official interpreter personally interpret the
questions and answers, Judge Clemens remained passive on so many occasions. Thus, it was Atty. Mijares who also
did the interpretations.

Atty. Tacorda attached to the Complaint the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 February 2012 executed by Gedraga.
The latter echoed therein the allegations of Atty. Tacorda. The witness narrated that he was exhausted after sitting on
the witness stand from 8:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. with only a two-minute break.

In his Comment, Judge Clemens belied the allegations of Atty. Tacorda as having no basis. Respondent judge
claimed that he did not know that allowing Gedraga to testify from 8:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. with only a two-minute
break was a violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. He countered that it was Atty. Tacorda who demanded
that the trial start at 8:30 a.m. Further, he said that Atty. Tacorda conducted a long direct examination. Further still,
Judge Clemens explained that the cross-examination of the witness by the defense lawyers, Atty. Mijares and Atty.
Vevelyn Monsanto (Atty. Monsanto), were in accordance with existing procedures. He added that, with respect to the
two-minute break, it was even Atty. Monsanto, and not Atty. Tacorda, who requested it. The supposed two-minute
break actually lasted 10 minutes.1

Judge Clemens vehemently denied letting Atty. Mijares and the court interpreter surround Gedraga. Respondent
judge cited the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN)2 in this wise:

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

Your Honor please, may I ask the Court that the Interpreter as well as the defense counsel will not surround the
witness. The public is entitled to see the demeanor of the witness and in accordance with the Court procedure

100
specially that this is a child witness. The defense counsel will maintain a distance because there might be an
intimidation, your Honor.

Court:

All right, do not surround the witness.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

Thank you, your Honor, for the wisdom of the court.

Atty. Allan Mijares:

Your Honor, I would like to make my manifestation that from the view point of the public, the----(Interrupted)

I am making my manifestation, your honor. The child was not being surrounded, in fact, everyone was supposedly
facing the public and he was not intimidated, he was being aided.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

There is already a ruling, your Honor.

Atty. Allan Mijares:

And the intention is to aid and not to intimidate.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

Your Honor, that is the intention, but my concern is the ruling of the court.

Court:

Anyway, do not cover the witness.

Atty. Alan Mijares:

Anyway, we submit your honor.

Based on the foregoing, Judge Clemens claimed that he did not violate the Child Witness Examination Rule because,
the demand of Atty. Tacorda was granted. If this accusation were true, the latter could have asked the Court to hold
Atty. Mijares in contempt of court for violating the order not to surround the witness, but complainant did not.

Judge Clemens further explained that it was not true that he let Atty. Mijares do the interpretation. Allegedly, when
Atty. Tacorda made a manifestation to that effect, respondent Judge immediately took appropriate action, as
indicated by the TSN:3

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

Your Honor, we request to read back the transcript your Honor, and not seek the statement from the defense counsel,
since he already closed his question your Honor.

Court:

Never mind, anyway you continue.

101
Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

May I move for the record, your honor, but my purpose is in consonance with the Supreme Court Circular that in case
there is a question as to the presentation--- (Interrupted)

Atty. Allan Mijares:

Actually there is no question on the statement being interpreted, only that the interpreter has a hard time interpreting
the statement in tagalog.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

Your honor, our point is the court of record. What is more important that there is the official stenographer and with this
kind of machinery that it be recorded officially in accordance with hierarchy in the plantilla of the Supreme Court.

Court:

Overruled, you continue your interpretation, we are wasting our time, there are other cases to be tried.

Continue, by the way, Rhea, do not ask the defense counsel, you interpret because that is your duty.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

I pray your honor, that the statement of the judge be duly recorded to inform the interpreter about her duty and not to
ask the defense counsel about the interpretation because it is her duty.

Atty. Allan Mijares:

Your Honor, we only have good intentions here. This representation and was just observed by the court that I’m just
trying to aid here because apparently there is an apparent lapse of memory, so we are trying to lead only, your honor.

Judge Clemens refused to accept any fault as to the duration of the examination. He explained that Atty. Tacorda
conducted a very long direct examination of the witness. It was only when Atty. Monsanto had already finished her
cross-examination after Atty. Mijares finished his, that Atty. Tacorda asked for a continuance. The request was at first
denied supposedly because Atty. Monsanto had said that her cross-examination would be short. When respondent
judge noticed that this proceeding was taking too long, he granted the motion for postponement. He cited the TSN as
follows:

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

Your Honor, at this juncture, may I be allowed to speak and manifest that our hearing started at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning and today it is closing to 11:00 and there are other cases to be heard, and in fact this case is set to February
22, secondly your honor…

Court:

Is your cross still long?

Atty. Vevelyn Monsanto:

Not too long, your Honor.

Atty. Jerome Tacorda:

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Secondly, your Honor, I think the witness is already exhausted, so, I move for the continuance, with all due respect to
the opposing counsel your Honor, and because there are too many calendar of cases today, and it is already 11:00
o’clock in the morning, and we have to pave way to the other cases.

xxxx

Court

Continue, anyway the defense counsel is still not through and we are receiving complaints, and also we are
observing the one (1) day cross examination rule. Continue, anyway, it is not 11:00 yet. 4

xxxx

Atty. Jerome Tacorda

At this juncture, your Honor, I am reiterating my compassionate motion to have for the continuance, since under the
Child Witness Protection law, if the witness who is a child is exhausted, he has been in the witness stand since 8:30
your Honor.

Court

You said your cross is short only.

Atty. Vevelyn Monsanto

That will also depend on the answer of the witness, your honor.

Court

All right, we will grant the motion for a continuance because the Court is not sure you have a short cross
examination.5

Atty. Allan Mijares

Your Honor, in the interest of Justice, we would like to ask the indulgence of the Honorable Court that the testimony
of the witness be terminated today in pursuance to the mandate of the Supreme Court on the day-witness rule and
besides your honor, as we would like to be reiterating again and again, we are hearing in this case on the petition for
bail.

This witness would be the last witness for the prosecution for the purpose of the petition for bail, and in the interest of
justice, we have sufficiently heard his testimony so we will terminate his testimony now, so that, this hearing on the
petition for bail for the accused be terminated today, so that, there will be no needless prolonging the
proceeding.1âwphi1 That is why, we are earnestly reiterating your Honor, that this petition for bail be terminated as
soon as possible, your Honor. Court Denied because the counsel questions will still be long and the Court has also to
try other cases and besides, the witness had been testifying for a long time already from 8:30 to 11:00 o’clock. 6

THE FINDINGS OF THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

The OCA rendered its Report, with a recommendation that charges for gross ignorance of the law against Judge
Clemens be dismissed. The OCA found that, aside from bare allegations, no other proof was adduced by Atty.
Tacorda to substantiate his claims. On the other hand, respondent judge was able to establish the falsity of the claims
against him. According to the OCA, the TSN showed that every time Atty. Tacorda would point out an error in the
conduct of the trial, respondent judge would promptly correct the error.

103
The OCA further said that, in administrative proceedings, the presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed the latter’s duties would prevail and that the complainant has the burden of proving the contrary by
substantial evidence. Charges based on suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.

The OCA explained that for respondent judge to be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the
acts complained of must be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, not only must the acts be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but they must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or
dishonesty.7 In this case, the OCA found that Atty. Tacorda failed to prove that the acts of Judge Clemens were ill-
motivated.

ISSUE

Whether Judge Clemens is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for supposedly violating the Child
Witness Examination Rule.

THE COURT’S RULING

We sustain the findings of the OCA that the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith
as to justify any administrative liability on his part. 8 A complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his
conduct of the proceedings.9 In the instances mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the
manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch.

It is doubtful that Judge Clemens failed to implement the directives he had issued during the conduct of the trial.
Based on the TSN, Atty. Tacorda did not have to make repeated manifestations to respondent Judge after pointing
out that the defense counsel tended to crowd the witness and/or that the court interpreter should be the one to
translate the testimony. Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that respondent Judge
was very much concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination of
Witness Rule was followed;10 but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness was already
exhausted, having testified for almost three hours. 11

WHEREFORE, the Complaint-Affidavit dated 21 February 2012 filed by Atty. Jerome Norman Labor Tacorda against
Hon. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Calbayog City, Western Samar, is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

104
 A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC November 11, 2013
RE: UNAUTHORIZED TRAVEL ABROAD OF JUDGE CLETO R. VILLACORTA III REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH 6, BAGUIO CITY
RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

On 1 December 2010, Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III (Judge Villacorta) was granted authority to travel to Canada for the
period covering 20 December 2010 to 3 February 2011.1 He was expected to report for work on 4 February 2011 but,
as certified by Atty. Mylene May G. Adube-Cabuag Atty. Adube-Cabuag), Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch
6 Baguio City, Judge Villacorta reported back for work only on 16 February 20112.

Judge Villacorta was asked to explain in writing his failure to secure an extension of his authority to travel abroad in
violation of Office of the Court Administrator OCA) Circular No. 49-2003.3 In a letter4 dated 31 March 2011, Judge
Villacorta explained that he was unable to return to the country at the expiration of his travel authority because he had
to attend few family-related matters: a) he had to accompany his son in Canada for the latter’s medical check-up; b)
the planned transfer by his family to an apartment in Canada was delayed because the original lessee of the unit was
still occupying the same; c) he had to wait for the issuance of his re-entry permit; and d) he had to wait for packages
from his sister which he would bring home to their mother in the Philippines.

On 29 April 2011, Judge Villacorta was granted another authority to travel to Canada for the period covering 1 May to
2 June 2011 to attend the wake and funeral of his sister. 5

Meanwhile, in a Memorandum dated 12 May 2011, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul B. Villanueva and the
OCA Office of Administrative Services (OCA-OAS) Chief Caridad A. Pabello recommended that the judge’s absence
during his extended travel from 4-15 February 2011 be considered unauthorized, which recommendation was
approved by the then OCA Officer-in-Charge.6 Also, his letter-explanation dated 31 March 2011 was referred to the
OCA Legal Office for appropriate action.

Judge Villacorta failed to report for work on 3 June 2011 following his second travel to Canada. Based on a
Certification issued by Atty. Adube-Cabuag, Judge Villacorta reported back for work only on 7 June 2011. 7 When
asked to explain, Judge Villacorta replied in a letter8 dated 15 June 2011 that no other return flight was available
other than on 5 June 2011.

Judge Villacorta sent another letter9 dated 11 August 2011 requesting for the consolidation of the two incidents for
the Court’s action. He also stated that he meant to resign effective 31 October 2011 to settle abroad and wished to be
advised on the implications of his extended travels on his intended resignation.

In a Memorandum10 dated 19 September 2011, DCA Villanueva and the OCA-OAS Chief Pabello recommended that
the judge’s absence during his extended travel from 3-6 June 2011 be considered unauthorized. In the same
memorandum, his letters dated 15 June and 11 August 2011 were referred to the OCA Legal Office for appropriate
action.

In a report to the Court dated 3 May 2012, the OCA recommended that Judge Villacorta be given a stern warning for
his failure to observe the rules relative to travel abroad.11

OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad)
requires that a request must be made for an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be
received by the OCA ten (10) working days before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would
make the absences beyond the original period unauthorized.

It should be noted that Judge Villacorta was in a position to file an application for leave to cover his extended stay
abroad from 3-6 June 2011. In his letter dated 15 June 2011, he stated that he had to rush on 28 April 2011 to book a
flight to Canada, as well as the return flight, for which the only available seat was for 5 June 2011. 12 Thus, even
before he left on 1 May 2011, he was already aware that he would not be able to report for work on 3 June 2011
because of the schedule of his return flight.

105
Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998, states that an official or an
employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled to receive the salary corresponding to the period
of the unauthorized leave of absence. Considering that the absences of Judge Villacorta during his extended travel
from 4-15 February and 3-6 June 2011 were already considered unauthorized, the OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR IS DIRECTED to deduct the salaries corresponding to the judge’s unauthorized absences, if they
have not yet been deducted.1âwphi1

We take this opportunity to emphasize that unauthorized absences of those responsible for the administration of
justice, especially on the part of a magistrate, are inimical to public service. Judge Villacorta is reminded that
reasonable rules were laid down in order to facilitate the efficient functioning of the courts. Observance thereof cannot
be expected of other court personnel if judges themselves cannot be relied on to take the lead.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, WE ISSUE A STERN WARNING to Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, that further failure to observe reasonable rules and guidelines for applying for a leave of
absence shall be dealt with more severely.

THE OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR IS ALSO DIRECTED to expedite the study and establishment of
rules and procedure for the electronic filing of applications for leave in the judiciary. These rules shall facilitate the
usual process, as well as sufficiently provide the mechanism for contingencies during which an official or employee is
unable to personally file the applications for leave of absence.

SO ORDERED.

106
 A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505 November 27, 2013
MAMASAW SULTAN ALI, Complainant,
vs.
HON. BAGUINDA-ALI PACALNA, Presiding Judge HON. PUNDAYA A. BERUA, Acting Presiding Judge
HADJI IBRA DARIMBANG, Clerk of Court and MANDAG U. BATUA-AN, Court Stenographer, all of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Municipality of Balin dong, Province of Lanao del Sur, Respondents.
In the Matter of: Petition for Absolute Judicial Clemency of Former Judge Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna, MTCC
Marawi City
RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition1 for judicial clemency filed by Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna (respondent), former Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Balindong in Lanao del Sur.

In the Decision2 dated September 25, 2007, respondent was found administratively liable for dishonesty, serious
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and also violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which
enjoins judges to uphold the integrity of the judiciary, avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in all
activities and to perform their official duties honestly and diligently. This Court thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross
ignorance of the law, respondent Judge Baguinda Ali Pacalna, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Municipality of Balindong, Lanao Del Sur, is ORDERED to PAY a fine of P20,000.00, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Court Stenographer Mandag Batua-an of the same court is hereby REPRIMANDED with similar WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.3

Respondent did not file any motion for reconsideration and paid the P20,000.00 fine on December 3, 2007.

Just one week after the decision in this case was rendered, another administrative complaint4 (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1791,
formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1958-MTJ) was filed against the respondent by members of the Marawi City Police, namely:
PO2 Ricky C. Gogo, PO2 Mamintal B. Osop, PO2 Casan A. Imam, PO1 Agakhan A. Tomawis, PO1 Anowar C.
Modasir, PO1 Alano D. Osop, PO1 Alnasser D. Ali, and PO1 Casanali M. Lawi. On August 17, 2011, this Court’s First
Division resolved to adopt and approve the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). Respondent was held liable for grave misconduct and meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension,
converted to forfeiture of the corresponding amount of his salary which was ordered withheld by Resolution of the
Court dated February 16, 2011. Said administrative matter was further indorsed to the OCA Legal Office for the
commencement of criminal charges against respondent for violation of P.D. No. 1829 (Obstruction of Justice).5

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied under Resolution 6 dated January 23, 2013 of this
Court’s Second Division. On September 4, 2013, a criminal complaint for Obstruction of Justice was filed by the OCA
with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. As per Certification dated October 25, 2013 issued by the OCA, the
amount of P209,810.70 corresponding to six months salary of respondent, was deducted from his terminal leave
benefits.

Respondent resigned on December 1, 2009 while he was being investigated by the OCA in his second administrative
case (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1791 formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-1958-MTJ). He now seeks to rejoin the judiciary and filed
his application for the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 9. He informs this Court that he was already
interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in Cagayan de Oro City in November 2012 and that the only
hindrance to his nomination for the said judicial position was the penalty imposed on him in the present case.
Respondent thus pleads for compassion, at the very least for this Court to reduce to P10,000.00 the penalty imposed
under our September 25, 2007 Decision.

107
This Court in A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency)7 laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or
judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance.1âwphi1 His appeal for
clemency is solely anchored on his avowed intention to go back to the judiciary on his personal belief that "he can be
x x x an effective instrument in the delivery of justice in the Province of Lanao del Sur because of his seventeen (17)
years of experience," and on his "promise before the Almighty God and the High Court that he will never repeat the
acts or omissions that he had committed as a Judge." He claims having learned "enough lessons" during the three
years he became jobless and his family had "suffered so much because of his shortcoming." 8

Apart from respondent’s own declarations, there is no independent evidence or relevant circumstances to justify
clemency. Applying the standards set by this Court in A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC, respondent’s petition for judicial
clemency must be denied.

In the present case, the Court held that respondent exhibited gross ignorance of procedure in the conduct of election
cases in connection with petitions for inclusion of voters in the barangay elections, resulting in delays such that
complainant’s name was not timely included in the master list and consequently he was not considered a candidate
for barangay chairman. Such failure to observe fundamental rules relative to the petitions for inclusion cannot be
excused. Further, respondent was found to have intentionally fabricated an order which supposedly granted a motion
for intervention by the counsel for the incumbent mayor whose re-election complainant and his co-petitioners were
allegedly not willing to support. Respondent’s act of fabricating an order to cover up his official shortcomings
constitutes dishonesty, a reprehensible act that will not be sanctioned by this Court.

In the subsequent administrative case (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1791), respondent was found to have misused his authority
when he, over the vigorous objection of complainants police officers, took custody of an accused then detained in jail
for carnapping charges, by merely issuing a signed handwritten acknowledgment receipt with an undertaking to
present the said accused to the court when ordered. Said accused was never returned to jail and while the case
against him was dismissed, there was no order for release issued by the court. Respondent endeavored to justify his
act in aiding the accused by virtue of his position as Sultan in his hometown, but the Court found him liable for Grave
Misconduct, warranting his dismissal from the service. But since the penalty of dismissal can no longer be imposed
on account of respondent’s resignation, he was meted the penalty of six months suspension converted to forfeiture of
the corresponding amount of his salary. This second administrative offense committed by respondent also led to the
OCA’s filing of a criminal complaint for obstruction of justice against him.

Given the gravity of respondent’s transgressions, it becomes more imperative to require factual support for
respondent’s allegations of remorse and reform. As this Court previously declared:

Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of
discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is
because a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his

108
conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties but also
as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to withstand the most
searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.

Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a
showing of potential and promise are indispensable. 9 Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Judicial Clemency filed by respondent Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna is DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

109
 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2390 August 13, 2014
(Formerly OCA LP.I. No. 12-3923-RTJ)

JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE SIBANAH E. USMAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Catbalogan City, Samar, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed by Josephine Jazmines Tan (complainant) against Judge
Sibanah E. Usman (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan City, Branch 28, Samar
for bribery and corruption, relative to Civil Case No. 7681 and Criminal Case No. 6536.

Complainant is one of the plaintiffs and accused in Civil Case No. 7681 and Criminal Case No. 6536, respectively,
then pending before Branch 28, presided by respondent. She claimed that relative to said cases, respondent was
paid P250,000.00 by their opponent, a certain Allan Tan, through Jaime Cui, Jr., as evidenced by a receipt stating:
"Received P250,000.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos) from Mr. Jaime Cui, Jr. as full payment in CC No. 6536
& 7681 tobe given to Judge S.E. Usman" and signed by Nilda C. Cinco, OIC-BranchClerk of Court of the same court.

Complainant further accused respondent of knowingly issuing an unjust interlocutory order when he cited her in
contempt. She, however, pointed out that in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2266,2 the Court found respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. Complainant now prays that respondent be meted the penalty of dismissal from service for
bribery and corruption.

On August 14, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed respondent to comment onthe charges of
Gross Misconduct, Knowingly rendering an Unjust Order,Abuse of Power and Dishonesty against him. 3

In his Comment4 dated October 9, 2012, respondent argued that since complainant's allegations and issues had
already been raised and threshed out in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2266, following the principle of res judicata, the instant
complaint should not be given due course. Respondent countered that the allegations of bribery and corruption are
baseless and unfounded. He deniedthat he received any money from Jaime Cui, Jr. or from anyone relative tosaid
subject cases. He claimed that complainant merely concocted and falsified the acknowledgment receipt wherein she
made it appear that Nilda C. Cinco received the money and issued the receipt in behalf of respondent.

Meanwhile, Nilda C. Cinco, in her Affidavit5 dated October 8, 2012, denied that she received any amount of money
from Jaime Cui, Jr., nor did she issue any acknowledgment receipt thereto.

Jaime Cui, Jr., likewise, in his Affidavit6 dated October 8, 2012, vehemently denied even in open court on August 28,
2009 that he disbursed a substantial amount of money to respondent or to Nilda Cinco, in any occasion or for any
purpose.

Finally, respondent pointed out thatwhen complainant alleged that she received information about the alleged bribery
sometime in February or March 2009, said subject case, particularly Civil Case No. 7681 was still being tried before
Branch 29 and was only transferred and received by RTC Branch 28 on June 25, 2009. Moreover,respondent judge
argued that Allan Tan was killed on October 28, 2008, hence, it is impossible that he gave orders to Jaime Cui, Jr. on
the alleged dates where bribery took place.

In a Memorandum dated August 12, 2013, the OCA, due to the conflicting versions of the parties, recommended that
the instant administrative complaint be referred to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals in Cebu City, for raffle
among the justices in Cebu City on who shall conduct the investigation. The complaint was later on raffled to Court of
Appeals Justice Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap.

After investigation and evaluation, in her Report,7 the Investigating Justice recommended that the instant complaint
be dismissed for lack of evidence. The Investigating Justice opined that the complaint-affidavit and the "receipt" given

110
by complainant do notconstitute as substantial evidence to prove that respondent judge committed bribery or
corruption.

RULING

The Court adopts the findings ofthe Investigating Justice.

It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burdenof proof that respondent committed the acts complained of
rests on the complainant. Thus, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, respondentis under no obligation to prove
his exception or defense.8

As settled, an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. The complainant must present a panoply
of evidence in support of such an accusation. Bare allegation would not suffice to hold respondent liable. 9In the
absence of showing direct and convincing evidence to prove the alleged bribery, respondent judge cannot be held
guilty ofsaid charge. In the instant case, no evidence was presented showing that respondent in fact accepted or
received money or anything from Cui in relation to the subject cases. Neither was there any evidence toshow that
respondent judge unlawfully or wrongfully used his official function for his own benefit or personal gain.

By merely presenting a "receipt" with a tenor that money in the amount of P250,000.00 was received by Nilda Cinco
in behalf of respondent to support an accusation of bribery will not stand alone. As correctly observed by the OCA,
while it may be considered as proof that indeed there was money received, it does not prove however that
respondent received the same. Notably, while complainant presented the subject receipt, there was no allegation as
to how she acquired the receipt and from whom she obtained said receipt. It did not help also that the due execution
and authenticity of said receipt was not sufficiently established considering that the parties thereto, Mr. Cui and Ms.
Cinco, swore in their affidavits and during the hearing that no money was received and that no receipt was issued
thereto. Likewise, complainant,despite notice, failed to attend the hearing of the case, hence, she failed to
substantiate and corroborate her claim of bribery and corruption against respondent.

Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would
entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. 10

The Rules of Court requires that ifa judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, as in this
case, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge.1âwphi1 The Judiciary to
which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should
be presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus, the ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which removal is sought is misconduct in
office, willful neglect, corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal
trials apply.11

Respondent judge cannot be blamed for asserting that complainant merely fabricated the allegation of bribery and
corruption due to the latter's failure to present evidence in support thereof. This is likewise not the first time that
complainant raised an unsubstantiated accusation of bribery against respondent. However, as in this Court's previous
rulings, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, respondent enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties as well as the presumption of innocence.12

This Court will not hesitate toprotect Judges or court personnel against any groundless accusation that trifles with
judicial processes when an administrative charge against them has no basis whatsoever in fact or in law. This Court
will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon all employees of the judiciary, but neither will it hesitate
to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.13

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge Sibanah E. Usman, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Catbalogan City, Samar, is hereby DISMISSED for failure of complainant to substantiate the
charges.

SO ORDERED.

111
 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394 September 1, 2014
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3847-RT J)
GEORGE T. CHUA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Respondent.
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A trial judge is not accountable for perfonning his judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter
of public duty and responsibility Indeed, the judge's office and duty to render and administer justice, being functions
of sovereignty, should not be simply taken for granted. No administrative charge for manifest partiality, gross
misconduct, and gross ign ')ranee of the law should be brought against him for the orders issued in the due course of
judicial proceedings.

Antecedents

On January 26, 1994, Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) leased for a period of 20 years about 10
hectares of reclaimed land along Roxas Boulevard in Parafiaque City to Jimmy Gow. A year later, Gow, who was the
president of Uni wide Holdings, Inc. (Uni wide), assigned the lease to Uniwide. MBDC and Uniwide then entered into
a supplemental agreement over the lease in 1996.1

On February 17, 2011, Uniwide filed an action for reformation of contract against MBDC in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Parañaque City.2 The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-0060, and was raffled to Branch 274 under
respondent Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, essentially alleged that MBDC had reneged on its promise to
develop the area into a commercial and business center; that the construction of what later came to be known
asMacapagal Avenue had cut through the leased area, greatly affecting Uniwide’s construction plans; and that
subsequent changes in circumstances had gone beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into
the lease contract.3

Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon MBDC on March 23, 2011. On the last day for the filing of
its responsive pleading, MBDC moved for the dismissal of the complaint instead of filing its answer, claiming
prescription and failureto state a cause of action.4 MBDC also stated in its motion that the action for reformation was
merely a ploy by Uniwide to forestall the ejectment case against it.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss through its order dated August 1, 2011. 5 MBDC received a copy of the order
on September 26, 2011, and filed its motion for reconsideration 11 days thereafter. Judge Madrona then directed
Uniwide and MBDC to file their comment and reply, respectively, after which the motion for reconsideration would be
deemed submitted for resolution.

Before MBDC could file its reply, Uniwide filed a motion to declare MBDC in default.

On December 23, 2011, Judge Madrona issued another order resolving the two pending motions, 6 declaring MBDC
in default, and declaring its motion for reconsideration moot. Aggrieved, complainant George T. Chua, as the
president of MBDC, filed a complaint-affidavit dated February 13, 2012 to charge Judge Madrona with manifest
partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.7

The Court referred the administrative case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation and recommendation. 8The
CA raffled the administrative case to Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam. 9

In due course, Justice Tijam submitted his Report and Recommendation to the Court.10 Allegations in Support of the
Complaint

The complainant asserted that the December 23, 2011 order declaring MBDC in default, and rendering the motion for
reconsideration moot showed Judge Madrona’s manifest partiality in favor of Uniwide; that the motion for
reconsideration should have first been resolved; that the motion to declare MBDC in default had not yet been deemed
submitted for resolution, for, in fact, Uniwide submitted its reply to MBDC’s comment/opposition to the motion only

112
after the issuance of the December 23, 2011 order; that by failing to resolve the substantial issues raised in the
motion for reconsideration, MBDC had been deprived of its right to participate in the proceedings; and thatMBDC had
actively participated in the proceedings in the RTC,and did not deserve to be declared in default. 11

On the allegation of gross misconduct, the complainant averred that Judge Madrona’s refusal to dismiss the
complaint, which on its face had no basis and had already prescribed, madehim unfit for his position as judge; that
the action was filed only in 2011,although the contract sought to be reformed had been executed in 1994, while the
supplemental agreement had been entered into in 1996; and that indeclaring that Uniwide’s cause of action had
arisen only in 2005 and thusdenying the motion to dismiss, Judge Madrona acted arbitrarily and without basis. 12

With regard to the allegation ofgross ignorance of the law, the complainant alleged that as a judge, Judge Madrona
was expected to know the pertinent law and procedural rules,and to apply them properly and in good faith; that his
stubborn refusal to reconsider the default declaration despite having been fronted with jurisprudence, citing Diaz v.
Diaz,13 that the reglementary period within which to filean answer to a complaint should be counted from a party’s
receipt of the order denying a motion for reconsideration; and that MBDC should not have been declared in default
without an earlier resolution of the motion for reconsideration.14

Finally, complainant accused Judge Madrona of tampering with the minutes of the November 18, 2011 hearing,
alleging that during the hearing, MBDC was given 15 days to commenton Uniwide’s motion to declare defendant in
default, which was reflected in the minutes of the RTC and confirmed by Sofronio Rojo, the court interpreter, but that
the minutes were later made out to giveonly 10 days to MBDC. 15

Judge Madrona’s Defenses Judge

Madrona justified his order declaring MBDC in default by reasoning that when MBDC’s motion todismiss was denied
by the August 1, 2011 order, it only had the balance of the period to file an answer, but not less than five days, as
allowed by Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, 16 which specifically provided the period to file the answer should
the motion to dismiss be denied; that he interpreted the rule as referring to any order denying a motion to dismiss,
even if said order had not yet become final or executory; that because the motion to dismiss was filed on the last day
to file the answer, MBDC only had five daysfrom the receipt of the August 1, 2011 order within which to file its answer,
that is, until October 1, 2011; and that MBDC filed its motion for reconsideration beyond the period allowed to file an
answer.17

On resolving the motion to declare defendant in default without first ruling on MBDC’s motion for reconsideration,
Judge Madrona insisted that MBDC had filed its comment/opposition, and the period for Uniwide to file its reply had
lapsed without having filed a request for additional time; that the motion could then be considered submitted for
resolution; and that on the propriety of the actual order of default,he indicated that MBDC had filed a motion to set
aside said order and to admit attached answer, which was still pending judicial action. 18

As to the allegation that he had tampered with the minutes of the November 18, 2011 hearing, Judge
Madronapointed out that he had thereby merely corrected the minutes; that heexplained that the practice in his
courtroom had been to allow the court interpreter to prepare the minutes before hearings started; that the interpreter
then asked the parties if they had reached any consensual agreements and noted the agreements down; that the
minutes were usually signed before the hearing, and the interpreter relayed its contents to him (Judge Madrona) who
then confirmed the contents in his corresponding orders; that on November 18, 2011, the date of the hearing of
Uniwide’s motion to declare MBDC in default, the parties agreed to file their comment and reply within 15 days
respectively; that with regard to the comment and reply, he usually granted the parties only 10 days to file them; that
unfortunately, the counsels for the parties had already left the courtroom before being heard; that when he dictated
his order for the hearing, he changed the period to file the commentand reply from 15 days to 10 days for both parties;
and that he did so inthe exercise of the court’s inherent power to amend and control its process and orders in order to
make them conformable to law and justice, pursuant to Section 5 (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.19

Report and Recommendation of Justice Tijam

In his Report and Recommendation,20 Justice Tijam rendered the following findings and conclusions, to wit:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint with
substantial evidence, i.e.,that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. We are reminded that administrative charges against judges have been viewed with utmost care,

113
as the respondent stands to face the penalty of dismissal or disbarment. The proceedings of this character are highly
penal in nature and are to be governed by the rules or law applicable to criminal cases. The charges in such case
must, therefore, be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the first issue,the Investigator finds Judge Madrona not administratively liable as the allegations of the
complaint are matters pertaining to the exercise of his adjudicative function.

It is undisputed that MBDC received the summons on March 23, 2011, and the latter was required to file an Answer
until April 7, 2011. However, instead of filing an Answer tothe complaint, it filed a motion to dismiss on April 7, 2011.
In the RTC’s Order, dated August 1, 2011, it denied MBDC’s motion to dismiss, which order was received by the
latter on September 26, 2011. Instead of filing an answer, MBDC filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order
denying its motion to dismiss on October 7, 2011. Consequently, Judge Madrona directed Uniwide to file a Comment
thereto and thereafter, MBDC filed its reply.

Pending compliance by the parties with Judge Madrona’s directive, Uniwide filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default and an Opposition/Commentthereto was filed by MBDC. On December 23, 2011, without resolving MBDC’s
motion for reconsideration, Judge Madrona issued this assailed Order, which reads:

In view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of the Court that the defendant failed to file the requisite
responsive pleading, Answer, within the reglementary period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. Having thus failed, the motion of plaintiff thus iswith merit, the defendant is therefore
hereby declared in default.

Let then the Clerk of Court receive the evidence ex-parte for the plaintiff and let the proper report/recommendation be
submitted within 30 days after completion of the reception of evidence aforesaid on the basis of which the Court shall
proceed to render judgment accordingly. The defendant in default, though, shall still be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.

With the motion of plaintiff being granted and the defendant declared in default, action on the motion for
reconsideration of defendant is thus rendered mooted.

SO ORDERED.

After a careful review of the foregoing factual circumstances and the documentary evidence presented, the
Investigator finds that Judge Madrona erred in declaring MBDC’s motion for reconsideration of the order denying
motion to dismiss as mooted and in declaring MBDC in default in his assailed Order dated December 23, 2011.

At the outset, MBDC cannot be legally declared in default as it still has a pending motion for reconsideration of the
order denying its motion to dismiss. Judge Madrona erred inresolving simultaneously the MBDC’s motion for
reconsideration and Uniwide’s motion to declare defendant in default. With the filing of MBDC’s motion for
reconsideration, the running of the prescriptive period to file an Answer was interrupted, thus, the counting of the
period shall onlybegin to run upon MBDC’s receipt of the Order denying the motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s
Order dated August 1, 2011.

The case of Narciso vs. Garcia,is instructive thus:

As a consequence of the motion to dismiss that defendant Narciso filed, the running of the period during which the
rules required her to file her answer was deemed suspended. When the trial court denied her motion to dismiss,
therefore, she had the balance of her period for filing an answer under Section 4, Rule 16 within which to file the
same but in no case less than five days, computed from her receipt of the notice of denial of her motion to dismiss.
Thus:

SEC. 4. Time to plead. – If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the balance of the period
prescribed by Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any
event, computed from his receiptof the notice of the denial.If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file his
answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the amended pleading, unless the court
provides a longer period.

114
But apart from opposing defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked the trial court to declare Narciso in
default for not filing an answer, altogether disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an
answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss that she filed in the case. Consequently, when the trial court
granted Garcia’s prayer and simultaneously denied Narciso’s motion to dismiss and declared her in default, it
committed serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when the trial court denied her motion to dismiss. She still had
at least five days within which to file her answer to the complaint.

What is more, Narcisco had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying her motion to
dismiss. No rule prohibits the filing of such a motion for reconsideration. Onlyafter the trial court shall have denied it
does Narcisobecome bound to file her answer to Garcia’s complaint. And only if she did not do so was Garcia entitled
to haveher declared in default. Unfortunately, the CA failed to see this point. xxx (emphasis supplied)

Judge Madrona cannot validly argue that the period of time for MBDC to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying a motion to dismiss must be within the same period of time provided under Section 4 Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court. A careful review of the said provision reveals that the period provided therein only applies to instances where a
motion to dismiss is denied, thus, the movant can still file his answer within the balance of the period prescribed by
law but no less than five days computed from the receipt of the notice of denial. The said provision explicitly provides
that the same period of time shall apply to cases where a party intends to file a motion for reconsideration of the
denial of a motion to dismiss. We stress that when the language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, it admits
no room for interpretation but merely application.

It bears stressing that under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within
the period for filing an appeal or to be precise, within 15 days from the receipt of the assailed judgment or resolution.
Evidence shows that MBDC received the August 1, 2011 Order on September 26, 2011, hence, MBDC’s motion for
reconsideration thereto was timely filed on October 7, 2011. Judge Madrona incorrectly ruled that MBDC failed to file
its responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and granted Uniwide’s motion to declare MBDC in default.
The undersigned Investigator finds that there was no basis to declare MBDC in default as Judge Madrona needs to
resolve first its motion for reconsideration before the latter is legally required by law to file its Answer within the period
of time allowed by law.

Be that as it may, it is worth emphasizing that jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any,
committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against
judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously
with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.

In the case of AMA vs. Hon. Bueser, et. al.citing the case of Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Laviña, the Supreme Court
ruled that resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies and a final ruling on the matter, are prerequisites for the taking
of appropriate measures against the judges concerned, whether of criminal, civil or administrative nature. If the
assailed act is subsequently found and declared to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at
all.

Records show that during the preliminary conference of the case on February 12, 2014, MBDC thru counsel,
admitted that there are two separate petitions for certiorarifiled with the Court of Appeals involving the interlocutory
orders issued by Judge Madrona which are allegedly questionable. CA-G.R. SP No. 126858 assails Judge Madrona’s
Orders, dated April 23, 2012 and July 18, 2012, which denied MBDC’s Motion for Inhibition and to Suspend
Proceedingsand granted Uniwide’s Motion to Set Case for Ex-parte Hearing for Further Reception of Plaintiff’s
Evidence;and denied its motion for reconsideration thereto, respectively. In CA-G.R. SP No. 126938, MBDC assails
Judge Madrona’s Order, dated August 13, 2012 denying its Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default and to Admit
Attached Answer. Since these two petitions for certiorari are still pending and as there is no evidence on record that
the same have already been resolved by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court with finality, the instant
administrative complaint is deemed pre-mature.

Assuming that Judge Madrona erroneously interpreted the provision of Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court in
relation to this case, he cannot be administratively liable for such judicial error. It is settled that a judge’s failure to
interpret the law orto properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively
liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an
injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice canbe infallible in his judgment.

115
In this case, other than the judicial error committed by Judge Madrona, MBDC failed to adduce convincing evidence
showing that Judge Madrona’s error was so gross orpatent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad
faith. Neither was bias nor partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein,
bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party.

A scrutiny of MBDC’s complaint against Judge Madrona’s alleged commission of acts amounting to gross ignorance
ofthe law, manifest partiality and gross misconduct, reveals that the complaint actually pertains to Judge Madrona’s
exercise of adjudicative functions. Assuming arguendo that Judge Madrona’s order iserroneous, such error cannot be
corrected in an administrative proceeding but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies, such as a motion
for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Administrative complaintsagainst judges cannot be pursued
simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the
former. Administrative remedies are neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such
reviewis still available to the aggrieved parties and the case has not yet been resolved with finality.

As to the second issue,the Investigator agrees with Judge Madrona that the changing of the period of time in the
Minutes of November 18, 2011 hearing was authorized and made pursuant to the inherent powers of the court
tocorrect error in his Order.

This Investigator is convinced that Judge Madrona acted in good faith when he correctedthe Minutes of the
November 18, 2011 hearing. We agree with Judge Madrona that the changes made from 15 days to 10 days for the
parties to file their respective Comment and Reply were done to correct the error and in order to conform with the
usual court practice of allowing only 10 days to file a comment. It was inaccurate for MBDC to claim that the
correction was purposely intended to make it appear that MBDC untimely filed its comment to the subject motion as
Uniwide was also given the same period of time tofile its reply. More so, despite MBDC’s late filing of its comment
beyond the 10 day period, the same was still considered in the resolution of Uniwide’s motion, thus, showing that the
correction was not intended tosolely prejudice MBDC but merely to conform with the court’s prevailing practice. Here,
MBDC’s accusation against Judge Madrona for grave misconduct and manifest partiality is without basis.

It is significant to emphasize the inherent power of the courts as provided under Section 5 (g) of Rule 135, that every
court shall have the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders, so as to make them conformable
to law and justice."This power includes the right to reverse itself, especially when inits honest opinion it has
committed an error or mistake in judgment, and thatto adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party-litigant.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the undersigned Investigator considers Judge Madrona’s act of
changing the period of time to file the comment and reply to have been done in good faith and in accordance with the
court’s inherentpower to amend and control his orders in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of the case.
Judge Madrona’s contention was supported by the Affidavit executed by Mr. Rojo, comprehensively explaining the
reason why the period of filing the pleadings in the Minutes of November 18, 2011 hearing was changed. Mr. Rojo’s
affidavit remained uncontested and this Investigator believes that it should be given weight as hewas the one who
had conferred with the parties prior to the said hearing and had it signed by their counsels.

On a final note, if a party is prejudicedby the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with the proper court for proper judicial
action and not with the office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint, as in this case.
Since, as admitted by the parties, the assailed interlocutory orders of Judge Madrona were appealed through
petitions for certiorari and are still pending with the Court of Appeals, hence, this Administrative case filed against
Judge Madrona constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice and further clog the courts’ dockets.

Judge Madrona, however, must be reminded to cease his practice of having his court interpreter, Mr. Rojo, prepare in
advance the minutes of the hearing and requiring the parties to sign the same prior to hearing. The minutes must only
be accomplished after the case is adjourned in order to avoid conflictand to reflect an accurate account of the
proceedings. RECOMMENDATION

The undersigned Investigator respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint against Judge Madrona be
DISMISSEDfor patent lack of merit and the Complainant be Admonished to refrain from filing groundless
administrative complaints against Judges without substantial or credible evidence. 21

Ruling

116
This Court adopts the foregoing findings and recommendations of Justice Tijam.

The complainant’s allegations against Judge Madrona arose from the following orders he had issued as the judge
trying the civil case involving MBDC, namely: (1) denying MBDC’s motion to dismiss; (2) denying MBDC’s motion for
reconsideration; and (3) granting Uniwide’s motion to declare defendant in default. Yet, it is clear that such orders
were Judge Madrona’s resolutions of the motion to dismiss, motion for reconsideration, and motion to declare MBDC
in default,and thus involved the exercise of his judicial functions. Assuming thatJudge Madrona thereby erred, his
errors were correctible only through available judicial remedies, not by administrative or disciplinary actions. 22

The records show that MBDC already availed of its rightful judicial remedies. On January 24, 2012, MBDC moved to
have the order of default set aside and to have its answer admitted. On February 10, 2012, it filed a motion for the
inhibition of Judge Madrona and for the suspension of the proceedings. After Judge Madrona adversely resolved
each of the motions, it assailed the adverse resolutions in the Court of Appeals through certiorari (i.e., CA-G.R. SP
No. 126858 and CA-G.R. SP No. 126938), the proceedings thereon being still pending.

This administrative complaint against Judge Madrona is disallowed and should be summarily dismissed.To start with,
no administrative recourse could supplant or pre-empt the proper exercise by the CA of its certiorarijurisdiction.
Furthermore, not every error or mistake by a judge in the performance of his official duties as a judge renders him
administratively liable. Indeed, no judge can be heldadministratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law,
or incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts constituted fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or were
imbued with malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. 23These exceptions did not obtain here,
for, as Justice Tijam rightly observed, MBDC did not adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge Madrona’s acts
were so gross or patent, deliberate and malicious; or imbued with evident bad faith; or tainted with bias or partiality.

In Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA Land, Inc. (represented by Joseph B. Usita) against Court of
Appeals Associate Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon And Hon. Ricardo G. Rosario,24 the
Court expressed its disdain for administrative charges brought against incumbent Justices and Judges for performing
their judicial functions, stating:

Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to answer for performing his
judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility. The office and
duty to render and administer justice are function of sovereignty, and should notbe simply taken for granted. As a
recognized commentator on public offices and public officers has written: 25

It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be sustained against a
judicial officer for the recoveryof damages by one claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within
his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the
matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or
disastrous in its consequencesit may appear either to the party or to others.

A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of this rule.1âwphi1 Thus it is said
of the judge: "His doing justice as between particular individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the
end and object which were in viewwhen his court was created, and he was selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts
are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail
in the political society, and that rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be
accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or improper and
imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to the
public by doing justice between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may be called to
account by the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the duty neglected
is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible."

Justice Tijam found the allegation on the tampering of the minutes of the November 18, 2011 hearing unlikely.

We concur with Justice Tijam. The correction of the minutes was done by Judge Madrona under the inherent powers
of his court to control its own orders and processes before they became immutable. In changing in the minutes the
period stated for filing the comment and the reply from 15 days to 10 days, Judge Madronawas merely correcting the
period conformably with the existing practice in his branch of granting only the shorter period of 10 days to make such
filings. In that context, no bad faith should be inferred, considering that both parties were subject to the same 10-day

117
period. Moreover, MBDC did not suffer actual prejudice from the change inasmuch as Judge Madrona had actually
noted MBDC’s comment, and had considered such comment in issuing his December 23, 2011 ruling.

Further, Justice Tijam’s recommendation to caution Judge Madrona against allowing his court interpreter to prepare
the minutes of the proceedings in advance and requiring the litigants to sign the minutes even prior to the holding of
the hearing itself is well taken. Given their obvious purpose, the minutes of judicial proceedings must be
accomplished after the close of such proceedings, or after the hearings have been adjourned in order to avoid
conflicting entries, or even confusion. It isalways essential for the minutes to give an accurate account ofthe
proceedings in accordance with their true nature as records of the official and public acts of the courts. Entries in the
minutes should not anticipate the proceedings they are intended to faithfully record, for the reliability and
trustworthiness of the entries could be easily compromised otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the administrative complaint against respondent Judge Fortunito A. Madrona
for its lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

118
 A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who
had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the
courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the
complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. 1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar
who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel
for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the
RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned."2

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14, 2007, 3 viz:

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was
not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province as
hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge
which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted
this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It
is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the
Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. Relative to the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby
DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint 4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’sunethical
practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of
previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to submit
his comment.5

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In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007 order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and
impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest
issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly
dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid). 8

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the administrative complaint against
Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil
Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or
criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued
adversely to him and his clients.9

In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and
recommendation:10

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The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1)
Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3)
OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ.
These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the
complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in
cases that respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A.
Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic)
out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The
other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a
favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L. Madrid
(RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was handled
by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842
entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala
ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph
H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman case
arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca
Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as
third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A.
Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant
JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the
respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his
clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

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The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in
Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF
RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY
VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No.
XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the Supreme Court
dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of
resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d)
VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby
Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting Presiding
Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial,
et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do
not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint is
one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to persons other than judges and
personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an
undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in the Civil
Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the administrative case
of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a)
to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of the bar in resorting to
harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the Rules of Court in the event of adverse
ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against
respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation11 finding Atty. Dealca
guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and
criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because
his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the
administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition, 13 which the IBP
Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-
545.14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

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Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court
personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute
cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel. 15

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out
from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that
direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the
Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed
our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it.
Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP
Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his
colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side.
He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor
harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the
aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney
constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. 18 The oath exhorts upon the members of
the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false or
unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must
not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’
propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is
equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. 21

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He
disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid,
increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to litigate,
the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith. 22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and
criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part,
considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully
deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even
the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court
personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case. 23

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently
dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby
demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions have been
issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court. 24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review
for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all
its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual
adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course indicates the Court’s
agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo. 26

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The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issuesin
disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: 27

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision
appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable
laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and
for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal
basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14, 29 Article VIII of the Constitution.
The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions withinthe constitutional
contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one
thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the
constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due course, with
the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the
petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions
raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion toinhibit in
order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has
recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely
based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases. 32

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno materiality to the
case.1âwphi1

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 34

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The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not appear
before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx x
x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges
could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges
and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him
because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars
that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the
latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel. 36 The latter’s bare allegations of
Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice, 37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his
noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer
as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought
against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating
Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of
the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on
erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03, 40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate
to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and
DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.
04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective
from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

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