1PVI.
RULE 114 – BAIL
1. San Miguel v. Maceda, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, 3 April 2007, 520
SCRA 205
Prepared by Manalang
FACTS:
Complainant San Miguel and another person named Osorio were charged
with violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). San Miguel was
arrested for illegally selling and distributing half gram of
methamphetamine (Shabu), which is punishable by prision correccional.
San Miguel jumped bail, so Judge Alumbres (a different judge), issued a
bench warrant and cancelled the 60,000 bail bond, and increased it to
120,000.
The prosecution moved to Cancel Recommended Bail since San Miguel is
seriously considering flight from prosecution. The hearing was set on
September 19, but on September 17, San Miguel filed a motion to oppose
the prosecution. On the same day, (two days before the hearing), Judge
Maceda granted the Motion of the Prosecution to Cancel the Bail. On the
day of the actual hearing, Judge Maceda considered San Miguel's motion
for reconsideration and required Prosecution's reply, but didn't do
anything until two months later when he issued an Order Clarifying his
Order in September 17. In his Clarificatory Order, he said that what was
cancelled was the 60,000 Bail Bond, not the 120,000 Bail Bond.
San Miguel went to court to charge Judge Maceda for Gross Ignorance of
the Law, Manifest Partiality, Gross Misconduct, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Evident Bad Faith and Gross Inexcusable Negligence relative
to his Order to grant a motion to cancel complainant's bail in a criminal
action.
San Miguel said that by Canceling his Bail Bond two days before the
hearing, he was deprived of his right to due process. He also alleged that
since the crime charged to him was punishable by mere prision
correccional, and not reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, his right to
bail is a constitutional right and not a mere privilege, subject to judicial
determination.
Maceda said that his Order to cancel the Bail Bond referred to the 60,000
Bail Bond, not the 120,000 Bail Bond, hence, the right to bail of San
Miguel was not impaired. Maceda said that San Miguel could've posted
bail for 120,000 or move for the lifting of his warrant, but he did neither.
Furthermore, three days before his assailed Order, an information
against San Miguel on the crime of murder was filed-- since the
complainant was already detained and murder is non-bailable, the
cancellation is in order.
The complaint was also submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator for filing of Administrative Complaint. OCA recommended
5,000 fine and a warning.
Six years after, Judge Maceda manifested his willingness to submit the
case for resolution based on the pleadings, but the notice to San Miguel
was returned unserved with notation of "RTS-Deceased."
ISSUE:
W/N San Miguel is entitled to Bail? YES
W/N the Judge committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, etc., for denying
him of such RIght to Bail? NO
HELD: Court adopted the recommendation of OCA.
1) San Miguel's charge was punishable by prision correccional, and hence,
his bail is a matter of right.
Basis: Section 13 of Article III of the Constitution provides that all
persons are entitled to bail except those who are charged with offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Section 4 of Rule 114 also states that if the
offense is not punishable by death, RP, LI, bail is a matter of right.
Section 15, Article III of RA 6452 punishes the selling of .5 grams of
marijuana with prision correccional.
The defense of Maceda that he granted the motion to cancel the 60,000
Bail Bond, and not the 120,000 one is untenable. The prayer of the
Prosecution was clear-- they moved to cancel the provisional liberty
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allowed since there was belief on their part that San Miguel is seriously
considering flight. The grant of the prayer was clear in the Order. It was
only two months after the said hearing with Motion for Reconsideration
of San Miguel that Maceda issued an Order clarifying that what he
cancelled was the 60,000 Bail Bond, and that San Miguel could’ve posted
120,000 Bail, but he didn't. Maceda’s use of Osorio (a co-accused of San
Miguel in the Criminal Case who was able to post bail) as an example
was misplaced since the bail was only posted five days after the
Clarificatory Order.
Court said that OCA was correct in saying that Maceda issued it as an
afterthought. Indeed, how can the judge cancel 60,000 Bail when it was
already forfeited by San Miguel's jumping of bail. His cancellation had
deprived San Miguel of his right to bail for 2 months.
Even if San Miguel was charged with murder three days before his Order,
the decision would still be untenable. The grant of bail when a person is
charged with murder is possible, subject to judicial determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Since no evidence was adduced in
the September 19 hearing, bail bond could still have been set for San
Miguel.
The Court held that the proper remedy was not to cancel the Bail Bond
but to increase it to assure the presence of San Miguel during the trial.
Excessive bail is not required.
2) The Court held that a mere administrative sanction is sufficient.
Absent the proof showing that there was fraud, dishonesty, or corruption
in the issuance of the Order, the action shouldn't be subject to
disciplinary action even though Maceda's act was erroneous. His error
should've been conscious and with deliberate intent to show arbitrariness.
His mistake, is not gross or flagrant or out of measure.
Decision: 5,000 fine + warning
2. Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, 1 February 2000,
324 SCRA 321
Prepared by Solco
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse
under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing
penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made
without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police.
It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San
Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had
been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner’s
room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this
was not the first time the police received reports of petitioner’s activities.
When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who
was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested
him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of
the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an
information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed
against petitioner. petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the
Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3)
In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused
be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged. nine more informations for child abuse were filed against
petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three
other minor children No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner
filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above case. He
is hereby granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for
each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following
conditions: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance
during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at
the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do
so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants
for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to
trial in absentia; c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April
10, 1997 stands; and d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only
after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire
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jurisdiction over the accused; Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
informations against him. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the
trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997. He
filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be
reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to
his arraignment. the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s
motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend
arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him
released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00,
subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-
departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on
June 7, 1997. The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid
but declined to pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground that
the issue had become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the
Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May
16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioner’s arraignment a
prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this
condition is void and that his arraignment was also invalid because it
was held pursuant to such invalid condition.
ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.
HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.
Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed
and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could
ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by
granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings,
such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear
before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these Rules,"
while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the
arraignment is required to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose
between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he
can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional right
not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The condition
imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the accused cannot
waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the
hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For
another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the
accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to
him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be
present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial shall
proceed in absentia." Jjsc Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing
trials in absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at
certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea,
whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for
identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it
is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required
and cannot be waived. IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE
ARRAIGNMENT OF PETITIONER ON MAY 23, 1997 WAS ALSO
INVALID. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the arraignment did not
emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall
be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the
arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the
condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and
the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
3. Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, 27 June 2008, 556
SCRA 471
Prepared by Nicki Capuchino
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.
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FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident,
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in
detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term,
Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his
functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed
Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the
RTC.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2.Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification
to allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator
3.Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal
treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state
that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class
of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude
involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for
bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that
the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of
his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the
denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the
criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public
self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon.
Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes’ election as Senator not a legislative justification to
allow him to serve his mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is
no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically
held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies pertinently
4
that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of
duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of
lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the
overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under
the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention
the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a
few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable
leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to
establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register
as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February
2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and
take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or
twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and
insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations
4. Andres v. Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1597, 20 August 2001, 363
SCRA 371
Prepared by Ian Benitez
Facts:
Andres (complainant) was charged with murder in RTC-Tugegarao City
presided by then Judge Abraham Prinsipe. Andres was granted bail by
Judge Prinsipe.
Judge Orlando Beltran took over the case as the presiding judge. Andres
filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence.
Case was then set for hearing. Andres attended, but his counsel failed to
attend. Respondent judge then issued an order cancelling the bail bond of
Andres and ordered his detention due to his counsel’s failure to appear,
together with the reason that the presentation of evidence for defense had
been delayed for almost a year now.
Issue:
w/n the judge erred in cancelling the bail bond?
Held:
No. The bail should not be cancelled since it is not disputed that the
accused violated the conditions of the bail as he was present at the
scheduled hearing. His counsel’s failure to appear for the accused at the
scheduled hearing is not a valid ground for cancellation of bail. The
alleged delay in the presentation of evidence by the defense is likewise
not substantiated. The postponements were due also to SC’s order of
change of venue.
5. Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010, 615
SCRA 619
Prepared by
Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was
convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the
RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application for admission to bail
pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
5

The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution
and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or
aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his
application for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying
denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than
six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-
mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
Issue/Held
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the application for bail of Leviste. NO
RATIO: Under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is
more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused,
of the following or other circumstances:
1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;
3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending
appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of
discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
DISSENT
PERALTA, J.
“The Philippine Constitution itself emphasizes the right of an accused to
bail with the sole exception of those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. Cases, like in the
present case, when an accused is charg8ed with Murder but was
convicted with Homicide, mean only one thing, that the lower court found
the evidence for the crime charged not strong, hence, the accused's
conviction of a lesser offense. Therefore, the denial of the same accused's
application for bail pending appeal on the ground that the evidence of his
guilt for the crime charged is strong, would unintentionally be suggestive
of the outcome of the appealed decision of the lower court. The discretion
whether to grant the application for bail or not is given to the CA in cases
such as the present one, on the reason that the same appellate court can
review the factual findings of the lower court. However, this will no
longer be the case if a Petition for Certiorari is filed with this Court as it
is not a trier of facts. Hence, the existence of those queries brought about
by the majority opinion casts confusion rather than an enlightenment on
the present case”
The CA should have applied the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, wherein the appellate court is given the discretion to
grant bail to the petitioner after considering the enumerated
circumstances, the penalty imposed by the trial court having exceeded six
years. Although this Court has held that the discretion to extend bail
during the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave caution
and for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact
convicted by the trial court, the set of circumstances succinctly provided
in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court should be considered.
6
Therefore, applying the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and after a careful perusal of the
records and a learned consideration of the arguments of the parties, this
Court finds no reason to deny petitioner his application for bail pending
appeal. Petitioner is indisputably not a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has he committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration. He has also not previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without a valid justification. He did not commit the offense charged while
under probation, parole, or conditional pardon. Lastly, as shown by his
previous records and pointed out by petitioner, considering his conduct
while out on bail during the trial of his case, his advanced age, and his
current health condition, the probability of flight is nil and there is no
risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
6. People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, 23 October 2006, 505
SCRA 573
Prepared by Enzo Agcaoili
FACTS
● Fitzgerald accused of coercing AAA, a minor of 13 years into
prostitution
● He applied for bail with RTC which was denied because he was
deemed to be a flight risk
● Fitzgerald filed motion for new trial on ground that new and
material evidence had surfaced. Motion was granted, directed to
RTC of Olongapo
● Here, it was found that the maximum imposable penalty in
accordance with Republic Act 7610 otherwise known as the
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. As it is, the
evidence of guilt is strong, hence, We hold that his motion
for bail cannot be granted at this point.
● With regard to Fitzgerald’s alleged physical condition, let
it be stressed that accused-appellant is not precluded from
seeking medical attention if the need arises provided the
necessary representations with the proper authorities are
made.
● CA subsequently granted Fitzgerald’s application to bail on the
ground that he is of old age and not in the best of health. Thus,
appellant was GRANTED temporary liberty premised not on
the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail but in the higher
interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial
granted in this case
● Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent
Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact that the latter was
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
● respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the
previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt;
and justifies his provisional release on humanitarian grounds,
citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and
deteriorating health
ISSUE - W/N Fitzgerald should be granted bail due to his physicial
condition
HELD
● Fitzgerald should not be granted bail
● The right to bail emanates from of the right to be presumed
innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who
may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be
allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee
his appearance before any court, as required under specified
conditions.
● Rule 114 Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an
accused person in custody for an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matter of
discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an
accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment when the evidence of his guilt is strong
● As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied based
on prosecution evidence as to existence of any of the
CIRCUMSTANCES (recidivist, escaped/evaded sentence, etc.)
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 ● It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with
violation of Section 5, par. (a), sub-paragraph (5), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC for a lesser
crime of 8 years (Prision Mayor) to 16 years (RT).
● In sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for
respondent, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege
subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance
with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5
directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the
existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein such as
those indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue
risk that the accused may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
● Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail.
● In this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that
respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his
continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not
in the best of health.
7. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015, 767
SCRA 282
Prepared by Abalos
Doctrines:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a
good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to
the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec.
13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
Facts:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder
in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in
an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan
denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading
to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which
was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution
had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that,
because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would
only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight
risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in
its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issues:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the
crime charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where the evidence of
guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would
be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is
strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
Held:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of
innocence.
8
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to
be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial
and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeated in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that
the evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice
of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable,
the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under
the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In
Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs.
Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
9

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong
SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II,
Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to
be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly
disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of
Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying the Motion to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and capriciously and
was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to
allow petitioner to post bail].
Leonen DISSENT (important):
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis –
the grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that
the court has no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen argues
that “[Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons was not
the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the
Sandiganbayan,” nor were these grounds raised in the petition in the
Supreme Court.
“Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in
our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.”
Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special
accomodation for the petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision to
wit:
[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on
their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely
grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.
10
Procedure for granting bail
Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail
without any hearing for the purpose of determining whether the evidence
of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no
opportunity to present any evidence because of the prematurity of
Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the
Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion based on prematurity
Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian
reasons at the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution
were able to develop their arguments as to this point to establish legal
and factual basis for this kind of bail.
Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced
The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong
SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case referred to extradition
cases, hence its increased emphasis on international law. As applied to
crimes charged under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's
rules regarding bail.
Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the
case back to the lower court for factual determination of whether or not
the accused was a flight risk.
8. Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140842, 12 April 2007, 520
SCRA 729
Prepared by Ong
FACTS:
Petitioner, Rufina Chua, met private respondent, Chiok, who represented
himself to be a licensed stockbroker. She, upon Chiok’s prodding, then
invested a lot of money for shares of stocks. Then in 1995, she entrusted
Chiok with Php 9 million. Respondent ended up spending the money, and
when petitioner asked to pay her back, issued two checks that bounced.
Petitioner then came to know that respondent was not a licensed
stockbroker but only a telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc.
Immediately, she caused the filing of an information for estafa against
him with the Regional Trial Court. During arraignment, respondent
pleaded not guilty. After defense and prosecution presented their
evidence, trial court set a date for promulgation to January 26, 1999.
However, the respondent and his counsel failed to appear so they moved
it to Feb 1, 1999. Again, respondent and counsel failed to appear, so the
RTC rendered its decision finding respondent guilty of estafa. On the
same day prosecution filed motion for cancellation of bail because
respondent might flee or commit another crime. On Feb 13, 1999,
respondent filed MR for judgment of conviction. Two days later, there was
a hearing of the motion for cancellation of bail. The prosecution presented
a Record Check Routing Form issued by the Bureau of Immigration
showing that respondent has an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR)
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR). During that hearing,
respondent admitted using the names "Mark Tan" and Tong Wai Fat" as
aliases. On May 28, 1999, RTC issued Omnibus Order (a) denying
respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction; (b)
canceling his bail; and (c) giving him five (5) days from notice within
which to appear before the trial court, otherwise he would be arrested.
Respondent then interposed an appeal to the CA from the RTC’s Order
insofar as it denied MR for his conviction. Also, respondent filed with CA
petition for certiorari with application for TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction assailing RTC’s Omnibus Order. On June 25, 1999, RTC issued
warrant of arrest against respondent for failure to appear. However, it
was returned unserved because he couldn’t be found at his given address.
On July 27, 1999, CA issued TRO against RTC from implementing
Omnibus Order cancelling respondents bail. On Sept 20, 1999, CA issued
writ of preliminary injunction against the Omnibus Order, saying that
respondent should not be deprived of his liberty pending resolution of his
appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense;
and that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his
appeal is merely conjectural. Petitioner then filed MR with CA but it was
denied. Hence this petition for certiorari
ISSUE:
11
W/N CA acted with grave abuse of discretion for issuing writ of
preliminary injunction against arrest of respondent
HELD:
YES. TRO and writ of preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy to
assail Omnibus Order cancelling his bail. Proper remedy is filing with CA
a motion to review of the said order in regular appeal proceedings. CA’s
granting of writ of prelim injunction is bereft of factual or legal basis. To
be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that:
(1) he has a clear existing right to be protected; and
(2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are in violation
of such right.
The first requisite is absent. Respondent has no right to be freed on bail
pending his appeal from the trial court’s judgment. His conviction carries
a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the
third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114. Moreover, he
failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment on
January 26, 1999. His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the
condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the court "whenever
required" by the latter or the Rules, but also showed the probability that
he might flee or commit another crime while released on bail.
Rule 120, Sec 6. Promulgation of Judgment - xxx If the judgment is for
conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the
judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and
file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Since respondent has not shown any right to be protected, the second
requisite for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is obviously
absent. As such, the Court of Appeals clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its assailed resolution.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Resolutions dated
September 20, 1999 and November 16, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 53340 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Wilfred N. Chiok’s
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53340 is DISMISSED. The
Omnibus Order dated May 28, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 165, Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 109927 canceling
respondent’s bail is AFFIRMED.
9. Esteban v. Alhambra, G.R. No. 135012, 7 September 2004, 437
SCRA 560
Prepared by So
Facts:
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases. His sister-in-law,
Anita Esteban, petitioner, posted cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for
his temporary liberty. While out on bail and during the pendency of the
four criminal cases, Gerardo was again charged with another crime. Fed
up, petitioner filed an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds
by surrendering the accused who is now in jail.
Respondent Judge denied petitioner’s application because his arrest and
detention for another criminal case does not affect the character of the
cash bail of the 4 previous cases.
Petitioner raises Sec. 22 off rule 114 stating that “upon application of the
bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled
upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.”
Issue: W/N cancellation of bail was done when Petitioner submitted
accused to jail?
Held: Petitioners submission is misplaced.
The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates a situation where the
surety or bondsman surrenders the accused to the court that ordered the
latter’s arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by the surety or
bondsman, cancels the bail bond.
12
We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not
surrender the accused, charged in the four criminal cases, to the trial
court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was charged in
a subsequent criminal case.

Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash
deposit which, as mandated by Section 14 of Rule 114, shall be applied to
the payment of fine and costs, and the excess, if any, shall be returned to
the accused or to any person who made the deposit.

The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other bail bonds. A cash
bond may be posted either by the accused or by any person in his behalf.
However, as far as the State is concerned, the money deposited is
regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it can be applied in
payment of any fine and costs that may be imposed by the court.

13
VII. RULE 115 - RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Cases:
1. Perez v. People, G.R. No. 164763, 12 February 2008, 544 SCRA
532
Prepared by Fradejas
FACTS
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner,
who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the
course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of
petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash
Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on
the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount
of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of
P72,784.57. Petitioner was present when the auditor counted the money
in his vault and he signed on a document confirming the amount counted
by the auditor. Two demand letters were sent by the auditor to the
petitioner asking to return the money. When asked by the auditing team
as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that
part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another
portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum
dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol
recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against
petitioner.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of
public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Petitioner was able to return the money by intallment (6), from January
to April 1989 as evidenced by the receipts.
Pretrial was set on June4-5, 1990. Petitioner moved to postpone the
pretrial but it was denied and the pretrial was dispensed and
presentation of evidence by the prosecution proceeded because the
witness, the auditor, came all the way from Bohol. Petitioner denied the
contents of his first Answer to the administrative case filed against him
by the audit team. He claimed it was prepared without the assistance of
counsel and that at the time of its preparation and submission, he was
not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with
diabetes mellitus.
Petitioner rested his case on October 20, 1990 and a decision was
rendered on September 2003 convicting him of malversation
ISSUES
WON petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of his case was
violated when the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision 13 years
after petitioner rested his case? - NO
WON the law upon which the petitioner was convicted and the
sentence imposed is cruel and violated Sec 19, Art 3 of the
Constitution? - NO
HELD
Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation. Shortage of accounts
constitute a prima facie evidence that a public official misappropriated
such funds. Although it is only prima facie, petitioner was unable to
present a clear and convincing evidence to rebut such evidence. The
evidence was established by the testimony of Arlene and petitioner’s first
Answer. The Court was not convinced on the sudden turnaround because
it was executed just to exonerate himself. The argument by the
petitioner that his first Answer was inadmissible because he was
not assisted by counsel is untenable. Jurisprudence is clear that
assistance of counsel is not indispensable to administrative
proceedings. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected
in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry. The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring
public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service. More than that, petitioner’s first Answer
may be taken against him, as he executed it in the course of the
administrative proceedings below. This is pursuant to Rule 130, Section
26 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
14

Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings is interpreted as “a
court that hears before it condemns”. Petitioner was given due process
when he was given a trial and allowed to present his evidence. There is
also no merit in the contention that petitioner’s sickness affected the
preparation of his first Answer. He presented no convincing evidence that
his disease at the time he formulated that answer diminished his
capacity to formulate a true, clear and coherent response to any query.
On the issue of violation of his right to speedy disposition of case. The
Court cited two approaches: the fixed-time period where the defendant
is offered a trial within a specified time period and the demand-waiver
rule which provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his
right to speedy trial for any period for which he has not demanded trial.
The fixed-time approach was rejected because there was no constitutional
basis for holding that the speedy trial can be quantified into a specific
number of days or months. The second rule was also rejected because it
was inconsistent with the Court’s pronouncements on waiver of
constitutional rights. The Court adopted a middle ground which is the
balancing test based on four factors: 1. Length of the delay; 2.
Reason for the delay; 3. Defendant’s assertion of his right; and 4.
Prejudice to the defendant. The first two are closely related and a
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighed heavily against the government. Here, petitioner
failed to prove first two factors. The strength of his efforts will be
affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason
for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice,
which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The
more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.
The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to
strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being
deprived of the right. Failure to assert the right will make it
difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy
trial.
A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course,
should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants
which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court
has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of
a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice
is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past.
Petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation which could be
construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be
dispatched without delay. Petitioner may have truly lived in suspicion
and anxiety for over twelve years. However, any prejudice that may have
been caused to him in all those years was only minimal and is more
imagined than real.
On the issue of cruel punishment, although there is no exact definition of
a law being cruel, earlier decisions point out to the definition that it is
akin to resulting to torture. The Court has ruled in Echagaray case that
even execution by lethal injection is not cruel and degrading. The
definition of what is cruel is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by jumane justice.
Petitioner argues that the sentence imposed was cruel since there was no
damage on the part of the government. The Court rejected this because
damage is not a requisite of the crime of malversation and payment or
reimbursement is not a defense and only a mitigating circumstance. The
Court also said that there is a strong presumption of constitutionality
accorded to statutes and petitioner was unable show why such law on
malversation is cruel, unusual, or inhumane.
The Court affirmed his conviction finding two mitigating circumstances:
1. the return of the money akin to a voluntary surrender; and 2. He
committed the crime because he was impelled by the genuine love for his
brother and family.
2. Benares v. Lim, G.R. No. 173421, 14 December 2006, 511 SCRA
100
Prepared by Rinah Lae Cabusora
15
Petitioner Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa arising from two
contracts of sale executed in 1976 where he sold two parcels of land to
respondent Josephine Lim. Records show that after respondent had fully
paid the amortizations and after the deed of absolute sale was issued,
petitioner mortgaged the same parcels of land to the BPI. When
respondent demanded the delivery of the properties, petitioner obviously
failed to comply. Thus, respondent filed a case for estafa against
petitioner.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness, it was
given 15 days to formally offer its evidence. However, the prosecution did
not make any formal offer of evidence. Petitioner then filed a motion
praying that the prosecution's submission of formal offer of evidence be
deemed waived and the case be dismissed for lack of evidence.
(4 Dec 2001 – Hearing on the motion) Respondent and her counsel failed
to attend the hearing.
(28 Jan 2002) MeTC issued an Order giving the prosecution another 15
days within which to formally offer its evidence which petitioner opposed.
(7 Feb 27 2002) MeTC issued another Order which states that for having
failed to file their formal offer of evidence despite the extension given
them, said court now denies the submission of their formal offer of
evidence. Respondent then filed an MR and prayed for the admission of
Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits claiming that she had difficulty
securing documents from the court which were marked during trial.
Petitioner opposed the motion invoking his right against double jeopardy.
(11 June 2002) MeTC issued an Order stating: “[I]n line with the long
standing policy of the Courts to decide issues based on the substantial
merits of the case and not simply dismiss cases on technical defects, the
Court finds Merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Prosecution.” In order words, MeTC with respect to the MR decided
to allow the respondents to present their evidence.
RTC: MeTC Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute "had the
effect of an acquittal" which is "a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged."
CA: Reversed the RTC Decision. There was no double jeopardy
because the order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute had not
become final and executory due to the timely MR filed by respondent.
Petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated when respondent
failed to formally offer her evidence within the period required by the
trial court. Thus, CA ordered the MeTC to set the case for further trial.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the MeTC's Order dismissing the case for
failure to prosecute amounted to an acquittal which gave
petitioner the right to invoke double jeopardy. (NO)
RATIONALE:
Double jeopardy1 attaches only:
1. upon a valid indictment
2. before a competent court
3. after arraignment
4. when a valid plea has been entered, and
5. when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
In this case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four
elements. As to the last element, there was yet no conviction, nor an
acquittal on the ground that petitioner's guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, but the dismissal of the case was based on failure
to prosecute.
1Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court:
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
16
A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does
not result in double jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit:
1. the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or
2. the case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial.
Prosecution’s delay in filing its formal offer of evidence did not violate
petitioner’s right to a speedy trial since there was justifiable reason for
the delay, i.e., the documents which were previously marked in court were
misplaced.
Indeed, delay is not a mere mathematical computation of the time
involved. Each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it. The
following factors must be considered and balanced: the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
In the instant case, the totality of the circumstances excuses the delay
occasioned by the late filing of the prosecution's formal offer of evidence.
Since the delay was not vexatious or oppressive, it follows that petitioner's
right to speedy trial was not violated, consequently he cannot properly
invoke his right against double jeopardy.
Petitioner’s reliable on the doctrine that when a judge dismisses a case
for failure to prosecute, the termination amounts to an acquittal as the
prosecution will fail to prove the case when the time therefor comes. In
the instant case, testimonial evidence were presented against petitioner.
Thus, even without documentary evidence, his guilt or innocence may be
proven. Second, petitioner appears to have admitted the genuineness and
due execution of respondent's documentary evidence, thus the
prosecution need not even present such documents in view of his
admission. With or without these documents, therefore, the prosecution
has enough evidence left for the trial court's determination of his guilt.
PETITION IS DENIED. The formal offer of evidence is allowed.
NOTE: Delay was only 6 months.
3. People v. Baloloy, G.R. No. 140740, 12 April 2002, 381 SCRA 31
Prepared by Annabelle Jalandoni
On August 3, 1996, the body of Genelyn Camacho was found at the
waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. The body
was discovered by Juanito Baloloy.
Juanito was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.
A black rope was found at the scene of the crime. It was handed over to
Brgy. Cap. Ceniza. When she asked those present as to who owned the
rope, Juanito admitted ownership. With further prodding, JUANITO told
Ceniza that his intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to molest
and kill her. When GENELYN ran away, he chased her then raped her.
Thereafter, he threw her body into the ravine.
After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a wound on
his right shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches on other parts of his
body. Ceniza then turned over JUANITO to a policeman for his own
protection and JUANITO was forthwith brought to the police
headquarters.
Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the MTC of Aurora, Zamboanga del
Sur, testified that when he arrived in his office several people, including
Barangay Captain Ceniza, were already in his courtroom. He learned
that they came to swear to their affidavits before him. After reading the
affidavit of Ceniza, he asked Ceniza whether her statements were true.
Ceniza answered in the affirmative and pointed to JUANITO as the
culprit. Judge Dicon turned to JUANITO and asked him whether the
charge against him was true. JUANITO replied in the dialect:
[N]apanuwayan ko, sir (I was demonized). While Judge Dicon realized
that he should not have asked JUANITO as to the truthfulness of the
allegations against him, he felt justified in doing so because the latter
was not under custodial investigation. This admission by Juanito was
corroborated by Albano, a process server in the court of Judge Dicon.
17
During his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, he was
never assisted by a lawyer.
ISSUES:
W/N the court gravely erred in admitting the alleged confession of
Juanito to witnesses Brgy Cap Ceniza and Judge Dicon as evidence
against the accused.
W/N on account of the inadmissibility of the accused’s alleged confession,
the court gravely erred in convicting the accused based on mere
circumstantial evidence.
HELD:
As to the 1st error, JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated
Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution when it admitted in
evidence his alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza
and Judge Dicon. According to him, the two failed to inform him of his
constitutional rights before they took it upon themselves to elicit from
him the incriminatory information.
In his second assigned error, JUANITO asserts that the prosecution
miserably failed to establish with moral certainty his guilt. He points to
the contradicting testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
concerning the retrieved rope owned by him.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial
investigation does not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither
can it apply to admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the
commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the Constitution are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth.
After admitting ownership of the black rope JUANITO voluntarily
narrated to Ceniza that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her
body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely
and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was
arrested or placed under custody for investigation in connection with the
commission of the offense.
Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior
motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify
falsely against him. Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason
or improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify against the
accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is
trustworthy.
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights
during custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the
latter propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him
of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused
voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the
custodial investigation is deemed to have started. So, he could not
thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the offense without the
assistance of counsel. Judge Dicon’s claim that no complaint has yet been
filed and that neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation
deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that time
JUANITO was already under the custody of the police authorities, who
had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then before
Judge Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.
Records reveal that JUANITO was in fact arrested.
Juanito’s extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon made without the
advice and assistance of counsel may be treated as a verbal admission of
the accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the
persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused.
Juanito’s defense of alibi is futile because of his own admission that he
was at the scene of the crime. As to the inconsistencies on the recovery of
the black rope, the same are irrelevant and trite and do not impair the
credibility of the witnesses. Minor inconsistencies and honest lapses
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses, as they erase
18
doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed. What
matters is that the testimonies of witnesses agree on the essential fact
that JUANITO was the owner of the black rope and the perpetrator of the
crime.
Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that
the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the inferences are based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused. All these requisites are present in the case at bar.
4. People v. Teves, G.R No. 141767, 2 April 2001, 356 SCRA 14
Prepared by Hanston Balonan
Facts:
- The lifeless body of Teresita was found by a group of barangay
tanods in Sta Rosa Laguna
o Strangled and stabbed
- During investigation of the case, barangay tanods identified
Hilarion, husband of Teresita, as the driver of a jeepney they chanced
upon before finding the body
- It was also stated that the spouses had marital problems prior to
the death of Teresita
- Hilarion was charged with the crime of parricide
o Pleaded not guilty
- Prosecution’s Evidence:
o 4 barangay tanods on board a patrol vehicle patrolled a seldom
visited stretch of dirt road bound by an irrigation canal and a
rice field on the other side
o They subsequently they met a passenger jeep coming from the
opposite direction
o the patrol car advance and they found the body
o They reported the what they found to the Laguna Police
Station
o A medico-legal examined the body and identified the body as
Teresita who died from strangulation
o Milagros (one of the barangay tanods) was invited by the PNP
provincial director to identify the driver of the passenger jeep
and she informed the police that it was the husband Hilarion
who was the driver
o Milagros and the other barangay tanod wrote down the partial
plate number of the jeep and identified also some of the jeeps
key features (maroon paint, green reflector paint and lights
on the bumper) on the night that the body was found
o Another sworn statement was made that Hilarion apparently
requested his aunt to bring money to bribe a barangay tanod,
This was turned down. The barangay tanods also noted that
during the funeral of his wife, Hilarion did not look sad but
only worried. Teresita also before her death was able to
confide with her aunt about their marital problems (Hilarion
was no longer happy about their marriage since Teresita was
constantly embarrassing him because of her jealousy over
Hilarion’s dalaga and binata friends). Hilarion wanted to live
separately and sell their house and lot
- Defense’s Evidence:
o Hilarion stayed at their house and helped his wife do the
laundry and his kids with their school work. He left to
proceed with his job. Teresita also left to meet with someone
and she boarded a tricycle. When Hilarion returned Teresita
was not yet home. He looked for her and then heard the news
that a body of a woman was found and it was later on
confirmed that it was Teresita who was said to had been a
victim of gang rape. He was investigated by the police and he
found out that he was being accused for the death of his wife
o 3 of the barangay tanods who allegedly saw Hilarion during
the night of the discovery of the body were brought to identify
him but they failed to do so
o Hilarion was then asked to sit in his jeep and wave. This was
in order to suggest to the barangay tanods that he was the
culprit. When the barangay tanods later on agreed, Hilarion
was arrested
- Hilarion claims that there was failure to identify him as the one
who committed the crime
o Barangay tanods failed to identify him and his vehicle
- The testimonies made regarding his marital problems were
merely suspicions
19
 - Medico-legal even suggested that the crime may have been done
by multiple people
- To prove its case of parricide against the appellant, the
prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence. In order to convict an
accused based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that: 1)
there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Issue: Whether or not circumstantial evidence presented was
sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Held: No
- SC, the identification of the accused was done in an irregular
manner
o Hilarion was made to pose sitting and waving on his jeep
which was suggestive
o Hilarion was already a suspect for the death of his wife and
was more importantly alone without presence of his counsel
o The identification during the night of the discovery according
to Milagros’ testimony was very unlikely
§ It was shown that after backing up to accommodate the
passage of the passenger jeepney allegedly driven by
Hilarion, the patrol car and the jeep were 36 feet
apart making it impossible to clearly identify the
driver even in broad daylight
§ The testimony made by Milagros to the police also
failed to make any mention of the identity and facial
features of the accused
· It was only during the custodial investigation
of Hilarion where Milagros claimed in her
subsequent affidavit that she had seen the
passenger and identified him as Hilarion
· Testimonies of the other 3 barangay tanods were
not acquired to corroborate the claims of
Milagros
· One of the barangay tanods during the
investigation also stated that she couldn’t
identify the driver because he did not have a
plate number at the rear of his vehicle and the
lights inside the jeep were turned off
· It was also contrary to human experience that
Hilarion would confess his guilt to the aunt of
Teresita
· The claims regarding marital problems were
only suspicion and was rendered doubtful
when the victim’s daughter testified that they
had a normal and happy family
· Their neighbor for 17 years also testified that
the relationship of the spouses were generally
smooth
5. People v. Musa, G.R. No. 170472, 3 July 2009, 591 SCRA 619
Prepared by Danielle Olan
A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in
selling marijuana in Zamboanga. Sgt. Ani was instructed by Sgt. Belarga,
NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) leader to conduct test buy on
Musa. Ani was able to buy one news-paper wrapped dried marijuana for
P10.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned with Ani was assigned as the
poseur buyer. He went to Musa’s house, while the NARCOM team
positioned themselves about 90-100 meters away.
Ani gave Musa the P20 marked money. Musa gave Ani 2 newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened it and inspected the
contents. Convinced that they were marijuana, he gave the signal to the
team. The NARCOM teams moved in and inspected the house. Belarga
frisked Musa in the living room. The agents moved in to the kitchen
where they found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana. They
asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they
opened it and found marijuana inside. Musa was arrested and brought to
the NARCOM office. All submitted specimens were examined and gave
20
positive results for marijuana.
For the warrantless seizure to be valid, it must be immediately apparent
RTC found the accused Musa guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now, to the officers that the items may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
appellant Musa contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable otherwise subject to seizure.
doubt and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
(Musa used Ker v. California (US case) - brick of marijuana in the
Musa assails the seizure and admission as evidence of the plastic bag kitchen; valid warrantless seizure based on "plain view"; inapplicable to
containing marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the his this case)
kitchen. Agents found a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at
the corner of the kitchen." They asked the Musa about its contents but 2) None. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however,
failing to get a response, they opened it. During trial, Musa questioned its diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence
admissibility. presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana,
in violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
Issues:
1) Is the plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves admissible The Court holds that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and Sgt.
in evidence? (NO) Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt.
2) If not, does its inadmissibility have any effect on the innocence Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the
of Musa? (NO) crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: APPEAL WAS DISMISSED.

1) No. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure; thus, it may not be
admitted as evidence. OTHER NOTES (just in case):

Although Rule 126 authorizes a warrantless search and seizure DEFENSE: 3 NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house
incidental to a lawful arrest, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The agents
under the circumstances of the case. searched Musa's house did not show their search warrant. They found a
plastic bag whose contents, Musa said, he did not know. Musa was then
The plastic bag was not within their "plain view" when they arrested the handcuffed and was told it was for purposes of clarification.
appellant as to justify its seizure. They arrested the accused in the
living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other In the NARCOM Office, Musa was investigated by a NARCOM agent
evidences where they found the plastic bag. The NARCOM agents which investigation was reduced into writing. The document stated that
could not have known the contents of the bag had they not the marijuana belonged to Musa and he was asked to sign it. Musa
forcibly opened it. Even assuming that the NARCOM agents refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Musa said
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although
"plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" he himself told the agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating
nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent Musa said he was maltreated (4 bullets between his fingers and
from the "plain view" of said object. squeezed, punched him) by the NARCOM agents When the fiscal asked

21
him if he owned the marijuana, he said "no." After that single question,
Musa was brought to Jail.
In his appeal, Musa had other arguments:
1. Sgt. Ani’s testimony is not credible because Musa could not have
transacted with him since they do not know each other
- Court: The day before the buy-bust, Ani conducted a test-buy
and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from Musa.
owned by an Igorot (“Arnold”). After resp was shown a sample, she agreed
to go with them to a pawnshop in Tondo. She was told that it was
genuine. However, she told the three that she had no money.
Pet and Garganta went back to the house of resp the following day. The
two convinced her to go with them to Angeles City, Pampanga to meet
Arnold and see the gold bar. They arrived 2:30 p.m. and met Arnold who
showed them the gold bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth
P60,000. After resp informed them again she had no money, pet continued
to press her that buying the gold bar would be good investment. The
three left and went home.

2. it was impossible for the Musa to sell marijuana while his wife, Mar. 16, 1991 - pet, Garganta, and Adeling returned to the house of
cousin and manicurist were in the house. respondent. Again, they failed to convince her to buy the gold bar.

- Court: Place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited On the next day, the three returned, this time they told respondent that
drugs not crucial; presence of other people will not necessarily the price was reduced to P10,000. She agreed to go with them to Angeles
prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. City to meet Arnold once more. Arnold pretended to refuse the P10,000
offer and insisted on P50,000.
3. Since Sgt. Belarga was about 90m away, he could not have
possibly witnessed the sale. Thus, the uncorroborated testimony On pet’s insistence, on March 18, 1991, the two went to Angeles City and
of Sgt. Ani cannot stand as basis for his conviction. bought the gold bar for PhP 50,000.

- Court: Belarga did not say he saw Musa hand over marijuana.
What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles.
It was not impossible for Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a
distance of 90m, a transaction of “something”.
- The testimony of the poseur-buyer is sufficient to prove the
consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug.
6. Aquino v. Paiste, G.R. No. 147782, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 255
Prepared by Chris Paredes
Facts:
Mar. 14, 1991, 9:00AM - pets. Juanita Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta, and
another woman (“Adeling”), went to the house of resp. Teresita Paiste
(611 Peñalosa St., Tondo, Manila.) The children of resp. and pet. were
grade school classmates. Pet started to convince resp to buy a gold bar
Mar. 19, 1991 - resp had the gold bar tested and she was informed that it
was fake. Resp then proceeded to pet’s house to inform the latter that the
gold bar was fake. Pet replied that they had to see Garganta, and that
she had nothing to do with the transaction.
Mar. 27, 1991 - resp brought pet to NBI-NCR in the presence of Atty.
Tolentino where pet amicably promised respondent they would locate
Garganta, and the document they both signed would be disregarded
should they locate Garganta.
April 6, 1991, petitioner brought Garganta to the house of respondent. In
the presence of Barangay Chairperson Pablo Atayde and a police officer,
respondent pointed to Garganta as the person who sold the fake gold bar.
Garganta was brought to the police station where there was a demand
against Garganta alone.

22
Subsequently, resp filed a criminal complaint from which an Information
against Garganta (pet), and 3 others for estafa filed before the Manila
RTC. The Information reads:
That on or about March 18, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused conspiring and confederating together with three others,
whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Teresita B. Paiste in the following
manner to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to the said Teresita B.
Paiste to the effect that a certain Arnold, an Igorot is selling a gold bar for
P50,000.00, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded
in inducing the said Teresita B. Paiste to buy the said gold bar and to give
and deliver to said accused the total amount of P50,000.00, the herein
accused well knowing that their manifestations and representations were
all false and untrue and were made only for the purpose of obtaining, as
in fact they did obtain the said amount of P50,000.00, which once in their
possession, they thereafter willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Teresita B. Paiste in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
Accused Garganta and the others remained at large; only petitioner was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial ensued with the prosecution presenting the testimonial evidence of
private complainant, herein respondent, Yolanda Pomer, and Ely
Tolentino. For her defense, petitioner testified along with Barangay
Chairperson Atayde, Jose Aquino, and SPO1 Roberto Cailan. The
prosecution presented as documentary evidence three (3) documents, one
of which is the amicable settlement signed in the NBI, while the defense
relied solely on its testimonial evidence.
Relevant Issue / Held:
(1) Whether the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is
admissible as evidence. – YES, admissible.
Ratio:
(1) When petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR on
March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already under custodial
investigation and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the
Miranda Rule has set in. Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was
provided with one in the person of Atty. Uy. the custodial investigation on
the inquiry or investigation for the crime was either aborted or did not
push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to
amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to
counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their
signatures on it in the presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely
Tolentino
First, she was provided with counsel (Atty. Uy). Presumption that Atty.
Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose interests are not
adverse to petitioner has not been overturned. Petitioner has merely
posed before the CA and SC that Atty. Uy may not be an independent and
competent counsel without any shred of evidence.
Second, pet emphasized that Atty. Uy was not presented as witness by
the prosec and that what pet and Atty. Uy supposedly conferred about
was likewise not presented. Consultation and information between
counsel and client is privileged communication and the counsel may not
divulge these without the consent of the client. A party in a case has full
discretion to choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to bolster
its case. Furthermore, pet could have asserted its right “to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses,” for which she
could have compelled Atty. Uy to testify. She did not.
Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uy’s
appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when
she signed the amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held in People v.
Jerez, when "the accused never raised any objection against the lawyer’s
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer" the accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer. Verily, in the
instant case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she
23
conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable settlement with
waiver of right to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer
of NBI agent Atty. Tolentino upon cross-examination about the
petitioner’s counsel in the NBI, could be evasive when the NBI agent
merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty. Uy, was
provided petitioner.
Fourth, when pet engaged Atty. Uy as lawyer, she undoubtedly executed
the amicable settlement. She was provided with an independent counsel
and such “right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however,
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.” An amicable settlement is not and does not partake of the
nature of an extrajudicial confession or admission but is a contract
between the parties within the parameters of their mutually recognized
and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty. Uy
safeguarded petitioner’s rights even if the custodial investigation did not
push through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or
intimidation.
Moreover, pet’s Miranda rights were not violated. The infractions of
Miranda rights render inadmissible "only the extrajudicial confession
or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation." An
admission is an act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact, while confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein.
Fifth, granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of
an admission, the document petitioner signed would still be
admissible since none of her constitutional rights were violated.
Petitioner’s allegations of threat, violence, and intimidation remain but
bare allegations. Allegations are not proof.
In fine, we agree with the courts a quo that even assuming arguendo that
the amicable settlement is not admissible, still the conviction of petitioner
would be affirmed as conspiracy was duly proven by other pieces of
evidence.
7. People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, 20 June 1997, 274 SCRA 553
Prepared by Luigi Bonoan
FACTS: August 22, 1990: Alfredo and his wife Adelaida Alcantara were at
home watching TV when at around 11:30pm, Susana Serzo (mother of the
accused) and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at their doorstep
and pleaded for help in order to bring out her grandchildren who were
being held inside their house by her son. The couple went with them to
their house across their residence. The spouses were able to rescue the
grandchildren and to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their
house, Alfredo Alcantara was stabbed at his back by the Mario Serzo
(accused), forcing the him to scamper. However, the accused overpowered
him causing his fall in the canal and was repeatedly stabbed. Adelaida
Alcantara shouted for help but was attacked by the accused as she was
only half-meter away from her husband. However, Adelaida was able to
hold the hand of the accused and persistently fought him. The commotion
had already caught the attention of the residents within the vicinity who
responded to help her thereby causing the accused to flee. The victim was
confirmed dead upon arrival in the hospital. The Medico-legal Officer
testified in Court that the victim sustained 3 stab wounds, two at the
back and one in his chest, which caused the victim’s death.
January 8, 1991: During arraignment, which appellant appeared without
counsel, the trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de
oficio for the arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that the
arraignment be reset and that he be given time to engage a counsel of his
own choice, which the trial court granted.
February 11, 1991: Appellant appeared without a counsel de parte. He
was nonetheless arraigned with the assistance of Counsel de oficio
Wilfredo Lina-ac and pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial was waived and trial
was set on April 22, May 6 and 13, 1991 for the reception of the
prosecution evidence and June 3 and 17, 1991 for the defense.
24
The hearings scheduled on April 22, 1991 and May 6, 1991 were cancelled
on motion of the Public Prosecutor. On both dates, appellant appeared
with Atty. Lina-ac. On May 13 and June 3, 1991, trial proceeded with the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses. On behalf of appellant, Atty. Lina-ac
cross-examined the said witnesses.
June 17, 1991: Trial was again cancelled as appellant appeared without
counsel.
August 13, 1991: The prosecution rested its case.
November 4 and 11, 1991: Presentation of evidence for the defense was
reset as appellant was not ready to testify and he manifested his
intention to secure the services of a counsel de parte.
On March 3, 1992: Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de oficio in view
of appellants manifestation and refusal to cooperate with said counsel.
On April 6, 1992 appellant appeared without counsel, forcing the trial
court to appoint another counsel de oficio, Bella Antonano. Counsels for
both parties agreed to reset the trial, but appellant refused to sign the
minutes of the proceedings.
April 27, 1992: Over vehement objection from the prosecution, hearing
was reset for the last time as appellant was still looking for a counsel de
parte.
August 25, 1992: Appellant appeared without counsel; thus, the trial
court appointed Atty. Garcia of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as
appellants counsel de oficio. Again, trial was postponed.
September 1 and October 19, 1992: Trial was postponed on motion of Atty.
Garcia. Appellant again refused to sign the minutes of the proceedings for
both trial dates.
November 5, 1992: Appellant refused to cooperate with Atty. Garcia by
declining to take the witness stand, forcing the defense to rest its case.
Both parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda in ten
days, after which the case would be submitted for decision. Atty. Garcia
was further ordered to manifest within the same period whether
appellant would change his mind and cooperate with her. No
memorandum or manifestation was ever filed by appellant.
Appellant wrote Judge Angeles three times within the period beginning
December 16, 1992 until April 2, 1993, seeking legal advice and the early
resolution of the case.
The Branch Clerk of Court replied to him twice, informing him that
Judge Angeles was prohibited by law from giving legal advice to litigants
in cases pending in his court and that a decision was forthcoming.
July 13, 1994: Appellant wrote the Deputy Court Administrator asking
for the early resolution of his case. The latter referred said letter to Judge
Angeles for appropriate action.
August 23, 1994: The assailed Decision convicting appellant of murder
was promulgated.
RTC: Convicted appellant on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. Appellant was positively identified as the assailant by the
widow, Adelaida Alcantara, who survived his attack. Not satisfied with
the RTC’s Decision, appellant through Counsel Carmelo L. Arcilla
appealed.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court did not give him enough time to
engage a counsel de parte, effectively depriving him of the
chance to present evidence in his defense.
HELD: Appellant’s claim: That he was not given sufficient time to engage
a counsel de parte, thereby preventing him from presenting evidence in
his defense. In his Brief he adds, but without giving particulars or proof,
that allegedly his counsels de oficio did not exert their utmost efforts in
representing him.
The Solicitor General’s Brief: Appellant had been given ample time to
secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his subsequent appearances
in court without such counsel and his act of allowing this situation to
continue until the presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of
25
intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying his own
presentation of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party,
the trial court and the orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of
his counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance
substantiating his claim that he was not effectively represented. It taxes
the mind to think that, almost two years since appellant first invoked his
right to be represented by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who
would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he cooperate with his court-
named lawyers.
The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant’s
constitutional right to counsel because he was adequately represented by
three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty.
Garcia. Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure and
convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the
speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they
countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy
requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant
was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown to be
negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.
No reason to reverse the conviction of appellant. In a case of murder or
homicide, it is enough that the death of the victim and the responsibility
of the person who caused such death are proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Both elements were duly established by the prosecution witnesses. The
medico-legal testified to the fact of death while Widow Adelaida
Alcantara positively identified the appellant as the assailant.
Based on the facts established by the prosecution which remain
uncontested, the Court affirms the trial court’s appreciation of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. To constitute treachery, two
conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate
and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The
manner of the attack itself is proof enough of alevosia. Widow Adelaida
vividly described the stabbing.
From this testimony, it appears that appellant waited for the victim and
his wife and pounced on them swiftly and without warning. The victim
and his wife were already on their way home after transferring
appellants children to a safe place. They were unarmed as they had
absolutely no idea that appellant would attack them right then and from
behind. The manner of the attack tended directly and especially to insure
the execution of the crime without risk to appellant and virtually no
chance for the victim to defend himself. Even Adelaidas life would have
been mortally threatened were it not for the timely intervention of her
neighbors.
DISPOSITIVE: Actual and moral damages require the presentation of
proof before they can be awarded by the trial court. According to
Adelaida, burial expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 were incurred. This
is separate and distinct from civil indemnity awarded under prevailing
jurisprudence, which is granted without further proof beyond the fact of
death and the accused’s responsibility therefor. Moral damages were not
discussed at all in Adelaidas testimony. Hence, without any factual basis,
the award of moral damages is not justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, but the
award of moral damages is DELETED. Instead, appellant is ORDERED
TO PAY the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and actual damages
of P2,000.00 as burial expenses.
8. Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014, 730 SCRA 655
Prepared by Abbey Perez
Facts
Agents and special investigators of the NBI, received a Complaint from
Corazon and Charito. The complainants claimed that Ariel, the live-in
partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown
male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. The
complainants were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office
where they met "James" who demanded from them 100k, later lowered to
40k, in exchange for the release of Ariel.
26
After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to NBI to file a complaint
and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at
the NBI, Charito even received calls supposedly from "James" instructing
her to bring the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI verified the text messages received
by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to implement an
entrapment operation. The officers were able to nab Dela Cruz by using a
pre-marked 500P bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made
part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon. Dela
Cruz was later brought to the forensic laboratory. There, Dela Cruz was
required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive
result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory
test result.
Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15 (R.A.) 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act in an Information which states that
he, a public officer, Police Officer 2 of PNP, was found positive for use of
Shabu. When arraigned, Dela Cruz pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Dela Cruz denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said
Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents.
He claimed that when he was required to extract urine for drug
examination, he refused saying he wanted it to be done PNP Crime Lab
and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested
to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to
no avail.
RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA found the
appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Dela Cruz
argued that the CA
overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug testing
conducted under circumstances similar to his would violate a person's
right to privacy.
Disregarding Dela Cruz's objection regarding the admissibility of the
evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his
right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is
already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony
against himself. Extracting urine from one's body is merely a mechanical
act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
Issue
Whether the drug test conducted upon the Dela Cruz is legal – No
Rationale
The following are the elements of Section 15 of RA 9165:
(1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test;
and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. Hence, a
drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for,
among others, the "importation", "sale, trading, administration (and other
acts) of dangerous drugs.
It would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges
under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug
use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required
under Sec. 15.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the
form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found
positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal,
the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law
enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for
use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should
have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During
Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).
27
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or
arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all
other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all
persons apprehended or arrested for any crime.
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a
person's right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial
compulsion (self-incrimination).
Dela Cruz never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he
is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest
curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. However, "a waiver
of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."
There are allowable exceptions to such proscription. Such exceptions,
however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the
principal cause of the arrest. The constitutional right of an accused
against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely
mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance
and guiding hand of counsel is not required.
The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a
testimonial act.
In the instant case, a urine sample is not material to the charge of
extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that
the extraction of Dela Cruz's urine for purposes of drug testing was
"merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
The situation in Gutang (case cited) was categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what
was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. The
circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the circumstances of
Dela Cruz in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a
drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were
other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes
charged. In the present case, though, Dela Cruz was arrested for
extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his
urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for
his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of Dela Cruz's right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination. Dela Cruz refused to have his urine extracted
and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He
was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile,
because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under
those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable…
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
28
 ○ Mother of the victim and prosecutor agreed and he got 10
years each.
● Daughter Magat revived case saying punishment too light.
● Magat arraigned again and pleaded not guilty on both
informations.
● Magat later on pleaded guilty after being told what it would
mean.
○ Sentenced to death for both counts.
● Magat’s defense argues that having been convicted earlier on
guilty plea means judgment cannot be set aside for trial again.
○ Also argues that trial court did not follow procedure in
pleading guilty of a heinous crime.
ISSUE: WON plea of guilty in earlier arraignment attaches first
jeopardy?
HELD: NO. Plea bargaining as envisioned by the law is a plea of guilt to
a lesser offense in exchange for a lesser penalty. Here Magat pleaded
guilty to rape and not a lesser offense for a lower penalty. This judgment
is void. Procedural defect was rectified when Magat was arraigned again
and he didn’t question it the first time so it was waived.

Magat also says that Rule 116 s3 was not followed which says court
should a) conduct searching inquiry into voluntariness, b) require
prosecution to present evidence, and c) ask accused if he desires
to present evidence. The courts actually did fulfill these requirements.
Courts explained to Magat what a guilty plea would mean, and
VIII. RULE 116 - ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA prosecution actually presented enough evidence to convict him anyway.
Cases:

1. People v. Magat, G.R. No. 130026, 31 May 2000, 332 SCRA 517
Prepared by Luigi Ocampo 2. People v. Ulit, G.R. No. 131799-901, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA
● Magat raped his daughter twice, once when she as 17 and again 374
when she was 19. Prepared by
● 2 informations for rape filed against him.
● Upon arraignment Magat pleaded guilty but bargained for a Facts:
lesser penalty for each case. Ulit was charged with qualified rape. He initially pleaded not guilty.

29

After the prosecution rested its case, Ulit’s counsel manifested that Mr.
Ulit will be changing his plea from Not Guilty to Guilty. The trial court
then suspended the proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five
minutes to confer with his counsel. When trial resumed, the appellant
reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by the court that he could
be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his
decision to plead guilty.
He was CONVICTED and sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and
indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
Issue: WON the trial court was correct in accepting Ulit’s plea of guilty?
Held: NO.
When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to change his
plea of not guilty to guilty, it is necessary for the trial court to conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay, this Court
enumerated the following duties of the trial court under the rule:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
In People vs. Aranzado, these are the guidelines as to how the trial court
may conduct its searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the
custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c)
under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the possibility
that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either
by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging
quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the
penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence.
Not infrequently indeed an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient
treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or
parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under
these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the
charges against him or make him reenact the manner in which he
perpetrated the crime, or cause him to supply missing details or
significance.
In People vs. Ostia, the trial court is also required to probe thoroughly
into the reasons or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for
a change of plea of the accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain
to him the elements of the crime for which he is charged as well as the
nature and effect of any modifying circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special qualifying
circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and his civil
liabilities for the crime for which he would plead guilty to.
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the
appellant’s voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilty.
30

(I suggest reading the stenographic notes)
3. Daan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 163972-77, 28 March 2008, 550
SCRA 233
Prepared by Beeya Echauz
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with Mayor Kuizon were charged for three counts of
malversation of public funds by falsifying the time book and payrolls for
given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction
of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte. In addition to the charge
for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three counts of
falsification of public document by a public officer or employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of not
guilty and substitute the same with a plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute their plea of not
guilty to the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of falsification of a
public document by a private individual. On the other hand, in the
malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty
thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as
acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the lesser crime of
falsification of public document by a private individual for it will strengthen
the cases against the principal accused, Mayor Kuizon who appears to be the
mastermind of these criminal acts. However, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by
the prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to
justify its approval. Likewise, it denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Office of the Special Prosecutor: Granted Plea
Sandiganbayan: Denied Plea
SC: Granted Plea
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N the the petitioner may plead guilty to a lesser offense of falsification of a
public document by a private individual because it is necessary included in
the crime of falsification of public document by a public officer and the lesser
offense of Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer because it is
necessary included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds –– YES.
RATIO:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject
to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
The lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public
Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in the complaint or
information constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter (Art. 171 vis-a-vis Art.
172).
31
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the crime of custody of local government funds, not to mention that petitioner has already
Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful narration of facts restituted the amount of P18,860.00 involved in this case.
to be established, the following elements must concur:
(a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration
of facts;
(b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated;
(c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.

Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under Article 172, paragraph

1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following elements:
(a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who
did not take advantage of his official position;
(b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.

In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner are
sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. In the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser
offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not
appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in
allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato,
Leyte. In the same vein, he may plead guilty for rendering account by an
accountable officer instead of malversation of public funds.

Therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case
likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to
such lesser offenses.
Moreover, petitioner is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his
duty as foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or

32
IX. RULE 117 - MOTION TO QUASH
Cases:
1. Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, 8 December 2010, 637 SCRA 615
Prepared by Paolo Dizon
FACTS
- Antone executed an affidavit-complaint for bigamy against Beronilla before the
OCP of Pasay City.
o The marriage with Beronilla in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when he
contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
- Prosecution filed an Information before the RTC, Pasay City; raffled to Branch
115.
- Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Beronilla moved to quash
the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense.
o He informed the court that his marriage with Antone was declared
null and void by the RTC of Naval, Biliran; and that such decree has
already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on April
2007.
o Since the marriage had been declared null and void from the
beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a
first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a crime of Bigamy.
- Prosecution, through Antone: Marriage in 1978 has not yet been severed
when he contracted a second marriage in 1991. For which reason, bigamy
has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null
and void.
- TC quashed the Information: First element of Bigamy was missing which
contemplates that the first marriage must at least be annullable or voidable but
not void.
o Prosecution moved for reconsideration. Moreover, a declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense.
o MR denied, CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. MR denied or lack of merit.
Hence, the Petition.
Issue 1:
W/N the filing of the present petition is in violation of Beronilla’s right
against double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been
practically acquitted when the trial court quashed the Information – NO
- For jeopardy to attach, the ff. requisites must concur:
o There is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
o The same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
o There is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges;
o The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise
dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
- 3RD AND 4TH requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case.
o Beronilla has not yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the
Motion to Quash;
o The case was dismissed not merely with his consent but at his instance.
- Jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order
sustaining a motion to quash. The granting of a motion to quash anchored on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.
Issue 2:
W/N the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion – YES
- A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint of Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information.
- This motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,
for which reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those
appearing on the face of the information.
- There are no apparent defects in the allegations in the Information in the case
at bar. The accusatory portion sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all
the element of the crime of Bigamy.
- The documents presented by Beronilla showing the decree of nullity and that it
is final and executory and duly registered with the registrar are pieces of evidence
that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information. This
should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be
raised in a motion to quash.
- The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between Antone and
Beronilla only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is immaterial
for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for
Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
-RTC and CA Orders are set aside. Case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
33

2. People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510, 23 July 2008, 559 SCRA
492
Prepared by
The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before
the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 (e) of (R.A. 3019) or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information states that from
1976-Feb 1986 in the City of Manila Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez who
was then the Provincial Governor of Leyte willfully, unlawfully and
criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government
without abandoning said position, and using his influence with his
brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself
appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries,
particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.),
knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in
violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of
Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of
Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both
the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of
Leyte in the amount of US $276,911.56 (P5,806,709.50).
Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely:
(1) that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the offense
with which the accused was charged; and
(2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription. He posited that the 15-year prescription under Section 11 of
R.A. 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary investigation of the case for
an offense committed from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in
May 2001 after a Division of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to
the Office of the Ombudsman. There was no interruption of the
prescriptive period for the offense because the proceedings undertaken
under the 1987 complaint filed with the PCGG were null and void
pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG and
Cruz, Jr.
He argued that the acts imputed against him do not constitute an
offense because:
(a) the cited provision of the law applies only to public officers charged
with the grant of licenses, permits, or other concessions, and the act
charged receiving dual compensation is absolutely irrelevant and
unrelated to the act of granting licenses, permits, or other concessions;
and
(b) there can be no damage and prejudice to the Government considering
that he actually rendered services for the dual positions of Provincial
Governor of Leyte and Ambassador to foreign countries.
The People opposed the motion to quash asserting that Section 3 (e) of
R.A. 3019 does not apply to him when Section 2 (b) of the law states that
corrupt practices may be committed by public officers who include
"elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government." On the issue of
prescription, the People argued that Section 15, Article XI of the
Constitution provides that the right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches
or estoppel, and that prescription is a matter of technicality to which no
one has a vested right.
The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the
first Resolution (Resolution 1) stating that the allegation of damage and
prejudice to the Government is without basis, absent a showing that the
accused did not actually render services for his two concurrent positions.
To receive compensation for actual services rendered would not come
within the ambit of improper or illegal use of funds or properties of the
government; nor would it constitute unjust enrichment tantamount to the
damage and prejudice of the government. The accused may have been
inefficient as a public officer by virtue of his holding of two concurrent
positions, but such inefficiency is not enough to hold him criminally liable
under the Information charged against him.
34
The Information does not sufficiently aver how the act of receiving dual
compensation resulted to undue injury to the government so as to make
the accused liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan found no merit in Romualdez' prescription argument.
The People moved to reconsider the SB’s Resolution, citing "reversible
errors", which the SB denied (Resolution 2) restating its first resolution
and concluded that that there could be no damage and prejudice to the
government "in the absence of any contention that receipt of such was
tantamount to giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
any party and to acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross excusable negligence.". Romualdez also moved for a partial
reconsideration of the Resolution's ruling on prescription which the court
eventually granted.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in quashing the
subject information. Private respondent responded with a Motion to
Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam, wherein he argued that the proper
remedy to an order granting a motion to quash a criminal information is
by way of appeal under Rule 45 since such order is a final order and not
merely interlocutory.
The People asserted that while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, or that certiorari is not a
substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal, the rule may be relaxed when
the issue raised is purely legal, when public interest is involved, and in
case of urgency. It also argued that certiorari may also be availed of
where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; and that it
is within this Court's power to suspend or exempt a particular case from
the operation of the rules when its strict application will frustrate rather
than promote justice. Thus, the People asked for a review of the case
based on substantial justice and the claimed merits of the instant
petition.
Issue: WON the SB acted with GAD? YES.
Held: Motion to Quash: Invalid
GAD Issue: Sandiganbayan acted with GAD
Romualdez' motion to quash that gave rise to the present case was
anchored on Section 3 (a) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
legal provision under which Romuldez stands charged is Corrupt
practices by public officers. Reduced to its elements, a violation under this
provision requires that:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his functions; and
3. His action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave a private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference.
The Sandiganbayan's actions grossly violated the defined
standards. Its conclusions are based on considerations that
either not appropriate in evaluating a motion to quash; are
evidentiary details not required to be stated in an Information;
are matters of defense that have no place in an Information; or
are statements amounting to rulings on the merits that a court
cannot issue before trial.
An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the
offense, not the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged
amounted to undue injury or damage. Whether or not compensation has
been earned through proper and commensurate service is a matter in
excess of the ultimate facts the Information requires and is one that
Romualdez, not the Information, should invoke or introduce into
the case as a matter of defense.
In the context of ruling on a motion to quash, the allegation that services
were not rendered that the Sandiganbayan wished to require,not being a
fact material to the elements of the offense, is an extraneous matter
that is inappropriate for the Sandiganbayan to consider for
inclusion in the Information. That the Sandiganbayan has a fixation on
this approach is patent from a reading of the second assailed Resolution
when the Sandiganbayan, following the same line of thought, once more
35
insisted that "receiving compensation is an incident of actual services
rendered, hence it cannot be construed as injury or damage to the
government." Thus again, the Sandiganbayan grossly erred in the same
manner it did in the first Resolution.
For the Sandiganbayan to assume, too, and to conclude, that there was no
damage and prejudice since there was no illegality in being compensated
for actual services rendered, is to pass upon the merits of the case - a task
premature for the Sandiganbayan to undertake at the motion-to-quash
stage of the case. In so doing, the Sandiganbayan prematurely
ruled on at least two matters.
Worse than the premature ruling was a patent speculation that the
Sandiganbayan undertook in considering "inefficiency" and arriving at its
conclusion. Still much worse was its misreading of what a violation of
Section 3(e), R.A. 3019 involves. Correctly understood, it is not the
holding of two concurrent positions or the attendant efficiency in the
handling of these positions, but the causing of undue injury to the
government that is at the core of a Section 3(e) violation.
The Sandiganbayan fared no better and similarly gravely abused its
discretion in the second Resolution when it. That no allegation of "giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to any party" appears in
the Information is due obviously to the fact that this allegation is not
necessary. In short, the Information is complete solely on the basis of the
"undue injury" allegation.
Even a cursory examination of the Information would show that an
allegation of "evident bad faith" was expressly made, complete with a
statement of how the bad faith was manifested Whether this allegation
can be successfully proven by evidence or established through an analysis
of the nature of the power of appointment remains to be seen after trial,
not at the motion-to-quash stage of the case. At this earlier stage, all
that is required is for this allegation to be an ultimate fact directly
providing for an element of the offense.
In light of all these, it is concluded that the Sandiganbayan grossly and
egregiously erred in the considerations it made and in the conclusions it
arrived at when it quashed the Information against Romualdez, to the
point of acting outside its jurisdiction through the grave abuse of
discretion that attended its actions. Its errors are so patent and gross
as to amount to action outside the contemplation of law. Thus, the
declaration of the nullity of the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolutions is in
order.
Other Main Issue not directly pertinent but he might ask:
The Threshold Issue: Rule 65/45
The appeal, as Romualdez correctly maintains, is through Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606 (as amended by Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 8249), which provides that decisions and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan are appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule
45.The People asks the SC to relax the application of the rules on the
modes of review and posits that this requirement does not foreclose the
use of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of
discretion when the issue is purely legal, when public interest is involved,
or in case of urgency.
Rule 45 provides for the broad process of appeal to the Supreme Court on
pure errors of law committed by the lower court. Rule 65, on the other
hand, provides a completely different basis for review through the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. The writ is extraordinary because it
solely addresses lower court actions rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.;certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal
a judgment or final order despite the availability of that remedy; a
petition for certiorari cannot likewise be a substitute for a lost appeal.
In the spirit embodied in this constitutional provision and in the interest
of substantial justice, we will not hesitate to deviate from the strict
application of our procedural rules when grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is properly and substantially
alleged in a petition filed after the lapse of the period for appeal under
Rule 45 but prior to the lapse of the period for filing a Rule 65 petition .
Conceptually, no major deviation from the rules in fact transpires in
36
doing this. The ruling's jurisdictional defect and the demands of of official functions to Mobil Link Enterprises causing the purchase of
substantial justice that we believe should receive primacy over the strict 1 computer unit costing P120,000.
application of rules of procedure, require that we so act.

Issue1: W/N there is a denial of procedural due process on the

part of the petitioners when the SP filed the Amended
3. Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166062, 26 September 2006, Information without authority from or the approval of the
503 SCRA 252 Ombudsman; W/N the Amended Information is valid in the
Prepared by Rosario Reyes absence of such authority or approval of the Ombudsman under
FACTS the circumstances – YES
- Ombudsman resolved to file charges of violation of Section 3(e) of RA - The delegation of the power to authorize the filing of information was
3019 against petitioners Mayor Perez (San Manuel, Pangasinan) and only made to Deputy Ombudsman, and not to Special Prosecutor. All that
Municipal Treasurer Juanita Apostol. was delegated to the SP was the discretional authority to review and
o They caused the purchase of 1 computer unit costing P120,000 modify the Deputy Ombudsmen-authorized information, but even this is
acquisition by personal canvass in violation of Sections 362 and RA 7160 subject to the condition that such modification must be “without
- Petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) a Motion for Leave of departing from, or varying in any way, the contents of the basic
Court to File MR alleging discovery of new evidence which will change Resolution, Order or Decision”
the outcome of the case if presented and appreciated [reassessment by
the COA auditors difference between the subject computer and that Issue2: Is there an implied delegation of the power to prosecute
canvassed by COA is not really that material. under RA 6770 such that the Special Prosecutors are presumed to
o Motion initially denied, but later granted petitioners 10 days from have been delegated such power in the absence of a prohibition
receipt of the current Resolution within which to formalize their MR in from the Ombudsman – NO
the Office of the Ombudsman. - Petitioners claim that the doctrine of qualified political agency does not
- Office of the Special Prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation. Asst. apply to the Office of the Ombudsman, since the latter is an apolitical
Special Prosecutor Galisanao prepared a Memorandum recommending agency, and is far different form the bureaucracy to which said doctrine
the withdrawal of the Information. However, in the portion of the applies.
Memorandum earmarked for the Special Prosecutor’s action, SP Dennis - Petitioners are correct. The SP is not an alterego of the Ombudsman. In
M. Villa-Ignacio chose the action “DO NOT CONCUR” and wrote a any case, the Ombudsman could very well make a general delegation of
marginal note recommending further fact finding and an administrative powers to the SP, if it is so desired. Based on the office orders issued by
case filed against Apostol, after withdrawing the Information for violation the Ombudsman, there is no such intention to do so.
of RA 3019. - The Ombudsman would be severely hampered from exercising his power
- Supplemental Memorandum. ASP Galisanao recommended an of control if we are to allow the SP to authorize the filing of informations
amendment of the Information instead of a withdrawal in the first instance.
o Approved by SP Villa-Ignacio. o While the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether or
o Galisanao filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Information not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the
- Amended Information charges Perez and Apostol for violation of Section case is filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan which has full
3(e) of RA 3019. control of the case so much so that informations may not be
o Give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge

37
dismissed without the court’s approval.
- When the law entails a specific procedure to be followed, unwarranted
shortcuts lead to the violation of the sacred right to due process.
Petition granted. Amended information is set aside.
4. People v. Laggui, G.R. No. 76262-63, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA
305
Prepared by Karla
FACTS:
The accused Eliseo F. Soriano is a minister of the "Church of God in Jesus
Christ, the Pillar and Ground of the Truth in the Philippines." He first
met the offended party Lolita 0. Hizon in July or August, 1983, when her
godson, Arcadio Malla who is a member of Soriano's congregation,
introduced the latter to her. Hizon became interested in Soriano's
religious group and became a member.
In the second week of August 1983, Soriano confided to Hizon his worries
about his indebtedness of P 250,000 to Dr. and Mrs. Zoilo Pangilinan. The
obligation was secured by a mortgage on the congregation's property
which would mature on October 4, 1983. Hizon offered to help. She
agreed to lend P250,000 in cash to Soriano who would issue a post-dated
check to her for the same amount.
To raise the P 250,000, Hizon borrowed against her time deposit at the
Unity Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (USLA). Since she and her
husband were leaving for the United States on a short trip in August
1983, she signed the necessary papers for the loan before their departure.
She also executed a special power of attorney authorizing her daughter,
Rose Anne Hizon, to receive from USLA the P250,000 check representing
the proceeds of her loan and to endorse and deliver it to Soriano upon
Soriano's issuing to her a post-dated check for the same amount of
P250,000. Accordingly, on October 4, 1983, Rose Anne got the P250,000
check from the USLA endorsed it to Soriano who issued, in exchange
therefor, his Banco Filipino check for the same amount. His check was
undated.
When Lolita Hizon arrived from her trip, she asked Soriano why his
check bore no date. Soriano told her to date it "July 18, 1984" so he would
have sufficient time to fund it. When Hizon deposited the check on that
date, the drawee bank dishonored it because Soriano's account with it
had been closed as of July 10, 1984, or one week before the due date of the
check.
During the trial on the merits, Soriano admitted that when he issued the
check he did not have enough funds in the bank, and that he failed to
deposit the needed amount to cover it. He alleged that he issued the
check as "a temporary receipt for what he had received". Despite repeated
demands to make good his check, or to replace it with cash, Soriano did
neither.
Trial Court: Ruled that the accused could not be convicted of a violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law, B.P. Blg. 22, because the information failed
to allege that he knew, when he issued the check, that he would not have
sufficient funds for its payment in full upon its presentment to the
drawee bank.
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the State alleges that the
information is sufficient, hence, respondent Judge committed an error of
law, and/or gravely abused his discretion, in dismissing the case.
ISSUE: WON Information in Criminal Case No. 2934 is fatally defective
HELD
The elements of the offense are:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or
for Value,
2. the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, and
38

3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
The "defect" which respondent Judge perceived in the information was
the failure to allege that the accused, as maker or drawer of the check at
the time of issue, knew of the insufficiency of his funds in the bank for
payment of the check in full "upon its presentment". In the court's
opinion, it was not enough for the information to have alleged that the
accused knew when he issued the check that he then did not have
sufficient funds in the bank; the information should have alleged that the
accused knew that he would not have sufficient funds in the bank to pay
the check in full "upon its presentment". It believed that the absence of an
allegation that the accused foresaw or had foreknowledge of the
insufficiency of his bank account upon presentment of the check for
payment, was fatal to the information.
The interpretation is erroneous.
The presence of the first and third elements of the offense constitutes
prima facie evidence that the second element exists. The maker's
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the
dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds.
Since the information in Criminal Case No. 2934 did allege that the
accused, for value received, unlawfully and feloniously issued the
postdated check "knowing fully well that he had no funds and/or
insufficient funds in the bank . . . and when the said check was presented
for encashment, said check was dishonored and returned with the
information that the said check is drawn against 'CLOSE ACCOUNT'
the information satisfies the legal definition of the offense under Section
1, B.P. Blg. 22. It is sufficient. The trial court erred in dismissing it.
[Dismissal; Double Jeopardy]
However, although its decision is erroneous, that decision may
not be annulled or set aside because it amounted to a judgment of
acquittal. It became final and executory upon its promulgation.
The State may not appeal that decision for it would place the
accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the offense in
violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy (Art.
III, Sec. 21, 1987 Constitution).
This case is somewhat similar to the case of US vs. Yam Tung Way, 21
Phil. 67, where this Court ruled that the defendant, after having been
discharged by a competent court, cannot again be put on trial for the
same offense "whether his discharge be the result of formal acquittal or of
a ruling of the court upon some question of law arising at the trial; no
appeal lies in such case on behalf of the government." The accused
therein was charged with infringement of literary rights. After trial, he
moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground that the
evidence of the Government did not establish the commission of the
offense charged. The Court reserved its judgment on the motion and
required the defendant to submit his evidence. Afterwards, it discharged
him on the ground that no copyright law existed then in the Philippines.
The Government appealed. The Supreme Court held that the
Government had no right to appeal.
Since in the present case the accused Eliseo Soriano had been
arraigned, pleaded "not guilty," and was tried upon a valid and
sufficient information (although the lower court erroneously
thought otherwise) and the case against him was dismissed by
decision of the trial court (hence, without his consent and not
upon his motion), he has been placed in jeopardy or danger of
punishment for the offense charged. For this Court to re-assess
the evidence against him pursuant to the Government's appeal,
would place him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.
Although the dismissal of the information against him may
constitute a miscarriage of justice, the erroneous dismissal by the
trial court may not be disturbed for it would violate his basic
constitutional right to be exempt from double jeopardy.
39

WHEREFORE, the petition for review of the trial court's decision
dismissing the information in this case is denied.
5. People v. Honrales, G.R. No. 182651, 182657, 25 August 2010, 629
SCRA 423 (SUPER procedural, he might ask about it so check the long
version if you have time)
Prepared by Alyanna
Short version of facts
Accused was charged with Parricide in RTC after shooting his wife. After
Reinvestigation of the Information, Prosecutor recommended he be
charged with Reckless Imprudence resulting to Parricide in MeTC, in
light of a new witness saying that it was an accident and accused was
merely playfully poking the gun to his wife when the gun was
accidentally fired.
A Motion to Withdraw the Information on Parricide was filed in the RTC,
but remained to be not acted upon due to Victim’s heir’s Motion for
Reconsideration on the downgrading of the offense pending with the
Secretary of Justice, Office of the President, and eventually, the CA.
The Info on Reckless Imprudence was filed in the MeTC and accused
plead guilty and was convicted. The RTC case was re-raffled to a new
judge after Accused moved for it due to “bias” of the old judge in favor of
the Heirs as evidenced by her inaction in the Motion to Withdraw. The
new judge granted the Motion to Withdraw Information due to Double
Jeopardy.
OSG and Heirs appealed RTC decision, saying that there was no Double
Jeopardy since MeTC did not acquire competent jurisdiction on the case
of Reckless Imprudence and that RTC judge did not use independent
judgement when he granted the motion to withdraw.
Long version of facts:
1. Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan
Honrales on the neck and head. An information charging the husband
with Parricide was filed in the RTC of Manila, and a warrant of
arrest was issued.
2. Accused moved for the reconsideration of the information with Office
of the City Prosecutor.
3. Assistant City Prosecutor moved for the RTC to defer the proceedings
in view of the MR and Accused filed a motion to recall the warrant of
arrest.
4. RTC deferred the proceedings but denied the recall for the warrant of
arrest, since Deferment of Proceedings does not impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render the same defective. It doesn’t
affect the jurisdiction of the RTC, which found probable cause for the
issuance of the arrest warrant
5. Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa (aka ACP 2), filed a motion for
leave to conduct a reinvestigation in light of a new witness that will
prove that the shooting was not intentional. (Witness Luna posits
that the accused removed the bullets of the gun and playfully poked
his maid and his wife and children with the gun; it was then that
accused accidentally shot his wife)
6. RTC granted leave for the motion for reinvestigation.
7. Heirs (Petitioners), moved with the Office of the City Prosecutor to
inhibit ACP 2 from conducting reinvestigation, and prayed it be
remanded for trial
8. OCP reassigned the case to Rebagay (aka ACP 3), and set hearings
for the reinvestigation
9. OCP denied the Heir’s petition to inhibit the reinvestigation
10. Heirs moved for the reconsideration of OCP’s denial to inhibit the
reinvestigation with the DOJ.
11. In reinvestigation hearing, Heirs moved to postpone due to #10, but
Accused wanted to proceed since their new witness Luna was present.
Hearing proceeded.
12. Heirs moved to cancel the Hearing in #11
13. Accused moved for resolution or clarificatory hearing
14. ACP 3 denied the motion for resolution and set another hearing
15. ACP 3 issued a resolution (even though he denied the motion as per
#14), recommending withdrawal of the information on parricide and
40
 instead the file an information of reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide.
16. ACP 3 filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information.
17. While the Motion to Withdraw was pending with the RTC, an
information on Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed
in the MeTC against accused.
18. Heirs wanted accused to be convicted of Parricide, so they moved for
reconsideration of ACP 3’s resolution with the DOJ.
19. Heirs filed a motion to defer proceedings in RTC pending the MR
with DOJ
20. DOJ dismissed the MR. DOJ agreed with ACP3 finding probable
cause for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Parricide
21. Heirs filed a MR with DOJ
22. RTC is waiting for the DOJ decision on the MR
23. DOJ dismissed the MR, and it became final
24. Accused went to RTC to resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information
25. Heirs appealed to the Office of the President
26. RTC waited to decide on the Motion to Withdraw pending the appeal
to Office of the President
27. In the MeTC, accused was arraigned— he plead guilty to reckless
imprudence resulting to parricide and was convicted
28. Accused again went to RTC to dismiss the parricide charge against
him, citing MeTC arraignment and conviction
29. Heirs filed a Motion to Nullify the MeTC proceedings as they were
denied due process and the agreed date of arraignment was
supposedly week after the accused was actually arraigned.
30. Office of the President denied the Heir’s MR on lowering the offense.
31. Accused moved for the Judge in the RTC to be inhibited due to his
alleged bias, as shown by her continued inaction on the Motion to
Withdraw
32. Heirs went to CA under Rule 43 under 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
to assail decision of the Office of the President
33. RTC Judge inhibited herself from the case and it was re-raffled to
Judge Barrios
34. New Judge granted the Motion to Withdraw the Information on
Parricide and recalled the Accused’s warrant of arrest
35. Heirs filed an MR for the Grant to Withdraw the Information, but
was not acted upon since the MR was filed without intervention of
Public Prosecutor
36. Heirs filed with the CA assailing the Grant of Motion to Withdraw by
RTC judge. They argue that the judge granted the Motion on grounds
other than his personal and independent findings and the judge
shouldn’t have granted to Motion knowing that an appeal under #32
was pending with the CA. They also impleaded the OSG.
37. CA dismissed the petition, but found that Judge Barrios failed to
make an independent assessment of the merits of the case and acted
as a mere surrogate of DOJ when it granted the Motion to
Withdraw.CA dismissed the remand to RTC as it will be a violation of
Accused’s right to double jeopardy.
38. OSG and Heirs appealed it to SC.
ISSUE: W/N the Accused’s right against double jeopardy will be
violated if the case on parricide is remanded back to RTC?
HELD: NO. SC granted the petition of the OSG and the Heirs.
RTC acted with GAD when it granted the withdrawal of the Information
and recall of the warrant when it did not independently assess the merits
of the case and evidence on the record. It shouldn’t merely rely on the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
On the issue of Double Jeopardy,
Section 7 of Rule 117 of Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the double
jeopardy will attach only if the first conviction was by a court with
competent jurisdiction. The MeTC not having proper jurisdiction when it
arraigned and convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to
parricide, no double jeopardy would attach.
The requisites of Double Jeopardy are:
1. First Jeopardy attached prior to the second
a. After valid indictment
b. Before a competent court
c. After arraignment
41
 d. Valid plea has been entered
e. Accused has been acquitted or convicted or case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent
2. First Jeopardy was validly terminated
3. Second Jeopardy is for the same offense
MeTC has no jurisdiction because it has been held in jurisprudence that
once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information was
filed, it is there retained. Since, the offense of reckless imprudence
resulting to parricide was included in the charge of intentional parricide
pending before RTC, MeTC clearly has no jurisdiction over the criminal
case before it, RTC having retained the jurisdiction.
6. Quiambao v. People, G.R. No. 185267, 17 September 2014, 735
SCRA 345
Prepared by Bryan
Facts: Petioners Quiambao and Pilapil are the President and the
Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation (STRADEC), a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
On August 12, 2005, the private respondents, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and
Aderito Z. Yujuico, both directors and officers of STRADEC, filed before
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City a criminal complaint
for violation ofSection 74 of B.P. 68, against the petitioners and a certain
Giovanni Casanova, then accountant of STRADEC.
After preliminary investigation, the petitioners were charged under two
(2) Informations for violation of Section 74 of B.P. 68. The first criminal
information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89723; while the second,
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89724. These cases were raffled to
Branch 69 of the MTC of Pasig City, presided by Judge Jacqueline J.
Ongpauco-Cortel. On the same date, the petitioners filed an Urgent
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and to Defer the
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest Pending Determination with the MTC.
The petitioners asserted that the private respondents failed to adduce
evidence to support a finding of probable cause against them. They also
alleged that their act of refusing to turn over STRADEC’s stock and
transfer books to the private respondents was not punishable under the
Corporation Code.
On May 8, 2006, the MTC denied the motion insofar as it prayed for the
dismissal the second criminal case. The first criminal case was, however,
dismissed. The petitioners moved for partial reconsideration, but the
MTC denied the motion in its Order dated August 16, 2006.
In the same Order, the court set the arraignment of the petitioners on
October 9, 2006. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari (with application for issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) docketed as SCA No. 3047
with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 154, seeking the partial annulment of the
MTC’s Orders dated May 8, 2006 and August 16, 2006.
The petitioners were arraigned on January 29, 2007. In an Order dated
June 4, 2007, the RTC-Branch 154, through Judge Abraham B. Borreta
granted the Petition holding that there was no probable cause to hold the
petitioners for trial. Consequently, it directed the MTC to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 89724 for want of probable cause.
The private respondents thereafter sought reconsideration but it was
denied by the RTC-Branch 154. Thus, they brought an appeal to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. 180416)
raising pure questions of law.
While G.R. No. 180416 remains pending before this Court, the MTC
dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724 on June 18, 2007 (Order of
Dismissal), pursuant to the RTC-Branch 154’s Order.
The private respondents thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the MTC granted. Upon learning that a petition for certiorari had
been filed before this court, the MTC issued an Order dated September
17, 2007 (Order of Revival) recalling the Order of Dismissal and
42
reinstating the criminal information in Criminal Case No. 89724. It
further ordered the suspension of the proceedings in G.R. No. 180416 to
await the final outcome of the pending case.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.
They thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
docketed as SCA Case No. 3193 with the RTC-Branch 161.
The RTC-Branch 161, in a decision dated June 26, 2008, dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. It found that the MTC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it revived and archived Criminal Case No.
89724. Since the RTC Branch 154’s Order dated June 4, 2007 has not yet
attained finality in view of the pendency of G.R. No. 180416, the MTC
cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the assailed orders.
Likewise, the RTC ruled that the Order of Revival was pursuant to
Section 5(g) of Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides for
the inherent power of the courts to amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. The motion for
reconsideration that followed was denied in an Order dated October 23,
2008. Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUES:
W/N RTC-Branch 161 correctly determined that the MTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Case
No. 89724? NO (RTC is wrong)
W/N MTC’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724 operate as an acquittal
of the petitioners for the crime charged (NO)
W/N the reinstatement or revival of Criminal Case No. 89724
place the petitioners in double jeopardy (NO)
HELD:
The MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order of
Dismissal dated June 18, 2007 In the present case, the MTC’s Order of
Dismissal is a jurisdictional error that must be struck down as flawed for
having been issued without jurisdiction. It amounts to a premature
execution which tended to render moot the issue raised in the order
appealed from and would render ineffective any decision which might
eventually be made by this Court.
Moreover, the jurisdiction over the issue of probable cause in Criminal
Case No. 89724 had already been acquired by this Court. From the
moment the case had been elevated to us, the MTC no longer had
authority to further act on the issue which was pending review. In fact, at
the time the MTC issued the Order of Dismissal, even the RTC had lost
jurisdiction. Thus, inasmuch as the case had already come under our
exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the MTC acted without jurisdiction when
it issued the Order of Dismissal.
The MTC’s Order of Revival is also void Like the Order of Dismissal, the
Order of Revival that followed should be declared null and void. While
said order merely sought to correct the previous Order of Dismissal, it
suffers from the same infirmity of having been issued without
jurisdiction.
As discussed above, the MTC no longer had the authority to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 89724 because the jurisdictionto act on and entertain
the case had already been acquired by this Court. Hence, it naturally
follows that all the issuances and/or orders issued by the lower court
relative to the issue pending review will become null and void.
There is no double jeopardy because the MTC, which ordered the
dismissal of the criminal case, is not a court of competent jurisdiction.
Since the MTC clearly had no jurisdiction to issue the Order of Dismissal
and the Order of Revival, there can be no double jeopardy. Thus, double
jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
43
been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted,
orthe case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
In this case, there is no question that the first four requisites are present
in the case at bar. However, in view of the nullity of the Order of
Dismissal and the Order of Revival, the fifth requisite – that the accused
be acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent – is absent.
As held in Paulin v. Gimenez: Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and
void.
In the subsequent case of People v. Albano (163 SCRA 511 [1988]), this
Court reiterated its previous ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of
discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively
dismissed the case and as a consequence thereof, deprived the
prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating
its fundamental right to due process. With such violation, its orders are,
therefore null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy
Since the MTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
pending this Court's review of the RTC Order, its order of dismissal was a
total nullity and did not produce any legal effect. Thus, the dismissal
neither terminated the action on the merits, nor amounted to an
acquittal. The same can be said of the Order of Revival. Since both orders
cannot be the source of any right nor create any obligation, the dismissal
and the subsequent reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 89724 did not
effectively place the petitioners in double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the present petition. RTC Branch
161’s Decision REVERSED. MTC Orders declared NULL and VOID; it is
hereby DIRECTED to await the resolution of G .R. No. 180416 before
taking any action on the criminal proceedings.
7. Villalon v. Chan, G.R. No. 196508, 24 September 2014, 736 SCRA
450
Prepared by Nicki Capuchino
Respondent Amelia Chan married to Leon Basilio Chua in a civil ceremony
solemnized by then judge Cancio C. Garcia of the City court of caloocan. The
respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and present
petitioner Leonardo A. Villalon are one and the same person.
During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this
time under the name of Leonardo A Villaon, allegedly contracted a second
marriage with erlinda Talde that took place on june 2, 1993. This marriage
was solmnized by Judge Ruth C. Santos of the MTC.
Amelia who was then living in the United States and could not personally file
a case for bigamy in the Phils, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to
commence the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. On sept 13,
2003, a verified complaint affidavit alleging the commission of the crime of
bigamy was filed with the office of the prosecutor.
During the pretrial Atty. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia the provate
offended party.
Leonardo Filed an omnibus motion seeking to diqualify Atty. Atencia. He
argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case, because she
was not a party to the case, as she did not file the complain Affidavit. He also
argued that Amelia has already waived her right to file a civil and criminal
case against him and his co defendant Erlinda.
RTC – Granted the omnibus resolution of Leonardo. (March 3, 2006
resolution)
Amelia filed a petition for certiari and prohibition with the CA, Amelia
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued its
March 3, 2006 resolution and proceeded with the bigamy case withoit
permitting the participation of Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor.
44
CA- Granted Amelia’s Petition and annulled the RTC’s March 3, 2006
resoltuion disqualifying Atty. Atencia from participating hthe case.
CA ruled that a crime of bigamy, being public in natur, can be demounced by
anyone, not only by the offended party, before the prosecuting authorities
without the offended pary losing her right to recover damages.
Atty. Atemcoa’s appearance as a private prosecutpr is proof enough of
Amelia’s determination to enforce her calim for damages in the bigamy case.
ISSUES:
1) W/N CA gravely transgresses the petitioner’s constitutional
rughts to due process of law, apart from being violative of the legal
poscription against DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
2)W/N failed to implead People of the Philippines as a party
respondent in the case is a fatal defect causing the case to dismiss
outright.
HELD:
1. NO. the petitioners are mistaken, the review by the CA on whther the
RTC committed GADALEJ encompassed not only the issuance of the March
3, 2006 resolution, but all proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter. this is
apparent from the words used by respondent in her certiorari:
“the hearing sof the bigamy case wherein the participation of the private
prosecutor is expressly prohibited are with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jusrisdiction”.
Evidently CA’s review is not limited to the RTC’s resoltion but also included
other proceedings in the bigamy case. Inlcuding sep 5, 2006 order that was
still subject for review of this court, has not attained finality and the CA’s
assailed order of remanding and re-rraffling the bigamy case to another trial
could not violate the petitioner’s right against double jeorpardy.
RTC issued its Sept. 5, 2006 order in defiance of the TRO issued by the CA.
the records shows that the CA issued TRO on April 19, 2006 which should
have prohibited the RTC for further proceedings on the case. But the RTC
instead, continued with the presentation of the prosecution evidence and
issued the assailed order. Therefore, sept, 5, 2006 order was without force
and effect and would not serve as basis for the petitioners claim that their
right against double jeopardy has been violated.
2. NO. The respondent's failure to implead the "People of the Philippines" as
a party-respondent is not a fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of
her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA because: (1) a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
alleged to have acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2)
the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent is a special
civil action separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the
petitioners. For these reasons, the "People of the Philippines" need not be
impleaded as a party in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
8. People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550
Prepared by Ian Benitez
An information for murder of Emmanuel Mendoza through gunshot was
filed with the RTC-Tanauan, Batangas against Joven De Grano (former
mayor of Laurel, Batangas, Armando de Grano, Estanislao Lacaba
together with Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo
Genil, who were at large.
They were charged for an alleged murder of Mendoza, a hit man, whom
they hired to kill another over a land dispute decades back.
Joven, Armando, and Estanislao were all duly arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, they filed motion for bail claiming that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong.
The case was transferred and re-raffled to RTC-Manila because one of the
accused is an incumbent mayor of Laurel, Batangas. Hearing for
application for bail ensued, which was granted finding that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong. People filed a petition for certiorari
to CA – denied; then to SC – granted, thereby reversing CA and RTC’s
Order of granting bail. RTC was also ordered to issue warrant of arrest
against the accused. Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando
were not. MR was then filed by the accused, SC issued a Resolution to
remand the case back to RTC for further proceedings. RTC ruled that
Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Lacaba – guilty of murder qualified by
45
treachery. RTC-Manila heavily relied on the testimony of the wife of the
victim. As for Leonides and Leonardo, still at-large, archived cases. Only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the the
other respondents.
Respondents then filed a Joint MR. RTC downgraded Domingo and
Estanislao’s conviction from murder to homicide. Further, Armando and
Joven were acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt.
People filed an MR tying to revive the case to CA; dismissed because of
double jeopardy and it was not endorsed by OSG.
Issues:
1. W/N the dismissal is proper due to double jeopardy?
2. W/N the dismissal is proper for it not having filed or
instituted by OSG?
3. W/N the dismissal on the ground that the verification and
certification attached to the petition was signed by the
private counsel and not by the offended party?
Held:
1. No. Judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but
only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. petitioner must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of
its very power to dispense justice.
Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double
jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without
jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void
and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an
acquittal.
2. No. OSG instructed the private prosec to secure the necessary
endorsement from the DOJ. OSG also filed its Comment on the
MR filed by the respondents. Thus, OSG participated in the
case.
3. No. The signature by the counsel is sufficient. Liberal application
of the rule.
Petition Granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC decision
convicting Domingo Landicho; acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven
de Grano - annulled and deleted.
OCA directed to investigate Judge Soriaso.
9. Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 350
Prepared by
FACTS:
Petitioner was earlier accused, together with another accused [Aquilina
B. Granada], of the crime of Falsification of Public Document and was put
on trial.
Petitioner was arraigned sometime on June 20, 1997.
The RESPONDENT CITY PROSECUTOR commenced the trial, but the
trial was later suspended when the Court granted the Joint Motion to
Suspend further Proceedings, filed jointly by the Accused and
RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN.
46

Reason for motion to suspend was because the two accused in the instant
case charged for falsification of a public document are the same accused
who are likewise charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec.
3(e) of RA No. 3019 Anti Graft and Corruption.
The Sandiganbayan, which is a collegial court, it is preferred that the
Sandiganbayan takes precedence over all other cases including the
instant case involving the same accused similarly situated.
So the case for Falsification was suspended and the case before the
Sandiganbayan continued – to which the accused was acquitted.
Thereafter RESPONDENT wrote a letter to the Clerk of Court of the
RESPONDENT JUDGE, expressing their decision in refiling the herein
enclosed information and request that the same be entered in the docket
of the criminal case with a new case number assigned to it x x x,
attaching thereto the Criminal Information. (So basically they wanted to
refile the case that they previously suspended.
New information was filed.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information and/or dismiss the
case before RTC.
RTC denied. The dismissal in Sandiganbayan did not bar the re-filing of
the questioned Information for falsification of a public document.
The offenses are two separate and distinct criminal offenses, such that
the dismissal of one would not constitute double jeopardy in the other
case.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the prosecution of petitioner for falsification of a
public document would place him twice in jeopardy; and
(2) Whether the ombudsman is barred from re-filing the criminal
information for falsification of a public document.
HELD: NO
FIRST ISSUE:
We hold that the instant case does not constitute double jeopardy, for
which the following requisites must concur: (1) the first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first.
Third requisite missing.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of falsification of a public
document, provided for in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and
those of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither
identity nor exclusive inclusion between the offenses. For falsification of a
public document to be established, the following elements must concur:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
On the other hand, to hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e) of RA
3019, the following elements must be present:
(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them;
(2) That said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the
performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions;
(3) That they cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a
private party;
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
It is undisputed that the two charges stem from the same transaction.
However, it has been consistently held that the same act may give rise to two
or more separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attaches, as long
as there is a variance between the elements of the offenses charged.
SECOND ISSUE:
The Joint Motion to Suspend filed by the accused and the respondent
ombudsman cannot be deemed an admission on the part of the latter with
respect to the so-called primordial legal issue involved in both cases. Much
47
less can the filing thereof amount to double jeopardy. As discussed above,
the Court has already noted the required elements of both crimes.
PETITIONER LOST
10. People v. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, 22 September 2014, 735
SCRA 687
Prepared by Enzo Agcaoili
FACTS
Accused charged with special complex crime of robbery with homicide
committed against victim Espino. Prosecution claims that while Espino
was driving along CM Recto, one of the accused (Ronnie) blocked his path
and tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino refused, so the other accused
approached him, all brandishing bladed weapons. They all took turns
stabbing him, and thereafter took his belt-bag along with his wallet and
jewelries.
Ruling of RTC - crime of robbery not having been indubitably established,
accused cannot be convicted of imputed crime. It held him guilty of the
crime of murder only. Accused appellant Bobby Torres appealed to CA in
the hopes of a more favorable judgment.
Ruling of CA - Found accused guilty of robbery with homicide. It found
that primary intention was to rob Espino and that killing was incidental.
ISSUE - W/N acquittal of the accused of the robbery charged should be
left undisturbed as being final and executory.
HELD - Guilty of robbery with homicide
In an appeal by the accused, he waives his right not to be subject to
double jeopardy. His appeal is not limited to the conviction of the murder
charge.
[W]hen an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the
whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called
upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. Thus, appellant could not have
been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC by finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the
Information instead of murder.
Based on the facts, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant
and his companions was to rob Espino. Had they primarily intended to
kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to death. However,
the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the
belt-bag clearly shows that the central aim was to commit robbery
against Espino.
11. Torres v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA
599
Prepared by Abalos
FACTS:
Spuses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the OCP a complaint
against Torres for Falsification of a Public Document, through a forged
deed of sale over their properties. Torres denied the allegations and
claimed the Aguinaldos sold to him the subject properties.
OCP recommended filing an Information before the MTC, where Torres
moved for reconsideration but was denied. On Appeal the DOJ Sec.
reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the
withdrawal of the Information, and the motion for reconsideration of the
Aguinaldos was denied. A motion to withdraw the Information was filed
before the MTC and was granted - it should be noted that petitioner had
not yet been arraigned. Aguinaldo filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari which was granted, Torres motion for reconsideration was
denied hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES
(1) WON the order of MTC Manila granting the motion to
withdraw rendered moot the petition for certiorari by Sps
Aguinaldo, reinstating the resolution of the OCP of
Manila, whether the rule on provisional dismissal applies
48
HELD
NO. Torres contends that the order granting withdrawal of the
information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the CA -
that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is final if no motion for
reconsideration or appeal is timely filed. The SC said this is untenable
because, while both a motion to dismiss and motion to withdraw put
an end to an action in court, their legal effect varies.
An order granting withdrawal of the information, attains finality after 15
days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to refiling of the information
upon reinvestigation. This does not fall within the ambit of Sec 8 Rule
117, hence it has no time bar. Motion to withdraw is part of the PI
(executive process) and not judicial.
An order granting a motion to dismiss attains finality after 15 days of
receipt, with prejudice to refiling of the same case. Falls within the ambit
of Sec 9 Rulee 117, hence it has a time bar, and it must be made with
express consent of accused and notice to the offended party.
A motion to withdraw the information was filed in the case at bar, so
there was no provisional dismissal, and no jeopardy can attach; a second
Information can be filed.
However, the SC held the Sec of Justice did not commit GAD and
reinstated the order for the Motion to Withdraw. (not so pertinent but just
in case sir asks)
There is basis in DOJ Sec’s finding that no probable cause exists. The
complaint and the 1979 Deed of Sale do not connect petitioner with the
crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed that the 1979 Deed of
Sale was falsified, there is no showing that petitioner was the author
thereof. We cannot discern direct and personal participation by the
petitioner in the alleged forged deed. While a finding of probable cause
rests on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of such facts
and circumstance must be strong enough to create a rational and logical
nexus between the acts and omissions and the accused.
SC also found that CA erred in relying solely on affidavit complaint and
NBI report disregarding counter affidavit and documentary evidence of
petitioner, since Sec 3 of Rule 112 not only requires the submission of the
complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well
as other supporting documents, but also directs the respondent to submit
his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense
12. Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, G.R. No. 183994, 30
June 2014, 727 SCRA 503
Prepared by Ong
FACTS: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth
Uy, filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner William Co. In the
absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on
June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003,
while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted.
Co filed a petition challenging the revival of the criminal cases. He argues that
the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be
considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was
denied. Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co
further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance
of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists
that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court's issuance of the
order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Even assuming
that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when
Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day
late since year 2004 was a leap year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the criminal case has
become permanent (NO)
HELD: The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph thereof are: (1) the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion
49
for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the prosecutor Los Baos, moved to reopen the case. Accused alleged that the
motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served case has already been quashed therefore the court cannot reopen the
with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, there is case.
no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was
served on the private complainant at least 3 days before said hearing as
Issue: W/N Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the CA
mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. Furthermore, the second paragraph
of the new rule should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall found? If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to
become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public rest. If it does not, then the revised RTC decision reopening the case
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having should prevail.
been revived. Correlatively, when a party is represented by a counsel, notices of
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given Held:
address pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The public prosecutor cannot In People v. Lacson, we ruled that the time-bar is an essence of the given
be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar
order of dismissal. Also, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
the case and the court order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of
the one-year period is not found in the Rules. Further, the fact that year 2004 was
a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy's motion to revive Motion to Quash Provisional Dismissal
the criminal cases. Even if the Court will consider that 2004 is a leap year and
that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of Sec. 3, Rule 117 Sec. 8, Rule 117
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy.
Mode by which an accused assails, A case shall not be provisionally
before entering his plea, the validity dismissed except with the express
13. Los Baños v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, 22 April 2009, 586 SCRA of the criminal complaint or the consent of the accused and with notice
303 criminal information filed against him to the offended party. The provisional
Prepared by So for insufficiency on its face in point of dismissal of offenses punishable by
law, or for defect apparent on the face imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
The accusation was based on the Omnibus Election Code after the of the Information. years or a fine of any amount, or both,
shall become permanent one (1) year
Marinduque PNP caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at a
after issuance of the order without the
checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team stopped a case having been revived.
silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national
highway, coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was A motion to quash does not result in a The provision on provisional dismissal
seated at the rear portion) opened the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry provisional dismissal to which Section is found within Rule 117 (entitled
case beside him. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority to carry 8, Rule 117 applies. Motion to Quash)
a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one.
Grounds for motion to quash are Section 8 does not state the grounds
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for specified under Section 3. that lead to a provisional dismissal.
violating the election gun ban.
The consent of the accused to a A dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one
dismissal relates directly to what with the express consent of the
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., accused is not intended to lead to
prosecutors to return the seized articles to Pedro. The petitioner, private the conditions for dismissals that lead double jeopardy as provided under

50
to double jeopardy.
When a motion to quash is
meritorious the governing rules are
the terms of Section 6
when a dismissal is pursuant to a
motion to quash under Section 3,
Section 8 and its time-bar does not
apply.
invariably filed by the accused to
question the efficacy of the complaint
or information filed against him or her
the form and content of a motion to
quash are as stated under Section 2 of
Rule 117;
assails the validity of the criminal
complaint or the criminal information
for defects or defenses apparent on
face of the information
allowed before the arraignment only
an information that is quashed stays
quashed until revived; the grant of a
motion to quash does not per se carry
any connotation of impermanence,
and becomes so only as provided by
law or by the Rules
In re-filing the case, what is
important is the question of whether
the action can still be brought, i.e.,
whether the prescription of action or
Section 7, but nevertheless creates a of the offense has set in.
bar to further prosecution under the
special terms of Section 8.
Held: Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the
No dismissal under sec 6 reopening of the case that the RTC ordered and which the CA reversed;
the reversal of the CAs order is legally proper.
Nevertheless, (the SC still decided on the initial quashal of RTC and
Merely provides a time-bar that stated that), the RTC erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the
uniquely applies to dismissals other Information was in order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated
than those grounded on Section 3
the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to quash. As a
consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro
a case may be provisionally dismissed should now be arraigned and stand trial.
at the instance of either the
prosecution or the accused, or both
these requirements do not apply to a
provisional dismissal
a provisional dismissal may be
grounded on reasons other than the
defects found in the information
allowed even when the trial proper of
the case is already underway provided
that the required consents are present
impermanent until the time-bar
applies, at which time it becomes a
permanent dismissal
there can be no re-filing after the
time-bar, and prescription is not an
immediate consideration.
51
X. RULE 118 -PRE-TRIAL guilty. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first, Stipulation 1(b)
which states that Both the accused admit the disbursement of the
1. Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143689-91, 12 November 2002, amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00; and second, Exhibits 1 to 8-
391 SCRA 415
a. They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
FACTS
• SB: denied motion to withdraw stipulation of facts because there was
3 informations were filed against Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and
no vitiation of consent through fraud or mistake of a serious character
Sixto M. Bayas charging them with malversation through falsification
and the fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the
penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised
accused to defend himself is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial
Penal Code in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal
order
treasurer of Kabayan, Benguet. They pleaded not guilty during
arraignment.
ISSUE
• Pretrial on October 15, 1999 - cancelled because the counsel for the
W/N pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused
accused, Atty. Molintas was not prepared
because allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has
• November 5, 1999 - cancelled because of the absence of the counsel due
issued a pretrial order approving them. -NO
to flu. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with
their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II
HELD
Evelyn T. Lucero.
a. NO. Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters
• December 10, 1999 - parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and
of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored
Documents, which had been duly signed by the two accused (herein
because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more
petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero (this was supposedly
convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties
the day the pre-trial should resume so they could pass upon all other
and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets.
matters). The Joint stipulation of facts and documents contain the COA
report, COA memorandum(1B), disbursement vouchers, checks issued,
Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for
resolution of the sangguniang bayan, minutes of the meeting of the
good cause. They should be enforced especially when they are not false,
sangguniang bayan, signature of both Matuday and Bayas, page of
unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made
journal entry of the sangguniang bayan, and statement of the result of
before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made
investigation.
them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress,
• Jan 14, 2000 - Atty. Molintas was again absent; rescheduled to Feb 14.
fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a
• Feb 7, 2000 - Att. Molintas moved to withdraw as counsel for the
showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a
accused. Granted on Feb 14, 2000, pretrial rescheduled to March 31.
particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation
• March 31 - new counsel (Atty. Cinco) moved to withdraw joint
validly made lies in the courts sound discretion which, unless exercised
stipulation of facts specifically when they admitted disbursement of
with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.
funds. Invoked constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven

52
Validity of joint stipulation: They wanted to be relieved of it without
alleging falsity, fraud, mistake. They did not even dispute the finding of
the SB of no vitiation of consent. In fact, they admitted that they freely
gave their consent in signing the joint stipulation of facts.
They blame incompetence of previous counsel; he failed to consider their
legal interests. To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a
mistake must be one of fact not, as in this case, a mere lack of full
knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining it.
Hornbook doctrine applies: parties are bound by the action or the inaction
of their counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the
defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the client. The rule
extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the
counsel.
Presumption of innocence: However, the Rules were amended in 1985,
precisely to enable parties to stipulate facts. The amendment was carried
over to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The acceptability
of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. There
is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The
policy encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which
recognizes that x x x everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of
the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public right and without
detriment to the community at large. In this case, there could have been
no impairment of petitioners’ right to be presumed innocent, right to due
process or right against self-incrimination because the waiver was
voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned by the
Rules.
e. Necessity of a pretrial order: Not necessary. Section 2 of Rule 118 a. for
a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the
following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in
writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their
counsel. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision
by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the
proceedings. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by
the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who
made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts
stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may
not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the
consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused are allowed to plead
guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they
should likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial
agreement under appropriate circumstances.
Moreover, SB could not be faulted for not approving the stipulations as
the pretrial was rescheduled 6 times.
Role of Lawyers in pretrial: The Rules provide that if the counsel for the
accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial and do not
offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court may
impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the
real issues of the trial would be. They were the ones who validly and
voluntarily entered into the joint stipulation. If the Court allows it to be
withdrawn, there would be no end to litigations. Lawyers can wiggle in
and out of agreements the moment they are disadvantaged. No bad faith
or malice was or can be imputed to the anti-graft court for failing to
immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not to its
53
deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued absence of petitioners
counsel.

54
XI. RULE 119 - TRIAL
Additional readings:
- Judicial Affidavit Rule
- Sec. 8-15, AM 12-11-2-SC, 1 May 2014
- Sec. 11-17, Rules on Summary Procedure
1. Visbal v. Vanilla, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA
11
Prepared by RL Cabusora
Respondent Judge Wenceslao B. Vanilla was charged with grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for ordering a criminal
case (People of the Philippines v. Rodelio Abayon y Benter) archived.
Complaint was sent to the Office of Court Administrator (OCA). The
allegation was that at the time the respondent judge ordered the criminal
case archived, the witnesses for the Prosecution were able, ready, and
willing to testify, with due notice to the accused after he had been
arrainged. The first witness Prosecutor Robert Visbal, the complainant
himself, had already testified. He maintained that the respondent's act
seriously violated Paragraph 2, Sections 14 and 16 Article III of the
Constitution and Section 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
The OCA required the respondent to comment on the complaint within 10
days from receipt of the indorsement.
Respondent’s narration of what transpired in criminal case he archived:
(23 June 2003)
● Order issued that the court reset the hearing to 27 Aug 2003 on
motion of the public prosecutor because of the absence of the
second witness and of the accused
(27 Aug 2003)
● Subpoena served on the accused was returned and showed that
he had not been properly notified;
● Prosecution did not present another witness or inform the court of
its desire to summon other witnesses;
● Case was reset to 9 Oct 2003 and another subpoena was sent to
the accused upon the motion of the prosecution;
(9 Oct 2003)
● Return of the subpoena indicated that the accused changed
address without informing the court;
● Thus, court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused for his
failure to appear;
● NO setting of the hearing in the meantime, for it was not
known when the accused would be arrested and, for
practical purposes, he ordered that the case be archived to
be revived upon the arrest of the accused.
OCA Report and Recommendation
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent's order archiving the case is patently erroneous.
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 provides that a criminal case can
be archived if after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused
remains at large for 6 months from delivery of the warrant to the proper
peace officer. However, the court may motu propio or upon motion of any
party, archive a criminal case when proceedings therein are ordered
suspended for an indefinite period because of the following reasons:
(a) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently, or to
undergo trial, and he has to be committed to a mental hospital;
(b) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during
the pendency of the criminal case unless the civil and criminal
cases are consolidated;
(c) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is
elevated to and is pending resolution/decision for an indefinite
period before a higher court which has issued a temporary
restraining or a writ of preliminary injunction; and
55
(d) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and
cannot be arrested by his bondsman.
The 9 Oct 2003 Order directing the case to be archived was issued on the
same day respondent ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest in
violation of the 6-month period required under the Circular. Neither does
the case fall under the circumstances where the court may archive the
case motu propio.
Respondent should have proceeded with the trial pursuant to Article III,
Section 14 (2) of the Constitution which authorizes trials in absentia
provided the following requisites are present:
(a) that accused has been arraigned;
(b) that he has been notified; and
(c) that his failure to appear is unjustified.
All the requisites are present in the case. Accused was arraigned on
January 28, 2003. He is deemed to have received notice of the hearings
considering that he has not notified the court of a change in address. The
inability of the court to notify him did not prevent it from continuing with
the trial because accused has waived his right to present evidence and to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testify against him.
(People vs. Salas; People vs. Nazareno).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISSUES – HELD:
(1) WON respondent judge correctly archived the criminal case. –
NO
(2) WON respondent was guilty of grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law. – YES (Non-CrimPro ISSUE)
DIGESTER’S NOTE: Essentially, SC just maintained the reasoning of the
OCA in convicting respondent. OCA decision is one between the dashes
(-----).
RATIONALE:
(1) Respondent violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, which
allows the archiving of a criminal case if, after the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from
delivery of the warrant to the proper peace officer.
*read OCA Report and Recommendation especially the part on
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 and trial in absentia requirements.
(2) OTHER ISSUE
Canon 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct. A judge must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be
proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, correct, and
impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must do so in a manner
free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for
good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of law and who
discharge their duties in accordance with law.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on
October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious
charge punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension of more
than one year or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
56
P40,000.00. In this case, considering that no malice or bad faith has been
established and that this is the respondent judge's first administrative
offense, we deem it just and reasonable to impose upon him a fine of
P10,000.00.
2. People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550
Prepared by President So
An information for murder of Emmanuel Mendoza through gunshot was
filed with the RTC-Tanauan, Batangas against Joven De Grano (former
mayor of Laurel, Batangas, Armando de Grano, Estanislao Lacaba
together with Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo
Genil, who were at large.
They were charged for an alleged murder of Mendoza, a hit man, whom
they hired to kill another over a land dispute decades back.
Joven, Armando, and Estanislao were all duly arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, they filed motion for bail claiming that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong.
The case was transferred and re-raffled to RTC-Manila because one of the
accused is an incumbent mayor of Laurel, Batangas. Hearing for
application for bail ensued, which was granted finding that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong. People filed a petition for certiorari
to CA – denied; then to SC – granted, thereby reversing CA and RTC’s
Order of granting bail. RTC was also ordered to issue warrant of arrest
against the accused. Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando
were not. MR was then filed by the accused, SC issued a Resolution to
remand the case back to RTC for further proceedings. RTC ruled that
Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Lacaba – guilty of murder qualified by
treachery. RTC-Manila heavily relied on the testimony of the wife of the
victim. As for Leonides and Leonardo, still at-large, archived cases. Only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the the
other respondents.
Respondents then filed a Joint MR. RTC downgraded Domingo and
Estanislao’s conviction from murder to homicide. Further, Armando and
Joven were acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt.
People filed an MR tying to revive the case to CA; dismissed because of
double jeopardy and it was not endorsed by OSG.
Issues:
(1) W/N there was a valid trial in absentia?
(2) W/N RTC had a valid jurisdicition?
(you can use the old digest for the other issues but this is the only
relevant aspect here)
Held:
(1) No. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing
trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but
not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment
and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At
such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause
shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the
judgment.
(2) When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only
Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion
for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC
not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at
large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the
57
 joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents
who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a
motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao.
Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.
3. Cabador v. People, G.R. No. 186001, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA
760
Prepared by Balonan
Facts:
- Antonio Cabador accused of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun Valerio
- Prosecution only presented 5 witnesses over 5 years of intermittent trial
- RTC declared the end of prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required to
make written and formal offer of documentary evidence within 15 days from notice.
- Prosecution asked 3 extensions, but prosecution still did not make any written offer
- Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, invoking his right to speedy trial
· Also that the prosecution had nothing more to add to the evidence
· Witnesses did not have knowledge of his part in the crime
- Prior to Cabador’s motion to dismiss and unknown to him RTC granted another
extension to the prosecution
- RTC treated Cabador’s motion to dismiss as demurrer of evidence that was filed
without leave of court
· Meaning, Cabador according to RTC waived his right to present evidence for
his defense and submitted for decision
- Cabador filed motion for reconsideration, RTC denied. Cabador files the same to
CA, CA denies. Cabador files certiorari in SC
Issue: WON Cabador’s motion to dismiss is equivalent to demurrer of evidence filed
without leave of court
Held: No,
- criminal case usually has two stages:
· first, the prosecutions presentation of evidence against the accused and, second,
the accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the prosecution has
presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial
court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second
stage and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the trial court to hear the
evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the burden of
proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal.
· But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the
proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a
demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for judgment
- Cabador points out that the motion to dismiss is soley based on his right to speedy
trial as shown by the consistent delays and extensions requested by the prosecution
and its failure comply with the written formal offer
- SC held that the additional statements by Cabador alleging the lack of evidence to
be added and the failure of the witnesses to point his part in the crime were merely
made to strengthen the fact that after 5 years of waiting, the prosecution was ill
prepared
· Cabador did not make any mention of any evidence of the prosecution that
lacked essential elements to convict him
· Nor did he make mention any of the testimonies of the witnesses
· Nor did he cite any documentary evidence
- Demurrer of evidence can only be filed when prosecution rests
· The motion to dismiss was filed before prosecution rested
o the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of
those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling
could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case.
4. Salazar v. People and J.Y. Brothers Marketing, G.R. No. 151931,
23 September 2003, 411 SCRA 598
Prepared by Dani
Petitioner Anmer Salazar and Nena Timario were charged with estafa
before the RTC Legazpi City.
The estafa case allegedly stemmed from the payment of a check worth
P214,000 to private respondent J.Y. Brothers Marketing (JYBMC) for the
purchase of 300 bags of rice. The check was dishonored by drawee
Prudential Bank as it is drawn against a closed account. Salazar replaced
58
said check with a new one, this time drawn against Solid Bank. It was
again dishonored for being drawn against uncollected deposit.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution presented its evidence, Salazar filed a
demurrer to evidence with leave of court, which RTC granted.
RTC later acquitted Salazar, but ordered her to remit to JYBMC
P214,000. RTC ruled that the evidence of the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between
the Salazar and the issuer of the check, Timario. As a mere endorser of
the check, Salazar's breach of warranty was a good one and did not
amount to estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the RPC. Timario remained at
large.
Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the
decision with a plea to be allowed to present evidence. RTC denied the
motion.
She then filed petition for review on certiorari with the SC, alleging she
was denied due process, since the RTC did not give her the opportunity to
adduce evidence to controvert her civil liability.
ISSUE: W/N Salazar was denied due process? (YES)
RATIO:
Salazar should have been given by RTC the chance to present her
evidence as regards the civil aspect of the case.
The demurrer to evidence partakes of a motion to dismiss the case for the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If
the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court (waiving
his right to present evidence and submitting the case for decision on the
basis of the prosecution's evidence), he has the right to adduce evidence
not only on the criminal aspect, but also on the civil aspect of the case if
the demurrer is denied by the court.
If the demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted, accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect unless the court also declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.
If the trial court grants the demurrer and acquits accused, but also
renders judgment on his civil liability, said judgment on the civil aspect
would be a nullity since the right of the accused to due process is violated.
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, accused
has not yet adduced evidence on the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
The only evidence on record is the prosecution’s. What the trial court
should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer
to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation
of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case, then complainant presents rebuttal evidence, etc (Sec. 11, Rule
119).
In this case, the civil action arising from the delict was impliedly
instituted since there was no waiver nor a reservation by the offended
party. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the
criminal action.
Salazar was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. RTC
granted the demurrer on its finding that the liability of accused was only
civil, not criminal. However, RTC rendered judgment on the civil aspect of
the case and ordered Salazar to pay for her purchases ant even before she
could adduce evidence thereon. Thus, she was denied due process.
5. Cabarles v. Maceda, G.R. No. 161330, 20 February 2007, 516
SCRA 303
Prepared by Chris Paredes
Rene Cabarles seeks to annul Order of Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda in
Criminal Case for murder with Las Pinas RTC. Said Order cancelled the
scheduled promulgation of judgment and reopened the case for reception
of evidence from two prosecution witnesses who were not presented during
trial.
59
Info: “...25...April, 1999...Las Pinas...and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable motive
with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
and stab with a deadly weapon (fan knife) one Antonio Callosa, which
directly caused his death.”
Cabarles pleaded not guilty. Trial court scheduled hearing, pre-trial,
presentation of prosec’s evidence, and presentation of defense evidence.
Prosec issued subpoenas to witnesses: Flocerfina Callosa (mother);
Imelda Pedrosa (eyewitness); Carlos Callosa (brother); and Dr. Romeo T.
Salen, Police Senior Inspector of SPD Crime Lab to testify on the contents
of death certificate.
Prosec, without fault, unable to present evidence on first four hearings.
Instead, trial on the merits began when prosec called (brother) to witness
stand. Since defense counsel agreed to stipulate that Carlos would testify
on matters in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, testimony dispensed with.
2nd prosec witness, Police Inspector Prudencio Parejos, presented in
court. Testimony also dispensed with after defense counsel agreed to
stipulate that witness testify on what was in the spot report of stabbing
incident. Prosec said it would offer its evidence and rest its case should
People fail to present witness next scheduled hearing.
Prosec failed to present a witness. Neither Pedrosa nor Dr. Salen
appeared. 4 subpoenas issued to Pedrosa. 3 subpoenas issued to Dr.
Salen. No evidence that subpoenas were issued to these two requiring
their attendance for June 27, 2001 hearing, which would explain why
they were absent. Taking into consideration the absence of a subpoena
issued to the two and notwithstanding objection of Cabarles, Judge
Maceda gave the prosecution a last chance with warning that whether
subpoena is actually issued and served or not, will not relieve prosec to
make formal offer of evidence should prosec fail to present witness next
hearing. With no witness for the August 1, 2001 hearing, the prosecution
rested its case and formally offered its evidence.
Cabarles, with leave of court, filed demurrer to evidence but was denied
by Judge Maceda. Two witnesses called for the defense, accused Cabarles
and Luisito Javier, a fisherman.
Before promulgation of judgment, Judge Maceda motu proprio issued
questioned order reopening the case. He noted prosecution may not
have been given its day in court resulting in miscarriage of justice
because of mix-up in dates in the subpoena and actual hearing dates.
According to Judge Maceda, since the prosecution was not able to present
its evidence on the first four hearing dates and there was either no return
on the subpoenas subsequently issued or there was no subpoena issued at
all to Pedrosa and Dr. Salen, the prosecution should have been given a
last chance to present the alleged eyewitness and the doctor.
Judge Maceda denied Cabarles’ MR and set the case to hear testimonies
of Pedrosa and Dr. Salen. Subpoena issued to Pedrosa for that hearing
was duly served, but service upon Dr. Salen failed since the doctor was no
longer assigned to the SPD Crime Laboratory. Prosecution still failed to
present a witness during a hearing. Nonetheless, Judge Maceda, upon
motion, again decided to extend to the prosecution another
chance, giving the People 2 additional hearing dates.
Finally, Pedrosa took witness stand and completed her direct
examination. Thereafter, Cabarles filed present petition questioning
Judge Macedas order, alleging that it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Since trial in the lower court continued, on July 3, 2003, the
Public Attorneys Office conducted its cross-examination of Pedrosa.
Defense counsel agreed on facts in death certificate, thus testimony of Dr.
Salen dispensed with. Thereafter, Judge Maceda set the date for
reception of evidence on the civil aspect of the criminal case, when
brother, was recalled to witness stand. Cabarles given chance to adduce
evidence.
ISSUE / HELD:
1. Did Judge Maceda act with GAD in issuing motu proprio the
Order reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to
60
 receive the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses after both
parties had rested their case? - YES, Maceda acted with GAD.
2. Did the said order violate Cabarles’ right to due process and
speedy disposition of his case? - YES, Cabarles’ right violated.
RATIO:
1. A motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the
old rules but it was nonetheless a recognized procedural recourse,
deriving validity and acceptance from long, established usage.
This lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was
remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took
effect on December 1, 2000.
The Order was issued under the Revised Rules. Sec. 24, Rule 119
and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for
reopening a case:
(1) reopening must be before finality of judgment of conviction;
(2) order issued by judge on his own initiative or upon motion;
(3) order issued only after hearing is conducted;
(4) order intends to prevent miscarriage of justice; and
(5) presentation of additional and/or further evidence terminated
within thirty days from issuance of order.
While Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is
rendered, Sec. 24 requires that a hearing must first be conducted.
Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without
notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and
accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the
matter.
Although the defense counsel cross-examined Pedrosa and
participated in proceedings case was reopened by Maceda, the
same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’ objection to the
Order. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and
unequivocal. Here, Cabarles filed the present petition seeking
for a writ of certiorari against Maceda before Pedrosa was cross-
examined. Also, when asked to comment on the prosec’s formal
offer of evidence taken after the case was reopened, Cabarles
objected to its admission on the ground that the same was
inadmissible having been received by the court after Maceda
issued the questioned order
2. Reopening case for reception of further evidence largely matter of
discretion of trial court judge. This judicial action must not be
done whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably. Prosec given
ample opportunity to present witnesses but failed. Failure to take
full advantage of opportunities does not change the fact that it
was accorded such opportunities. Prosec was not deprived of its
day in court.
While it may be true that due to some confusion with the trial
courts calendar, some of the trial dates assigned to the
prosecution did not push through and some of the subpoenas
issued to Pedrosa and/or Dr. Salen pertained to hearing dates
which were different from those assigned for reception of
prosecutions evidence, still the prosecution had a total of 4
hearing dates when it was given the chance to prove its case.
Presence of prosec witnesses in court is the responsibility of the
public prosec and it is incumbent upon him to take the initiative of
ensuring the attendance of his witnesses at the trial.
Since Judge Maceda issued questioned order without complying
with the third requirement of Sec. 24, that there be a hearing
conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the assailed
order must be annulled and set aside for having been issued
contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of discretion.
6. Go v. People, G.R. No. 185527, 18 July 2012, 677 SCRA 213
Prepared by Bono
Facts: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
61
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home country back
to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9,
2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his
unavailability.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral
Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung
infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that,
upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines
by reason of ill health.
The MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the
directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners
sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners
to file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an
Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.
the CA denied petitioners' motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: W/N CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation
committed by the MeTC in applying the ruled on deposition-
taking in civil case to criminal cases.
Held: The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in
open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet
the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and
most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the judge to
test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking
of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to
administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before
any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person
authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no
additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other
party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before
the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as
required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall
be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure
or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and
not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only
deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution
witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is
especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the
prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's
ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further declared that – While we
recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness
in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are
designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights.
The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as
such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
62
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had Innocent civilians were massacred in Municipality of Ampatuan,
managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was Ampatuan,
Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and then the Mayor of the Municipality.
fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the Inquest proceedings were conducted against him at General Santos
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the NBI.
or testimony taken. In fact, it should have been imperative for the Secretary of Justice Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. The DOJ resolved
testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non- to file the corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and
resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite to issue subpoenae to several persons.
date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to
leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure Several informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in RTC
intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause Cotabato. The following month, Secretary of Justice transmitted her
is attributable to no other party. letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of the
trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato to Metro Manila to
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination prevent a miscarriage of justice. This request was granted.
before the MeTC prior to said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the
prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal In the joint resolution, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals
application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. In
the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the issuing this joint resolution, the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the
deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag.
charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the
State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard Petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the informations for murder when
against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the he was arraigned.
witnesses against him face to face. Great care must be observed in the
taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no Dalandag was then admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the
conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and deposition. DOJ. QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was
listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses.
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice
when it upheld the trial court's order allowing the deposition of Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to
prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder
court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
discretion. massacre through his two sworn declarations. Secretary De Lima denied
petitioner's request.
7. Ampatuan v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197291, 3 April 2013, 695 SCRA
159 Accordingly, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in
Prepared by Abbey Perez Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another

63
accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).
With this, the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the
testify on the Civil Case. Respondents moved to quash the subpoena but trial court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that
petitioner opposed. they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the
Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the
Issue Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial
charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of
the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Rule 119 are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the
Protection Program of the DOJ – NO testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no
other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
Rationale committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said
Courts should not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations. accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said
It should allow the Executive Department, through DOJ, exclusively to accused does not appear to be most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at
determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception,
however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion. The Section 10.State Witness. – A person…shall be admitted into the Program
records in this case are bereft of any showing that the Panel of whenever the following circumstances are present:
Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 a.the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as
individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special
laws;
Dalandag’s exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all b.there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of c.there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was the offense committed;
far from arbitrary. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which d.his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
requires that "the complaint or information shall be . . . against all e.he does not appear to be most guilty; and
persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a f.he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral
mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is turpitude.
when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra,
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may the requisites under both rules are essentially the same. An accused
become a state witness are, namely: discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17
(a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of
of the Rules of Court; and the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No.
(b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness 6981.
Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981

64
A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become
a state witness pursuant to Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused
in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an acquittal of the
discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the
same offense, unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co- accused
in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for his
discharge.
The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but
with due regard to the proper administration of justice.
There is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution
to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to
qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The
admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates
as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the
criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The
immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial
court.
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the
Government as a state witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by
the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the
criminal charges. All the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981
were met in his case.
That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao
massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection
Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to
appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged
for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his
admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to
testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for
his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.
8. Jimenez v. People, G.R. No. 209195, 17 September 2014, 735
SCRA 596
Prepared by Ocampo
● Montero, employee of BSJ company owned by Jimenez, confessed
to the killing of Ruby Rose.
○ Named Jimenez among others as co-conspirators.
● Montero’s confession was given credit because he described the
steel drum her body was found in as well as identified where it
could be found.
● Information for murder filed against Jimenez and the co-
conspirators.
● Montero and prosecutor both motioned to have Montero
discharged as a state witness.
○ Jimenez opposed both motions.
● RTC dismissed the motion saying the prosecution failed to comply
with requirement of R119 s17.
○ Prosecution failed to prove that Montero was not the most
guilty, or better yet the least guilty.
○ Also failed to comply with the requirement of proving a
possible conviction against Jimenez.
● Montero and prosecution both filed a motion for reconsideration
(MR).
● Judge Docena, a newly appointed judge, approved the MR.
○ Said that without Montero’s confession the crime would
have gone unnoticed.
○ Also said that the principals by inducement (ie. Jimenez
and co.) are more guilty than that of direct participation
as Montero only committed the crime on their orders.
○ Montero also not previously convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude.
● During pendency of MR Jimenez moved to have Judge Docena
inhibit himself.
● Judge Docena denied Jimenez’s motion, but suspended
proceedings as Jimenez’s inclusion in information still pending
with OP.
● Jimenez filed certiorari against Judge Docena.
● CA ruled in favor of Judge Docena and agreed that Montero could
be discharged as a state witness.
● Jimenez argued that Montero is actually the most guilty and the
lack of a hearing concerning Montero’s discharge is fatal.
65
ISSUE: WON Montero could be discharged as a state witness?
HELD: YES. Rule 119 s17 provides the requisites for discharge as a state
witness. 1) Two or more accused 2) motion filed before prosecution
rests 3) evidence and sworn statement of proposed state witness
supporting discharge 4) consent of potential state witness 5) trial
court has to be satisfied that a) absolute necessity b) no other direct
evidence aside from testimony c) testimony can be corroborated
on material points d) accused not the most guilty e) no previous
conviction.

a+b) In this case, Montero is actually the only person who can provide
direct evidence. While it is possible that the prosecution could use
Montero’s confession even without discharging him, it is still the
prosecution’s decision WON to discharge. Court can only deny if the
requirements aren’t complied with.

c) The testimony could be corroborated with. The only reason they found
the body in the first place was because of the testimony. Even though
some of the information doesn’t line up exactly (“busal” in RR’s mouth, no
mention of packaging tape, death by “lubid” instead of asphyxiation) it’s
pretty obvious that Montero got the relevant details right.

d) “Most Guilty” looks at degree of culpability and not imposable penalty.

CA however is not 100% correct when it said that principal by
inducement is always the most guilty. You still have to look at the actual
actions they both took. SC agreed with CA that Jimenez is more guilty
than Montero though.

Lack of hearing not fatal to discharge either. The previous judge that
dismissed didn’t hold a hearing but Jimenez didn’t care. In fact Jimenez
actually participated by submitting a memorandum of authorities and
opposing both motions.

Finally, even though Montero gave a notice withdrawing his consent, this
is not the proper venue. Montero already confessed anyway. This notice
does not defeat the previous testimony because anyone who says
something stupid could just withdraw his consent later on if that were
the case.

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XII. RULE 120 - JUDGMENT
1. People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550
Prepared by President So
An information for murder of Emmanuel Mendoza through gunshot was
filed with the RTC-Tanauan, Batangas against Joven De Grano (former
mayor of Laurel, Batangas, Armando de Grano, Estanislao Lacaba
together with Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo
Genil, who were at large.
They were charged for an alleged murder of Mendoza, a hit man, whom
they hired to kill another over a land dispute decades back.
Joven, Armando, and Estanislao were all duly arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, they filed motion for bail claiming that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong.
The case was transferred and re-raffled to RTC-Manila because one of the
accused is an incumbent mayor of Laurel, Batangas. Hearing for
application for bail ensued, which was granted finding that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong. People filed a petition for certiorari
to CA – denied; then to SC – granted, thereby reversing CA and RTC’s
Order of granting bail. RTC was also ordered to issue warrant of arrest
against the accused. Estanislao was re-arrested, but Joven and Armando
were not. MR was then filed by the accused, SC issued a Resolution to
remand the case back to RTC for further proceedings. RTC ruled that
Joven, Armando, Domingo, and Lacaba – guilty of murder qualified by
treachery. RTC-Manila heavily relied on the testimony of the wife of the
victim. As for Leonides and Leonardo, still at-large, archived cases. Only
Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the the
other respondents.
Respondents then filed a Joint MR. RTC downgraded Domingo and
Estanislao’s conviction from murder to homicide. Further, Armando and
Joven were acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt.
People filed an MR tying to revive the case to CA; dismissed because of
double jeopardy and it was not endorsed by OSG.
Issues:
(3) W/N the absence during promulgation of sentence
amounted to waiver of remedies?
(4) W/N RTC had a valid jurisdicition?
(you can use the old digest for the other issues but this is the only
relevant aspect here)
Held:
(3) Yes. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, authorizing
trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but
not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment
and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial,
whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which
case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At
such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived.
According to Sec 6, Rule 120:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to
appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies
available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion
for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice.
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause
shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the
judgment.
67
 (4) When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only
Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven,
Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion
for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC
not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at
large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the
joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents
who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a
motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao.
Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his
standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to
seek relief from the court.
2. Rimando v. Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583, 13 October 2014, 738 SCRA
232
Prepared by Calo
FACTS:
Rimando was charged with Estafa. A charge for violation of B.P 22 was
also filed by Spouses Aldaba in the MTC.
Rimando was acquitted by the MTC of the B.P 22 charge on the ground of
reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or omission from which
liability may arise does not exist.
The RTC also acquitted Rimando of Estafa but was found civilly liable
because Rimando, as an accommodation party, should be liable to Spouses
Aldaba.
Rimando argued that her acquittal from the B.P 22 charge should bar the
Spouses Aldaba from claiming civil liability coming from the Estafa case.
ISSUE: WON Rimando still has civil liability coming from the Estafa
case. YES.
RATIO:
Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting
the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never
employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in
Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an
accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on
behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as
a surety to the latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the
value of the issued check.Verily, Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in
the amount of ₱500,000.00 does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime she is charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the same
despite her acquittal in the estafa case.
Further, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an
identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action,
which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their
final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to
the prohibition on double recovery.28 Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case
concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given
any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related
estafa case, as in this instance.
3. Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 350
(Supra)
Prepared by President So
FACTS:
Petitioner was earlier accused, together with another accused [Aquilina
B. Granada], of the crime of Falsification of Public Document and was put
on trial.
Petitioner was arraigned sometime on June 20, 1997.
68
The RESPONDENT CITY PROSECUTOR commenced the trial, but the
trial was later suspended when the Court granted the Joint Motion to
Suspend further Proceedings, filed jointly by the Accused and
RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN.
Reason for motion to suspend was because the two accused in the instant
case charged for falsification of a public document are the same accused
who are likewise charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of Sec.
3(e) of RA No. 3019 Anti Graft and Corruption.
The Sandiganbayan, which is a collegial court, it is preferred that the
Sandiganbayan takes precedence over all other cases including the
instant case involving the same accused similarly situated.
So the case for Falsification was suspended and the case before the
Sandiganbayan continued – to which the accused was acquitted.
Thereafter RESPONDENT wrote a letter to the Clerk of Court of the
RESPONDENT JUDGE, expressing their decision in refiling the herein
enclosed information and request that the same be entered in the docket
of the criminal case with a new case number assigned to it x x x,
attaching thereto the Criminal Information. (So basically they wanted to
refile the case that they previously suspended.
New information was filed.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information and/or dismiss the case
before RTC.
RTC denied.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the prosecution of petitioner for falsification of a
public document would place him twice in jeopardy; and
HELD: NO
Sec 5, Rule 120: An offense charged necessarily includes that which is
proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter.
We hold that the instant case does not constitute double jeopardy, for
which the following requisites must concur: (1) the first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first.
Third requisite missing.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of falsification of a public
document, provided for in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and
those of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither
identity nor exclusive inclusion between the offenses. For falsification of a
public document to be established, the following elements must concur:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
On the other hand, to hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, the following elements must be present:
(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them;
(2) That said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the
performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions;
(3) That they cause undue injury to any party, whether the Government
or a private party;
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
69
It is undisputed that the two charges stem from the same transaction.
However, it has been consistently held that the same act may give rise to
two or more separate and distinct offenses. No double jeopardy attaches,
as long as there is a variance between the elements of the offenses
charged. PETITIONER LOST
4. Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, 13 August 2014, 732 SCRA 687
Prepared by Beeya Echauz
FACTS:
‒ Former councilor of Malabon City, Venancio Sevilla was charged with
the felony of falsification of public documents under Art, 171(4) of the
RPC.
‒ Sevilla entered a plea of not guilty; thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
‒ The prosecution alleged on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as
councilor of Malabon, Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) by checking the box that answers “no” with regard
the question whether there is a pending criminal case against him.
‒ Sevilla had a pending criminal case against him for assault upon an
agent of a person in authority before the MTC of Malabon.
‒ Based on the same facts, an administrative complaint was filed
against Sevilla.
‒ The Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively liable
for dishonesty and falsification of official document and dismissed
from the service which the Court affirmed in the case Sevilla v.
Gervacio.
‒ Sevilla admitted that the box corresponding to the “no” answer was
indeed marked but he averred that he did not intend to falsify his
PDS.
‒ He further claimed that on his first day he did not have an office yet
and that it was Editha Mendoza, a member of his staff, was the one
who prepared his PDS.
‒ Mendoza informed Sevilla around 2pm on that day that the PDS was
needed to be submitted by 5pm on that day.
‒ After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla
claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of
the entries therein.
‒ He failed to notice that the “no” box was the one marked.
‒ All of Sevilla’s claims were backed up by the testimony of Edilberto
Torres, a former city councilor saying that he saw Mendoza that day
preparing the PDS of Sevilla in his [Torres] office and even used the
typewriter there.
‒ Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in
his PDS, which is a public document and that he took advantage of
his official position since he would not have accomplished the PDS if
not for his being a City Councilor.
‒ Nevertheless, Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted
of falsification of public document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC
since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the
aforementioned entry in his PDS.
‒ However, considering that Sevilla's PDS was haphazardly and
recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry therein, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 11
of the RPC.
‒ Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of
the felony of falsification of public documents through reckless
imprudence.
‒ He claims that the Information that was filed against him specifically
charged him with the commission of an intentional felony,i.e.,
falsification of public documents under Article 171 (4) of the RPC.
‒ He could not be convicted of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a
culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N Sevilla can be convicted of falsification of public document through
reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the
Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC. –– NO. (appeal is dismissed
for lack of merit)
RATIO:
70
‒ The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence,
punished under Article 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the
falsification of a public document.
‒ However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as
"falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence."
‒ The foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it.
‒ Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate
crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
‒ It was held in the cases of Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro and RRTC v.
People:
● Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses.
● It is not a question of classification or terminology.
● In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible.
● Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such
descriptive phrase as 'homicide through reckless imprudence', and the
like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, 'reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide'; or 'simple imprudence causing
damages to property'.
‒ The proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of
public documents through reckless imprudence.
[DECISION ON JUDGMENT]
‒ Sevilla's appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the
offense charged in the Information that was filed against him and
that proved by the prosecution. The rules on variance between
allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court, viz.:
○ Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. —
When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
○ Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
‒ Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a
defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
‒ There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged
against Sevilla and that proved by the prosecution — the Information
charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171 (4) of the RPC while the prosecution was
able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents.
‒ The question that has to be resolved then is whether reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily
included in the intentional felony of falsification of public document
under Article 171 (4) of the RPC.
‒ The case of Samson v. CA ruled in the affirmative:
● While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful
crime, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi-offense, in
our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission
of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense.
● In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This
is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the
allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.
‒ Thus, Sevilla's claim that his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated
when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information
only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public
documents, is untenable.
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‒ To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act
of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater
offense.
‒ As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the
Information only charged the willful act of falsification
XIV. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES
- Rules 121-125; 127
1. People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 147678-87, 7 July 2004,433 SCRA 640
Prepared by Paolo Dizon
LANDMARK CASE: CASES THAT INVOLVE CAPITAL OFFENSES
MUST GO THROUGH CA BEFORE SC. (If you don’t have time just
read everything in BOLD, it will suffice)
FACTS:
10 Informations, one count for each rape, was filed against the
accused, Efren Mateo (Mateo). He pleaded not guilty during
arraignment. Rosemarie and Mateo started to live together without the
benefit of marriage when Imelda was only 2 years old. Imelda narrated
that the 10 incidents of rape took place when her mother, Rosemarie, was
not around. According to her, she never reported the incidents of rape to
anybody due to the fact the Mateo threated to kill her and her mother if
she told anyone.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape, imposing on
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The records
showed that the case was handled by 3 different judges. Although
the change in the presiding judges would not invalidate the proceedings,
it did deny the deciding magistrate the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witness which could be crucial in the decision-making
process.
ISSUE:
W/N the case should be directly forwarded to the Supreme Court
by virtue of the Constitutional provision on automatic appeal
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death?
HELD:
No. The case is REMANDED and the records are forwarded to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the DIRECT
APPELLATE REVIEW over all criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution Article VIII,
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
“(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
“(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
or higher.”
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659, as well as procedural rules contained in
Section 3 of Rule 122, Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule
124 and Section 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court. It must be
stressed, however, that the constitutional provision does not
prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from
adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.
During the deliberations of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity of the point of guilty of the accused, some are convinced
there is enough evidence to prove his guilt, while some agree with the
Solicitor General. The occasion demonstrates the typical dilemma, the
determination factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face
with in automatic review cases, however, it is the Court of Appeals that
has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues. While
the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
72
imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an
intermediate review.If only to ensure utmost circumspection before
the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is
imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide
in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is
elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all
possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an
accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone.
A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly,
the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment
imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant,
refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case
to the Supreme Court for its final disposition. Under the Constitution, the
power to amend rules of procedure is vested in the Supreme Court -
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
“(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.”
Procedural matters fall more within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule on
allowing for an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a
subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the
Supreme Court on automatic review, is a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
more particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13
of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to
the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution
of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in
"Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving
the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
2. Pobre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141805, 8 July 2005, 463
SCRA 50
Facts
● Private respondent Ovalles was charged in the RTC with the
crime of Parricide. The information states that around 1AM in
Occidental Mindoro Ovalles pushed his wife Alma, causing her to
fall and hitting her head on the floor which caused her death.
● Assistant Prosec Salcedo recommended a 200K bail but a copy of
the information shows a cancellation of such amount with an
annotation “no bail”. The RTC Judge Pagayatan (Judge) issued
an order of arrest with the same information (with the
annotation). The warrant was unserved so the Judge issued an
alias order of arrest. Ovalles was later arrested that day and
committed in jail.
● Ovalles filed a motion to quash (MQ) praying that if it won't be
granted, it be treated as an application for bail.
● On the hearing, Atty Aglipay, representing the victim’s sister
(Pobre) wanted to re-set the hearing but the Judge pushed
through and treated it as Ovalles’ motion to fix bail. The bail was
set at 40K and approved Ovalles’ property bond.
● Ovalles was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Atty. Aglipay filed
an omnibus motion contesting that the order granting bail and
wanted the Judge and the Prosec to inhibit themselves, the case
be re-raffled and the information amended.
● The case was re-raffled but the bail decision was sustained. The
case was temporarily deferred due to the impending retirement
of the judge assigned to the new court, to be resumed only after
the designation of a new judge.
● Pobre filed for Certiorari with the CA regarding the bail decision
issued by Judge Pagayatan. It was dismissed for late filing. MR
was also denied for being 83 days late. Thus this case.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in dismissing her appeal because it was filed
out of time. -- NO but the court retroactively applied a newer rule which
invalidates the CA’s decision.
Held:
● Petitioner argues that a null and void order granting bail cannot
reach finality any time during the stage of the criminal
prosecution and may be questioned on appeal or petition for
review even if filed beyond the reglementary period.
73
● The court held that under Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court,
an accused charged with a capital offense is not entitled to bail at
any time during trial when the evidence of guilt is strong. It does
not mean however that since the accused is not entitled to bail at
any stage of the trial, a grant thereof can be questioned any time
and without regard to the period of filing provided by the Rules of
Court.
● An order granting bail is an interlocutory order. The word
interlocutory refers to something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or
matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. In that
sense, it does not attain finality since there leaves something else
to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case.
If and when the trial court issued such interlocutory order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous, then a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
● However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a special civil
action for certiorari. The 60-day period was specifically set to
avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
case. Such right to a speedy disposition of the case pertains not
only to a private complainant in a criminal case, but to an
accused as well.
● It is noted that the petition was filed late by 13 days, not 83 days
as computed by the CA. Petitioner received the Order dated June
29, 1998 on July 17, 1998, and a motion contesting, among others,
the grant of bail, was filed by her on July 30, 1998. During this
period, 13 days had already passed. Given that petitioner received
a copy of the Order dated September 28, 1998 denying her motion
for reconsideration on October 12, 1998, she had 47 days
therefrom, or until November 28, 1998 within which to file the
petition. Since the petition was filed with the CA only on
December 11, 1998, 13 days had lapsed.
● Thus, strictly speaking, the CA did not err in dismissing the
special civil action for certiorari for having been filed out of time.
● However, with the issuance of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC on September
1, 2000, amending Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 4.
When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
● The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court. No extension of
time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
● The petition filed before the CA should now be considered as
timely filed. The court ruled in a previous case that A.M. No. 00-
2-03-SC, being a curative statute should be retroactively applied.
● The Omnibus Motion filed by Atty. Aglipay contesting the grant of
bail, is, in effect, a motion for reconsideration of the June 29, 1998
order of Judge Pagayatan. This was denied by the trial court per
Order dated September 28, 1998. Petitioner received a copy
thereof on October 12, 1998. Taking into account A.M. No. 00-2-
03-SC, the petition filed on December 11, 1998, or on the 60th day
should then be considered filed on time.
● Case is remanded to the CA.
3. Tamayo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147070, 17 February 2004,
423 SCRA 175
Prepared by
● Tamayo was convicted of arson and sentenced to reclusio
temporal maximum.
● Tamayo filed a notice of appeal with the CA.
● June 30, 1999 the CA required an appellant’s brief from Tamayo.
○ Tamayo failed to submit.
● CA treated this as an abandonment of the appeal pursuant to
Rule 124 s8.
● Tamayo moved for reconsideration saying it was not his fault, but
his counsel who abandoned him.
● CA said no again as 41 days after the filing of the motion for
reconsideration there was no brief filed.
74
 ● Tamayo says it was not his fault as he did not even know if his
appeal would be approved.
○ Appeal has to be approved or else brief would be useless.
ISSUE: WON Tamayo should be given the chance to appeal?
HELD: YES. Tamayo’s mistake was forgivable. Tamayo did not fail to file
the appeal, he failed to file the brief within the period provided in the
rules.
Failure to file the appeal at all means CA cannot acquire
jurisdiction and decision is final. Failure to file brief is only final if
there is no reconsideration.
In this case, the CA dismissed because Tamayo was allegedly in delay for
not filing a brief 41 days after he submitted his motion. It could not be
Tamayo’s fault as there was never any order to file a brief, nor was his
motion approved. Tamayo was waiting for the approval so he could file
the brief. It’s not Tamayo’s fault no brief was ever filed as he had no way
of knowing for sure that it was needed pending decision.
Generally speaking, these periods to file should not be ignored. The SC
held that these rules should not be interpreted in a vacuum and should
safeguard petitioner’s rights especially in criminal cases.
4. People v. Latayada, G.R. No. 146865, 18 February 2004, 423
SCRA 237
Prepared by Cera
Latayada was convicted by the RTC with carnapping with homicide.
Pedro Playa (victim) arrived at the house of Cordino in Misamis Oriental.
Playa allegedly told Vicenta 'Don't be afraid, Nang, I am the son of Lucia
Payla, I was stabbed by Elgin Latayada, bring me to the hospital.'
Vicenta, who was already old, then called her neighbor Joseph Tion for
help and the latter responded. Joseph treated the wounds of Pedro and
asked what happened. Pedro allegedly told Joseph that Elgin asked to be
brought to the hospital.
On their way, Elgin told Pedro to stop because he wanted to answer the
call of nature. After Elgin relieved himself, instead of boarding at the
back of the motorcycle, he stabbed Pedro and escaped on board the
motorcycle. "When a passenger jeepney passed by, Pedro was loaded and
brought to Claveria Hospital. When they passed by a police station, the
conductor of the passenger jeep reported the stabbing incident. Due to
inadequate medical facilities at Claveria
Hospital, the doctor thereat advised Gina Payla, wife of Pedro, to bring
Pedro to CDO.
Gina was able to converse with him. Again, Pedro pointed to appellant as
his assailant and further narrated the circumstances surrounding his
stabbing. SPO1 Victorino Busalla arrived at the hospital and then
proceeded to take the ante-mortem statement of Pedro. Pedro could not
write because of his injuries; hence, he placed his thumb mark using his
own blood in lieu of his signature on the said statement. The same
statement was signed by Gina Payla who was present when the
statement was taken. Pedro died.
"The (blue) motorcycle driven by Pedro is owned by Kagawad Caabay.
olor blue. It was Kagawad Caabay who had an arrangement with Pedro
regarding the use of the motorcycle to transport passengers."The
motorcycle was recovered but was already cannibalized.
After the prosecution rested its case on June 21, 2002, appellant
escaped from prison which is evidenced by a Notice of Escape
submitted to the court a quo. He has remained at large."
RTC
· Apellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with
homicide.
· Held as part of the res gestae were Pedro Payla's statements uttered
before his death to his wife, Gina; and to Prosecution Witnesses Joseph
Tion and Vicenta Cordino that it was appellant who had stabbed him. His
75
Statement taken by a police officer a day after the incident and on the
same dayhe died, was admitted by the court a quo as a dying declaration.
It admitted these pieces of prosecution evidence as exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
· The lower court also ruled that circumstantial evidence indicated
that appellant was responsible for the disappearance of the motorcycle.
· Upheld Joseph Tion's testimony that on the pretext of wanting to
answer the call of nature, the accused had asked Payla to stop the
motorcycle and, without any warning or provocation, stabbed the latter
on the back. Finding treachery to have qualified the killing, the
lower court imposed on the accused the supreme penalty of
death.
Hence, this automatic review
ISSUE/S
[CRIMPRO ISSUE]
(1)WON the accused is still entitled to an automatic appeal even if he
absconded. -YES
[Non Crimpro Issues]
(2)WON the Trial Court erred in convicting the appellant the crime of
carnapping with homicide - YES
(3)WON the Trial Court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of death
upon the accused appellant when treachery was not alleged in the
Information either as a qualifying or as a generic aggravating
circumstance. – YES
HELD
(1)Effect of Appellant's Escape
When an appellant escapes detention pending appeal, the appeal is
normally dismissed, and the lower court's judgment thus becomes final
and executory. However, this Court has held in People v. Esparas, People
v. Prades, and People v. Raquino that this rule does not apply to
death cases, in which an automatic review is mandated by law
even if appellant has absconded. (Footnote: For a discussion, see
Panganiban, Battles in the Supreme Court, 1998 ed., pp. 68-71; and
Leadership by Example, 1999 ed., pp. 96-97. The herein ponente (CJ
Panganiban) is duty-bound to follow the ruling in these Decisions and to
decide this case accordingly, although he dissented from them, and
although he still believes that the review of death cases should be
made by the Court only after appellant (who is at large) is
apprehended and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court.)
Digester’s Note: This is the application of Rules 124,Sec. 8 and 122 Sec
2 (d)
Rule 124 Sec 08:
Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. -The Court
of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with
notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where
the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio. The Court of Appeals
may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
the appeal.
Rule 122 Sec 2 (d)
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically
reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this
Rule.
Doctrine: Section 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which, inter alia,
authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps bail, has
76
no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. In
death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and
tone of section 12, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule. No
litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution.
The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure
the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes
that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This
concern cannot be diluted. (People v. Esparas)-footnote cited by this case
__________________
Non-Crimpro Issues
(2) Apellant is guilty of homicide only.
Elements of Carnapping with Homicide
The charge filed against appellant for which he was convicted —
carnapping with homicide — is punishable under Section 2, in relation to
Section 14 of RA 6539 12 as amended by RA 7659. 13 Under Section 2 of
RA 6539, carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent; or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons; or with the use of force upon things.
On the other hand, Section 14 of the same act, as amended by RA 7659,
provides:
"SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion hereof."
In the present case, the prosecution had the burden of proving that 1)
appellant took the motorcycle; 2) his original criminal design was
carnapping; 3) he killed Payla; and 4) the killing was perpetrated "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
It is undisputed that the motorcycle driven by Payla had been taken
without his consent on and recovered days later in a cannibalized
condition. The elements of taking and intent to gain were thus
established. The prosecution also proved it was appellant who had killed
him. It failed, however, to discharge its burden of proving the two
other requisites of carnapping.
The circumstantial evidence in the instant case is not sufficient to show
that appellant is
guilty of carnapping.
First, there is no mention in the purported antemortem
Statement 22 of Payla or in his statement to his wife and the
other prosecution witnesses that appellant carnapped his
motorcycle.
Payla merely stated that appellant had stabbed him twice in the back
and once in the face. In fact, the former did not know why he had been
stabbed, as he said in response to a query from his wife and from Joseph
Tion. If appellant had wanted to carnap the motorcycle, Payla would have
pointed this out as the reason for the attack. Yet, the records show that
the former intended only to kill the latter.
Second, still according to Tion's testimony, appellant followed
Payla for about 30 meters from where the motorcycle stood, then
stabbed the latter, who then ran to Vicenta Condino's house for
help.
There is no evidence showing that appellant went back to take the
motorcycle; hence, there is no basis for concluding that he stole it. On
crossexamination,Tion wavered on whether it was his neighbor — herein
77
appellant — whom he had seen with the motorcycle when the former
tried to retrieve it. It is likewise unclear from the testimony of Tion
whether the motorcycle was already missing at the time. As the
carnapping by appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, it
cannot be said that the killing of Payla was an incident thereof, or that it
was committed "in the course of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof." The provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act are therefore
inapplicable. The killing of Payla is punishable under the Revised Penal
Code, either as homicide or as murder.
Proof of Homicide Sufficient
Verily, the utterances of Payla to Condino were instinctively made at a
time when he had no
more opportunity to concoct a fabricated version of the startling event;
hence, the words
he spoke were credible.
(2) A perusal of the Information in this case readily reveals that
treachery was not alleged as an aggravating or a qualifying circumstance
in the commission of the crime charged. Consistent with the new Rules,
treachery may not be appreciated, because it was not alleged in the
Information.
5. Vitto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134981, 18 June 2003, 404
SCRA 307
Prepared by Manalang
Vitto along with Pizarro and Pajaron were charged with Homicide in the
RTC. All three weren’t in jail as they posted bail. RTC rendered a decision
finding all three of them guilty of homicide. All three remained at large
and failed to post bail on appeal.
All three appealed to the CA the conviction, but the CA issued a
resolution requiring them to explain why their appeal should not be
deemed abandoned due to their failure to submit themselves to the
authorities during the pendency of their appeal.
Petitioner through counsel said he didn’t know he had to surrender and
asked for an extension to surrender himself and to file his brief.
The extension lapsed and the petitioner didn’t submit himself, nor filed
his brief. CA dismissed his appeal.
Two months after, Petitioner through his counsel filed a Motion For
Leave of Court to File Appellant’s Brief stating that his failure to
surrender himself to the authorities was because he is in a remote farm
in Mindoro, and that he has no means to go to Metro Manila. CA denied
since the RTC decision was already final and executory.
Issue: W/N the RTC decision was already final and executory?
YES
Held:
Section 8 of Rule 124 states that the CA may dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule or if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal.
Accused considered to have abandoned his appeal where her fails to properly
prosecute his appeal and when he refused to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of the authorities.
Since Vitto asked for an extension to surrender and to file his brief, but had
failed to do so, his appeal is considered to have been abandoned and
consequently, dismissed. CA correctly ruled on Vitto’s Motion For Leave of
Court to File Appellant’s Brief, since Vitto submitted such 2 months after
the finality of the Resolution dismissing the appeal.
Vitto’s excuses were untenable. He was facing a serious charge and it is
incumbent upon him to inform his lawyer where he was and to inquire
the status of the case.
78
The law cannot protect a party who sleeps on his rights or does some acts
inconsistent with its prosecution.
6. Quesada v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 150325, 31 August
2006,500 SCRA 454
Prepared by Bryan Solco
On March 1, 2000, Clemente M. Teruel, (respondent), filed with the Office
of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City, an affidavit-complain t
charging Edgardo V. Quesada (petitioner), Ramon P. Camacho, Jr., and
Rodolfo Corgado with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (par 2 and 3.)
The affidavit-complaint alleges that on June 13, 1998 at, EDSA Shang,,
Quesada, Camacho, and Corgado represented themselves to Teruel as the
president, vice-president/treasurer, and managing director, respectively,
of VSH Group Corporation; that they offered to him a telecommunication
device called Star Consultant Equipment Package which provides the
user easy access to the internet via television; that they assured him that
after he pays the purchase price of P65,000.00, they will immediately
deliver to him two units of the internet access device; that relying on
their representations, he paid them P65,000.00 for the two units; and
that despite demands, they, did not deliver to him the units.
It was only petitioner Quesada who filed a counter-affidavit. He alleged
that he, Camacho, and Corgado are Star Consultant Trainers of F.O.M.
Philippines, Inc., a corporation engaged in the business of selling and
marketing telecommunication products and technologies; that they
formed the VSH Group as a corporation for the principal purpose of
pooling the commissions they will receive as Star Consultant Trainers
and then dividing said commissions among themselves according to their
agreement; that while he admitted that the two units of internet access
devices purchased by herein respondent Teruel were not delivered to him,
however, this was not due to their alleged fraudulent representations
since they merely acted as sales agents of F.O.M. Phils., Inc.; and that
they found out too late that the said company could not cope with its
commitment to them as it ran short of supplies of telecommunication
products.
On April 25, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. issued
a Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner Quesada,
Camacho, and Corgado, and recommending the filing of the
corresponding Information.
Consequently, an Information for estafa against petitioner Quesada,
Camacho, and Corgado was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Mandaluyong. In the meantime, petitioner filed with the Department of
Justice a Petition for Review challenging the April 25, 2000 Resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor finding probable cause.The Secretary of
Justice issued a Resolution dismissing the petition. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
While the RTC was hearing the criminal case, petitioner filed with this
Court the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that the Secretary of
Justice, in dismissing his Petition for Review acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends
that the element of fraud or deceit in the crime of estafa is not present
and that there is no evidence which will prove that the accused promise
to deliver the purchased items was false or made in bad faith.
ISSUES:
1. W/N hierarchy of courts violated? Yup
2. Did secretary of justice act w/ GADELEJ? Nope
HELD:
1. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, must be filed with the Court of Appeals whose
decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the same Rules. A direct
recourse to this Court is warranted only where there are special and
compelling reasons specifically alleged in the petition to justify such
action. Such ladder of appeals is in accordance with the rule on hierarchy
of courts.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
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assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writs
procurement must be presented. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that
courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional
Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is, after all, a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.
The case must be dismissed outright because there is no compelling
reason for the SC to take jurisdiction of the case.
2. (Not Important). Even assuming that the petition can be filed directly
with this Court, the same must fail. Petitioner contends that the element
of fraud or deceit as an element of the crime of estafa is absent.
Consequently, the affirmance by the Secretary of Justice of the
Investigating Prosecutors finding that there exists a probable cause is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The issue of whether the element of fraud or deceit is present is both a
question of fact and a matter of defense, the determination of which
is better left to the trial court after the parties shall have adduced their
respective evidence. It bears stressing that a preliminary investigation is
merely an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on
the merits. As implied by the words probably guilty, the inquiry is
concerned merely with probability, not absolute or moral certainty. At this
stage, the complainant need not present proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties evidence. As ruled by the Investigating
Prosecutor and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice, petitioner's
representation and assurance to respondent Teruel that the
telecommunication equipment would be delivered to him upon payment
of its purchase price was the compelling reason why he parted with his
money. Such assurance, the Investigating Prosecutor added, is actually a
misrepresentation or deceit.
7. Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 9 February 2011,642 SCRA
421
Prepared by Nicki Vine Capuchino
FACTS:
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an
information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.
In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
It imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto
mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the
payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount
as the fine.
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Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion
for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material
evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted.
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners
motion for new trial for lack of merit.
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the
RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
she had a fresh period of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of
the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within
which to file a
notice of appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases. - YES
HELD:
The raison d’tre for the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal
period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to
appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves
with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day
period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final
order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to
the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the ff reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of
Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a
civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states
that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought
not to recognize any distinction.
8. Macapagal v. People, G.R. No. 193217, 26 February 2014, 717
SCRA 425
Prepared by Ian Benitez
Corazon Macapagal is found guilty of estafa for unreturned jewelries
worth P800k. She received the decision on 13 Jan 2009, then timely filed
an MR which was denied. She then filed a Notice of Appeal on 3 Aug
2009, which was also denied on 29 Jun 2010 for being filed out of time.
She directly filed a Petition for Review on certiorari to the SC (Rule 45)
assailing conviction for estafa, denial of MR, and denial of Notice of
Appeal.
Petition dismissed for complete disregard of procedural rules:
1. Corazon availed the wrong mode of appeal. She should have
gone to CA for special civil action under Rule 65. Rule 45 is a
mode of appeal of lower court’s decision or final order. The RTC
Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order,
and ROC provide that it cannot be appealed.
2. Violation of hierarchy of courts - direct filing to SC is only
allowed if there are special, important, and compelling reasons
clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not
present in this case.
3. Failure to attach a clearly legible duplicate original, or a
CTC of Order convicting her of estafa and denial of her
MR. Under Rule 45 of ROC, a petition for review on certiorari
must contain a CTC or duplicate original of the assailed issuance.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition.
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 4. Failure to comply with rules and court’s lawful orders. No
attached affidavit of service to RTC and OSG. No notarized NFS.
No counsel’s contact details. They constantly gave excuses.
Consequently, the counsel withdrew from the case after efforts to
contact client proved futile. SC even contacted Macapagal
directly, but to no avail, she still did not comply with rules.
Petition denied.
9. People v. Piccio, G.R. No. 193681, 6 August 2014, 732 SCRA 254
(Supra)
Prepared by Remollo
Jessie John P. Gimenez, President of the Philippine Integrated
Advertising Agency – the advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group of
Companies (a part of Malayan Insurance Co.), filed a Complaint-Affidavit
for libel before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City against a
group called the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for
posting on the website an article entitled "Back to the Trenches: A Call to
Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance with Coalition."
Such publication was said to be highly defamatory and libelous against
the Yuchengco family and their company.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found probable cause to
indict 16 trustees, officers and/or members of PEPCI, one of which was
respondent Piccio.
Private respondents moved to quash the information, reasons being the
criminal information failed to allege where the article was printed and
first published or where the offended parties reside. RTC granted.
Private Complainants (also petitioners), through private and public
prosecutor filed a Notice of Appeal, WITHOUT going through the OSG.
Therefore the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the appeal was not supported by the OSG.
Respondents added that the notice of appeal was signed by the public
prosecutor and therefore valid; and that jurisprudence shows that the
conformity of the OSG is not required when grave errors are committed
by the trial court or where there is lack of due process.
OSG then commented that the remedy of appeal is appropriate however
such is void for not in conformity with the law – which states that it is
only the OSG that should represent the People in criminal cases.
CA – Dismissed case due to reasoning of OSG.
ISSUE/HELD: W/Npetitioners, being mere private complainants,
may appeal an order of the trial court dismissing a criminal case
even without the OSG’s conformity. NO.
RATIO:
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal
case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only
the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing
the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party
affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the
petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses.
The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action
for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the
end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.
Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to
preserve their interest in the civil aspect of the case. Rather, by seeking
the reversal of the RTC’s quashal of the information in the Criminal case
and thereby seeking that the said court be directed to set the case for
arraignment and to proceed with trial, it is sufficiently clear that they
sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of respondents for
libel.
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10. Cajipe v. People, G.R. No. 203605, 23 April 2014, 723 SCRA 615
Prepared by Enzo Agcaoili
FACTS
Lilian filed complaint before DOJ charging several PNP Highway Patrol
Group officers (herein petitioners) of multiple murder. Another group
consisted of police officers from PNP SAF
Lilian contended that the SAF and HPG groups conspired in carrying out
a plan to kill her husband and their 7 yr old daughter. She was supposed
to meet her family in Pasay but they did not show up. She called her
househelper only to find out that there had been a shooting incident,
which her husband and daughter had been involved in. She was advised
to go to the hospital. She learned that her daughter had been shot in the
head and died. Her husband had been found dead near a passenger
jeepney as well.
Witnesses testified that husband and daughter were riding in his Isuzu
Crosswind van when police officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly
fired at the van. Husband got out, went to the passenger side, and tried to
carry daughter out to safety as she had been wounded. The police officers
went after Husband and shot him on the head.
DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary investigation finding probable
cause to indict all the police officers involved in the police action that led
to the shooting of Husband Jun and Daughter Lia for two counts of
murder.
RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of
probable cause against them, given that the witnesses made no mention
of seeing anyone from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and
killing of Jun and his daughter. Instead, the RTC found that the evidence
tends to show that petitioner HPG officers were requested and acted
merely as blocking force in a legitimate police operation.
Some 6 moths later, OSG filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part.
CA granted petition, ruling that RTC gravely abused its discretion.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in granting the OSG's petition for certiorari under Rule
65, given that the RTC's order of dismissal is final and appealable?
HELD - CA erred in granting OSG’s petition
The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against
petitioner HPG officers. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." The CA
should have denied the People's petition for special civil action of
certiorari that assails the order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65
provides that such action is available only when "there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
The fact, however, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides
that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final
order like the RTC's order dismissing the case against petitioner HPG
officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes of
the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing
further to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. CA
clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy.
Furthermore, even assuming the propriety of the filing of a special civil
action of certiorari against the RTC's order of dismissal, the People had
sixty days from receipt of such order within which to file the action. Here,
the People filed its petition for certiorari 112 days from receipt of the
dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, clearly beyond the
60-day period allowed for such action. Therefore, not only was a special
civil action for certiorari the wrong remedy, it has also prescribed.
11. World Wide Web vs People
By Jc Abalos
Facts:
- Police Chief Inspector villegas filed applications for warrants
before QC RTC to search the premises of World Wide Web
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 Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation.
- The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal
toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of
P.D. No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water,
Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water
or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice
of the PLDT
- The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search
warrants. The applicants Rivera and Gali of the Alternative
Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testi ed as witnesses
- Basically, WWC and Planet Internet were able to provide
international long distance call services to any part of the world
by using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF.
- Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and
registered to WWC was used to provide a service called
GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call service, which
can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts." During
a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone
number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt
required him to enter the user code and PIN provided under a
GlobalTalk prepaid account, he was then requested to enter the
destination number, which included the country code, phone
number and a pound sign. The call was completed to a phone
number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records,
it showed that the call was only directed to the local
number 6891135. This indicated that the international test
call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.
- Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had
been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment
that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they
violated P.D. No. 401 as amended, on unauthorized
installation of telephone connections
- Gali also alleged petitioners committed theft thru the misuse of
PLDT lines/numbers, with clear intent to gain, depriving PLDT of
revenue - by ‘piggy backing’ on PLDT’s multi-million facilities.
- Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum
Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications
Commission prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment
without rst securing type approval license from the latter. PLDT
computed a monthly revenue loss of P764,718.09. They alleged
that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and
evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the
prejudice of the government.
- Three warrants were issued against the o ce premises of
petitioners, authorizing police o cers to seize various items in the
premises of WWC and Planet Internet
- Over a hundred items were seized.
- including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and les, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet
notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were
con scated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of
international calls, such as the President’s O ce and the
Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as
well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
- Petitioners led their respective motions to quash the search
warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search
warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts
complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act
complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were
general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto
were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
- The RTC granted the motions to quash since the warrants
issued were in the nature of general warrants.
- PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on
the ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City
Prosecutor prior to ling the motion, as required under Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. PLDT appealed to
the CA which reversed and set aside the RTC Resolutions
and declared the search warrants valid and effective.
- Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.
Among the points raised was that PLDT should have led a
petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned
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 the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the
Motions for Reconsideration.
Issues/Held
- (1) WON conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary prior
filing a motion for reconsideration to question an order quashing
search warrants. NO
- (2) WON an order quashing a search warrant issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal action is deemed a
final order that can be the subject of an appeal. YES
- (3) WON the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable
cause, considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not
constitute theft. YES
- (4) WON the assailed search warrants were general warrants.
RATIO
- (1) An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action, therefore, conformity of the public prosecutor is
not necessary to give PLDT personality to question the
motion to quash granted by the RTC.
- A search warrant is obtained, not by the ling of a complaint or an
information, but by the ling of an application therefor.
- An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process,
rather than a criminal action.
- The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely di erent from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
- A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant,
merely constitutes process. A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity. CA ruling sustained.
- (2) An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
independently prior to the ling of a criminal action, is not
merely an interlocutory order. It partakes of a final order
and can be the proper subject of an appeal. Therefore, PLDT was
correct when they assailed the quashal orders via an appeal
rather than a petition for certiorari.
- Thus, the CA correctly ruled that is this case, the applications for
search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not
as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search
warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there
was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of
the search warrants were nal orders, not interlocutory, and an
appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
- (3) The assailed search warrants were issued upon
probable cause. Trial judges determine probable cause in
the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial judge’s
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the
finding has substantial basis.
- Sec 2 Article III of Consti
- In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an o ense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with that o ense are in the place to be
searched.
- There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in
the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent
on the nding of trial judges in the process of exercising their
judicial function. They determine probable cause based on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the offender.
- A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as
long as there was substantial basis for that determination.
Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an o ense
has been committed, and the objects in connection with the o ense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. -
- According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to
appear as local calls and not overseas calls, thus e ectively
evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass
charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of
taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT
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 concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives
legitimate telephone operators, of the compensation which it is
entitled to had the call been properly routed through its network.
As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the
elements of the crime are present therein.
- For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements
must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s
personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent
of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.
- It is the use of these communications facilities without the
consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the
unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
- Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been
accomplished without the installation of telecommunications
equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may
also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401
- Prision correccional minimum period or a fine ranging
from 2k pesos or both
- (4) Assailed search warrants not general warrants.
- A general warrant is de ned as a search or arrest warrant that is
not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be
seized. It is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another and gives the officer executing the
warrant the discretion over which items to take.
- Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against
whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our
Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure
that people and their properties are searched only for the most
compelling and lawful reasons.
- Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution: The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and e ects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or a rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
- In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the
following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:
- SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
- a) Subject of the offense;
- b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the o ense;
- c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense
- SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or a rmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
- The things to be seized must be described with particularity.
Technical precision of description is not required. It is only
necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as
to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so
that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed,
the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the
rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
warrant/ Any description of the place or thing to be searched that
will enable the offocer making the search with reasonable
certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
- A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the
description of the things to be seized when the things described
86
 are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offeense for
which the warrant is being issued.
- PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to
be searched as identi ed in the warrants and the crime of theft of
its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for
the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the
premises of petitioners and was able to confirm that they had
utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of
computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers,
multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, and support
equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.
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AMDG

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