1. CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. vs.

ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,

G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966
CASTRO, J., En Banc

Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason
of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).

FACTS: In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) conceived a promotional scheme to drum up patronage for its oil products – i.e.
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest." It calls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas
pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Participation is to be open indiscriminately to all
"motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". No fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex
products required to be made.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails for the said contest, Caltex made a letter to the postal authorities to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting
Postmaster General, Enrico Palomar, opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions of The Postal Law
– i.e. Chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983, which prohibits the non-mailable
matter of any information regarding "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real
or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the Postmaster General,
praying that judgment be rendered declaring its Caltex Hooded Pump Contest not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public. The trial
court ruled that the contest does not violate the Postal Code and that the Postmaster General has no right to bar the
public distribution of the contest rules by the mails. The Postmaster General appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal
Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein?

HELD: No. "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by Caltex is not a lottery that may be administratively and
adversely dealt with under the Postal Law. The term in question is used in association with the word "lottery".

"Lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio). In the present case, the elements of prize
and chance are too obvious in the disputed Caltex’s scheme. However, with regards to the third element – i.e.
consideration, SC found nowhere in the said rules of any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought,
any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. The scheme does not only
appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance. Like a lottery, a “gift enterprise” comes
also within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration. The
apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical,
the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably; every case must be resolved upon the particular
phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis
— it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is
consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a
consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest
indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included. Gratuitous
distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law
and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar
schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.

9. HIDALGO VS HIDALGO
Facts
-In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels of land
for P4,000.00.
-Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as
tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed
values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by
respondents-vendees in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00,
-Petitioner-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a
deed of sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.

-The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention
to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by Section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently,
the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial
assessor of Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor
of the affidavit required by Section 13 of the Land Reform Code.

Issue
Whether or not the plaintiffs as “share tenants” are entitled to redeem the parcel of land by virtue of Section 12 of the
Agricultural Land Reform and is a right of redemption granted by Section 12 of the said act applicable to them.

Ruling of Supreme Court

-The code intended to afford the farmers who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who
inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and
preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier
converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of
their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority.
-The agrarian court erred in dismissing the petition on the basis of its conclusion that the right of redemption granted by
Section 12 of Land Reform Code is available to “leasehold tenants” and not “shared tenants” and that their respective
rights and obligations are not coextensive or coequal.

-It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the said Code. In fact, the spirit or intention of a statute
prevails over the letter thereof. A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as
necessary, the letter of the law. By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather carry out and give due
course to 'its intent. Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court.
The very essence of agricultural reform code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy.
It was error of the agrarian court to state that the systems of agricultural tenancy is recognized in this jurisdiction are
share tenancy and leasehold tenancy even after the enactment of the said reform code.

Statutory Construction
The court has consistently held in line with authoritative principles of statutory construction that, it will reject a narrow
and literal interpretation, such as that given by the agrarian court.
-That would defeat and frustrate rather than foster and give life to the laws declared policy and intent.
-Finally, under the established jurisprudence of the Court, in the interpretation of tenancy and labor legislation, it will be
guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve grave doubts
in favor of the tenant and worker.

5. BRUNO APARRI vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. L-30057 JANUARY 31, 1984

Construction: Power to Construe: Judicial Construction: Prerequisite

DOCTRINE:
For where there is no ambiguity in the words of a statute, there is no room for construction.

CASE SUMMARY:
Bruno Aparri contested that he shall continue as General Manager of NARRA (National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration) until he vacates the office. Private respondents in response said that they have the right to remove him
from appointment because his term has already expired and that the respondents (Members of the Board of Directors)
was given a power by the Chairman of the Board to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager of the NARRA.

FACTS:
On January 15, 1960, private respondents (as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration created under Republic Act No. 1160, approved June 18, 1954 — NARRA) approved the
resolution no. 13 appointing Mr. Bruno O. Aparri as General Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA).
However on March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) which states that
the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors the desire of the office of the Philippines to fix the
term of Aparri, the general manager up to the closing time of the office on March 31, 1962 in accordance with paragraph
2, section 8 of R.A. 1160:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. — The Board of Directors shall have the following powers and duties:
To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager, subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic
Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines, …. The Board, by a majority vote of all members, may,
for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the approval of the President of the
Philippines, suspend and/or remove the General Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the then Court of First Instance of Manila on
March 29, 1962. The petition prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board dated March 15, 1962, to command the
Board to allow petitioner to continue in office as General Manager until he vacates said office in accordance with law and
to sentence the private respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner actual damages in the sum of P95,000.00,
plus costs.

On August 8, 1963, when the case was still pending decision in the lower court, Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known
as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, abolished the NARRA (Sec. 73, R.A. 3844) and transferred its functions and powers
to the Land Authority.

On October 21, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, finding "that this case has become
academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) and thereby dismissing
the instant petition without pronouncement as to costs" (p. 5, rec.)
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of the petitioner without cause

HELD/ RATIO:
Affirmed. The term office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.

It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory
scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the
power to fix the term is rested in the Board of Directors (Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160) subject to the
recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the Philippines. Resolution
No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner.

The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed,
and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed
to know the meaning of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute.

SC DECISION: The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. WITHOUT COSTS.

2. REPUBLIC VS LACAP 2007

FACTS
• Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed, with modifications,
ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance and damages filed by Lacap against RP
• Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other contractors
were pre-qualified
• Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, and thereafter undertook the
works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
• On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount it 100% completed
according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
• DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as
contractor having expired
• Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractors License Law
(RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no
law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
• DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that
payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued
• On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner before
the RTC.14
• On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the
claim.
• Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued an Order dated March
11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the
RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
• On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
• Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to pay Lacap for the contract of
the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
• CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%

ISSUE WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects

RULING : A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him
from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
“SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to
construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work
within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or
who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member
thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall
be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred
pesos but not more than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if
the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a
contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed
therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to
the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

3. GAN VS REYES
Legal Maxim: Absoluta Sententia Expositore Non Indiget Augustus
Meaning of the Maxim: an absolute judgment needs no expositor
Relevant Facts of the Case
-Bernadette S. Pondevida cannot afford to send her 3-year old daughter to school so she wrote to the petitioner Augustus
R. Gan a demand to give support for their ‘love child’. However, Gan denied paternity of the child which resulted to
Pondevida filing a complaint against Gan.
-Gan moved to dismiss the case invoking that there is no cause of action because the birth certificate of the child indicated
that the father is unknown but it was denied. Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the
reglementary period.
-Thus, on January 19, 2000 private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted.
-Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent
ex parte.
The court ruled in favor of Pondevida and ordered Gan for support for his illegitimate child immediately.
-Petitioner in his appeal argued that he shouldn’t immediately provide for the child because
a. under the rules a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good reason for
its immediate execution
b. the writ is invalid because it was issued in violation of his right to notice and hearing
c. he should be allowed to prove his defense in adultery so that the claim for support would be denied
d. “in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's mother would be a valid defense to show that
the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not
entitled to support”
e. DNA testing should be allowed to prove paternity

Ruling of Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any
to argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate execution.
The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise
dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities.
Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded
since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, hence, denied the petition.
Ratio:
According to the Court, Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court,
judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to
the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance
execution will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. To consider petitioner's argument that there should
be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule
mandating immediate execution.
The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction
between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta
sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead
to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition.
Ambiguity Needing Statutory Construction/Interpretation:
1. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court which provided that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in
actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.
-Court applied the legal maxim of Absoluta Sententia Expositore Non Indiget Augustus and reminded the petitioner that
the plain words of the statute does not need further explanation. The court cannot wait for the result of the paternity in
all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns because if it had to wait the final
judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school
because of lack of funds. Petition is denied.

4. RAMIREZ VS GARCIA
FACTS:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent,
Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act
to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

-Petitioner’s contention plain meaning should be understood and therefore that the phrase “private communication” in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations”.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation
Held: Yes. PETITION DISMISSED
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

-The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
-As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.

-The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings
or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office.

-Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by
the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his
Explanatory Note to the Bill.
6. GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPOROTION v. NLRC/SALAZAR

G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992

PETITIONER: GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION (GMCR) RESPONDENT: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC) and IMELDA SALAZAR (private respondent)
Nature of the case: Regarding the alleged Illegal Dismissal of SALAZAR

Doctrine according to the Syllabus: VERBA LEGIS FACTS OF THE CASE Parties Involved/Characters:
• Imelda Salazar – General System Analyst of GMCR
• Delfin Saldivar – Manager for Technical Operations’ support of GMCR
• Agustin Maramara – Company’s Internal Auditor
• Richard Yambao – Owner and Manager of Elecon Engineering which is a supplier of GMCR

FACTS:
It is alleged that Salazar and Saldivar are very close. It is also mentioned that they share an apartment. 1984, reports
shows that the company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were
missing.
-A report prepared by Maramara indicated that
- Saldivar entered into a partnership with Yambao - Saldivar recommended Elecon
- The missing aircon was used by Saldivar for personal use (recovered by replevin)
- Salazar (respondent) got involved because she is a signed witness of the Articles of Partnership of the two
- She knows where the missing aircon is, failed to report it.

(1984) Because of those, Salazar was suspended and was given time to explain herself (for 30 days/one month).
After 3 days she already filed a complaint against GMCR for illegal dismissal (illegal suspension at first then it escalated to
that).
(1985) Heared by Labor Arbiter – in favor of Imelda Salazar, awarded her reinstatement, backwages and other benefits
plus moral damages.
(1987) NLRC – affirmed Labor Arbiter decision but backwages of 2 years only; no moral damages Thus this petition by
GMCR before SC

ISSUES: Is she illegally dismissed based on the Labor Code and Constitutional guarantee?

RULING OF SUPREME COURT: She was illegally dismissed.

The Court pointed out Art 279 of the Labor Code, Sections 2 and 3 of IRR of Labor Code which talks about the Security of
tenure for regular employees which states that: xxx An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent xxx
Corollary to it is the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code (IRR) stating that employer cannot terminate
regular employees without just cause or authorized by laws 1 and if such employeed get illegally dismissed, he or she will
be entitled to be back in his/her position or be reinstated without loss of seniority rights plus backwages.
The priority is clearly leaned towards the employee or to labor. The Court pointed out the opening paragraph on Labor
and the 1973 Constitution on Article 2 which enshrines “full protection” to labor. In the 1986 ConCom, they have designed
Social Justice an Human rights to reduce social, economic and political inequalities.
Court held that the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous. Under statcon, if the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be applied literally [Verba Legis] (Additional, away from statcon, she is not in a fiduciary position so she can be
reinstated because “strained relations” aren’t relevant in her position)
7. REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS VS COM OF CUSTOMS
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

 Petitioner, Republic Flour Mills, Inc., is a domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of wheat flour,
and produces pollard (darak) and bran (ipa) in the process of milling.
 During the period from December, 1963 to July, 1964, inclusive, petitioner exported Pollard and/or bran which was
loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater
 The respondent assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00,
which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest.
 According to the petitioner, “products of the Philippines” found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code,
excludes bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) because they are merely waste from the production of flour.
 The main contention before respondent Court of petitioner was "that in as much as no government or private
wharves or government facilities were utilized in exporting the pollard and/or bran, the collection of wharfage dues
is contrary to law.
 Respondent Commissioner of Customs said that petitioner was liable for wharfage dues upon receipt or discharge
of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of government-owned or
private wharves.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law.

RULING:

The language of Section 2802 appears to be quite explicit: "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines except coal, lumber, creosoted and other
pressure treated materials as well as other minor forest products, cement, guano natural rock asphalt, the minerals and
ores of base metals (e.g., copper, lead, zinc, iron, chromite manganese, magnesite and steel), and sugar molasses exported
from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage xxx"

One category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are exported. Even
without undue scrutiny, it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within
the terms of the above section.

The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law is clear; it must be
obeyed.

The objective of the act must be carried out. Even if there be doubt as to the meaning of the language employed,
the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas
motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled
to sympathetic consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the coverage of the
Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate.

The decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.