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NATIoNAL LAW UNIVERSITY oDISHA, CUTTACK

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PROJECT ON
EROSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSCIENCE
Submitted by:
Ananya Satish (2019/BALLB/015)
Prerna Sengupta (2019/BALLB/078)
Kumar Satyam (2019/BALLB/052)

Submitted to:
Dr. Yogesh Pratap Singh
Registrar (I/C)
Mr. Ashit Kumar Srivastava
Assistant Professor of Law
Dr. Rangin P. Tripathy
Assistant Professor of Law

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In perf0rming 0ur assignment, we had t0 take the help and guideline 0f s0me respected
pers0ns, wh0 deserve 0ur greatest gratitude. The c0mpleti0n 0f this assignment gives us
much Pleasure. We w0uld like t0 sh0w 0ur gratitude t0 Dr. Yogesh Pratap Singh and Mr.
Ashit Kumar Srivastava and Dr. Rangin P. Tripathy, f0r giving us a g00d guideline f0r
assignment thr0ugh0ut numer0us c0nsultati0ns. We w0uld als0 like t0 expand 0ur deepest
gratitude t0 all th0se wh0 have directly and indirectly guided us in writing this assignment.
Many pe0ple, especially 0ur classmates and team members itself, have made valuable
c0mment suggesti0ns 0n this pr0p0sal which gave us an inspirati0n t0 impr0ve 0ur
assignment. We thank all the pe0ple f0r their help directly and indirectly t0 c0mplete 0ur
assignment.

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COntents
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................... 5
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: CORNERSTONE OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION ................................................... 7
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY: CONSCIENCE OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION ................... 10
IGNORANCE OF DPSP: AGAINST THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION............................................... 11
FAILURES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES ..................................................... 12
CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY................................................................................................................ 13
HORIZONTAL POWER SHARING ............................................................................................................ 15
INTRA ORGAN DEVICES ..................................................................................................................... 16
INTER ORGAN CONTROL DEVICES .................................................................................................... 18
VERTICAL POWER CONTROL DEVICE .................................................................................................... 20
CONFLICTS AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND THE JUDICIARY ...................... 22
EROSION OF POWER IN THE EXECUTIVE .............................................................................................. 26
INDIAN EXECUTIVE ............................................................................................................................ 27
ABUSE OF POWER ................................................................................................................................. 28
ABUSE OF POWER BY JUDICIARY ...................................................................................................... 28
CASES OF JUDICIAL OVERREACH....................................................................................................... 31
REPERCUSSIONS OF ABUSE OF POWER BY JUDICIARY ..................................................................... 34
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................................... 35
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 36

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Table of Cases
Anil Kumar Jha v. U0I, AIR (2005) SC 4255 ...................................................................................... 29
Bij0e Emmanuel v. State 0f Kerala, (1987) AIR 748 ........................................................................... 31
B0ard 0f c0ntr0l f0r cricket v. Cricket Ass0ciati0n 0f Bihar & 0rs., (2016) 8 SCC 535 .................... 32
I. R. C0elh0 v. State 0f Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1 .......................................................................... 21
I.C. G0lak Nath v. State 0f Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643......................................................................... 7
Indian Y0ung Lawyers Assn. v. State 0f Kerala (2017) SCC 1690 .................................................... 14
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 3 SCC 321 ................................................................................... 24
Jagdambika Pal v. State 0f UP, AIR (1998) SC 998 ............................................................................ 29
J0seph Shine v. Uni0n 0f India (2019)2 SCC 18 ................................................................................. 14
K. S. Puttaswamy v. Uni0n 0f India (2017) 10 SCC .......................................................................... 14
Kesavananda Bharati v. State 0f Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 ................................................................. 7
L. Chandra Kumar v. Uni0n 0f India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 ................................................................... 20
N. Priyadarshini v. The Secretary t0 G0vernment, Educati0n Department (2005) 3 CTC 449 ........... 34
Navtej Singh J0har v. Uni0n 0f India, 2019 10 SCC 1 ........................................................................ 13
P.V. Narasimha Ra0 v. State (CBI/SPE) , (1998) 4 SCC 626 .............................................................. 23
S.P. Gupta v. President 0f India,AIR (1982) SC 149 ........................................................................... 27
Shamsher Singh v. State 0f Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192 ....................................................................... 17
Shayara Ban0 v. Uni0n 0f India, (2017) 9 SCC ................................................................................... 13
Shyam Narayan Ch0uksey v. Uni0n 0f India, (2017) 1 SCC 422 ........................................................ 31
State 0f Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu, (2016) SCC 0nLine SC 1487 ............................................................ 33
Supreme C0urt 0n rec0rds ass0ciati0n v. Uni0n 0f India, (2016) 5 SCC 1......................................... 28
T.N. G0davarman Thirumulpad v. Uni0n 0f India & 0rs : (1997) 2 SCC 267 .................................... 33
Uni0n 0f India v. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat (2016) SCC 0nLine Utt 670 ..................................... 30
Uphaar Tragedy v. Sushil Ansal, (2011) 14 SCC 481 .......................................................................... 31
Vishaka & 0rs. v. State 0f Rajasthan : AIR 1997 SC 3011 .................................................................. 33

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INTRODUCTION

The c0nscience 0f wielders 0f state p0wer fails t0 res0nate with the c0nscience 0f the
C0nstituti0n.1 The idea 0f c0nstituti0nal m0rality and judicial values undertake myriad
dimensi0ns in a dem0cratic system and thus affects the dignity and freed0m 0f individual
citizens in a multitude 0f ways. Essentially, the basic c0ncept 0f c0nstituti0nal m0rality can
be defined as a param0unt reverence f0r the f0rms 0f the C0nstituti0n enf0rcing 0bedience t0
auth0rity and acting under and within these forms.2 In the perspective 0f Dr. Ambedkar,
c0nstituti0nal m0rality means an effective c00rdinati0n between c0nflicting interests 0f
different pe0ple and the administrative c00perati0n t0 res0lve these disputes amicably
with0ut any c0nfr0ntati0n am0ngst the vari0us gr0ups w0rking f0r the realizati0n 0f their
ends at any c0st.3 In his 0pini0n, the m0ral fabric 0f s0ciety, that is, the g0verned and the
g0vernance sh0uld be str0ng. Dem0cracy in India was 0nly, as he put it, „t0p dressing 0n
Indian s0il, which is essentially undem0cratic.‟4 0ur pe0ple have „yet t0 learn‟ c0nstituti0nal
m0rality.

Theref0re, the ambit 0f c0nstituti0nal m0rality is n0t 0nly limited t0 adhering t0 the
c0nstituti0nal pr0visi0ns in the literal sense but is t0 realize the g0al 0f the C0nstituti0n,
which is a s0ci0-juridical scenari0 pr0viding a platf0rm t0 reveal the full pers0nh00d 0f every
citizen, f0r wh0m and by the will 0f wh0m the C0nstituti0n exists.5

The c0ncise Oxford Dicti0nary (10th editi0n) defines c0nscience as a m0ral sense 0f right and
wr0ng.

“C0nscience means the internal kn0wledge 0r judgment 0f right and wr0ng. It is the faculty
within us by which 0ur acti0ns are tried and judged. Freed0m 0f c0nscience implies that a
man is free t0 entertain whatever ideas 0f m0rality appeals t0 him. The principle is that a man

1
Anand Chakravarti “Conscience 0f the C0nstitution and Vi0lence 0f the Indian State ” Economic and
Political Weekly, v0l. 47, n0. 47/48, 2012, pp. 33–38 JSTOR, <www.jst0r.0rg/stable/41720407> accessed 25
March 2019
2
Pratap Bhanu Mehta,”What Is C0nstituti0nal M0rality?” <http://india-
seminar.c0m/2010/615/615_pratap_bhanu_mehta.htm> accessed 25 March 2019
3
Minu Elizabeth Scaria “C0nstituti0nal M0rality And Judicial Values
<http://www.legalserviceindia.c0m/article/l186-C0nstituti0nal-M0rality-And-Judicial-Values.html> accessed
25 March 2019
4
Ambedkar, „Speech Delivered 0n 25 N0vember 1949‟ in The Constitution and Constituent Assembly Debates,
p. 174.
5
Supra to note

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can never be hindered fr0m thinking whatever he ch00ses. Every man is free t0 think his 0wn
th0ughts and t0 have his 0wn 0pini0ns ab0ut religi0n and m0rality.”6

C0nscience is, theref0re, a step in the pr0gress 0f the m0rality 0f man. It is an internal
rati0nal capacity that bears witness t0 0ur value system.7

In 0ther w0rds, freed0m 0f c0nscience means that n0 man except the individual himself has
any right 0r auth0rity t0 dictate t0 him what shall be his phil0s0phical 0r belief system. It
means that the right t0 be free t0 think and believe as 0ne wants with0ut the imp0siti0n 0f
0fficial c0ercive p0wer 0ver th0se beliefs.8

Even th0ugh the freed0m 0f c0nscience pertains t0 the m0ral aut0n0my and judgement 0f
man, deprived 0f any regulati0n, prescripti0n 0r interference by law, it cann0t be enj0yed
c0mpletely. Such freed0m cann0t be enj0yed t0 the detriment 0r enj0yment 0f similar
freed0m 0f 0thers. The self, which determines his 0wn faith and belief system must in like
l0gic 0blige himself m0rally t0 0thers, enj0yment 0f similar faith and belief system. Als0,
c0nstituti0nally such freed0ms are subject t0 public 0rder, m0rality and 0ther pr0visi0ns 0f
Part-Ill 0f the C0nstituti0n.9 The lack 0f 0bservance 0f such c0nduct, that is, enj0ying
c0nstituti0nally guaranteed freed0ms while acc0mm0dating the rights and interests 0f 0thers
has lately been 0n a rise in India. The instituti0ns that wield p0wer are bec0ming increasingly
ign0rant 0f the spirit 0f the C0nstituti0n, its c0nscience. In this paper, we theref0re,
determine t0 understand the c0nscience and the m0rality 0f the Indian C0nstituti0n and the
abuse 0f p0wers by the maj0r instituti0ns in 0ur c0untry which has led t0 the er0si0n 0f the
c0nscience 0f the Indian C0nstituti0n.

6
A.S. Chaudhari “C0nstituti0nal Rights and Limitati0ns” (1958) v0l. 2 p. 87
<http://sh0dhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/187007/14/14_chapter%209.pdf> accessed 25 March 2019
7
J0e Carter, “What is conscience?” (2014) < https://www.theg0spelc0aliti0n.0rg/article/what-is-c0nscience/>
accessed 25 March 2019
8
“Freed0m 0f Conscience” < https://www.thefire.0rg/ab0ut-us/campus-rights/freedomofconscience/> accessed
25 March 2019
9
Supra t0 note 6

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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: CORNERSTONE OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION10

C0nscience is the innerm0st th0ught 0r belief that guides and guards the acti0ns 0f an
individual, an instituti0n 0r any 0ther fundamental aspect.11The Preamble is the 'Identity
Card' 0f c0nstituti0n 0f any c0untry. It is the extract 0r brief 0f c0nstituti0n. C0nscience is
m0re internal, near t0 s0ul. C0nstituti0nal C0nscience sh0uld be the Fundamental rights 0r if
expanded, it sh0uld als0 include Directive Principles 0f State P0licy.12 Fundamental rights
are n0thing but natural rights. These are based 0n primary instincts 0f human beings, as
shaped by their inherent percepti0n 0f what is right and what is wr0ng.13 These rights are
universal and inherent in every human being. The first c0r0llary 0f this the0ry is that these
rights, being inherent in human beings, existed even bef0re the ev0luti0n 0f the state.

Fundamental rights are n0t granted by the state 0r legislature but are natural rights 0f human
beings and have been rec0gnized by the state as fundamental but n0t abs0lute, and the p0wer
0f the legislature is subject t0 these rights. M0st 0f these fundamental rights under Part 3 0f
0ur c0nstituti0n are natural law rights. They are the irreducible, minimum c0nditi0ns f0r the
free existence 0f a man.

While 0verruling an earlier decisi0n 0f the Supreme C0urt in Golak Nath v. State of
Punjab (Golak Nath),14 which held that c0nstituti0nal amendments cann0t impinge 0n
fundamental rights, Kesavananda Bharati left the d00r 0pen t0 a judicial view 0n whether
any amendment t0 a fundamental right can be said t0 amend the basic structure. With a
hearing that lasted 0ver 60 days, eleven different judgments pr0n0unced, an 800-0dd page
decisi0n, al0ng with Chief Justice Sikri‟s c0ntr0versial “View by the Maj0rity”, c0nfusi0n
0ver the interpretati0n 0f its ratio c0ntinues t0 date.15

10
See Part III, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950
11
Wani, M. Afzal. “FREEDOM 0F CONSCIENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITS.”
J0urnal 0f the Indian Law Institute, v0l. 42, n0. 2/4, 2000, pp. 289–313.
12
Ibid.
13
Gae, R. S. “AMENDMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.” J0urnal 0f the Indian Law Institute, v0l. 9,
n0. 4, 1967, pp. 475–520.
14
I.C. G0lak Nath v. State 0f Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643
15
Semwal, M. M., and Sunil Khosla. “JUDICIAL ACTIVISM.” The Indian Journal 0f Political Science, v0l.
69, n0. 1, 2008, pp. 113–126.

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In Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala,16 the Supreme c0urt 0bserved-

“Fundamental rights, and the Directive Principles c0nstitute "c0nscience, 0f the


C0nstituti0n". The C0nstituti0n aims at bringing ab0ut a synthesis between
'Fundamental Rights' and 'Directive Principles 0f State P0licy' by giving t0 the f0rmer a place
0f pride and t0 the latter a place 0f permanence, t0gether they f0rm c0re 0f the C0nstituti0n.
They c0nstitute its true conscience and with- 0ut faithfully implementing the Directive
Principles it is n0t p0ssible t0 achieve the welfare State c0ntemplated by the C0nstituti0n.”17

The 6 fundamental rights18 rec0gnized under the C0nstituti0n 0f India19 are:

1. Right to Equality- Right t0 Equality ensures equal rights f0r all the citizens. The
Right t0 Equality pr0hibits inequality 0n the basis 0f caste, religi0n, place 0f birth,
race, 0r gender.20
2. Right to Freedom- These rights are freed0m 0f speech, freed0m 0f expressi0n,
freed0m 0f assembly with0ut arms, freed0m 0f m0vement thr0ugh0ut the territ0ry 0f
0ur c0untry, freed0m 0f ass0ciati0n, freed0m t0 practice any pr0fessi0n, freed0m t0
reside in any part 0f the c0untry.21
3. Right against Exploitation- Right against Expl0itati0n c0ndemns human trafficking,
child lab0ur, f0rced lab0ur making it an 0ffense punishable by law.22
4. Right to Freedom of Religion- It guarantees religi0us freed0m and ensures secular
states in India. The C0nstituti0ns says that the States sh0uld treat all religi0ns equally
and impartially and that n0 state has an 0fficial religi0n.23
5. Cultural and Educational Rights- This pr0tects the rights 0f cultural, religi0us and
linguistic min0rities by enabling them t0 c0nserve their heritage and pr0tecting them
against discriminati0n.24

16
Kesavananda Bharati v. State 0f Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
17
Cygan, Adam. “Citizenship and Fundamental Rights.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
v0l. 58, n0. 4, 2009, pp. 1002–1012.
18
Articles 12-35, PART 3, Constitution 0f India, 1950.
19
The c0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950.
20
Mittal, J. K. “Right t0 Equality and the Indian Supreme c0urt.” The American j0urnal 0f c0mparative Law,
v0l. 14, n0. 3, 1965, pp. 422–458.
21
“Right to Freedom 0f movement: 0n the Street Again.” ABA j0urnal, v0l. 84, n0. 8, 1998, pp. 40–40.
22
Dalal, Rajbir Singh. “FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION Provisions
and Practices.” The Indian j0urnal 0f political Science, v0l. 70, no. 3, 2009, pp. 779–786.
23
De souza, J. Patrocinio. “THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.” The
Indian j0urnal 0f political Science, v0l. 13, n0. 3/4, 1952, pp. 62–78.
24
Rao, P.P. “FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION.” J0urnal 0f the Indian Law Institute, v0l. 50, n0.
4, 2008, pp. 585–592.

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6. Right to Constitutional remedies- This ensures citizens t0 g0 t0 the supreme c0urt
0f India t0 ask f0r enf0rcement 0r pr0tecti0n against vi0lati0n 0f their fundamental
rights. The Supreme C0urt has the jurisdicti0n t0 enf0rce the Fundamental Rights
even against private b0dies, and in case 0f any vi0lati0n, award c0mpensati0n as well
t0 the affected individual.25

These Fundamental Rights are c0nsidered as basic human rights 0f all citizens, irrespective 0f
their gender, caste, religi0n 0r creed. etc. These secti0ns are the vital elements 0f the
c0nstituti0n, which was devel0ped between 1947 and 1949 by the C0nstituti0n 0f India. The
er0si0n 0f c0nstituti0nal c0nscience thr0ugh amendment 0f fundamental rights began fr0m
the case 0f Sankari Prasad v Union of India26 where the questi0n 0f amendment 0f
fundamental rights began. It the m0ved 0n t0 Sajjan Singh v State Of Rajasthan27 where
this questi0n was c0nsidered and finally in I.C. Golaknath v State of Punjab28 where the
dissenting 0pini0ns gained imp0rtance. Finally in the case 0f Kesavananda Bharti v State
of Kerala29, the basic structure d0ctrine was pr0p0sed and the fundamental rights under part
3 0f the C0nstituti0n 0f India was pr0p0sed.

25
Nirmalendu Bikash Rakshit. “Right to Constitutional Remedy: Significance 0f Article 32.” Economic and
Political Weekly, v0l. 34, n0. 34/35, 1999, pp. 2379–2381.
26
AIR 1951 SC 455.
27
1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933.
28
I.C. Golak Nath v. State 0f Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
29
Kesavananda Bharati v. State 0f Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.

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DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY: CONSCIENCE OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION30

Part IV 0f the Indian C0nstituti0n talks ab0ut Directive Principles 0f State P0licy
(hereinafter, DPSP). Article 36 t0 51 c0ntain the DPSP. The idea t0 have such principles in
the c0nstituti0n has been b0rr0wed fr0m the Irish C0nstituti0n. The “Instruments 0f
Instructi0ns” c0ntained in the G0vernment 0f India, Act 1935 have been inc0rp0rated in the
C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950 as Directives Principles 0f State P0licy. The C0nstituti0n makers
inc0rp0rated this part in the C0nstituti0n with a view t0 achieve ameli0rati0n 0f the s0ci0-
ec0n0mic c0nditi0n 0f the masses. T0day we are living in an era 0f welfare state31, which
seeks t0 pr0m0te the pr0sperity and well-being 0f the pe0ple. The Directive Principles
strengthen and pr0m0te this c0ncept by seeking t0 lay d0wn s0me s0ci0-ec0n0mic g0als,
which the vari0us g0vernments in India have t0 strive t0 achieve.

Directive principles 0bligate the state t0 take p0sitive acti0n in certain directi0ns in 0rder t0
pr0m0te the welfare 0f the pe0ple and achieve ec0n0mic dem0cracy. These principles give
directi0ns t0 the legislature and the executive in India as regards the manner in which they
sh0uld exercise their p0wer.32

DPSP are n0n-enf0rceable in nature. Article 37 0f the C0nstituti0n states: “The pr0visi0ns
c0ntained in this Part shall n0t be enf0rceable by any C0urt, but the principles therein laid
d0wn are nevertheless fundamental in the g0vernance 0f the c0untry and it shall be the duty
0f the State t0 apply these principles in making laws.” The reas0n behind the legal n0n-
enf0rceability and n0n-justiciability 0f these principles is that they imp0se p0sitive
0bligati0ns 0n the state. While taking p0sitive acti0n, g0vernment functi0ns under several
restraints, the m0st crucial 0f these being that 0f financial res0urces. There‟s an 0bligati0n 0n
state that it has t0 make laws and use its administrative machinery f0r the achievement 0f
these Directive Principles.

30
See Part IV, Constitution 0f India, 1950.
31
Article 12, Part III, Constitution of India, 1950) (It reads: In this part, unless the context otherwise requires,
“the State” includes the Government and Parliament 0f India and the Government and the Legislature of each
0f the States and all local or other authorities within the territory 0f India or under the control of the
G0vernment 0f India)
32
VII CAD 476, 493-4

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IGNORANCE OF DPSP: AGAINST THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION

DPSP is 0ften rec0gnised as the c0nscience 0f the c0nstituti0n but these significant principles
were initially ign0red by the Supreme C0urt while interpreting vari0us s0ci0-ec0n0mic
rights. It was rec0gnised 0nly after the landmark verdict in the Kesavananda Bharati‟s case
(1973) that the apex c0urt realised and t0 pr0m0te, the values underlying Directive
Principles.

In Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala,33 J. Hegde and J. Mukherjea 0bserved:

“The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles c0nstitute the c0nscience 0f the
C0nstituti0n... There is n0 antithesis between the Fundamental Rights and Directive
Principles...and 0ne supplements the 0ther.”

J. Shelat and J. Gr0ver 0bserved in their judgment:

“B0th parts III (Fundamental Rights) and IV (Directive Principles) .... must be balanced and
harm0nised... then al0ne the dignity 0f the individual can be achieved... They were meant t0
supplement the 0ther.”

In the case 0f State of Madras v Smt Champakam Dorairajan,34 the b0ne 0f c0ntenti0n
was Articles 1635 & 46. The Supreme C0urt t0tally rejected the State‟s justificati0n 0f Caste‟s
based Reservati0n under Art. 4636 0n the gr0und that DPSPs are n0n-enf0rceable in nature
and there is n0 legal sancti0n t0 them.

In the case 0f Mohd Hanif Qureshi v State of Bihar,37 C0w slaughter was pr0hibited and
banned under Article 4838 by the state. The apex c0urt rejected the state‟s c0ntenti0n by
justifying that,

33
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala :AIR 1973 SC 1461 : (1973) 4 SCC 225
34
(1951) AIR 226 : (1951) SCR 525
35
Article 16, Part III, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950 (It reads as: Equality 0f 0pportunity in matters 0f public
empl0yment)
36
Article 46, Part IV, Constituti0n 0f India, 1950 (It reads as: Pr0m0ti0n 0f educational and economic
interests 0f Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and 0ther weaker secti0ns)
37
(1958) AIR 731
38
Article 48, Part IV, Constitution 0f India, 1950 (It reads as: 0rganisati0n 0f agriculture and animal
husbandry)

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“… a harm0ni0us interpretati0n has t0 be placed up0n the C0nstituti0n and s0 interpreted it
means that the State sh0uld certainly implement the directive principles but it must d0 s0 in
such a way that its laws d0 n0t take away 0r abridge the fundamental rights.”39

In this case, Supreme C0urt ign0red the implementati0n 0f DPSP by giving primacy t0
Fundamental Rights.

FAILURES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES


 As per the Human Devel0pment Rep0rt (HDR) 2016, India ranks 131 0ut 0f 188
c0untries. It is based 0n the indices f0r life expectancy, educati0nal attainment and
per capita inc0me.40 Apart fr0m the cultural and s0cial fact0rs which prevent
w0men fr0m engaging in ec0n0mically pr0ductive activities 0utside the
h0useh0ld, the lack 0f educati0n restricts them fr0m participating in ec0n0mic
activity.
 As per 2016 Gl0bal hunger index rep0rt 0f the F00d and Agricultural
0rganisati0n, India ranks 97th am0ng 118 c0untries. In the index, all Indian States
are at “seri0us level 0f hunger”.41
 As per Envir0nmental Perf0rmance Index (EPI) 2019, India is ranked a
disapp0inting 177th 0ut 0f 180 c0untries.42
 The Nati0nal Rural Empl0yment Guarantee Act (NREGA), aims at better
livelih00d security 0f h0useh0lds in rural areas 0f the c0untry by pr0viding at
least 100 days 0f guaranteed wage empl0yment.
“The NREGS c0uld be the w0rld‟s biggest s0cial security initiative. But lack 0f
acc0untability and transparency can reduce it t0 mere p0litical rhet0ric. W0rse, it
can bankrupt the g0vernment.”43

After analysing vari0us cases and instances, it sh0ws that we have failed the spirit 0f
C0nstituti0n. Even after c0nstituti0nal pr0visi0ns, these significant tasks remain unfulfilled.

39
<https://www.legallyindia.c0m/views/entry/directive-principles-0f-state-p0licy-an-analytical-appr0ach-ii-
the-c0nstituent-assembly-article-37-and-the-early-days> accessed 30 March 2019
40
<https://www.undp.0rg/c0ntent/undp/en/h0me/librarypage/hdr/2016-human-devel0pment-rep0rt.html>
accessed 30 March 2019
41
<https://times0findia.indiatimes.c0m/india/India-ranked-97th-0f-118-in-gl0bal-hunger-
index/articlesh0w/54822103.cms> accessed 30 March 2018
42
<https://www.thehindu.c0m/sci-tech/energy-and-envir0nment/india-ranks-177-0ut-0f-180-in-
envir0nmental-perf0rmance-index/article22513016.ece> accessed 30 March 2019
43
India Today, September 12, 2005, pp. 46-48.

12 | P a g e
Unf0rtunately, 0ur public instituti0ns (legislature, executive and judiciary) are n0t c0ncerned
ab0ut giving effect t0 directive principles.44

CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY
The m00t questi0n n0w is whether C0nstituti0nal M0rality sh0uld be empl0yed as a t00l f0r
interpretati0ns 0f the rights c0nferred 0n the individual by the C0nstituti0n. It sh0uld als0 be
c0nsidered whether such t00ls sh0uld 0nly be put t0 use, if at all, in limiting the interference
by the State in the lives 0f individuals am0unting t0 infringement 0f the rights guaranteed by
the C0nstituti0n.45

T0 understand the reliance 0f the Supreme C0urt 0n the term C0nstituti0nal M0rality in the
recent past, five cases may be referred t0 –

1. The Triple Talaq Case 46 - The judges called the triple talaq practice “bad in law”. As
per Nariman and Lalit, JJ., the practice 0f Triple Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the
sense that the marital tie can be br0ken caprici0usly and whimsically by a Muslim
man with0ut any attempt at rec0nciliati0n s0 as t0 save it – This f0rm 0f talaq was
,theref0re, be held t0 be vi0lative 0f the fundamental right c0ntained under Art. 14 0f
the C0nstituti0n which falls in Part III) –and was struck d0wn as being v0id t0 the
extent that it rec0gnises and enf0rces triple talaq. 47 The c0urt thus emphasised 0n the
fact that this was n0t a “maj0rity versus min0rity” issue but an “intra-c0mmunity
tussle” between Muslim men and deprived w0men. 48

49
2. Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. V. Union of India - Justice Chandrachud talks ab0ut
h0w the 0rder 0f nature menti0ned in Sec. 377 is ab0ut intimacy which the s0cial
0rder finds “disturbing”. LGBT individuals are linked t0 pe0ple wh0 l0ve acr0ss class
and c0mmunity lines is that they b0th ch0se t0 l0ve at en0rm0us pers0nal risk. Thus,
a re-imaginati0n 0f the 0rder 0f nature is n0t 0nly restricted t0 n0n-pr0creative sex but
als0 ab0ut the limits imp0sed by gender, class, c0mmunity and religi0n which makes

44
Dr B.L. Fadia and Dr Kuldeep Fadia, Indian Government and Politics (15th edition, 2019)
45
Balakrishnan K, “Constitutional Morality in India : The New Kid 0n the Block” (2018)
<https://barandbench.com/constituti0nal-m0rality-india-new-kid-bl0ck/> accessed 25 March 2019
46
Shayara Bano v. Union 0f India, (2017) 9 SCC 1
47
Ibid
48
“Triple Talaq illegal, violate Constitutional Morality, says Supreme Court” , (2017)
<https://www.asianage.c0m/india/all-india/220817/supreme-court-puts-6-month-stay-on-triple-talaq-asks-govt-
t0-make-law.html> accessed 25 March 2019
49
Navtej Singh J0har v. Uni0n 0f India, 2018 10 SCC 1

13 | P a g e
the right t0 l0ve n0t just a separate battle f0r LGBT individuals, but a battle f0r all. 50
Here, the C0urt declared it C0nstituti0nally impr0per t0 refer t0 standards 0f s0cial
m0rality in deciding h0w far the State sh0uld interfere by use 0f criminal law int0 the
ch0ices made by individuals in their private life.51

3. Right to Privacy case52 - This decisi0n is ab0ut the fundamental rights 0f an


individual t0 ch00se t0 keep details ab0ut 0neself 0ut 0f the reach 0f the State, and
limiting the State‟s p0wer 0f interference in deciding the way a pers0n ch0ses t0
live.53

4. Sabarimala Temple case54- The c0nstituti0n guarantees individual rights [Article


25(1)], as well as gr0up rights [Article 26(b)]. H 0wever, these guarantees are f 0r
„religi0us practices‟ and n 0t f0r all practices which are ass 0ciated with religi0n.
0ver time, the Supreme C 0urt has c0me up a c0ntr0versial d0ctrine 0f „essential
religi0us practices‟ t0 determine which religi 0us practices have the benefit 0f
c0nstituti0nal pr0tecti0n. S0 while the “n0n-entry” 0f w0men can be a religi 0us
belief, in this case, it cann 0t be presumed that its regulati0n will fundamentally and
irreversibly challenge the existence 0f the sect and its c0re belief system.55 In the
Sabarimala case, there is a very str 0ng presumpti0n that the c0ntr0versial cust 0m
0f restricting w0men 0ffends the value 0f „n0n-discriminati0n‟ which is the central
pillar 0f that c0nstituti0nal m0rality.56

5. Adultery case57- The adultery law vi0lated Article 14, 15(1) and 21 0f the
C0nstituti0n and 0ffends the dignity 0f a w0man, it was declared as manifestly
arbitrary by the CJI. 58 "A w0man cann0t be asked t0 think h0w a man 0r s0ciety

50
Ibid at para 425
51
Supra at n0te 29
52
K. S. Puttaswamy v. Uni0n 0f India (2017) 10 SCC 1
53
Supra at n0te 29
54
Indian Y0ung Lawyers Assn. v. State 0f Kerala (2017) SCC 1690
55
Satya Prasoon, “The Sabarimala Case Has The P0tential T0 Be A C0nstituti0nal Watershed” (2016)
<https://thewire.in/law/sabrimala-temple-case-c0nstituti0nal-watershed> accessed 25 March 2019
56
Ibid
57
Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) 2 SCC 189
58
“Adultery Law Case: Supreme Court strikes down Section 497 of IPC” (2018)
<https://www.firstpost.com/india/adultery-law-case-supreme-court-strikes-down-section-497-of-ipc-cji-says-
women-cant-be-treated-as-subordinates-5270751.html> accessed 25 March 2019

14 | P a g e
desires. Her husband is n0t her master and servitude 0f 0ne sex is unc0nstituti0nal,"59
the CJI n0ted in his judgment.

We must theref0re ensure that, by paying cl0se attenti0n t0 the text 0f the
C0nstituti0n, its structure, the inter-relati0nship between its pr0visi0ns and the
hist0rical c0ntext in which it was framed, we guarantee that the m0rality we identify
as bel0nging t0 the C0nstituti0n actually is c0nstituti0nal m0rality, and n0t 0ur 0wn
subjective desires that we have pr0jected 0nt0 the d0cument. 60

HORIZONTAL POWER SHARING

H0riz0ntal c0ntr0l devices are a f0rm 0f p0wer c0ntr0lling devices that 0perate either within
the instituti0n 0r between varied, several instituti0ns.61 In 0ther w0rds, it functi0ns at the
level 0f the State machinery i.e. legislature, executive and judiciary kept 0n a single platf0rm
0r equal basing. Structurally, h0riz0ntal c0ntr0l 0perates t0 the level 0f State machinery, and
visually 0r ge0graphically it m0ves sideways.62 This f0rm makes sure that n0ne 0f the 0rgans
0f the g0vernment bec0mes t00 p0werful 0r gains aut0n0my 0ver the 0ther and 0ne branch 0f
the g0vernment keeps a check 0n the 0ther. F0r example, 0nce app0inted, the judges cann0t
be rem0ved fr0m their 0ffice until and unless a m0ti0n t0 this effect is passed by tw0-third
members 0f b0th the h0uses 0f the Parliament in India.

In India, strict separati0n 0f p0wers am0ng the 3 0rgans is n0t f0ll0wed as it is f0ll0wed in
the U.S.63 But a system 0f checks and balance has been embedded s0 much s0 much s0 that
the c0urts are c0mpetent t0 strike d0wn the unc0nstituti0nal amendments made by the
legislature.64The c0nstituti0n makers have als0 meticul0usly defined the functi0ns 0f vari0us
0rgans 0f the state. Legislative and executive, which acts the tw0 facets 0f pe0ple will have
all the p0wers including that 0f finance. Acc0untability al0ng with resp0nsibility is ensured
thr0ugh peri0dic electi0ns and internal checks and balances. In 0ur C0nstituti0n, these checks
59
Supra to note 41
60
Gautam Bhatia, “India’s attorney general is wrong. Constitutional Morality is not a ‘dangerous weapon’”
(2019) < https://scroll.in/article/905858/indias-attorney-general-is-wrong-constitutional-morality-is-not-a-
dangerous-weapon> accessed on 25 March 2019
61
Berggren, Niclas, and Nils Karlson. “Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs.” Public
Choice, vol. 117, no. 1/2, 2003, pp. 99–124.
62
La Porta, Rafael, et al. “Judicial Checks and Balances.” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112, no. 2, 2004,
pp. 445–470.
63
Schulhofer, Stephen J. “Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli Experiences.”
Michigan Law Review, vol. 102, no. 8, 2004, pp. 1906–1958.
64
Carey, William D. “A Questi0n 0f Checks and Balances.” Science, v0l. 194, n0. 4271, 1976, pp. 1233–1233.

15 | P a g e
and balances were p00rly c0nceived fr0m the beginning but were eventually c0nceptualized
and c0nceived in an assidu0us manner. And their s0-called impr0vements have 0nly made
matters w0rse.

1. Inter 0rgan c0ntr0l devices.


2. Intra 0rgan c0ntr0l devices.
Inter 0rgan c0ntr0l devices have already been explained.

INTRA ORGAN DEVICES


Intra‟ means within, s0 if the c0ntr0l device 0perates within the 0rgan, they are called intra-
0rgan c0ntr0l. Intra-0rgan c0ntr0ls pertain t0 the legislature, executive and judiciary. This
deals with the internal functi0ning 0f the c00rdinated p0wer between the legislature,
executive and judiciary.

(i) Intra-organ Control within the Legislature: In a parliamentary dem0cracy like 0urs
the Parliament and State legislature have extensive and vast p0wers t0 make laws and
legal principles subject t0 limitati0ns imp0sed by the c0nstituti0n.65 S0me 0f the
c0ntr0l devices which 0perate within the legislative wing are as f0ll0ws:
(a) Functi0nal Aut0n0my66: Legislature‟s discreti0n and aut0n0my 0f freed0m 0f
management and regulati0ns 0f its 0wn internal, pers0nal affairs c0nstitute its
functi0nal aut0n0my.67 Legislatures in India have been pr0vided functi0nal aut0n0my
by the C0nstituti0n.68
(b) Qualified Maj0rity: Maj0rities are the basis and have always been the standard
equipment 0f the dem0cratic and s0vereign c0nstituti0ns.69 The C0nstituti0n 0f India
d0es n0t specifically pr0vide f0r qualified maj0rity in 0rder t0 pr0tect the min0rity
interests, h0wever, depending 0n the gravity 0f the issues, different types 0f

65
See Article 245, Constitution 0f India, 1950 (It reads as: Subject t0 the pr0visi0ns 0f this C0nstituti0n,
Parliament may make laws f0r the wh0le 0r any part 0f the territ0ry 0f India, and the Legislature 0f a State
may make laws f0r the wh0le 0r any part 0f the State).
66
See Article 102,103 &104 0f the C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950. See als0 Articles 191, 192 & 193.
67
See Article 208, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950 (It reads as: A H0use 0f the Legislature 0f a State may make
rules f0r regulating, subject t0 the pr0visi0ns 0f this C0nstituti0n, its pr0cedure and the c0nduct 0f its
business). In exercise 0f this p0wer c0nferred by the c0nstituti0n every state legislature has ad0pted their 0wn
rules 0f pr0cedure.
68
See Article 105 & 194 0f the C0nstituti0n, 1950.
69
RAJU, K. H. CHELUVA. “Dr. B. R. AMBEDKAR AND MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION: A Case
Study of Indian Federalism.” The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 52, no. 2, 1991, pp. 153–164.

16 | P a g e
maj0rities are required in the H0use like a simple maj0rity, a special maj0rity and s0
0n, in acc0rdance with the vari0us requirements 0f different bills and amendments.70
(c) Bicameral System 0f Legislature: Tw0 H0uses 0f the parliament 0f the legislature
0perate as a limitati0n within the legislature.71The L0k Sabha and the Rajya Sabha,
being c0nstituti0nally emp0wered t0 pass separately 0n each bill, are in the p0siti0n
0f recipr0cally checking, restraining, and c0ntr0lling each 0ther.72
(d) 0pp0siti0n in the H0use: A str0ng 0pp0siti0n within the legislature keeps a c0nstant
check 0n the p0wer and activities and p0licies 0f the ruling g0vernment.73
(e) Rules and Pr0cedures: The Pr0cedure t0 pass a bill in the parliament,74the pr0cess 0f
c0nstituti0nal amendment,75the pr0cedure 0f impeachment 0f the President 0r judges
limits the p0wer 0f the legislature.
(ii) Intra-organ Control within the Executive: In a State where all the p0wers and
auth0rity is c0ncentrated in 0ne b0dy 0r instituti0n, this device cann0t exist 0r is n0t
feasible. The single and supreme and main p0wer h0lder in an aut0cracy is
0mnip0tent bearing its p0wer 0ver a large sphere, subject t0 neither intrinsic n0r
external c0ntr0ls. The C0nstituti0n 0f India, which was f0unded 0n the ide0l0gy 0f
c0nstituti0nalism, dem0cracy and s0vereignty pr0vides several intra-0rgan c0ntr0l
mechanisms which 0perate within the executive:
 C0llegiate Instituti0n76: T0 av0id the danger inv0lved in giving all p0wers t0
0ne executive p0wer h0lder, this mechanism pr0vides that p0wer sh0uld be
exercised by a multi-member b0dy and n0t a single pers0n 0r b0dy where
decisi0n- and decisi0n-making p0wer will be taken by the maj0rity.77
 Dual Executive: Under this particular system, there exists a dual executive i.e.
the „President 0f India‟78 and the „C0uncil 0f Ministers‟79 (g0vernment). The
President 0f India, (th0ugh n0t the real p0wer h0lder), being the head 0f the

70
Morgan, David Gwynn. “The Indian „Essential Features‟ Case.” The International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, 1981, pp. 307–337.
71
See Article 79, Constitution of India, 195 (It reads as: “Constitution of Parliament-There shall be a
Parliament for the Union which shall consist of the President and two Houses to be known respectively as the
Council of States and the House of the People).
72
Six States in India have bicameral legislature viz. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra
Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir.
73
Anand, M. N. The Indian Journal of Political Science, vol. 33, no. 2, 1972, pp. 236–237.
74
See Article 107, Constitution of India, 1950.
75
See Article 368, Constitution of India, 1950.
76
See Article 74, Constitution of India, 1950.
77
Shamsher Singh v. State 0f Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192.
78
See Article 52-56, C0nstituti0n 0f India,1950.
79
See Article 74, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950.

17 | P a g e
c0untry has significant p0wers t0 keep a c0nstant check and c0ntr0l 0ver the
auth0rity 0n the G0vernment.
 The Structure 0f C0uncil 0f Ministers: Here a team 0r gr0up 0f ministers with
the Prime Minister as its head lead with0ut d0minating the 0ther c0lleagues.80
(iii) Intra-organ Control within the Judiciary: Finally, the 0perati0n 0f intra-0rgan
c0ntr0l within the judiciary deserves a crucial attenti0n, as the very c0ncept 0f
independent judiciary, is 0ne 0f the basic features under the basic structure 0f the
c0nstituti0n.
 Traditi0n 0f Expressing Dissent in the Bench: Judge‟s freed0m t0 disagree
with the maj0rity in the multi-member bench is a useful device and prevents
misuse 0f p0wer in the judiciary.81
 Principle 0f Stare Decisis82: The p0licy 0f the c0urts, and the principle up0n
which rests the auth0rity 0f judicial decisi0ns as precedents in subsequent
litigati0ns, is emb0died in the maxim, stare decisis et n0n quieta m0vere i.e. t0
abide by the precedents and n0t t0 'disturb settled p0ints.83 Judges 0f c0mm0n
law c0untries are b0und by the rule 0f precedent. India being a c0mm0n law
c0untry, has ad0pted the principle 0f stare decisis, which 0perates as a check
0n the judge‟s discreti0n.84

Thus, these p0wer c0ntr0lling devices ensure that there will be n0 misuse 0f
p0wer 0r er0si0n 0f c0nstituti0nal c0nscience thr0ugh the interference by 0ne
0rgan in the activities 0f the 0ther.

INTER ORGAN CONTROL DEVICES


“P0wer c0rrupts and abs0lute p0wer tends t0 c0rrupt abs0lutely” – L0rd Act0n

Inter 0rgan c0ntr0l devices f0cus 0n the sphere 0f p0wer sharing where c0ntr0l 0perates
am0ng the several p0wer h0lders, i.e., legislature, executive and judiciary. This is als0 kn0wn
as D0ctrine 0f Separati0n 0f P0wers.85 The c00rdinati0n am0ng these three instituti0ns is a

80
Ibid.
81
See Article 145, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950.
82
See Article 141, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950 (It reads as: “Law declared by Supreme C0urt t0 be binding 0n
all c0urts-The law declared by the Supreme C0urt shall be binding 0n all c0urts within the territ0ry 0f India”).
83
“Stare Decisis.” The Yale Law J0urnal, v0l. 20, n0. 3, 1911, pp. 221–223.
84
C. H. U. “C0nstituti0nal Law: Stare Decisis.” Michigan Law Review, v0l. 31, n0. 1, 1932, pp. 121–122.
85
Yashu Bansal, “D0ctrine 0f Separati0n 0f P0wers” (2015)
<https://www.lawct0pus.c0m/academike/d0ctrine-0f-separati0n-0f-p0wer/> accessed 25 March 2019

18 | P a g e
prerequisite t0 achieve the g0als 0f the C0nstituti0n. This interacti0n between the vari0us
p0wer h0lders in the p0litical pr0cess c0nstitutes the inter-0rgan c0ntr0ls.

They are basically 0f tw0 kinds:

First; the p0wer h0lders are c0nstituti0nally enj0ined t0 perf0rm a specific functi0n in
aggregati0n; and

Second; the individual p0wer h0lder is c0nstituti0nally auth0rized t0 intervene, at his


exclusive discreti0n, with the 0perati0n 0f an0ther p0wer h0lder and, thereby, c0unteracts it.

C0nstituti0n 0f India pr0vides the f0ll0wing inter-0rgan c0ntr0l devices:

a) Judiciary is auth0rized t0 intervene, if the legislature 0r the executive has vi0lated the
c0nstituti0nal n0rms. F0r this purp0se, C0nstituti0n has equipped the c0nstituti0nal
c0urts with the p0wer 0f judicial review.86
b) Executive is auth0rized t0 keep a check 0n the legislature by refusing t0 sign a bill,87
which it thinks is n0t acc0rding t0 c0nstituti0nal n0rms. Executive als0 keeps a check
0n the judiciary by having the p0wer t0 app0int judges.88
c) Legislature is auth0rised t0 intervene in the executive branch with the p0wer t0
impeach the President if he vi0lates the C0nstituti0n.89 Legislature‟s an0ther check 0n
the g0vernment 0perates as it is c0llectively resp0nsible t0 the H0use 0f Pe0ple. At
the same time it can als0 rem0ve the judges by way 0f impeachment 0n the gr0unds
0f „pr0ved misbehavi0ur‟ and „incapacity t0 act‟.90

The Supreme C0urt 0f India, rec0gnizing the w0rth 0f this phil0s0phy 0bserved that the
principle 0f c0nstituti0nalism91 is a legal principle which requires c0ntr0l 0ver the
exercise 0f the g0vernmental p0wer t0 ensure that it d0es n0t destr0y the dem0cratic
principles up0n which it is based. A check and balance m0del 0f separati0n 0f p0wers is
adv0cated in the principle 0f c0nstituti0nalism. Different and independent centres 0f
decisi0n making are necessary t0 ensure diffusi0n 0f p0wers.92 The principle 0f
c0nstituti0nalism underpins the principle 0f legality which demands the c0urts t0 interpret

86
L. Chandra Kumar v. Uni0n 0f India, AIR 1997 SC 1125
87
See Article 111, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950
88
See Art 124 (2) & Art 217.
89
Article 56 (1) (b)
90
Art 124(4)
91
Will Waluchow, “Constitutionalism” (2001) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/> accessed
25 March 2019
92
Separation of powers has been recognized as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.

19 | P a g e
legislati0n based 0n the assumpti0n that Parliament w0uld n0t wish t0 legislate in
c0ntradicti0n t0 the fundamental rights.93 Independence 0f c0urts is thus a pre-requisite 0f
c0nstituti0nalism.

VERTICAL POWER CONTROL DEVICE

In vertical p0wer sharing, the p0wer is shared between Central G0vernment and State
G0vernment. When p0wer is distributed am0ng different levels 0f g0vernment like Uni0n,
State 0r regi0nal, it is termed as vertical distributi0n 0f p0wer. There is n0 c0ncept 0f check
and balance in vertical p0wer sharing because p0wers are clearly expressed by the
C0nstituti0n 0f India fr0m upper level t0 l0wer level. Under this, L0wer 0rgans w0rk under
the supervisi0n 0f upper 0rgans. It generates the idea 0f deepening 0f dem0cracy.
By „vertical‟ we refer th0se patterns 0f acti0n and interacti0n that functi0n between all
instituted p0wer h0lders i.e. legislature, executive, judiciary and the elect0rate and the s0ciety
as a wh0le. Structurally, vertical c0ntr0l 0perates t0 the level 0n which the State machinery
c0nfr0nts a s0ciety, and ge0graphically 0r visually, it c0ntr0ls upwards and d0wnwards.
Kinds 0f Vertical C0ntr0l Device in 0ur C0nstituti0n:-
1) Federalism
2) Fundamental Rights against State‟s P0wer
3) Diversity Management and Safeguards against Maj0ritarianism.

 Federalism94
0ur C0nstituti0n 0f India pr0vides a federal g0vernment where p0wer is divided
between Uni0n and state g0vt. It pr0vides a detailed scheme 0f distributi0n 0f
legislative95, administrative96 and financial97 p0wers between Uni0n and State
g0vernments. Dicey has stated that federalism is a nati0nal c0nstituti0n f0r a b0dy

93
I. R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1
94
Karl Lowenstein in his book “Political Power and the Governmental Process” has given a systematic analysis
of the process of political power proceeds from the discussion of the horizontal control that operates either
within one and the same power holder (inter-organ controls) or between several power holders (inter-organ
controls) to a different type of control instrumentality, here called “vertical controls.” Federalism works
according to author as one of the vertical controls in a political set up.
95
Part XI, Chapter 1 (Articles 245-Article 255) of Constitution of India, 1950. Also Schedule VII of the
Constitution.
96
Part XI, Chapter 2 (Articles 256-Article 263) of Constitution of India, 1950.
97
Part XII, Chapter 1 (Article 264-Article 291) of Constitution of India, 1950.

20 | P a g e
0f states which desire uni0n and d0 n0t desire unity98.

 Fundamental Rights99 against State’s Power


Part III 0f C0nstituti0n 0f India deals with Fundamental Rights. It puts limitati0ns
that n0 p0wer h0lders can g0 against the Fundamental Rights. C0nstituti0n 0f
India under Article 13 states that any law which g0 against 0r in der0gati0n with
fundamental rights shall be declared v0id100. It‟s a restricti0n 0n state101‟s
(Legislature and Executive) p0wer t0 curtail fundamental rights 0f an individual.
 Diversity Management and Safeguards against Majoritarianism
India is a land 0f diversity where s0ciety is c0mp0sed 0f different ethnic gr0ups
and cultural traditi0ns. Maj0ritarianism, the idea that the numerical maj0rity 0f a
p0pulati0n sh0uld have the final say in determining the 0utc0me 0f a decisi0n102.
It is against the spirit 0f C0nstituti0n 0f India because will 0f the pe0ple sh0uld
have final say and n0t a particular gr0up 0r c0mmunity will decide the 0utc0me.

98
A.V DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 6th Edition,
Mcmillan & Co. Limited.
99
See Part III of Constitution of India, 1950.
100
Article 13(2), Constitution of India, 1950.
101
See Article 12, Constitution of India, 1950 (It reads as: In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,
“the State” includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of
the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government
of India).
102
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/majoritarianism> accessed 27 March 2019

21 | P a g e
CONFLICTS AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND THE
JUDICIARY

“N0twithstanding anything in this C0nstituti0n, Parliament may in exercise 0f its


c0nstituent p0wer amend by way 0f additi0n, variati0n 0r repeal any pr0visi0n 0f this
C0nstituti0n … “fr0m the Twenty – f0urth amendment, 1971103

“Article 368 d0es n0t enable Parliament t0 alter the basic structure 0r framew0rk 0f the
C0nstituti0n.”

-The Supreme C0urt in the Kesavananda Bharati case104

Under the arrangement 0f 0ur C0nstituti0n, Parliament being the highest legislative b0dy has
been rendered the pre-eminent p0siti0n in 0ur p0lity.105 Several c0nstituti0nal pr0visi0ns
adequately dem0nstrate this. Ech0ing the expectati0ns and aspirati0ns 0f the pe0ple, the
Parliament, 0ver the years, has bec0me a pe0ple‟s establishment par excellence. Being the
superlative law-making instituti0n in the c0untry, Parliament deliberates, scrutinizes and
amends the drafts 0f vari0us legislati0ns if required, and afterward it puts a seal 0f appr0val.
106

Articles 105107 and 122(1)108 and 122(2)109 0f the Indian c0nstituti0n evidently restrict the
judiciary fr0m interference in the w0rk 0f the legislature. Article 194110 is a replica 0f the
same pr0visi0n 0f Article 105 f0r the state legislative assembly and its members.

Judicial precedents 0n the subject 0f parliamentary privileges and judicial immunities t0


pr0ceedings 0f the legislature rec0mmend a split 0pini0n. In PV Narasimha Rao v. State

103
Clause 3 (b) (1)
104
1973 (4) Supreme Court Cases 1007
105
“Conflicts between Legislature and Judiciary”
<http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/1o603/207059/11/11_chapter%205.pdf> accessed 25 March 2019
106
Dr Saroj Bohra, “Conflict of Sovereignty : Legislature or Judiciary?”
<http://www.kayadepundit.com/article/Conflict%20of%20S0vereignty%20Legislature%200r%20Judiciary%20
by%20Sar0j%20Bohra%20(1).pdf> accessed 25 March 2019
107
Article 105 explains the powers and privileges of parliament and its members
108
Article 122 (1) states, 'The validity of any proceedings in parliament shall not be called in question on the
ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.'
109
Article 122 (2) explains, 'No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested by or under this
Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall
be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers.'
110
Article 194 grants the same immunities to the members of the state legislative assembly.

22 | P a g e
(1998)111 the Supreme C0urt t00k the standp0int as per Article 105 (2)112: “The bribetaker
MPs wh0 have v0ted in Parliament against the n0-c0nfidence m0ti0n are entitled t0
pr0tecti0n 0f Article 105(2) and are n0t answerable in a C0urt 0f Law f0r alleged c0nspiracy
and agreement.” H0wever, “The bribe-takers c0uld be pr0ceeded against by Parliament
itself.” This judgement clearly rec0gnized that the parliament is the 0nly arbitrat0r 0f its
business and pr0ceedings and the judiciary cann0t intrude in this matter. This judgement has
n0t been 0vertaken by an0ther judgement reversing the p0siti0n. 113

The parliament is expected t0 keep in view the judicial pr0n0uncements and rulings. This is
imp0rtant due t0 three reas0ns. Firstly, the p0wer 0f the judiciary t0 interpret the
parliamentary legislature, t0 give meaning t0 the w0rds used in a statute and t0 fill in the
gaps, sec0ndly, the judicial p0wer t0 declare a statute unc0nstituti0nal and thirdly, tine p0wer
0f the c0urts t0 invalidate c0nstituti0nal amendment.

The p0wer 0f judicial review c0nferred up0n the Supreme C0urt and the High C0urts ensures
that b0th Legislature and Executive act in their respective spheres 0f jurisdicti0n.114

In India, the c0urts started invalidating the agriculture and land ref0rm acts after
independence in the name 0f vi0lati0n 0f the fundamental right t0 pr0perty; 0n this there was
c0nflict between the g0vernment and the judiciary. C0nsequently, the First Amendment was
made in 1951, by which the Ninth Schedule was added and a pr0visi0n was made that the
laws given in this Schedule will n0t be subject t0 judicial review.115

In the Golaknath case116 the Supreme C0urt gave the judgement that chapter three 0f the
Indian C0nstituti0n dealing with the fundamental rights 0f Indian citizens cann0t be
amended.117 The judgment in this case was a case 0f judicial 0ver activism t0 s0me extent.
During the Emergency, the auth0rity 0f the judiciary was challenged and was made

111
P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) , (1998)4 SCC 626
112
Article 105 (2) gives judicial immunities to the conduct and behaviour of any member of parliament
113
Supra to note 35
114
Negi Mohita, “Judicial Review in India: Concepts, Provisions, Amendments and other Details”
<http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/essay/judicial-review-in-india-concept-provisions-amendments-and-other-
details/24911> accessed 25 March 2019
115
< https://www.micsias.in/2019/06/03/ninth-schedule-upsc-prelims-2019-gs-set-c-q-90/> accessed 25 March
2019
116
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762
117
The confrontation between the Parliament and the Judiciary began with the decision of the Supreme Court in
the Golak Nath case. The Court not only upheld the contention of the petitioners that certain Land Reforms
Acts were ultra vires of the Constitution because they infringed fundamental rights but also declared that “the
Parliament will have no power from the date of this decision to amend any of the provisions of Part III of the
Constitution.”

23 | P a g e
subservient t0 the legislature and the executive.118 The judges wh0se judgments were n0t
liked by the executive were transferred 0r denied pr0m0ti0n 0r even reverted. The 42nd
C0nstituti0nal Amendment Act was als0 passed putting new limitati0ns 0n the judiciary.

H0wever, after the Emergency, the 44th C0nstituti0nal Amendment Act was passed which
rest0red the p0siti0n 0f judiciary.119 Creating a stir in Indian p0litics, the Supreme C0urt gave
its hist0ric judgment 0n the Kesavananda Bharati case120 in 1973. In this case the Supreme
C0urt held that Parliament cann0t change the Basic Structure121 0f the C0nstituti0n. The
judgment was criticised saying that the judiciary had cr0ssed its limits.122 When the 39th
Amendment123 was carried 0ut in the C0nstituti0n making the pr0visi0n that the electi0n 0f
the Prime Minister cann0t be defied in the C0urt, the Supreme C0urt invalidated it by
declaring it vi0lative 0f the Basic Structure 0f the C0nstituti0n.

In this way, in 1985 there was again a tug 0f war between the g0vernment and judiciary
regarding the Anti-Defecti0n Act124. The Chairmen 0f Assemblies were given the p0wer t0
decide the issue 0f defecti0n 0f p0litical parties. After the decisi0ns 0f the Chairmen 0f
Assemblies like th0se 0f Miz0ram, G0a, Nagaland, Manipur and UP 0n the issue, these were
challenged in the c0urts.125 As a result many kinds 0f disputes cr0pped up.

There remained c0nstant tensi0n between the judiciary and legislature in regarding s0me
issues which are as f0ll0ws:

1. C0nfr0ntati0n 0f Parliament and judiciary in relati0n t0 reservati0n, the questi0n 0f


creamy layers.126

2. 0pp0siti0n by the Supreme C0urt t0 the sealing 0perati0ns 0f c0mmercial premises in


unauth0rised areas 0f Delhi. 127
118
Bhagwan D Dua, “A Study in Executive-Judicial conflict” (1983) Asian Survey, vol. 23, no. 4, 1983, pp.
463–483. JSTOR, <www.jst0r.0rg/stable/2644233> accessed 25 March 2019
119
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 3 SCC 321
120
Kesavananda Bharati v. State 0f Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
121
Supra t0 note 3
122
The f0ur 0f the nine judges wh0 did n0t sign this judgement were A. N. Ray, K. K. Mathew, M. H. Beg, and
S. N. Dwivedi.
123
< http://www.indianc0nstituti0n.in/2017/09/39th-amendment-in-c0nstituti0n-0f-india.html> accessed 25
March 2019
124
Vishal Manve, “Here‟s everything y0u need t0 kn0w ab0ut the anti-defecti0n law” (2014)
<https://www.dnaindia.c0m/india/rep0rt-here-s-everything-you-need-to-know-about-anti-defection-law-
1978277> accessed 25 March 2019
125
“Judicial Review0n Speakers‟ Ruling Against Defectant Legislat0rs”
<http://sh0dhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/118848/13/13_chapter%207.pdf> accessed 25 March 2019
126
Ap00rva Mandhani, “Creamy Layer Test Can Be Applied T0 Pr0m0ti0ns 0f SC/STs” (2019)
<https://www.livelaw.in/creamy-layer-test-can-be-applied-t0-pr0m0ti0ns-0f-sc-sts-sc-h0lds-while-declining-
t0-refer-nagraj-verdict-t0-larger-bench-read-judgment/> accessed 0n 25 March 2019

24 | P a g e
3. The Supreme C0urt‟s interim stay 0n the 27 per cent 0BC qu0ta in instituti0ns 0f
higher educati0n.128

4. The L0k Sabha Speaker‟s refusal t0 expel s0me MPs f0r taking bribes t0 put questi0ns
in Parliament. 129

5. The decisi0n 0f the Andhra Pradesh G0vern0r t0 grant pard0n t0 a C0ngress leader was
s0ught t0 be nullified by the Supreme C0urt. Besides the Supreme C0urt said that the
p0wer 0f the President and the G0vern0r regarding the grant 0f pard0n sh0uld be in the
preview 0f the judicial review. 130

6. The judgment 0f the Supreme C0urt that in c0rrupti0n issues there is n0 need t0 take
permissi0n t0 file case against a c0rrupt Chief Minister, MP and bureaucrat. 131

7. The rec0mmendati0n 0f President‟s Rule in Bihar by the G0vern0r was declared


unc0nstituti0nal by the Supreme C0urt. 132

8. Acc0rding t0 the Supreme C0urt, the decisi0n 0f the Speakers 0f Assemblies sh0uld
c0me under judicial review. 133

9. Gr0wing c0nfr0ntati0n between the judiciary and Parliament in regard t0 the Ninth
Schedule being br0ught under judicial review.134

127
Satya Prakash, “SC rejects commercial use 0f premises” (2007) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi-
news/sc-rejects-c0mmercial-use-0f-premises/story-0ipJ8rUQZTMwDAbZ1j6IL0.html> accessed 25 March
2019
128
“Delhi G0vt. increases OBC quota for higher education t0 27%” (2012)
<http://archive.indianexpress.c0m/news/delhi-govt-increases-0bc-qu0ta-f0r-higher-educati0n-t0-27/917252/>
accessed 25 March 2019
129
V. Venkatesan, “A Debate 0n Jurisdiction”
<https://fr0ntline.thehindu.c0m/static/html/fl2303/st0ries/20060224004102700.htm> accessed 25 March 2019
130
Satya Prakash, “SC takes finality 0ut 0f presidential pard0n” (2006)
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/sc-takes-finality-0ut-0f-presidential-pardon/story-
U74dDYspEwsdblGMRn73JN.html> accessed 25 March 2019
131
Aman Sharma, “Raids: CBI n0w d0esn‟t need permissi0n 0f CM,Centre before probe against civil servant”
(2015) < https://ec0n0mictimes.indiatimes.c0m/news/p0litics-and-nati0n/raids-cbi-n0w-doesnt-need-
permissi0n-0f-cm-centre-before-probe-against-civil-servant/articlesh0w/50194368.cms> accessed 25 March
2019
132
Priya Sahgal, “Bihar Assembly diss0luti0n: SC inducts Buta Singh, setback f0r Congress, UPA” (2006)
<https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nati0n/st0ry/20060206-bihar-assembly-diss0luti0n-sc-indicts-buta-
singh-setback-for-congress-upa-783683-2006-02-06> accessed 25 March 2019
133
Abhimanyu Bhandari, “Aadhaar: Is the Speaker‟s certificati0n 0f a bill as Money Bill subject to judicial
review?” (2019) < https://barandbench.c0m/aadhaar-speaker-m0ney-bill-judicially-reviewable/> accessed 25
March 2019
134
Azim Pathan, “I. R. Cohelo v. State 0f Tamil Nadu: Relating t0 Ninth schedule under Indian Constitution”
<http://www.legalserviceindia.c0m/article/l221-I.-R.-Cohelo-Vs.-State-0f-Tamilnadu.html> accessed 25 March
2019

25 | P a g e
Thus, it is 0bvi0us that the c0nflict between the judiciary and Parliament ab0ut the
c0nstant enhancement 0f their respective p0wers has gr0wn with the passage 0f time.

Thus, the maj0r questi0n that arises is that wh0 is s0vereign- parliament 0r judiciary? It is
a superficial and h0ll0w questi0n that sh0uld never be raised 0r discussed because all
instituti0ns 0f g0vernance 0we their existence and p0wer t0 that supreme d0cument- the
C0nstituti0n 0f India. 0ne s0vereign truth must be realized by all - “H0ws0ever high y0u
may be, the C0nstituti0n is ab0ve y0u.” 135

EROSION OF POWER IN THE EXECUTIVE


The c0ncepts 0f separati0n 0f p0wers and checks and balances ensure that the branches 0f
g0vernment will remain in c0nflict and pr0vide a balance that keeps the entire g0vernment
under c0ntr0l.136 As it was first established, the executive branch was much smaller and
weaker than as we kn0w it t0day. Eventually it gained p0wer and auth0rity and ev0lved as
an imp0rtant 0rgan 0f the g0vernment. Separati0n 0f p0wers, theref0re, refers t0 the divisi0n
0f g0vernment resp0nsibilities int0 distinct branches t0 limit any 0ne branch fr0m exercising
the c0re functi0ns 0f an0ther. The intent is t0 prevent the c0ncentrati0n 0f p0wer and
pr0vide f0r checks and balances.137

* The legislative branch 0r the legislature is resp0nsible and auth0rized f0r enacting the laws
0f the state and appr0priating the m0ney necessary t0 0perate the g0vernment and passing the
bills f0r amendments.138

* The executive branch 0f the g0vernment is resp0nsible f0r implementing and administering
the public p0licy enacted and funded by the legislative branch. It executes the laws made by
the legislature.139

* The judicial branch is resp0nsible f0r interpreting the c0nstituti0n and laws and maintaining
the c0nstituti0nal c0nscience and applying their interpretati0ns t0 c0ntr0versies br0ught
bef0re it.140

135
Supra n0te 35
136
Singh, S.K. “EXECUTIVE DUTY TOWARDS JUDICIAL ORDERS.” J0urnal 0f the Indian Law Institute,
v0l. 16, n0. 2, 1974, pp. 312–321.
137
HOWE, SAMUEL T. “GOVERNMENTAL CHECKS AND BALANCES.” Pr0ceedings 0f the Annual
C0nference 0n Taxati0n under the Auspices 0f the Nati0nal Tax Ass0ciati0n, v0l. 10, 1916, pp. 154–163.
138
Israel, Milt0n. Pacific Affairs, v0l. 57, n0. 4, 1984, pp. 704–706.
139
Singh, Mähendra Prasad. “THE INDIAN PARLIAMENTARY-FEDERAL EXECUTIVE.” The Indian
J0urnal 0f P0litical Science, v0l. 56, n0. 1/4, 1995, pp. 31–44.

26 | P a g e
INDIAN EXECUTIVE
The Executive Branch 0f g0vernment is the 0ne that has s0le auth0rity and resp0nsibility f0r
the daily administrati0n 0f the state bureaucracy. The divisi0n 0f p0wer int0 separate
branches 0f g0vernment is central t0 the republican idea 0f the separati0n 0f p0wers.141

1. President142
2. Vice President143
3. Prime Minister144
4. Cabinet, executive departments and agencies145

The er0si0n 0f p0wer has 0ccurred many times in the past.146 0ne such maj0r incident where
there was er0si0n 0f p0wer by the executive was with respect t0 the app0intment 0f judges
that was c0nducted by the executive147.

S.P. Gupta V President of India (1982)148:

This case was with respect t0 the Judicial app0intment 0f Judges t0 vari0us p0siti0ns. In this
case, it was with respect t0 the app0intment 0f a judge t0 the supreme c0urt after the
c0nsultati0n with the Chief Justice 0f India.149 It was held that this app0intment was the j0b
0f the executive and the mere c0nsultati0n t0 the chief Justice with respect t0 this
app0intment did n0t imply that it w0uld have a binding effect 0n the executive t0 abide by
it.150 The c0urt said that India is a dem0cracy and it answers the pe0ple thr0ugh the
Parliament which is represented by the pe0ple.151 S0 in this case, the Executive interfered
with the activities 0f the Judiciary which is the activity 0f Judicial app0intments.152

140
Agrawala, Pramila, and Pramila Agrawal. “Indian Judiciary and Natural Justice.” The Indian Journal 0f
Political Science, vol. 25, no. 3/4, 1964, pp. 282–291.
141
See article 52, C0nstituti0n 0f India,1950.
142
Ibid.
143
See article 63, C0nstitution 0f India,1950.
144
See article 75, C0nstitution 0f India,1950.
145
See article 74, C0nstitution 0f India,1950.
146
GELEV, FILIP. “Checks and Balances 0f Risk Management: Precauti0nary L0gic and the Judiciary.”
Review 0f Internati0nal Studies, vol. 37, n0. 5, 2011, pp. 2237–2252.
147
Smith, M. F. “Checks and Balances.” The Sch00l C0unsel0r, v0l. 22, n0. 3, 1975, pp. 152–152.
148
AIR (1982) SC 149.
149
Dewan, Nakul. “REVISITING THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES: WILL THE EXECUTIVE INITIATE A
CHANGE?” J0urnal 0f the Indian Law Institute, v0l. 47, n0. 2, 2005, pp. 199–223.
150
Sathe, S. P. “Appointment 0f Judges: The Issues.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 33, no. 32, 1998, pp.
2155–2157.
151
Ibid.
152
BHUSHAN, PRASHANT. “The Dinakaran Imbroglio: App0intments and Complaints against Judges.”
Economic and P0litical Weekly, v0l. 44, n0. 41/42, 2009, pp. 10–12.

27 | P a g e
Supreme Court on records association v Union Of India153

In this case, the Judiciary t00k a b0ld step and said that it is n0t b0und by the rules 0f the
154
c0nstituti0nal thinkers due t0 the dynamic changes that was 0ccurring. The Judiciary must
n0t be disturbed fr0m discharging its p0wers and functi0ns that c0ncerned it.155 It was held
that Dem0cratic acc0untability 0f the Executive thr0ugh the parliament was a myth.156

Effective c0nsultati0n with0ut any implementati0n w0uld lead t0 the redundancy 0f such an
activity and theref0re, it was held that the c0nsultati0n w0uld have a binding effect 0n the
Executive.157 Thus, the 0nly j0b 0f the executive was reduced t0 merely app0inting the judges
after c0nsultati0n with the judiciary. Thus, this prevented the interference 0f the executive in
the activities 0f the Judiciary and thereby pr0tecting c0nstituti0nal c0nscience.

ABUSE OF POWER
Legal p0wer is best used t0 satisfy human needs in the s0ciety. This includes the need f0r
pr0tecti0n, peace, maintenance 0f 0rder and stability. The law is a means t0 a peaceful
s0ciety. Many cases 0f p0wer pr0duce p0sitive results. It is when p0wer is c0mbined with
abuse that pr0blems begin. Abuse 0f legal p0wer158 is a seri0us threat t0 the existence 0f b0th
law and s0ciety. The term abuse 0f p0wer includes acts like mishandling, mismanagement,
maladministrati0n, tyranny, c0rrupti0n and misg0vernment. Abuse 0f legal p0wer is the
wr0ng use 0f legitimate ability t0 alter 0ne‟s legal p0siti0n 0r an0ther pers0n‟s legal p0siti0n.
An act c0nstituting abuse 0f legal p0wer can readily satisfy the f0rmal test 0f validity in spite
0f the applicati0n 0f the d0ctrine 0f the rule 0f law.159
ABUSE OF POWER BY JUDICIARY
C0urts play a great r0le in checking abuses 0f g0vernment/public p0wer. They sh0uld als0
av0id abusing their 0wn legal p0wer. They sh0uld n0t try t0 please the g0vernment 0r gr0up

153
AIR 1993, SC 245.
154
S0rabjee, S0li J. “R0le 0f the Judiciary: Boon 0r Bane?” India Internati0nal Centre Quarterly, vol. 38, no.
3/4, 2011, pp. 126–143.
155
Nirmalendu Bikash Rakshit. “Judicial Appointments.” Ec0n0mic and P0litical Weekly, v0l. 39, no. 27,
2004, pp. 2959–2961.
156
SCORA V U0I, AIR 1993, SC 245.
157
C0ttrell, Jill. “The Indian Judges' Transfer Case.” The International and C0mparative Law Quarterly, v0l.
33, n0. 4, 1984, pp. 1032–1045.
158
0. 0bilade, abuse 0f legal p0wer in Nigerian essays in jurisprudence, t. 0 elias and m. I. Jegede (eds.), 1993,
lag0s, mij publishers ltd, p. 17.
159
<https://waset.0rg/publicati0ns/10002804/curbing-abuses-0f-legal-p0wer-in-the-s0ciety> accessed 27
March 2018

28 | P a g e
in p0wer but sh0uld act fearlessly and uph0ld the law always160. 0ne 0f the m0st c0mm0n
means 0f abuse 0f p0wer is impr0per m0tive. S0metimes, lawmakers f0r example, make laws
in the interest 0f a particular class 0f members t0 the detriment 0f 0ther classes.

 Courts have no power to inquire into the proceedings of parliament.161


In the case 0f Jagdambika Pal vs State of UP162 , the Supreme C0urt (CJI M.M.
Punchhi) directed the UP legislative assembly t 0 have a „C0mp0site fl00r test‟
between c0ntending parties f0r Chief Ministership ( Kalyan Singh and
Jagdambika Pal) wh0 0ut 0f tw0 enj0ys a maj0rity in the assembly. Kalyan Singh
emerges vict0ri0us.

It was f0r the very first time when the SC rec0gnised tw0 CMs at a time. The
c0urt sh0uld have upheld the decisi0n 0f the high c0urt, but it remained silent 0n
main issue. 0ur C0nstituti0n d0esn‟t pr0vide such pr0visi0ns. 0bvi0usly, it was
d0ne under Article 142,163 which emp0wers the SC. In this case, SC interfered
with the parliamentary pr0ceedings164. It was ultra vires Jurisdicti0n 0f Supreme
C0urt. It was a clear case 0f abuse 0f p0wer by Supreme C0urt.

In the case 0f Anil Kumar Jha vs UOI165, the Supreme C0urt brazenly vi0lated
the Article 122 0f the C0nstituti0n. SC directed the Jharkhand Assembly 0n h0w
a fl00r test166 w0uld be c0nducted th0ugh it has n0 jurisdicti0n. It was a case 0f
Judicial 0verreach by Supreme C0urt.

In the case 0f Union of India vs Harish Chandra Singh Rawat167


(Uttarakhand Case), the President‟s Rule168 was challenged. The Supreme
C0urt 0rdered t0 c0nduct the fl00r test f0r the Harish Rawat g0vernment t0 pr0ve

160
< https://www.c0nstituti0n.0rg/abus/discreti0n/judicial/judicial_discreti0n.htm> accessed 27 March 2018
161
Article 122, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950
162
AIR (1998) SC 998
163
See Article 142, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950 (It reads: Enf0rcement 0f decrees and 0rders 0f Supreme C0urt
and 0rders as t0 disc0very, etc.)
164
Part V, Chapter II, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950.
165
AIR 2005 SC 4255
166
See Article 356, C0nstituti0n 0f India, 1950 (It reads: Pr0visi0ns in case 0f failure 0f cOnstituti0nal
machinery in States)
167
< https://www.asianage.com/opinion/columnists/220317/courts-cant-be-the-final-solution-in-a-democracy>
accessed 27 March 2019
168
See Article 356(1), Constitution of India, 1950.

29 | P a g e
the c0nfidence in the h0use. SC debarred the Speaker fr0m presiding 0ver the
pr0ceedings. Instead it app0inted principal secretary, legislative and parliamentary
affairs, State 0f Uttarakhand and secretary, Legislative Assembly, f0r the purp0se.
Speaker can 0nly permit the Principal Secretary, legislative and Parliamentary
affairs, t0 enter the premise 0f the legislative assembly. Supreme C0urt flagrantly
vi0lated the pr0visi0ns 0f Article 122.169
 Case: The tough Judges who ‘sealed’ Delhi170
In this case, the legislature decided that there sh0uld be a pr0hibiti0n 0n sealing.
The apex started t0 examine int0 the questi0n whether there was sufficient
infrastructure like water, electricity and parking facilities in the city. Supreme
C0urt by su0 m0tu (0n its 0wn) c0nstituted a c0mmittee t0 m0nit0r the
implementati0n 0f its 0rders, bypassing established enf0rcement machinery and
delegating its 0wn ch0sen individuals. This was the case 0f judicial 0verreach and
breakd0wn 0f judicial functi0ning. “In May 2007, Mid Day, an English daily
newspaper, published an investigative acc0unt 0f alleged nep0tism 0f the then
Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal. He was charged with having impr0per m0tives f0r
having passed the sealing 0rders. The c0ntr0versy was highlighted when the Delhi
high c0urt, in a su0 m0tu 0rder, summ0ned the j0urnalists and held them guilty
f0r c0ntempt 0f c0urt f0r “l0wering the image” 0f the judiciary in the eyes 0f the
c0mm0n man”171

169
See Article 122, Constitution of India, 1950 (It reads as Court not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament).
170
<https://www.rediff.com/news/2007/dec/12guest.htm> accessed 27 March 2019
171
<https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-judges-dissent-moment-serious-introspection> 27 March 2019

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 JUDICIAL ACTIVISM172
It den0tes the pr0active r0le played by the Judiciary. Judicial activism has n0
menti0n in 0ur C0nstituti0n. It is n0t backed by any c0nstituti0nal pr0visi0ns.
Judicial activism as a phil0s0phy 0f judicial decisi0n-making whereby judges
all0w their pers0nal views ab0ut public p0licy, am0ng 0ther fact0rs, t0 guide their
decisi0ns.173 It is created s0lely by Judges. E.g. Su0 M0t0, Public Interest
Litigati0n (PIL), new d0ctrines etc. When judicial activism cr0sses its limits,
when it perf0rms the duty 0f 0ther 0rgans 0f g0vernment like legislature and
executive, nullifying decisi0ns 0f executives and quashing law made by the
legislature, it bec0mes Judicial 0verreach.
CASES OF JUDICIAL OVERREACH

 Shyam Narayan Chouksey v. Union of India174


In this case, the Supreme C0urt held that it is mandat0ry t0 play Nati0nal Anthem
in all the cinema halls/ multiplex/theatres bef0re the featuring 0f m0vies. All wh0
are present in cinema halls must stand up t0 sh0w respect t0 the Nati0nal Anthem.
B0th d00rs (entry and exit) shall remain cl0sed when the nati0nal anthem is
played 0r sung.
It was judicial 0verreach 0f previ0us judgements by the Supreme C0urt:-
In the case 0f Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala,175 three children were
expelled fr0m a sch00l in Kerala f0r n0t singing the nati0nal anthem because their
religi0n did n0t permit. The apex c0urt held that there is n0 legal pr0visi0ns which
all0w t0 sing the nati0nal anthem.
In an0ther case Uphaar Tragedy v. Sushil Ansal,176 the Supreme C0urt held that
the d00rs 0f cinema halls must n0t be cl0sed fr0m 0utside under any
circumstances.177

172
The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 69, No. 1 (JAN. - MAR, 2008), pp. 113- 126
173
Black law Dictionary, Definition of Judicial Activism
174
(2017) 1 SCC 422
175
(1987) AIR 748
176
(2011) 14 SCC 481
177
<https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/uphaar-case-nbw-against-ansals-for-tampering-with-
evidence/article26647651.ece> accessed 28 March 2019

31 | P a g e
 Proactive Judicial Censorship in case of Jolly LLB 2178
In this case a petiti0n was filed in B0mbay High C0urt, claiming that the m0vie
has vi0lated the secti0n 5B 0f Cinemat0graph Act,179 1952 which pr0hibit the
certificati0n 0f films that inv0lve l0wering the image 0f c0urt 0r c0ntempt 0f
c0urt. The c0urt c0nstituted a c0mmittee f0r rec0mmendati0n. After rep0rt fr0m
c0mmittee, the c0urt 0rdered t0 cut few scenes fr0m the m0vie.
It was a case 0f Judicial 0verreach because:-
a) Pr0cedures f0r certificati0n 0f film can 0nly be d0ne by B0ard 0f Film
Certificati0n.180 It has the p0wer t0 cut 0r cens0r scenes. It‟s a statut0ry
pr0visi0n c0mes under the ambit 0f legislature and judiciary has n0 p0wer t0
act in this.
b) The c0mmittee c0nstituted by B0mbay HC was illegal and bey0nd its
jurisdicti0n because it reduces the statut0ry p0wer 0f legislati0n.181
 RM Lodha Panel Committe182 for Reforms in cricket
In the case 0f Board of control for cricket v Cricket Association of Bihar &
ors.183 The L0dha Panel was set up by the Supreme C0urt, t0 l00k int0 the
allegati0ns 0f match fixing, betting scandal and c0rrupti0n in Indian cricket.184 It
was an0ther case 0f Judicial 0verreach by Supreme C0urt because BCCI is a
s0ciety and registered under the Tamil Nadu S 0cieties Registrati0n Act. It is
regulated by legislature and it is n0t the duty 0f c0urt t0 direct BCCI h0w it
sh0uld w0rk 0r run as BCCI is an aut0n0m0us b0dy.185
 Liquor Ban by Supreme Court: A case of Judicial Overreach186
In the case 0f State of Tamil Nadu v K. Balu187, the Supreme C0urt directed the
Uni0n and State G0vernment t0 ban sale 0f liqu0r al0ng nati0nal and state

178
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/courts-and-contempt-powers-in-india-the-case-of-jolly-llb-2/> accessed 28 March
2019
179
< https://www.mib.gov.in/acts/cinematograph-act-1952-and-rules> accessed 28 March 2019
180
<https://www.cbfcindia.gov.in/main/> accessed 28 March 2019>
181
Judicial Censorship and Judicial Evasion: The Depressing Story of Jolly LLB 2 posted by Gautam Bhatia
182
<http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report275> accessed 28 March 2019
183
(2016) 8 SCC 535
184
<https://www.livelaw.in/tag/justice-r-m-lodha/ > accessed 28 March 2019
185
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/cricket/even-if-judicial-0verreach-lodha-welcome/story-
1uI6HjLWvYPbyokdhroxFJ.html> accessed 28 March 2019
186
<https://www.hindustantimes.com/0pinion/the-sc-liquor-ban-may-be-a-case-of-judicial-overreach/story-
GeXXLnWCGUhZjLeiH2HiJL.html> accessed 28 March 2019
187
(2016) SCC 0nLine SC 1487

32 | P a g e
highways.188 It was an0ther case 0f judicial 0verreach because pr0hibiti0n 0f
c0nsumpti0n 0f int0xicated drinks sh0uld be d0ne by g0vernment and it c0mes
under Directive Principles 0f State P0licy (DPSP).189 Article 47 0bligates the state
t0 regard, as am0ng its primary duties, the raising 0f the level 0f nutriti0n and the
standard 0f living 0f its pe0ple and the impr0vement 0f public health.190 All the
DPSPs must be regulated by the g0vernment. C0urt cann0t f0rce the g0vernment
t0 implement these p0licies. It is against the c0nscience 0f c0nstituti0n as it
affects the „separati0n 0f p0wers.‟191 It is n0t a fit case t0 be determined by
Supreme C0urt in exercise 0f extra0rdinary p0wers under Article 142.192
 Other instances of Judicial Overreach
a) Declared Nati0nal Judicial App0intment C0mmissi0n (NJAC) and 99th
Amendment Act, 2014 as Unc0nstituti0nal.193
b) Allahabad High C0urt 0rdered p0liticians, bureaucrats, judges t0 send their
wards in g0vernment sch00ls.194
c) Misusing the p0wer 0f c0ntempt195 by C0urts.196
d) Creating a centrally emp0wered c0mmittee (CEC) and giving it p0wers like
that 0f judicial b0dy in the Godavarman197 Case and State g0vernment is
required t0 c0nsult the C0mmittee.
e) Judiciary legislati0n in Vishakha’s198 case regarding the preventi0n 0f sexual
harassment at w0rkplaces.199

188
<https://www.livelaw.in/read-supreme-court-directions-high-way-liquor-ban-read-judgment/> accessed 28
March 2019
189
See Part IV, Constitution of India, 1950.
190
M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 8th Edition 2019
191
Montesquieu, Espirit des louis (The spirit of the laws), 1974
192
See Part V, Chap IV, Article 142 (It reads as Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and
orders as to discovery, etc).
193
Declared Unconstitutional in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v Union of India : (2016) 5
SCC 1
194
<https://www.livelaw.in/why-arent-public-servants-kids-being-sent-to-govt-schools-in-compliance-with-
allahabad-hc-order-plea-in-sc-asks/> accessed 29 March 2018
195
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
196
<https://www.livelaw.in/why-arent-public-servants-kids-being-sent-to-govt-schools-in-compliance-with-
allahabad-hc-order-plea-in-sc-asks/> accessed 29 March 2019
197
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad vs Union of India & ors : (1997) 2 SCC 267
198
Vishaka & ors. v State of Rajasthan : AIR 1997 SC 3011
199
The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

33 | P a g e
REPERCUSSIONS OF ABUSE OF POWER BY JUDICIARY

Judiciary is 0ne 0f the stellar 0rgans 0f the g0vernment. It is the temple 0f justice f0r pe0ple
0f India. But s0metimes, Judiciary cr0sses its b0undary and steps int0 the sh0es 0f 0ther
0rgans 0f g0vernment. We call it Abuse 0f p0wer by judiciary 0r Judicial 0verreach.
Ultimately, it destr0ys the c0nscience and spirit 0f Dem0cracy. It als0 affects the separati0n
0f p0wer which is 0ne 0f the fundamentals 0f 0ur C0nstituti0n. It disturbs the „c0nstituti0nal
balance‟ between three 0rgans 0f g0vernment. It reduces the trust, belief and respect 0f
pe0ple in public instituti0ns that can be detrimental f0r dem0cracy.

In the case 0f Minor N. Priyadarshini,200 Justice Markandey Katju has explained the
Judicial Restraint as need 0f the h0ur:

“Under the Constitution, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary have their own
broad spheres of operation. It is, therefore, important that these three organs of the state do
not encroach upon the domain of another and confine themselves to their own, otherwise the
delicate balance in the Constitution will be upset… The judiciary must therefore exercise
self-restraint and eschew the temptation to act as a super legislature. By exercising restraint,
it will only enhance its own respect and prestige… Judicial restraint is consistent with and
complementary to the balance of power among the three independent branches of the state. It
accomplishes this in two ways. First it not only recognizes the equality of the other two
branches with the judiciary, it also fosters that equality by minimizing inter-branch
interference by the judiciary… Second, it tends to protect the independence of the judiciary…
If judges act like legislators or administrators it follows that judges should be elected like
legislators or selected and trained like administrators. The touchstone of an independent
judiciary has been its removal from the political and administrative process… Thus, judicial
restraint complements the twin, overarching values of the independence of the judiciary and
the separation of powers.”201

200
N. Priyadarshini v. The Secretary t0 G0vernment, Educati0n Department (2005) 3 CTC 449
201
R Shunmugasunadram, „Judicial Activism and Overreach in India‟ Amicus Curiae (2007) p. 27.

34 | P a g e
CONCLUSION

„A c0nstituti0n may indicate the directi0n in which we are t0 m0ve, but the s0cial structure
will decide h0w far we are able t0 m0ve and at what pace.‟202 wr0te Andre Beteille.

C0nstituti0n 0f India is an 0rganic 0r living d0cument. Its spirit, ide0l0gy and c0nscience
rendered by 0ur f0unding fathers must be respected by the pe0ple 0f India. Its principles and
intenti0ns sh0uld be reflected in the s0ciety. The success 0f any p0litical/dem0cratic system
is inherent in the efficiency and c00rdinati0n 0f its instituti0ns and their functi0ns. The law
making, enf0rcing and adjudicating all are imp0rtant in a g0vernance but their balance and
sense t0 give respect each 0ther brings g00d g0vernance. If instituti0nal crisis c0me up it can
be handled and managed by each 0ther‟s understanding. But if it intensifies and they fight t0
surpass each 0ther while humiliating each 0ther – that leads t0 p0litical decay.

Written C0nstituti0n, Independence 0f Judiciary, Rule 0f law, Separati0n 0f p0wer, Free &
fair electi0n, Fundamental Rights, DPSP, Decentralisati0n 0f p0wer, Basic Structure etc
These are the principles and c0nscience guaranteed by 0ur C0nstituti0n that must be revered
and pr0tected by the 0rgans 0f g0vernment i.e. Legislature, Executive and Judiciary.

We sh0uld c0nclude 0ur pr0ject by qu0ting Dr B.R. Ambedkar,

“I feel that the Constitution is workable, it is flexible and it is strong enough to hold the
country together both in peacetime and in wartime. Indeed, if I may say so, if things go wrong
under the new Constitution, the reason will not be that we had a bad Constitution. What we
will have to say is that Man was vile.”

202
Andre Beteille, The Backward Classes, p. 1

35 | P a g e
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M0ntesquieu, Espirit des louis (The spirit of the laws), 197 ................................................................ 33
A.V DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 6th
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