Yamada v Manila Railroad and Bachrach Garage and Taxicab Co.

Dec. 24, 1914

Moreland, J.

Facts:

1) Jan 2, 1913: Plaintiffs (Butaro Yamada, Kenjiro Karabayashi, and Takutaru Uyehara) hired an
automobile from defendant taxicab company. It was secured at a certain price and was driven
and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab company.
2) They went to Caviete Viejo. On the return trip, while crossing the tracks of defendant Manila
Railroad in the barrio of San Juan, Municipality of Cavite Viejo, they automobile was struck by a
train and the plaintiffs were injured.
3) TRIAL COURT: Dismissed the complaint at the Manila Railroad and held the taxicab company
liable for damages to plaintiffs. Taxicab company appealed.

Issue: Is the taxicab company liable? YES!!!

Sub-issue: Did the taxicab company fully discharge its duty when it furnished a suitable and
proper car and selected driver? NO

Ratio:

1) Appellant’s first contention relates to the finding of the trial court that the driver of the
automobile was grossly negligent by not slowing down and going at a reckless speed upon
approaching the railroad crossing. Appellant contends that the view of the railroad tracks in both
directions was obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, so that it was
impossible for a person approaching the crossing to detect by sight the approach of a train.
a. However, it was clearly the duty of the driver to reduce the speed of the car and the
noise thereof, and use any and all faculties available to him to be able to determine
whether or not a train was near.
b. A person must use ordinary care and prudence in passing over a railroad crossing. It is
always incumbent on him to use ordinary care and diligence.
c. The driver drove upon the tracks without investigation or precaution of any kind.
Railroad trains are generally easily detected by persons who take ordinary precautions.
d. Appellant’s witness (President of defendant company Mr. Bachrach) testified that all of
his drivers operated cars in that manner and that it was the custom among automobile
drivers generally.
i. Obviously, a practice which is dangerous to human life cannot become a custom
which will protect anyone who follows it. One who performs an act so inherently
dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs, take refuge behind the plea that
others have performed the same act safely.
2) Appellant contends that plaintiffs cannot recover because the negligence of the driver of the
automobile was imputable to them, having permitted the driver to approach and pass over the
 railroad crossing without the use of ordinary care and diligence to determine the proximity of a
train or locomotive, and having made no effort to caution or instruct him or compel him to take
reasonable care in making the crossing.
a. Appellant is wrong. A person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver
direction as to the place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other
control over the conduct of the driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence of the
latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from a collision between the
automobile and a train.
b. Responsibility cannot attach to one who has in no way interfered with and controlled the
matter causing the injury. The party hiring or riding must in some way have cooperated
in producing the injury complained of before he can incur any liability for it.
3) RULE: Where one rides a public vehicle with the driver thereof and is injured by the negligence
of a third person, to which negligence that of that driver contributes his contributory negligence
is not imputable to the passenger unless said passenger has or is in the position to have and
exercise some control over the driver with reference to the matter wherein he was negligent.
4) Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant Manila Railroad was
not guilty of negligence which contributed to the causing of the accident.
a. Before the present action, there were 2 other actions:
i. Criminal action against the engineer of the rain where he was acquitted; and
ii. Civil action for damages by the garage and taxicab company against Manila
railroad for damages to the automobile. Manila Railroad won.
b. The engineer gave due and timely signals on approaching the crossing. Employees of the
railroad company fully performed their duty on the night in question. Thus, the railroad
company in no way contributed to the accident.
i. The bell was rung and the whistle was blown on nearing the crossing.
c. The assertion that the railroad company did not maintain either a flagman or protecting
gates at the gate crossing where the accident occurred is not considered negligence.
5) MAIN CONTENTION: That even admitting all of the facts alleged by plaintiffs, appellant is not
liable, because up to the time of the accident, the taxicab company had fully performed its duty
to the public, since it is undisputed in the record that the driver was competent and had a long
and satisfactory record (driving for 5-6 years for defending with accident or misadventure), and
that his negligence, cannot be legally imputed to the taxicab company.
a. Of course, appellant is WRONG.
b. Trial court correctly found that the driver was guilty of gross negligence was that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident; and,
c. That the taxicab company had permitted its drivers to approach and pass over railroad
tracks in such manner and form and that it had become custom. For that reason, the
taxicab company is liable for the damages caused.
6) Discussion of precedents, CC, etc.:
a. The Civil Code, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his
servant, makes a distinction between private individuals and public enterprises, under
Art. 1902 and Art. 1903 of the OLD Civil Code. They’re under Art. 2176 and Art. 2180 in
the current one.
 b. In the chapter of the CC, there is also Art. 1905 (Art. 2183)1, Art. 19062, Art. 1907 (Art.
2190), Art. 1908 (Art. 2191), and Art. 1910 (Art. 2193), which are the only cases under
the CC where damages may be recovered for the master for the negligent servant.
c. Under Art. 1903, the master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the
owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while
the servant is engaged in his master’s employment.
d. In Johnson v David, the defendant was not liable for the acts of his servant in negligently
driving a horse and carriage and injuring the plaintiff who was riding a bicycle. In that
case, the vehicle was being driven by the defendant’s coachman on the private affairs of
the owner, and not a public conveyance driven for hire or as part of a business or
enterprise.
e. The rule applies WON the owner is present when the accident happens. An owner who
sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in violation of
the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity
to observe them and to direct that driver, becomes himself responsible for such acts
(Chapman v Underwood).
i. If the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the law, the owner of the automobile, although present, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally.
f. In Bahia v Litonjua and Leynes, an automobile was being operated by defendant as a
public vehicle for hire. On one of the trips, because of a defect in the steering gear, a
child was run over and killed.
i. In addition to the requirement to furnish and use proper and safe machines, it is
the duty of a person or corporation operating automobiles to for hire to exercise
ordinary care and diligence in the selection of the drivers of his or its
automobiles and in supervision over them while in his or its employ, including
the promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and due
publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules,
regulations, and instructions are necessary.
ii. Under Art. 1903 (Art. 2180): When an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee or in supervision over him after the selection, or both
iii. This presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, which means it can be
rebutted. If the employer shows that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
g. THUS, the taxicab company did not perform its full duty when it furnished a safe and
proper care and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed to comply with

1
The articles in parentheses are the articles in the current CC. Some are amended but are generally the same.
2
Not in new CC, unless it is hidden somewhere else not under the chapter on quasi-delicts
 the requirement of supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper
rules and regulations.
i. The taxicab company has failed to rebut the presumption of negligence arising
from the carelessness of its servant, but it has made those negligent acts its
own by having observed and known the custom of its drivers without
disapproving it and without issuing instructions designed to supersede it.
7) ERROR AS TO DAMAGES:
a. Under the law, each of the plaintiffs is entitled to recover the time, doctor’s bills and
hospital bills and medicines, and any other item of expense which it was found
necessary to undergo by reason of the damages sustained.
i. YAMADA: Reimbursed P49 for hospital bills, P50 for Dr. Strahan, and loss of time
at the rate of P100/month. TC allowed him for certain alleged fees of doctors
and expenses at hot springs in Japan. However, he remained in Manila for nearly
6 months after the accident before going back to Japan. He was already in good
physical condition by the time he left the Philippines. No evidence was given
with regard to the expenses in Japan. In all, he is only given P299 (P100 x 2
months, P50, and P49). The expenses in Japan were taken out.
ii. UYEHARA: Same with Yamada. His claim as to expenses in Japan were taken out.
He is given P950 (P200 x 3 months, P350 for hospital bills)
iii. KARABAYASHI: Plaintiff was able to move about immediately after the accident
occurred. It seems incredible to the court that the plaintiff, who suffered no
physical injury, should have paid out more than P800, especially compared to
the other plaintiffs who spent less but were injured much worse. He is given
P400 (he lost work for 2 and a half months, at a rate of P160/month).