Case No.

30
Subject Matter: Amendment and Revision

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
FACTS

The petitioners filed petitions for prohibition with preliminary injunction against PD Nos. 991 and
1033, by Pres. Ferdinand Marcos, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution and PD No.
1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to supervise, control, hold and conduct Referendum Plebiscite
on Oct. 16, 1976. The petitioners content that the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions do not provide grant
to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The Solicitor General likewise filed a comment and maintains that petitioners have no
standing to sue as the issue raised in political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the Supreme
Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the president’s proposed amendment is a political question or a judicial
question
2. Whether or not the president’s proposed amendment is constitutional

RULING

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments
of the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition. After that
period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art.
XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033
to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue.

Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides:

"All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may
shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive
agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at
least ten Members. ..."

2. SC ruled that the proposed amendment by the President is constitutional. The power to legislate
is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period.
However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer
convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference (As early as the
referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of
the interim National Assembly). In the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15
of the Transitory Provisions). The President can assume the constituent power of the interim
Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions. If the President has been
legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why
he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. With the
interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in
operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent
for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its
very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without
constitutional infractions.