Republic of the Philippines The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an expert witness. Dr.
prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an expert witness. Dr. Ogues was the
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208007 April 2, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND JOHN LENNON", Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
For a measly five- or ten-peso tip that a 10-year-old child would need for lunch money, a
known acquaintance of their family would destroy a child's dignity by having illicit carnal
knowledge of her. This case involves an act that is so dastardly that it is punished by Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code as statutory rape which carries a sentence of reclusion
perpetua.
We are asked to review the Court of Appeals decision1 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02955. This
decision affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant for statutory rape under Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 30, 2005, an information2 was filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59. The information reads:
That on or about November 29, 2005, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the offended party, (AAA), who is under
twelve (12) years old.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was then 10 years old and a Grade 2 student
at Camp 7 Elementary School in Baguio City. She testified that on November 29, 2005, she
went home from school at around 12 noon to have lunch.3 On the way home, she met Rodrigo
at his house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on the bed. He then raised her skirt
and removed her panties. He pulled down his pants and then inserted his penis into her
vagina.4
According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long time, and when he withdrew his
penis, white liquid came out. He then gave her five pesos (₱5.00) before she went back to
school.5
AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser, Agustina Chapap, asked her where
she came from because she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer. When asked again why
she was tardy, AAA admitted she came from "Uncle Rod." She also admitted that she went
there to ask for money. Chapap then brought AAA to Rona Ambaken, AAA's previous teacher.
Together, they brought AAA to the principal's office. AAA was brought to the comfort room
where Ambaken inspected her panties. The principal was able to confirm that AAA was
touched since AAA's private organ was swelling. Her underwear was also wet.6
Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to Baguio General Hospital where her
underwear was again inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On the way to the
hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay hall and the police station to report the incident.7
AAA also disclosed during trial that the accused-appellant had done the same thing to her
about 10 times on separate occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (₱10.00) or five
(₱5.00) pesos.8
superior of Dr. Pascua who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified based on the medical
certificate issued by the examining physician that there was blunt force penetrating trauma that
could have been caused by sexual abuse. She also stated that there was another medico-legal
certificate issued by Dr. Carag, surgical resident of the Department of Surgery of Baguio
General Hospital, showing findings of some hematoma in AAA's legs.9
In his defense, Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his house at 12 noon on November 29, 2005
and claimed he was already at work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA for a long time since his
family rented the house of AAA's grandfather from 2001 to 2004.10 When the police came and
asked him if he knew AAA, he answered in the affirmative. He was then brought to Baguio
General Hospital where he was told that AAA identified him as the one who raped her.11
Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA's sister, and they even lived together as
common-law spouses.12 He also admitted that a similar complaint was filed against him by
AAA's mother when AAA was eight years old, but they settled the case at the barangay level.13
On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a judgment14 finding Rodrigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of statutory rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He
was additionally required to indemnify the offended party ₱50,000.00 moral damages and
₱25,000.00 exemplary damages with costs of suit.
Rodrigo appealed15 to the Court of Appeals claiming that AAA's testimony fell short of the
requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence required. He argued that she did not cry for
help when her family's house was just nearby, which was cause for reasonable doubt that the
trial court failed to appreciate.
On February 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision16 affirming the conviction.
On March 11, 2013, Rodrigo filed a notice of appeal17 with the appellate court, which was
given due course in a resolution18 dated March 15, 2013.
Hence, this appeal was instituted.
In the resolution19 of September 9, 2013, this court required the parties to submit their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. Both parties, however, manifested that they
were dispensing with the filing of a supplemental brief as their arguments were already
substantially and exhaustively discussed in their respective briefs filed before the appellate
court.
The only issue to be resolved by this court is whether the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape punishable
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. ― Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was
done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven
and that there was sexual intercourse.
People v. Teodoro20 explained the elements of statutory rape committed under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1) (d):
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual
modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury
are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot
have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial
because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil. (Emphasis supplied)
The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at the time of the incident. Her
birth certificate was presented before the trial court.21 What is critical in this case, therefore, is
whether there is a showing that Rodrigo had carnal knowledge of AAA.
In the testimony of AAA, she narrated that on November 29, 2005, she met Rodrigo in his
house, thus:
Q: Now, when you met the accused, what did he do?
A: He brought me in the room, Ma'am.
Q: The room is located inside his house?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: And, was that the first time you entered the room?
A: (The witness nods.)
Q: After entering the room, what did Uncle Rod tell you?
A: He laid me down, Ma'am.
COURT:
Q: Where?
A: On the bed, Ma'am.
PROS. BERNABE:
Q: Who were the persons inside the room aside from you and Uncle Rod?
A: (Witness shook her head - meaning no persons around.)
Q: After lying down on the bed, what did he do next?
A: He raised up my skirt.
Q: After raising up your skirt, what else did he do?
A: He removed my panty, Ma'am.
Q: Was he able to remove it from your legs your panty? [sic]
A: No, Ma'am.
Q: Until where was he able to remove?
A: (Witness is pointing down to the ankle.)
Q: After pulling down your panty until your ankle, what happened?
A: He pulled down his short pants, Ma'am.
Q: After pulling down his short pants, what did Uncle Rod do?
A: He brought out his penis.
Q: After bringing out his penis, what did he do next?
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina, Ma'am.
Q: Will you please show us where is your vagina?
A: (The witness stood and pointed to her private part.)
Q: You also mentioned AAA that Uncle Rod inserted his penis to your vagina, could you point
to the "ari" of Uncle Rod?
A: (The witness pointed to a portion where the private part of the elder brother was standing.)
Q: Was it painful when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Did you cry when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Did he stay long on top of you? At around how many minutes?
A: Very long, Ma'am.
Q: Did he withdraw his penis from your vagina?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: And after he withdrew his penis inside your vagina, what happened?
A: There is some white liquid that came out of his penis, Ma'am.22
As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical manner the
ordeal that was done to her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in coming to court,
her testimony deserves full weight and credence. People v. Veloso23 stated that:
In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be
given full weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who
barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as
rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the
earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will-as in this case-motivates her to testify falsely
against the accused. It is well-settled that when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The
accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.24
AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her led to
the discovery of the crime. The medical certificate presented in court, together with the
testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with the finding that she was sexually abused.
Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 He
noted that her house was just near his house where the incident happened.
This argument is so feeble that it could only have been put up out of desperation.
Rodrigo was referred to by the child-victim as "Uncle Rod." He admitted that AAA's family had
known him for a long time. Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any elder in the family of
AAA had. Instead of providing the moral guidance that his status allowed him, he took
advantage of AAA's youthful innocence to satiate his illicit carnal desires. To cover this up and
seemingly justify his actions, he gave his child-victim the measly sum of five pesos. Rodrigo
knew that what he did was wrong; AAA would have probably doubted whether such act was
normal among adults.
With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to assume that even the
child-victim's desire for help would be muffled by her fear of her "Uncle Rod." To a young
10-year-old, the ordinary world can be daunting. To be so young and silently aware that one is
the victim of such callous depravation by Rodrigo, who she could have expected to take care
of her, can create the kind of lasting fear that diminishes the development of her own person
and her own convictions.
In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge of statutory rape since "[t]he
law presumes that such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will
of her own."25
Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a minor who was only 10 years of age,
on November 29, 2005.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code requires that the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed in cases of rape stated in the first paragraph of Article 266-A where there are no
aggravating or qualifying circumstances present. The lower courts correctly imposed this
penalty.
Their award of damages, however, must be modified in light of recent jurisprudence.
It is settled that the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding that rape was
committed, along with the award of moral and exemplary damages.26 In People v. Degay,27 the
accused-appellant was found guilty of raping his nine-year-old neighbor. This court did not
hesitate to increase the award of civil indemnity and moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00. In People v. Gambao,28 we have also increased the award of civil indemnity,
moral damages, and exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00 each.
Due to the utter heinousness of the crime involved in this case, we, therefore, exercise our
judicial prerogative and increase the damages to ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
There are not enough words to condemn the depravity that one adult can do to a child-victim.
The many years that Rodrigo Gutierez will, by law, serve in prison will, of course, not make up
for the wrong and the injury that he has so selfishly and callously caused and with utter
disregard for what truly makes us human: that we care, nurture, and protect our children
because we hope that they can make their world better than ours. All this was lost on Rodrigo
Gutierez. The five pesos that he gave on every occasion that he defiled his child-victim simply
underscores the ignominy of his act.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the accused-appellant Rodrigo
Gutierez y Robles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is ordered to
pay AAA the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision until its full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO,
AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21,
dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents
Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the
prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz,
Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping
AAA,3 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s
Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a
16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought
said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house,
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal
knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA,
with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty
to the offense charged.5cralawlawlibrary
Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however,
remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao
del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza
because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at
around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be
attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and
Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan,
Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a
walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they were greeted
by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside
and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold
Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one
Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to
which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2) bottles of
Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2)
glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other
glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard
liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was
AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first
shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of
Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started
kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them
to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then,
Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take
another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say,
“Hubuga na, hubuga na,” (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard
someone say, “You drink it, you drink it.” She leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell
asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the
remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly from the
bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she
was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the
Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there
before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the
times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of
her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she
felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room,
watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting
his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and
started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body
felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower
garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the
floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and
went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already
furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother started hitting her. They
brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26,
2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at
the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses,
in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at
Gemeno’s house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by
Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned by the latter’s family. When they reached the place,
Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie
Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson’s Palace but could
not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group agreed to celebrate
further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of
Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz,
Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were
Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga,
and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and instead
told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oporto’s lap. She
even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoy’s
crotch, she remarked, “What was that, penis?” Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and
the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and AAA also kissed him. After Oporto,
Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola
Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at
around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s Palace to see
her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on
Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not
look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, “I just stay here.” Alquizola and Fiel then
went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they went to Alson’s Palace again, and
saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his
neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed
them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim,
and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA
approached Alquizola and told him, “Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime.” Alquizola
then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two
beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked
at Carampatana. The latter approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and
AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her
brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed
her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear
down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand,
placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put
on his shorts and went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and
AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said,
“Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem.” Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s
breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio
on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards,
Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with
AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson’s Palace to sleep. At around 6:00
a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up,
but she did not move so they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he
came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela
Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00
as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
ACCOMPLICE in the commission of the crime charged, and the court
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of
P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by
way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda,
Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana,
Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their
prison terms provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7,
and detained since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also 2008 to assail the petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this I.
time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on
26 March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL
Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for AND EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT
his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court, APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE
thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of the CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE
DSWD. JEOPARDY.
II.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on
the prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE
as soon as he is apprehended. OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.7 III.

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR
2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling and, RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision IV.
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL
doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL CASES.11
OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns
the following errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.8 I.

In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private
respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance,
never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court
further relied on the medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration
on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man
before. The CA also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she
discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who
found out that her child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule
65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently
contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL
AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT
OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION
TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair
and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of
achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of
due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.13 Liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation
or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is
warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer
technicalities.14cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of
the Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with
respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower
court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also
exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of
due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse
of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in
double jeopardy.17cralawlawlibrary
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v.
Santiago:18cralawlawlibrary
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited
to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's
role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on
the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not
take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the
person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and
the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the
OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against
him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is
because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme
Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20cralawlawlibrary
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private
counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted
private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in
her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining
justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held
in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private offended party’s right in a criminal
case to file a special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of
dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General’s intervention was not necessary, the recourse of
the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that of
the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in its
Comment,22thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor.23cralawlawlibrary
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that
AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double
jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to previously file a motion for
reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.24cralawlawlibrary
Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private
respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay
would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the
Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due
process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered
tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecution’s right to due
process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner
to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority
such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice.25cralawlawlibrary

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion,
totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby adopting
hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents’ narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can
only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of
discretion when the disputed act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus
effecting an injustice.27cralawlawlibrary
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private
respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the
defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration
of the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a
more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the
testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the
accused-appellants in the case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private
respondents’ testimonies, particularly those as to the specific events that transpired during the
crucial period - from the dinner at Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the Alquizola
Lodging House. As a result, it presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as
though these were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to
support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence
presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that
of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one party’s cause
and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in this case because the
parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the
accused are saying it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard
of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes
grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due
process.33cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made
its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The
fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought
against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were
indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the
assault. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
cralawred
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object,
into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under
twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more
than she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly
deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout
or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and
dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime.35 The appellate court
never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or
why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the
victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be
credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her
testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be
offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself.36 The trial
court correctly ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened
herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying
eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing experience.37cralawlawlibrary
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to
resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found
AAA’s testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court
likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and
straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony.38 Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep,
when did you regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the
bottle of Emperador Brandy.cralawred
xxxx
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining
contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying
you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy
carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was
awakened by the flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that
(sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.cralawred
xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what
happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.cralawred
xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on
top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually
abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the
witness is crying.cralawred
xxxx
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of
you, who else was there inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us. Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed? ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A: Dressed up, sir. On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted
that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the defense
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing? of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir. avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The
trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed? the court by surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a
A: I could not remember, sir.cralawred rape case claims that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was
consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined
xxxx to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that
needs convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse
Q: After that, what happened? was indeed consensual.42 Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish
A: I went asleep again, sir. each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its
commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up? guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created
Raymund Carampatana, sir. against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has
produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in
Q: On top of you? litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir. convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the
romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having
Q: What was your reaction? admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t. prove his defense by substantial evidence.45cralawlawlibrary

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately
Carampatana? failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching
A: Only the three of them, sir. the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then
approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto
Q: Including Moises Alquizola? also removed AAA’s lower garments and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed
A: Yes, sir. himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto
himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. While Carampatana
Q: What was he doing? was removing AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me. removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him
to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA,
Q: Where in particular? according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA
A: In my face, sir. could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few
Q: Then after that, what happened? minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He
A: I fell asleep again, sir. went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly
thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time.47 Despite said shameless
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical
that you feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund resistance on AAA’s part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA
Carampatana? had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir. seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent
consent to the sexual act.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir. The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated
when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an
indication of a rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the attending
circumstances.49cralawlawlibrary
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to
observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.50 Matters of
credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the
appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses
who have personally appeared before him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the
details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its
review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court
acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings
must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any
palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these
findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding.53cralawlawlibrary
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal
laceration on AAA’s private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected
to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually
consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina
becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed
that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent considering the presence of old hymenal
laceration that could have resulted from her previous sexual encounters. The defense,
however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even
joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of
the incident, having just graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar case,54 the
Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual
intercourse with two men — or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in
the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally
debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that
Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so
characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity
and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest
any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of
the crime charged.55
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim
were not true.56 And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the
same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who was
a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of
rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that
the victim was deprived of reason or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable
the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a woman against her consent.57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its
essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape
cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without
rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat,
rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a
conviction for rape.58cralawlawlibrary
Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It
is a truism that “the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and the people react differently.”59 Different people react differently to a given
type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration
and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the
night before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was
impelled by improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is
entitled to full faith and credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she
still need to immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to
herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love
with any of the private respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with
any of them of which her family disapproved.63 She never became pregnant as a result of the
deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag the private
respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private respondents simply
because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the
case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that
she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased.64 Unfortunately, the CA chose
to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the
facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65 contrary to common human
experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The
Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not of a conspirator,
but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof
as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have
acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing
evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a
common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during
or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.70cralawlawlibrary
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and
Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying
weaponsduring the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by
more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo
stated that they did.

In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not
necessary. In this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with
respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation
in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was
conspiracy:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the
victim based on the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso
succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela
Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts,
accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of
Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and
mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked
jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of
the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged
as a principal in the commission of the crime.73
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not at all
uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape
could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently
watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to
stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and
other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and
Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of
them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC
found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial
court,74 he waived the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole
case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such
judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
accused-appellant.75cralawlawlibrary
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or
information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.76 The rationale
behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his
defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might
confuse him in his defense.77 Non-compliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the
duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise,
the defect is deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense
simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information
during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the
same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different
counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no
duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed
of the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they “took turns in
having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA” on March 25, 2004.82 Further, allegations
made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and
defiled several times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA,
Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the
other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two
or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto,
and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4)
counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of
the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape
committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ
into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor
because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to
the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the
presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him
is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a
divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which
shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and
there being no aggravating circumstance.85 With that, the Court shall impose the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each
count of rape committed.86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87 which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,88 and
provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:89cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should
be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who
have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by
law.

As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of
P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from
committing the same bestial acts.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:
Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case;
b)
Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c)
Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in each case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 178321 October 5, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellant’s conviction for murder in Criminal Case No.
2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,2 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said lead pipe the said Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical
injuries which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA.3 The second
Information,4 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking
and hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious physical injuries
that almost caused her death, and while in such defenseless situation, did then and there have
carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were thereafter
tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old
at the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six o’clock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend,
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work
at a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly,
appellant, who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought
them to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in
the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this,
she cried out for help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her
down. Appellant stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her
body with thick grass.5 Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times
more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless
position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her
blouse and bra. He then went on top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her
vagina. After raping AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed
out.6
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she
reached her uncle’s farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.7 When she saw him, she waved at him
for help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag,
Bulacan where she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had
died.8
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant
accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity. She said that she
never thought he would harm them.9
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six o’clock in the morning, he was at his rice field
at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman waving a hand and then fell down.
The woman was about 200 meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did
not mind her. However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the
woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately approached her and saw that her face
was swollen, with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what
happened to her, and AAA uttered, "Si Tata Coni" referring to appellant who is his
son-in-law.10 With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home.11 AAA was later brought to
Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she visited
AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for
Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they
went to Buenavista where they found Jennifer’s cadaver covered with grass and already
bloated.12
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan,
conducted the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
…the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] … eyeballs and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed;
the lips and abdomen are swollen; … desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of
the epidermis in the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots
coming from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds, … three (3) lacerations
at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at
the chest of the victim[.]
… cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the head
and trunk.13
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran,
Jennifer’s mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated
that she spent ₱25,000 for Jennifer’s funeral and burial.14
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at
home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children,
Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven o’clock, he
was arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had
reported him to the police after he "went wild" that same night and struck with a lead pipe a
man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he
learned that he was being charged with murder and rape.15
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever they
would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer
slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at around seven o’clock. An hour later,
he left his house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that
was the time when he "went wild" after seeing his wife with another man. He admitted that
his nipa hut is more or less only 100 meters away from the scene of the crime.16
The defense also presented appellant’s nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to
appellant’s house on June 5, 2000, at around three o’clock in the afternoon, and saw AAA and
Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncle’s house about seven
times because AAA and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived
before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following morning, at around six
o’clock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and appellant meanwhile left the house together.
Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe repaired while he proceeded to his
house in Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.17
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision18 on June 30, 2003 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused Conrado Laog
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused Conrado
Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement
in People v. Mateo,20 the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s
judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated June 30,
2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos.
2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case
[No.] 2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual damages. The exemplary damages
awarded by the Trial Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to
P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction for both
crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution22 dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties to
submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties submitted
separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in their
respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised the following errors allegedly committed
by the trial court:
 I defer to the trial court’s firsthand observations on AAA’s deportment while testifying and its
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAA’s credibility, the
prosecution’s main witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant
also contends that the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of
the crimes charged. According to him, AAA’s narration that he waylaid them while walking
along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates evident premeditation since there
was no evidence that the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to be
appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim
should have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the capacity to
overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable to put
up a defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAA’s testimony, arguing that it
lacked some details on how, after she was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was still able
to put on her clothes and crawl to her grandfather’s farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has
decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province
of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts"24 and "absent any substantial reason which
would justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court
is generally bound by the former’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered
would have affected the outcome of the case."25 This rule is even more stringently applied if
the appellate court concurred with the trial court.26
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the
testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifer’s killing and was herself brutally attacked by
appellant who also raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us
to disturb the trial court’s evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness’ credibility. In particular, we
veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the trepidations
of a woman outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her
oath with trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes were
constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man she was about to testify
against. After a few questions in direct, the emotion building up inside her came to the fore and
she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her testimony. Thus, in
deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to defer her direct-examination. When she
came back, however, to continue with her aborted questioning, this time, composed and
collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all vestiges of doubt on her credibility
vanished.27
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness
stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut short her initial direct examination. However,
during the next hearing she was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and
straightforward manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit
and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before raping her. We quote the
pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that you’re not able to reach
your place of work on June 6, 2000, what is the reason why you did not reach your place of
work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where were you when you were hit?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by Conrado Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir. A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.

Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her? Q: And what happened to you?

A: Yes, sir. A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.

Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying? Q: Then, what happened to you?

A: He was beside me, sir. A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my blouse and
my bra.
Court:
Q: After that, what did he do next?
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Q: Then, what happened?
Fiscal:
A: He sucked my breast, sir.
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
Q: And after that?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Then, what happened next?
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened to Jennifer?
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your vagina?
A: She fell down, sir.
A: For quite sometime, sir.
Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
Q: After that, what happened?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
A: After that, he stood up, sir.
Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
Q: And where did he go?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: He came back to me, sir.
A: I fell unconscious, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmate’s uniform and when asked his name,
answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x28
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that
at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his children and nephew cooking dinner.
His defense, however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA
who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we
have held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over
the alibi and denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.29 AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the one who
attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping AAA. It should be noted
that AAA knew appellant well since they were relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA,
with AAA’s familiarity and proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her
identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering
appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own uncle would harm her and her friend.
Moreover, the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of
the perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being
committed.30 There is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify
falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the
logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.31
In People v. Nieto,32 we reiterated that --
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable
when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that
alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during
the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him
to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of June 6,
2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that his house was more or less
only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for
the added reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi deserve no
consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand against the positive
identification and categorical testimony of a rape victim.33
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while she testified
on being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped by appellant, she
nevertheless stated that when she crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing
her clothes. Appellant also contends that the prosecution should have presented the physician
who examined AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAA’s account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra were
merely lifted up ("nililis") while her undergarments were just pulled down, which therefore
explains why she still had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfather’s farm.
Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral
matters -- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the
essential credibility of witnesses’ declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole.34 For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to
serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for
the crime charged.35 It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not
diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.36
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the
trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecution’s case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the
victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victim’s testimony
alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.37 Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of
the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an
indispensable element for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private
complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,38 as what we find in this
case.
While we concur with the trial court’s conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped
AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate
crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question, including one not raised by the parties.39The facts alleged and proven clearly
show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime
provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.40
In People v. Larrañaga,41 this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as
follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a
single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical
injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special
complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component
offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject
of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed;["] and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information
specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection" with
her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof." Considering
that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape. x x x42 (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and
special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate
Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,43explained that composite crimes are "neither of the
same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised
Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less
grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to
commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the
present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for
each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."44
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the
composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the
killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the
above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA
or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may
not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been
satiated, appellant purposely covered AAA’s body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifer’s
body, so that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that
the savage blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer.
But AAA survived and appellant’s barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with
homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have
been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon,45we
expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that
has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on
the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of
the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by
or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in
its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape.47 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales48
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case
correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms
were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales,
as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such
treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a
composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There
is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here,
treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the
complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic
aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed.49(Emphasis
supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and
obviously advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.50 It is taken into account whenever the aggressor
purposely used excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.51
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead
pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant
had brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe
to render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably
showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority
which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to
defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean
that the victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess
of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position
of both and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By
deliberately employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant
clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his
unarmed victim. The accused-appellant’s sudden attack caught the victim off-guard rendering
her defenseless.52
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating circumstance
to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24,
2006 of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines" the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.53
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly
weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is concerned. While the
trial court and CA were correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the
rape victim (AAA) are entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award
needs further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are
entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With respect to the rape committed
against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article
266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Since the use of a deadly
weapon raises the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify the award of exemplary
damages to the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated therein. Among
these circumstances is minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAA’s relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the information
but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x54 (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAA’s relationship to appellant will
not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In
any case, even without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages
may still be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the "highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender." Citing our earlier ruling in the case of People v.
Catubig,55 this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay56:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded
exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same
was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230.
However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the
aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in
the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was
not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are the following sections of
Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary
damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has
not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the
effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the
retroactive application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the
private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape,
dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance
attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently
proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an
aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules.
Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v.
Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People
of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And
in the second set are People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and
People of the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on
when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised
Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary
damages—taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus—
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to
account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that
there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the
defendant—associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud—that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of
damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In
either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as
Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229,
the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the
Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the
Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in
People of the Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and
The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to
set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to
protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than
Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio
Morales’ words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,
"[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the
present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages—to
set a public example or correction for the public good."57 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1

In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his
niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any harm to her and her
friend, justified the award of exemplary damages. Appellant’s sudden and fierce attack on AAA
-- hitting her several times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell
down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her undergarments, raping her
while she was in such a defenseless position, covering her body with grasses and abandoning
her to die in a grassy field -- was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was
made even more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more stab
wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the
award of exemplary damages in order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow the
courts to forestall behavior that would pose grave and deleterious consequences to
society.58 In line with current jurisprudence, the amount of ₱30,000 each for AAA and the heirs
of Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.

We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of ₱50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and
homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.59 Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased
to ₱75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence.60 As to expenses incurred for the funeral and
burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount of ₱25,000 as actual
damages, said amount having been stipulated by the parties during the trial.

Lastly, we affirm the award of ₱50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as well
as the award of ₱50,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a
finding of the fact of rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of
further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award.61

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Rape With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuawithout
eligibility for parole.

Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal ₱75,000 as

civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages, ₱25,000 as actual damages and
₱30,000 as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of
₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱50,000 as moral damages and ₱30,000 as exemplary
damages.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189822 September 2, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
BRION, JOJIE SUANSING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is rape since she is incapable
of giving consent to a sexual act. Under these circumstances, all that needs to be proved for a
successful prosecution are the facts of sexual congress between the rapist and his victim, and
the latter’s mental retardation.1
Factual Antecedents
For review is the July 17, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00439-MIN that affirmed with modification the April 14, 2004 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 33, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 49,196-2002, finding appellant Jojie
Suansing (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against "AAA,"4 as
described in the Amended Information,5 the relevant portions of which read as follows:
That sometime in the first week of April 2001, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one "AAA", attended
by the qualifying circumstance that the victim has a mental disability. The accused knew of
such mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime. The sexual assault done by
the accused was against the will of "AAA".
Contrary to law. 6 and her relatives and was considered a member of their family. He treated "AAA" as his niece
Appellant pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as its witnesses "AAA;" her aunt and guardian, "EEE;" her friend,
"FFF;" doctor of gynecology, Mary Grace Solano, M.D. (Dr. Solano); doctor of psychiatry, Sally
Jane Kwong-Garcia, M.D. (Dr. Kwong-Garcia); and psychologist Evangeline Castro (Castro).
The RTC allowed "AAA" to testify after evaluating her ability to comprehend and answer
questions. The RTC also permitted the prosecution and the defense to propound leading
questions to her.7 Based on their testimonies,8 the following facts emerged:
"AAA" was born on July 6, 1975. She used to live in Tangub City with her grandparents
because her mother suffered from and later died of tuberculosis. When "AAA" was 15 years
old, she became a mother to a baby boy who was born on September 29, 1990. Nobody
admitted responsibility for her pregnancy. To receive better guidance and supervision, "AAA"
was transferred to the residence of "EEE" who raised her as a daughter.
Sometime before April 8, 2001, "GGG" requested "FFF" to get from appellant’s boarding house
an electric fan and a transformer. "FFF" together with her brother and "AAA" went to the
boarding house of appellant. After giving the requested items, appellant ordered "FFF" and her
brother to leave "AAA" behind.
"FFF" brought the items to "GGG" who, upon learning that "AAA" was still with appellant,
requested "FFF" to return to appellant’s boarding house to fetch "AAA." Upon arriving at the
boarding house, "FFF" noticed that the door was closed. She called out to "AAA" to go home to
avoid being scolded by "EEE." "AAA" opened the door and came out fixing her short pants.
"FFF" then asked "AAA" if anything happened. "AAA" replied that after "FFF" and her brother
left the boarding house, appellant pulled her inside the room, removed her shoes and panty,
told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent.
"AAA" requested "FFF" not to tell anyone that she was raped by appellant.
On August 3, 2001, "EEE" learned about the rape and confronted "AAA." "EEE" then reported
the incident to police authorities.
The genital examination of "AAA" on August 6, 2001 revealed old hymenal lacerations. Her
psychiatric evaluation also disclosed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the
mental age of a 9 to 12-year old child. Although with impaired adaptive skills, the RTC found
"AAA" qualified to testify. The psychological examination of "AAA" established her mental
retardation to be in a mild form and her intelligence quotient (IQ) of 53 though below the
average IQ score of 71 was "within the defective level of a Normal Intelligence Scale."
Version of the Defense
In his testimony,9 appellant denied raping "AAA." He claimed that he used to live with "AAA"
and knew about her mental retardation. He later rented a room near the residence of "AAA."
He admitted that sometime in the first week of April 2001, his sister "GGG," who was living
nearby, asked "AAA," "FFF," the latter’s brother and another girl to go to his boarding house to
get an electric fan, a bread toaster, and a wall décor. "AAA," "FFF" and the other girl went
inside his room while "FFF’s" brother waited outside. After getting the items, "FFF" and the
other girl left while "AAA" stayed behind. After a few minutes, "FFF" and the other girl returned
to fetch "AAA." He belied the statement of "FFF" that "AAA" was fixing her short pants when
she came out of his room.
Appellant claimed that the relatives of "AAA" filed the instant case against him because his
sister, "GGG", no longer gives them financial support.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its April 14, 2004 Decision, the RTC found convincing evidence that "AAA" is a mental
retardate; that in spite of her mental inadequacy, her testimony was credible as shown from
her "intelligent and coherent answers to questions propounded to her by the prosecution, the
defense and the Court;"10 that appellant was aware that "AAA" is a mental retardate; that
appellant raped "AAA;" that "AAA" or "FFF" was not ill-motivated to falsely accuse appellant of
such crime; and, that proof of force or intimidation was unnecessary as a mental retardate is
not capable of giving consent to a sexual act.
However, the RTC also ruled that since "AAA’s" mental retardation was not specifically alleged
in the Amended Information, it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance that would
warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The RTC stated that the "mental disability" of
"AAA" at the time of the rape relates to a broad description of several mental ailments and that
the Amended Information failed to specify what constitutes "mental disability." Thus, the RTC
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple rape, the accused JOJIE SUANSING is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of Php50,000.00 as moral damages.
He shall be committed forthwith to the national penitentiary.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal12 with this Court. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo,13 the case was remanded to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.14
In his brief, appellant imputed upon the court a quo the lone error that it –
X X X GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.15
Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; that the medical findings do not substantiate the allegation that "AAA" was
raped; that the elements of force, violence and intimidation were not proved; that he was
falsely accused of the crime charged; that "AAA’s" aunt, "EEE", was angry at him even before
they reported the alleged rape to police officers; that even if nobody raped her, "AAA" would
say the opposite just to please "EEE."
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), asserted in its brief16 that the
RTC’s Decision should be affirmed in all respects since the arguments of appellant failed to
persuade; that a medical examination is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of
rape and an accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim’s credible
testimony; that force and intimidation do not have to be proved since "AAA" suffers from
mental retardation; and that appellant’s denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of
"AAA." It thus invoked the well-established rule that the findings of the RTC on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and are given the
highest consideration on appeal.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC with respect to the assessment of the
testimony of "AAA." It also affirmed the RTC’s ruling not to consider the mental retardation of
"AAA" as a qualifying circumstance that would result in the imposition of the death penalty
since it was not specifically alleged in the Amended Information. However, the CA modified the
awards for civil indemnity and moral damages to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. Thus,
the dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Davao City, dated April 22,
2004 in Criminal Case No. 49,196-2002 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant JOJIE SUANSING is ordered to pay the private complainant the sums of
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php50,000.00 as moral damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.17
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal18 praying for his exoneration.
On February 3, 2010, the parties were directed to file their supplemental briefs19 but both the
OSG and appellant opted to adopt their respective briefs submitted before the CA as their
appeal briefs.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 8353, states that:
Art. 226-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious, Q:

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; What did he do to you?

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though A:
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
(No answer)
"[F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of ATTY. GASPAR:
reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented."20 From these requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is committed the
moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person suffering from mental retardation. We manifest Your Honor that the witness is crying.
"[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A mental condition of
retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a bestial assault on her ATTY. CAGATIN:
chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with one who is intellectually
weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal act already constitutes We would like to manifest for the record, your Honor that in spite of several questions of what
rape[,] without requiring proof that the accused used force and intimidation in committing the [Suansing did] to her[,] no answer was given.
act."21 Only the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim and the latter’s
mental retardation need to be proved.22
COURT:
In this case, the evidence presented by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt
the sexual congress between appellant and "AAA" and the latter’s mental retardation. "AAA" Alright.
positively identified appellant as her rapist.23 She also described the manner by which
appellant perpetrated the crime, viz: Q:

ATTY. GASPAR: Could you answer the question?

Q: A:

What happened when you stayed behind? [We] had sexual intercourse.

A: ATTY. GASPAR:

He removed my shorts and panty. Q:

Q: Where did that happen?

So what happened after removing your shorts and panty? A:

A: At the boarding house.

[We] had a (sic) sexual intercourse. Q:

COURT: What part of the boarding house?

A: COURT:

I could not recall. Alright.

Q: Q:

What was your position, were you lying when he had sexual intercourse with you? And you consented [to] the sexual intercourse?

A: A:

He asked me to lie down. No.

COURT: Q:

Q: Why did you allow yourself to have sexual intercourse with Jojie Suansing?

Did the penis enter your vagina? A:

A: Because he pulled me towards the room.24

(The witness is gesturing in the affirmative.) Both the RTC and the CA also found that "AAA’s" mental retardation was satisfactorily
established by the prosecution. Dr. Kwong-Garcia, a psychiatrist at the Davao Medical Center,
ATTY. CAGATIN: testified that the results of the IQ test conducted on "AAA" revealed that she is a mental
retardate with a mental age of between 9-12 years. These findings are contained in a Medical
Certificate dated December 11, 2002.25 These findings were corroborated by the
The gesture of the witness could not be made a point of reference. Nothing has been shown by Psychological Assessment Report26 of Castro, a psychologist at the Davao Medical Center,
the witness that it has been for the affirmative. whose examination showed that the intellectual capacity of "AAA" is between 9-12 years old.
These pieces of evidence prove beyond doubt that "AAA" is a mental retardate. Notably, the
COURT: defense did not even impugn "AAA’s" mental retardation. On the contrary, records show that
even appellant himself conceded that "AAA" is a mental retardate. We therefore agree with the
Alright, you answer. RTC’s ruling, as affirmed by the CA, that "AAA’" is mentally retarded.

A: A mentally retarded victim cannot fabricate her charges.

He entered his penis. The RTC and the CA did not err in giving credence to the testimony of "AAA." Records show
that "AAA" cried when she recalled on the witness stand her ordeal at the hands of the
appellant. "[T]he crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape
Q: charge with the verity borne out of human nature and experience."27

And you enjoyed it? There is also nothing from "AAA’s" testimony that would arouse suspicion. Considering the
mental retardation of "AAA," we find it highly improbable that she would fabricate the rape
A: charge against appellant. It is likewise unlikely that she was instructed into accusing appellant
given her limited intellect.1âwphi1 Due to her mental condition, only a very traumatic
experience would leave a lasting impression on her so that she would be able to recall it when
No.
asked.28Thus, in People v. Balatazo,29 we held that:
Given the low IQ of the victim, it is impossible to believe that she could have fabricated her
charges against appellant. She definitely lacked the gift of articulation and inventiveness. Even
with intense coaching, assuming this happened as appellant insists that the victim’s mother
merely coached her on what to say in court, on the witness stand where she was alone, it
would eventually show with her testimony falling into irretrievable pieces. But, this did not
happen. During her testimony, she proceeded, though with much difficulty, to describe the
sexual assault in such a detailed manner. Certainly, the victim’s testimony deserves utmost
credit.30
Mental retardation does not lessen her credibility.
The mental deficiency of "AAA" does not diminish the reliability of her testimony. It has been
our consistent ruling that the RTC’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great
respect in the absence of any attendant grave abuse of discretion since it had the advantage of
actually examining the real and testimonial evidence, including the conduct of the witnesses,
and is in the best position to rule on the matter. This rule finds greater application when the
RTC’s findings are sustained by the CA, as in this case. Here, we do not find any reason to
depart from the RTC’s assessment of the testimony of "AAA."31
Further, "AAA" was able to make known her perception, communicate her ordeal, in spite of
some difficulty, and identify appellant as her rapist. Even a mental retardate qualifies as a
competent witness if she can perceive, and can make known her perception to others.32
Absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse.
Concededly, the physical examination conducted on "AAA" revealed old hymenal lacerations.
However, "[t]he absence of fresh lacerations does not negate sexual intercourse. In fact,
rupture of the hymen is not essential as the mere introduction of the male organ in the labia
majora of the victim’s genitalia consummates the crime."33 In other words, "[w]hat is required
for a consummated crime of rape x x x is the mere touching of the labia by the penis."34 In this
case, "AAA" went beyond this minimum requirement as she testified that appellant’s penis
entered her vagina.35
All told, we are not persuaded by appellant’s denial, which is inherently weak and cannot
prevail over the positive identification by "AAA" of him as the perpetrator of the crime.
"[A]ppellant’s mere denial cannot overcome the victim’s positive declaration that she had been
raped and the appellant was her rapist."36
Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the rape qualifies and
makes it punishable by death.
Paragraph 10, Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, provides:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of
the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such knowledge by the
rapist should be alleged in the Information since "a crime can only be qualified by
circumstances pleaded in the indictment."37
In this case, the Amended Information specifically provides:
That sometime in the first week of April 2001, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one "AAA", attended
by the qualifying circumstance that the victim has a mental disability. The accused knew of
such mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime. The sexual assault done by
the accused was against the will of "AAA".
Contrary to law.38
Clearly, appellant’s knowledge of the mental disability of "AAA" at the time of the commission
of the crime of rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. "Knowledge of the
offender of the mental disability of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime of rape
qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death x x x."39"When rape is committed by an
assailant who has knowledge of the victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is increased to
death."40 "Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and
characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized
tests."41 Intellectual or mental disability "is a term synonymous with and is now preferred over
the older term, mental retardation."42
As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of "AAA." Appellant testified that he
knew "AAA" and that he even used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated as a
member of their family. In fact, he regarded "AAA" as his niece. His boarding house was also a
few minutes away from the residence of "AAA." He also admitted that "AAA" was known to be
mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of "AAA" was easily noticeable to the
RTC from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the course of her
testimony. We also stress that from the filing of this case until its appeal, appellant did not
assail "AAA’s" mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy.
Thus, appellant’s knowledge of "AAA’s" mental disability at the time of the commission of the
crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape.
Proper Penalty
Paragraph 10 of Article 266-B of the RPC expressly provides that the penalty of death shall be
imposed "when the offender knew of the mental disability x x x of the offended party at the time
of the commission of the crime." The supreme penalty of death should have been imposed on
the appellant due to the special qualifying circumstance of knowledge at the time of the rape
that "AAA" was mentally disabled.

However, the enactment of RA 934643 prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In lieu
thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in accordance with Section 2 of RA 9346.
In addition, as provided under Section 3 thereof, appellant shall not be eligible for parole.

Damages

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be ₱75,000.00 if the
rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying aggravating circumstances that require
the imposition of the death penalty.44

Moral damages must also be awarded in rape cases without need of proof other than the fact
of rape since it is assumed that the victim suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.
However, the CA’s award of ₱50,000.00 must be increased to ₱75,000.00 to conform to
existing case law.45 Exemplary damages are likewise called for, by way of public example and
to protect the young from sexual abuse.46 We therefore order appellant to pay "AAA"
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00.47 In addition, we order appellant to pay
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.48

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00439-MIN dated
July 17, 2009 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Jojie Suansing is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The amounts of civil indemnity and
moral damages awarded to "AAA" are increased to ₱75,000.00 each. Appellant Jojie Suansing
is also ordered to pay "AAA" exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00. All damages
awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
SO ORDERED.9
G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014
Hence, this appeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. JERRY In a Resolution10 dated February 15, 2012, we required both parties to file their Supplemental
OBOGNE, Accused–Appellant. Briefs. However, they opted to adopt the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals as their
Supplemental Briefs.11
RESOLUTION
Appellant argues that the testimony of “AAA” deserves no credence because she was
DEL CASTILLO, J.: incapable of intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her mental
disability.

Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as We are not persuaded.
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon,
in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next
by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of “AAA”,1 a 12–year old mentally make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
retarded person, to the damage and prejudice of the said “AAA”.2
xxxx
When arraigned on December 17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. On March 13,
3

2008, the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, rendered a Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The
Judgment,4viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary following persons cannot be witnesses:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
WHEREFORE, judgment is, hereby, rendered finding Jerry Obogne guilty
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape committed against
their perception to others;
“AAA” and, hereby, sentences him to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify “AAA” the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating
and to pay the costs.
them truthfully.
SO ORDERED.5
In this case, “AAA” is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental
condition. As correctly observed by the trial court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance
considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental disability.
When “AAA” was presented on November 14, 2006, defense counsel
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision of March 28, 2011, the
6 7 manifested his objection and called the Court’s attention to Rule 130,
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with Section 21 of the Rules of Court, which lists down persons who cannot be
modifications, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary witnesses; i.e. those whose mental condition, at the time of their production
for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others x x x.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment, dated March 13,
2008, of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 34,8 in
During the continuation of AAA’s testimony x x x she was able to recall what
Criminal Case No. 3303, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
[appellant] did to her x x x.
accused–appellant is further ordered to pay “AAA” the additional amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity apart from the award of P50,000.00 as moral
“AAA” recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her
damages and of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
to go with him because he would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought
“AAA” to his house and while inside, ‘he removed her panty, and then
 inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife and then he took a
sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.’
xxxx
This Court finds “AAA” a very credible witness, even in her mental
condition. Contrary to defense counsel’s objection that “AAA” was not
capable of intelligently making known her perception to others, “AAA”
managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the
accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner x x x.
“AAA’s” simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity and
truthfulness.
While it is true that, on cross–examination, “AAA” faltered in the sequence of
events x x x this is understandable because even one with normal mental
condition would not be able to recall, with a hundred percent accuracy,
events that transpired in the past. But “AAA” was certain that ‘it was a long
time x x x after the incident’ when it was reported to the police. Likewise,
she was very certain that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x
x.12
In the same vein, the appellate court found “AAA” qualified to take the witness
stand, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that “AAA” was shown to be able
to perceive, to make known her perception to others and to remember
traumatic incidents. Her narration of the incident of rape given in the
following manner is worthy of note:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Private complainant “AAA” provided a clear, convincing and competent
testimonial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused–appellant of the crime
of rape beyond reasonable doubt. As found by the trial court, the testimony
of “AAA” was replete with consistent details, negating the probability of
fabrication.
We stress that, contrary to accused–appellant’s assertions, mental
retardation per se does not affect a witness’ credibility. A mental retardate
may be a credible witness.13
Appellant’s assertion that the trial court and the appellate court should have considered his
alibi must likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that appellant was at
another place at the time of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him
to be present at the crime scene. In this case, appellant attempted to show that he was
at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape incident. However, as found by the trial court,
the distance between barangay Ananong and barangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and
could be traversed in one hour or even less.14
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape
and properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266–B,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that “AAA’s” mental disability
could not be considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege
that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As
held in People v. Limio:15
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate
does not call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by
the offender of such mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately
proved by the prosecution.
For the Anti–Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266–B of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty shall
also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the qualifying
circumstance of ‘(10) when the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the
time of the commission of the crime.’ Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape
as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be proved by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for
qualified rape under Art. 266–B (10), RPC, could not be
sustained, although the offender may be held liable for simple rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.16
xxxx
[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not
automatically merit the imposition of the death penalty. Under Article
266–B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the
mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the
commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the
imposition of the death penalty. As such this circumstance must be formally
alleged in the information and duly proved by the prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying
and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the
information. x x x But in the absence of a specific or particular allegation in
the information that the appellant knew of her mental disability or retardation,
as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact, Article
266–B (10), RPC, could not be properly applied x x x
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under
Article 266–A of the [Revised] Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua.17
However, it must be mentioned that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section
318 of Republic Act No. 9346.19
The awards of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity are likewise
proper. However, the award of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00 in line
with prevailing jurisprudence.20 Also, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed
from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the March 28, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR H.C. No.
03270 finding appellant Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay “AAA” civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole; the amount of
exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 206393, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL
JOSON Y ROGANDO, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration by the Court is the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated 31 August 2012 that
affirmed the judgment2 of conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Dasmarinas (RTC), Cavite,
Branch 90 sitting in Imus, Cavite, convicting appellant Michael Joson y Rogando of the crime
or rape of his 14-year old sister.
Appellant was charged with violation of Articles 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 14th day of May 2009, in the Municipality of XXX,
Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the biological brother and thus a
relative within the second degree of consanguinity of [AAA],3 a minor
fourteen (14) years of age and born on March 24, 1995, motivated by lust
and with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation and taking
advantage of his moral ascendancy over her, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said [AAA], against her
will and consent, thereby debasing, degrading and demeaning her intrinsic
worth and integrity as a child, to the damage and prejudice of said
complainant.4cralawlawlibrary
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The prosecution’s evidence is
based on the sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives with appellant and his common-law
partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14 May 2009, and while appellant’s
wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but
appellant was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted
her. Appellant was able to insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia.
Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the
morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and begging her not to
tell on his wife. The letter reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ne!
Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang
ganung bagay. Sana po wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy
mo. Ayokong masira na naman ang pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki
tapon muna to pag tapos mong basahin.5cralawlawlibrary
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellant’s wife the rape
incident.6 And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the
police and she executed a sworn statement detailing the rape.7cralawred
The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted on
AAA by Irene D. Baluyut of Philippine General Hospital which essentially states that there is no
evident injury on AAA at the time of the examination.
Also submitted as part of the prosecution’s evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove that
she was still a minor at the time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009.
Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed that
he was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back to his house in
Dasmariñas on 26 May 2009. Appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and
speculated that AAA resented him because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied
writing the apology letter and presented his specimen handwriting in court.8cralawred
After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused MICHAEL JOSON y
ROGANDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined
in Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the said accused is hereby ordered to
indemnify the victim by way of moral damages in the amount of
Php50,000.00, civil indemnity ex-delicto in the amount of Php50,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of Php25,000.00.9cralawlawlibrary
The trial court found credible the testimony of AAA. It noted that appellant even wrote to the
victim that he was sorry for what he has done. The trial court considered the letter as
admission against appellant’s interest.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.10 On 31 August 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision affirming the judgment of conviction.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal11 with the appellate court. In a Resolution12 dated 19 June
2013, the Court ordered the elevation of the records and directed the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs should they so desire. However, appellant and the Office of the
Solicitor- General both manifested that they were adopting their respective appeal briefs
previously filed with the Court of Appeals.13cralawred
In his Appeal Brief, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of A: ‘Yung asawa niya po, umuwi sa kanila.
rape as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the elements of Q: What about your parents, where were they?
force, threat or intimidation. Appellant argues that AAA did not allege that she was threatened A: ‘Yung tatay ko po, nagtatrabaho.
by appellant with the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did appellant say anything Q: Your mother?
to threaten or intimidate her. With respect to moral ascendancy, appellant contends that the A: Patay na po.
Court in a recent case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin who has moral Q: What happened next when you were told not to shout?
ascendancy over a victim that would substitute for force and intimidation. Appellant further Hinubaran niya po ‘yung ibaba ko, tapos pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko tapos
A:
points out that there was no showing of any resistance on the part of AAA to his alleged sexual pinaghahalikan niya ko.
advances. Q: Was he able to undress you?
A: Opo.
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, we find no reason to reverse appellant’s conviction. Q: Totally?
A: Opo.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the Q: Thereafter, what did you do?
prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he A: Pinaghahalikan niya po ako.
accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or Q: What were you doing?
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.14cralawred A: Umiiyak lang po ako.
Q: What about the accused, what did he do to you?
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother, to A: Pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko.
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Q: He went on top of you? Thereafter what did the accused do next?
A: Pilit niya pong ipinapasok ang ari niya sa ari ko.
Q: Do you know one Michael Joson? Q: Was he able to insert his penis?
A: Opo. A: Opo.
Q: Why do you know him? Q: For how long?
A: He is my brother. A: Matagal po.
Q: Is he inside the courtroom? Q: How did you feel when his organ was inside your organ?
A: Opo. A: Masakit po.
Please point to him. (Witness points to a man wearing a yellow tshirt, who when Q: And what (sic) you trying to do while his organ was inside?
Q: A: Umiiyak lang po ako.
asked what his name is, answered “Michael Joson.”)
Q: After that, what happened next?
Q: On May 14, 2009, around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, where were you? Pinaghahalikan niya pa rin po ako, tapos tumayo po siya sandali tapos humiga po uli
A:
A: Nasa bahay po. siya. Natulog po.
Q: What were you doing in your house? Q: What about you, you went to sleep also?
A: Tulog po. A: Hindi po, umiiyak lang po ako.
Q: What time did you wake up? Q: The following day, in the morning, were you not able to sleep after that incident?
A: Sa tingin ko po mga 1:00 o’clock. A: Hindi po.
Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court the reason why you woke up early? Q: What did you do?
A: Hinuhubaran po niya ako. A: Doon lang po, umiiyak lang po.
Q: Who are you referring to? Q: What about the accused?
A: Ng kapatid ko. A: Doon lang din po siya.
He was undressing you? So what did you do while he was undressing you, while you Q: Beside you?
Q: A: Opo.
were lying or sleeping? That’s why you were awakened?
A: Opo. Q: And what happened next, at 6:00 o’clock in the morning or 7:00 o’clock?
Q: So what happened next when you felt that he was undressing you? A: May iniwan po siyang sulat.
A: Pumalag po ako, kasi hinihigpitan po niya ako sa braso ko. Q: Where did he go, if you know?
Q: So what else did you do? A: Sa trabaho po.
A: Sabi po niya kasi, wag daw po ako maingay. Q: What was the letter all about?
Who was your companion in the house, aside from your brother? A: Humihingi po siya ng sorry.15
Q: cralawlawlibrary
Who else was there in the house?
A: Wala po.
Q: Where were they? Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively
identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and
intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we quote with approval the ruling of the Court of
Appeals on this point:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that
is required in rape cases is relative; when applied, it need not be
overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate
his purpose is enough. The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be
taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the
crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is
an adult may be more than enough if employed against a person of tender
age.
In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force
sufficient to consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the
incident, AAA was only 14 years old. Considering the tender years of the
offended party as compared to the accused-appellant who was in the prime
of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms of AAA to
avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not
limited to physical force. As long as it is present and brings the desired result,
all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
We are not persuaded by the accused-appellant’s insistence that the
absence of any resistance on the part of AAA raised doubts as to whether
the sexual congress was without her consent. The failure of the victim to
shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to
consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats
and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her
attackers of because of fear.
Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a
woman voluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show
no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be
too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. After all, resistance is not an
element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAA’s claim that the
accused-appellant consummated his bestial act.16cralawlawlibrary
Anent appellant’s argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her sister, the
victim, that could substitute for force and intimidation, our ruling in People v. Villaruel,17 as
cited by the Court of Appeals, has rejected such proposition.
The fact remains that Myra positively testified in court that her brother
sexually molested her in the morning of February 21, 1996. The
accused-appellant was her older brother who had definitely moral
ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest had definitely moral
ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest among the children since both of
their parents were dead, the accused-appellant stood as guardian of the
siblings. Thus, when the complainant was roused from her sleep to
accompany the accused-appellant to buy bread, the complainant obediently
followed him. To the accused-appellant, this was highly improbable that the
complainant would entertain his plea to go out with him at such an unholy
hour or even allegedly knowing fully well that the latter had taken shabu and
liquor. There is nothing incredible with the complainant’s story.
Notwithstanding the time or the physical condition of her brother, Myra
certainly did not expect that he had other ill motives against her. It certainly
is not normal for a brother to take out his lust on his sister. Myra also testified
that she did not resist his advances for fear of her life as her brother had two
(2) fan knives poking at her as she was being raped. More importantly, the
moral ascendancy and influence the accused-appellant has over the
complainant sufficiently substitute for the force and intimidation required in
rape.18cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals found AAA’s testimony credible. The
trial court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial,
can best assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Thus, the trial court’s
findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued
some substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the case.19cralawred
With respect to appellant’s defense of denial and alibi, it is an oft- repeated rule that positive
identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated
by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.20cralawred
We likewise agree that appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, however, the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
In conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence, we deem it proper to modify the amount of
damages awarded in this case. In People v. Gambao,21 we increase the amounts of
indemnity and damage where the penalty for the crime committed is death but which cannot be
imposed because of Republic Act No. 9346, as follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to
have suffered and thus needs no proof; and
 3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the
public good.

All damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate

of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.22cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 August 2012 finding appellant Michael
Joson yRogando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil indemnity awarded is increased to
P100,000.00; moral damages to P100,000.00; and the exemplary damages to P100,000.00.
The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of the judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189293 July 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICENTE CANDELLADA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the appeal of the Decision dated April 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G,R. CR.-H. C. No. 00361-MIN,1 which affirmed the Consolidated Decision2 dated
December 23, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tubod, Lanao del Norte in
Criminal Case Nos. 118-07-2005 and 159-07-2005 to 166-07-2005, acquitting
accused-appellant Vicente Candellada of the charge of attempted rape but finding him guilty of
eight counts of rape.
Accused-appellant was charged with attempted rape before the RTC under the following
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 118-07-2005:
That on or about December 28, 2004, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening at x x x, Lanao del
Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is father of AAA3, a 14-year-old minor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with lewd design, and who was under the influence of liquor, wanted to have sexual
intercourse with said AAA, but the latter strongly refused, so that accused got mad and boxed,
and battered AAA, by the use of a piece of wood, but did not perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of Rape as a consequence by reason of the fact that
AAA, shouted for help and the people of x x x, Lanao del Norte, were able to apprehend the
aforesaid accused.4
Accused-appellant was likewise charged with eight counts of consummated rape committed
on May 30, 2004,5June 2, 2004,6 June 12, 2004,7 July 10, 2004,8 August 13, 2004,9 November
5, 2004,10 December 15, 2004,11 and December 25, 200412 under eight Informations, docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005 to 166-07-2005. The Informations were similarly worded
except for the different dates of commission of the crime and read as follows:
That on or about date at x x x, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through force, threats and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have (sic) carnal knowledge upon AAA, the
accused’s own daughter, a minor 14 years of age, against her will and consent, which sexual
abuse by the accused debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said
child as a human being.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law in
relation to R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on May 17, 2005 with the assistance of counsel. He pleaded
not guilty to the charges against him.13
During pre-trial, the defense admitted that accused-appellant is the father of private
complainant AAA and that AAA was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crimes charged and/or filing of the cases.14
Thereafter, the nine criminal cases were tried jointly.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Jovenal Magtagad (Magtagad),15 the Municipal
Health Officer who physically examined AAA on December 29, 2004; AAA,16 the victim herself;
Elsie Gemina (Gemina),17 the owner of the house in Lanao del Norte where accused-appellant
and AAA lived; and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Rosa Bastigue (Bastigue),18 Women’s Desk
Police Non-Commissioned Officer (PNCO), Magsaysay Police Station. It also presented the
following documentary evidence: Gemina’s Affidavit19 dated January 3, 2005; AAA’s Sworn
Statement20 dated January 3, 2005; Joint Affidavit21 dated January 3, 2005 of SPO4 Bastigue,
Police Investigator SPO3 Orlando Caroro, and Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) Officer Virgilio Yaral (Yaral); and Dr. Magtagad’s Medical
Certificate22 dated December 29, 2004.
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
AAA was born in Davao on January 10, 1990. She was 15 years old when she testified before
the RTC on August 24, 2005.23
AAA was the second of three daughters of accused-appellant and his deceased first wife. AAA
lived with accused-appellant and the latter’s second wife, while AAA’s two sisters lived with
accused-appellant’s mother. While they were still living in Davao, accused-appellant
impregnated AAA. When AAA was already five months pregnant, accused-appellant brought
her with him to Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte on
May 30, 2004.24
Accused-appellant approached Gemina, who he came to know during a previous visit to Lanao
del Norte in 1993. Accused-appellant asked permission if he could stay at Gemina’s old house
with his wife, introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife. Gemina immediately noticed that AAA
was pregnant. She also commented that AAA was so young she could already be
accused-appellant’s daughter, but accused-appellant only laughed. Gemina and her husband
allowed accused-appellant and AAA to stay at their old house on the condition that
accused-appellant would pay for the electricity.25
While they were staying at Gemina’s old house, accused-appellant had intercourse with AAA
many times, but AAA could only remember eight specific dates, i.e., on May 30, 2004; June 2,
2004; June 12, 2004; July 10, 2004; August 13, 2004; November 5, 2004; December 15, 2004;
and December 25, 2004. When asked to explain what "intercourse" meant, AAA stated that
accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA further testified that she consistently
resisted accused-appellant’s bestial acts but he threatened to stab her with a knife. Lastly,
AAA narrated that she delivered a baby boy with Gemina’s help on September 24, 2004, but
the baby died four days later, on September 28, 2004.26
On December 28, 2004, accused-appellant again made amorous advances on AAA. AAA
refused so accused-appellant became violently angry. He mauled AAA and hit her head with a
piece of wood, which rendered her unconscious.27 Gemina, who saw what happened, asked
help from the Barangay Captain. The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested the
accused-appellant.28
According to Gemina, since accused-appellant and AAA arrived in Lanao del Norte, the two
lived as husband and wife. However, sometime in December 2004, a drunk accused-appellant
already admitted to Gemina’s husband that AAA was his (accused-appellant’s) daughter.
Gemina further testified that the mauling incident that took place on December 28, 2004 was
already the fourth time she saw accused-appellant maltreating AAA.29
After conducting a physical examination of AAA on December 29, 2004, Dr. Magtagad
observed hematoma, contusions, and abrasions on different parts of AAA’s body, which were
caused by a blunt object, possibly a piece of wood.30 Dr. Magtagad estimated that AAA’s
injuries would heal in five to seven days. AAA did not mention being raped by
accused-appellant to Dr. Magtagad.
SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer Yaral were assigned to AAA’s case. They
were initially investigating only the mauling of AAA, but during the course of their investigation,
AAA claimed that she had been raped by accused-appellant at least eight times.31 In their Joint
Affidavit though, SPO4 Bastigue, SPO3 Caroro, and DSWD Officer Yaral reported only the
mauling of AAA and did not mention her being raped by accused-appellant. SPO4 Bastigue
reasoned on the witness stand that maybe the investigator merely forgot to include the rapes
in the Joint Affidavit.
The sole evidence for the defense is accused-appellant’s testimony, summarized as follows:
Accused-appellant acknowledged that AAA is his daughter with his deceased first
wife.32 Accused-appellant stated that AAA was born on January 10 but since he was
unschooled, he could not remember the exact year of AAA’s birth.
Accused-appellant recalled that AAA went to school in Davao. Accused-appellant and AAA
had misunderstandings because he would admonish AAA for roaming around late in the
evening. In 2004, AAA got pregnant and had to stop her studies. Accused-appellant did not
inquire from AAA’s sisters, friends, classmates, or teachers who impregnated AAA.
Accused-appellant, upon the insistence of his second wife, brought AAA to Lanao del Norte to
conceal AAA’s pregnancy. Accused-appellant and AAA stayed at Gemina’s old house while in
Lanao del Norte. Accused-appellant denied introducing AAA to Gemina as his wife. He
introduced AAA to Gemina as his daughter and said that AAA was impregnated by a
classmate. By accused-appellant’s account, AAA gave birth on October 10, 2004 but the baby
died. Accused-appellant and AAA were planning to go back to Davao in January 2005 after
accused-appellant had saved enough money from making charcoal and cutting grass.33
Accused-appellant outright called AAA a liar. He denied raping AAA eight times between May
30, 2004 to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have made an attempt to
rape AAA on December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that time. Accused-appellant
claimed that he was already arrested on December 23, 2004, a Tuesday, after he struck
AAA.34
The RTC rendered its Consolidated Decision on December 23, 2005.
The RTC found that there was not enough evidence to prove accusedappellant’s culpability for
the charge of attempted rape on December 28, 2004. Citing Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code,35 the RTC pointed out that the overt acts committed by accused-appellant resulted only
in AAA’s physical injuries that took five to seven days to heal and slight physical injuries were
not necessarily included in the charge of attempted rape. As for the charge of eight counts of
consummated rape, the RTC pronounced that "AAA’s down-to-earth testimony was convincing
and straightforward that she was abused by her father in x x x Lanao del Norte."36 In the end,
the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, and by the weight or quantum of
evidence, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt in
Crim. Case No. 118-07-2005, for attempted rape in relation with Republic Act No. 9262,
acquits him thereof;
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005, 161-07-2005, 162-07-2005, 163-07-2005,
164-07-2005, 165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005, pursuant to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
in relation with Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as Anti-Child Abuse Law, finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged and committed
against his minor daughter, AAA, and sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH
in each of the 8 counts thereof;
3. Accused is ordered to pay moral damages to complainant of ₱75,000.00 and exemplary
damages of ₱25,000.00 in each of the 8 cases of rape;
4. The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology warden of Tubod, Lanao de Norte is ordered
to deliver the living body of accused to the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila
within 15 days from the promulgation of the decision.37
The records of the eight rape cases were then forwarded to the Court of Appeals for appellate
review.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contended that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of eight counts of rape. AAA’s short and simple answers during her
testimony "were short of a mere allegation." Despite remembering the dates of the alleged
crimes, AAA could not vividly describe how she was molested. AAA merely repeated that on all
eight occasions, accused-appellant had intercourse with her by inserting his penis into her
vagina. AAA’s uniform manner of describing the alleged rapes created a strong suspicion that
her testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived. Accused-appellant also labeled
AAA’s testimony incredible because according to AAA, accused-appellant immediately
inserted his penis into her vagina without even taking off their undergarments. Thus,
accused-appellant argued that the presumption of innocence accorded to accused-appellant
must prevail, for it could not be overcome by mere suspicion, conjecture, or probability. The
standard has always been proof beyond reasonable doubt.38
Plaintiff-appellee, for its part, maintained that the RTC judgment of conviction against
accused-appellant was consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. However, it prayed that the
sentence imposed upon accused-appellant be modified in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines.39
In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction
against accused-appellant but modified the sentence and award of damages:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the court a quo is modified, and after
taking into account the qualified aggravating circumstances of minority of the victim and her
relationship with accused-appellant Vicente Candellada, he (Vicente Candellada) is
DIRECTED and ORDERED to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the eligibility
for parole for each rape committed under Criminal Cases Nos. 159-07-2005, 160-07-2005,
161-07-2005, 162-07-2005, 163-07-2005, 164-07-2005, 165-07-2005, and 166-07-2005.
Accused-appellant Vicente Candellada is further DIRECTED and ORDERED to pay AAA the
following for each rape committed:
₱75,000.00 as Civil Indemnity;
₱75,000.00 as Moral Damages;
₱25,000.00 as Exemplary Damages.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Accused-appellant insists that the RTC erred in convicting him despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no merit in the appeal.
Qualified rape is defined and punished under the following provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – x x x.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
For a conviction of qualified rape, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements
of (1) sexual congress, (2) with a woman, (3) by force and without consent; and in order to
warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that (4) the victim is under
eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (5) the offender is a parent (whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.40
The fourth and fifth elements, minority and relationship, were admitted by accused-appellant
during the pre-trial conference.
The existence of the first three elements was established by AAA’s testimony. Relevant are the
pronouncements of the Court in People v. Manjares41 that:
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of
the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a
rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the
Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a
young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his
remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this
reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a
minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape. (Citations omitted.)
The Court will not disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that AAA’s
testimony deserves full faith and credence. In resolving rape cases, primordial consideration is
given to the credibility of the victim’s testimony. The settled rule is that the trial court's
conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are generally accorded great weight
and respect, and at times, even finality. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court stood in a much better position
to decide the question of credibility. Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and
conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.42 No such facts or
circumstances exist in the present case.
The uniform way by which AAA described the eight rape incidents does not necessarily mean
that her testimony was coached, rehearsed, and contrived. Also, AAA’s failure to mention that
accused-appellant removed their undergarments prior to the rape does not destroy the
credibility of AAA’s entire testimony. Rape victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an
accurate account of the manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus, errorless
recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a witness, especially when she is
recounting details from an experience so humiliating and painful as rape.43 In addition, bearing
in mind that AAA had been repeatedly raped by accused-appellant for a period of time
(beginning in Davao, which resulted in AAA’s pregnancy), it is not surprising for AAA to recall
each incident in much the same way. What is important is that AAA had categorically testified
that on eight specific dates, her father, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, successfully had
sexual intercourse with her by inserting his penis into her vagina.
It is noteworthy to mention that even if accused-appellant did not use a knife or made threats to
AAA, accused-appellant would still be guilty of raping AAA, for in rape committed by a close kin,
such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not
necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence or intimidation.44
positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial,
on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.45
Accused-appellant proffered a general denial of all eight rapes. Accused-appellant’s alibi that
he was arrested and imprisoned on December 23, 2004 is not supported by positive, clear,
and satisfactory evidence. In fact, it was entirely uncorroborated. Moreover, he was charged of
seven other counts of rape that happened on earlier dates. In contrast, prosecution witnesses
AAA, Gemina, and SPO4 Bastigue consistently testified that accused-appellant was arrested
only on December 28, 2004.
With the guilt of accused-appellant for the eight rapes already established beyond reasonable
doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death,
when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 further provides that persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.46
As for the damages, the Court affirms the award to AAA of ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity and
₱75,000.00 moral damages for each count of rape. However, in line with jurisprudence,47 the
Court increases the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA from ₱25,000.00 to
₱30,000.00 for each count of rape; and imposes an interest of 6% per annum on the aggregate
amount of damages awarded from finality of this judgment until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00361-MIN is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA
shall be increased to ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape, and all damages awarded shall be
subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Although Gemina did not personally witness the rapes of AAA by accused-appellant, she did
confirm that accused-appellant had introduced AAA as his wife; and when Gemina stayed a
week with accused-appellant and AAA at the old house, Gemina observed that the two
apparently lived as husband and wife. Accused-appellant’s imprudence in representing himself
as AAA’s husband to the public lends credence to AAA’s assertions that accused-appellant
took perverted liberties with her in private.

Accused-appellant’s denial and alibi deserve scant consideration.1âwphi1 No jurisprudence in

criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. It has been
consistently held that denial and alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial
could not prevail over complainant's direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ,
ALIAS “MACHETE,” Accused–Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03–0763 to 03–0765,
finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias “Machete” guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Parañaque,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above–named [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took
advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by
means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and
consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against
him.5Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child
Protection Unit, University of the Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP–PGH), who
examined the victim.
The testimonies of the above–named prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003,
at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July
1986, was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and
informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew
against minors. AAA’s companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was
apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that
she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit
any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained
unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio BarangayHall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside
the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After
a while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the
appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge
in San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he
would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered
AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the
former did not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned
it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and
to take off her clothes. The appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his
penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant
stopped. But, after a short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again,
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant
inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped
and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her
should she tell anyone about what happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a
school in Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat
to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad,
who simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the
appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to
Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o’clock area with petechiae, fresh
HYMEN laceration at 9 o’clock area with eccymosi at 8–10 o’clock area, Type of Hymen:
Crescentic
xxx
Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and
ANAL EXAMINATION 1 o’clock area. No evident injury at the
time of examination.
xxx
IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating
Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).
physical examination by Dr. Tan,11which resulted in the following findings:
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn
statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her
assailant because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with “Barangay Police,” as
well as a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however, the parties made the following
stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on that
date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2)
that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned
after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke up at 5:00 o’clock in the
morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these stipulations, Corpuz’s testimony was
dispensed with.14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered
a different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at
the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of
the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of
assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay
tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but
he denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he
raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating
the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going
to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003,
he went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003
as he did not commit any crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual
abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under
paragraph 1(a) of Article 266–A, in relation to Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO
LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266–a par. 1(a) in relation to
Art. 266–B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353)and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In
addition, the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals with the following
assignment of errors:
I.
 THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN
APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO
PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE
CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision
dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellant’s conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as
the damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts
revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The said
three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein
the appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would
again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct
acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective appeal
briefs23 filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation
attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his
alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout
her ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was
unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which she never did. These
reactions of AAA were contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity
of her testimony and on her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s medical examination is quite disturbing
as it appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though nothing was
said to this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The
intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove
that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime
importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages
awarded in favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the
intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the
complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is duty–bound to conduct a thorough
and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason to
reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article
266–A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
These provisions specifically state:
ART. 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266–B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
(Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape:
(1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age.26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be
so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the force
or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in
mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time
of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such
degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is
sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with
death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as
observed by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and
the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to
which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The appellant then put the
gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not only once
but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the
appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This
same threat of killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the former was still inside the
tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and
intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved
desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he
inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of
sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had
already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was
still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime
the latter would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAA’s lack of physical resistance,
therefore, is understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be
expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this
Court, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be established
when intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will,
to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety. The victim’s failure to
shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts
of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with
reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human
mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some may
shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges, the
appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of AAA’s medical examination disclosing that
even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her
testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even
work to appellant’s advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAA’s
testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate,
albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful
prosecution for rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any anal penetration,
such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As
succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and
positively narrated her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in
detail how the appellant took advantage of her by bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where
nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and undress herself at a point of a gun; and
successfully inserting his penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after
the first penetration the appellant stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant,
once again, inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third
and last time, the appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina. This narration was
consistent with the rest of the medical findings showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s
vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of “blunt force or penetrating trauma” –
a disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses
are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without force or
intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was
consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified
the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he
raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape
cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the
victim,33 as in this case.
Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at
the barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home,
failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime when it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony of defense witness
Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same time the rape
incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even bolster the possibility of the
appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill–motive on the part of AAA to
testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAA’s accusation since no woman
would concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself
and her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the
prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime
committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellant’s guilt for the crime of
rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the P50,000.00
Case),35 insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by
penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this both lower courts in favor of AAA.
contention fallacious.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an
and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case, since the qualifying
penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime,
lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor
into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per
Court convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment
penetrations because there is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the until fully paid.40
accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his
lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R.
Court, thus, viewed that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in CR–H.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable
which the accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. doubt of three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on all damages at the legal
we quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
court, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted
of three (3) counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant]
thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The
three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five (5)
minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon
his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape
[AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when
the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,]
but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3)
counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).

This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA
were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellant’s
conviction for three counts of rape is proper.

As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266–B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides that “[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.” As it was properly alleged and proved that the
appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly
imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.

As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from and
should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations
and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral damages,
on the other hand, is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other
than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife,
to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means,
to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty
not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within
the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly
legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and
99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together
since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2,
Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the
accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape
and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the
accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed
as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal
Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18,
1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial
court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was
arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring
that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The
motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15,
1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and
October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The
motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were
amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both
indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM
and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the
laborers. They got married after a year of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born,
KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in several
other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for
the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a
trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by
occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's
dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He
would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the
businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not
acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the
accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled
between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed
in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to
Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan
de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the
accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of
course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started to be
brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her
penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she
would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that
she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses
and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house
and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of
providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the
accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest
daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de
Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their
nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper
was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of
the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living
room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched
KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house.
KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not
lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed.
Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to
instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due
to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose
from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor.
Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in
penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the
spouses' bedroom,43KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay
awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have
pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM
hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and
inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his
briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family
trouble," before closing it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored
his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious
accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us.
Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of
the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you
crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is
torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in
order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered
herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK
from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the
knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK
pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back.
Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they
pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what
happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with
him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store
on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not
join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short
while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK
decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the
beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she
preferred to sleep with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me,
anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by
turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated.
He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why
will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short
pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama
because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled,
"[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family."
He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the
staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the
creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled
KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my
body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I
cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her
and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and
briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is
what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters'
bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs
but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for
the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found
their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what
happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he
again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to
that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers.
When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an
elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life.
Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties
and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the
accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on
those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an
accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by
the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK.
When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to
Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some
com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the
above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the
vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On
October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks
of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then
instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a
fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together
with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the
accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with
the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and
hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived
in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at
3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the other three men
brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge
because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the
possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do
so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in
their bank account showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a
month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to
immediately report to the police also belies her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually
detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation
rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife
asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech,"
because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become
increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who
opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for his
permission whenever she went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant
several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as:
Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police,
another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several
persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it
because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998.
At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a
television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got
annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with the
socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter
followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK
was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody young, handsome,
and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her
and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through
because the accused-appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal
separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the
Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a
Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the
prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine
the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against
their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the
accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK.
The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the
accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable
doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral
damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the
original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment
because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself
and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond
reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate
the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and
wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing
physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such
as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to
prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to
have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only
reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would
accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated
that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of
the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he
allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the
parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a
Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012,
the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not
in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force,
threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal
bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police
authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture'
whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man
abducted a woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but
rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a
man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man
raped his wife, he was merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was
justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her
father until she marries to become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an
unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and
marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the
law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to
bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon
marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract,
sue another, own personal property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the
irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in
rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA)
and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act
which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is
traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of
the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced
that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts
adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was
personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be
liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its
abolition for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of
the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which
by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written
agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of
New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced
Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital
rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either
based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are
simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital
exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse
has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based
on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one
party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity
of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To
ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape
statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse
on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a
husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control
her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic
relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines
that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was
"incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course,
have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or] in any
modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal
identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations
omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of
Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some
exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically
impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It
appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to
Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815
but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his
wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first
international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban
on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting
gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global
concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a
policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or
other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and
other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the
principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article
II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to
adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law such as the CEDA
W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997,
R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law
reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against
chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso
is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime
shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining
rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's
legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of
the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In
spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions
on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape
under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to
marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the
offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private
practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my
license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued
by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife
from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition
of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide
here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go
against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be
prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from
doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many
of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it
here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family
together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House
Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual
assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So,
Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second
paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape
filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that.
Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That
is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by
the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee
report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to
death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that
correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing
the husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it
marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x
x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not
excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly
contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x
x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are
the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you
can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I
mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage
contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring
to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga
kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me
up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband,
you cannot say when I am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you
can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a
grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an
instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another classification of
rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule
is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be
charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that
this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital
rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on
page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule
of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have
sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if
you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my
wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we
can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a
new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact
that he is husband is not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only
disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now
on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the
circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are
separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as
long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital
rape, it does not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's
mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the wife. So the
bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't
really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under the
revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape. It merely
says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really
brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse against her
will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding
the fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No.
9262,114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be
committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex
object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual
parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows
or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with
the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force,
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of
non-personal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23%
incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced
physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent
theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse,
which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory
even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting couple. He
argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless
the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently
from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or
lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and
obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved
have already been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between
men and women and respect for human dignity established in various international
conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized
that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the
family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take
all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it
eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with
him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General
Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of
gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital
rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the
following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering,
sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female
genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and
violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage.
A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence
upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying
Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He
cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her
full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments
and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their
relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule
sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife
excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is
a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to
despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or
intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our
laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or
uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital
obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains that similar
subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape,
as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the
law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped
by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape
victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their
husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the
argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be
viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has
the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She can give or
withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully
wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and
responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free
of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by
contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor
provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply
what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully
divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary
rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and
irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband.
The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should
apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established
legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and
found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence,
the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party.
While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining
witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's
testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and
otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to
directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during
cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or
certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire
records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court
found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous.
Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her
statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical,
straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination,
she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her
refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed
by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his advances due
to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.
Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug
caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and
begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis
into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted.133 A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her
lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise
unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK Q So, what did you do after that?
decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the
accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness
conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the is sobbing)
accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the
accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he
could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse.
He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into
her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that
is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135 A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be xx xx
proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or
intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Q So after that what else did he do?

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I
through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the
wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:

COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)

(Direct Examination)

Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you
ATTY. LARGO:
and held your two hands?

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
what happened?

Q How did you say that to your husband?

A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well." xxxx

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now? Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your
nightgown?
xxxx
A No, Sir.
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
xxxx
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
xxxx
A No, only on the breast level.138
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. 137

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Cross-Examination)
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
ATTY. LARGO
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your
panty? Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?

A Yes, Sir. A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.

Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
normally do that if he have sex with you?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do
A Yes, Sir. what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you? Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to
have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and
succeeded in having sex with me.139

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time? The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her
hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs. consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His
actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his
distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on
the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed,
when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance
over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on
October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual
intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act
of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to
take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally
required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired.
The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim
that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the
accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an
invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to
convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and
the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more requires
her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant
to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties
to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted
and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just
enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as
to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or
the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood
on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate
is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144These details do not pertain to
the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary
circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the
testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the
prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based on the
position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign
of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's
testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value
as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with
regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and
OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their
declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding,
subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard
KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of
October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom.
When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for
meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard
the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all
these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom
panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were
finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her
daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not
feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant
barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to
interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can
have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the head of the family. The
girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying
and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the
accused-appellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced
carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and
physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw
her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct
towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her
children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that
occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to
report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges.
Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their
credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit
to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his
husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about
it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries against the
accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353
abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet
known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear
of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from
reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view
of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her
husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar
occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and
public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police
authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or
delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of
the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence
carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross,
re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally
considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in
court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is
riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was
able to establish that the ₱3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of
their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction
sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the
accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant
denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately ₱3 Million was spent for the
construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's
allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs
could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28
while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself,
being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He
likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters
neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who
could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would
not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom
he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are
inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he
merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this
legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded
suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's
credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently
convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-appellant
with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the
accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two
criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any
discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but
also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify
falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not
only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place
where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of
access between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime,
the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan
de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed
by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which
was available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible
for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were
committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible
testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter,
especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently
overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent
and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is
extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO
and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason
and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his
wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the
accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC.
Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states
that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages
are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not
₱75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic
violence, an award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be
reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's
value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or
social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the
present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against
her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an
affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually
coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A
husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest
herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can
lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's
unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion
to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether
her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and
self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be
stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize
fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious
charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of
PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta.
SUPREME COURT Rosa at past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old,10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX,
Manila then 10 years old.11

SECOND DIVISION After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late.12 He
slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.13
G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and
RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, something inserted in his anus."14 He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis."15 When Ricalde
vs. returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened.16 He also
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.17

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Even men can become victims of rape.
Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed against a 10-year-old
boy. Accused Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape as described under the second
paragraph of Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, committed "[b ]y any person who,
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person." 1
This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals’ August 28, 2013
Decision3 affirming Ricalde’s conviction for rape through sexual assault and January 15, 2014
Resolution4 denying reconsideration.
XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about
the incident, but he remained silent.18 She asked him to leave.19
XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report
the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.20 The police referred them to the municipal health
center for medical examination.21 Dr. Roy Camarillo examined22 XXX and found no signs of
recent trauma in his anal orifice23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa."24
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa
police station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde.25
Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town fiesta of
Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXX’s mother is the cousin of his cousin Arlan
Ricalde.27 He and XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his house.28 On January 30,
2002, XXX’s mother picked him up to sleep at their house.29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the
living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor.30 He denied the alleged rape through sexual
assault.31

The Provincial Prosecutor of Biñan, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde guilty beyond
through sexual assault: reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault:

That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde,
prompted with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserting [sic]
his penis into the anus of XXX who was then ten (10) years of age against his will and consent,
to his damage and prejudice.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape by sexual assault and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered
to pay [XXX] the sums of 50,000.00 as moral damages and 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5 SO ORDERED.33

Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002.6 The prosecution
presented the victim (XXX),7 his mother, and the medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense
presented Ricalde as its sole witness.8
The facts as found by the lower courts follow.
The Court of Appeals in its Decision34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the conviction with the
modification of lowering the amounts of damages awarded:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, in Crim. Case No. 11906-B, is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to
the award of damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD RICALDE is ordered to pay the victim
civil indemnity in the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages
likewise in the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos, both with interest at the legal
rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.35
Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.36
Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal
testified that he found "no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXX’s]
anus,"37 or any trace of spermatozoa.38 He contends that physical evidence "ranks high in [the
court’s] hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." 39
Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he
saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.40 XXX was also able to
immediately push him away.41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain
XXX’s alleged stomach ache.42 Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache was an
attempt to aggravate the charge against him.43
Petitioner argues that XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his
guilt.44 XXX claimed that he immediately pushed petitioner away, but in another instance, he
testified as follows: "I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even
able to hold his penis. He was also playing with my penis."45 XXX also stated in his salaysay
that "the penis reached only the periphery of his anal orifice."46
Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was
wearing pants with the zipper open.47 Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while
wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge — the risk of injuring the sexual organ or
having pubic hair entangled in the zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must consider
every circumstance favoring the innocence of an accused.49
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied the
"variance doctrine" in People v. Sumingwa,50 and the court would have found him guilty for the
lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.51 The
petition then enumerated circumstances showing possible homosexual affections between
petitioner and XXX.52 These include the fact that they were textmates and that petitioner
played with XXX’s penis.53
Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as
penetration.54 XXX could also have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as a male organ trying
to enter his [anus]."55 Assuming these acts took place, these would only be considered as acts
of lasciviousness.56
The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
all elements of the crime charged.
The Comment discussed that it is neither improbable nor contrary to human experience that
57
XXX’s mother allowed her son to be left alone with a stranger.58 Petitioner was not a complete
stranger, and she could not have foreseen such abuse since "rape by sexual assault or any
form of sexual abuse of a boy by a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture."59
Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s findings deserves scant consideration.60 The
Comment quoted People v. Penilla61 in that "[a] medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime."62 In any case, the medico-legal testified on the
sphincter’s flexibility and how an insertion into the anal orifice would not necessarily cause
injury.63
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual assault based on
XXX’s clear and categorical testimony.64 Petitioner’s defense of mere denial cannot outweigh
positive testimony.65 Consequently, petitioner’s contention that the incident only amounts to
acts of lasciviousness lacks merit.66
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
petitioner Richard Ricalde’s guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault.
We affirm petitioner’s conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.
The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against persons68 and amended the
Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:
Article 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is Committed—
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis
supplied)
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape,"69 "gender-free rape,"70 or "homosexual rape."71 The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice."72
Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect."73
The trial court found that XXX’s "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony"74 sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into XXX’s anal orifice.75 There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to
falsely accuse petitioner.76 The Court of Appeals accorded great weight to the trial court’s
findings and affirmed petitioner’s conviction.77
No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts’ findings.
First, petitioner’s argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXX’s testimony fails to
convince.
In a long line of cases,78 this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child
victims. Their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."79 XXX, then
only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner.80
This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially
when they are relating past incidents of abuse."81
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal
orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.
This contradicts petitioner’s earlier statement in his appellant’s brief82 that "[a]lthough it is true
that the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases
where the victim remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically examined, still,
it bears stressing that in the instant case, the private complainant testified that the
accused-appellant’s penis fully penetrated his anus."83
The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXX’s testimony in that he "felt
something was inserted in [his] anus."84
Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping at your house, do you
recall any unusual incident that happened to you?
A: Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus.
....
Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus, what did you do?
A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his
penis. He was also playing with my penis.
Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he was even playing with
your private part, who is this person you are referring to as "he"?
A: Richard, sir.85
In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into
his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed:
We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular instrument or
object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to identify the instrument or object
that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.87
Second, petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal
orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal
orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not
contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and
consistent with human nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.88
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice
does not remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter:
Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings states [sic] that you
did not find any congestion or abrasion, can you explain to this court why you stated in your
findings that you did not find any congestion or abrasion?
A: Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external signs of recent trauma to the
anus. It should be realized that the sphincter, that is the particular portion of the anus
controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a certain flexibility such that it can resist any
objected [sic] inserted and that area is very vascular, meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply,
such that any injuries would be healed in 24 hours or less than 24 hours, sir?89
Lastly, we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance doctrine" citing People v.
Sumingwa.90 Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides for the "variance doctrine":
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified
rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a
child under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 761091 since "there was no penetration,
or even an attempt to insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."92
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during
trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape
through sexual assault.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."93 The slightest penetration
into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v.
Bonaagua94 discussed this distinction:
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest
penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora
of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of
cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already
consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must
be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but
did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various
interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno.
Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape
through sexual assault.95 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing
jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by
analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice
consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is
not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity."96
People v. Quintos97 discussed how rape causes incalculable damage on a victim’s dignity,
regardless of the manner of its commission:
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only insofar
as these define the manners of commission of rape. However, it does not mean that one
manner is less heinous or wrong than the other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual
carnal knowledge of a woman or by insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the
damage to the victim’s dignity is incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general has been
associated with negative psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety,
self-destructive behavior, emotional pain, impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties.
Hence, one experience of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just because it was committed
in a relatively unusual manner.
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order." Crimes are punished as retribution so
that society would understand that the act punished was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that
one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different
levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration
of a person’s will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as
greater or less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not raised in
this case. Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in
criminal cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser penalty for rape committed by
inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim.98 (Citations omitted)
We affirm petitioner’s conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to the
penalty under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act":99
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.— Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpertua shall be imposed
upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case maybe: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
(Emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines "lascivious
conduct": [T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus
or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.100
In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape "for inserting his fingers and
afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim[.]"102 The Court of Appeals found
the accused guilty of two counts of rape: statutory rape and rape through sexual
assault.103 This court modified the penalty imposed for rape through sexual assault to the
penalty provided in Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, discussing as follows:
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years
old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines sexual abuse of
children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5(b), Article III, to wit:
....
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for
Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein,
which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering
further that Armando’s act of inserting his finger in VVV’s private part undeniably amounted to
lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness
under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more
severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape
Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably
unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to
have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children.
Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied
when the victims are children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over
but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition."104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the accused
Chingh was] sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum."105
The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) "for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period."
This penalty is higher than the imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty when
the victi m is a child.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his
birth certificate, and this was admitted by the defense.106 His age of 10 years old was alleged
in the Information.107 The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People
v. Chingh, applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act No.
7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for
children. Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation
that Republic Act No. 7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on
the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This
view is inaccurate on grounds of verba legis and ratione legis.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that
"children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . .
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label "children
exploited in . . . other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion
and sexual intercourse.
Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be
imposed. The person who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is liable.
It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The proposal
of Justice Velasco implies that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature other than the rape
itself that will characterize rape as child abuse. One count of rape is not enough. Child abuse,
in his view, is not yet present with one count of rape.
This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If
we adopt his view, it would amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that a single act
of rape is not debilitating to a child. That a single act of rape is not a tormenting memory that
will sear into a child’s memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the trust
that will enable him or her to have full and diverse meaningful interactions with other human
beings. In my view, a single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is already reprehensible.
Our society has expressed that this is conduct which should be punishable. The purpose and
text of the law already punish that single act as child abuse.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.
Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused will be violated
should we impose the penalty under Republic Act No. 7610. I disagree.
The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The facts constitutive of
the offense will suggest the crime punishable by law. The principle is that ignorantia legis non
excusat. With the facts clearly laid out in the Information, the law which punishes the offense
should already be clear and the accused put on notice of the charges against him.

Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by counsel. Clear
from the records is the entry and active participation of his lawyer up to and including this
appeal.

On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of 30,000.00 in favor of XXX as a victim of
rape through sexual assault, consistent with jurisprudence.108

This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information
that the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by
means other than penile insertion is ₱30,000."109

This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims of rape
are all women.1âwphi1However, as in this case, men can also become victims of rape through
sexual assault, and this can involve penile insertion.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387 dated August 28,
2013 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault under Article
266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount
of ₱30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the amount of ₱30,000.00, both with interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a
violation of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on a
bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as
duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal
must determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the
Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in its
comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused
from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but
instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and
pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As
he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner
proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home
crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his
Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza
(TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor.
Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr.
Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They,
likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1,
1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City
(RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as
follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF
CHILD ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary Grade
below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her
pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his
body, and thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to
lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child
abuse,5 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10
(a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal
Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum
thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the
acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of
Republic Act No. 7610[,] and notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that
petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and her right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not violated when
the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly recited in the
information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are
mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the
affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and jurisprudence,
and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the information charging her
with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in
her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questionsof
law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact by the CA, which
affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier
of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4,
Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions
in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate
courts went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of
the collegial appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of
the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further exception is recognized when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or
degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as a
school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insists that her
act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil,
her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy
even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she
acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely
prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of
corporal punishmentby a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was
provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her
Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr.
Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by
the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the
ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness
at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her
examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the said area. She
stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is
located on the victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by
ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr.
Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act
by deedsor by wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner
"went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw
him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose
consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held
the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said
that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma
that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his
parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again.16 Such established
circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a
human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her
first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced the petitioner’s cruelty.17 The petitioner was also
convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment
of another childnamed Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents manifested that the
petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26,
2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were not
properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of law
was consequently violated.
The petitioner’s submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the petitioner in
the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner’s challenge against the
sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge
was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground
that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an
offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no evidence
had been adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court.
The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however, because
even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower
courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and the
means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and
emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily
spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a plain error that demands
correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People,21 it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and
determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation
of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing
so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction,
state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages
caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party,
if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at
any time a matter of law and justice.1âwphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties
are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not
be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the
litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations
would they betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should
then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They
should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and
expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for
being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in
order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions
has been reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the
victim, and in that respect the Court believes and holds that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The
victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil
Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her
being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period pursuantto
Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is
imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as a deterrent to other public
school teachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against
the infliction of corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The
lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victim’s treatmentshould not hinder the granting of
a measure of compensation in the formof temperate damages, which, according to Article
2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered butits
amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no question aboutthe injuries sustained
requiring medical treatment, temperate damages ofat least ₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it
would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per
annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability, to be reckoned from the finality of this
decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered
by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four
years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day
of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the
petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which
commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the
offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the
information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was
erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime
committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are
six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight
months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years,
four months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes
it at seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower
than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and one
day to six years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years,
nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of
prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay
to Michael Ryan Gonzales ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each
item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the
petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171222 February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G.
MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and THE
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174786
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, ENS. DENNIS S.
VELASCO, and the HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity members for
hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school
authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students has been
characterized by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and
responsibility.1 This responsibility has been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law,
in that the failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided
by the law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the
institution and its officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed
within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure that the
crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine Merchant Marine
Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to
hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan
quashed2 the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case
against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material
averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s
quashal of the Information.
THE CASE BACKGROUND
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the
PMMA.3 In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation Period,"4 which was set from 2 May to
1 June 2001.5 Balidoy died on 3 May 2001.6
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of Balidoy. After months of
investigation, it forwarded its findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the
preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of those involved in the orientation
and indoctrination of the PMMA Class of 2005.8 Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution9 finding probable cause to charge the following
as principals to the crime of hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C.Montez (Montez),
Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S. Simpas (Simpas) – collectively, Alvarez et al.
A criminal case against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales (RTC–Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
the finding of probable cause to charge the following school authorities as accomplices to
hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris (Aris), Lieutenant SeniorGrade (LTSG.)
Dominador D. Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P. Doctor (Doctor),
LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G.
Magsino (Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS. Dominador Operio
(Operio) – collectively, respondents. The Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered re-docketed for the purpose
of conducting the proper administrative proceedings against respondents for grave misconduct
and abuse of authority.10 The Office of the Special Prosecutor eventually filed with the
Sandiganbayan a criminal case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of hazing.11
Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the
principal accused, Alvarez et al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment. Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively, Bayabos et al.) filed a
Motion to Quash the Information.13 They argued that the Information did not contain all the
essential elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was no allegation that the
purported act had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially
considering that the victim had already been accepted in the academy. Moreover, they
stressed that there was no averment in the Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a
sorority, or an organization. Also underscored was the absence in the Information of any
assertion that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental, and psychological
testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental
and psychological fitness of prospective regular members." Furthermore, they emphasized
that there was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of the hazing and that they
had permitted the activity.
As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against the principal accused had already
been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could
have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them
must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et al. He insisted that the
Information alleged the material facts that would sufficiently establish the presence of the
essential ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He also stressed that there was
nothing in the law requiring that the principals must be prosecuted first before a case could be
filed against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the Special Prosecutor was,
however, silent on the issue of whether the Information contained an allegation that the
supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, and whether the
academy was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the Sandiganbayan issued the
assailed Resolution (SB Resolution I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal
case against them. According to the court, the fact that the charge against the principal
accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with finality favorably carried with it the indictment
against those charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was subordinate to that of
the former. It stressed that before there can be an accomplice, there must be a principal by
direct participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal design. In this case, as there
were no principal perpetrators to speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they
could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing. In view of the dismissal of the
case against the principals, the court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as
accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information charged no offense, and that the
allegations therein were mere conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment
that the alleged hazing was not part of the "physical, mental and psychological testing and
training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members" of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the law.16 It must be
noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make any categorical determination that the
PMMA was considered an "organization" within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution dismissing the criminal case against
Bayabos et al., the accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to
Quash,17 adopting the grounds raised by that court. His arraignment was set on 14 August
2006.18 However, on 3 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution (SB
Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According to the court, since Velasco was
similarly situated as Bayabos et al., the Information against him must likewise be quashed in
light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
ex proprio motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang (collectively, Velasco et al.),
explaining that they, too, had been charged under the same Information for the same
offense.19 It is unclear from the records20 whether the accused Aris and Mabborang
surrendered or were arrested, or whether the Order of Arrest21 was recalled prior to the
dismissal of the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor, filed with this Court
on 13 March 2006 a Petition assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another
Petition challenging SB Resolution II.
THE ISSUES
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal issues. After a thorough
evaluation of the Petitions, however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed by
this Court as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can proceed
in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused
II. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for
the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
OUR RULING
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the Sandiganbayan erred when it
dismissed outright the case against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the
purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those
charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported
principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially
when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.22 In People v. Rafael,23 the
Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: "The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the
offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice
or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal." Accordingly, so long as the
commission of the crime can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices to
determine their criminal liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged
principal.24 We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely presented the Order of
Entry of Judgment25 dismissing the case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the
order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals, because no crime had been
committed. In fact, it does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment
without so much as scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the purported
principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of the Information against
respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional
right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging persons with an offense be
"sufficient." One of the key components of a "sufficient information" is the statement of the acts
or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the complaint.26 The information must
also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough to enable persons of common
understanding to know the offense being charged against them.27 This approach is intended to
allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed.28 The
information need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied upon.29
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is
the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an
information must be quashed on that ground, the basic test30 is to determine if the facts
averred would establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime as defined in the
law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims
therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of
the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as follows:
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do
menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical
or psychological suffering or injury.
The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the
Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological
testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental
and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of National
Defense and the National Police Commission duly recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be
considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall
be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis
supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are established:
(1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to physical or
psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the
person’s admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial ingredient
distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal
Code is the infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on another in
furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct participation in
the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as
established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty
members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in spite
actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be considered an
organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – but is
not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational
institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the PNP,
and the AFP.31 Attached to the Department of Transportation and Communications,32 the
PMMA is a government-owned educational institution33 established for the primary purpose of
producing efficient and well-trained merchant marine officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the
term organization within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was
warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption
relating to the duly recommended and approved "testing and training procedure and practices"
for prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative
defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion
that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason for this rule
is that the accused carry the burden of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence
that they have satisfied the requirements thereof.35 Thus, the prosecution’s failure to point out
in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that
Information.
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the Motion to Quash must be
granted, as the Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of
accomplice to hazing. The Information charging respondents reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses [RADM] VIRGINIO R. ARIS, [LTSG.] DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS,[LTJG.] MANNY G.
FERRER, [LTJG.] RONALD G. MAGSINO,[LTJG.] KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG, [LTJG.]
GERRY P.DOCTOR, [ENS.] DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., and [ENS.] DENNIS S.
VELASCO, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as follows:
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of May 2001, inside the campus
of the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso,
Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused
RADM VIRGINIO R. ARIS, President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG.
DOMINADOR D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.) MANNY G. FERRER, 1st
Batallion Officer; LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, Security Officer; LTJG. KRUZALDO G.
MABBORANG, 2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG.GERRY P. DOCTOR, Batl. Mast.; ENS.
DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and ENS. DENNIS S.
VELASCO, Mess Officer, all public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their
duties as such public officers being the school authorities and/or faculty members did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual knowledge of the hazing
perpetrated by the principal accused, all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary
midshipman FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. during the school’s Indoctrination and Orientation;
and, fail to take any action to prevent the occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of
psychological and physical injuries against said FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR. thereby causing
the instantaneous death of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
FERNANDO BALIDOY, JR.36

As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological pain and
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were
employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this
crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a
technical term37 – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a
characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia,
both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense." The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument38 in his
Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the indoctrination and orientation
program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy – i.e., attainment
of active midshipman status – does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the
Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of
accomplice to hazing. Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan
should just have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by
amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright.39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a chance to correct the defect
by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor
insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash40 that there was no defect in the Information.
Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information and
the eventual dismissal of the case.

This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another
information.1âwphi1 Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion
to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to
prove that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has
already attached.

Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other issues
raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 171222 is hereby DENIED and
the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in
Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27 January 2006 and 3 August 2006 in Criminal Case No.
28339 are thus AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.
Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old
son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on December 13, 1999. And again upon being
reunited with him some 16 months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember
who he was.
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and
child be punished to the full extent of the law.
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister
Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and
Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after
Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher
gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister
frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As
their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police
detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss
of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa
received no word about Christopher’s whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a
field day aggravating her misery.
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The
caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for ₱30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a
recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True
enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then
contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given
her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa
reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay
off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A
team was formed and Police Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s
niece.
Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001,
they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.1awphi1
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two
women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak
approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that
they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she
received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that
she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter
was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak
came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak
asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to
leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that
Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted
on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and
came back after several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He
no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When
asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered
that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox
boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the
jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox
gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and
Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the
other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was
pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the
following Information:
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another
and grouping themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
carry away and deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will
for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition
for his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) to the damage and
prejudice of Christopher Basario in said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to
him under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the
parties presented their respective evidence.
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at
the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares in Divisoria market,
Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did
not seem to understand her. She took the boy under her care and waited for someone to come
for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her to the
Muslim Center in Quiapo.
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was
there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents
could claim him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del
Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked for Christopher’s picture for confirmation.
It was at this point that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte on April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only
after confirming that Teresa was the boy’s mother did she relinquish custody to her. However,
she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested
because she was innocent. There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her
arrest.
Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak’s testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan,
Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts
of Taurak who was in Manila and whom she had not seen for some time. They met again on
April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when
Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her and then left, returning after a
few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had
found the boy and was returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the
while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members
suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and there was no
warrant for her arrest.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision2 on
November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA
TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly
and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa
Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral
damages. With costs against the accused.
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the
pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.3
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision4 dated March 31, 2006,
the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for ₱30,000 as
a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus,
the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification
amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as
amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to
this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.6
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim7 or a public officer
who has a duty under the law to detain a person;8
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained
or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a
public official.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death
even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code is present.9
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled
with the intent of the accused to effect it.10 It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but
also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.11 And liberty
is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given
faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.12
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered
only after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he
was certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to
leave appellants’ custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with
total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At
such a very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his
family, specially his mother.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao
del Norte. She demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand,
Mamantak’s actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom)
showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These
were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to
disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence.
Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the
apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of
rope and brought it home not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never
even tried to bring the boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development’s social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time
during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone
conversations with Taurak when they were total strangers to each other?
Similarly, Mamantak’s account that she was at Pitang’s Carinderia only by coincidence and
that it was only there that she first saw Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. The
unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment
of ransom and the release of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and
demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed otherwise. The evidence clearly
established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must
be credible in itself.13The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the statements of
Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court,
including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof,
are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.14
The Court of Appeals considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which
necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the
amount as too measly, compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and
subsistence of Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom
but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the child. (Kidnappers in
Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.")
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a
captured person that will release him from captivity.15 No specific form of ransom is required to
consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a
bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the
ransom is immaterial.
In this case, the payment of ₱30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of
Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for
ransom.
One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA
934618 has banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on
appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000 civil indemnity19 was proper.
Pursuant to People v.Garalde,20 the award of ₱50,00021 moral damages is increased to
₱200,000 considering the minority of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by
a demand for ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to
₱100,000 exemplary damages.22
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga
Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, ₱50,000 civil indemnity, ₱200,000 moral damages and ₱100,000 exemplary
damages to their young victim Christopher Basario.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ,
JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y
Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos
(Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his
brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty
minutes later, he received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin had
been kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and
Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him
inside a dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message,
Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of
the same day, he received a phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin
if he should report the matter to the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the
payment of ransom money in the amount of ₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no
such money, as he only had ₱50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the
telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of
₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their
next call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to
deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of
the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated place.
After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and
proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH
498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men
take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove
away.6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by
SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the
Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of the
investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche
that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano,
Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given
a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts,
leading to their arrest on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June 13,
2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas,
which Roderick identified.9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and
intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior
strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for
the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a
condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and interposed the defenses of
denial and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they
were in their respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then
subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the other
hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2003,
while walking on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four
(4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually
tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession,
purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist him, the
latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of
Death13 with Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May
19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129
(RTC), in Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
which clearly established that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied
Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected
accused-appellants‟ respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It
also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom,
which is punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of the death
penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as
the accused-appellants’ individual participation was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal
design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the
victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is
supported by the subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment. The
CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of
accused-appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements
of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private
individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense,
any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
than three days; (2) it is committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries
are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.21 It likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the
victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as
the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same purpose or common design, and they
were united in its execution.23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were never supported, and
that Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and
independent counsel in its execution.24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of
the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court
to determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through
oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent
any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted
arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the
appellate court.25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through
these testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all private
individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and
for the purpose of extorting ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or
misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb
its factual findings on this score.1âwphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise
finds the conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable
regardless of the extent of their respective participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not
essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the
accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that
accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their
acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution,29 the
CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the
RTC and the CA, as the crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records
obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the
special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s
(i.e., Edwin’s) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information,30and (b) clearly
established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues
raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the
settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide
open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be
found in the appealed judgment.31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article
267 of the same Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of
kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On
appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex
crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of „special complex
crime‟ of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by
the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought
by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but
was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is
killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special
complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No.
7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346
had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants
could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as
well as damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court
explained that even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants in view
of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
crime.36 In the present case, considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and
the death of the victim during captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven during
trial, civil indemnity in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the family of
the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the
same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It
cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim‟s family suffered mental anguish, fright,
and serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00
must perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the
aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same
atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
all the accusedappellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of
the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum ·from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.