PART I.
Q: When is motive relevant to prove a
REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK I
FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL
PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW
Fundamental Principles
Q: Define Criminal Law.
A: Criminal Law is that branch of law, which
defines crimes, treats of their nature, and
provides for their punishment.
Q: What are the different schools of
thought or theories in Criminal Law and
describe each briefly. To what theory
does our Revised Penal Code belong?
(1996)
A: The following are the theories governing
our Criminal Law.
1. Classical Theory, which provides that the
basis of criminal liability is human free
will and the purpose of penalty is
retribution.
2. Positivist Theory, which provides that the
basis of criminal liability is the sum of the
social, natural and economic
phenomena to which the actor is
exposed and the purposes of penalty are
prevention and correction.
The Revised Penal Code is generally
governed by Classical Theory.
Q: Distinguish “motive” from “intent”.
(2004, 1999, 1996) May crime be
committed without criminal intent? (1996)
A: Motive is the moving power that impels a
person to act for a definite result. It is not
considered as an element of the crime. It is
essential only only when the identity of the
offender is in doubt. On the otherhand, intent
is the purpose for using a particular means
to achieve a desired result. It is an ingredient
of dolo or malice, thus it is an element of
deliberate felonies.
A crime may be committed without criminal
intent in the following instances:
1. If such is a culpable felony;
2. In crimes which are mala prohibita in
nature.
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case? (When is it not necessary to be
established? Explain. (2006, 1999)
A: Motive is relevant to a case when:
1. The identity of the offender is in
doubt;
2. When the act committed gives rise to
variant crimes and there is a need to
determine which crime should be properly
imputed to the offender;
3. When the evidence is merely
circumstantial;
4. When there are no eyewitnesses to
the crime and where suspicion is likely to fall
upon a number of persons;
5. In ascertaining the truth between two
antagonistic theories or versions of the
killing; and
6. When the act is alleged to be
committed in defense of a stranger because
it must not be induced by revenge,
resentment or other evil motive.
Motive is not necessary to be established in
the following instances:
1. When there is a witness positively
identifying the accused;
2. In commission of crimes which are
mala prohibita in nature; and
3. In crimes committed through reckless
imprudence.
Q: Define "corpus delicti" What are the
elements of "corpus delicti"? (2000)
A: Corpus delicti literally means the body or
substance of the crime or the fact that a
crime has been committed, but does not
include the identity of the person who
committed it.
The elements of corpus delicti are:
1. The existence of a certain act or
result forming the basis of the criminal
charge; and
2. The existence of a criminal agency as
the cause of the act or result.
Q: At a birthday party in Bogo, Cebu, A
got intoxicated and started quarrelling
with B and C. At the height of their
arguments, A left and took a bolo from his
house, after which he returned to the
party and threatened to stab everybody.
B got scared and ran towards the
seashore, with A chasing him, B ran up a
steep incline along the shore and was
cornered on top of a cliff. Out of fear, B
jumped from the cliff into the sea, A
returned to the scene of their
confrontation and seeing that nobody
was there, went home to sleep. The next
day, B’s wife reported to the police
station that her husband had not yet
come home. A search was conducted by
the residents of the barangay but after
almost two days, B or his body could not
be located and his disappearance
continued for the next few days. Based
on the testimony of C and other guests,
who had seen A and B on top of the cliff,
A was arrested and charged with Murder.
In his defense, he claimed that since B's
body has not been found, there was no
evidence of "corpus delicti' and
therefore, he should be acquitted. Is the
defense of A tenable or not? State the
reason(s) for your answer. (2001)
A: The defense of A is not tenable. "Corpus
delicti" does not refer to the body of the
purported victim which had not been found.
Even without the body of the purported victim
being found, the offender can be convicted
when the facts and circumstances of a crime,
the body of the crime or "corpus delicti" is
established. In other words, the non-
recovery of the body of the victim is not a bar
to the prosecution of A for Murder, but the
fact of death and identity of the victim must
be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws
Q: What are the limitations upon the
power of Congress to enact penal laws?
(1988, 2012 Bar)
A: The limitations upon the power of
congress to enact penal laws are as follows:
(a) Congress cannot enact an ex post facto
law.
(b) Congress cannot enact a bill of attainder.
(c) Congress cannot provide for a cruel
punishment.
However, other limitations may be
considered like:
1. Congress cannot enact a law which shall
punish for a condition.
2. Congress shall punish an act and not the
condition or status. (Robinson v.
California)
3. Congress should consider Article 21 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides
that “penalties that may be imposed. No
felony shall be punishable by any penalty
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not prescribed by law prior to its
commission.”
Doctrine of Pro Reo (2010, 2012 Bar)
Q: What is the Doctrine of Pro Reo? How
does it relate to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code? (2010 Bar)
A: The Doctrine of Pro Reo provides that
whenever a penal law is to be construed or
applied and the law admits of two
interpretations, one lenient to the offender
and one strict to the offender, that
interpretation which is lenient or favorable to
the offender will be adopted.
Following this doctrine, crimes under
Art. 48 of the RPC are complex and
punishable with a single penalty (that
prescribed for the most serious crime and to
be imposed in its maximum period).
The rationale being, that the accused
who commits two crimes with a single
criminal impulse demonstrates lesser
perversity than when the crimes are
committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions (People v. Comadre,
G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004).
However, Art. 48 shall be applied only
when it would bring about the imposition of a
penalty lesser than the penalties imposable
for all the component crimes if prosecuted
separately.
Q: What is the fundamental principle in
applying and interpreting criminal laws ?
(2012 Bar)
A: The fundamental principle in interpreting
and applying penal laws is the principle of pro
reo.
The phrase “in dubio pro reo”
means “when in doubt, for the accused”
(Intestate Estate of Gonzales v. People, GR
No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused
ought to be presumed innocent until and
unless his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt (People v. Temporary, GR
No. 173473)
Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita
(1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2017 Bar)
Q: Distinguish between crimes mala in se
and mala prohibita. (1997, 1999, 2001,
2003, 2005, 2017 Bar)
A: In concept, crimes mala in se are those
where the acts or omissions penalized are
intently bad, evil, or wrong that they are
almost universally condemned.
Crimes mala prohibita are those
where the acts penalized are not inherently
bad, evil, or wrong but prohibited by law for
public good, public welfare, or interest and
whoever violate the prohibition are
penalized.
In legal implications, in crimes mala in
se, good faith or lack of criminal intent or
negligence is a defense, while in crimes mala
prohibita, good faith or lack of criminal intent
or malice is not a defense; it is enough that
the prohibition was voluntarily violated.
Also, criminal liability is generally
incurred in crimes mala in se even when the
crime is only attempted or frustrated, while in
crimes mala prohibita, criminal liability is
generally incurred only when the crime is
consummated.
Also in crimes mala in se, mitigating
and aggravating circumstances are
appreciated in imposing the penalties, while
in crimes mala prohibita, such circumstances
are not appreciated unless the special law
has adopted the scheme or scale of penalties
under the Revised Penal Code.
Lack of criminal intent is a valid
defense in mala in se except when the crime
results from criminal negligence. Such
defense is not available in cases of mala
prohibita.
Q: May an act be malum in se and be, at
the same time, malum prohibitum? (1997
Bar)
A: Yes, an act may be, malum in se and
malum prohibitum at the same time. In
People v. Sunico, et. al. (CA, 50 OG 5880) it
was held that the omission or failure of
election inspection and poll clerks to include
a voter’s name in the registry list of voters is
wrong per se because it disenfranchises a
voter of his right to vote.
In this regard, it is considered as
malum in se. Since it is punished under a
special law (Sec. 101 and 103, Revised
Election Code), it is considered malum
prohibitum.
Applicability and Effectivity of the Penal
Code
(1988, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2015, 2016 Bar)
Q: State the characteristics of criminal
law and explain each. (1988, 1998 Bar)
A: The characteristics of criminal law are as
follows:
1. Generality – that the law is binding upon
all persons who reside to sojourn in the
Philippines, irrespective of age, sex,
color, creed, or personal circumstances.
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2. Territoriality – that the law is applicable
to all crimes committed within the limits of
Philippine territory, which includes its
atmosphere interior water and maritime
zone. (Art. 2)
3. Prospectivity – that the law does not
have any retroactive effect, except if it
favors the offender unless he is a habitual
delinquent (Art. 22) or the law otherwise
provides.
Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted
another marriage with Connie in
Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie
returned to the Philippines and lived as
husband and wife in the hometown of Abe
in Calamba, Laguna. Can Abe be
prosecuted for bigamy? (1994 Bar)
A: No. Abe may not be prosecuted for
bigamy since the bigamous marriage was
contracted or solemnized in Singapore,
hence, such violation is not one of those
where the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2
thereof, may be applied extraterritoriality.
The general rule on territoriality of
criminal law governs the situation.
Q: After drinking one (1) case of San
Miguel Beer and taking two plates of
“pulutan”, Binoy, a Filipino seaman,
stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean
seaman, aboard M/V “Princess of the
Pacific”, an overseas vessel which was
sailing in the South China Sea. The
vessel, although Panamanian registered,
is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino
businessman. When M/V “Princess of the
Pacific” reached a Philippine Port at Cebu
City, the Captain of the vessel turned over
the assailant Binoy to the Philippine
authorities. An Information for homicide
was filed against Binoy in the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved to
quash the Information for lack of
jurisdiction. If you were the judge, will you
grant the motion? Why? (2000 Bar)
A: Yes. The motion to quash the information
should be granted. The Philippine court has
no jurisdiction over the crime committed
since it was committed on the high seas or
outside of Philippine territory and on board a
vessel not registered or licensed in the
Philippines (US v. Fowler, 1 Phil 614)
It is the registration of the vessel in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines,
not the citizenship of her owner, which
makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being
registered in Panama, the laws of Panama
govern while it is in the high seas.
Robin and Rowell are best friends and
have been classmates since grade
school. When the boys graduated from
high school, their parents gifted them
with a trip to Amsterdam, all expenses
paid. At age 16, this was their first
European trip. Thrilled with a sense of
freedom, they decided to try what
Amsterdam was known for. One night,
they scampered out of their hotel room,
went to the De Wallen, better known as
the Red-light District of Amsterdam.
There, they went to a "coffee shop" which
sells only drinks and various items made
from opium poppy, cannabis, and
marijuana, all of which are legal in
Amsterdam. They represented
themselves to be of age, and were served,
and took shots of, cannabis and
marijuana products. They indulged in
these products the whole night, even if it
was their first time to try them.
Before returning to Manila, they bought a
dozen lollipops laced with cannabis, as
souvenir and "pasalubong" for their
friends. They were accosted at the Manila
International Airport and were charged
with importation of dangerous drugs
under the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. They were also
charged with use of dangerous drugs
after pictures of them in the "coffee shop"
in Amsterdam were posted on Facebook,
showing them smoking and taking shots
of a whole menu of cannabis and
marijuana products. Their own captions
on their Facebook posts clearly admitted
that they were using the dangerous
products. The pictures were posted by
them through Private Messenger (PM)
only for their close friends, but Roccino,
the older brother of one of their best
friends, was able to get hold of his
younger brother's password, and without
authority from his brother, accessed his
PM and shared Robin and Rowell's
Amsterdam photos on Facebook. (2018)
(a) Can Robin and Rowell be prosecuted
for use of dangerous drugs for their one-
night use of these products in
Amsterdam?
A: No. Under the territorial characteristics of
Philippine criminal laws, penal laws of the
country have force and effect only within its
territory. While Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code applies for extraterritoriality, it is not
among the exception to the application of the
extraterritorial application of criminal law.
Thus, Robin and Rowel cannot be
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prosecuted for the crime committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
(b) Can they be prosecuted for
importation of dangerous drugs?
A: No. Robin and Rowell is still a minor
at the time of the commission of the
crime. Under RA 9344 or Juvenile
Justice Welfare Act, when a child is
fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall be exempt from
criminal liability unless acted with
discernment.
(c) If found liable under either (a) or (b)
above, what is the penalty that may be
imposed on them?
A: Granting that Robin and Rowell acted with
discernment, they are liable for importation of
illegal drugs with privilege mitigating
circumstance of a minor. In this case, the
penalty is lowered by degree than based on
penalty to be imposed upon the offender of
the crime.
(d) Can Roccino be prosecuted for the act
of accessing and sharing on Facebook
the private pictures sent by PM to his
brother? If yes, for what crime?
FELONIES
Corpus delicti
Questions:
 Define “Corpus delicti”.
 What are the elements of “Corpus
delicti”? (2000 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Corpus Delicti literally means “the
body or substance of the crime” or the
fact that a crime has been committed,
but does not include the identity of the
person who committed it. (People v.
Pascal, 44 OG 2789)
(B) Elements of corpus delicti: The actual
commission by someone of the
particular crime charged. It is a
compound fact made up of two
things:
o The existence of a certain act or
result forming the basis of the
criminal charge; and
o The existence of a criminal
agency as the cause of the act or
result.
The identity of the offender is not a
necessary element of corpus delicti.
Q: At a birthday party in Cebu, A got
intoxicated and started quarreling with B
and C. At the height of their arguments, A
left and took a bolo from his house, after
which he returned to the party and
threatened to stab everybody. B got
scared and ran towards the seashore,
with A chasing him. B ran up a steep
incline along the shore and was cornered
on top of a cliff. Out of fear, B jumped
from the cliff into the sea. A returned to
the scene of their confrontation and
seeing that nobody was there, went home
to sleep. The next day, B’s wife reported
to the police station that her husband had
not yet come home. A search was
conducted by the residents of the
barangay but after almost two days, B or
his body could not be located and his
disappearance continued for the next few
days. Based on the testimony of C and
other guests, who had seen A and B on
top of the cliff, A was arrested and
charged with Murder. In his defense, he
claimed that since B’s body has not been
found, there was no evidence of corpus
delicti and therefore, he should be
acquitted.
Is the defense of A tenable or not? State
the reason(s) for your answer? (2001 Bar)
A: The defense of A is not tenable. “Corpus
delicti” does not refer to the body of the
purported victim which had not been found.
Even without the body of the purported victim
being found, the offender can be convicted
when the facts and circumstances of a crime,
the body of the crime or “corpus delicti” is
established.
In other words, the non-recovery of
the body of the victim is not a bar to the
prosecution of A for Murder, but the fact of
death and identity of the victim must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Motive and Intent
Q: May a crime be committed without
criminal intent? (1988 Bar)
A: A crime may be committed without
criminal intent in two cases:
1. In offense punishable as mala
prohibita; and
2. Felonies committed by means of
culpa.
Q: Distinguish intent from motive in
Criminal Law. (1996, 2004 Bar)
A: Motive is the moving power which impels
one to action for a definite result; whereas
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intent is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect such results. Motive is not an
essential element of a felony and need not
be proved for purpose of conviction, while
intent is an essential element of felonies by
dolo.
Q: When is motive relevant to prove a
case? When is it not necessary to be
established? Explain. (1999, 2006 Bar)
A: Motive is relevant to prove a case when
there is doubt as to the identity of the
offender or when the act committed gives
rise to variant crimes and there is the need to
determine the proper crime to be imputed to
the offender.
It is not necessary to prove motive
when the offender is positively identified or
the criminal act did not give rise to variant
crimes.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
(1994, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2018)
Q: JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill
Elsa, a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel,
Batangas. They asked the assistance of
Ella, who is familiar with the place.
On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in
the evening, JP, Aries and Randal, all
armed with automatic weapons, went to
Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide,
directed her companions to the room in
the house of Elsa.
Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal
fired their guns at her room. Fortunately,
Elsa was not around as she attended a
prayer meeting that evening in another
barangay in Laurel.
JP, et. al., were charged and
convicted of attempted murder by the
Regional Trial Court at Tanauan,
Batangas. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, all the accused ascribed to the
trial court the sole error of finding them
guilty of attempted murder.
If you were the ponente, how will
you decide the appeal? (1994 Bar)
A: If I were the ponente, I will set aside the
judgment convicting the accused of
attempted murder and instead find them
guilty of impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2,
RPC, in relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for
impossible crime arises not only when the
impossibility is legal, but likewise when it is
factual or physical impossibility, as in the
case at bar.
Elsa’s absence from the house is a
physical impossibility which renders the
crime intended inherently incapable of
accomplishment. To convict the accused of
attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2,
practically useless as all circumstances
which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an incident
independent of the actor’s will which is an
element of attempted or frustrated felony.
(Intod v. CA, 215 SCRA 52)
Q: Puti detested Pula, his roommate,
because Pula was courting Ganda, whom
Puti fancied. One day, Puti decided to
teach Pula a lesson and went to a
veterinarian to ask for poison on the
pretext that he was going to kill a sick pet,
when actually Puti was intending to
poison Pula, the Vet instantly gave Puti a
non-toxic solution which, when mixed
with Pula’s food, did not kill Pula. What
crime, if any, did Puti commit? (1994,
1998, 2004, 2009, 2014 Bar)
A: Puti committed an impossible crime of
murder. Puti, with intent to kill Pula,
unknowingly employed ineffectual means to
accomplish the intended felony, that is, using
a non-toxic solution.
Questions:
a. What is an impossible crime?
b. Is an impossible crime really a
crime?
c. A, B, C and D, all armed with
armalites, proceeded to the house
of X, Y, a neighbor of X, who
happened to be passing by,
pointed to the four culprits the
room that X occupied. The four
culprits peppered the room with
bullets. Not satisfied, A even threw
a hand grenade that totally
destroyed X’s room. However,
unknown to the four culprits, X
was not inside the room and
nobody was hit or injured during
the incident. Are A, B, C and D
liable for any crime? Explain.
d. Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped
by Enrique, the tricycle driver paid
by her parents to bring and fetch
her to and from school. Enrique
wrote a ransom note demanding
P500,0 00 from Carla’s parents in
exchange for Carla’s freedom.
Enrique sent the ransom note by
mail. However, before the ransom
note was received by Carla’s
parents, Enrique’s hideout was
discovered by the police. Carla
was rescued while Enrique was
arrested and incarcerated.
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Considering that the ransom note
was not received by Carla’s
parents, the investigating
prosecutor merely filed a case of
“Impossible Crime to Commit
Kidnapping” against Enrique. Is
the prosecutor correct? (2000 Bar)
Answers:
a. Impossible crime is an act which would
be an offense against person or property,
were if not for the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC).
b. No, an impossible crime is not really a
crime. It is only so-called because the act
gives rise to criminal liability. But actually,
no felony is committed. The accused is to
be punished for his criminal tendency or
propensity although no crime was
committed.
c. Yes, A, B, C and D are liable for
destructive arson because of the
destruction of the room of X with the use
of an explosive, the hand grenade.
Liability for an impossible crime is to be
imposed only if the act committed would not
constitute any other crime under the Revised
Penal Code. Although the facts involved are
parallel to the case of ), where it was ruled
that the liability of the offender was for an
impossible crime, no hand grenade was used
in the said case, which constitutes a more
serious crime though different from what was
intended.
d. No, the prosecutor is not correct in filing
a case for “impossible crime to commit
kidnapping” against Enrique.
Impossible crimes are limited only to acts
which when performed would be a crime
against persons or property. As kidnapping is
a crime against personal security and not
against persons or property, Enrique could
not have incurred an “impossible crime” to
commit kidnapping. There is thus no
impossible crime of kidnapping.
Q: Roberto and Ricardo have had a long-
standing dispute regarding conflicting
claims over the ownership of a parcel of
land. One night, Roberto was so enraged
that he decided to kill Ricardo. Roberto
asked his best friend, Rafael, to lend him
a gun and drive him to Ricardo's house.
Rafael knew about Roberto's plan to kill
Ricardo, but agreed to lend him a gun
nevertheless. Rafael also drove Roberto
to the street corner nearest the house of
Ricardo. Rafael waited for him there, until
the task had been accomplished, so that
he could drive Roberto to the next town to
evade arrest. Roberto also asked another
friend, Ruel, to stand guard outside
Ricardo's house, for the purpose of
warning him in case there was any danger
or possible witnesses, and to keep other
persons away from the vicinity. All three -
Roberto, Rafael and Ruel - agreed to the
plan and their respective roles.
On the agreed date, Rafael drove Roberto
and Ruel to the nearest corner near
Ricardo's house. Roberto and Ruel
walked about 50 meters where Ruel took
his post as guard, and Roberto walked
about five (5) meters more, aimed the gun
at Ricardo's bedroom, and peppered it
with bullets. When he thought that he had
accomplished his plan, Roberto ran away,
followed by Ruel, and together they rode
in Rafael's car where they drove to the
next town to spend the night there. It
turned out that Ricardo was out of town
when the incident happened, and no one
was in his room at the time it was
peppered with bullets. Thus, no one was
killed or injured during the incident. (2018
Bar)
(a) Was a crime committed? If yes, what
is/are the crime/s committed?
A: No. It was an impossible crime. There is
an impossible crime when it constitutes an
inherent impossibility to perform the act due
to factual or physical impossibility, that is,
extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor beyond his control, prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. (Intod
v. CA 215 SCRA 52) The crime committed
was crime against persons but nevertheless
did not occur because of its impossibility
since Ricardo was not around his bedroom
when the crime occurred. Nevertheless, the
said act is still punishable with arresto mayor
or a fine under Article 59 of the RPC.
(b) If a crime was committed, what is the
degree of participation of Roberto,
Rafael, and Ruel?
A: Roberto, Rafael, and Ruel will all be liable
as principal because they are all
conspirators. Pursuant to Art. 8 of the RPC
conspiracy exists when two or more persons
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come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Further it is a settled rule that when is
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
STAGES OF EXECUTION
(BAR QUESTION
1996, 2000, 2005, 2015)
Q: Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in
consideration of money, to kidnap a girl
he is courting so that he may succeed in
raping her and eventually making her
accede to marry him. Vicente asked for
more money which Edgardo failed to put
up. Angered because Edgardo did not put
up the money he required, he reported
Edgardo to the police. May Edgardo be
charged with attempted kidnapping?
(1996 Bar)
A: No. Edgardo may not be charged with
attempted kidnapping inasmuch as no overt
act to kidnap or restrain the liberty of the girl
had been commenced. At most, what
Edgardo has done in the premises was a
proposal to Vicente to kidnap the girl, which
is only a preparatory act and not an overt act.
The attempt to commit a felony commences
with the commission of overt act, not
preparatory act. Proposal to commit
kidnapping is not a crime.
Q: Taking into account the nature and
elements of the felonies of coup d’etat
and rape, may one be criminally liable for
frustrated coup d’etat or frustrated rape?
Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: No. A person may not be held liable for
frustrated coup d’ etat or for frustrated rape
because in a frustrated felony, it is required
that all acts of execution that could produce
the felony as a consequence must have been
performed by the offender but the felony was
not produced by reason of causes
independent of the will of the offender. In the
said felonies, one cannot perform all the acts
of execution without consummating the
felony. The said felonies, therefore, do not
admit of the frustrated stage.
COMPLEX AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
Complex crime (1987, 1989, 1991, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2007)
Q: Jose purchased roofing materials
worth P20, 000 from PY & Sons
Construction Company owned by Pedro
and paid the latter a check in the said
amount. The following day, Pedro
deposited the check but it was returned
dishonored because it was drawn against
a closed account. Jose failed to make
good the said check despite written
demands. Atty. Saavedra, counsel for
Pedro, filed two complaints against Jose
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
one for estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code and another for
violation of BP Blg. 22. Atty. San Pascual,
counsel for Jose, claimed that if his client
was at all liable, he could only be liable for
violation of BP 22 and not for estafa under
Art. 315 of the RPC because one
precludes the other and because BP 22 is
more favorable to the accused as it
carries a lighter penalty.
The investigating fiscal, on his resolution,
stated that only one crime was
committed, namely, the complex crime of
estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC and
another under BP 22.
Is the investigating fiscal correct?
(Question reframed) (1987 Bar)
A: The resolution of the investigating fiscal is
erroneous. There is no complex crime of
estafa under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code and the violation of BP 22. A complex
crime refers only to felonies which are
punished in the Revised Penal Code.
Q: Rodolfo, a policeman, was cleaning his
service pistol inside his house when it fell
from his hand and fired. The bullet hit a
neighbor on the stomach and a second
neighbor on the leg. The injuries
sustained by the two neighbors required
thirty-five (35) days and nine (9) days of
medical attendance, respectively. The
investigating fiscal later filed an
information for frustrated homicide and
slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence against Rodolfo. Is the
charge correct? Explain. (1989 Bar)
A: The charge is not correct.
One single act of accidental shooting
cannot give rise to two felonies. One of which
is intentional and the other negligent.
Frustrated homicide presupposes intent to
kill. The facts do not show any intent to kill on
the part of Rodolfo. At most, he was careless,
and therefore only negligent.
Two separate crimes of serious
physical injuries (against the first neighbor
whose injuries requires 35 days of medical
attendance), and slight physical injuries
(against the second neighbor), both through
reckless imprudence, were committed by
8|Page
Rodolfo. Although both of these offenses
were the result of one single act, a complex
crime is not committed because it is only
when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies that a complex
crime may be committed under the first
clause of Article 48, RPC. Slight physical
injuries is not a grave or less grave felony.
Q: Harry, an overseas contract worker,
arrived from Saudi Arabia with
considerable savings. Knowing him to be
“loaded”, his friends Jason, Manuel and
Dave invited him to poker session at a
rented beach cottage. When he was
losing almost all his money which to him
was his savings of a lifetime, he
discovered that he was being cheated by
his friends.
Angered by the betrayal, he
decided to take revenge on the three
cheats.
Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay
Rhum and gave them to his companions
to drink, as they did, until they all fell
asleep.
When Harry saw his companions
already sound asleep, he hacked them all
to death. Then he remembered his losses,
he rifled through the pockets of his
victims and got back all the money he
lost. He then ran away but not before
burning the cottage to hide his misdeed.
The following day, police investigators
found among the debris the charred
bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave and the
caretaker of the resort.
The Provincial Prosecutor charged
Harry with the complex crime of arson
with quadruple homicide and robbery.
Was Harry properly charged? Discuss.
(1995 Bar)
A: No. Harry was not properly charged.
Harry should have been charged with three
(3) separate crimes, namely: murder, theft,
and arson.
Harry killed Jason, Manuel and Dave
with evident premeditation, as there was
considerable lapse of time before he decided
to commit the crime and the actual
commission of the crime. In addition, Harry
employed means which weakened the
defense of Jason, Manuel, and Dave. Harry
gave them the liquor to drink until they were
drunk and fell asleep.
The taking of the money was a mere
afterthought of the killings. Hence, Harry
committed the separate crime of theft and not
the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Although theft was committed against dead
persons, it is still legally possible as the
offended party are the estates of the victims.
In burning the cottage, it is another
separate crime of arson. The act of burning
was not necessary for the consummation of
the two previous offenses he committed. The
fact that the caretaker died from the blaze did
not qualify Harry’s crime into a complex
crime of arson with homicide for there is no
such crime.
Hence, Harry was improperly
charged with the complex crime of arson with
quadruple homicide and robbery. Harry
should have been charged with three
separate crimes, murder, theft and arson.
Q: A, actuated by malice and with the use
of a fully automatic M-14 sub-machine
gun, shot a group of persons who were
seated in a cockpit with one burst of
successive, continuous, automatic fire.
Four (4) persons were killed thereby, each
having hit by different bullets coming
from the sub-machine gun of A. Four (4)
cases of murder were filed against A.
The trial court ruled that there was only
one crime committed by A for the reason
that, since A performed only one act, he
having pressed the trigger of his gun only
once, the crime committed was murder.
Consequently, the trial judge sentenced A
to just one penalty of reclusion perpetua.
(A) Was the decision of the trial judge
correct? Explain.
(B) What constitutes a complex crime?
How many crimes may be involved in a
complex crime? What is the penalty
therefor? (1999 Bar)
Answer:
(A) The decision of the trial judge is not
correct. When the offender made use of
an automatic firearm, the acts
committed are determined by the
number of bullets discharged inasmuch
as the firearm being automatic, the
offender need only press the trigger
once and it would fire continually. For
each death caused by a distinct and
separate bullet, the accused incurs
distinct criminal liability. Hence, it is not
the act of pressing the trigger which
should be considered as producing the
several felonies, but the number of
bullets which actually produced them.
9|Page
(B) A complex crime is constituted when a
single act caused two or more grave or
less grave felonies or when an offense
is committed as a necessary means to
commit another offense. (Art 48, RPC)
At least two crimes are involved in a complex
crime; either two or more grave or less grave
felonies resulted from a single act, or an
offense is committed as a necessary means
for committing another.
The penalty for the more serious crime shall
be imposed and in its maximum period. (Art.
48, RPC)
Q: Distinguish between compound and
complex crime as concepts. (2004 Bar)
A: Compound crimes result when the
offender committed only a single felonious
act from which two or more crimes resulted.
This is provided for in modified form
in the first part of Article 48, RPC, limiting the
resulting crimes to only grave and/or less
grave felonies. Hence, light felonies are
excluded even though resulting from the
same single act.
Complex crime result when the
offender has to commit an offense as a
necessary means for committing another
offense. Only one Information shall be filed
and if proven, the penalty for the more
serious crime shall be imposed.
Special Complex Crime
(1989, 1995, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2016,
2018)
Q: After raping the complainant in her
house, the accused struck a match to
smoke a cigarette before departing from
the scene. The brief light from the match
allowed him to notice a watch in her wrist.
He demanded that she hand over the
watch. When she refused, he forcibly
grabbed it from her. The accused was
charged with and convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape. Was
the court correct? (1997 Bar)
A: No. The accused should instead be held
liable for two separate crimes of robbery and
rape, since the primary intent or objective of
the accused was only to rape the
complainant, and his commission of the
robbery was merely an afterthought. The
robbery must precede the rape, in order to
give rise to the special complex crime for
which the court convicted the accused.
Q: Distinguish between an ordinary
complex crime and a special complex
crime as to their concepts and as to the
imposition of penalties. (2003 Bar)
A: In concept – An ordinary complex crime
is made up of two or more crimes being
punished in distinct provisions of the Revised
Penal Code but alleged in one information
either because they were brought about by a
single felonious act or because one offense
is a necessary means for committing the
other offense or offenses.
They are alleged in one information
so that only one penalty shall be imposed.
A special complex crime, on the other
hand, is made up of two or more crimes
which are considered only as components of
a single indivisible offense being punished in
one provision of the Revised Penal Code.
As to penalties – In ordinary complex crime,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed and in its maximum period.
In special complex crime, only one
penalty is specifically prescribed for all the
component crimes which are regarded as
one indivisible offense.
The component crimes are not
regarded as distinct crimes and so the
penalty to be imposed for the most serious
crime is not the penalty to be imposed nor in
its maximum period.
It is the penalty specifically provided
for the special complex crime that shall be
applied according to the rules on imposition
of the penalty.
Composite crime (1998, 1999, 2004)
Q: A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank
and when they were about to get out of
the bank, policemen came and ordered
them to surrender but they fired on the
police officers who fired back and shot it
out with them. Suppose a bank employee
was killed and the bullet which killed him
came from the firearm of the police
officers, with what crime shall you charge
A, B, C and D? (1998, 2004 Bar)
A: A, B, C and D should be charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide because the
death of the bank employee was brought
about by the acts of said offenders on the
occasion of robbery.
They shot it out with the policeman,
thereby causing such death by reason or on
the occasion of robbery; Hence, the
composite crime of robbery with homicide.
10 | P a g e
Q: Samuel, a tricycle driver, plied his
usual route using a Honda motorcycle
with a sidecar. One evening, Raul rode on
the sidecar, poked a knife at Samuel and
instructed him to go near a bridge. Upon
reaching the bridge, Raul alighted from
the motorcycle and suddenly stabbed
Samuel several times until he was dead.
Raul fled from the scene taking the
motorcycle with him. What crime(s) did
Raul commit? (1998, 2004 Bar)
A: Raul committed the composite crime of
Carnapping with homicide under Sec. 14 of
RA 6539, as amended, considering that the
killing “in the course of” or “on the occasion
of” a carnapping. (People v. De la Cruz, 183
SCRA 763).
A motorcycle is included in the
definition of a “motor vehicle” in said
Republic Act.
There is no apparent motive for the
killing of the tricycle driver but for Raul to be
able to take the motorcycle.
The fact that the tricycle driver was
killed brings about the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
Q: Two young men, A and B, conspired to
rob a residential house of things of value.
They succeeded in the commission of
their original plan to simply rob. A,
however, was sexually aroused when he
saw the lady owner of the house, and so
raped her.
The lady victim testified that B did not in
any way participate in the rape but he
watched the happening from a window
and did nothing to stop the rape. Is B as
criminally liable as A for robbery with
rape? Explain. (1999 Bar)
A: Yes. B is as criminally liable for the
composite crime of robbery with rape under
Art. 294 (1). Although the conspiracy of A
and B was only to rob, B was present when
the rape was being committed which gave
rise to a composite crime, a single indivisible
offense of robbery with rape.
B would not have been liable had he
endeavored to prevent the commission of the
rape.
But since he did not when he could
have done so, he in effect acquiesced with
the rape as a component of the robbery and
so he is also liable for robbery with rape.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
(1993, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 1996,
2008, 2016 BAR)
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly:
Between justifying and exempting
circumstances in criminal law. (2004,
1998 Bar)
A: Justifying circumstance affects the act, not
the actor; while exempting circumstance
affects the actor, not the act. In justifying
circumstance, no criminal and, generally, no
civil liability is incurred; while in exempting
circumstance, civil liability is generally
incurred although there is no criminal liability.
Self-Defense
(Defense of Person, Rights, Property and
Honor)
Q: BB and CC, both armed with knives,
attacked FT. [The victim's son,] ST, upon
seeing the attack, drew his gun but was
prevented from shooting the attackers by
AA, who grappled with him for
possession of the gun. FT died from knife
wounds.
AA, BB and CC were charged with
murder. In his defense, AA invoked the
justifying circumstance of avoidance of
greater evil or injury, contending that by
preventing ST from shooting BB and CC,
he merely avoided a greater evil. Will AA's
defense prosper? Reason briefly. (2004
Bar)
A: No, AA's defense will not prosper. The act
of the victim's son, ST, appears to be a
legitimate defense of relatives; hence,
justified as a defense of his father against the
unlawful aggression by BB and CC.
ST’s act to defend his father's life and
to stop BB and CC achieve their criminal
objective cannot be regarded as an evil
inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a
lawful act.
What AA did was a lawful defense,
not greater evil. Likewise, AA’s defense will
not prosper because in this case there was a
conspiracy among the three of them, hence,
the act of one is the act of all.
Q: Pat Negre saw Filemon, an inmate,
escaping from jail and ordered the latter
to surrender. Instead of doing so, Filemon
attacked Pat Negre with a bamboo spear.
Filemon missed in his first attempt to hit
Pat Negre, and before he could strike
again, Pat Negre shot and killed him.
(A) Can Pat Negre claim self defense?
Explain.
11 | P a g e
(B) Suppose Pat Negre missed in his
shot, and Filemon ran away without
parting with his weapon. Pat Negre
pursued Filemon but the latter was
running so fast that Pat Negre fired
warning shots into the air shouting for
Filemon to stop. In as much as
Filemon continued running Pat. Negre
fired at him hitting and killing him. Is
the plea of self-defense sustainable?
Why would you then hold Pat. Negre
criminally liable? Discuss. (1993 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Yes. Self-defense can be claimed as
there is an imminent and great peril on
the life of Pat Negre.
(B) No. Self-defense is no longer sustainable
as there is no more peril on his life.
Q: Osang, a married woman in her early
twenties, was sleeping on a banig on the
floor of their nipa hut beside the seashore
when she was awakened by the act of a
man mounting her. Thinking that it was
her husband, Gardo, who had returned
from fishing in the sea, Osang continued
her sleep but allowed the man, who was
actually their neighbor, Julio, to have
sexual intercourse with her. After Julio
satisfied himself, he said “Salamat
Osang" as he turned to leave. Only then
did Osang realize that the man was not
her husband. Enraged, Osang grabbed a
balisong from the wall and stabbed Julio
to death. When tried for homicide, Osang
claimed defense of honor. Should the
claim be sustained? Why? (2000, 1998
Bar)
A: No. Osang's claim of defense of honor
should not be sustained because the
aggression on her honor had ceased when
she stabbed the aggressor.
In defense of rights under Art. 11(1)
of the RPC, it is required inter alia that there
be (1) unlawful aggression, and (2)
reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it.
The unlawful aggression must be
continuing when the aggressor was injured
or disabled by the person making a defense.
Otherwise, the attack made is a retaliation
and not a defense.
Hence, Osang's act of stabbing Julio
to death after the sexual intercourse was
finished, is not defense of honor but an
immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her, which is only
mitigating.
Defense of Relatives
Q: When A arrived home, he found B
raping his daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran
away. A took his gun and shot B, killing
him. Charged with homicide, A claimed he
acted in defense of his daughter's honor.
Is A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit
of any mitigating circumstance or
circumstances? (2002, 2000, 1998 Bar)
A: No. A cannot validly invoke defense of his
daughter's honor in having killed B since the
rape was already consummated; moreover,
B already ran away, hence, there was no
aggression to defend against and no defense
to speak of.
Defense of honor as included in self-
defense, must have been done to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression. There is no
defense to speak of where the unlawful
aggression no longer exists.
A may, however, invoke the benefit of
the mitigating circumstance of having acted
in immediate vindication of a grave offense to
a descendant, his daughter, under par. 5, Art.
13 of the RPC.
Q: Pedro is married to Tessie. Juan is the
first cousin of Tessie. While in the market,
Pedro saw a man stabbing Juan. Seeing
the attack on Juan, Pedro picked up a
spade nearby and hit the attacker on his
head which caused the latter’s death. Can
Pedro be absolved of the killing on the
ground that it is in defense of a relative?
Explain. (2016 Bar)
A: No. The relatives of the accused for
purpose of defense of relative under Art. 11
(20) of the Revised Penal Code are his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or
sisters or of his relatives by affinity in the
same degrees, and those by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree.
Relative by affinity within the same
degree includes ascendant, descendant,
brother or sister of the spouse of the
accused.
In this case, Juan is not the
ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of
Tessie, the spouse of Pedro.
Relative by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree includes first cousin. But in
this case, Juan is the cousin of Pedro by
affinity but not by consanguinity. Juan,
therefore, is not a relative of Pedro for the
purpose of applying the provision on
defense of relative.
Pedro, however, can invoke defense
of a stranger.
Under the Revised Penal Code, a
person who defends a person who is not his
relative may invoke the defense of a stranger
provided that all its elements exist, to wit: (a)
12 | P a g e
unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the attack; and (c) the person
defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
Defense of Stranger
Q: A chanced upon three men who were
attacking B with fist blows. C, one of the
men, was about to stab B with a knife. Not
knowing that B was actually the
aggressor because he had earlier
challenged the three men to a fight, A
shot C as the latter was about to stab B.
May A invoke the defense of a stranger as
a justifying circumstance in his favor?
Why? (Bar 2002)
A: Yes. A may invoke the justifying
circumstance of defense of stranger since he
was not involved in the fight and he shot C
when the latter was about to stab B. There
being no indication that A was induced by
revenge, resentment or any other evil motive
in shooting C, his act is justified under par. 3,
Art. 11 of the RPC.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
(1998, 2000, 2010 BAR)
Insanity
Q: While his wife was on a 2-year
scholarship abroad, Romeo was having
an affair with his maid Dulcinea. Realizing
that the affair was going nowhere,
Dulcinea told Romeo that she was going
back to the province to marry her
childhood sweetheart. Clouded by anger
and jealousy, Romeo strangled Dulcinea
to death while she was sleeping in the
maid’s quarters.
The following day, Romeo was found
catatonic inside the maid’s quarters. He
was brought to the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH) where he was
diagnosed to be mentally unstable.
Charged with murder, Romeo pleaded
insanity as a defense.
(a) Will Romeo’s defense prosper? Explain.
(b) What is the effect of the diagnosis of the
NCMH onthe case? (2010 Bar)
Answers:
(A) No. Romeo’s defense of insanity will not
prosper. Insanity as a defense to the
commission of a crime must have existed
and proven to have been existing at the
precise moment when the crime was
being committed. The facts of the case
indicate that Romeo committed the crime
with discernment and was only
 diagnosed to be mentally unstable after
the crime was committed.
(B) The effect of the diagnosis made by
NCMH is possibly a suspension of the
proceeding against Romeo and his
commitment to appropriate institution for
treatment until he could already
understand the proceedings.
Minority
Q: While they were standing in line awaiting
their vaccination at the school clinic,
Pomping repeatedly pulled the ponytail of
Katreena, his 11 years, 2 months and 13
days old classmate in Grade 5 at the
Sampaloc Elementary School.
Irritated, Katreena turned around and
swung at Pomping with a ball pen. The top of
the ball pen hit the right eye of Pomping
which bled profusely. Realizing what she had
caused, Katreena immediately helped
Pomping. When investigated, she freely
admitted to the school principal that she
was responsible for the injury to
Pomping's eye.
After the incident, she executed a
statement admitting her culpability. Due
to the injury, Pomping lost his right eye.
(2000, 1998 Bar)
(A) Is Katreena criminally liable? Why?
(B) Discuss the attendant circumstances and
effects thereof.
Answers:
(A) No. Katreena is not criminally liable due
to her minority. She is exempted from
criminal liability for being a minor less
than fifteen (15) years old although over
nine (9) years of age. Nonetheless is she
civilly liable.
(B) The attendant circumstances which may
be considered are:
 Minority of the accused as an
exempting circumstance under Art.
12(3) of RPC, where she shall be
exempt from criminal liability, unless
it was proved that she acted with
discernment. She is however civilly
liable;
 If found criminally liable, the minority
of the accused is a privileged
mitigating circumstance. A not subject to the off-set rule.
discretionary penalty lower by at least
two (2) degrees than that prescribed
for the crime committed shall be
imposed in accordance with Art.
68(1) of RPC. The sentence
however, should automatically be
suspended in accordance with Sec.
5(a) of R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts
Act of 1997);
13 | P a g e
 Likewise if found criminally liable, the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of
not intending to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed under Art.
13(3) of the RPC may apply;
 The ordinary mitigating circumstance
of sufficient provocation on the part of
the offended party immediately
preceded the act.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(1988, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2012, 2016,
2018 BAR)
Q: What is a privileged mitigating
circumstance? Distinguish a privileged
mitigating circumstance from an ordinary
mitigating circumstance as to reduction
of penalty and offsetting against
aggravating circumstance(s). (2012 Bar)
A: Privileged mitigating circumstances are
those that mitigate the criminal liability of the
accused by graduating the imposable
penalty for the crime being modified to one or
two degrees lower.
These circumstances cannot be
offset by aggravating circumstance.
The circumstance of incomplete
justification or exemption (when majority of
the conditions are present), and the
circumstance of minority (if the child above
15 years of age acted with discernment) are
privileged mitigating circumstance.
The distinctions between ordinary and
privileged mitigating circumstances are as
follows:
(A) Under the rules for application of divisible
penalties (RPC, Art. 64), the presence of
a mitigating circumstance, [if not off-set
by aggravating circumstance,] has the
effect of applying the divisible penalty in
its minimum period.
Under the rules on graduation of
penalty (RPC, Art. 68, 69), the presence
of privileged mitigating circumstance has
the effect of reducing the penalty one
to two degrees lower;
(B) Ordinary mitigating circumstances can
be off-set by aggravating circumstances.
Privileged mitigating circumstances are
Surrender and Confession of Guilt
Q: After killing the victim, the accused
absconded. He succeeded in eluding the
police until he surfaced and surrendered
to the authorities about two years later.
Charged with murder, he pleaded not
guilty but, after the prosecution had
presented two witnesses implicating him
to the crime, he changed his plea to that
of guilty. Should the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty be considered in favor
of the accused? (1997 Bar)
A: Voluntary surrender may not be
appreciated in favor of the accused. Two
years is too long a time to consider the
surrender as spontaneous (People v. Ablao,
G.R. No. 69184, March 26, 1990).
For sure the government had already
incurred considerable efforts and expenses
in looking for the accused.
Plea of guilty can no longer be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance
because the prosecution had already started
with the presentation of its evidence (Art.
13[7], RPC).
Q: When is surrender by an accused
considered voluntary, and constitutive of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender? (1999 Bar)
A: A surrender by an offender is considered
voluntary when it is spontaneous, indicative
of an intent to submit unconditionally to
the authorities. To be mitigating, the
surrender must be:
(A) Spontaneous, i.e., indicative of
acknowledgment of guilt and not for
convenience nor conditional;
(B) Made before the government incurs
expenses, time and effort in tracking
down the offender's whereabouts; and
(C) Made to a person in authority or the
letter's agents.
Q: Robbie and Rannie are both inmates of
the National Penitentiary, serving the
maximum penalty for robbery which they
committed some years before and for
which they have been sentenced by final
judgment. One day, Robbie tried to collect
money owed by Rannie. Rannie insisted
that he did not owe Robbie anything, and
after a shouting episode, Rannie kicked
Robbie in the stomach. Robbie fell to the
ground in pain, and Rannie left him to go
to the toilet to relieve himself. As Rannie
was opening the door to the toilet and
with his back turned against Robbie,
Robbie stabbed him in the back with a
bladed weapon that he had concealed in
his waist. Hurt, Rannie ran to the nearest
"kubol" where he fell. Robbie ran after
him· and, while Rannie was lying on the
ground, Robbie continued to stab him,
inflicting a total of 15 stab wounds. He
died on the spot. Robbie immediately
surrendered to the Chief Warden. When
prosecuted for the murder of Rannie,
14 | P a g e
Robbie raised provocation and voluntary
surrender as mitigating circumstances.
The prosecution, on the other hand,
claimed that there was treachery in the
commission of the crime. (2018)
(a) Is Robbie a recidivist, or a quasi-
recidivist?
A: Robbie is a quasi-recidivist. A quasi‐
recidivist is a special aggravating
circumstance where a person, after having
been convicted by final judgment, shall
commit a new felony before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the
same. Since Robbie committed a crime while
serving his sentence, he is a quasi-recidivist.
(b) Can the mitigating circumstances
raised by Robbie, if proven, lower the
penalty for the crime committed?
A: No, quasi-recidivism is a special
aggravating circumstance, it cannot be offset
by ordinary mitigating circumstances. Since
quasi-recidivism has no penalty of its own
and it is not a felony, its effect is to increase
the penalty for the new felony to the
maximum period.
Q: In order that the plea of guilty may be
mitigating, what requisites must be
complied with? (1999 Bar)
A: For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the
requisites are, that:
1. The accused spontaneously pleaded
guilty to the crime charged;
2. Such plea was made before the court
competent to try the case and render
judgment; and
3. Such plea was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (1988,
1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2003,
2005, 2009)
Q: The robbers killed a mother and her
baby, then threw the body of the baby
outside the window. Can the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty be considered in
this case? Reason. (1988 Bar)
A: Cruelty cannot be considered in this case
because the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty requires deliberate prolongation of
the suffering of the victim.
In this case, the baby was dead
already so that there is no more prolongation
to speak of.
Q: At about 9:30 in the evening, while
Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre
Faura Street, Manila, Johnny hit them with
a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy
approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby,
Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the
duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve,
Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting
Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result,
Dino died.
Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and
Johnny were charged with homicide. Can
the court appreciate the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and band?
(1994 Bar)
A: No. Nighttime cannot be appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance because there
is no indication that the offenders
deliberately sought the cover of darkness
to facilitate the commission of the crime or
that they took advantage of nighttime
(People v. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707)
Besides, judicial notice can be taken of the
fact that Padre Faura Street is well-lighted.
However, band should be
considered as the crime was committed by
more than three armed malefactors; in a
recent Supreme Court decision, stones or
rocks are considered deadly weapons.
Q: Name the four (4) kinds of aggravating
circumstances and state their effect on
the penalty of crimes and nature thereof.
Distinguish generic aggravating
circumstance from qualifying
aggravating circumstance. (1999 Bar)
A: The four (4) kinds of aggravating
circumstances are:
1. Generic aggravating or those that can
generally apply to all crimes, and can be
offset by mitigating circumstances, but if
not offset, would affect only the maximum
of the penalty prescribed by law;
2. Specific aggravating or those that apply
only to particular crimes and cannot be
offset by mitigating circumstances;
3. Qualifying circumstances or those that
change the nature of the crime to a
graver one, or brings about a penalty next
higher in degree, and cannot be offset by
mitigating circumstances;
4. Inherent aggravating or those that
essentially accompany the commission
of the crime and do not affect the penalty
whatsoever.
The distinctions between generic
aggravating circumstances and qualifying
aggravating circumstances are as follows:
Generic aggravating circumstances:
(a) affects the nature of the crime or
brings about a penalty higher in
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degree than that ordinarily
prescribed;
(b) can be offset by ordinary
mitigating circumstances;
(c) need not be alleged in the
Information as long as proven
during the trial;
(d) the same shall be considered in
imposing the sentence.
Qualifying circumstances:
(a) affects the nature of the crime or brings
about a penalty higher in degree than that
ordinarily prescribed;
(b) cannot be offset by mitigating
circumstances;
(c) must be alleged in the Information and
proven during trial.
Q: Rico, a member of the Alpha Rho
Fraternity, was killed by Pocholo, a
member of the rival group, Sigma Phi
Omega. Pocholo was prosecuted for
homicide.
During the trial, the prosecution
was able to prove that the killing was
committed by means of poison in
consideration of a promise or reward and
with cruelty.
If you were the Judge, will you
consider the aggravating circumstances
of using poison, in consideration of a
promise or reward and cruelty? (2000 Bar)
A: The circumstances of using poison, in
consideration of a promise or reward and
cruelty which attended the killing of Rico
could only be appreciated as generic
aggravating circumstances since none of
them have been alleged in the Information to
qualify the killing to murder. A qualifying
circumstance must be alleged in the
Information and proven beyond reasonable
doubt during the trial to be appreciated as
such.
Q: When would qualifying circumstances
be deemed, if at all, elements of a crime?
(2003 Bar)
A: A qualifying circumstance would be
deemed an element of a crime when:
(a) It changes the nature of the crime,
bringing about a more serious crime and
heavier penalty;
(b) It is essential to the crime involved,
otherwise some other crime is
committed; and
(c) It is specifically alleged in the information
and proven during trial.
Q: Candido stabbed an innocent
bystander who accidentally bumped him.
The innocent bystander died as a result of
the stabbing. Candido was arrested and
was tested to be positive for the use of
“shabu” at the time he committed the
stabbing. What should be the proper
charge against Candido? Explain. (2005
Bar)
A: Candido should be charged with murder
qualified by treachery because the
suddenness of the stabbing caught the victim
by surprise and was totally defenseless.
Being under the influence of dangerous
drugs is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime
(Sec. 25, RA 9165, Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug Act of 2002); Hence, the
penalty for murder shall be imposed in the
maximum.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
(2004, 2008, 2012 BAR)
Article 332: Persons exempt from criminal
liability for theft, swindling and malicious
mischief.
Q: The wife of AAA predeceased his
mother-in-law. AAA was accused of
defrauding his mother-in-law under a
criminal information for estafa, but the
actual recital of facts of the offense
charged therein, if proven, would
constitute not only the crime of estafa,
but also falsification of public document
as a necessary means for committing
estafa. AAA invokes the absolutory cause
of relationship by affinity. Which
statement is most accurate? (2012 Bar)
A: There are two views on whether the
extinguishment of the marriage by death of
the spouse dissolves the relationship by
affinity for purpose of absolutory clause.
The first holds that the relationship by
affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage, while the second maintains that
relationship continues even after the death of
the deceased spouse.
The principle of pro reo calls for the
adoption of the continuing affinity view
because it is more favorable to the accused.
However, the absolutory cause
applies to theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply to theft through
falsification or estafa through falsification
(Intestate estate of Gonzales v. People, G.R.
No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
Article 20: Accessories exempt from
criminal liability by reason of relationship.
Q: DCB, the daughter of MCB, stole the
earrings of XYZ, a stranger. MCB pawned
the earrings with TBI Pawnshop as a
16 | P a g e
pledge for P500 loan. During the trial,
MCB raised the defense that being the
mother of DCB, she cannot be held liable
as an accessory. Will MCB's defense
prosper? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: No. MCB's defense will not prosper
because the exemption from criminal liability
of an accessory by virtue of relationship with
the principal does not cover accessories who
themselves profited from or assisted the
offender to profit by the effects or proceeds
of the crime.
This non-exemption of an accessory,
though related to the principal of the crime, is
expressly provided in Art. 20 of the RPC.
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE (1988,
1991, 2001, 2007, 2015, 2016 BAR)
Q: At 10:00 in the evening, upon his
arrival, Marco surprised his wife, Rosette
and her former boyfriend, Raul, both
naked and in the act of illicit copulation.
Raul got his revolver and upon
seeing the revolver, Marco ran toward the
street, took a pedicab and proceeded to
the house of his brother, a policeman
from whom he borrowed a revolver.
With the weapon, he returned to
his residence. Unable to find Raul and
Rosette, Marco proceeded to a disco
jointly owned and operated by Raul. It
was already 11:00 that evening when he
arrived at the joint.
Upon seeing Raul with two (2) male
companions, A and B, drinking beer at
one of the tables, Marco fired two (2)
shots at Raul, who was hit on his
forehead with one of the bullets; the other
hit A, injuring him on his stomach.
As a consequence of the gunshot
wound, Raul died instantaneously. Due to
the timely medical attention given to A, he
survived. He was, however, hospitalized
for 45 days.
Marco was prosecuted for Murder
for the death of Raul and for frustrated
murder in the case of A. You are Marco’s
lawyer, what will be your defense? (1991
Bar)
A: The defense with respect to the death of
Raul is death under exceptional
circumstances. (Art. 247, People v. Abarca,
153 SCRA 735). Although the killing
happened one hour after having surprised
the spouse, that would still be within the
context of “immediately thereafter”.
With respect to the wounding of the
stranger, the defense of lawful exercise of a
right is a justifying circumstance. Under Art.
11, par. 5 could be invoked. At the time the
accused shot Raul, he was not committing a
felonious act and therefore could not have
been criminally liable under Art. 4, RPC.
Q: Macky, a security guard, arrived home
late one night after rendering overtime.
He was shocked to see Joy, his wife and
Ken, his best friend, in the act of having
sexual intercourse.
Macky pulled out his service gun
and shot and killed Ken. Macky was
charged with murder for the death of Ken.
The court found that Ken died
under exceptional circumstances and
exonerated Macky of murder but
sentenced him to destierro.
The court also ordered Macky to
pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P50, 000.00. Did the court
correctly order Macky to pay indemnity?
(2007 Bar)
A: No. Since the killing of Ken was committed
under the exceptional circumstances in
Article 247, RPC, it is the consensus that no
crime was committed in the light of the
pronouncement in People v. Cosicor (79 Phil
672) that banishment (destierro) is intended
more for the protection of the offender rather
than as a penalty.
Since the civil liability under the RPC
is the consequence of the criminal liability,
there would be no legal basis for the award
of indemnity when there is no criminal
liability.
Q: Jojo and Felipa are husband and wife.
Believing that his work as a lawyer
is sufficient to provide for the needs of
their family. Jojo convinced Felipa to be a
stay- at-home mom and care for their
children.
One day, Jojo arrived home earlier
than usual and caught Felipa in the act of
having sexual intercourse with their
female nanny, Alma, in their matrimonial
bed.
In a fit of rage, Jojo retrieved his
revolver from inside the bedroom cabinet
and shot Alma, immediately killing her.
Is Art. 247 (Death or physical
injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances) of the RPC applicable in
this case given that the paramour was of
the same gender as the erring spouse?
(2015, 2016 Bar)
A: The crime committed is parricide, qualified
by the circumstance of relationship. Killing a
spouse after having been surprised in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with
another woman is death under exceptional
17 | P a g e
circumstance under Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.
However, in this case this is not death
under exceptional circumstance because
Felipa was having homosexual intercourse
with another woman and not sexual
intercourse with a man.
“Homosexual intercourse “is not
within the contemplation of the term
“sexual intercourse” in Article 247.
However, the crime of parricide is
attended by the circumstance of passion
arising from a lawful sentiment as a result of
having caught his wife in the act of infidelity
with another woman (People v. Belarmino,
G.R. No. L-4429, April 18, 1952, En Banc).
PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF
PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES, AND
ACCESSORIES
(1987, 1989, 2013 BAR)
Principal
(1994, 2000, 2002, 1994, 2014, 2015 Bar)
Q: Tata owns a three-storey building. She
wanted to construct a new building but
had no money to finance the
construction. So, she insured the building
for P3, 000, 000.00. She then urged Yoboy
and Yongsi, for monetary consideration,
to burn her building so she could collect
the insurance proceeds. Yoboy and
Yongsi burned the said building resulting
to its total loss. What is their respective
criminal liability? (1994 Bar)
A: Tata is a principal by inducement for the
crime of destructive arson because she
directly induced Yoboy and Yongsi for a price
or monetary consideration, to commit arson
which the latter would not have committed
were it not for such reason. Yoboy and
Yongsi are principals by direct participation
(Art. 17, pars. 21 and 3, RPC).
Q: Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his
.45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to
knock down Jepoy and end his
arrogance. When Jepoy came out, Jonas
immediately shot him with Jaja’s .45
caliber gun but missed his target. Instead,
the bullet hit Jepoy’s five year old son
who was following behind him, killing the
boy instantaneously. What is the criminal
liability of Jonas and Jepoy? (Question
reframed) (2000 Bar)
A: Jonas shall be convicted as principal by
direct participation and Jaja as co-principal
by indispensable cooperation for the
complex crime of murder with homicide. Jaja
should be liable as co-principal and not only
as an accomplice because he knew of Jonas’
criminal design even before he lent his
firearm to Jonas and still he concurred in that
criminal design by providing the firearm.
Q: A asked B to kill C because of a grave
injustice done to A by C. A promised B a
reward. B was willing to kill C, not so
much because of the reward promised to
him but because he also had his own
long-standing grudge against C, who had
wronged him in the past. If C killed by B,
would A be liable as a principal by
inducement? (2002 Bar)
A: No. A would not be liable as principal by
inducement because the reward he promised
B is not the sole impelling reason which
made B kill C. To bring about the criminal
liability of a co-principal, the inducement
made by the inducer must be the sole
consideration which caused the person
induced to commit the crime and without
which the crime would not have been
committed. The facts of the case would
indicate that B, the killer supposedly induced
by A had his own reason to kill C out of a long
standing grudge.
Q: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies,
Mr. White and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr.
Green with his former girlfriend, Ms.
Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red declared
in a loud voice that if he could not have
Ms. Yellow, no one can. He then
proceeded to the men’s room but told Mr.
White and Mr. Blue to take care of Mr.
Green. Mr. Blue and Mr. White asked Mr.
Red what he meant but Mr. Red simply
said, "You already know what I want," and
then left. Mr. Blue and Mr. White
proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt Ms.
Yellow.
1. What, if any, are the respective
liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr.
Blue for the death of Mr. Green?
2. What, if any, are the respective
liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr.
Blue for the injuries of Ms. Yellow?
(2014 Bar)
Answers:
(a) Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable for the
death of Mr. Green as principals by direct
participation. They were the ones who
participated in the criminal resolution and
who carried out their plan and personally
took part in its execution by acts which
directly tended to the same end. Mr. Red
cannot be held criminally liable as
principal by inducement because his
18 | P a g e
statement that Mr. Blue and Mr. White
are to take care of Mr. Green was not
made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime.
There is no showing that the words
uttered by him may be considered as so
efficacious and powerful so as to amount
to physical or moral coercion (People v.
Assad, G.R. No. L-33673, February 24,
1931). Neither is there evidence to show
that Mr. Red has an ascendancy or
influence over Mr. White and Mr. Blue
(People v. Abarri, F.R. No. 90815, March
1, 1995).
(b) Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable as
principals by direct participation for the
crime of physical injuries for hurting Ms.
Yellow to the extent of the injuries
inflicted. Having no participation in the
attack upon Ms. Yellow, Mr. Red would
have no criminal liability therefor.
Accomplice (2007, 2012 Bar)
Q: Ponciano borrowed Ruben’s gun,
saying that he would use it to kill Freddie.
Because Ruben also resented Freddie, he
readily lent his gun, but told Ponciano:
"O, pagkabaril mo kay Freddie, isauli mo
kaagad, ha." Later, Ponciano killed
Freddie, but used a knife because he did
not want Freddie’s neighbors to hear the
gunshot.
(a) What, if any, is the liability of
Ruben? Explain.
(b) Would your answer be the same if,
instead of Freddie, it was Manuel,
a relative of Ruben, who was killed
by Ponciano using Ruben’s gun?
Explain. (2009 Bar)
Answers:
(a) Ruben’s liability is that of an accomplice
only because he merely cooperated in
Pociano’s determination to kill Freddie.
Such cooperation is not indispensable to
the killing, as in fact the killing was carried
out without the use of Ruben’s gun.
Neither may Ruben be regarded as a co-
conspirator since he was not a participant
in the decision-making of Ponciano to kill
Freddie; he merely cooperated in
carrying out the criminal plan which was
already in place (Art. 18, RPC).
(b) No. The answer would not be the same
because Ruben lent his gun purposely
for the killing of Freddie only, not for any
other killing. Ponciano’s using Ruben’s
gun in killing a person other than Freddie
is beyond Ruben’s criminal intent and
willing involvement. Only Ponciano will
answer for the crime against Manuel.
Q: Who is an accomplice? (2012 Bar)
A: Accomplices are those persons who, not
being the principal, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts (Art. 18, RPC).
Accessory (1998, 2010, 2013 Bar)
Q: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake
went to his mother to seek refuge. His
mother told him to hide in the maid’s
quarters until she finds a better place for
him to hide. After two days, Jake
transferred to his aunt’s house. A week
later, Jake was apprehended by the
police. Can Jake’s mother and aunt be
made criminally liable as accessories to
the crime of murder? Explain. (2010, 1998
Bar)
A: Obviously, Jake’s mother was aware of
her son’s having committed a felony, such
that her act of harbouring and concealing him
renders her liable as an accessory. But being
an ascendant of Jake, she is exempt from
criminal liability by express provision of Art.
20 of the RPC. On the other hand, the
criminal liability of Jake’s aunt depends on
her knowledge of his commission of the
felony, her act of harbouring and concealing
Jake would render her criminally liable as
accessory to the crime of murder; otherwise,
without knowledge of Jake’s commission of
the felony, she would not be liable.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL (1988,
1990, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2004, 2006, 2012,
2013, 2016 BAR)
Q: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito
engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob
Disco, Special Police Officer 3 (SPO3)
Manolo Yabang suddenly approached
them, aimed his revolver at Sergio whom
he recognized as a wanted killer and
fatally shot the latter. Whereupon,
Yoyong Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on
Yabang, Warlito, using his own pistol,
shot and wounded Yabang.
What are the criminal libailities of
Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to
Yabang? Was there conspiracy and
treachery? (1992 Bar)
A: If they have to be criminally liable at all,
each will be responsible for their individual
acts as there appears to be no conspiracy,
as the acts of the three were spontaneous
and a reflex response to Yabang’s shooting
of Sergio. There was no concerted act that
will lead to a common purpose.
Q: As a result of a misunderstanding
during a meeting, Joe was mauled by
19 | P a g e
Nestor, Jolan, Reden, and Arthur. He ran
towards his house but the four chased
and caught him. Thereafter, they tied
Joe’s hands at his back and attacked him.
Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel;
Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a piece of
wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the
digging of a grave to bury Joe’s lifeless
body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together.
Convicted for the killing of Joe, Arthur
now claims that his conviction is
erroneous as it was not he who conflicted
the fatal blow. Would you sustain his
claim? (1993 Bar)
A: No. Arthur’s claim is without merit. The
offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the
victim and hence, liable collectively. The act
of one is the act of all.
The existence of a conspiracy among
the offenders can be clearly deduced or
inferred from the manner they committed the
killing, demonstrating a common criminal
purpose and intent. There being a
conspiracy, the individual acts of each
participant is not considered because their
liability is collective.
Q: State the concept of “implied
conspiracy” and give its legal effects.
(1998, 2003 Bar)
A: An implied conspiracy is one which is only
inferred or deduced from the manner of
participants in the commission of crime
carried out its execution. Where the
offenders acted in concert in the commission
of the crime, meaning that their acts are
coordinated or synchronized in a way
indicative that they are pursuing a common
criminal objective, they shall be deemed to
be acting in conspiracy and their criminal
liability shall be collective, not individual.
The legal effects of an implied conspiracy
are:
1. Not all those who are present at the
scene of the crime will be considered as
co-conspirators;
2. Only those who participated by criminal
acts in the commission of the crime will
be considered as co- conspirators; and
3. Mere acquiescence to or approval of the
commission of the crime, without any act
of criminal participation, shall not render
one criminally liable as co-conspirator.
Q: During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight
erupted in the public plaza. As a result of
the tumultuous affray, A sustained one
fatal and three superficial stab wounds.
He died a day after. B, C, D and E were
proven to be participants in the “rumble”,
each using a knife against A, but it could
not be ascertained who, among them,
inflicted the mortal injury.
Who shall be held criminally liable
for the death of A and for what? (1997 Bar)
A: B, C, D and E being participants in the
tumultuous affray and having been proven to
have inflicted serious physical injuries, or at
least, employed violence upon A, are
criminally liable for the latter’s death. And
because it cannot be ascertained who
among them inflicted the mortal injury on A,
there being a free-for-all fight or tumultuous
affray, B, C, D and E are all liable for the
crime of death caused in a tumultuous affray
under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code.
Q: Together XA, YB and ZC planned to rob
Miss OD. They entered her house by
breaking one of the windows in her
house. After taking her personal
properties and as they were about to
leave, XA decided on impulse to rape OD.
As XA was molesting her, YB and ZC
stood outside the door of her bedroom
and did nothing to prevent XA from raping
OD. What crime/s did XA, YB and ZC
commit and what is the criminal liability of
each? Explain briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: The crime committed by XA, YB and ZC is
the composite crime of Robbery with Rape, a
single, indivisible offense under Art. 294 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the conspiracy among the
offenders was only to commit robbery and
only XA raped CD, the other robbers, YB and
ZC, were present and aware of the rape
being committed by their co-conspirator.
Having done nothing to stop XA from
committing the rape, YB and ZC thereby
concurred in the commission of the rape by
their co- conspirator XA.
The criminal liability of all, XA, YZ,
and ZC, shall be the same, as principals in
the special complex crime of robbery with
rape which is a single, indivisible offense
where the rape accompanying the robbery is
just a component.
Q: Differentiate wheel conspiracy and
chain conspiracy. (2016, 2017 Bar)
A: There are two structures of multiple
conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle
conspiracy and chain conspiracy.
A “wheel conspiracy” occurs when
there is a single person or group (the hub)
dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
20 | P a g e
typically interacts with the hub rather than
with another spoke. In the event that the
spoke shares a common purpose to
succeed, there is a single conspiracy.
However, in the
instances when each spoke is unconcerned
with the success of the other spokes, there
are multiple conspiracies.
A “chain conspiracy”, on the other
hand, exists when there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
then retailer and consumer. (Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February
26, 2002)
PENALTIES (1988, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001,
2004, 2005, 2007 Bar)
Questions:
(a) State the two classes of penalties
under the Revised Penal Code. Define
each.
(b) May censure be included in a
sentence of acquittal? (1988 Bar)
Answers:
a) The two classes of penalties under
Article 25 of the RPC are as follows:
(a) Principal – A principal penalty is
defined as that provided for a
felony and which is imposed by
court expressly upon conviction.
(b) Accessory – An accessory
penalty is defined as that deemed
included in the imposition of the
principal penalty.
b) Censure may not be included in a
sentence of acquittal because a censure
is a penalty. Censure is repugnant and is
essentially inconsistent and contrary to
an acquittal (People v. Abellera, 69 Phil
623).
Q: Imagine that you are a Judge trying a
case, and based on the evidence
presented and the applicable law, you
have decided on the guilt of two (2)
accused.
Indicate the five (5) steps you would
follow to determine the exact penalty to
be imposed.
Stated differently, what are the factors
you must consider to arrive at the correct
penalty? (1991 Bar)
Answers:
a) Determine the crime committed;
b) Stage of execution and degree of
participation;
c) Determine the penalty
d) Consider the modifying circumstances;
e) Determine whether Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable or not.
Q: After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the
Manila RTC found Benjamin Garcia guilty
of Murder, the victim having sustained
several bullet wounds in his body so that
he died despite medical assistance given
in the Ospital ng Manila. Because the
weapon used by Benjamin was
unlicensed and the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was found to
be present. Judge Laya rendered his
decision convicting Benjamin and
sentencing him to "reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment".
Are "reclusion perpetua" and life
imprisonment be the same and can be
imposed interchangeably as in the
foregoing sentence? Or are they totally
different? State your reasons. (1994,
2001, 2005 Bar)
A: The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
penalty of life imprisonment are totally
different from each other and therefore,
should not be used interchangeably.
Reclusion perpetua is a penalty
prescribed by the RPC, with a fixed duration
of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to
40 years, and carries it with accessory
penalties.
Life imprisonment, on the other
hand, is a penalty prescribed by special laws,
with no fixed duration of imprisonment and
without any accessory penalty.
Q: Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7959, reclusion perpetua shall be
from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. Does
this mean that reclusion perpetua is now
a divisible penalty? Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: No, because the Supreme Court has
repeatedly called the attention of the Bench
and the Bar to the fact that the penalties of
reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are
not synonymous and should be applied
correctly and as may be specified by the
applicable law.
Reclusion perpetua has a specific
duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40 years
(Art. 27) and accessory penalties (Art. 41),
while life imprisonment has no definite term
or accessory penalties.
Also, life imprisonment is imposable
on crimes punished by special laws, and not
on felonies under the RPC.
Q: What are the penalties that may be
served simultaneously? (2007 Bar)
21 | P a g e
A: The penalties that may be served
simultaneously are imprisonment/destierro
and –
(a) Perpetual absolute disqualification;
(b) Perpetual special disqualification;
(c) Temporary absolute disqualification;
(d) Temporary special disqualification;
(e) Suspension from public office, the right to
vote and be voted for and the right to
follow a profession or calling;
(f) Fine; and any principal penalty with its
accessory penalties.
Principles, include R.A. No. 9346 – Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines (1988, 1997,
2004 Bar)
Q: What offenses, if any, may be punished
with the death penalty in our jurisdiction
at present? Explain. (1988, 1995 Bar)
A: At present, no offense may be punished
with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at
present.
The 1987 Constitution has abolished
the death penalty and the abolition affects
even those who has already been sentenced
to death penalty. Therefore, unless Congress
enacts a law, no offense may be punished
with the death penalty at present.
Application (2005, 2013 Bar)
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103,
as amended) (Refer to SPL Section)
Q: Roman and Wendy are neighbors. On
Valentine's Day, without prior notice,
Roman visited Wendy at her condo to
invite her to dinner, but Wendy turned him
down and abruptly left, leaving her condo
door unlocked.
Roman attempted to follow, but
appeared to have second thoughts; he
simply went back to Wendy's condo, let
himself in, and waited for her return. On
Wendy's arrival later that evening, Roman
grabbed her from behind and, with a knife
in hand, forced her to undress.
Wendy had no choice but to
comply. Roman then tied Wendy's hands
to her bed and sexually assaulted her five
(5) times that night. Roman was charged
with, and was convicted of, five (5) counts
of rape, but the judge did not impose the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
Instead, the judge sentenced
Roman to 40 years of imprisonment on
the basis of the three- fold rule. Was the
judge correct? (2013 Bar)
A: No, the three-fold rule is applicable only
in connection with the service of the
sentence not in the imposition of the proper
penalties.
The court must impose all penalties for all the
crimes for which the accused have been
found guilty. Thus, the court should not make
a computation in its decision and sentence
the accused to not more than the three-fold
of the most severe of the penalties
imposable.
The computation under the three-fold rule is
for the prison authorities to make.
Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law
that imposes a penalty of fine or
imprisonment or both fine and
imprisonment. The judge sentenced them
to pay the fine, jointly and severally, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
a) Is the penalty proper? Explain.
b) May the judge impose an
alternative penalty of fine or
imprisonment? Explain. (2005 Bar)
Answers:
(a) No. The penalty should be imposed
individually on every person accused of
the crime. Any of the convicted accused
who is insolvent and unable to pay the
fine, shall serve the subsidiary
imprisonment.
(b) No. Although the law may prescribe an
alternative penalty for a crime, it does not
mean that the court may impose the
alternative penalties at the same time.
The sentence must be definite.
Otherwise, the judgment cannot attain
finality.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES
EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
(1988, 1990, 2004, 2015 BAR)
Questions:
(a) How is criminal liability totally
extinguished? (1988, 1990 Bar)
(b) How is criminal liability partially
extinguished?
(c) If an accused is acquitted does it
necessarily follow that no civil liability
arising from the acts complained of
may be awarded in the same
judgment? Explain briefly. (1988 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the following causes of total
extinction of criminal liability:
22 | P a g e
 Death of the convict as to personal
penalties, as to the pecuniary
liabilities, liability therefore is
extinguished only when death
occurs before final judgment
 Service of sentence
 Amnesty
 Absolute pardon
 Prescription of the crime
 Prescription of the penalty
 Marriage of the offended woman as
provided in Article 344.
(B) Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the following causes of the
partial extinction of criminal liability.
 Conditional pardon.
 Commutation of sentence\Good
conduct allowance during
confinement.
 Parole
 Probation
(C) If an accused is acquitted, it does not
necessarily follow that no civil liability
arising from the acts complained of may
be awarded in the same judgment
except: If there is an express waiver of
the liability; and if there is a reservation to
file a separate civil action (Rule 107;
Padilla v. CA, People v. Jalandoni).
Q: AX was convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The
trial court sentenced him to a prison term
as well as to pay P150, 000 as civil
indemnity and damages. While his appeal
was pending, AX met a fatal accident. He
left a young widow, 2 children, and a
million-peso estate. What is the effect, if
any, of his death on his criminal as well
as civil liability? Explain briefly. (2004
Bar)
A: The death of AX while his appeal
from the judgment of the trial court is
pending, extinguishes his criminal liability.
The civil liability insofar as it arises from the
crime and recoverable under the RPC is also
extinguished; but indemnity and damages
may be recovered in a civil action if
predicated on a source of obligation under
Art. 1157, NCC, such as law, contracts,
quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts, but not on
the basis of delicts (People v. Balagtas, 236
SCRA 239).
Prescription of crimes (1987, 1990, 1993,
1994, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2010,
2015 Bar)
Q: B imitated the signature of A,
registered owner of a lot, in a special
power of attorney naming him (B) as his
attorney-in-fact of A. On February 13,
1964, B mortgaged the lot to a bank using
the special power of attorney to obtain a
loan. On the same day, both the special
power of attorney and the mortgage
contract were duly registered in the
Registry of Deeds. Because of B’s failure
to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage
and the lot was sold to X in whose name
a new title was issued. In March, 1974, A
discovered that the property was already
registered in the name of X because of an
ejectment case filed against him by X.
If you were the counsel of B, what would
be your defense? Discuss. (1993 Bar)
A: My defense will be prescription because
the crime was committed in 1964 and almost
twenty-nine years had already elapsed
since then. Even if we take Falsification and
Estafa individually, they have already
prescribed.
It is to be noted that when it comes to
discovery, the fact that the crime was
discovered in 1964 will be of no moment
because the offended party is considered to
have constructive notice on the forgery after
the Deed of Sale, where his signature had
been falsified was registered in the office of
the Register of Deeds (Cabral v. Puno, 70
SCRA 606).
Q: On January 1990, while 5-year old
Albert was urinating at the back of their
house, he heard a strange noise coming
from the kitchen of their neighbor and
playmate, Ara.
When he peeped inside, he saw
Mina, Ara’s stepmother, very angry and
strangling the 5-year old Ara to death.
Albert saw Mina carry the dead body of
Ara, place it inside the trunk of her car and
drive away. The dead body of Ara was
never found. Mina spread the news in the
neighborhood that Ara went to live with
her grandparents in Ormoc.
For fear of his life, Albert did not
tell anyone, even his parents and
relatives. 20 and 1⁄2 years after the
incident, and right after his graduation in
Criminology, Albert reported the crime to
NBI authorities. The crime of homicide
prescribes in 20 years.
Can the State still prosecute Mina
for the death of Ara despite the lapse of
20 and 1⁄2 years? Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: Yes. The State can still prosecute Mina for
the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 &
1⁄2 years. Under Article 91, RPC, the period
of prescription commences to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the
23 | P a g e
offended party, the authorities or their
agents.
In the case at bar, the commission of
the crime was known only to Albert, who was
not the offended party nor an authority or an
agent of an authority. It was discovered by
the NBI Authorities only when Albert
revealed to them the commission of the
crime.
Hence, the period of prescription of
20 years for homicide commenced to run
only from the time Albert revealed the same
to the NBI Authorities.
Q: On June 1, 1988, a complaint for
concubinage committed in February 1987
was filed against Roberto in the Municipal
Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite for purposes
of preliminary investigation. For various
reasons, it was only on July 3, 1998 when
the judge of said court decided the case
by dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction
since the crime was committed in Manila.
The case was subsequently filed
with the City Fiscal of Manila but it was
dismissed on the ground that the crime
had already prescribed. The law provides
that the crime of concubinage prescribes
in ten (10) years. Was the dismissal by the
fiscal correct? Explain. (2001 Bar)
A: No. The fiscal’s dismissal of the case on
alleged prescription is not correct. The filing
of the complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court, although only for preliminary
investigation, interrupted and suspended
the period of prescription inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of a court in a criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information, not by the result of
proof (People v. Galano, 75 SCRA 193).
Q: A killed his wife and buried her in their
backyard. He immediately went into
hiding in the mountains. Three years
later, the bones of A’s wife were
discovered by X, the gardener.
Since X had a standing warrant of
arrest, he hid the bones in an old clay jar
and kept quiet about it. After two years, Z,
the caretaker, found the bones and
reported the matter to the police. After 15
years of hiding, A left the country but
returned three years later to take care of
his ailing sibling.
Six years thereafter, he was
charged with parricide but raised the
defense of prescription.
(a) Under the Revised Penal Code,
when does the period of
prescription of a crime commence
to run?
(b) When is it interrupted?
 (c) Is A’s defense tenable? Explain.
(2000, 2004, 2009, 2010 Bar)
Answers:
(a) Generally, the period of prescription of a
crime commences to run from the date it
was committed; but if the crime was
committed clandestinely, the period of
prescription of the crimes under the RPC
commence to run from the day on which
the crime was discovered (the discovery
rule) by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents (Art. 91, RPC).
(b) The running of the prescriptive period of
the crime is interrupted when “any kind of
investigative proceedings is instituted
against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution.”
(Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No.
167571, November 25, 2008)
(c) No, the defense of prescription of the
crime is not tenable. The crime
committed is parricide which prescribes
in twenty (20) years (Art. 90, RPC).
It was only when the caretaker, Z,
found the victim’s bones and reported the
matter to the police that the crime is
deemed legally discovered by the
authorities or their agents and thus the
prescriptive period of the crime
commenced to run.
When A left the country and returned
only after three (3) years, the running of
the prescriptive period of the crime is
interrupted and suspended because
prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC).
Since A had been in hiding for 15
years after the commission of the crime
and the prescriptive period starting
running only after 5 years from such
commission when the crime was
discovered, only 10 years lapsed and 3
years thereof should be deducted when
the prescriptive period was interrupted
and suspended.
Hence, the 3 years when A was out
of the Philippines should be deducted
from the 10 years after the prescription
starts running. Adding the 7 years of
prescription and the 6 years that lapsed
before the case was filed, only a total of
thirteen (13) years of the prescriptive
period had lapsed. Hence, the crime has
not yet prescribed.
Q: Taylor was convicted of a violation of
the Election Code, and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of one year as
24 | P a g e
minimum, to three years as maximum.
The decision of the trial court was
affirmed on appeal and became final and
executory.
Taylor failed to appear when
summoned for execution of judgment,
prompting the judge to issue an order for
his arrest. Taylor was able to use the
backdoor and left for the United States.
Fifteen years later, Taylor returned to
the Philippines and filed a Motion to
Quash the warrant of arrest against him,
on the ground that the penalty imposed
against him had already prescribed.
(a) If you were the judge, would you
grant Taylor's Motion to Quash?
Explain.
(b) Assuming that instead of the
United States, Taylor was able to
go to another country with which
the Philippines had no extradition
treaty, will your answer be the
same? Explain. (2015 Bar)
Answers:
(A) If I were the judge, I will deny the motion
to quash. Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under
said provision, it shall commence to
run from the date the felon evades the
service of his sentence. Pursuant to
Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of
service of sentence can be committed
only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his
sentence.
Taylor never served a single minute
of his sentence, and thus, prescription
never started to run in his favor. Clearly,
one who has not been committed to
prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom (Del Castillo v. Torrecampo,
G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002).
(B) Even if Taylor was able to go to another
country which the Philippines had no
extradition treaty, I will still deny the
motion to quash.
Going to a foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty
to interrupt the running of prescription is
not applicable nor even material
because the period of prescription is not
applicable nor even material because the
period of prescription had not
commenced to run in the first place;
hence, there is nothing to interrupt. (THIS
ANSWER IS FOR REVISION)
Pardon and Amnesty (2006, 2009)
Q: Enumerate the differences between
pardon and amnesty. (2006 Bar)
A: The following are the differences between
pardon and amnesty:
In pardon, the convict is excused from
serving the sentence but the effects of
conviction remain unless expressly remitted
by the pardon; hence, for pardon to be valid
there must be a sentence already final
and executory at the time the same is
granted.
Moreover, the grant is in favor of
individual convicted offenders, not to a
class of convicted offenders; and the crimes
subject of the grant may be common crimes
or political crimes.
Finally, the grant is a private act of
the Chief Executive which does not require
the concurrence of any other public officer or
office.
In amnesty, the criminal conviction of
the act constituting the crime is erased, as
though such act was innocent when
committed; hence, the effects of the
conviction are obliterated. Amnesty is
granted is in favor of a class of convicted
offenders, not to individual convicted
offenders; and the crimes involved are
generally political offenses, not common
crimes.
Amnesty is a public act that
requires the conformity or concurrence of
the Philippine Senate.
CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
(1987, 1990, 1991, 1992 BAR)
Q: Rico was convicted of raping Letty, his
former sweetheart, by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila and he was ordered to
serve the penalty of life imprisonment, to
indemnify Letty in the amount of P30,
000.00 and to support their offspring.
Pending appeal in the Supreme
Court, Rico died. His widow, Bernie,
moved for a dismissal of the case. What
is the legal effect of Rico’s death on his
civil liability? State your reasons. (1990
Bar)
A: The civil liability of Rico survives.
(People v. Tirol, G.R. L- 30588, January
31, 1981, People v. Naboa, et. al., 132
SCRA 410) (THIS ANSWER IS FOR
REVISION)
PART 2.
REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK 2
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
25 | P a g e
Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters (2006, 2008 Bar)
Q: The inter-island vessel M/V Viva Lines
I, while cruising off Batanes, was forced
to seek shelter at the harbor of
Kaoshiung, Taiwan because of a strong
typhoon.
While anchored in said harbor,
Max, Baldo and Bogart arrived in a
speedboat, fired a bazooka at the bow of
the vessel, boarded it and divested the
passengers of their money and jewelry.
A passenger of M/V Viva Lines I,
Dodong took advantage of the confusion
to settle an old grudge with another
passenger, and killed him. After their
apprehension, all four were charged with
qualified piracy before a Philippine court.
(A) Was the charge of qualified piracy
against the three person (Max,
Badong & Bogart) who boarded the
inter-island vessel correct? Explain.
(B) Was Dodong correctly charged before
the Philippine court for qualified
piracy? Explain. (2008 Bar)
Answers:
(A) No. Dodong was not correctly charged
with qualified piracy because committing
piracy was never in his mind nor did he
have any involvement in the piracy
committed.
He merely took advantage of the
situation in killing the passenger. He
should be charged with murder since
there was evident premeditation and
intent to kill.
(B) The charge is correct. Qualified Piracy
was committed when the offenders
seized the vessels by firing on or
boarding the same. In the problem, they
even went further by divesting the
passengers of their money and jewelry.
The vessel was anchored in the
Harbour of Kaoshioung, Taiwan and it is
submitted that the crime was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of another
country.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the
high seas contemplated under Art. 122
of the RPC include the three-mile limit of
any state (People v. Lol- lo, G.R. No.
17958, February 27, 1922).
Moreover, piracy is an offense that
can be tried anywhere because it is a
crime against the Law of Nations.
Q: While SS Nagoya Maru was negotiating
the sea route from Hongkong towards
Manila, and while still 300 miles from
Aparri, Cagayan, its engine
malfunctioned.
The Captain ordered the ship to stop for
emergency repairs lasting for almost 15
hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and
crew fell asleep. While the ship was
anchored, a motorboat manned by
renegade Ybanags from Claveria,
Cagayan, passed by and took advantage
of the situation. They cut the ship’s
engines and took away several heavy
crates of electrical equipment and loaded
them in their motorboat. Then they left
hurriedly towards Aparri. At daybreak, the
crew found that a robbery took place.
They radioed the Aparri Port Authorites
resulting in the apprehension of the
culprits.
(A) What crime was committed? Explain.
(B) Supposing that while the robbery was
taking place, the culprits stabbed a
member of the crew while sleeping.
What crime was committed? Explain.
(2006 Bar)
Answers:
(A) The crime committed was piracy under
Art. 122, Revised Penal Code, the
essence of which is robbery directed
against a vessel and/or its cargoes. The
taking of the several heavy crates of
electrical equipment from a vessel at sea,
was effected by force and undoubtedly
with intent to gain. It is of no moment
that the vessel was anchored when
deprecated so long as it was at sea.
(B) The crime was qualified piracy under
Art. 123 of the RPC because it was
attended by a killing committed by the
same culprits against a member of the
crew of the vessel.
Treason
Q: The brothers Roberto and Ricardo
Ratute, both Filipino citizens, led a group
of armed men in seizing a southern island
in the Philippines, and declaring war
against the duly constituted government
of the country. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), led by its Chief of Staff,
General Riturban, responded and a full
scale war ensued between the AFP and
the armed men led by the brothers. The
armed conflict raged for months.
When the brothers-led armed men were
running out of supplies, Ricalde, also a
Filipino, and a good friend and supporter
of the Ratute brothers, was tasked to
leave for abroad in order to solicit arms
26 | P a g e
and funding for the cash-strapped
brothers. He was able to travel to Rwanda,
and there he met with Riboli, a citizen and
resident of Rwanda, who agreed to help
the brothers by raising funds
internationally, and to send them to the
Ratute brothers in order to aid them in
their armed struggle against the
Philippine government. Before Ricalde
and Riboli could complete their fund-
raising activities for the brothers, the AFP
was able to reclaim- the island and defeat
the Ratute-led uprising.
Ricalde and Riboli were charged with
conspiracy to commit treason. During the
hearing of the two cases, the government
only presented as witness, General
Riturban, who testified on the activities of
the Ratute brothers, Ricalde, and Riboli.
(2018)
(a) Can Ricalde and Riboli be convicted of
the crime of conspiracy to commit
treason?
A: No, they cannot be convicted of the crime
of conspiracy to commit treason. Treason is
a war crime. It can only be committed in times
of war. There must be actual hostilities. For
the same reason, conspiracy to commit
treason cannot be and will never be
committed in time of peace.
(b) Will the testimony of General
Riturban, assuming he can testify on
acts within his personal knowledge,
be sufficient to convict the Ratute
brothers, Ricalde, and Riboli?
A: Yes. Since the crime is not treason, the
two witness rule is not applicable. As long as
General Riturban has personal knowledge of
the crime, then he is qualified to become a
witness.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAW OF THE STATE
Arbitrary Detention or Expulsion, Violation of
Dwelling, Prohibition, Interruption, and
Dissolution of Peaceful Meeting and Crimes
Against Religious Worship
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND
EXPULSION (2006, 2008, 1992 BAR)
Q: Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-
Bago community in a police car with SP03
Caloy Itliong blew his whistle to stop a
Nissan Sentra car which wrongly entered
a one-way street. After demanding from
Linda Lo Hua, the driver, her driver’s
license, Menor asked her to follow them
to the police precinct. Upon arriving
there, he gave instructions to Itliong to
guard Lo Hua in one of the rooms and not
to let her out of sight until he returns; then
got the car key from Lo Hua. In the
meantime, the latter was not allowed to
make any phone calls but was given food
and access to a bathroom.
When Menor showed up after two
days, he brought Lo Hua to a private
house and told her that he would only
release her and return the car if she made
arrangements for the delivery of P500,
000.00 in a doctor’s bag at a certain place
within the next twenty- four hours. When
Menor went to the designated spot to pick
up the bag of money, he suddenly found
himself surrounded by several armed
civilians who introduced themselves as
NBI agents. What criminal offense has
Menor committed? Explain. (1992 Bar)
A: Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC
(Arbitrary Detention) he being a public officer
who detained, a person without legal
grounds. Violation of a traffic ordinance by
entering a one-way street is not a valid
reason to arrest and detain the driver. Such
only merits the issuance of a traffic violation
ticket. Hence, when Lo Hua was ordered to
follow the police officers to the precinct
(confiscating her license to compel her to do
so), and confining her in a room for two days
and prohibiting her to make phone calls, is a
clear case of deprivation of personal liberty.
Giving her food and access to the bathroom
will not extinguish or mitigate the criminal
liability.
Menor is further liable for robbery, because
money or personal properly was taken, with
intent to gain, and with intimidation. The
peculiar situation of Lo Hua practically forced
her to submit to the monetary demands of the
major.
Q: What are the 3 ways of committing
arbitrary detention? Explain each. What
are the legal grounds for detention? (2006
Bar)
A: The three (3) ways of committing arbitrary
detention are:
(a) by detaining or locking up a person
without any legal cause or ground
therefore purposely to restrain his liberty
(RPC, Art. 124);
(b) by delaying delivery to the proper judicial
authority of a person lawfully arrested
without a warrant (RPC, Art. 125); and
(c) by delaying release of a prisoner whose
release has been ordered by competent
authority (RPC, Art. 126).
27 | P a g e
In all the above-stated ways, the principal
offender should be a public officer acting
under color of his authority.
The legal grounds for detention are:
1. commission of a crime;
2. violent insanity or other ailment
requiring compulsory confinement in
an institution established for such
purpose.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
Rebellion, Coup d’etat, Sedition, and
Disloyalty
REBELLION(1991, 1994, 1998, 2004 BAR)
Q: In the early morning of 25 October
1990, the troops of the Logistics
Command (LOGCOM) of the AFP at Camp
General Emilio Aguinaldo headed by their
Operations Officer, Col.
Rito Amparo, withdrew firearms
and bullets and, per prior agreement,
attacked, in separate teams, the offices of
the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of
National Defense, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence and other offices,
held hostage the Chief of Staff of
LOGCOM and other officers, killed three
(3) pro- Government soldiers, inverted the
Philippine flag, barricaded all entrances
and exits to the camp, and announced
complete control of the camp. Because of
the superiority of the pro-Government
forces, Col. Amparo and his troops
surrendered at 7:00 in the morning of that
day.
Did Col. Amparo and his troops
commit the crime of coup d’etat (Article
134-A, RPC) or of rebellion? (1991 Bar)
A: Under the facts stated, the crime
committed would be coup d’etat (R.A. 6988
incorporating Art. 134-A).
However, since the law was not yet
effective as of October 25, 1990, as the
effectivity thereof (Sec. 8) is upon its
approval (which is October 24, 1990) and
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation, the felony committed
would be rebellion.
Q: VC, JG, GG, and JG conspired to
overthrow the Philippine Government. VG
was recognized as the titular head of the
conspiracy. Several meetings were held
and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered
by his conscience, confessed to Father
Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have
conspired to overthrow the government.
Father Abraham did not report this
information to the proper authorities. Did
Father Abraham commit a crime? If so,
what crime was committed? What is his
criminal liability? (1994 Bar)
A: No. Father Abraham did not commit a
crime because the conspiracy involved is
one to commit rebellion, not a conspiracy to
commit treason which makes a person
criminally liable under Art 116, RPC. And
even assuming that it will fall as misprision of
treason, Father Abraham is exempted from
criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 7, as his
failure to report can be considered as due to
"insuperable cause", as this involves the
sanctity and inviolability of a confession.
Conspiracy to commit rebellion
results in criminal liability to the co-
conspirators, but not to a person who learned
of such and did not report to the proper
authorities (US v. Vergara, 3 Phil. 432;
People vs. Atienza, 56 Phil. 353).
COUP D’ ETAT
(BAR 1988, 1991, 1998, 2002 BAR)
Q: Distinguish rebellion from coup d’etat.
(1991, 2004 Bar)
A: Rebellion distinguished from coup d’etat:
As to overt acts, in rebellion, there is public
uprising and taking up arms against the
Government.
In coup d’etat public uprising is not
necessary. The essence of the crime is a
swift attack, accompanied by violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
directed against duly constituted authorities
of the Government, or any military camp or
installation, communication networks, public
utilities, or facilities needed for the exercise
and continued possession of government
power.
As to objective or purpose, in rebellion, the
purpose is to remove from the allegiance of
the Philippines, the whole or any part of the
Philippines, or any military or naval camps,
deprive the Chief Executive or Congress
from performing their functions. In coup
d’etat, the objective is to seize or diminish the
state powers.
As to participation, in rebellion, any person
may commit. In coup d’etat, any person
belonging to the military or police or holding
public office, with or without civilian
participation may commit.
Q: Supposing a public school teacher
participated in a coup d'etat using an
unlicensed firearm. What crime or crimes
did he commit? (1998 Bar)
A: The public school teacher committed only
coup d'etat for his participation therein. His
use of an unlicensed firearm is absorbed in
28 | P a g e
the coup d'etat under the new firearms law
(R.A. 8294).
Q: If a group of persons belonging to the
armed forces makes a swift attack,
accompanied by violence, intimidation
and threat against a vital military
installation for the purpose of seizing
power and taking over such installation,
what crime or crimes are they guilty of?
If the attack is quelled but the
leader is unknown, who shall be deemed
the leader thereof? (1998, 2002 Bar)
A: The perpetrators, being persons
belonging to the Armed Forces, would be
guilty of the crime of coup d'etat, under Art.
134-A of the RPC, as amended, because
their attack was against vital military
installations which are essential to the
continued possession and exercise of
governmental powers, and their purpose is to
seize power by taking over such installations.
The leader being unknown, any person who
in fact directed the others, spoke for them,
signed receipts and other documents issued
in their name, or performed similar acts, on
behalf of the group shall be deemed the
leader of said coup d'etat (Art 135, RPC).
SEDITION (1987, 2007 BAR)
Q: A, B, C, D, and E were former soldiers
who deserted their command in
Mindanao. Jose and Pedro, two big
landowners, called A, B, C, D, and E to a
conference. Jose and Pedro proposed to
these former soldiers that they recruit
their comrades and organize a group of
100 for the purpose of challenging the
government by force of arms in order to
prevent the enforcement or
implementation of the Land Reform Law
in Cotabato Province. Jose and Pedro
promised to finance the group and to buy
firearms for the purpose. The former
soldiers agreed. After Jose and Pedro left,
A, the leader of the former soldiers, said
that in the meanwhile he needed money to
support his family. D suggested that they
rob a bank and agreed to carry put the
plan on the 15th day of the month.
Unknown to all of them, as they were
conferring with Jose and Pedro and as
they were planning to rob the bank,
Rosauro, a houseboy was within hearing
distance. On the pretext of buying
cigarettes, Rosauro instead went directly
to the Police and told them what
transpired. All the former soldiers, as well
as Jose and Pedro, were arrested.
 (a) What crime, if any, did the
former soldiers commit?
(b) What about Jose and Pedro?
(1987 Bar)
Answers:
(A) The former soldiers committed the crime
of conspiracy to commit sedition. What
Jose and Pedro proposed to the soldiers
that they recruit their comrades and
organize a group of 100 for the purpose
of challenging the government by force of
arms in order to prevent the
implementation of the Land Reform Law
in Cotabato Province is to commit
sedition. Proposal to commit sedition is
not punished. But since the soldiers
agreed, a conspiracy to commit sedition
resulted which is now punishable.
Conspiracy arises on the very moment
the plotters agree (People v. Peralta, 25
SCRA 759).
(B) Jose and Pedro will also be liable for
conspiracy to commit sedition since they
are members of the conspiracy where the
act of one is the act of all. If the soldiers
did not agree to their proposal, they
would not incur any criminal liability
because there is no proposal to commit
sedition.
Q: What are the different acts of inciting
to sedition? (2007 Bar)
A: The different acts which constitute the
crime of inciting to sedition are:
1. Inciting others through speeches,
writings, banners and other media of
representation to commit acts which
constitute sedition;
2. Uttering seditious words, speeches or
circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines or any of
its duly constituted authorities, which
tend to disturb or obstruct the
performance of official functions, or
which tend to incite others to cabal and
meet for unlawful purposes;
3. Inciting through the same media of
representation rebellious conspiracies or
riots;
4. Stirring people to go against lawful
authorities, or disturb the peace and
public order of the community or of the
Government; or
5. Knowingly concealing any of the
aforestated evil practices (Art. 142, RPC)
ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND
DISOBEDIENCE TO PERSONS IN
AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS
(1993, 1995, 2001, 2002, 2013 BAR)
29 | P a g e
Q: A, a teacher at Mapa High School,
having gotten mad at X, one of his pupils,
because of the latter’s throwing paper
clips at his classmates, twisted his right
ear. X went out of the classroom crying
and proceeded home located at the back
of the school. He reported to his parents,
Y and Z, what A had done to him, Y and Z
immediately proceeded to the school
building and because they were running
and talking in loud voices, they were seen
by the barangay chairman, B, who
followed them as he suspected that an
untoward incident might happen. Upon
seeing A inside the classroom, X pointed
him out to his father, Y, who administered
a fist blow on A, causing him to fall down.
When Y was about to kick A, B rushed
towards Y and pinned both of the latter’s
arms. Seeing his father being held by B, X
went near and punched B on the face,
which caused him to lose his grip on Y.
Throughout this incident, Z shouted
words of encouragement at Y, her
husband, and also threatened to slap A.
Security guards of the school arrived,
intervened and surrounded X, Y and Z so
that they could be investigated in the
principal’s office. Before leaving, Z
passed near A and threw a small flower
pot at him but it was deflected by B.
(A) What, if any, are the respective
criminal liability of X,YandZ?
(B) Would your answer be the same if B
were a barangay tanod only? (2001
Bar)
Answers:
(A) X is liable for direct assault only,
assuming the physical injuries inflicted on
B, the Barangay Chairman, to be only
slight and hence, would be absorbed in
the direct assault. A Barangay Chairman
is a person in authority (Art. 152, RPC)
and in this case, was performing his duty
of maintaining peace and order when
attacked.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of
Direct Assault with Less Serious Physical
Injuries for the fist blow on A, the teacher,
which caused the latter to fall down. For
purposes of the crime in Arts. 148 and
151 of the RPC, a teacher is considered
a person in authority, and having been
attacked by Y by reason of his
performance of official duty, direct
assault is committed with the resulting
less serious physical injuries complexed.
Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may
only be liable as an accomplice to the
complex of crimes of direct assault with
less serious physical injuries committed
by Y. Her participation should not be
 considered as that of a co- principal,
since her reactions were only incited by
her relationship to X and Y, as the mother
of X and the wife of Y.
(B) If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act
of X of laying hand on him, being an
agent of a person in authority only, would
constitute the crime of Resistance and
Disobedience under Art. 151, RPC since
X, a high school pupil, could not be
considered as having acted out of
contempt for authority but more of
helping his father get free from the grip of
B. Laying hand on an agent of a person
in authority is not ipso facto direct
assault, while it would always be direct
assault if done to a person in authority in
defiance to the latter’s exercise of
authority.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Forgeries
Q: How are "forging" and "falsification"
committed?
A: Forging or forgery is committed by giving
to a treasury or bank note or any instrument
payable to bearer or to order the appearance
of a true and genuine document; or by
erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or
altering by any means the figures, letters,
words or signs contained therein.
Falsification, on the other hand, is
committed through –
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any
handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have
participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made
by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a
document
8. Purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists,
or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or
9. Intercalating any instrument or note
relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry, or official book.
Counterfeiting coins; Forging treasury or
bank notes, obligations and securities;
30 | P a g e
Importing and uttering false or forged
notes, obligations and securities.
Q: Is mere possession of false money
bills punishable under Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code? (1999 Bar)
A: No. Possession of false treasury or bank
note alone without an intent to use it, is not
punishable. But the circumstances of such
possession may indicate intent to utter,
sufficient to consummate the crime of illegal
possession of false notes.
Introduction of false documents
Q: M was forced by a policeman to sign a
document entitled “Sinumpaang
Salaysay” in which M implicated X as the
brain behind the robbery of a bank where
P500, 000.00 were lost.
The document was prepared by
the policeman upon advice of B, the
bank’s lawyer, who was present when the
policeman asked M to sign the document.
As M refused to sign it, the policeman
held him by the neck and forced him to
sign, which he did as he was afraid he
might be bodily harmed.
During the hearing of the robbery
before the Fiscal’s Office, B submitted the
“Sinumpaang Salaysay” as evidence, on
the basis of which X was included in the
information filed by the Fiscal in court.
When M testified in court, he
repudiated the document and told the
court there was no truth to its contents as
he was merely forced to sign it.
Did lawyer B commit any crime when he
used the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” as
evidence?
A: The lawyer would be liable under Article
172 of the RPC for the offense of introducing
a false document in a judicial proceeding as
he knew the same to be false.
Falsification of Public Document (1988,
1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2008, 2018 Bar)
Q: Robina bought from Ramsey a seaside
property located in Romblon. At that time,
she was in the process of returning to the
Philippines as a returning resident, after
retiring from her work in Russia, and was
planning to set up a diving school in the
area. In a non-notarized "Kasunduan ng
Pagbibili," Ramsey represented the
property as alienable and disposable, and
that he had a valid title to the property.
When the sale was completed, and as she
was applying for permits and licenses for
her school, she found out that the
property was a public non-alienable and
non-disposable land which Ramsey had
bought from someone who only had a
foreshore lease over the same. As she
was bent on setting up the diving school
in the area, having made all the
preparations and having already bought
all the equipment, she filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA)
with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) at the
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Romblon. In her
application, she stated that she was a
Filipino citizen, although she was still a
naturalized Russian citizen at that time. It
was only six months after she filed the
MLA that she filed her petition for dual
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. When
DENR discovered that, at the time of filing
the MLA, she was still a Russian citizen,
her application was denied and she was
charged with falsification of a public
document for misrepresenting herself as
a Filipino citizen. Infuriated, Robina also
filed charges against Ramsey for
falsification of a private document for
stating in their "Kasunduan" that the
property was alienable and disposable.
In the case for falsification of a public
document, Robina's defense was that, at
the time she filed the MLA, she had every
intention to reacquire Philippine
citizenship, as in fact she filed for dual
citizenship six months thereafter, and
that she had no intent to gain or to injure
the Philippine government since she
expected that her application for dual
citizenship would be approved before the
MLA could be approved. On the other
hand, she claimed in the action against
Ramsey that intent to gain was present
since he received the purchase price as a
result of his misrepresentation. Ramsey's
defense was that he had a valid Transfer
Certificate of Title in his name, and he had
a right to rely on his title. (2018)
(a) Will the case for falsification of public
document filed against Robina prosper?
A: No, it will not prosper. Robina is not liable
for falsification of public document. In this
case, at the time of the application for
Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) she
has no legal obligation to disclose her
citizenship as the truth of the facts narrated
in the application.
(b) Will the case for falsification of private
document filed against Ramsey prosper?
31 | P a g e
Q: Andrea signed her husband’s name in
endorsing his treasury warrants which
were delivered to her directly by the
district supervisor who knew that her
husband had already died, and she used
the proceeds to pay for the expenses of
her husband’s last illness and his burial.
She knew that her husband had
accumulated vacation and sick leaves the
money value of which exceeded that
value of the three treasury warrants, so
that the government suffered no damage.
Andrea’s appeal is based on her claim of
absence of criminal intent and of good
faith.
Should she be found guilty of
falsification? Discuss briefly. (1988 Bar)
A: Andrea should be held guilty of
falsification of public documents. Her claim of
absence of criminal intent and of good faith
cannot be considered because she is
presumed to know that her husband is dead.
The element of damage required in
falsification does not refer to pecuniary
damage but damage to public interest.
NB: Executive clemency can, however, be
sought for by Andrea.
Q: Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born
in Macao, having applied with a
recruitment agency to work in Kuwait,
went to Quezon City Hall to procure a
Community Tax Certificate, formerly
called Residence Certificate.
He stated therein that his name is
Leo Tiampuy, a Filipino citizen born in
Binan, Laguna. As he paid for the
Community Tax Certificate, Cecille
Delicious, an employee in the office
recognized him and reported to her boss
that the information written in the
Community Tax Certificate were all lies.
Shortly thereafter, an information was
filed against Dee Kiam alias Tiampuy.
(A) An information was filed against Dee
Kiam. What crime, if any, may he be
indicted for? Why?
(B) The accused move to quash the
information on the ground that it did
not allege that he had the obligation to
disclose the truth in the Community
Tax Certificate; that the same is a
useless scrap of paper which one can
buy even in the Quiapo underpass and
that he had no intent of deceiving
anybody. Would you grant the motion
to quash? (1992 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony
of Falsification of a Public Document
 committed by a private individual under
Art. 172 of the RPC in relation to Art. 171
thereof. A residence certificate is a public
or official document within the context of
said provisions and jurisprudence. Since
Dee Kiam made an untruthful statement
in a narration of facts (Art. 171(4), RPC),
and he being a private individual, he is
culpable thereunder.
(B) Falsification of public documents under
Arts. 171 and 172, RPC does not require
that the document is required by law. The
sanctity of the public document, a
residence certificate, cannot be taken
lightly as being a “mere scrap of paper”
Intent to cause damage or actual damage, is
not an indispensable requisite for falsification
of public document.
Q: A falsified official or public document
was found in the possession of the
accused. No evidence was introduced to
show that the accused was the author of
the falsification. As a matter of fact, the
trial court convicted the accused of
falsification of official or public document
mainly on the proposition that “the only
person who could have made the
erasures and the superimposition
mentioned is the one who will be
benefited by the alterations thus made”
and that “he alone could have the motive
for making such alterations”.
Was the conviction of the accused proper
although the conviction was premised
merely on the aforesaid ratiocination?
Explain your answer. (1999 Bar)
A: Yes. The conviction is proper because
there is a presumption in law that the
possessor and user of a falsified document is
the one who falsified the same.
Falsification of Private Document
(1989, 1991, 2007 Bar)
Q: In a civil case for recovery of a sum of
money filed against him by A, B
interposed the defense of payment. In
support thereof, he identified and offered
in evidence a receipt which appears to be
signed by A. On rebuttal, A denied having
been paid by B and having signed the
receipt. He presented a handwriting
expert who testified that the alleged
signature of A on the receipt is a forgery
and that a comparison thereof with the
specimen signatures of B clearly shows
that B himself forged the signature of A.
(A) Is B liable for the crime of using a
falsified document in a judicial
proceeding (last paragraph of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code)?
32 | P a g e
(B) If he is not, what offense of offenses
may he be charged with? (1991 Bar)
Answers:
(A) No. B should not be liable for the crime of
using a falsified document, under the last
paragraph of Art. 172, RPC. He would be
liable for forgery of a private document
under the second mode of falsification
under Art. 172, RPC. Being the
possessor and user of the falsified
document he is presumed to be the
forger or falsifier and the offense of
introducing falsified document is already
absorbed in the main offense of forgery
or falsification.
(B) If he testified on the genuineness of the
document, he should also be liable under
Art. 182, which is false testimony in civil
cases.
Q: Fe is the manager of a rice mill in
Bulacan. In order to support a gambling
debt, Fe made it appear that the rice mill
was earning less than it actually was by
writing in a “talaan” or ledger a figure
lower than what was collected and paid
by their customers. Fe then pocketed the
difference. What crime/s did Fe commit, if
any? Explain your answer. (2007 Bar)
A: If the “talaan” or ledger which Fe made to
show a falsehood was a private document,
the only crime that Fe committed was estafa
thru abuse of confidence or unfaithfulness.
Criminal liability for falsification of a private
document does not arise without damage or
at least proof of intent to cause damage. It
cannot co-exist with the crime of estafa which
also essentially requires damage or at least
proof of intent to cause damage.
Since the “talaan” was falsified to
cover up or conceal the misappropriation of
the amount involved, whatever damage or
intent to cause damage that will attend the
estafa.
If such “talaan” or ledger was a
commercial document, damage or proof of
intent to cause damage is not necessary.
The falsification alone if done with intent to
pervert the truth, would bring about criminal
liability for falsification of a commercial
document.
Damage or intent to cause damage,
would sustain the estafa independently of the
falsification of the commercial document. In
this case, two (2) separate crimes are
committed – estafa and falsification of the
commercial document. The falsification
should not be complexed with estafa since it
was not committed as a necessary means to
commit the estafa but rather resorted to, to
conceal or hide the misappropriation of the
amount she pocketed.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The crime
committed by Fe are theft and falsification of
private document because Fe’s possession
of the proceeds of the rice mill was only
physical, not juridical, possession, and
having committed the crimes with grave
abuse of confidence, it is qualified theft.
The falsification is a separate crime from the
theft because it was not committed as a
necessary means to commit the theft but
resorted to only to hide or conceal the
unlawful taking.
Simulation of birth
Q: A childless couple, A and B, wanted to
have a child they could call their own. C,
an unwed mother, sold her newborn baby
to them. Thereafter, A and B caused their
names to be stated in the birth certificate
of the child as his parents. This was done
in connivance with the doctor who
assisted in the delivery of C. What are the
criminal liabilities, if any, of the couple A
and B, C and the doctor? (2002 Bar)
A: The couple, A and B, and the doctor shall
be liable for the crime of simulation of birth
penalized under Article 347 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. The act of making
it appear in the birth certificate of a child that
the persons named therein are the parents of
the child when they are not really the
biological parents of the said child constitutes
the crime of simulation of birth.
C, the unwed mother is criminally
liable for “Child Trafficking”, a violation of
Article IV, Sec. 7 of RA 7610. The law
punishes inter alia the act of buying and
selling of a child.
False testimony (1987, 1991, 1993, 1994,
1996, 1997, 2005, 2008 Bar)
Q: Explain and illustrate “subordination
of perjury”. (1993 Bar)
A: Subordination of perjury refers to the act
of a person procuring a false witness to
testify and thereby commit perjury. The
procurer is a co- principal by inducement.
Q: Sisenando purchased the share of the
stockholders of Estrella Corporation in
two installments, making him the majority
stockholder thereof and eventually, its
president. Because the stockholders who
sold their stocks failed to comply with
their warranties attendant to the sale,
Sisenando withheld payment of the
second installment due on the shares and
deposited the money in escrow instead,
subject to release once said stockholders
comply with their warranties. The
33 | P a g e
stockholders concerned, in turn,
rescinded the sale in question and
removed Sisenando from the Presidency
of the Estrella Corp., Sisenando then filed
a verified complaint for damages against
said stockholders in his capacity as
president and principal stockholder of
Estrella Corp. In retaliation, the
stockholders concerned, after petitioning
the Securities and Exchange Commission
to declare the rescission valid, further
filed a criminal case for perjury against
Sisenando, claiming that the latter
perjured himself when he stated under
oath in the verification of his complaint
for damages that he is the President of
the Estrella Corporation when in fact he
had already been removed as such.
Under the facts of the case, could
Sisenando be held liable for perjury?
Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: No. Sisenando may not be held liable for
perjury because it cannot be reasonably
maintained that he wilfully and deliberately
made an assertion of a falsehood when he
alleged in the complaint that he is the
President of the Corporation.
Obviously, he made the allegation on
the premise that his removal from the
presidency is not valid and that is precisely
the issue brought about by his complaint to
the SEC.
It is a fact that Sisenando has been
the President of the corporation and it is from
that position that the stockholders concerned
purportedly removed him, whereupon he
filed the complaint questioning his removal.
There is no wilful and deliberate assertion of
a falsehood which is a requisite of perjury.
Q: A, a government employee, was
administratively charged with immorality
for having an affair with B, a co-employee
in the same office who believed him to be
single. To exculpate himself, A testified
that he was single and was willing to
marry B, He induced C to testify and C did
testify that B was single. The truth,
however, was that A had earlier married
D, now a neighbor of C.
Is A guilty of perjury? Are A and C guilty
of subordination of perjury? (1997 Bar)
A: No. A is not guilty of perjury because the
willful falsehood asserted by him is not
material to the charge of immorality. Whether
A is single or married, the charge of
immorality against him as a government
employee could proceed or prosper. In other
words, A's civil status is not a defense to the
charge of immorality, hence, not a material
matter that could influence the charge.
There is no crime of subornation of
perjury. The crime is now treated as plain
perjury with the one inducing another as the
principal inducement, and the latter, as
principal by direct participation (People v.
Podol, 66 Phil. 365).
Since in this case, A cannot be held
liable for perjury, the matter that he testified
to being immaterial, he cannot therefore be
held responsible as a principal by
inducement when he induced C to testify on
his status. Consequently, C is not liable as
principal by direct participation in perjury,
having testified on matters not material to an
administrative case.
Q: Al Chua, a Chinese national, filed a
petition under oath for naturalization, with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In his
petition, he stated that he is married to
Leni Chua; that he is living with her in
Sampaloc, Manila; that he is of good
moral character; and that he has
conducted himself in an irreproachable
manner during his stay in the Philippines.
However, at the time of the filing of the
petition, Leni Chua was already living in
Cebu, while Al was living with Babes Toh
in Manila, with whom he has an amorous
relationship. After his direct testimony, Al
Chua withdrew his petition for
naturalization. What crime or crimes, if
any, did Al Chua commit? Explain. (2005
Bar)
A: Al Chua committed perjury. His
declaration under oath for naturalization that
he is of good moral character and residing at
Sampaloc, Manila are false. This information
is material to his petition for naturalization.
He committed perjury for this wilful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood which is
contained in a verified petition made for a
legal purpose.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
(1996, 1993 BAR)
Q: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor
of a plush condominium in Makati City
sunbathed naked at its penthouse every
Sunday morning. She was unaware that
the business executives holding office at
the adjoining tall buildings reported to
office every Sunday morning and, with
the use of powerful binoculars, kept on
gazing at her while she sunbathed.
Eventually, her sunbathing became the
talk of the town.
34 | P a g e
(A) What crime, if any, did Pia commit?
Explain.
(B) What crime, if any, did the business
executives commit? Explain. (1996
Bar)
Answers:
(A) Pia did not commit a crime, the felony
closest to making Pia criminally liable is
Grave Scandal, but then such act is not
to be considered as highly scandalous
and offensive against decency and good
customs. In the first place, it was not
done in a public place and within public
knowledge or view. As a matter of fact it
was discovered by the executives
accidentally and they have to use
binoculars to have public and full view of
Pia sunbathing in the nude.
(B) The business executives did not commit
any crime. Their acts could not be acts of
lasciviousness (as there was no overt
lustful act), or slander, as the eventual
talk of the town, resulting from her
sunbathing, is not directly imputed to the
business executives, and besides such
topic is not intended to defame or put Pia
to ridicule.
Q: Juan and Petra are officemates. Later,
intimacy developed between them. One
day, Juan sent to Petra a booklet
contained in a pay envelope which was
securely sealed. The booklet is
unquestionably indecent and highly
offensive to morals. Juan was thereafter
charged under par. 3 of Art. 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D.
969, which provides that the penalty of
prision mayor or a fine from P6, 000to
P12, 000, or both such imprisonment and
fine shall be imposed upon those who
shall sell, give away or exhibit films,
prints, engravings, sculpture or literature
which are offensive to morals.
Is Juan guilty of the crime charged?
Reasons. (1993 Bar)
A: No. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged
because the law (Art. 201, RPC) covers only
the protection of public moral and not only
the moral of an individual.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC
OFFICERS
Bribery (1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001,
2005, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 Bar)
Q: During the presentation of the
prosecution's evidence, Reichter was
called to the witness stand with the stated
purpose that he would testify that his wife
Rima had shot him in the stomach with a
.38 caliber pistol, resulting in near fatal
injuries. Upon objection of the defense on
the ground of the marital disqualification
rule, the presiding judge (Judge Rossano)
disallowed Reichter from testifying in the
case. Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the People of the
Philippines went up on certiorari to the
Court of Appeals (CA) questioning Judge
Rossano's ruling.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered
judgment declaring Judge Rossano's
ruling void ab initio for having been made
with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
directing Judge Rossano to allow
Reichter to testify in the criminal case for
the stated purpose. This is based on the
fact that the marital privilege rule does
not apply where a spouse committed the
crime against the other.
As the CA decision became final and
executory, the criminal case before the
RTC was calendared for trial. At the
scheduled trial, the prosecution called
Reichter to the witness stand in order to
testify on the same matter it earlier
announced. The defense objected on the
ground that the CA erred in its disposition
of the certiorari case. Judge Rossano
sustained the objection and again
disallowed Reichter from testifying in the
criminal case. Repeated pleas from the
prosecution for Judge Rossano to
reconsider his ruling and to allow
Reichter to testify fell on deaf ears.
May Judge Rossano be convicted of a
crime? If yes, what crime did he commit?
(2018)
A: Yes, Judge Rossano may be convicted of
the crime of malicious delay in the
administration of justice. Delay is malicious
with deliberate intent because the judge
intent to inflict damage on either party in the
case.
Q: During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao
Shih was arrested for selling 20 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
to a poseur-buyer. Cao Shih, through an
intermediary, paid Patrick, the Evidence
Custodian of the PNP Forensic Chemistry
Section, the amount of P500, 000 in
consideration for the destruction by
Patrick of the drug. Patrick managed to
destroy the drug.
35 | P a g e
State with reasons whether Patrick
committed the following crimes:
(A) Direct bribery
(B) Indirect bribery
(C) Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act)
(D) Obstruction of Justice under PD
1829 (2005 Bar)
A: Patrick committed the crimes of direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code, Violation of Section 3 (e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA3019) and Obstruction of Justice under
Section 1 (b) of PD 1829.
(A) Direct bribery was committed by
Patrick when, for a consideration of
P500, 000.00, he committed a violation of
PD 1829 by destroying the drugs which
were evidence entrusted to him in his
official capacity.
(B) Indirect bribery is not committed
because he received the P500, 000.00
as consideration for destroying the
evidence against the offender, which was
under his official custody as a public
officer. The money was not delivered to
him simply as a gift or present by reason
of his public office.
(C) Patrick also violated Section 3 (e), R.A.
3019 causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith,
giving unwarranted benefit to the
offender by destroying evidence of a
crime.
(D) Obstruction of justice under Section 1
(b) of P.D. 1829 is committed by
destroying evidence intended to be used
in official proceedings in criminal case.
Indirect bribery
Q: Commissioner Marian Torres of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) wrote
solicitation letters addressed to the
Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce
and Industry and to certain CEOs of
various multinational corporations
requesting donations of gifts for her
office Christmas party. She used the
Bureau's official stationery. The response
was prompt and overwhelming so much
so that Commissioner Torres' office was
overcrowded with rice cookers, radio
sets, freezers, electric stoves and
toasters. Her staff also received several
envelopes containing cash money for the
employees' Christmas luncheon.
Has Commissioner Torres committed any
impropriety or irregularity? What laws or
decrees did she violate? (2006 Bar)
A: Yes. Commissioner Torres violated the
following:
(A) Indirect bribery (Art. 211, RPC) for
receiving gifts offered by reason of office.
(B) RA 6713 or Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees when he solicited and accept
gifts (Sec. 7[d]).
(C) PD 46 making it punishable for public
officials and employees to receive, and
for private persons to give gifts on any
occasion, including Christmas.
Q: A, who is the private complainant in a
murder case pending before a Regional
Trial Court judge, gave a judge a
Christmas gift, consisting of big basket of
assorted canned goods and bottles of
expensive wines, easily worth P10,
000.00. The judge accepted the gift
knowing it came from A. What crime or
crimes, if any, were committed? (1997,
1993 Bar)
A: The judge committed the crime of indirect
bribery under Art. 211 of the RPC. The gift
was offered to the judge by reason of his
office. In addition, the judge will be liable for
the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the
receiving of gifts by public officials and
employees on occasions like Christmas.
Qualified bribery
Q: What is the crime of qualified bribery?
May a judge be charged and prosecuted
for such felony? How about a public
prosecutor? A police officer? Explain.
(2010 Bar)
A: Qualified bribery is a crime committed by
a public officer who is entrusted with law
enforcement and who, in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift of offer, refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/ or death (Art. 211-A, RPC).
No, a judge may not be charged of
this felony because his official duty as a
public officer is not law enforcement but the
determination of cases already filed in court.
On the other hand, a public prosecutor may
be prosecuted for this crime in respect of the
bribery committed, aside from dereliction of
duty committed in violation of Art. 208 of the
Revised Penal Code, should he refrain from
prosecuting an offender who has committed
a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
and/or death in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present.
Meanwhile, a police officer who
refrains from arresting such offender for the
same consideration above stated, may be
36 | P a g e
prosecuted for this felony since he is a public
officer entrusted with law enforcement.
Corruption of Public Officer
Q: Ricky was driving his car when he was
flagged down by a traffic enforcer for
overspeeding. Realizing his undoing, but
in a hurry for a meeting, Ricky shoved a
PhP500 bill in the traffic enforcer's pocket
and whispered to the latter to refrain from
issuing him a traffic violation receipt. The
traffic enforcer still issued him a ticket,
and returned his money.
What crime, if any, was committed by
Ricky? (2018)
A: The crime committed by Ricky is
corruption of public officer. It is the act of the
giver in the crime of bribery. While the crime
was not consummated by reason of non-
acceptance of traffic enforcer, the mere act
of giving consummates this crime.
Malversation of Public Funds (1987, 1988,
1990, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006,
2008 Bar)
Q: Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer
of the town, was also the treasurer of a
charity ball of the church. Because he
was short of payroll funds for the
municipal employees, he used part of the
church funds to replenish the payroll
funds with the intention of returning the
same when the public funds came.
(A) Is Dencio guilty of malversation under
the RPC? State your reasons.
(B) Assuming that he failed to replenish
the church funds, may he be held
criminally liable thereby? (1990 Bar)
Answers:
(A) No. The church funds used by Dencio do
not constitute public funds which are the
proper subject of malversation. Neither
does said funds constitute the so called
private funds which could be the proper
subject of malversation under Art. 222,
RPC, which pertain to private property
placed in the custody of public officers by
reason of their office.
(B) Yes. Momentary use of funds, since
there is defraudation, is tantamount to
estafa under Art. 215 of the RPC. This is
because he received the funds in his
capacity as treasurer and there was
temporary damage caused. Personal
benefit is not an element of the crime of
estafa.

Q: Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by
the NBI an armalite rifle (M16) and a Smith
and Wesson Revolver Cal. 38. After a
year, the NBI Director made an inspection
of all the firearms issued. Randy, who
reported for work that morning, did not
show up during the inspection. He went
on absence without leave (AWOL).
After two years, he surrendered to
the NBI the two firearms issued to him. He
was charged with malversation of
government property before the
Sandiganbayan.
Randy put up the defense that he
did not appropriate the armalite rifle and
the revolver for his own use, that the
delay in accounting for them does not
constitute conversion and that actually
the firearms were stolen by his friend,
Chiting. Decide the case. (1994 Bar)
A: Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217,
RPC. He is accountable for the firearms they
issued to him in his official capacity.
The failure of Randy to submit the
firearms upon demand created the
presumption that he converted them for his
own use.
Even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation, his failure to account for
the government property is enough factual
basis for a finding of malversation.
Indeed, even his explanation that the
guns were stolen is incredible for if the
firearms were actually stolen, he should have
reported the matter immediately to the
authorities.
Q: Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of
Masinloc, Zambales. On January 10, 1994,
she received, as municipal treasurer,
from the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the amount of P100, 000.00
known as the fund for construction,
rehabilitation, betterment, and
Improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of
Barangay Phanix Road located in
Masinloc, Zambales, a project undertaken
on proposal of the Barangay Captain.
Informed that the fund was already
exhausted while the concreting of
Barangay Phanix Road remained
unfinished, a representative of the
Commission on Audit conducted a spot
audit of Elizabeth who failed to account
for the P100, 000 CRBI fund. Elizabeth,
who was charged with malversation of
public funds, was acquitted by the
Sandiganbayan of that charge but was
nevertheless convicted, in the same
criminal case, for illegal use of public
37 | P a g e
funds. On appeal, Elizabeth argued that
her conviction was erroneous as she
applied the amount of P50, 000.00 for a
public purpose without violating any law
or ordinance appropriating the said
amount for any specific purpose.
The absence of such law or
ordinance was, in fact, established.
Is the contention of Elizabeth legally
tenable? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: Elizabeth's contention that her conviction
for illegal use of public funds (technical
malversation) was erroneous is legally
tenable because she was charged for
malversation of public funds under Art. 217
of the RPC but was convicted for Illegal use
of public funds which is defined and punished
under Art. 220.
A public officer charged with
malversation may not be validly convicted of
illegal use of public funds (technical
malversation) because the latter crime is not
necessarily included nor does it necessarily
include the crime of malversation.
The Sandiganbayan should have
followed the procedure provided in Sec. 11,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and order the
filing of the proper Information (Parungao v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15,
1991).
From the facts, there is no showing
that there is a law or ordinance appropriating
the amount to a specific public purpose. As a
matter of fact, the problem categorically
states that the absence of such law or
ordinance was, in fact, established.
So, procedurally and substantially,
the Sandiganbayan's decision suffers from
serious infirmity.
Q: Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos,
were former warehousemen of the Rustan
Department Store. In 1986, the PCGG
sequestered the assets, fund and
properties of the owners-incorporators of
the store, alleging that they constitute "Ill-
gotten wealth" of the Marcos family. Upon
their application, Reyes and Santos were
appointed as fiscal agents of the
sequestered firm and they were given
custody and possession of the
sequestered building and its contents,
including various vehicles used in the
firm's operations.
After a few months, an inventory was
conducted and it was discovered that two
(2) delivery vans were missing. After
demand was made upon them, Reyes and
Santos failed to give any satisfactory
explanation why the vans were missing or
to turn them over to the PCGG; hence,
they were charged with Malversation of
Public Property. During the trial, the two
accused claimed that they are not public
accountable officers and, if any crime was
committed, it should only be Estafa under
Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
What is the proper offense committed?
State the reason(s) for your answer. (2001
Bar)
A: The proper offense committed was
Malversation of Public Property, not estafa,
considering that Reyes and Santos, upon
their application, were constituted as "fiscal
agents" of the sequestered firm and were
"given custody and possession" of the
sequestered properties, including the
delivery vans which later they could not
account for.
They were thus made the depositary
and administrator of properties deposited by
public authority and hence, by the duties of
their office/position, they are accountable for
such properties.
Such properties, having been
sequestered by the Government through the
PCGG, are in custodia legis and therefore
impressed with the character of public
property, even though the properties belong
to a private individual (Art. 222, RPC).
The failure of Reyes and Santos to
give any satisfactory explanation why the
vans were missing, is prima facie evidence
that they had put the same to their personal
use.
Q: Allan, the Municipal Treasurer of the
Municipality of Gerona, was in a hurry to
return to his office after a day- long
official conference. He alighted from the
government car which was officially
assigned to him, leaving the ignition key
and the car unlocked, and rushed to his
office. Jules, a bystander, drove off with
the car and later sold the same to his
brother, Danny for P20, 000.00, although
the car was worth P800, 000.00.
(A) What are the respective crimes, if any,
committed by Allan, Danny and Jules?
Explain.
(B) What, if any, are their respective civil
liabilities? Explain. (2005 Bar)
(C)
Answers:
(A) Allan, the municipal treasurer is liable for
malversation committed through
negligence or culpa. The government car
which was assigned to him is public
property under his accountability by
reason of his duties. By his act of
negligence, he permitted the taking of the
38 | P a g e
car by another person, resulting in
malversation, consistent with the
language of Art. 217 of RPC.
Danny committed the crime of
fencing for having bought the car which
was the proceeds of carnapping, a crime
in the nature of theft or robbery of motor
vehicle. The presumption of fencing
applies to him for he paid a price so
inadequate for the value of the car.
Jules committed the crime of
carnapping for the unlawful taking, with
intent to gain, of the government’s motor
vehicle. (Unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle is now governed by the Anti-
Carnapping Act, R.A. 6539, not by the
provisions of the RPC on theft or
robbery).
(B) Allan, Jules and Danny are all civilly liable
for restitution of the car to the
government or if not possible, reparation
of damages caused by payment of the
replacement cost of the car minus
allowance for depreciation, and to
indemnify consequential damages.
Infidelity of Public Officers
Custody of prisoners
(1989, 1990, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2009, 2014)
Q: Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable
to post a bail bond for his provisional
liberty pending trial of his case, he was
detained in the city jail. On the date of the
hearing of the estafa case, Daniel, a
policeman detailed in the city jail,
escorted Ernani to the city hall for the
trial. Daniel removed the handcuffs of
Ernani and allowed him to sit on one of
the chairs inside the courtroom. As Daniel
was talking to a lawyer inside the
courtroom, Ernani, with the help of a
cigarette vendor, Meynardo, who used his
cigarette container as cover,
surreptitiously moved out of the room
and escaped. Ernani and Meynardo went
to the comfort room for a while, then went
down the stairs and lost themselves in the
crowd. What crime/s were committed by
Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your
reasons. (1989 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is
not criminally liable for any offense. The
detention prisoner who escapes from
detention does not commit any crime. If
he were a convict by final judgment who
is serving a sentence which consists of
deprivation of liberty and he escapes
during term of his sentence, he would be
liable for Evasion of Service Sentence
(Art. 157).
(B) Daniel, the policeman, committed the
crime of Evasion thru Negligence, one of
the forms of Infidelity in the custody of
Prisoner (Art. 224), the essential
elements of which offense are:
 That the offender is a public officer
 That he has in his custody or
charge a prisoner, either detention
prisoner(s) by final judgment
 That such prisoner escaped from
his custody thru his negligence
All of these elements are present, Daniel,
a policeman detailed in the city jail, is a
public officer. As the escort for Ernani in
the latter’s trial, he had custody of charge
of a detention prisoner. Ernani escape
was thru his negligence because after
removing Ernani’s handcuffs and
allowing him to sit in one of the chairs
inside the courtroom, he should have
taken the necessary precautions to
prevent Ernani’s escape by keeping an
eye on him. Instead, he provided the
opportunity for the escape by talking with
a lawyer and not keeping watch over his
prisoner.
(C) Meynardo, not being a public officer, is
guilty of the crime of Delivering Prisoners
From Jails (Art. 156), which is committed
by any person who either removes from
any jail or penal establishment any
person confined therein, or who helps the
escape of such person by means of
violence, intimidation, bribery of other
means. The act of Meynardo in giving to
Ernani his cigarette container is helping
in the latter’s escape by other means.
Q: Amy was apprehended and arrested by
the Patrolman Bart for illegal parking. She
was detained at the police precinct,
underwent investigation, and released
only after 48 hours.
(A) Is Patrolman Bart liable for any
offense? Explain your answer.
(B) Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and
grappled with patrolman Bart, is she
criminally liable thereby? State your
reasons. (1990 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code –
Delay on the Delivery of Detained
Persons to the Proper Judicial
Authorities.
(B) She is criminally liable for slight
disobedience under Art. 151 of the RPC
– Resistance and disobedience to a
person in authority or the agents of such
person.
39 | P a g e
Q: During a town fiesta, A, the chief of
police, permitted B, a detention prisoner
and his compadre, to leave the municipal
jail and entertain visitors in his house
from 10:00 am to 8:00 pm. B returned to
the municipal jail at 8:30 pm. Was there
any crime committed by A? (1997 Bar)
A: Yes. A committed the crime of infidelity in
the custody of a prisoner. Since B is a
detention prisoner, as Chief of Police, A has
custody over B. Even if B returned to the
municipal jail at 8:30pm. A, as custodian of
the prisoner, has maliciously failed to
perform the duties of his office, and when he
permits said prisoner to obtain a relaxation of
his imprisonment, he consents to the
prisoner escaping the punishment of being
deprived of his liberty which can be
considered real and actual evasion of service
under Article 223 of the RPC (People v. Leon
Bandino, 29 Phil 459).
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Parricide (1994, 1996, 1997, 2003, 2006,
2015 Bar)
Q: Aldrich was dismissed from his job by
his employer. Upon reaching home, his
pregnant wife, Carmi, nagged him about
money for her medicines. Depressed by
his dismissal and angered by the nagging
of his wife, Aldrich struck Carmi with his
fist. She fell to the ground. As a result, she
and her unborn baby died.
What crime was committed by Aldrich?
(1994 Bar)
A: Aldrich committed the crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion. When Aldrich
struck his wife, Carmi, with his fist, he
committed the crime of maltreatment under
Art. 266, par. 3 of the RPC.
Since Carmi died because of the
felonious act of Aldrich, he is criminally liable
of parricide under Art. 246, RPC in relation to
Art. 4, par. 1 of the same Code.
Since the unborn baby of Carmi died
in the process, but Aldrich had no intention to
cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich
committed unintentional abortion as defined
in Art. 257, RPC.
Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich
produced two grave or less grave felonies,
he falls under Art. 48, RPC, i.e. a complex
crime (People v. Salufrancia, 159 SCRA
401).
Q: In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of
Manila, abandoned his wife and their son,
Ricky, who was then only three years old.
Twenty years later, an affray took place in
a bar in Olongapo City between Pedro and
his companions, on one hand, and Ricky
and his friends, upon the other, without
the father and son knowing each other.
Ricky stabbed and killed Pedro in the
fight, only to find out, a week later, when
his mother arrived from Manila to visit
him in jail, that the man whom he killed
was his own father.
(A) What crime did Ricky commit?
(B) Suppose Ricky knew before the killing
that Pedro is his father, but he
nevertheless killed him out of
bitterness for having abandoned him
and his mother, what crime did Ricky
commit? Explain. (1996 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Ricky committed parricide because the
person killed was his own father and the
law punishing the crime (Art. 246, RPC)
does not require that the crime be
knowingly committed. Should Ricky be
prosecuted and found guilty of parricide,
the penalty to be imposed is Art. 49 of the
Revised Penal Code for Homicide (the
crime he intended to commit) but in its
maximum period.
(B) The crime committed should be parricide
if Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro
is his father, because the moral basis for
punishing the crime already exists. His
having acted out of bitterness for having
been abandoned by his father may be
considered mitigating.
Q: Ana has been a bar girl/GRO at a beer
house for more than 2 years. She fell in
love with Oniok, the bartender, who
impregnated her. But Ana did not inform
about her condition and, instead, went to
Cebu to conceal her shame. However, her
parents drove her away so she returned
to Manila and stayed with Oniok in his
boarding house.
Upon learning of her pregnancy,
already in an advanced state, Oniok tried
to persuade her to undergo an abortion,
but she refused. Because of their
constant and bitter quarrels, she suffered
birth pangs and gave birth prematurely to
a live baby girl while Oniok was at his
place of work.
Upon coming home and learning
what happened, he prevailed upon Ana to
conceal his dishonor. Hence, they placed
the infant in a shoe and threw it into a
nearby creek.
However, an inquisitive neighbor
saw them and with the help of others.
Retrieved the infant who was already
dead from drowning. The incident was
reported to the police who arrested Ana
and Oniok.
40 | P a g e
The two were charged with
parricide under Article 246 of the RPC.
After trial, they were convicted of the
crime charged. Was the conviction
correct? (Bar 2006)
A: The conviction was incorrect because of
the following reasons:
(A) Under Art. 46, Civil Code, a newborn with
an intra- uterine life of less than 7 months
must live for at least 24 hours before it
may be considered born and hence,
before it may acquire personality of its
own;
(B) The newborn, therefore was still a fetus
when killed and was not yet a person.
Hence, the crime in law is abortion. It is
legally a fetus who was killed, not a
person or child because legally it has no
personality yet.
(C) Infanticide and parricide involves a killing
when the victim is already a person.
Murder (1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996,
1999, 2001, 2008, 2009 Bar)
Q: A, a 76-year old woman, was brought
to the hospital in a coma with slight
cerebral hemorrhage. An endotracheal
tube was inserted in her mouth to
facilitate her breathing. B, a hospital
janitor, removed the tube. The victim
started to convulse and bleed in the
mouth. Only the timely arrival of the nurse
prevented the patient’s death. The patient
was then transferred to another hospital
where she died the next day of cardio-
respiratory.
Is B criminally liable? If so, what crime
was committed? (1991 Bar)
A: Yes. B is criminally liable for Murder
(qualified by treachery) because the death of
A appears to be the proximate cause of the
overt acts of B.
A died of cardio-respiratory arrest
which evidently was brought about by the
convulsion and bleeding in the mouth of the
victim due to the removal by B of the
endotracheal tube twice. The two acts of B
can be considered as the result of one
criminal design.
In People v. Umaging, 107 SCRA
166, the Supreme Court ruled that removal of
the endotracheal tube is attempted murder,
qualified by treachery, because the patient
did not die.
Q: Define murder. What are the elements
of the crime? (1999 Bar)
A: Murder is the unlawful killing of a person
which otherwise would constitute only
homicide, had it not been attended by any of
the following circumstances:
1. With treachery or taking advantage of
superior strength, or with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward or
promise;
3. By means or on the occasion of
inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall
of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of an earthquake, eruption
of a volcano, destructive cyclone,
epidemic or other public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanely augmenting the suffering of
the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.
Q: Candido stabbed an innocent
bystander who accidentally bumped him.
The innocent bystander died as a result of
the stabbing. Candido was arrested and
was tested to be positive for the use of
“shabu” at the time he committed the
stabbing.
What should be the proper charge against
Candido? Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: Candido should be charged with murder
qualified by treachery because the
suddenness of the stabbing caught the victim
by surprise and was totally defenseless.
Being under the influence of dangerous
drugs is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime
(Sec. 25, RA 9165, Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Hence, the
penalty for murder shall be imposed in the
maximum.
Homicide (1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995,
1996, 2003, 2005, 2014 Bar)
Q: Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in
a street fight. Lino then suddenly drew his
balisong and lunged at Okito. In an effort
to break up the fight, Tommy tried to
snatch the balisong from Lino but not
before the latter had inflicted a wound on
Okito. As Lino withdrew the weapon and
attempted to stab Okito a second time,
Tommy tried to grab the weapon again. In
so doing, his left forearm was slashed. As
he succeeded in snatching away the
balisong with his right arm, it flew with
41 | P a g e
such force, that it hit Nereo, a passerby
who was seriously injured.
Explain your answers fully.
1. What is the criminal liability of Lino
with respect to Okito, Tommy and
Nereo?
2. In turn, is Tommy criminally liable to
Nereo? (1992 Bar)
Answers:
1. As far as Okito is concerned, Lino is liable
for frustrated homicide, assuming that
the wound suffered by Okito is such that
for reasons or causes independent of the
will of Lino (such as timely medical
attention) Okito would have died. If the
injury is not serious enough, the liability is
only attempted homicide.
Intent to kill is manifest because of
the use of a deadly weapon. For the
injury on the arm of Tommy, Lino is liable
only for physical injuries (serious, less
serious or slight, depending on the nature
of the injury).
Apparently, there is no intent to
kill.For Nereo, Lino should be liable for
serious physical injuries as the wounding
of Nereo was the natural and logical
consequences of Lino’s felonious act.
2. Tommy is exempted from criminal liability
for the injury to Nereo as he was
performing a lawful act with due care and
the injury was caused by mere accident
(Art. 12, par. 4), or that he was in lawful
exercise of a right (Art. 11, par. 6), that is,
defense of a stranger.
Q: In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after
some customers inside a nightclub
became unruly, guns were fired by a
group, among them A and B, that finally
put the customers back to their senses.
Unfortunately, one customer died.
Subsequent investigation revealed that
A’s gunshot had inflicted on the victim a
slight wound that did not cause the
deceased’s death nor materially
contribute to it. It was B’s gunshot that
inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased. A
contended that his liability should, if at
all, be limited to slight physical injury.
Would you agree? Why? (2003 Bar)
A: No. I beg to disagree with A’s contention
that his liability should be limited to slight
physical injury only. He should be held liable
for attempted homicide because he inflicted
said injury with the use of a firearm which is
a lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the
use of a firearm (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 187 SCRA 123).
Q: Belle saw Gaston stealing the prized cock
of a neighbor and reported him to the police.
Thereafter, Gaston, while driving a car, saw
Belle crossing the street. Incensed that Belle
had reported him, Gaston decided to scare
her by trying to make it appear that he was
about to run her over. He revved the engine
of his car and drove towards her but he
applied the brakes. Since the road was
slippery at that time, the vehicle skidded and
hit Belle causing her death. What is the
liability of Gaston? Why? (2005 Bar)
A: Gaston is criminally liable for homicide in
doing the felonious act which caused Belle’s
death, although the penalty therefor shall be
mitigated by lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed (Art. 13 [3],
RPC). The act having been deliberately done
with malice, is felonious and being the
proximate cause of Belle’s death, brings
about criminal liability although the wrong
done.
Rape (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002,
2004, 2009, 2018 Bar)
Q: The complainant, an eighteen-year old
mental retardate with an intellectual
capacity between the ages of nine and
twelve years, when asked during the trial
how she felt when she was raped by the
accused, replied “Masarap, it gave me
much pleasure.” With the claim of the
accused that the complainant consented
for a fee to the sexual intercourse, and
with the foregoing answer of the
complainant, would you convict the
accused of rape if you were the judge
trying the case? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: Yes, I would convict the accused of rape.
Since the victim is a mental retardate with an
intellectual capacity of a child less than 12
years old, she is legally incapable of giving a
valid consent to the sexual intercourse.
The sexual intercourse is tantamount
to a statutory rape because the level of
intelligence is that of a child less than 12
years of age. Where the victim of rape is a
mental retardate, violence or intimidation is
not essential to constitute rape (People v.
Trimor, G.R. 106541-42, March 31, 1995).
As a matter of fact, R.A. No. 7659, the
Heinous Crimes Law, amended Art. 335,
RPC, by adding the phrase “or is demented”.
Q: Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way
home to Quezon City which was driven by
Roger. Flordeluna noticed that Roger was
always placing his car freshener in front
of the car aircon ventilation but did not
bother asking Roger why. Suddenly,
42 | P a g e
Flordeluna felt dizzy and became
unconscious. Instead of bringing her to
Quezon City, Roger brought Flordeluna to
his house in Cavite where she was
detained for two (2) weeks. She was raped
for the entire duration of her detention.
May Roger be charged and convicted of
the crime of rape with serious illegal
detention? (2000 Bar)
A: No. Roger may not be charged and
convicted of the crime with serious illegal
detention.
Roger may be charged and convicted
of multiple rapes. Each rape is a distinct
offense and should be punished separately.
Evidently, his principal intention was
to abuse Flordeluna; the detention was
only incidental to the rape.
Q: A, a male, takes B, another male, to a
motel and there, through threat and
intimidation, succeeds in inserting his
penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is
A’s criminal liability? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: A shall be criminally liable for rape by
committing an act of sexual assault against
B, by inserting his penis into the anus of the
latter.
Even a man may be a victim of rape
by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, “when the offender’s penis is
inserted into his mouth or anal orifice.”
Q: Braulio invited Lulu, his 11-year old
stepdaughter, inside the master
bedroom. He pulled out a knife and
threatened her with harm unless she
submitted to his desires. He was touching
her chest and sex organ when his wife
caught him in the act.
The prosecutor is unsure whether to
charge Braulio for acts of lasciviousness
under Art. 336 of the RPC, for lascivious ;
or conduct under RA 7610 (Special
Protection against Child Abuse,
Exploitation, and Discrimination Act); or
for rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC.
What is the crime committed? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
A: The acts of Braulio of touching the chest
and sex organ of Lulu who is under 12 years
of age, are merely acts of lasciviousness and
not attempted rape because intent to have
sexual intercourse is not clearly shown.
(People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060,
December 11, 2013) To be held liable of
attempted rape, it must be shown that the
erectile penis is in the position to penetrate
(Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441, October
8, 2014) or the offender actually commenced
to force his penis into the victim’s sexual
organ. (People v. Banzuela, supra)
The same acts of touching the chest
and sex organ of Lulu under psychological
coercion or influence of her stepfather,
Braulio, constitutes sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610. (People v.
Optana, G.R. No. 133922, February 12,
2001).
Since the requisites for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code are met, in addition to
the requisites for sexual abuse under Section
5 of RA No. 7610, and the victim is under 12
years of age, Braulio shall be prosecuted for
acts of lasciviousness under the Revised
Penal Code but the penalty imposable is that
prescribed by RA No. 7610. (Amployo v.
People, G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005)
Under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,
when the victim (child subjected to sexual
abuse) is under 12 years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted (for acts of
lasciviousness) under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That the
penalty for lasciviousness conduct when the
victim is under 12 years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Q: With a promise of reward, Robert
asked Romy to bring him a young girl that
he (Robert) can have carnal knowledge
with. Romy agreed, seized an eight-year
old girl and brought her to Robert. After
receiving his reward, Romy left while
Robert proceeded to have carnal
knowledge with the girl. (2018 Bar)
(a) For what felony may Robert and
Romy be charged?
A: Robert and Romy are liable for statutory
rape and abduction. Robert is liable as
principal by direct participation in the crime of
statutory rape under Article 266-A by having
a carnal knowledge with a girl who is less
than 12 years old. On the other hand, Romy
is liable as principal by inducement since the
latter is the one who induced the child.
Further, they are both liable for abduction
under Article 342 of the RPC for having
abducted a woman against her will for lewd
design.
(b) Will your answer in (a) be the same if
the victim is a 15-year old lass who was
enticed, through cunning and deceit of
Romy, to voluntarily go to the house of
Robert where the latter subsequently had
carnal knowledge with her?
43 | P a g e
A: My answer would not be the same. Robert
shall be liable under Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 by
his act of promoting, facilitating or inducing
child prostitution by means of acting as a
procurer of a child prostitute for the purpose
of exploiting the latter or intending to exploit
said child for prostitution. On the other hand,
Romy shall be liable under Sec. 5(B) of RA
7610 by his act of committing act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND SECURITY
Kidnapping(1991, 2009, 2014, 2016)
Q: A charged B with the crime of rape.
While the case was pending in court, B,
together with his mother and brother,
overpowered A while riding a tricycle,
dragged her inside a carenderia owned by
them and detained her for two (2) days.
They demanded that she sign an affidavit
of desistance and reimburse B the sum of
P5, 000.00 which he paid to his lawyer in
the case. She was released only after she
signed the affidavit asking for the
dismissal of the case and delivered to B
P1, 000.00. She promised to deliver the
balance of P4, 000.00 thirty (30) days later.
What crime/s was/were committed by B,
his mother and brother? (1991 Bar)
A: This is Kidnapping with Ransom which is
kidnapping or illegal detention committed by
a private person for the purpose of extorting
ransom. Since the victim is a woman, it is
serious.
Q: A, with lewd designs, took a 13-year
old girl to a nipa hut in his farm and there
had sexual intercourse with her. The girl
did not offer any resistance because she
was infatuated with the man, who was
good-looking and belonged to a rich and
prominent family in the town. What crime,
if any, was committed by A? Why? (2002
Bar)
A: A committed the crime of Consented
Abduction under Article 343 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
The said Article punishes the
abduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18
years of age, carried out with her consent
and with lewd designs. Although the problem
did not indicate the victim to be a virgin,
virginity should not be understood in its
material sense, as to exclude a virtuous
woman of good reputation, since the
essence of the crime is not the injury to the
woman but the outrage and alarm to her
family (Valdepeñas v. People, 16 SCRA
871).
Trespass to dwelling
Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante
forced his way inside the house of
Mamerto. Jay, Mamerto’s son, saw Dante
and accosted him. Dante pulled a knife
and stabbed Jay on his abdomen.
Mamerto heard the commotion and went
out of his room. Dante, who was about to
escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered
injuries which, were it not for the timely
medical attendance, would have caused
his death. Mamerto sustained injuries that
incapacitated him for 25 days. What
crime/s did Dante commit? (1994 Bar)
A: Dante committed qualified trespass to
dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing
of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for
the assault on Mamerto. The crime of
qualified trespass to dwelling should not be
complexed with frustrated homicide because
when the trespass is committed as a means
to commit a more serious crime, trespass to
dwelling is absorbed by the greater crime
and the former constitutes an aggravating
circumstance of dwelling (People v.
Abedoza, 53 Phil 788).
Grave Threats and Coercion
(1987, 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999)
Grave Coercion
Q: Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing
his initials. He saw Roy wearing the said
necklace. Isagani asked Roy to return to
him the necklace as it belongs to him, but
Roy refused. Isagani then drew his gun
and told Roy, “If you will not give back the
necklace to me, I will kill you!” Out of fear
for his life and against his will, Roy gave
the necklace to Isagani. What offense did
Isagani commit? (1998 Bar)
A: Isagani committed the crime of grave
coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for compelling Roy,
by means of serious threats or intimidation,
to do something against the latter’s will,
whether it be right or wrong. Serious threats
or intimidation approximating violence
constitute grave coercion, not grave threats.
Such is the nature of the threat in this case
because it was committed with a gun, is a
deadly weapon.
The crime cannot be robbery
because intent to gain, which is an essential
element of robbery, is absent since the
necklace belongs to Isagani.
QUESTIONS:
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(A) Distinguish coercion from illegal
detention.
(B) Forcibly brought to the police
headquarters, a person was tortured
and maltreated by agents of the law in
order to compel him to confess a
crime imputed to him. The agents
failed, however, to draw from him a
confession which was their intention
to obtain through the employment of
such means. What crime was
committed by the agents of the law?
(1999 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Coercion may be distinguished from
illegal detention as follows: In coercion,
the basis of criminal liability is the
employment of violence or serious
intimidation approximating violence,
without authority of law, to prevent a
person from doing something not
prohibited by law or to compel him to do
something against his will whether it be
right or wrong; while in Illegal Detention,
the basis of liability is the actual restraint
or locking up of a person thereby
depriving him of his liberty without
authority of law. If there was no intent to
lock up or detain the offended party
unlawfully, the crime of illegal detention is
not committed.
(B) Evidently, the person tortured and
maltreated by the agents of the law is a
suspect and may have been detained by
them. If so and he had already been
booked and put in jail, the crime is
maltreatment of prisoner and the fact that
the suspect was subjected to torture to
extort a confession would bring about a
higher penalty, in addition to the
offender’s liability for the physical injuries
inflicted.
But if the suspect was forcibly
brought to the police headquarters to
make him admit the crime and
tortured/maltreated to make him confess
to such crime, but later released because
the agents failed to draw such
confession, the crime is grave coercion
because of the violence employed to
compel such confession without the
offended party being confined in jail. (US
v. Cusi, 10 Phil 143)
It is noted that the offended party was
merely “brought” to the police
headquarters and is thus not a detention
prisoner. Had he been validly arrested,
the crime committed would be
maltreatment of prisoners.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Robbery (1987, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000,
2001, 2012, 2018 Bar)
Q: Five robbers robbed one after the other
five houses occupied by different families
located inside a compound enclosed by a
six-foot high hollow block fence. How
many robberies did the five commit?
Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: The offenders committed only one robbery
in the eyes of the law because when they
entered the compound, they were impelled
only by a single indivisible criminal resolution
to commit a robbery as they were not aware
that there were five families inside said
compound, considering that the same was
enclosed by a six-foot high hollow block
fence. The series of robbery committed in the
same compound at about the same time
constitutes one continued crime, motivated
by one criminal impulse.
Q: A, brother of B, with the intention of
having a night out with his friends, took
the coconut shell which is being used by
B as a bank for his coins from inside their
locked cabinet using their common key.
Forthwith, A broke the coconut shell
outside of their home in the presence of
his friends.
(A) What is the criminal liability of A, if
any? Explain.
(B) Is A exempted from criminal liability
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code for being a brother of B?
Explain. (2000 Bar)
Answers:
(A) A is criminally liable for Robbery with
force upon things, because the coconut
shell with the coins inside, was taken with
intent to gain and broken outside of their
home (Art. 299 [b], [2], RPC).
(B) No. A is not exempt from criminal liability
under Art. 332 because said Article
applies only to theft, swindling, or
malicious mischief. Here, the crime
committed is robbery.
Q: A entered the house of another without
employing force or violence upon things.
He was seen by a maid who wanted to
scream but was prevented from doing so
because A threatened her with a gun. A
then took money and other valuables and
left. Is A guilty of theft or robbery?
Explain. (2002 Bar)
A: YES, A is liable for robbery because the
intimidation he employed on the maid before
the taking of the money and other valuables.
It is the intimidation of the person relative to
45 | P a g e
the taking that qualifies the crime as robbery,
instead of simply theft.
The non-employment of force upon
things is of no moment because robbery is
committed not only by employing force upon
things but also by employing violence against
or intimidation of persons.
Theft (1989, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2008,
2012, 2018 Bar)
Q: Sunshine, a “beauteous” colegiala but
a shoplifter, went to the Ever Department
Store and proceeded to the women’s wear
section. The saleslady was of the
impression that she brought to the fitting
room three (3) pieces of swimsuits of
different colors. When she came out of
the fitting room, she returned only two (2)
pieces to the clothes rack. The saleslady
became suspicious and alerted the store
detective. Sunshine was stopped by the
detective before she could leave the store
and brought to the office of the store
manager. The detective and the manager
searched her and found her wearing the
third swimsuit under her blouse and
pants. Was the theft consummated,
frustrated, or attempted? Explain. (2000
Bar)
A: The theft was consummated because the
taking or asportation was complete. The
asportation is complete when the offender
acquired the exclusive control of the personal
property being taken. In this case, when
Sunshine wore the swimsuit under her
blouse and pants and was on her way out of
the store, with evident intent to gain, the
taking constitutes theft and being complete,
it is consummated. It is not necessary that
the offender is in a position to dispose of the
property.
Q: Francis Garcia, a Jollibee waiter, found
a gold bracelet in front of his working
place in Makati and, upon inspecting it,
saw the name and address of the owner
engraved on the inside.
Remembering his parents’
admonition that he should not take
anything which does not belong to him,
he delivered the bracelet to PO1 Jesus
Reyes of the Makati quad precinct with
the instruction to locate the owner and
return it to him. PO1 Reyes, instead, sold
the bracelet and misappropriated the
proceeds.
Subsequent events brought out
the fact that the bracelet was dropped by
a snatcher who had grabbed it from the
owner a block away from where Francis
had found it and further investigation
traced the last possessor as PO1 Reyes.
 Charged with theft, PO1 Reyes
reasoned out that he had not committed
any crime because it was not he who had
found the bracelet, and moreover, it
turned out to have been stolen.
Resolve the case with reasons. (2001 Bar)
A: PO1 Reyes is criminally liable. His
contention that he has not committed any
crime because he was not the one who found
the bracelet and it turned out to be stolen
also, is devoid of merit. It is enough that the
bracelet belonged to another and the failure
to restore the same to its owner is
characterized by intent to gain.
The act of PO1 Reyes of selling the bracelet
which does not belong to him and which he
only held to be delivered to its owner, is
furtive misappropriation with intent to gain.
Where a finder of lost or mislaid property
entrusts it to another for delivery to the
owner, the person to whom such property is
entrusted and who accepts the same,
assumes the relation of the finder to the
owner as if he was the actual finder; if he
would misappropriate it, he is guilty of theft
(People v. Avila, 44 Phil 720).
Q: On the way home from work, Rica lost
her necklace to a snatcher. A week later,
she saw what looked like her necklace on
display in a jewelry store in Raon.
Believing that the necklace on display
was the same necklace snatched from her
the week before, she surreptitiously took
the necklace without the knowledge and
consent of the store owner. Later, the loss
of the necklace was discovered, and Rica
was shown on the CCTV camera of the
store as the culprit. Accordingly, Rica
was charged with theft of the necklace.
Rica raised the defense that she could not
be guilty as charged because she was the
owner of the necklace and that the
element of intent to gain was lacking.
(2018 Bar)
What should be the verdict if:
(a) The necklace is proven to be owned by
Rica?
A: Rica shall not be liable for theft. The
elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking
of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be
done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) that the taking be accomplished without
the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things. In the case at
bar, the second element is not present. Since
46 | P a g e
the said necklace is proven to be owned by
Rica, the crime of theft will not prosper.
(b) It is proven that the store acquired the
necklace from another person who was
the real owner of the necklace?
A: Rica shall be liable for theft. The elements
of theft are all present in this case. Rica took
a necklace belonging to the store, without the
consent of the owner, with intent to gain and
without the use of violence against or
intimidation upon persons or force upon
things.
Q: Wielding loose firearms, Rene and
Roan held up a bank. After taking the
bank's money, the robbers ran towards
their getaway car, pursued by the bank
security guards. As the security guards
were closing in on the robbers, the two
fired their firearms at the pursuing
security guards. As a result, one of the
security guards was hit on the head
causing his immediate death.
For the taking of the bank's money and
killing of the security guard with the use
of loose firearms, the robbers were
charged in court in two separate
informations, one for robbery with
homicide attended by the aggravating
circumstance of use of loose firearms,
and the other for illegal possession of
firearms.
Are the indictments correct? (2018)
A: No, the indictments are not correct. The
crime should only be robbery with homicide
because the use of loose firearm is only
considered as an aggravating circumstance,
the penalty imposed upon which shall be the
maximum of the corresponding penalty
provided by law.
Qualified theft (1992, 2002, 2006, 2018
Bar)
Q: Orphaned when still an infant, Rocky
lived under the care of his grandmother
Rosario. Now 18, Rocky entered
Rosario's bedroom who was then outside
doing her daily marketing. He ransacked
the bedroom and took Rosario's money
and valuables amounting to PhP100,000.
When Rosario came home, she found her
room in disarray, and her money and
valuables gone. She confronted Rocky,
who confessed to taking the money and
valuables in order to pay his debts. (2018)

(a) What crime, if any, did Rocky commit?
A: Rocky committed the crime of qualified
theft because of abuse of confidence. In this
case, Rocky committed the act while his
grandmother is outside and doing a daily
marketing.
(b) Does he incur criminal and/or civil
liability?
A: Yes, he istil incurs criminal and/or civil
liability. While Rocky is a direct descendant
of the offended party, qualified theft however,
is not among the exemption of crime
committed in crimes against property which
only includes theft, estafa and malicious
mischief.
Q: A fire broke out in a department store.
A, taking advantage of the confusion,
entered the store and carried away goods
which he later sold. What crime, if any, did
he commit? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: A committed the crime of qualified theft
because he took the goods on the occasion
of and taking advantage of the fire which
broke out in the department store. The
occasion of a calamity such as fire, when the
theft was committed, qualifies the crime
under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
Q: Forest Ranger Jay Velasco was
patrolling the Balara Watershed and
Reservoir when he noticed a big pile of
cut logs outside the gate of the
watershed. Curious, he scouted around
and after a few minutes, he saw Rene and
Dante coming out of the gate with some
more newly-cut logs. He apprehended
and charged them with the proper
offense.
What is that offense? Explain. (2006 Bar)
A: The offense committed is qualified theft
pursuant to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 330 and Sec.
68 of P.D. No. 705 defining the offense
committed by any person who directly or
indirectly cuts, gathers, removes or
smuggles timber or other forest products in
violation of existing laws, rules and
regulation, from any public forest reserves,
and other kinds of public forest or even
privately owned forest lands.
Q: A is the driver of B’s Mercedez Benz
car. When B was on a trip to Paris, A used
the car for a joyride with C whom he is
47 | P a g e
courting. Unfortunately, A met an
accident.
Upon his return, B came to know
about the unauthorized use of the car and
sued A for qualified theft. B alleged that A
took and used the car with intent to gain
as he derived some benefit or satisfaction
from its use. On the other hand, A argued
that he has no intent of making himself
the owner of the car as he in fact returned
it to the garage after the joy ride. What
crime/s, if any, were committed? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
A: The crime committed by A is carnapping.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now
covered by the Anti- Carnapping Law (RA
6539 as amended) and not by the provisions
on qualified theft or robbery. (People v.
Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004)
The concept of carnapping is the
same as that of robbery and theft. Hence,
rules applicable to theft or robbery are also
applicable to carnapping. (People v.
Asamuddin, G.R. No. 213913, September 2,
2015)
In theft, unlawful taking should be
understood within the Spanish concept of
apoderamiento. In order to constitute
apoderamiento, the physical taking must be
coupled with the intent oto appropriate the
object, which means intent to deprive the
lawful owner of the thing, whether
permanently or temporarily. (People v.
Valenzuela, G.R. No. 160188, June 21,
2007)
In this case, A took the car without the
consent of B with intent to temporarily
deprive him of the car. Although the taking
was “temporary” and for a “joy ride”, the
Supreme Court in People v. Bustinera
(supra), sustains as the better view which
holds that when a person, either with the
object of going to a certain place, or learning
how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes
possession of a vehicle belonging to another,
without the consent of its owner, he is guilty
of theft because by taking possession of the
personal property belonging to another and
using it, his intent to gain is evident since he
derives therefrom utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure.
Usurpation (1988, 1989, 1996, 2018 Bar)
Q: Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of
land in the foothills which he planted with
lanzones. On his last visit there, he was
shocked to discover that his land had
been taken over by a group of 15 families
whose members had forcibly driven away
his caretaker, had appropriated the fruits
for themselves, and were not threatening
to kill him should he try to eject them.
What crime should Jorge charge these 15
families? Explain. (1988 Bar)
A: Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2
separate crimes namely:
(A) Violation of Article 282, Grave threats.
(B) Violation of Article 312 which provides
that: “Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property. –
Any person who, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, shall
take possession of any real property or
shall usurp any real rights in property
belonging to another, in addition to the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence
executed by him, shall be punished by a
fine...”.
Q: A and B, both farmers, entered the land
owned by X and planted palay thereon.
When X came to know about it, he
confronted A and B and inquired why the
latter occupied his land and planted palay
thereon.
A, with a bolo in hand, replied that
the land belongs to the family of S, and
not to X and at the same time said, “If you
touch this land and my palay, blood will
flow on this ground.” Because of the said
remark, X went to the Chief of Police and
complained.
The Chief of Police filed a complex
crime of Usurpation of Real Property with
Grave Threats. What crime/s were
committed? (1989 Bar)
A: The crime committed by A and B is
squatting under PD 772 and not Usurpation
of Real Property because in the latter crime,
there must be violence against or intimidation
of persons employed in taking possession of
any real property or in usurping any real
rights in property belonging to another (Art.
312, RPC).
In this case, it appears that A and B
entered X’s land without the owner’s consent
or against his will but without any violence
against or intimidation of persons.
The crime of squatting is committed
by any person, who, with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the landowner,
succeeds in occupying or possessing the
property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other
purposes.
The threat uttered by A, not having
been used in the taking of possession of the
land, it is not absorbed in the crime of
48 | P a g e
squatting. When A threatened X that blood
will flow if X touches the land and his palay,
he committed the crime of grave threats by
threatening another with the infliction of a
wrong amounting to a crime.
Only A is criminally liable for the
crime of grave threats.
Q: A group of homeless and destitute
persons invaded and occupied the
houses built by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) for certain military
personnel. To gain entry to the houses,
the group intimidated the security guards
posted at the entrance gate with the
firearms they were carrying and
destroyed the padlocks of the doors of
the houses with the use of crowbars and
hammers. They claimed that they would
occupy the houses and live therein
because the houses were idle and they
were entitled to free housing from the
government.
For the reason that the houses were
already awarded to military personnel
who have been found to have fully
complied with the requirements for the
award thereof, NHA demanded the group
to vacate within ten (10) days from notice
the houses they occupied and were still
occupying. Despite the lapse of the
deadline, the group refused to vacate the
houses in question.
What is the criminal liability of the
members of the group, if any, for their
actions? (2018 Bar)
A: The members of the group are liable for
the crime of usurpation of real rights in
property under Article 312 of the RPC.
The elements are the following: a) that the
offender takes possession of any real
property or usurps any real rights in property;
b) That the real property or real rights belong
to another; c) That violence against or
intimidation of persons is used by the
offender in occupying real property or
usurping real property or usurping real right
in property; and d) that there is intent to gain.
In the case at bar, all the elements are
present. The members of the group took
possession of a property which is supposed
to be occupied by the members of certain
military personnel. They occupied the same
by means of violence against or intimidation
of person by using firearms and destroying
its padlock. And lastly their possession of the
is with intent to gain.
Arson (1994, 2000 Bar)
Q: One early evening, there was a fight
between Eddie Gutierrez and Mario
Cortez. Later that evening, at about 11
o’clock, Eddie passed by the house of
Mario carrying a plastic bag containing
gasoline, threw the bag at the house of
Mario who was inside the house watching
television, and then lit it. The front wall of
the house started blazing and some
neighbors yelled and shouted. Forthwith,
Mario poured water on the burning
portion of the house. Neighbors also
rushed in to help put the fire under control
before any great damage could be
inflicted and before the flames have
extensively spread. Only a portion of the
house was burned. Discuss Eddie’s
liability. (2000 Bar)
A: Eddie is liable for destructive arson in the
consummated stage. It is destructive arson
because fire was resorted to in destroying
the house of Mario which is an inhabited
house or dwelling.
The arson is consummated because
the house was in fact already burned
although not totally.
In arson, it is not required that the
premises be totally burned for the crime to be
consummated. It is enough that the premises
suffer destruction by burning.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
Adultery & Concubinage
(1991, 1994, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2018 Bar)
Q: A, a married woman, had sexual
intercourse with a man who was not her
husband. The man did not know she was
married. What crime, if any, did each of
them commit? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: A, the married woman, committed the
crime of adultery under Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, for
having sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband while her marriage is still subsisting.
But the man who had carnal knowledge of
her, not knowing her to be married, shall not
be liable for adultery.
Q: A is married. He has a paramour with
whom he had sexual relations on a more
or less regular basis. They meet at least
once a week in hotels, motels, and other
places where they can be alone. Is A
guilty of any crime? Why?
A: A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by
having sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife.
49 | P a g e
Having sexual relations on a more or
less regular basis in hotels, motels, and other
places may be considered scandalous
circumstances that offends public
conscience, giving rise to criticism and
general protest, such acts being imprudent
and setting a bad example (People v.
Santos, 86 SCRA 705).
Q: Rafa caught his wife, Rachel, in the act
of having sexual intercourse with Rocco
in the maid's room of their own house.
Rafa shot both lovers in the chest, but
they survived. Rafa charged Rachel and
Rocco with adultery, while Rachel and
Rocco charged Rafa with frustrated
parricide and frustrated homicide.
In the adultery case, Rachel and Rocco
raised the defense that Rafa and Rachel,
prior to the incident in question, executed
a notarized document whereby they
agreed to live separately and allowed
each of them to get a new partner and live
with anyone of their choice as husband
and wife. This document was executed
after Rachel discovered that Rafa was
cohabiting with another woman. Thus,
they also raised the defense of in pari
delicto. In the frustrated parricide and
frustrated homicide cases, Rafa raised
the defense that, having caught them in
flagrante delicto, he has no criminal
liability. (2018)
Assuming that all defenses have been
proven:
(a) Will the action for adultery prosper?
A: (a) Yes, the action will prosper. For
adultery to exist, there must be a valid
marriage. In the crime of adultery, the
essence of the crime is sexual congress.
Even a man can be held liable for adultery for
having knowledge that the woman is legally
married.
(b) Will the actions for frustrated parricide
and frustrated homicide prosper?
A: Yes, the actions will prosper. Rafa is liable
for frustrated parricide and frustrated
homicide but under exceptional
circumstances in Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty of destierro is
prescribed. Article 247 governs since Rafa
surprised his wife Rachel in the act of having
sexual intercourse with Rocco, and inflicting
injury to both of them.
 CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
Libel (2002, 2005, 2013, 2016 Bar)
Q: A was nominated Secretary of a
Department in the Executive Branch of
the government. His nomination was
thereafter submitted to the Commission
on Appointments for confirmation.
While the Commission was
considering the nomination, a group of
concerned citizens caused to be
published in the newspapers a full-page
statement objecting to A’s appointment.
They alleged that A was a drug
dependent, that he had several
mistresses, and that he was corrupt,
having accepted bribes or favors from
parties transacting business in his
previous office, and therefore he was
unfit for the position to which he had been
nominated. As a result of the publication,
the nomination was not confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
The official sued the concerned
citizens and the newspapers for libel and
damages on account of his non-
confirmation. How will you decide the
case? (2002 Bar)
A: I will acquit the concerned citizens
and the newspapers involved, from the crime
of libel, because obviously they made the
denunciation out of a moral or social duty and
thus there is absence of malice.
Since A was a candidate for a very
important public position of a Department
Secretary, his moral, mental, and physical
fitness for the public trust in such position
becomes a public concern as the interest of
the public is at stake. It is pursuant to such
concern that the denunciation was made;
hence, bereft of malice.
Q: A is the president of the corporate
publisher of the daily tabloid, Bulgar; B is
the managing editor and C is the
author/writer. In his column, Direct Hit, C
wrote about X, the head examiner of the
BIR-RDO Manila as follows:
“Itong si X ay talagang BUWAYA
kaya ang logo ng Lacoste Tshirt niya ay
napaka swapang na buwaya. Ang nickname
niya ay si Atty. Buwaya. Ang PR niya ay 90%
sa bayad ng taxpayer at ang para sa RP ay
10% lang. Kaya ang baba ng collection ng
RDO niya. Masyadong magnanakaw si X at
dapat tanggalin itong bundat na bundat na
buwaya na ito at napalaki na ng kurakot.”
A, B and C were charged with libel before
the RTC of Manila. The three (3)
50 | P a g e
defendants argued that the article is
within the ambit of qualified privileged
communication; that there is no malice in
law and in fact; and that defamatory
comments on the acts of public officials
which are related to the discharge of their
official duties do not constitute libel.
Was the crime of libel committed? If so,
are A, B and C all liable for the crime?
Explain. (2016 Bar)
A: Yes, the crime of libel is committed. Fair
comment on acts of public officers related to
the discharge of their duties is a qualified
privileged communication, hence, the
accused can still be held liable for libel if
actual malice is shown.
In fair comment, actual malice can be
established by showing that comment was
made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. (Guingguing v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, September 30,
2005)
Journalists bear the burden of writing
responsibly when practicing their profession,
even when writing about public figures or
matters of public interest.
The report made by C describing a
lawyer in the Bureau of Customs as corrupt
cannot be considered as “fair” and “true”
since he did not do research before making
his allegations, and it has been shown that
these allegations were baseless.
The articles are not “fair and true
reports,” but merely wild accusations. He has
written and published the subject articles with
reckless disregard of whether the same were
false or not. (Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No.
161032, September 16, 2008)
Defamation (1988, 1993, 2003 Bar)
Q: Romeo Cunanan, publisher of the
Baguio Daily, was sued by Pedro Aguas
for libel for the public publication of his
picture with the notice that: “This is to
inform the public that Mr. Pedro Aguas
whose picture appears above has ceased
to be connected with the Sincere
Insurance Company as underwriter as of
December 31, 1987. Any transaction
entered into by him after the said date will
not be honored. Is the publication
defamatory? Explain briefly. (1988 Bar)
A: The publication is not defamatory because
the element of intent to defame is absent.
This is a mere announcement and does not
carry any implication.
Q: During a seminar workshop attended
by government employees from the
Bureau of Customs and Bureau of
Internal Revenue, A, the speaker, in the
course of his lecture, lamented the fact
that a great majority of those serving in
said agencies were utterly dishonest and
corrupt.
The following morning, the whole group
of employees in the two bureaus who
attended the seminar, as complainants,
filed a criminal complaint against A for
uttering what the group claimed to be
defamatory statements of the lecturer.
In court, A filed a Motion to Quash
the Information, reciting fully the above
facts, on the ground that no crime was
committed. If you were the judge, how
would you resolve the motion? (2003 Bar)
A: I would grant the Motion to Quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, since there is no
definite person or persons dishonored.
The crime of libel or slander is a crime
against honor such that the person/s
dishonored must be identifiable even by
innuendoes. Otherwise, the crime against
honor is not committed.
Moreover, A was not making a
malicious imputation, but merely stating an
opinion; he was delivering a lecture with no
malice at all during a seminar workshop.
Malice being inherently absent in the
utterance, the statement is not actionable as
defamatory.
Slander
Q: Lando and Marco are candidates in the
local elections. In his speeches, Lando
attacked his opponent Marco alleging that
he is the son of Nanding, a robber and a
thief who amassed his wealth through
shady deals. May Marco file a case
against Lando for grave oral defamation?
State your reasons. (1990 Bar)
A: Marco cannot file a case for grave oral
defamation. If at all, he may file a case for
light slander.
In the case of People v. Laroga (40
OG 123), it was held that defamation in a
political meeting when feelings are running
high and people could not think clearly only
amount to light slander. Moreover, his
statements against Marco pertains to a
person who is running for public office
wherein a wider latitude is given.
PART III. QUASI-OFFENSES
ARTICLE 365 – CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
Q: Eddie brought his son Randy to a local
faith healer known as “Mother Himala”.
He was diagnosed by the faith healer as
51 | P a g e
being possessed by an evil spirit. Eddie
thereupon authorized the conduct of a
“treatment” calculated to drive the
“spirit” from the boy’s body.
Unfortunately, the procedure conducted
resulted in the boy’s death.
The faith healer and three others who
were part of the healing ritual were
charged with murder and convicted by
the lower court. If you were the appellate
court Justice, would you sustain the
conviction upon appeal? Explain your
answer. (2007 Bar)
A: No. The conviction for murder should not
be sustained because there is no indication
that the accused acted with intent to kill
Randy. On the contrary, the facts show that
the accused acted to “treat” the victim in a
way of driving the evil spirit which was
believed to have “possessed” him.
Considering that the proximate cause of the
victim’s death was the healing ritual done by
the accused which is not recognized in law
as legitimate, the accused are criminally
liable for the victim’s death. As they may
have overdone the “healing ritual” they
conducted on the victim’s body, causing the
latter’s death, although the intent to kill was
absent, the accused may be held criminally
liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide.
PART IV. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
ANTI-HAZING LAW
Q: What is hazing as defined by law?
(2002)
A: Hazing, as defined by law, is an initiation
rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership. In a fraternity,
sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing
or humiliating situations such as forcing him
to do menial, silly, foolish and similar tasks or
activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
Q: What does the law require before
initiation rites may be performed? (2002)
A: Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8049 (Anti-
Hazing Law) requires that before hazing or
initiation rites may be performed, notice to
the school authorities or head of
organizations shall be given seven (7) days
before the conduct of such rites. The written
notice shall indicate (a) the period of the
initiation activities, not exceeding three (3)
days; (b) the names of those to be subjected
to such activities, and (c) an undertaking that
no physical violence shall be employed by
anybody during such initiation rites.
Q: On February 5, 2017, Rho Rio
Fraternity held initiation rites. Present
were: (i) Redmont, the Lord Chancellor
and head of the fraternity; (ii) ten (10)
members, one (1) of whom was Ric, and
(iii) five (5) neophytes, one (1) of whom
was Ronald. Absent were: (i) Rollie, the
fraternity's Vice Chancellor and who
actually planned the initiation; and (ii)
Ronnie, the owner of the house where the
initiation was conducted.
Due to the severe beating suffered by
Ronald on that occasion, he lost
consciousness and was brought to the
nearest hospital by Redmont and Ric.
However, Ronald was declared dead on
arrival at the hospital.
During the investigation of the case, it
was found out that, although Ronald
really wanted to join the fraternity
because his father is also a member of the
same fraternity, it was his best friend Ric
who ultimately convinced him to join the
fraternity and, as a prerequisite thereto,
undergo initiation. It was also shown that
Redmont and Ric did not actually
participate in the beating of the
neophytes (hazing). The two (2) either
merely watched the hazing or helped in
preparing food. And, lastly, two (2) days
prior thereto, Ronnie texted Rollie that the
fraternity may use his house
as the venue for the planned initiation.
Aside from those who actually
participated in the hazing, Redmont,
Rollie, Ric, and Ronnie were criminally
charged for the hazing of Ronald that
resulted in the latter's death. (2018 Bar)
(a) Are the four criminally liable?
A: Yes they are all criminally liable. The act
of inducing the victim to attend the initiation
rite is necessarily part of a “planned initiation
rite.” Further, RA 11053 provides that the
presence of any person during the hazing is
a prima facie evidence of participation as
principal, unless he prevented the
commission of the punishable act. In this
case, although Richmond and Ronnie did not
participate in the beating, their mere
presence in the place where the hazing was
conducted is a prima facie evidence of their
participation. In the case of Rollie, the same
law also provides that the owner or the
lessee of the place where the hazing was
52 | P a g e
conducted shall be liable as principal. And
lastly, Ric is the one who ultimately induce
the victim. Hence, all of them are criminally
liable since they fulfilled their role in the
planned hazing rite which led to the death of
the victim.
(b) Can all those criminally charged be
exonerated upon proof that Ronald,
knowing the risks, voluntarily submitted
himself to the initiation? Will the absence
of proof that the accused intended to kill
the victim affect their liability?
A: No, they will not be exonerated. Since all
of them fulfilled their role in the planned
hazing rite which led to the death of the
victim, which is strictly prohibited under RA
11053, all of them shall still be liable under
the said law although Ronald voluntarily
submitted himself to the initiation.
Furthermore, the crime of hazing is a mala
prohibita, hence, the existence of criminal
intent is immaterial.
ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW (R.A. NO. 7610,
AS AMENDED) (1993, 2004, 2018 Bar)
Mrs. Robinson is a teacher at an
elementary school. In one of her classes,
she found, to her consternation, that an 8-
year old Richard was always the cause of
distraction, as he was fond of bullying
classmates smaller in size than him.
One morning, Reymart, a 7-year old pupil,
cried loudly and complained to Mrs.
Robinson that Richard had boxed him on
the ear. Confronted by Mrs. Robinson
about Reymart's accusation, Richard
sheepishly admitted the same. Because
of this, Mrs. Robinson ordered Richard to
lie face down on a desk during class.
After Richard obliged, Mrs. Robinson hit
him ten (10) times on the legs with a ruler
and pinched his ears. Richard ran home
and reported to his mother what he had
suffered at the hands of Mrs. Robinson.
When Richard's parents went to Mrs.
Robinson to complain, she interposed the
defense that she merely performed her
duty as a teacher to discipline erring
pupils.
Richard's parents ask your advice on
what actions can be instituted against
Mrs. Robinson for acts committed on
their minor child. (2018)
(a) May Mrs. Robinson be charged with
child abuse OR slight physical injuries?
A: No. She must be charged with separate
offenses of CHILD ABUSE and SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES since there were two
acts committed, one on the SPL of child
abuse when she inflicted corporal
punishment to face lie down on the desk
during class hour under her act exercising as
special parental authority as provided in Art
233 of the FC, the purpose of which is to
humiliate the child and the second act is
inflicting slight physical injuries by hitting 10
times on the leg and pinching his ears which
is punishable under the RPC.
(b) May Mrs. Robinson be charged with
child abuse AND slight physical injuries?
A: No. Even if the acts committed arises on
the same occasion, they cannot be treated
as single act that produces grave or less
grave offenses which can be complexed
since both acts are punished under different
penal laws, one which is a Special Penal Law
and the other is RPC.
Q: Sometime in December 1992, retired
Lt. Col. Agaton, celebrating the first year
of his compulsory retirement from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had in
his company a fourteen (14) year-old girl
whose parents were killed by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and being totally
orphaned has been living or fending for
herself in the streets in Manila. They were
alone in one room in a beach resort and
stayed there for two (2) nights. No sexual
intercourse took place between them.
Before they parted, retired Lt. Col. Agaton
gave the girl P1, 000.00 for her services.
She gladly accepted it.
(A) What crime may the retired colonel be
charged with, if any? Discuss.
(B) What possible defenses can he
interpose? Explain. (1993 Bar)
Answers:
(A) The retired colonel may be charged with
child abuse, the violation of Rep. Act.
7610, a law providing special protection
against child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination.
One of the acts of child abuse or
exploitation penalized under Article VI of
RA 7610 is that of keeping company of a
minor who is ten (10) years or younger
than the offender in a hotel, motel, beer
house, disco joint, pension house,
cabaret, sauna or massage parlor, beach
resort, and similar places.
Considering that Lt. Col Agaton is a
retiree pursuant to a compulsory
retirement, while the child he kept
53 | P a g e
company within a private room in the
beach resort is only 14 years old, there
must be an age difference of more than
10 years between them.
This fact plus the circumstance that
Lt. Col. Agaton stayed with the child, a
girl in one room at such beach resort for
two nights and thereafter he gave her
P1,000.00 “for her services”, constitutes
the very evil punished, among other acts,
in said law.
(B) The possible defenses Lt. Col. Agaton
may interpose are –
 That the child is related to him by
affinity, or by consanguinity within
the fourth degree or by a bond
recognized in law, or local customs
and traditions; or
 That he was only acting in pursuance
of a moral, social or legal duty [Sec.
10 (b), Art. VI, R.A. 7610]
Q: Arnold, 25 years of age, was sitting on
a bench in Luneta Park, watching the
statue of Jose Rizal, when, without his
permission, Leilani, 17 years of age, sat
beside him and asked for financial
assistance, allegedly for payment of her
tuition fee, in exchange for sex. While
they were conversing, police operatives
arrested and charged him with violation
of Section 10 of RA 7610 (Special
Protection of Children against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act), accusing him of having in his
company a minor, who is not related to
him, in a public place. It was established
that Arnold was not in the performance of
a social, moral and legal duty at that time.
Is Arnold liable for the charge? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
A: No, Arnold is not liable. Under Section 10
of RA No. 7610, any person who shall keep
or have in his company a minor, twelve (12)
years or under or who in ten (10) years or
more his junior in any public or private place,
hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret,
pension house, sauna or massage parlor,
beach and/or other tourist resort or similar
places is liable for child abuse.
Arnold is not liable for the charge. To
be held liable under Section 10(b) of RA No.
7610, it is indispensable that the child in the
company of the offender must be 12 years or
under or who in 10 years or more his junior
in a public place. In this case, Leilani is 17
years of age, and only 8 years younger than
Arnold.
Moreover, Leilani sat beside Arnold
without his permission, hence, he is not in the
company if a child in a public place.
Lastly, applying the episdem generis
principle, Arnold is not liable for child abuse
because Luneta is not a place similar to
hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret,
pension house, sauna or massage parlor,
beach and/or other tourist resort.
ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D 1612) (1987,
1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2005, 2010, 2013
Bar)
Q: Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received
form the Provincial Treasurer of the
Province five (5) brand new typewriters
for use in the municipal treasurer’s office.
Each typewriter is valued at P10, 000.00.
Since Pedro needed money for the
hospitalization of his sick son, he sold
four (4) of the typewriters to his friend,
Rodolfo, a general merchant in San Isidro
for P2, 000.00 each. Rodolfo, as a general
merchant knew that one typewriter could
easily be between P6, 000.00 to P10,
000.00. For this reason, he readily agreed
to buy the typewriters. Rodolfo then
resold the typewriters at P6, 000.00 thus
making a profit of P16, 000.00. Two
months after the transaction, Pedro was
audited and the investigation as to his
accountabilities led to the discovery that
Rodolfo bought the four (4) typewriters
from Pedro. Is Rodolfo liable for violation
of the Anti- Fencing Law? (1987 Bar)
A: Rodolfo is not liable for violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law as this law refers only to
the buy and sell of articles of value which are
the proceeds of robbery and theft.
Rodolfo is liable as an accessory to
the crime of malversation as he purchased
the typewriters for P2, 000 each only
although he knew it could easily be sold for
P6, 000 to P10, 000. Therefore, he profited
or assisted the principal to profit from the
effects or proceeds of the commission of the
crime.
Questions:
(A) What are the elements of fencing?
(B) What is the difference between a fence
and an accessory to theft or robbery?
Explain.
(C) Is there any similarity between them?
(1995 Bar)
Answers:
(A) The elements of fencing are:
 A crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
 Accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the crime, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals or disposes or
54 | P a g e
buys and sells or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value , which has been
derived from the proceeds of said
crime;
 The accused knows or should have
known that said article, item, object
or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
 There is, on the part of the accused,
intent to gain for himself or for
another.
(B) One difference between a fence and
accessory to theft or robbery is the
penalty involved – a fence is punished as
a principal under PD No. 1612 and the
penalty is higher, whereas an accessory
to robbery or theft under the RPC is
punished two degrees lower than the
principal, unless he bought or profited
from the proceeds of theft or robbery
arising from robbery in Philippine
highways under PD 532 where he is
punished as an accomplice, hence the
penalty is one degree lower.
Also, fencing is a malum prohibitum
and therefore there is no need to prove
criminal intent of the accused; this is not
so in violations of the RPC.
(C) There is similarity in the sense that all the
acts of one who is an accessory to the
crimes of robbery or theft are included in
the acts defined as fencing. In fact, the
accessory in the crimes of robbery or
theft could be prosecuted as such under
the RPC or as a fence under PD 1612
(Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA
63)
Q: Ofelia engaged in the purchase and
sale of jewelry, was charged with
violation of PD 1612, otherwise known as
the Anti-Fencing Law, for having been
found in possession of recently stolen
jewelry valued at P100, 000.00 at her
jewelry shop.
Her defense is that she merely
bought the same from Antonia and
produced a receipt covering the sale. She
presented other receipts given to her by
Antonia representing previous
transactions.
Convicted of the charge, Ofelia
appealed, arguing that her acquisition of
the jewelries resulted from a legal
transaction and that the prosecution
failed to prove that she knew or should
have known that the pieces of jewelry
which she bought from Antonia were
proceeds of the crime of theft.
(A) What is a “fence” under PD 1612?
(B) Is Ofelia liable under the Anti-Fencing
Law? Explain. (2016 Bar)
Answers:
(a) Fencing is the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of,
or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. (Section 2, PD 1612)
(b) No. Ofelia is not liable under the Anti-
Fencing Law. While under the said law
mere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which
has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of
fencing, such evidence when sufficiently
overturned constitutes a defense.
In this case, Ofelia’s defense that she
merely acquired the jewelries through a
legitimate transaction is sufficient.
Further, there is no other circumstance
as regards the jewelries which would
indicate to Ofelia, an innocent purchaser,
that the jewelries were the subject of
theft. There was even a receipt produced
by Ofelia for the transaction.
ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT (R.A. NO. 3019, AS AMENDED)
(1990,1991, 2001, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014,
2016 Bar)
Questions:
(A) Melda who is the private secretary of
Judge Tolits Naya, was persuaded by
a litigant, Jumbo, to have his case
calendared as early as possible for a
consideration of P500.00. May she be
held criminally liable for this
accommodation? Explain your
answer.
(B) What will be the criminal liability of
Melda if she volunteered to persuade
Judge Tolits Naya to rule in Jumbo’s
favor without asking any
consideration? Explain your answer.
(1990 Bar)
Answers:
(A) The answer would depend or be qualified
by the implication of the phrase “to have
his case calendared as early as
possible”. If the phrase is interrupted as
an unjust act and in violation of the rule
to give priority to the older cases, then
she would be liable under direct bribery
55 | P a g e
for an act which does not constitute a
crime but is unjust.
He may also be held liable under
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practicess Act, as amended:
“xxx giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits”. If you interpret the
phrase as a non-violation of the rules and
regulations, then she can only be held
liable for direct bribery.
(B) Melda is not criminally liable because the
actor volunteering to persuade is not a
criminal act. It is the act of persuading
that is considered a criminal act.
The act does not fall under Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code on Direct
Bribery nor does it fall under Article 211
of the RPC on Indirect Bribery. Neither
does it fall under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(a) of RA
3019 refers to acts of persuading another
public official to violate rules and
regulations.
Q: Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court,
promised the accused in a drug case
pending before the court, that he would
convince the judge to acquit him for a
consideration of P5 million. The accused
agreed and delivered the money through
his lawyer to the clerk of court.
The judge, not knowing of the deal,
proceeded to rule on the evidence and
convicted the accused.
Malo was charged with violation of
Section 3 (b), RA 3019 which prohibits a
public officer from directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share percentage or benefit wherein the
public officer, in his official capacity, has
to intervene under the law.
He was later charged also with
indirect bribery under the RPC. Malo
claims he can no longer be charged under
the RPC for the same act under RA 3019.
Is he correct? (2014 Bar)
A: No. One may be charged with violation of
RA No. 3019 in addition to a felony under the
RPC for the same delictual act, either
concurrently or subsequent to being charged
with a felony under the RPC. This is very
clear from Section 3 of RA 3019. Also, RA
3019 is a special law, the elements of the
crime is not the same as those punished
under the RPC.
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY
ROBBERY (P.D. NO. 532) (2000, 2001,
2006, 2008, 2012 Bar)
Q: A postal van containing mail matter,
including checks and treasury warrants,
was hijacked along a national highway by
ten (10) men, two of whom, were armed.
They used force, violence and
intimidation against the three postal
employees who were occupants of the
van, resulting in the unlawful taking and
aspiration of the entire van and its
contents.
(A) If you were the public prosecutor,
would you charge the ten (10) men
who hijacked the postal van with
violation of Presidential Decree
No. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy and Anti- Highway
Robbery Law of 1974? Explain
your answer.
(B) If you were the defense counsel,
what are the elements of the crime
of highway robbery that the
prosecution should prove to
sustain a conviction? (2012 Bar)
Answers:
(A) No. I would not charge the 10 men with
the crime of highway robbery. The mere
fact that the offense charged was
committed on a highway would not be
the determinant for the application of PD
No. 532. If a motor vehicle, either
stationary or moving on a highway is
forcibly taken at a gunpoint by the
accused who happened to take a fancy
thereto, the location of the vehicle at the
time of the unlawful taking would not
necessarily put the offense within the
ambit of PD 532. In this case, the crime
committed is violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972 (People v. Punk,
GR No. 97471, February 17, 1993).
Moreover, there is no showing that the
10 men were a band of outlaws
organized for the purpose of depredation
upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants
who travel from one place to another.
What was shown is one isolated
hijacking of a postal van. It was not
stated in the facts given that the 10 men
previously attempted at similar robberies
by them to establish the “indiscriminate”
commission thereof (Filoteo, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, GR No. 79543, October
16, 1996).
(B) Under Section 2 of PD 532, highway
robbery is defined as “the seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion, or other
unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
56 | P a g e
the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person
or force upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any
Philippines highway.” Hence, the
elements of highway robbery are:
a. Intent to gain;
b. Unlawful taking of property of
another;
c. Violence against or intimidation of
any person;
d. Committed on a Philippine
highway.
To obtain a conviction for highway robbery,
the prosecution must prove that the accused
were organized for the purpose of committing
robbery indiscriminately. If the purpose is
only a particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at
least four armed participants (See People v.
Mendoza, GR No. 104461, February 23,
1996).
Q: Distinguish Highway Robbery under
PD No. 532 from Robbery committed on a
highway. (2000 Bar)
A: Highway Robbery under PPD 532 differs
from ordinary Robbery committed on a
highway in these respects:
(A) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the
robbery is committed indiscriminately
against persons who commute in such
highways, regardless of the potentiality
they offer; while in ordinary Robbery
committed on a highway, the robbery is
committed only against predetermined
victims;
(B) It is Highway Robbery under PD 532,
when the offender is a brigand or one
who roams in public highways and
carries out his robbery in public highways
as venue, whenever the opportunity to do
so arises. It is ordinary Robbery under
the RPC when the commission thereof in
a public highway is only incidental and
the offender is not a brigand; and
(C) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there
is frequency in the commission of the
robbery in public highways and against
persons traveling thereat; whereas
ordinary robbery in public highways is
only occasional against a predetermined
victim, without frequency in public
highways.

ANTI-PLUNDER ACT (R.A. NO. 7080, AS
AMENDED) (1993, 2014)
Q: Through kickbacks, percentages or
commissions and other fraudulent
schemes / conveyances and taking
advantage of his position, Andy, a former
mayor of a suburban town, acquired
assets amounting to P10 billion which is
grossly disproportionate to his lawful
income. Due to his influence and
connections and despite knowledge by
the authorities of his ill-gotten wealth, he
was charged with the crime of plunder
only after twenty (20) years from his
defeat in the last elections he participated
in.
(A) May Andy still be held criminally
liable? Why?
(B) Can the State still recover the
properties and assets that he illegally
acquired, the bulk of which is in the
name of his wife and children?
Reason out. (1993 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Andy will not be criminally liable because
Section 6 of RA 7080 provides that the
crime punishable under this Act shall
prescribe in twenty years and the
problem asked whether Andy can still be
charged with the crime of plunder after 20
years.
(B) Yes, because Section 6 provides that
recovery of properties unlawfully
acquired by public officers from them or
their nominees or transferees shall not be
barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel. Battered Woman Syndrome
(2010, 2014, 2015 Bar)
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN
(R.A. NO. 9262) (2018 Bar)
For the past five years, Ruben and Rorie
had been living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage.
Initially, they had a happy relationship
which was blessed with a daughter, Rona,
who was born on March 1, 2014. However,
the partners' relationship became sour
when Ruben began indulging in vices,
such as women and alcohol, causing
frequent arguments between them. Their
relationship got worse when, even for
slight mistakes, Ruben would lay his
hands on Rorie. One day, a tipsy Ruben
barged into their house and, for no
reason, repeatedly punched Rorie in the
stomach. To avoid further harm, Rorie ran
out of the house. But Ruben pursued her
57 | P a g e
and stripped her naked in full view of their
neighbors; and then he vanished.
Ten days later, Ruben came back to Rorie
and pleaded for forgiveness. However,
Rorie expressed her wish to live
separately from Ruben and asked him to
continue providing financial support for
their daughter Rona. At that time, Ruben
was earning enough to support a family.
He threatened to withdraw the support he
was giving to Rona unless Rorie would
agree to live with him again. But Rorie
was steadfast in refusing to live with
Ruben again, and insisted on her demand
for support for Rona. As the ex-lovers
could not reach an agreement, no further
support was given by Ruben. (2018 Bar)
What crimes did Ruben commit:
(a) For beating and humiliating Rorie?
A: Ruben committed the crime of violence
against women and their children under RA
9262. Violence refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a
woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering.
(b) For withdrawing support for Rona?
A: Under the same reason, withdrawing of
support to a women with whom who has a
child is a violation of RA 9262 which is an
financial or economic abuse.
Battered Woman Syndrome (2010,2014,
2015 Bar)
Q: Define "Battered Woman Syndrome."
What are the three phases of the
"Battered Woman Syndrome"? Would the
defense prosper despite the absence of
any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self- defense under the
Revised Penal Code? Explain. (2010 Bar)
A: “Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a
scientifically define pattern of psychological
and behavioural symptoms found in woman
living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse (Sec. 3[d], R.A. 9262).
The three (3) phases of the BWS are:
1. tension- building phase;
2. acute battering incident; and
3. tranquil, loving, or non-violent phase
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004).

Yes, the defense will prosper. Sec. 26 of R.A.
9262 provides that victim-survivors who are
found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements of justifying
circumstances of self- defense under the
RPC.
Q: Ms. A had been married to Mr. B for 10
years. Since their marriage, Mr. B had
been jobless and a drunkard, preferring to
stay with his “barkadas” until the wee
hours of the morning.
Ms. A was the breadwinner and
attended to the needs of their three (3)
growing children. Many times, when Mr. B
was drunk, he would beat Ms. A and their
three children, and shout invectives
against them.
In fact, in one of the beating
incidents, Ms. A suffered a deep stab
wound on her tummy that required a
prolonged stay in the hospital. Due to the
beatings and verbal abuses committed
against her, she consulted a psychologist
several times, as she was slowly
beginning to lose her mind.
One night, when Mr. B arrived dead
drunk, he suddenly stabbed Ms. A several
times while shouting invectives against
her.
Defending herself from the attack,
Ms. A grappled for the possession of a
knife and she succeeded.
She then stabbed Mr. B several
times which caused his instantaneous
death. Medico-Legal Report showed that
the husband suffered three (3) stabbed
wounds.
Can Ms. A validly put up a
defense? Explain. (2014 Bar)
A: Yes. Ms. A can put up the defense of
battered woman syndrome. It appears that
she is suffering from physical and
psychological or emotional distress resulting
from cumulative abuse by her husband.
Under Section 26 of RA 9262, “victim
survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome do
not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-
defense under the RPC.”
As a rule, once the unlawful
aggression ceased, stabbing the victim
further is not self-defense. However, even if
the element of unlawful aggression in self-
58 | P a g e
defense is lacking, Ms. A, who is suffering for
battered woman syndrome, will not incur
criminal and civil liability.
Q: Romeo and Julia have been married for
twelve (12) years and had two (2) children.
The first few years of their marriage went
along smoothly. However, on the fifth
year onwards, they would often quarrel
when Romeo comes home drunk. The
quarrels became increasingly violent,
marked by quiet periods when Julia
would leave the conjugal dwelling. During
the times of quiet, Romeo would court
Julia with flowers and chocolates and
convince her to return home, telling her
that he could not live without her; or
Romeo would ask Julia to forgive him,
which she did, believing that if she
humbled herself, Romeo would change.
After a month of marital bliss, Romeo
would return to his drinking habit and the
quarrel would start again, verbally at first,
until it would escalate to physical
violence.
One night, Romeo came home drunk and
went straight to bed. Fearing the onset of
another violent fight, Julia stabbed
Romeo, while he was asleep. A week later,
their neighbors discovered Romeo’s
rotting corpse on the marital bed. Julia
and the children were nowhere to be
found. Julia was charged with parricide.
She asserted “battered woman
syndrome” as her defense.
(A) Explain the cycle of violence.
(B) Is Julia’s “battered woman syndrome”
defense meritorious? Explain. (2016
Bar)
(A) The Battered Woman Syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases:
(a) tension-building phase;
(b) the acute battering incident; and
(c) the tranquil, loving (or at least,
nonviolent) phase.
During the tension-building phase, minor
battering occurs – it could be verbal or slight
physical abuse or another form of hostile
behavior. The woman tries to pacify the
batterer through a kind, nurturing behavior;
or by simply staying out of his way.
The acute battering incident is
characterized by brutality, destructiveness
and sometimes, death. The battered woman
deems this incident as unpredictable, yet
also inevitable. During this phase, she has no
control; only the batterer may put an end to
the violence.
The final phase of the cycle of violence
begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple
experience profound relief.
(B) Yes. Under Section 3(c) of RA No. 9262,
“Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a
scientifically defined pattern of
psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of “cumulative
abuse”.
Under Section 3(b), “Battery” refers to an act
of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or
her child resulting in physical and
psychological or emotional distress.
In sum, the defense of Battered
Woman Syndrome can be invoked if the
woman in marital relationship with the victim
is subjected to cumulative abuse or battery
involving the infliction of physical harm
resulting to the physical and psychological or
emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition.
In sum, there must be “at least two
battering episodes” between the accused
and her intimate partner and such final
episode produced in the battered person’s
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life.
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004)
In this case, because of the battering
episodes, Julia feared the onset of another
violent fight and honestly believed the need
to defend herself even if Romeo had not
commenced an unlawful aggression.
Even in the absence of unlawful
aggression, however, Battered Woman
Syndrome is a defense. Under Section 27 of
RA No. 9262, Battered Woman Syndrome is
a defense notwithstanding the absence of
any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the
Revised Penal Code such as unlawful
aggression. (Section 26, RA No. 9262)
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22) (1987,
1990, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2009, 2010, 2013
Bar)
Q: As security for a loan of P50, 000.00 he
obtained from his friend, Joseph David,
payable not later than 17 April 1990,
Roger Vasquez drew and delivered to
Joseph a check on due date.
The check was dishonored on the
ground of insufficiency of funds. After
appropriate preliminary investigation, the
City Prosecutor filed against Roger an
Information for violation of B.P. Blg. No.
59 | P a g e
22 alleging therein, inter alia, that Roger
“with intent to defraud, by means of
deceit, knowing fully well that he had no
funds and/or sufficient funds in the bank,
for value received, did then and there,
willfully and feloniously, issue the
aforesaid check” but “when the said
check was presented for encashment,
said check was dishonored and returned”
on the ground of insufficiency of funds.
In a decision rendered thereafter,
the trial judge ruled that Roger cannot be
convicted of the offense charged because
the information failed to allege that he
knew, when he issued the check, that he
would have insufficient funds for its
payment in full upon its presentment to
the drawee bank. Is the judge correct?
(1991 Bar)
A: No. The allegation satisfies the legal
definition of the offense. The maker’s
knowledge of insufficiency of his funds is
legally presumed from the dishonor of the
check for lack of funds (People v. Lagui, 171
SCRA 305).
Q: The accused was convicted under BP
Blg. 22 for having issued several checks
which were dishonored by the drawee
bank on their due date because the
accused closed her account after the
issuance of checks.
On appeal, she argued that she
could not be convicted under B.P. Blg. 22
by reason of the closing of her account
because said law applies solely to checks
dishonored by reason of insufficiency of
funds and that at the time she issued the
checks concerned, she had adequate
funds in the bank. While she admits that
she may be held liable for estafa under
Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code,
she cannot however be found guilty of
having violated B.P. Blg. 22. Is her
contention correct? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: No. As long as the checks issued were
issued to apply on account or for value, and
was dishonored upon presentation for
payment to the drawee bank for lack of
insufficient funds on their due date, such act
falls within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22. Said law
expressly punishes any person who may
have insufficient funds in the drawee bank
within ninety (90) days from the date
appearing thereon.
Estafa (1989, 1998, 1990, 1991, 2005, 2010,
2013, 2014, 2018 Bar)
Q: Rashid asked Rene to lend him
PhP50,000, payable in six (6) months and,
as payment for the loan, Rashid issued a
postdated check for the said amount plus
the agreed interest. Rashid assured Rene
that the account would have sufficient
funds on maturity date. On that date,
Rene presented the check to the drawee
bank for payment but it was dishonored
for the reason that it was drawn against
insufficient funds (DAIF).
Rene sent Rashid a timely notice of
dishonor of the check and demanded the
latter to make good the same within five
(5) days from notice. After the lapse of the
five (5)-day notice, Rene redeposited the
check with the drawee bank but it was
again dishonored for the same reason,
i.e., DAIF. Rene thereafter filed two (2)
separate criminal actions against Rashid:
(1) Estafa under Art. 315(2)(d) of the RPC,
as amended by R.A. No. 4885, i.e, estafa
committed by postdating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an
obligation without sufficient funds in the
bank; and (2) Violation of B.P. 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law. (2018 Bar)
(a) Can he be held liable under both
actions?
A: Yes, Rashid can be held liable for Estafa
and BP 22. There is no double jeopardy as
both are different crimes, punished by
different laws. Estafa is mala in se, whereas
BP 22 is mala prohibita.
(b) If the check is presented for payment
after four (4) months, but before it
becomes stale, can the two actions still
proceed?
A: No, Rashid may only be liable for estafa
but not BP 22. In BP 22, there is a prima facie
evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds
when the check was presented within 90
days from the date appearing on the check
and was dishonored. Since the check was
presented only after 90 days, in this case,
120 days, prima facie knowledge is no longer
present.
Q: B imitated the signature of A,
registered owner of a lot, in special power
of attorney naming him (B) as the
attorney-in-fact of A. On February 13,
1964, B mortgaged the lot to a bank using
the special power of attorney to obtain a
loan of P8, 500. On the same day, both the
special power of attorney and the
mortgage contract were duly registered in
the Registry of Deeds.
60 | P a g e
Because of B’s failure to pay, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was
sold to X in whose name a new title was
issued. In March 1974, A discovered that
the property was already registered in the
name of X because an ejectment case
filed against him by X.
(A) If you were the lawyer of A, with what
crime or crimes would you charge B?
Explain.
(B) If you were the counsel of B, what
would be your defense? Discuss.
(1993 Bar)
Answers:
(A) The crime committed is estafa thru
falsification of public document.
(B) My defense will be prescription because
the crime was committed in 1964 and
almost twenty nine years had already
elapsed since then.
Q: On March 31, 1995, Orpheus Financing
Corp. received from Maricar the sum of
P500, 000 as money market placement for
sixty days at fifteen (15) percent interest,
and the President of said Corp. issued a
check covering the amount including the
interest due thereon, postdated May 30,
1995. On the maturity date, however,
Orpheus Financing Corp. failed to deliver
back Maricar's money placement with the
corresponding interest earned,
notwithstanding repeated demands upon
said Corporation to comply with its
commitment. Did the President of
Orpheus Financing Corporation incur any
criminal liability for estafa for reason of
the non-payment of the money market
placement? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: No. The President of the financing
corporation does not incur criminal liability for
estafa because a money market transaction
partakes of the nature of a loan, such that
non- payment thereof would not give rise to
estafa through misappropriation or
conversion. In money market placement,
there is transfer of ownership of the money to
be invested and therefore the liability for its
return is civil in nature.
Q: A sold a washing machine to B on
credit with the understanding that B could
return the appliance within two weeks if
after testing the same, B decided not to
buy it. Two weeks lapsed without B
returning the appliance. A found out that
B had sold the washing machine to a third
party. Is B liable for estafa? Why? (2002
Bar)

A: No. B is not liable for estafa because he is
not just an entrustee of the washing machine
which he sold; he is the owner thereof by
virtue of the sale of the washing machine to
him.
The sale being on credit, B as buyer
is only liable for the unpaid price of the
washing machine; his obligation is only a civil
obligation.
There is no felonious misappropriation that
could constitute estafa.
Q: A and B agreed to meet at the latter's
house to discuss B's financial problems.
On his way, one of A's car tires blew up.
Before A left following the meeting, he
asked B to lend him money to buy a new
spare tire. B had temporarily exhausted
his bank deposits, leaving a zero balance.
Anticipating, however, a replenishment of
his account soon, B issued A a postdated
check with which A negotiated for a new
tire. When presented, the check bounced
for lack of funds. The tire company filed a
criminal case against A and B. What
would be the criminal liability, if any, of
each of the two accused? Explain. (2003
Bar)
A: A who negotiated the unfunded check of
B in buying a new tire for his car may only be
prosecuted for estafa if he was aware at the
time of such negotiation that the check has
no sufficient funds in the drawee bank;
otherwise, he is not criminally liable.
B who accommodated A with his
check may nevertheless be prosecuted
under B.P. 22 for having issued the check,
knowing at the time of issuance that it has no
funds in the bank and that A will negotiate it
to buy a new tire, i.e., for value. B may not be
prosecuted for estafa because the facts
indicate that he is not actuated by intent to
defraud in issuing the check which A
negotiated. Obviously, B issued the
postdated check only to help A; criminal
intent or dolo is absent.
Q: DD was engaged in the warehouse
business. Sometime in November 2004,
he was in dire need of money. He, thus,
sold merchandise deposited in his
warehouse to VR for P500, 000.00. DD was
charged with theft, as principal, while VR
as accessory. The court convicted DD of
theft but acquitted VR on the ground that
he purchased the merchandise in good
faith. However, the court ordered VR to
return the merchandise to the owner
thereof and ordered DD to refund the
61 | P a g e
P500, 000.00 to VR. DD moved for the
reconsideration of the decision insisting
that he should be acquitted of theft
because being the depositary, he had
juridical possession of the merchandise.
VR also moved for the reconsideration of
the decision insisting that since he was
acquitted of the crime charged, and that
he purchased the merchandise in good
faith, he is not obligated to return the
merchandise to its owner. Rule on the
motions with reasons. (2005 Bar)
A: The motion for reconsideration of DD
should be denied.
In this case, there being no proof that
title to the goods was transferred to DD, only
physical possession is presumed transferred
to and obtained by DD. (U.S. v. De Vera,
G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921)
The principal distinction between the
two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken
while in estafa the accused received the
property and converts it to his own use or
benefit.
However, there maybe theft even if
the accused has possession of the property,
if he was entrusted only with the material or
physical (natural) or de facto possession of
the thing, his misappropriation of the same
constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
possession of the thing, his conversion of the
same constitutes embezzlement or estafa
(Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, January
29, 1990).
While VR is acquitted of theft, such
acquittal does not of itself negate civil liability
of VR to return the property stolen by DD.
Civil liability on the part of VR exists despite
acquittal since his acquittal is premised on
the finding that his liability is only civil in
nature. (De Guzman v. Alva, 51 OG 1311).
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT (R.A. 9165) (1990, 1992, 1995, 1996,
1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009,
2015, 2016 Bar)
Questions:
(A) Distinguish entrapment from instigation.
Discuss fully. (1990, 1995, 2003, 2015
Bar)
(B) Suspecting that Juan was a drug pusher,
SPO2 Mercado, leader of the Narcom
team, gave Juan a P100-bill and asked
him to buy some marijuana cigarettes.
Desirous of pleasing SPO2 Mercado,
Juan went inside the shopping mall while
the officer waited at the corner of mall.
After 15 minutes, Juan returned with ten
sticks of marijuana cigarettes which he
gave to SPO2 Mercado who thereupon
placed Juan under arrest and charged
 him with violation of The Dangerous
Drugs Law by selling marijuana
cigarettes. Is Juan guilty of any offense
punishable under The Dangerous Drugs
Act? Discuss fully. (1995 Bar)
Answers:
(A) As to the criminal design, in entrapment,
it originates from and is already in the
mind of the lawbreaker even before
entrapment.
In instigation, the idea and design to
bring about the commission of the crime
originated and developed in the mind of
the law enforcers;
In entrapment, the law enforcers
resort to ways and means for the purpose
of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante
delicto.
In instigation, the law enforcers
induce, lure, or incite a person who is not
minded to commit a crime and would not
otherwise commit it, into committing the
crime;
and Entrapment will not bar the
prosecution and conviction of the
lawbreaker while instigation absolves the
accused from criminal liability (People v.
Dante Marcos, 185 SCRA 154, 1990).
(B) Juan cannot be charged of any offense
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Although Juan is a suspected drug
pusher, he cannot be charged on the
basis of a mere suspicion. By providing
the money with which to buy marijuana
cigarettes, SPO2 Mercado practically
induced and prodded Juan to commit the
offense of illegal possession of
marijuana. Set against the facts
instigation is a valid defense available to
Juan.
Q: Pat. Buensuceso, posing as a buyer,
approached Ronnie, a suspected drug
pusher, and offered to buy P300.00 worth
of shabu. Ronnie then left, came back five
minutes later and handed the aluminum
foil containing the shabu to him. Before
Pat. Buensuceso was able to deliver the
marked money to Ronnie, the latter
spotted a policeman at a distance, whom
Ronnie knew to be connected with the
Narcotics Command of the Police. Upon
seeing the latter, Ronnie ran away but
was arrested thirty minutes later by other
policemen who pursued him. Under the
circumstances, would you consider the
crime of sale of a prohibited drug already
consummated? (1996 Bar)
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A: Yes. The sale of prohibited drug is already
consummated although the marked money
was not yet delivered. When Ronnie handed
the aluminum foil containing the shabu to
Pat. Buensuceso pursuant to their agreed
sale, the crime was consummated. Payment
of the consideration is not an element of
requisite of the crime. If ever, the marked
money is only evidentiary to strengthen the
case of the prosecution.
The absence of the marked money will not
create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence
as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug subject of
the transaction is presented before the court.
There was a perfected contract of sale of the
drug (People v. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733)
Q: Obie Juan is suspected to have in his
possession an unspecified amount of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu”. An entrapment operation was
conducted by police officers, resulting in
his arrest following the discovery of 100
grams of the said dangerous drug in his
possession. He was subsequently
charged with two crimes: Violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for the
possession of “shabu” and violation of
Section 15, Art. II of RA 9165 for the use
of marijuana.
(A) Are the charges proper? Explain.
(B) So as not to be sentenced to death,
Obie Juan offers to plead guilty to a
lesser offense. Can he do so? Why?
(1998, 2004, 2005 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Proper. The mere possession of such
drug is punishable, but the charge of use
of marijuana is not proper as Section 15
of R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) expressly
excludes penalties for “use” of dangerous
drugs when the person tested “is also
found to have in possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug” provided
for in Section 11 of such Act.
(B) No. Because Section 23 of R.A. 9165
expressly provides that “Any person
charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall
not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.” For this reason, Obie
Juan cannot be allowed to plead guilty to
a lesser offense.
Q: After receiving a reliable information
that Dante Ong, a notorious drug
smuggler, was arriving on PAL Flight No.
PR181, PNP Chief Inspector Samuel
Gamboa formed a group of anti-drug
agents. When Ong arrived at the airport,
the group arrested him and seized his
attaché case.
Upon inspection the Immigration
holding area, the attaché case yielded 5
plastic bags of heroin weighing 500
grams. Chief Inspector Gamboa took the
attaché case and boarded him in an
unmarked car driven by PO3 Pepito
Lorbes.
On the way to Camp Crame and
upon nearing White Plains corner Edsa,
Chief Inspector Gamboa ordered PO3
Lorbes to stop the car. They brought out
the drugs from the case in the trunk to
and got 3 plastic sacks of heroin.
They then told Ong to alight from
the car. Ong left with the 2 remaining
plastic sacks of heroin. Chief Inspector
Gamboa advised him to keep silent and
go home which the latter did. Unknown to
them, an NBI team of agents had been
following them and witnessed the
transaction.
They arrested Chief Inspector
Gamboa and PO3 Lorbes. Meanwhile,
another NBI team followed Ong and
likewise arrested him. All of them were
later charged.
What are their respective criminal
liabilities? (2006 Bar)
A: Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa and PO3
Pepito Lorbes incur criminal liability under
Art. 11, Sec. 4 last par., RA No. 9165,
otherwise known as the “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. They acted
as “protector/coddler” to the unlawful
bringing into the Philippines of the dangerous
drugs. A “protector/coddler” refers to any
person who uses his power or position in,
inter alia, facilitating the escape of any
person whom he knows or believes, has
violated the Dangerous Drugs Law, in order
to prevent the arrest, prosecution and
conviction of the violator.
The two police officers are criminally
liable for violation of Sec. 27. RA 9165 of the
same law for misappropriation and failure to
account for the confiscated or seized
dangerous drugs.
On the other hand, Dante Ong is
criminally liable for the illegal importation or
bringing into the Philippines of the dangerous
drugs (Art. 11, Sec. 4, RA 9165).
Q: Tuburcio asked Anastacio to join their
group for a “session”. Thinking that it
was for a mahjong session, Anastacio
63 | P a g e
agreed. Upon reaching Tiburcio’s house,
Anastacio discovered that it was actually
a shabu session. At that precise time, the
place was raided by the police, and
Anastacio was among those arrested.
What crime can Anastacio be charged
with, if any? Explain. (2007 Bar)
A: Anastacio may not be charged of any
crime.
Sec. 7 of RA 9165 on the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs of 2002 punishes
employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort where dangerous drugs are used in
any form. But for a visitor of such place to
commit the crime, it is a requisite that he is
“aware of the nature of the place as such and
shall knowingly visit the same.” These
requisites are absent in the facts given.
Q: Following his arrest after a valid buy-
bust operation, Tommy was convicted of
violation of Section 5, Republic Act 9165.
On appeal, Tommy questioned the
admissibility of the evidence because the
police officers who conducted the buy-
bust operation failed to observe the
requisite "chain of custody" of the
evidence confiscated and/or seized from
him.
(a) What is the "chain of custody"
requirement in drug offenses?
What is its rationale? (2009, 2016
Bar)
(b) What is the effect of failure to
observe the requirement? (2009
Bar)
A: “Chain of custody” requirement in drug
offenses refers to the duly recorded,
authorized movement and custody of seized
dangerous drugs, controlled chemicals, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and laboratory
equipment of dangerous drugs from the time
of confiscation/seizure thereof from the
offender, to its turn-over and receipt in the
forensic laboratory for examination, to its
safekeeping and eventual violation, and for
destruction (Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1 Series of 2001)
Its rationale is to preserve the
authenticity of the corpus delicti or body of
the crime by rendering it improbable that the
original item seized/ confiscated in the
violation has been exchanged or substituted
with another or tampered with or
contaminated.
It is a method of authenticating the
evidence as would support a finding beyond
reasonable doubt that the matter is what the
prosecution claims to be.
 Failure to observe the “chain of
custody” requirement renders the evidence
questionable, not trustworthy & insufficient to
prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable
doubt.
Hence, Tommy would be acquitted
on reasonable doubt.
Q: The Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) had intelligence reports
about the drug pushing activities of Rado,
but could not arrest him for lack of
concrete evidence. SP03 Relio, a PDEA
team leader, approached Emilo and
requested him to act as poseur- buyer of
shabu and transact with Rado. Emilo
refused, saying that he had completely
been rehabilitated and did not want to
have anything to do with drugs anymore.
But he was prevailed upon to help when
SP03 Relio explained that only he could
help capture Rado because he used to be
his customer. SP03 Relio then gave Emilo
the marked money to be used in buying
shabu from Rado. The operation
proceeded. After Emilo handed the
marked money to Rado in exchange for
the sachets of shabu weighing 50 grams,
and upon receiving the pre-arranged
signal from Ernilo, SP03 Relio and his
team members barged in and arrested
Rado and Ernilo, who were both charged
with violation of R.A. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
(A) What defense, if any, may Emilo
invoke to free himself from criminal
liability? Explain.
(B) May Rado adopt as his own Emilo's
defense? Explain. (2015 Bar)
Answers:
(A) Ernilo may invoke Section 33, Art. II of
RA 9165 or the “Comprehensive Drugs
Act of 2002”.
He may have violated Section 11 of
RA 9165 for possession of shabu but he
is immune from prosecution and
punishment because of his role as the
poseur-buyer in the entrapment
operation.
There was virtually instigation. He is
exempted from prosecution or
punishment because the information
obtained from him by the PDEA agents,
who had no direct and concrete evidence
of Rado’s drug-pushing activities, led to
the whereabouts, identity and arrest of
Rado. So long as the information and
testimony given are pleaded and proven,
Ernilo cannot be prosecuted for violation
of RA 9165.
64 | P a g e
(B) No. First, an entrapment operation is a
valid means of arresting violators of RA
9165. It is an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. Second, the
immunity does not extend to violators of
Section 5 of RA 9165 or the sale of shabu
(sec. 33, RA 9165). Lastly, he was the
offender of the crime and apparently the
most guilty of the offense.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
(P.D. 1866, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO.
8294 AND R.A. 10591) (1990, 2000, 2004
Bar)
Questions:
(A) Ka Jacinto, an NPA commander, was
apprehended with unlicensed
firearms and explosives. He was
accordingly charged with illegal
possession of said firearms and
explosives. He now questions the
filing of the charges on the ground
that they are deemed absorbed in a
separate charge of rebellion filed
against him. Decide the issue.
(B) Suppose Ka Jacinto, using one of the
unlicensed firearms, shot and killed
his neighbor in an altercation. May the
charge of murder and illegal
possession of firearms be deemed
absorbed in the separate charge of
rebellion filed against him? Resolve
the matter with reasons. (1990) Bar
Answers:
(a) The charge of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives is deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion,
such possession being a necessary
means for the perpetration of the latter
crime. (Elias v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil
659)
(b) The charges here could not be
absorbed in the separate charge of
rebellion as it is clear that the act of
murder, coupled with the possession
of an unlicensed firearm, was not in
furtherance of the rebellion.
Q: PH killed OJ, his political rival in the
election campaign for Mayor of their
town. The Information against PH alleged
that he used an unlicensed firearm in the
killing of the victim, and this was proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution. The trial court convicted PH
of two crimes: Murder and Illegal
Possession of Firearms. Is the conviction
correct? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: No. The conviction of PH for two crimes is
not correct. Under the new law on illegal
possession of firearms and explosives, RA
8294, a person may only be criminally liable
for illegal possession of firearm if no other
crime is committed therewith; If a homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
PH therefore may only be convicted of
murder and the use of an unlicensed firearm
in its commission may only be appreciated as
a special aggravating circumstance,
provided that such use is alleged specifically
in the Information for Murder.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A.
4103, AS AMENDED) (1988, 1989, 1990,
1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009,
2010, 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018)
Q: State the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. (1988, 2016
Bar)
A:
The Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLaw)
applies in cases:
1. where the penalty imposed is more than
one year and the ISLaw shall apply
2. where there is a minimum penalty which
is not lower than the penalty next lower in
degree provided by law and
3. the maximum not higher than the
maximum penalty provided by law in
cases of felonies but when it comes to
statutory offenses, it must be lower than
the minimum penalty provided by law and
not higher than the maximum penalty
provided by law except in the following
cases as provided by Section 2 of Art.
4103:
(a) Life imprisonment
(b) Those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason
(c) To those convicted of misprision of
treason, rebellion, sedition or
espionage
(d) Those convicted of piracy
(e) Those who are habitual delinquents
(f) Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence
(g) Those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive shall have violated the
terms thereof
(h) Those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one
year, not to those already sentenced
65 | P a g e
by final judgment at the time of
approval of this Act, except as
provided in Sec. 5 hereof
Q: Itos special law. The penalty
prescribed is not less than six years but
not more than twelve years. No modifying
circumstance attended the commission
of the crime. If you were the judge, will
you apply the Indeterminate Sentence
Law? If so, how will you apply it? (1994,
1999 Bar)
A: If I were the judge, I will apply the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as the last sentence of Section 1 Act
4103, specifically provides the application
thereof for violations of special laws. Under
the same provision, the minimum must not
be less than the minimum provided therein
(six years and one day) and the maximum
shall not be more than the maximum
provided therein, i.e. twelve years.
Q: Explain how the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applied in crimes
punished by special laws. (2017 Bar)
A: The indeterminate sentence in such cases
shall consist of a maximum term which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by the special
law and a minimum term which shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by
the same.
Q: When would the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISLaw) be inapplicable?
(1999, 2003 Bar)
A: The ISLaw is not applicable to:
1. Those persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua;
2. Those convicted of treason,
conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of
treason, rebellion, sedition or
espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence;
7. Those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive shall have violated the
terms thereof;
8. Those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one
year;
9. Those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of the approval of
this Act; and
 10. Those whose sentence imposes
penalties which do not involve
imprisonment, like destierro.
Q: How are the maximum and the
minimum terms of the indeterminate
sentence for offenses punishable under
the Revised Penal Code determined?
(2002 Bar)
A: For crimes punished under the Revised
Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty
properly imposable under the same Code
after considering the attending mitigating
and/or aggravating circumstances according
to Art. 64 of said Code. The minimum term of
the same sentence shall be fixed within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree to
that prescribed for the crime under the said
Code.
Q: While serving his sentence, Macky
entered the prohibited area and had a pot
session with Ivy (Joy’s sister). Is Macky
entitled to an indeterminate sentence in
case he is found guilty of use of
prohibited substances? Explain your
answer. (2007 Bar)
A: No. Macky is not entitled to the benefit of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103,
as amended) for having evaded the sentence
which banished or placed him on destierro.
Sec. 2 of the said law expressly provides that
the law shall not apply to those who shall
have “evaded sentence”.
Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for
killing the 75 year old owner of his
rooming house. The prosecution proved
that Bruno stabbed the owner causing his
death; and that the killing happened at 10
in the evening in the house where the
victim and Bruno lived. Bruno, on the
other hand, successfully proved that he
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities;
that he pleaded guilty to the crime
charged; that it was the victim who first
attacked and did so without any
provocation on his (Bruno's) part, but he
prevailed because he managed to draw
his knife with which he stabbed the
victim. The penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. Assuming a Ronnie posted themselves at the door.
judgment of conviction and after
considering the attendant circumstances,
what penalty should the judge impose?
(2013 Bar)
A: Bruno should be sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence penalty of arresto
mayor in any of its period to prision
66 | P a g e
correccional in its medium period as
maximum. Bruno was entitled to two
privileged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and the presence of
at least two ordinary mitigating
circumstances (voluntary surrender and plea
of guilt) without any aggravating
circumstance under Art. 69 and 64(5) of the
RPC respectively, which lowers the
prescribed penalty for homicide which is
reclusion temporal to prision correccional.
Q: Randy was prosecuted for forcible
abduction attended by the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. After trial, the
court held that the prosecutor was able to
prove the charge. Nonetheless, it
appreciated in favor of Randy, on the
basis of the defense's evidence, the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender, uncontrollable fear, and
provocation. Under Art. 342 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for
forcible abduction is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, what penalty should be imposed on
Randy? (2018)
A: The penalty to be imposed on Randy shall
be prision mayor in its medium period as
maximum and any period within the degree
of prision correccional as its minimum
penalty. Since the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism is offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
other two mitigating circumstances present
had the maximum penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period lowered to
prision mayor in its medium period. Its
minimum penalty, then, shall be any period
within the next lower degree, which is prision
correccional.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
(R.A. NO. 9344, AS AMENDED, R.A. NO.
10630 AND IN RELATION TO P.D. 603)
(1995, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013 Bar)
Q: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to
the store of Mang Pandoy, Victor and
Ricky entered the store while Rod and
After ordering beer, Ricky complained
that he was shortchanged although Mang
Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly,
Ricky whipped out a knife as he
announced “Hold-up ito!” and stabbed
Mang Pandoy to death. Rod boxed the
store’s salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from
helping Mang Pandoy. When Lucy ran out
of the store to seek help from people next
door, she was chased by Ronnie. As soon
as Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy,
Victor scooped up the money from the
cash box. Then Victor and Ricky dashed
to the street and shouted, “Tumakbo na
kayo!” Rod was 14 and Ronnie was 17.
The money and other articles looted from
the store of Mang Pandoy were later
found in the houses of Victor and Ricky.
Are the minors Rod and Ronnie
entitled to suspended sentence under
The Child and Youth Welfare Code?
Explain. (1995 Bar)
A: No. Because the benefits of suspension of
sentence is not available where the youthful
offender has been convicted of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under Art. 294 (1), RPC (People v. Galit, 230
SCRA 486).
Questions:
(A) A was 2 months below 18 years of age
when he committed the crime. He was
charged with the crime 3 months later.
He was 23 when he was finally
convicted and sentenced. Instead of
preparing to serve a jail term, he
sought a suspension of the sentence
on the ground that he was a juvenile
offender. Should he be entitled to a
suspension of sentence? Reasons.
(B) Can juvenile offenders, who are
recidivists, validly ask for suspension
of sentence? Explain. (2003, 2013 Bar)
Answers:
(A) No. A is not entitled to a suspension of
sentence because he is no longer a
minor at the time of promulgation of the
sentence. For purposes of suspension of
sentence, the offender’s age at the time
of promulgation of the sentence is the
one considered, not his age when he
committed the crime. So although A was
below 18 years old when he committed
the crime, but he was already 23 years
old when sentenced, he is no longer
eligible for suspension of sentence.
(B) Yes. So long as the offender is still a
minor at the time of the promulgation of
the sentence. The law establishing
Family Courts, RA 8369, provides to this
effect: that if the minor is found guilty, the
court should promulgate the sentence
and ascertain any civil liability which the
accused may have incurred. However,
the sentence shall be suspended without
the need of application pursuant to PD
603, otherwise known as the “Child and
67 | P a g e
Youth Welfare Code” (RA 8369, Sec. 5a).
It is under PD 603 that an application for
suspension of the sentence is required
and thereunder it is one of the conditions
for suspension of sentence that the
offender be a first time convict: this has
been displaced by RA 8369.
PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968, AS
AMENDED) (1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992,
1993, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
2010 Bar)
Q: Who are the offenders disqualified
from availing themselves of the benefits
of the probation law (P.D. 968, as
amended)? (1988 Bar)
A: The following offenders are disqualified
from availing of the benefits of the Probation
Law:
1. Those sentenced to serve maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six
years;
2. Those convicted of subversion or any
crime against the national security of the
public order;
3. Those who have previously been
convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less
than one month and one day and or a fine
of not less than P200;
4. Those who have been once on probation
under the provisions of this decree; and
5. Those who are already serving sentence
at the time the substantive provisions of
this decree applicable pursuant to Sec.
33 of P.D. 968.
Q: A was charged with theft and upon
arraignment, pleaded guilty to the charge.
He was detained for failure to post bail.
After two (2) months, a decision was
rendered sentencing “A” to an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months
and one (1) day as a minimum, to one (1)
year and one (1) month as maximum, and
to pay the offended party the amount of
P700. On January 16, 1985, the very day
the sentence was read to “A”, the Judge
issued a Commitment Order addressed to
the Provincial Jail Warden. On January
28, 1985, “A” applied for probation but his
application was denied on the ground that
the sentence of conviction became final
and executory on January 16, 1985, when
“A” commence to serve his sentence. Is
“A” eligible for probation? (1989 Bar)
A: A is still eligible for probation since he filed
his application for probation within 15 days
from the promulgation of the judgment.
Under the Probation Law, the accused may
apply for probation within the period for
perfecting an appeal which is 15 days from
promulgation or notice thereof.
The judge committed an error in
issuing a Commitment order on the same
day of promulgation. A commitment order for
the convict to begin serving his sentence can
be validly issued only if the period for
perfecting an appeal has expired with no
appeal being taken.
The fact that in compliance with such
order, which is void, the accused
commenced to serve his sentence does not
bar him from availing himself of the benefits
of the Probation Law.
While it is true under the Rules that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served or the
accused has applied for probation (Sec. 7,
Rule 120), Sec. 9 of the same Rule provides
that “nothing in this Rule shall be construed
as affecting any existing provision in the law
governing suspension of sentence, probation
or parole.”
The probation law does NOT speak
of filing an application for probation before
judgment has become final. It only speaks of
filing the application WITHIN THE PERIOD
FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL. There is
nothing in the Probation Law that bars an
accused who has commenced to serve his
sentence from filing an application for
probation provided he does so within the
period for perfecting an appeal.
What the Probation Law provides is
that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment or
conviction. It does not say that no application
shall be entertained if the judgment has
become final because the convict has
already commenced to serve his sentence.
Q: Boyet Mar was charged with
consented abduction by a 17-year old
complainant. The accused made wedding
arrangements with the girl, but her
parents insisted on the prosecution of the
case. To avoid further embarrassment of
a court trial for him and the girl, the
accused entered a plea of guilty. He then
filed a petition for probation before
serving sentence, but the court denied
the petition on the ground that “it would
be better for the accused to serve
sentence so that he would reform himself
and avoid the scandal in the community
that would be caused by the grant of the
petition. The accused serve sentence but
he brought the matter to the Supreme
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Court in a petition for certiorari. Did the
trial court act correctly in denying the
petition for probation? (1991 Bar)
A: The trial court acted incorrectly. In Balleta
v. Leviste (92 SCRA 719), the Judge
precisely denied the petition for probation on
the same excuse stated in the problem. The
Supreme Court held that an accused must
fall within any one of the disqualifications
stated in Sec. 9 of PD 960 in order to be
denied probation.
Q: Johnny Gitara was convicted of the
crime of estafa by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. He was imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
3 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum
and six years as maximum, both of
prision correccional and was ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P3, 000.00. He filed an
application for probation upon the
promulgation of the judgment.
What is the legal effect of his
application for probation on the judgment
of conviction? Does said application
interrupt the running of the period of
appeal? (1992 Bar)
A: The filing of the application for probation is
considered as a waiver of the right of the
accused to appeal; the decision has become
final. In view of the finality of the decision,
there is no period of appeal to speak of.
Q: On February 3, 1986, Roberto was
convicted of arson through reckless
imprudence and sentenced to pay a fine
of P15, 000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency by
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On February 10, 1986, he appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Several months later,
he filed a motion to withdraw the appeal
on the ground that he is applying for
probation. On May 7, 1987, the Court of
Appeals granted the motion and
considered the appeal withdrawn.
On June 10, 1987, the records of the case
were remanded to the trial court. Roberto
filed a “Motion for Probation” praying that
execution of his sentence be suspended,
and that a probation officer be ordered to
conduct an investigation and to submit a
report on his probation.
The judge denied the motion on the
ground that pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1990, which took effect on
July 16, 1986, no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction. Is the denial
of Roberto’s motion correct? (1994 Bar)

A: Yes, even if at the time of his conviction,

Roberto was qualified for probation but that
at the time of his application for probation, he
is no longer qualified, he is not entitled to
probation. The qualification for probation
must be determined as of the time the
application is filed in Court (Bernardo v.
Judge Balagot, et. al., G.R. 86561, Nov. 10,
1992).

Q: Juan was convicted of the Regional

Trial Court of a crime and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
minimum of eight years. He appealed
both his conviction and the penalty
imposed upon him to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court ultimately
sustained Juan’s conviction but reduced
his sentence to a maximum of four years
and eight months imprisonment. Could
Juan forthwith file an application for
probation? Explain. (1992, 1995, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003 Bar)

A: No. Juan can no longer avail of the

probation because he appealed from the
judgment of conviction of the trial court, and
therefore, cannot apply for probation
anymore. Section 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended, mandates that no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if
the accused has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction.

Q: May a probationer appeal from the

decision revoking the grant of probation
or modifying the terms and conditions
thereof? (2002 Bar)

A: No. Under Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as

amended, an order granting or denying the
probation is not appealable.

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