A Selective General Bibliography

The historical background

• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, espec. III, VI & VII. (The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed.
J. Barnes, contains an excellent bibliography: see espec. IV, A-E & VIII, I-N).
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, 1a2ae.1 & 6-17.
• R. Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, Part 1, espec. §§17-18.
• J.Hobbes, Leviathan, espec. Part 1, ch.6.
• J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book 2, ch.21.
• D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §§7-8.
• J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, espec. chs.7-10.
• J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, Lectures 18-19.
• J.S. Mill, System of Logic, Book 3, ch.5, §11.
Key books published since 1945
• G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention.
• D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events.
• J. Hornsby, Actions.
• J. P. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will.
• J. P. Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power.
• G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind.
• L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.
• G. H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding.
• G. H. von Wright, Norm and Action.
Other important books published since 1945
• J. Bennett, The Act Itself.
• M. Brand, Intending and Acting.
• M. Bratman, Intentions, Plans and Practical Reason.
• J. Dancy, Practical Reality.
• Danto, Analytical Philosophy of Action.
• Donagan, Choice: the essential element in human action.
• F. Dretske, Explaining Behavior.
• Ginet, On Action.
• Goldman, A Theory of Human Action.
• K. Lennon, Explaining Human Action.
• I. Melden, Free Action.
• R. Mele, Springs of Action.
• Moya, The Philosophy of Action.
• O’Shaughnessy, The Will.
• Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour.
• R. Taylor, Action and Purpose.
• J. Thomson, Acts and other Events.
Collections
• M. Brand and D. Walton, Action Theory.
• J. Heil and A.R. Mele, Mental Causation.
• E. LePore and B. McLaughlin, Actions and Events.
• R. Mele, The Philosophy of Action.
• T. O’Connor, Agents, Causes and Events.
• J. Raz, Practical Reasoning.
• Vermazen and M.B. Hintikka, Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events.
• G. Watson, Free Will.
• R. White, The Philosophy of Action.
Course Outline
Week 2: Events and Actions
• Alvarez, M. and Hyman, J. (1998). ‘Agents and Their Actions’, Philosophy 73: 219-45
• Bach, K. (1980). ‘Actions Are Not Events’, Mind 89: 114-20.
• *Bennett, J. (2002). ‘What events are’ in Gale, ed., The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. R. Gale
(Ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.
• Danto, A. (1963). ‘What We Can Do’, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 435-45
• Danto, A. (1965). ‘Basic Actions’, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 141-48.
• Davidson, D. (1980). ‘Causal Relations’, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: OUP.
• *Davidson, D. (1980). ‘The Individuation of Events’, in his Essays on Actions and Events.
Oxford: OUP.
• Davidson, D. (1980). ‘Events as particulars’, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: OUP.
• Kim, J. (1973). ‘Causation, nomic subsumption and the concept of an event’, Journal of
Philosophy, 70 (8): 217-236.

Week 3: Intention
• Adams, F. (1986). ‘Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View’, Mind and Language, 1:
281-301.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Anscombe, G. E. M. (1983). ‘The Causation of Action’. In C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds.),
Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 174-90
• *Davidson, D. (1980). ‘Intending’, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: OUP: 83–102.
• Hursthouse, R. (2000). ‘Intention’. In Roger Teichmann (ed.), Logic, Cause and Action: Essays in
Honour of Elizabethe Anscombe, Cambridge: CUP: 83-105.
• Mele, A. (1989). ‘Intention, Belief, and Intentional Action’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 26:
19-30.
• Mele, A. and Moser, R. K. (1994).‘Intentional action’, Nous, 28: 39-68.
• *Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge: CUP. Chapter 3.

Week 4: The causal theory of action

• *Davidson, D. (1980). ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’, in his Essays on Actions and Events.
Oxford: OUP, pp. 3–20.
• Davidson, D. (1980). ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?’, in his Essays on Actions and
Events. Oxford: OUP, pp. 21–42.;
• Harman, G. (1997). ‘Practical Reasoning’, in A. R. Mele (ed.) The Philosophy of Action. Oxford:
OUP, pp. 149 – 177.
• Roth, A. (2000). ‘Reasons Explanation of Actions: Causal, Singular, and Situational’, Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 59: 839-74.
• Setiya, K. (2003) ‘Explaining Action,’ Philosophical Review, 112: 339-93.

Week 5: Reasons for action

• *Audi, R. (1997). ‘Acting for Reasons’, in A. R. Mele (ed.) The Philosophy of Action. Oxford:
OUP, pp. 75–105.
• Davidson, D. (1980). ‘Freedom to Act’, in his Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: OUP, pp.
63-81.
• Farrell, D. 1(989). ‘Intention, Reason, and Action’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 26: 283-95.
• Frankfurt, H. (1997). ‘The problem of action’, in A. R. Mele (ed.) The Philosophy of Action.
Oxford: OUP.
• Harman, G. (1997). ‘Practical Reasoning’, in A. R. Mele (ed.) The Philosophy of Action. Oxford:
OUP, pp. 149 – 177.
• O’Connor, T. (2002). Persons and Causes. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Cambridge, MA: OUP.
• Watson, G. (1977). ‘Scepticism about the Weakness of Will’, Philosophical Review 83, 1977: 316
– 339.

Week 6: The two faces of intention

• Bratman, M. (1985). ‘Davidson’s theory of intention’ in Actions and Events. Perspectives on the
philosophy of Donald Davidson. E. Lepore and B. McLaughlin (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell.
• Bratman, M. (1981). ‘Intention and means-end reasoning’, Philosophical Review, 90: 252-265.
• *Bratman, M. (1984). ‘Two faces of intention’, Philosophical Review, 93 (3): 375-405.
• Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: MA. Harvard University
Press.
• Hursthouse, R. (1991). ‘Arational Actions’, Journal of Philosophy, 88: 57–68.

Week 7: Trying and Volitionism

• Adams, F. and Mele, A. (1992). The intention / volition debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
22 (3), 323-338.
• Ginet, C. (1990). On Action. Cambridge: CUP. Chapter 2.
• Hornsby, J. (1980). Actions. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Hornsby, J. (1980). ‘Arm raising and arm rising’, Philosophy 55 (1980), 73-84.
• McCann, H. (1974). ‘Volition and Basic Action’, The Philosophical Review 83: 451-473.
• Mele, A. (1990). ‘He wants to try’, Analysis 50: 251-253.
• Odegard, D. (1988). ‘Volition and Action’, American Philosophical Quarterly 25: 141-151.
• *O’Shaugnessy S. (1973). ‘Trying (as the mental “pineal gland”)’, The Journal of Philosophy 70
(13): 365-386.
• Ripley, C. (1974). ‘A Theory of Volition’, American Philosophical Quarterly 11: 141-147.

Week 8: Knowledge of action

• Falvey, K. (2000). ‘Knowledge in Intention’. Philosophical Studies, 99 (1): 21-44.
• Neisser, U. (1988). ‘Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge’. Philosophical Psychology, 1: 35-59.
• *Peacocke, C. *2008). Truly Understood. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 7.
• Pickard, H. (2004). ‘Knowledge of action without observation’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society. Volume 104 (3): 203-228.
• Setiya, K. (2008). ‘Practical Knowledge’. Ethics, 118 (3): 388-409.
• Way, J. (2007). ‘Self-Knowledge and the Limits of Transparency’. Analysis, 67 (295): 223–230.

Week 9: Agency and Control

• de Vignemont, F. and P. Fourneret (2004). ‘The Sense of Agency: A Philosophical and Empirical
Review of the “Who” System.’ Consciousness and Cognition, 13: 1-19.
• Humphreys, G. and J. Riddoch (2003). Fractionating the Intentional Control of Behaviour: A
Neuropsychological Analysis. Agency and Self-Awareness. J. Roessler and N. Eilan. Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
• Libet, B. (1985). ‘Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary
Action.’ The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8: 529-566.
• Mele, A. (2003) Motivation and Agency. Oxford: OUP. Chapter 8.
• Peacocke, C. (2003). Action. Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge. Agency and Self-
Awareness. J. Roessler and N. Eilan. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
• Proust, J. (2003). Perceiving Intentions. Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and
Psychology. J. Roessler and N. Eilan. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
• Roessler, J. and N. Eilan, Eds. (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness. Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
• Strawson, G. (2003) ‘Mental Ballistics or the involuntariness of spontaneity’. Meeting of the
Aristotelian Society, April, 28th.
• Velleman, J. D. (1992). ‘What Happens When Someone Acts’ Mind (1992): 461-81.
• *Frankfurt, H. (1971).‘Freedom of the will and the concept of a person’, Journal of Philosophy, 68
(1): 5-20.
• Watson, G. (1975). ‘Free Agency’, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 205-220.
• *Wegner, D. M. & Wheatly, T. P. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of
will. American Psychologist, 54, 480–492

Week 10: Practical vs. Epistemic Responsibility

• Adams, R. (1985). ‘Involuntary sins’, Philosophical Review, 94, 3-31.
• Dennett, D. (1982). ‘Mechanism and Responsibility’, in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will, Oxford: OUP,
pp. 127–173.
• *Hieronymi, P. (2008) ‘Responsibility for believing’, Synthese (2008), 161, 357-373.
• Owens, D. (2000). Reason Without Freedom. The Problem of Epistemic Normativity. London:
Routledge.
• Smith, A. M. (2005). ‘Responsibility for attitudes: activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics,
115, 236-271Travis, C.
• "Pragmatics" (from the Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by B. Hale and C.
Wright, pp. 87-107. Oxford: Blackwell)