G.R. No. 130319.
October 21, 1998 authority under the Resolution, he offered to buy the lot
ERIBERTO L. VENUS, Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his
official capacity as Ombudsman; SANDIGANBAYAN [Third Division];
MARS REGALADO and HARRY ABAYON, Respondents.
In this is petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with application for a temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction, petitioner urges us to (1) annul and set
aside (a) the Ombudsmans approval, granted on 26 April 1996, of
the Memorandum of 22 February 1996 1 of Special ProsecutionSangguniang Bayan of New Washington,
Officer III Orlando I. Ines finding reasonable ground to charge
herein petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as the parcel of land
amended; (b) the Information 2 thereafter filed before respondent3278 located in New Washington, Aklan, and instead, the
Sandiganbayan, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23332; and
(c) the disapproval of 1 August 1997 by the Ombudsman of the bidding over said land on 19
Order3 of 15 July 1997 of Special Prosecution Officer III Victor A. 1988.
Pascual recommending the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause; (2) prohibit the Ombudsman from further
prosecuting the case; and (3) prohibit the Sandiganbayan from
acting on and trying Criminal Case No. 23332.
Acting on petitioners urgent motion to resolve his application for a
temporary restraining order, oral arguments were held on. On that
occasion, petitioner stressed the absence of a prima facie case for
the offense for which he was charged, and argued that unless
injunctive relief was granted, his suspension from office was
almost inevitable in light of the mandatory language of the law.
Assistant Solicitor General Pio Guerrero opposed the application,
alleging that there was a paucity of material facts and that the
propriety of determining the presence or absence of bad faith lay
with the Ombudsman. Arguing for the Ombudsman, Special
Prosecutor Carlos Montemayor characterized the application as
premature as petitioner had not yet been arraigned and
suspension from office could only be ordered after arraignment.
After the filing of the required memoranda4 by the parties, except
the Office of the Solicitor General which was excused from filing
any further pleadings in this case, we issued a temporary
restraining order on 12 January 1998, effective during the
pendency of this case or until further orders, enjoining public
respondents, their agents, representatives and persons acting
upon their orders or in their place or stead from prosecuting
Criminal Case No. 23332 and from conducting further proceedings
thereon.
Thereafter, in compliance with the resolution of 2 February 1998,
the parties informed us that they were submitting this case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings already filed.
FACTS:
• On and prior to 2 September 1988, petitioner was the
Municipal Mayor of New Washington, Aklan, while private
respondents Mars C. Regalado and Harry P. Abayon were
members of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said
municipality.
• At its sixteenth regular session on 2 September 1988, the
SB of New Washington passed Resolution No. 19, S. 1988
authorizing petitioner to:
• Negotiate And/or Inter (sic) Into A Contract With the
Board of Liquidators, Office of The President of The
Philippines In The Acquisition Of The Garcia-Diapo
Enterprise, Lot No. 2, PSU-134402 Tax Declaration No.
154 Which Is At Present In the Position (sic) Of The Board
of Liquidators Scheduled For Public Bidding On
September 19, 1988.5cräläwvirtualibrär
• Pursuant to the resolution, petitioner proceeded to Manila
• and submitted to one Wenceslao Buenaventura, a
Director and the General Manager of the Board of
Liquidators, a copy of Resolution No. 19 S. 1998, together ISSUE:
with petitioners letter-proposal wherein, on behalf of the
Municipality of New Washington and pursuant to his
on a government-to-government basis at a price mutually
acceptable to the parties.
• On 8 September 1988, petitioners offer to purchase the
lot for the Municipality of New Washington
• was deliberated upon by the Board of Liquidators. The
Board rejected both offers by way of Resolution No. 420,
Series of 1988, which reads:
RESOLVED, to reject the offer of the
Province of Aklan, and Mr. Tomas Manalang to purchase
covered by TCT No.
Ad Hoc Committee on Bids shall conduct a public
September
• Petitioner returned to New Washington and informed the
SB thereof of the denial.
• He likewise submitted to the Municipal Treasurer his
voucher for P1,401.00 for the transportation expenses he
incurred for the trip, which was covered by an itinerary of
travel. He then sought the opinion of the Provincial
Auditor, Atty. Antonio Tabang, as regards the
municipalitys participation in the bidding. The latter
informed the municipality of the requirements in order
that a municipal government validly participate in a
public bidding, which he set forth in his affidavit .
• In view of the numerous requirements, the SB doubted
whether New Washington could participate in the public
bidding.
• Nevertheless, on 19 September 1988, petitioner went to
Manila at his personal expense and submitted a letter-
request to the Board of Liquidators that the public bidding
be postponed to another date.
• However, the Board did not accede. Petitioner then
submitted his personal bid, which turned out to be the
highest bid. The property was thus sold to him and a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed on 3 October 1988.
Thereafter, he introduced improvements thereon at his
expense. During his incumbency as Mayor, he allowed a
portion of the lot to be used, without charge, as a garage
for the municipalitys fire truck and for the municipalitys
mushroom culture laboratory.
• Private respondents filed a sworn letter-complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo, Aklan,
charging petitioner with violation of paragraph (h) of
Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), as amended.
• the above-named respondent being then the duly
elected Mayor of New Washington, Aklan, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously having been
previously authorized to negotiate and/or enter into a
contract with the Board of Liquidators, Office of the
President of the Philippines, in the acquisition of the
Garcia-Diapo Lot No. 2, PSU-134402, Tax Declaration No.
154 and covered with TCT No. T-16837 which was already
then acquired by the Board of Liquidators and scheduled
for public bidding on September 19, 1988 and further,
having withdrawn money from the Municipality Treasury
for said purpose as expenses thereof in the amount
of P1,401.00, to the prejudice of the Municipality of New
Washington and for his own personal benefit, entered into
a Contract of Sale with the Board of Liquidators in his own
name and purchased the aforementioned lot for and in his
own behalf in contravention with [sic] the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices
1. the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to
file the information
 2. whether or not the offense charged was in fact prosecution service. A court should never play into the
committed by petitioner . hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its
erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information
RULING: charging a manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a
trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and
1. Crespo v. Mogul27 that courts cannot interfere with the where possible, make it conform to the law.
prosecutors discretion as to and control over criminal
prosecutions.
1) the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction
or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine whether there exists reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file
the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.28 There are, however, settled exceptions to this
rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile,29 to
wit:
(a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance

(j) Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the

accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied
(k) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme
Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners

• In Young v. Office of the Ombudsman,32 however, we held

that this Court may interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion.

2) applying by analogy Crespo v. Mogul,36 Marcelo v. Court

of Appeals,37 Roberts v. Court of Appeals 38 and Martinez
v. Court of Appeals,39 the Sandiganbayan was not bound
by such quasi-judicial findings. In fact, under the
principles governing criminal procedure, the
Sandiganbayan, or any trial court for that matter, is
mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits
of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the prosecutor. Hence, the logical
thing for us to do would be to remand this case to the
Sandiganbayan.
• We emphasize at this point that the Court has a policy of
non-interference in the Ombudsmans exercise of his
constitutionally mandated powers. The overwhelming
number of petitions brought to us questioning the filing
by the Ombudsman of charges against them are
invariably denied due course. Occasionally, however,
there are rare cases when, for various reasons there has
been a misapprehension of facts, we step in with our
review power. This is one such case.

• All courts should remember that they form part of an

independent judicial system; they do not belong to the

G.R. No. L-101545 January 3, 1995
HERMENEGILDO M. MAGSUCI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is here confronted with the question of whether
or not criminal responsibility may be incurred by a head of
office who, in the discharge of his official duties, has
relied on an act of his subordinate. There is no inflexible
rule.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the 05th
September 1991 decision of respondent Sandiganbayan
convicting petitioner, Hermenegildo M. Magsuci, of estafa
through falsification of public documents.
Facts:
• That on or about March 11, 1983 and prior
sometime thereto, in Cagayan de Oro City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused Hermenegildo M. Magsuci,
a public officer, being the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR), Department of Natural Resources),
(formerly Ministry of Natural Resources), Region
X, Cagayan de Oro City, and accused Jaime B.
Ancla, a private person, and Engineer and
General Manager of Dexter Construction,
Cagayan de Oro City, conspiring, confederating,
and helping one another while the former in the
discharge of his public position and committing
the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of
his public functions, with grave abuse of
confidence, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously issue and make it
appear in the Certificate of Completion, dated
March 10, 1983 and the undated Accomplishment
Report, that the latter had satisfactorily completed
the Work Order on the forty (40) ton ice plant and
cold storage located at Magallanes Street,
Surigao City, when in truth and in fact, there were
no such installation and construction made
thereon, thus, from the aforesaid falsities thereof,
enabled the accused to obtain and receive the
sum of P412,729.24 through a Disbursement
Voucher and various Treasury Checks and once
they are in possession of said sum, with intent to
defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert to
their own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.
• On 10 August 1988, both accused were ordered
arrested. Magsuci voluntarily surrendered and
posted a surety bond for his provisional liberty.
Ancla appeared to have absconded. On 12
September 1988, Magsuci pleaded "not guilty" to
the accusation.
• The factual findings of the Sandiganbayan may be
narrated thusly:
• Some time in January 1980, the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources ("BFAR") and
Dexter Construction ("DEXTER"), represented by
its Manager Jaime B. Ancla, entered into a
"Contract of Service" for the construction by the
latter of a 40-ton ice making plant, including a
150-ton ice storage and 350-ton cold storage
facility, in Surigao City. In October 1982, while the
construction was still on-going, BFAR and Ancla
executed a supplemental "Memorandum of
Agreement," under which Ancla additionally
undertook "the purchase and installation of three
distribution transformers and construction of
circular steel elevated tank" for P910,500.00. On
10 March 1983, BFAR Central Office Engineer
David T. Enriquez,2 charged with the duty to
render accomplishment reports on the progress of
the construction and to certify on the work
accomplishments of DEXTER, prepared and
signed an "Accomplishment Report," as well as a
"Certification," attesting to the progress and extent
of completion of the additional work. The report
also bore the signature of Ancla. On the following
day, or on 11 March 1983, Hermenegildo M.
Magsuci, the newly designated3 BFAR Regional
Director for Region X, Cagayan de Oro City, read
the Accomplishment Report and Certification,
affixed his signature thereon, and directed the
Chief of the Fisheries Extension Division in
Cagayan de Oro City, David F. Ernacio, to cause
the issuance of the corresponding voucher.
Disbursement Voucher No. 3-0061, to which the
Accomplishment Report and Certification were
attached, was thereupon prepared for the
payment of 45.32% (P412,729.24) of the contract
price of P910,700.00, or P357,217.16 after
deducting the contractor's tax, withholding tax,
and the required retention. Magcusi signed the
disbursement voucher, carrying the standard
printed certification that the expenses were
necessary, lawful, and incurred under his
supervision. Forthwith, Magcusi likewise signed
four checks, payable to the order of DEXTER, in
the total amount of P357,217.16. The
disbursement Voucher, along with its attachments,
and the corresponding checks were then
transmitted from the regional office to the BFAR
Central Office in Manila. Director Felix R.
Gonzales approved the voucher and co-signed
 the checks. Later, the checks were released to
DEXTER.
• As it turned out, however, the additional work so
represented to have been accomplished in the
field report and certifications had yet to be
undertaken. Although somewhat hazy, it would
appear that the work was ultimately completed in
December, 1983.
• Magsuci guilty of the offense charged
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan is correct in finding the accused
guilty of conspiracy.
RULING:

• There is conspiracy "when two or more persons

come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit
it." 5 Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the
physical acts constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, all
taken together, however, the evidence therefor
must reasonably be strong enough to show a
community of criminal design.
• Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of
intentionally on the part of cohorts.
• We are not unaware of an observation made by
this Court in People vs. Rodis8 to the effect that a
person may be so held liable as a co-principal if
he, be an act of reckless imprudence, has brought
about the commission of estafa through
falsification, or malversation through falsification,
without which (reckless negligence) the crime
could not have been accomplished.9 When,
however, that infraction consists in the reliance in
good faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on
a subordinate upon whom the primary
responsibility rests, absent a clear case of
conspiracy, the Arias doctrine must be held to
prevail.