Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Commission on Elections,
(G.R. No. 136781, G.R. No. 136786, G.R. No. 136795 October 6, 2000, En Banc, Panganiban)
Apportionment and Representation, Par. 2 Party list representation;
standards for apportioning seats for party-list representatives; not mandatory to fill-in sits
Facts: Before the court are three consolidated Petitions assailing the resolution order proclaiming 38 additional
party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided
under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941 (An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives Through The Party-List System, and Appropriating funds therefor).
The party-list method of representation under our Constitution provides that any national, regional or sectoral party or
organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives
who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. Complying
with its duty, Congress then enacted RA 7941, which provides that the State shall "promote proportional representation
in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, xxxx belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, xxxx the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party xxxx.“ This act also provides requirements
for entitlement to a party-list seat:
Sec. 11 Number of Party-List Representatives. -- T he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of
the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That
each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to this the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations
governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
In 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held. Out of 123 parties, Comelec proclaimed 14 party-list
representatives from 13 parties and organizations (including COCOFED), which had obtained at least two percent of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Right after, PAGASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and
Good Government towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) and other part-list organizations filed
before the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the constitutional provision of filling up of the 20% membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives was mandatory, and that the 2% vote requirement and the three-seat
limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short
of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Comelec 2nd Division promulgated the present assailed resolution granting PAG-ASA’s petition and ordered the
proclamation of herein 38 respondents in addition to the 14 already sitting. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional seats must be filled up by 80% district representatives and 20% party-list representatives." It
disregarded the “two percent-vote requirement” and instead identified three “elements of the party-list system” as
follows:
1. "The system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in
the House of Representatives."
2. "The system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society."
3. "It should encourage [the] multi-party system.
This decision was affirmed by Comelec En banc, adding that a strict application of the 2% threshold does not serve the
essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature – free and open party system. Without expressly declaring
the said act as unconstitutional, Comelec rejected its application, holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.
Issue: Whether the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, is mandatory or is merely a ceiling.
Held: No, Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory—it merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress. It simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. The court ruled that Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, simply conveys that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of
the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total
membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941, wherein it declared a policy to promote
"proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. Section 11 (b) of the said
act also deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those
garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
2. Phil. Guardians v. COMELEC (GR 1900529; Apr 29, 2009; En Banc; Brion)
Facts:
1. For the upcoming 2010 elections, COMELEC, in Resolution No. 8679, deleted several PL groups from the list of
registered; among them, PGBI because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the
2007 elections.
Issue:
W/N it the case of Phil Guardians falls under the ground in RA 7491(Sec 6)
Held:
Proceeding from the Senate deliberations on the then-Bill, the law provides for 2 grounds.
Despite an earlier precedent in Minero v. COMELEC, this Court finds that it was a strained application of the law. Its
basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a
failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.[7] Thus,
the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined
to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections
should now be understood, in light of the Banat r uling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. T his, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be
understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an exception to the application
of the principle of stare decisis.
3. BANAT v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 178271, July 8, 2009, Justice Carpio)
Mere Ceiling
Facts:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900
votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and
the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to
and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.
There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC.
BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections,
namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas
Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action
Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak
Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not
file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to
use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans f ormula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration
during the proceedings of the NBC.
Issues:
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
Held:
The Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans.
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all p arty-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
However, because the formula in Veterans h as flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional
representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list
organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
x x x
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of
the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats Number of seats available to
available to legislative x .20 party-list representatives
districts =
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives
whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220 x .20 55
=
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[the following procedure shall be observed:
... (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes
received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a
party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats. Thirty-four (34) party-list
seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the
party-list elections
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in
the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution,
the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination
of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of
party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap,
as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be
allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August
2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional
seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major
political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.
4. Title: Ang Ladlad v Comelec
Topic: Apportionment and Representation (disapproval of Ladlad due to moral issues)
Rule: Sec 5 (2), Art. VI: The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector
Petitioner: ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC
in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base.
On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. They argued that the LGBT
community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with
the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and
outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs.
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has
properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's expressed
sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is
there any attempt to any particular religious group's moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as
moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but
as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing,
such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not
publicly accepted moral norms.
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions.
COMELEC argues that Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs
but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a
sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a
bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set
of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.
Ang Ladlad argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner's application for registration since there was no
basis for COMELEC's allegations of immorality.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can dismiss Ang Ladlad for registering as a party list group with public morals as
ground.
Held/ Ratio:
No. We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the
COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not
suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual
relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental
to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate
morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. The
COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
5. MAGDALO vs. COMELEC
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
(G.R. No. 190793; 19 June 2012; EN BANC; Sereno, J.)
In Re: Article IX – C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and qualifications as a regional political party
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC
dated 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010.
Magdalo filed a petition with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party
based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. Pursuant
to the filing for registration and accreditation, Magdalo submitted pertinent documents for registration as well as
caused the publication of the petition in three daily newspapers of general circulation. Afterwards, a hearing was
conducted in which Magdalo (a) established its compliance with the jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented Francisco
Acedillo, its Secretary General, as its witness; and (c) marked its documentary evidence in support of its Petition for
Registration.
In 26 October 2009, COMELEC issued its resolution denying the petition of Magdalo to register as a political party on
the ground that Magdalo, in light of the Oakwood Mutiny, shows its purpose in employing violence and using unlawful
means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. Thereafter, Magdalo filed for a
motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied in the resolution of the COMELEC on 4 January 2010.
Thus, this petition was filed by Magdalo on the claim that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record. Specifically, its contentions are: (a) the
COMELEC Resolutions were not based on the record or evidence presented; (b) the Resolutions preempted the
decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, in which several members of the military are being tried for
their involvement in the siege of the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood); and (c) it has expressly renounced the
use of force, violence and other forms of unlawful means to achieve its goals.
COMELEC contends that given that it has the authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable law, and that its proceedings are administrative
in nature and may not, in anyway, affect the criminal case filed against Magdalo.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Magdalo its registration as a political party
in light of the allegations that it purports violence as a means to achieve its goals?
Ruling:
The COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse in denying Magdalo its petition for registration. The COMELEC has a
constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral
contests. The relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:
ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
C. The Commission on Elections
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. T hose which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Furthermore, the Omnibus Election Code provides for the following:
Sec. 60. Political party. Political party or party, when used in this Act, means an organized group of persons pursuing
the same ideology, political ideals or platforms of government and includes its branches and divisions. To acquire
juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation, and to entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted
to political parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with the Commission. Any registered political party
that, singly or in coalition with others, fails to obtain at least ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it
nominated and supported a candidate or candidates in the election next following its registration shall, after notice
and hearing, be deemed to have forfeited such status as a registered political party in such constituency.
Sec. 61. Registration. Any organized group of persons seeking registration as a national or regional political party may
file with the Commission a verified petition attaching thereto its constitution and by-laws, platforms or program of
government and such other relevant information as may be required by the Commission. The Commission shall after
due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within ten days from the date it is submitted for decision. No religious sect
shall be registered as a political party and no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be
entitled to accreditation.
In view of the foregoing provisions, it can be noted that the COMELEC has indeed the right to assess whether a party is
qualified to register as a political party under the grounds provided by law, one of which is that none of them should
exercise violence in the pursuit of its goals.
In light of the factual incidents that had transpired, the COMELEC referred to the Oakwood Mutiny in which officers and
members of the Magdalo participated. As noted, in order to demonstrate its grievances to President Arroyo’s
administration, Magdalo opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with
ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods clear acts of violence and leads to the fact
that indeed, Magdalo resorted to violence in pursuit of its goals. Thus, it is only imperative for the COMELEC to reject
the former’s application.
Considering these contentions, the Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The
dispositive portion of the case states:
“WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration by
MAGDALO.”
6. Dayao vs. Commission on Elections
(G.R. No. 193643, 193704, January 29, 2013, En Banc, Reyes)
Apportionment and Representation, Par. 2 Party list representation;
Members not belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sector
Facts: At bench are consolidated petitions assailing Comelec’s resolution denying the complaint filed by petitioners
Antonio D. Dayao, Rolando P. Ramirez, Adelio R. Capco, and Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII) for the
cancellation of the registration of private respondent LPG Marketers Association, Inc. (LPGMA) as a sectoral
organization under the Party-List System of Representation.
The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while petitioner FPII is an
association comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the country.
LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and energy sector
who have banded together in order. The group advocates access to reasonably priced LPG by household consumers.
For the purpose of participating in 2010 elections, LPGMA filed a petition for party-list accreditation with the Comelec
under RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act. They averred that they sought for promotion of fair trade practices and
prevention cartels and monopolies by actively pursuing oil deregulation, and vigilant advocacy for regulatory
procedures and governmental practices detrimental to small LPG entrepreneurs. The Comelec approved the said
petition. Thereafter, petitioners filed for the cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a paty-list organization. They
argued that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers
and independent re-fillers of LPG that control 45% of the national LPG market. Petitioners furthered that LPGMA only
seeks to promote their own interest before the Congress and the Dept. of Energy.
In response LPGMA contended that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-list
representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society. It also averred
that the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. The Comelec
dismissed the compliant holding that the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners is not among the exclusive
enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941.||
Issue: Whether a party-list organization, LPGMA, may be disqualified on the ground that its officers and members do
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Held: Yes, under the Party-List System Act, the party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and
underrepresented and their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. Under paragraph 5 of Section 6, a party-list
organization may be disqualified on the ground that its officers and members do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector.||| The Court explained that the “laws, rules or regulations relating to elections” referred to in
Section 6 par 5 of Party-List System Act, disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election
laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to “enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become
members of the House of Representatives.” A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy
must be disqualified. In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that “those who are not marginalized and
underrepresented are disqualified.” As state policy, it must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political
parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
In the present case however, the COMELEC has already determined and declared that the present factual
circumstances of LPGMA meet the qualifications imposed by law on party-list groups. They held that this group
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors they seek to represent, and that they have genuinely and
continuously supported their members and constituents, as shown by their track records. The court furthered that no
useful purpose will be served hearing the factual and evidentiary matters of LPGMA's qualifications again. Therefore, in
holding that a party-list representation should represent the marginalized and underrepresented, otherwise they shall
be disqualified, the Court affirmed Comelec’s finding that LPGMA was found to have complied with these requirements
provided by law.
7. Atong Paglaum et al., (GR 203766; Apr 2, 2013; En Banc; Carpio)
Facts:
1. Pursuant to RA 7941 and COMELEC Resolutions, 280 groups and organization registered and manifested their desire
to participate in the PL elections
2. COMELEC denied the petitions of many organizations due to various reasons, among which were: Failure to show
that the group represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector, failure to prove track record, failure to prove
that their nominees belong to the underrepresented sector, etc.
3. Thus, this case constituting 54 Petitions by 52 PL groups for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition
assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
Issue:
W/N criteria for participating in the PL system laid down in BANAT should be applied
Holding:
As can be gleaned from the discussions of the Constitutional Commission:
“PL system is not synonymous with sectoral representation. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors, which were outlined by PD No. 9, or include
other sectors. xxx We suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system
to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. xxx Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.”
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make
the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative
district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates in legislative districts can. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear, party-list system is
composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
RA 7941 clearly differentiates a sectoral party and a political party and it does not require national and regional parties
or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are
excluded from the party-list system?
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. However,
for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. It would not be in accord with the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May
2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined
political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies,"
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED.
8. Abang Lingkod
ABANG LINGKOD v. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 206952 October 22, 2013, Justice Reyes)
Meaning of National, Regional, or Sectoral
Facts:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and fisherfolks, and was
registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to
obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013 elections.
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which, inter alia required previously registered party-list
groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of
determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 and the guidelines
set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the summary evidentiary hearing of
previously registered party-list groups. The COMELEC scheduled three (3) dates -August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012
-for the summary hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent to enable it to show proof of its continuing
qualification under the party-list system.
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's August 9, 2012 Resolution, filed with the
COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated November 7 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's
registration as a partylist group. The COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some
alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG
LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been
involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to
represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system.
Issues: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the
party-list system.
Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD satisfies the requirements to be considered a party-list
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections,6 laid down new parameters to be
observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or accreditation
under the party-list system, viz:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties
can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the ''marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
Issue/s: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the
party-list system.
Held:
However, after a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against the new parameters in
screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum the Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it declared untruthful
statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately
submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it
failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present evidence
showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance. As a requirement
imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to
the actual activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution,
to assist the COMELEC in its work.
____
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies'' include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required
to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of
the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are
geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only
required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented
who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a conclusion derived
from a simplistic reading of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's disposition in tong Paglaum.
Not every misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations would merit the
denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation must relate to their
qualification as a party-list group. In this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on
requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s track record is no longer required
pursuant to the Court s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum
Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s registration, notwithstanding that it was able to obtain
sufficient number of votes for a legislative seat, would serve no purpose other than to subvert the will of the electorate
who voted to give ABANG LINGKOD the privilege to represent them in the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated May
10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections in SPP Case No. 12-238 (PLM), insofar as it affirmed the cancellation of
ABANG LINGKOD s registration and disallowed it to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one of the winning party-list
groups during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total number of
votes it garnered during the said elections.
9. Lico v Purisima
Topic: expulsion
Petitioner: ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T. SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM
C. YBANEZ, SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO
E. PEREZ, HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C. BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C.
GOLO & JONATHAN DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND AS LEGITIMATE MEMBERS AND OFFICERS
OF ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY LIST)
Respondents: HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST
REPRESENTED BY AMPARO T. RIMAS.
Facts:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16 November 2009. Under Ating Koop's
Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policymaking body is the National Convention. The Central Committee, however,
takes over when the National Convention is not in session.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups. 5 Based on the
procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC, 6 Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives, 7 and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop
issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees.
Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term.
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it introduced amendments to its
Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of the Central Committee, 10 which would
still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal
representation). The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within
six months after the Second National Convention.
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim
Central Committee) of the Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas
Group. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central
Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption,
the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as
cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012, 25 the COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico from
Ating Koop and declared Mascariña as the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group. The Second Division
characterized the issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership
dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register political parties.
In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from
the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of
the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the
Petition. At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining
that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in
hold-over capacity even after their terms had expired; and that the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its
judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the expulsion. Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized
the Rimas Group as the legitimate representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to
show that the Lico Group made a valid call for the special election of Central Committee members as required under
the Amended Constitution and By-Laws; 2) there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended the
Cebu meeting; and 3) the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and
By-Laws.
Issue: Whether or not the
Held/ Ratio:
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion
from Ating Koop — a matter beyond its purview.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office
as member of the House of Representatives. 35 In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning
party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the
HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the
disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona
fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on the rule that it can decide intra-party
matters as an incident of its constitutionally granted powers and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held
that when the resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary or incidental to the performance of the
constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can step in and exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party
matter. 36 The Lokin case, however, involved nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the present case,
the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the
matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect.
Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is
given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed
winner. 37 ASEcHI
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his
expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have
been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of
the election. 38 Needless to say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have
ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire
tenure.
We now pass upon the question of which, between the two contending groups, is the legitimate leadership of Ating
Koop.
At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide which of the
feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies. Indeed, the COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well
established. This power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an
incident of its enforcement powers. That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that the
amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of
the elections held during the Cebu meeting and the Parañaque conference pursuant to the said amendments, were
valid.
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective elections were conducted pursuant to the
amendment introduced in the Second National Convention held on 14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of Article VI of
Ating Koop's By-laws called for the conduct of an election of Central Committee members within six months after the
Second National Convention. There is no showing, however, that the amendments were actually filed with the
COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's approval must be obtained through its agent,
the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC, 48 We declared that it is the State, acting through the
COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is that the State, through the
COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into by the party-list organization and its members — the
Constitution and By-laws — such that any amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation requiring the
consent of all the parties involved. An amendment to the by-laws of a party-list organization should become effective
only upon approval by the COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended by-laws and subsequent conformity
thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code, an
amendment to a by-law provision must be filed with the SEC. The amendment shall be effective only upon the issuance
by the SEC of a certification that it is not inconsistent with the Corporation Code.
There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop were filed with and subsequently
approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted pursuant thereto may not be considered valid. Without such
requisite proof, neither the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set of officers of Ating Koop.
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into play. This rule
provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of
both parties are evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party succeeds
in making out a case, neither side prevails. The courts are left with no other option but to leave them as they are. The
consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of the complaint/petition. 51
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden of proving that it is the petitioner, and not
the Lico Group, that is the legitimate group. As the evidence of both parties are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to
discharge its burden. The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group insofar as it sought to be
declared the legitimate group representing Ating Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Parañaque convention "appeared to be in conformity" with Ating Koop's Amended
Constitution and By-Laws. 52 It should be stressed that the COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion. 53
The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of the evidence. 54 But when
the COMELEC's assessment of the evidence is so grossly unreasonable that it turns into an error of jurisdiction, the
Court is compelled to intervene and correct the error. 55
As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able to establish its legitimacy. The evaluation of the
evidence by the COMELEC in deciding the issue of which group legitimately represents Ating Koop was therefore
grossly unreasonable, which amounts to a jurisdictional error that may be remedied by certiorari under Rule 65.
The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two groups is the legitimate leadership of
Ating Koop, then who is?
We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee, whose members remain as such in a hold-over
capacity.
In Señeres v. COMELEC, 56 the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay Party-List through its President,
Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground that his term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by
analogy the default rule in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the
expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. 57 Señeres ruled that the
hold-over principle applies in the absence of a provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-list organization
prohibiting its application.
In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop and We do not see any
provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with
corporation law, the existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to bind the
corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its members on 14 November 2011, since no
successors had been validly elected at the time, or since. CHTAIc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 31 January
2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING
KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.
A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set of officers legitimately representing
Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop.
10. Tobias v, Abalos
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR.,
petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Tobias vs. Abalos
(G.R. No. L-114783; 8 December 1994; EN BANC; Bidin, J)
Reapportionment thru special law – Mandaluyong City
Facts:
Herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people
of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. Result of the plebiscite was in favor of the the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanize city. Thus, said R.A. was passed.
Petitioner's first objection over R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in the
Constitution.
Further, the petitioners likewise assail the law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that
said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum
population requirements. Petitioners likewise assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4). The relevant provisions are as follows:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.
Lastly, petitioners assert that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.
7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 7675 is unconstitutional as it deprived the Congress to reapportion the legislative districts
pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution?
Ruling:
The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative
districts (i.e., minimum population of 250,000 inhabitants). At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from
the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
As to the contention that San Juan should be included in the plebiscite previously held, the contention is bereft of merit
since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city.
The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were
properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
The petition to rule that R.A. 7675 is unconstitutional was thus, stroke down. The dispositive portion, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
11. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
(G.R. No. 118577, 118627, March 7, 1995, En Banc, Puno)
Apportionment and Representation, Par. 1, 3, 4: Rules on Apportionment;
Reappointment thru special law; Makati City
Facts: At bench are two petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No.
7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati." Among the petitioners, only Mariano Jr. was a resident of Makati, others were suing as taxpayers. They
assailed the constitutionality of Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to
Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three consecutive term' limit for local elective
officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
Held: Yes. In the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994, this Court ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred
fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative
districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. That
intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Additional Notes:
On petitioners contention that Makati is not in accord with Section 5(3), Article VI. – the Court ruled otherwise. Said
section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250, 000)
shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.
12. Sema v. COMELEC (GR 177597; Jul 16, 2008; En Banc; Carpio)
Facts:
1. By virtue of the Ordinance, Maguindanao has 2 legislative districts. The 1st district consists of Cotabato City and 8
municipalities. Maguindanao is part of ARMM by virtue of the Organic Act RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054. Though
Cotabato City is not part of ARMM, it is part of the 1st legislative district of Maguindanao, but not of the province of
Maguindanao.
2. 2006 AUG 28: ARMM’s legislature, ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its powers to create provinces under RA
9054(Art VI)(Sec 19), enacted MMA Act 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Later, 3 new municipalities
were carved out, Shariff Kabunsuan now consist of 11 municipalities. New province ratified on 2006 OCT 29.
3. Sangguniang Lungsod of Cotabato City clarified the status of CC in view of the conversion.
4. 2007 MAR 29: COMELEC issued Reso No 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s 2st leg district is composed only of CC
5. 2007 MAY 10, COMELEC issued Reso No 7902, amending Reso 07-0407, renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
6. Sema, candidate for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office.
Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Sema further claimed that in issuing
Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
Issue:
1. W/N Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional;
Held:
No. Note that the creation of any LGU must comply with the 3 conditions provided in 1987 Const(Article X)(Sec 10).
A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city, requires also the
power to create a legislative district.
The office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the
House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office. The office is also maintained by national funds. It is a
self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only
create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.
When a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the
Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one representative. This does not detract from the
constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. Only an act of
Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of
the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise
13.Montejo v. Commission on Elections
(G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995, En Banc, Puno)
Redistricting Leyte; Mere minor adjustments
Facts:
Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of
Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of
Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second
District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his district. We gave due course to the petition considering that,
at bottom, it involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of
redistricting and reapportionment.
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran
became a regular province. It provides:
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite to be held in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite
shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of
this code. The new legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be
represented in Congress by the duly-elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new
provinces or districts were created until their own representatives shall have been elected in the next regular
congressional elections and qualified.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on.
As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third District composed the new province of Biliran,
A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as
per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte,
respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other
interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of Leyte.
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to
the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First
District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226
registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters
be transferred from the First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol.
Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption
of the territorial composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that
each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
Petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in
the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders, h e argues that respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept
that as much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The
Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the
petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it
has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment
alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1of Resolution No. 2736. (Yes)
(2) (Important) Whether or not COMELEC’s reapportionment is inconsistent with the standards set forth by law.
(Yes)
Held:
(1) Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power
granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
"apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. . . ."
With the foregoing, the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
(2) The conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution
of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its
degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress.
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3)
years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment
is a justiciable question.
*The Supreme Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, however it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as the petitioner in this case would want the Court to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of
Leyte, is annulled and set aside. The Court also denies the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of
Tolosa f rom the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
14. Title: Herrera v COMELEC (GR 131499; 17 Nov 1999; En Banc; Purisima)
Topic: redistricting Province of Guimaras & population size
Petitioner: HERMIE M. HERRERA, DONABELLA T. SORONGON, JULIO T. TAMAYOR, EDELJULIO R. ROMERO
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION
Facts:
In view of the addition of the two (2) new municipalities, San Lorenzo and Sibunag, to the Province of Guimaras, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras decided to have the province subdivided into two provincial districts.
Provincial Election Supervisor in the Province of Guimaras conducted two consultative meetings on August 21, 1996
and on October 2 of the same year, with due notice to all elected provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains,
barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. Through secret balloting, a
consensus was reached unanimously in favor of a division as follows: (1) First District shall be composed of the
Municipalities of Jordan Buenavista and San Diego with three (3) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and (2) The
Second District shall be composed of the Municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag with three (3)
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members.
Petitioners question the manner in which the province was so divided into districts, pointing out that: 1) the districts do
not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area; 2) the "consultative meeting" upon which the districting was
based did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province; 3) the apportionment of the province into two
districts is not equitable, and 4) there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.
It must be noted that on April 30, 1997, the Province of Guimaras was re-classified from a fifth class to a fourth class
province under Memorandum Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department
of Finance. Hence, the Province of Guimaras, having only one legislative district, has to be divided into two provincial
districts with an allotment of eight elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by virtue of its reclassification
into a fourth class province.
The rules and guidelines to be followed by the Commission on Elections in the apportionment, by district, of the
number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district is
provided for by law. Under the above cited R.A. 7166, division of provinces into districts shall be done in a manner: (1)
as nearly as practicable, (2) according to the number of inhabitants, (3) each district comprising a compact, contiguous
and adjacent territory, and (4) the number of seats of elective members of the respective Sanggunian equitably
apportioned between the districts.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the apportionment of Guimaras provides a disproportionate representation and there for inequitable.
(2) Whether or not the consultative meetings did not express true sentiment of the voters
(3) Whether or not the municipalities which comprise each district do not embrace a compact, contiguous and adjacent
area.
Held/ Ratio:
(1) No, it does not provide for a disproportionate representation. Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec Resolution No. 2313, the
basis for division into districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number of
listed or registered voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus, Comelec did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Resolution because clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province
of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa,
Administrator of the National Statistics Office
(2) No, it did express the true sentiment of the voters. As shown by the documentary exhibits, all interested parties
were duly notified and represented during the two consultative meetings as required by Comelec Resolution No. 2313.
Appended to respondent Comelec's Comment are the attendance sheets where the names and signatures of those
who attended the consultative meetings and the corresponding barangay and/or group which they represented
appear and which belie petitioners' allegation that there was no valid representation.
(3) No. "Contiguous" and/or "adjacent" means "adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or
touching along boundaries often for considerable distances." Not even a close perusal of the map of the Province of
Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners' stance. On its face, the map of Guimaras indicates that the municipalities
of Buenavista and San Lorenzo are "adjacent" or "contiguous". They touch along boundaries and are connected
throughout by a common border. Buenavista is at the northern part of Guimaras while San Lorenzo is at the east
portion of the province. It would be different if the towns grouped together to form one district were Buenavista and
Nueva Valencia or Buenavista and Sibunag. In that case, the districting would clearly be without any basis because
these towns are not contiguous or adjacent. Buenavista is at the north while Nueva Valencia and Sibunag are at the
southern and southeastern part of the province, respectively.
PETITION IS DISMISSED.
15. Samson v. Aguirre
MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents.
(G.R. No. 133076; 22 September 1999; EN BANC; Quisumbing, J.)
Absence as to the certification of income, population, and area not fatal: presumed valid
Petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8535 which creates the City of Novaliches out of the 15 barangays
of Quezon City.
Petitioner bases his petition mainly on the following grounds:
a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7,
11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income, population and land area; seat of government; and no adverse
effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as
to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; and
b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.
From the above, petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to
Congress during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535, as only oral manifestations were made.
Also, petitioner argues that the statute will cause an adverse effect on the mother city, Quezon City. Petitioner likewise
argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as required
under Section 11(a) of the Local Government Code, and that Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the
petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 8535 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No, R.A. No. 8535 is not unconstitutional.
Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular congressional processes. A
person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably. In the case at bar, the
petitioner had failed to breach this assumption of constitutionality since his arguments were only based on allegations
and not on substantive proof.
As such, the assailed article provides:
Local Government Code
SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from
one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services,
to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and
services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit
concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a local government
unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National
Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11:
ART. 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and
either population or land area are present:
(1) Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately
preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income
shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants,
as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction
of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The petitioner failed to prove that the above requirements were not met. In fact, during the deliberations and the public
hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government, there were resource persons from the different
government offices like National Statistics Office, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management Bureau,
and Department of Budget and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself.
The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined average annual income of
the 13 barangay for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26. Under the Local Government Code, a
proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding
two years. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise the
proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310. This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the Implementing
Rules. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government Code, the
proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income and population or land area. Other than the income
requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly
urbanized.
As to the contention that these were merely oral manifestations, the above official statements could serve the same
purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session
of either the Senate or the House of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification submitted to
either chamber routinely.
Moreover, petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during the public hearings, the
representatives present did not also submit written certifications. Note that under the Implementing Rules, written
certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted by interested
municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a resolution. Petitioner, however, did not even bother to present
a copy of said petition if only to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as required by law. We are
thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these requirements were met appropriately in the passage of
the assailed legislative act.
With regard to the contention that the statute did not provide for a seat of government for Novaliches, the Court ruled
that this will not gravely affect the validity of the law. Section 12 of the Local Government Code, which applies to the
proposed City of Novaliches, provides that the same can establish a seat of government after its creation. To wit:
SECTION 12. Government Centers. Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall endeavor to establish a government
center where offices, agencies, or branches of the National Government, local government units, or
government-owned or controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the
local government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of national and local agencies and
offices which may serve as the government center as contemplated under this Section. The National Government,
local government unit or government-owned or controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the
construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.
Lastly, that the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling for the
creation of the City of Novaliches, if true, will also not render invalid R.A. No. 8535. The evident purpose of this
requirement, found in the Implementing Rules, is to inform the City Council of the move to create another city and to
enable it to formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City Council members are
obviously aware of the petition. The matter has been widely publicized in the mass media. Surely members of the
Quezon City Council, including petitioner, could not now be heard to claim they have not known of the contents of the
barangays petition to create the City of Novaliches.
Based on the foregoing, the proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited
amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The dispositive portion states:
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.”
16. Aldaba vs. Commission on Elections
(G.R No. 188078 January 25, 2010, En Banc, Carpio)
Rules on Apportionment; (3) Population size, par 3 and 4
Facts: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a
legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of
a legislative district in a city.
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in
Congress as provided under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect
because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also
void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than
250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In
any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the
“immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall
have a district representative. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of
Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010
elections.
17. Aquino v. COMELEC (GR 189793; Apr 7, 2010; En Banc; Perez)
Facts:
1. GMA signed into law RA 9716 which, among others, created an additional legislative district for the Province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
2. PT seek the nullification as constitutional of RA 9716 because the creation of a new district leaves District 1 with less
than 250, 000 population
Issue:
W/N the Constitution requires a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a new legislative district.
Held:
Any law carries the presumption of constitutionality
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
Based on Sec 5, while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a
city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, Makati having a population of 450, 000, declared a law increasing its district constitutional
since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250,000. In other words, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. And, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be
needed for an additional district in a province
Population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement found in Sec 461 of the Local Government Code.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, an Ordinance apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives to the different legislative districts , which was appended to the final document, reflect that 250,000
requirement was not taken as an absolute minimum; it was a factor but not the sole. Example, Palawan has 2 districts
with 1 less than 250,000 but they were divided based on contiguity. It was decided by the importance of the towns and
the city that eventually composed the districts.
18. Navarro v. Ermita
(G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011, En Banc, Nachura)
Land area as a factor
Facts:
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders
of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments
to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress
amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement;
and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
Petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari seeking
to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte
of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They
pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population
of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both
counts, viz.
Constitution, Article X Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
Issue: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands is Constitutional. (Yes)
Whether or not RA 9355 is Constitutional. (Yes)
Held:
The LGC and the LGC-IRR, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability.
However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is
exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly
stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442
(for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It
would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interprbetation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of local
autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy
to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of
both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 53. of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the
Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and
effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of
local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a local government
code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of
local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
(Emphasis supplied.)
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization
and countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a
new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic
country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed of one
or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the creation of
municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence,
the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the
many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical and
not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress, recognizing the capacity
and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the
land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in
the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
Province of Dinagat.
R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of
Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided
only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times
more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services
to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and
the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as
a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution
is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and
Justice Carpio (Dissenting Opinion)
19. Bagabuyo v COMELEC (GR 176970; Dec. 8, 2008; En Banc; Brion)
Topic: no need for plebiscite in apportionment
Petitioner: ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO
Respondents: COMELEC
Facts:
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No.
5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan de Oro." This law
eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two.
For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the
second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued
that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit.
Issue: Whether or not a plebescite is required
Held/ Ratio:
No. Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty members
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local
government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself
classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 20 In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been
defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the
purpose of local government thereof." The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local
government units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local
Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.
First, we must know the difference of the two terms. Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as
the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a
legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting
district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand,
is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a
legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of
legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among districts". Hence, emphasis is given to
the number of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative
districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous,
compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every
province (irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one
hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate and interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to
the required standards of apportionment, Section 5 (4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given
standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of
how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered". Its
concern is the commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate existence
and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern,
namely, the criteria established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the
criteria of income, population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide
services. The division or merger of existing units must comply with the same requirements (since a new local
government unit will come into being).
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite.
The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists
under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.
Concept: DIFFERENCE BET. APPORTIONMENT/REAPPORTIONMENT AND DIVISION OF LGU
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is the
basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not,
however, a political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be
described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the
latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people
comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their
national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it
elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the
legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or
dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other
similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the territorial and political
subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the
Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or
whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.
A local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a
majority of the members of its Sanggunian.
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of
government." As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special
functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of local
affairs" and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns. In light of these
roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the
division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean,
and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.
PETITION IS DISMISSED
20. Bengson v HRET and Cruz
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
(G.R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001; EN BANC; Kapuan, J.)
Recovery of natural born citizen status
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the decision by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
in which it dismissed petitioner’s petition for quo warranto against Teodoro Cruz (Cruz).
Teodoro Cruz recently won as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections over
petitioner Bengson. However, Bengson is assailing that Cruz was not qualified for such post since he is not a natural
born citizen given that he had to perform an act to acquire his status as a citizen of the Philippines.
It must be noted that Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:
x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking
of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino
of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of
his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said
foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen
x x x.
He was thereafter naturalized as a U.S. citizen, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17,
1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. And as
mentioned, he thereafter ran for Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in which he won over Cruz.
Thus, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse when it considered Cruz as a natural born Filipino who became an
American citizen and thereafter reacquired his Philippine citizenship?
Ruling:
No, the HRET did not commit any grave abuse on its ruling favoring Cruz.
The term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and
(2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered
natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who
natural-born citizens are, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring
Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this
law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and
none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1)
desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political
and economic necessity.
Respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizen status under the law governing repatriation. Noteworthy is the
absence in the above enumeration of a category for citizenship regarding persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, the petition for certiorari is denied. The disposition of the Court provided:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.”
21 aquino
22. Marcos
23. domino
24. perez
25. fernandez
26. tagolino
27. reyes
28. luvero
29. jalosjos
30. trillanes
31. jimenez
32. pobre
33. dante
34 puyat
35 baguilat
36. aevlino
37datu michael
38. arroyo
39. osmena
40. santiago