ELCANO vs.
HILL, 77 SCRA 98 (1977); case has not extinguished his liability for
FACTS:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of
the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A
criminal complaint was instituted against
him but he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of
lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint
for recovery of damages against defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time
of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was
living and getting subsistence, for the same
killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the
defendants. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City denied the motion.
Nevertheless, the civil case was finally
dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the present civil action for damages
is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case.
2. W/N Article 2180 (2nd and last
paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already
legally married.
HELD:
1. No, the present civil action for damages
is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a
distinction as regards the proof required in
a criminal case and a civil case. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a
civil case for damages on the basis of
quasi-delict does is independently
instituted from a criminal act. As such the
acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a
bar to the instant action against him.
2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may
still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill.
Although parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child,
emancipation by marriage is not absolute,
i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. As in the present case, killing
someone else contemplated judicial
litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply
to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
CINCO vs. CANONOY, 90 SCRA 369
(1979);
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court
for recovery of damages on account of
a vehicular accident involving his car and a
jeepney driven by respondent Romeo
Hilot and operated by respondents
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed
against the driver. At the pre-trial of the
civil case counsel for the respondents
moved for the suspension of the civil action
pending determination of the criminal case
invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.
The City Court granted the motion and
ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari
to the Court of First Instance, alleging that
the City Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the
petition; hence, this petition to review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N there can be an independent civil
action for damages to property during the
pendency of the criminal action?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for
damages based on Articles 2176 and
2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-
delictual in character which can be
prosecuted independently of the criminal
action.
Where the plaintiff made essential
averments in the complaint that it was the
driver's fault or negligence in the operation
of the jeepney which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney;
that plaintiff sustained damages because of
the collision; that a direct causal
connection exists between the damage he
suffered and the fault or negligence of the
defendant-driver and where the defendant-
operator in their answer, contended,
among others, that they observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees, a defense peculiar to
actions based on quasi-delict , such action
is principally predicated on Articles 32176
and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is
quasi-delictual in nature and character.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict ,
the civil case may proceed as a separate
and independent court action as specifically
provided for in Article 2177.
Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court refers to "other civil actions arising
from cases not included in Section 2 of the
same rule" in which, "once the criminal
action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered".
The civil action referred to in Section 2(a)
and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that
arising from the criminal offense and not
the civil action based on quasi delict.
The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property. It
makes no distinction between "damage to
persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other.
The word "damage" is used in two
concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with
respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An
example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in
Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds proprietors responsible for damages
caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property".
Respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in upholding the decision of the
city court suspending the civil action based
on quasi-delict until after the criminal
action is finally terminated.
MENDOZA vs. ARRIETA; 91 SCRA 113
(1979);
FACTS:
On October 22, 1969, a three-way
vehicular accident occurred along Mac-
Arthur Highway, Marilao Bulacan involving
Mercedes Benz Owner/ petitioner, Edgardo
Mendoza, and respondents jeepney driver
Salazar and truck driver Montoya. This
resulted in the filing of two separate
Informations of Reckless Imprudence
resulting to Damage to Property.
The first one being a Php 1604.00 Criminal
case against truck driver Montoya for
hitting Salazar’s jeepney at the right rear
portion causing the jeep to hit Mendoza’s
Mercedes, and the second Criminal Case
was against jeepney driver Salazar for
hitting the Benz in the amount of Php
8,890.00.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Bulacan rendered
judgment. Truck driver Montoya was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of crime of
damage to property through reckless
imprudence and was sentence to pay
jeepney driver Salazar a fine for actual
damages and indemnity. Accused Rodolfo
Salazar, on the other hand, was acquitted.
Mercedes Benz owner was not awarded
damages.
On August 22, 1970 , after termination of
criminal cases, Petitioner filed Civil Case
against truck owner Timbol and jeepney
driver Salazar. Timbol filed a motion to
dismiss claiming that such action is barred
by the prior judgment in criminal cases.
The CFI judge granted Timbol’s Motion to
Dismiss.
ISSUES:
Can Timbol be sued for damages by
Mendoza after termination of criminal
cases? – YES.
Should the Civil Case against jeepney
driver Salazar be dismissed? YES.
HELD:
Timbol can be sued for damages.
No reservation need be made in the
criminal case, it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate. Even if it
were not substantive but adjective, it
cannot stand because of its inconsistency
with Article 2177, an enactment of the
legislature superseding the Rule of 1940.
There is no oneness in Identity in the civil
and criminal cases. In the former, the truck
owner, Timbol, was made a party in the
case while in the latter only the jeepney
driver, Salazar, was a party in the case for
the damage to Petitioner’s Mercedes Benz.
Moreover, in the criminal cases, the cause
of action was the enforcement of a civil
liability arising from criminal negligence,
while the August 22 Civil Case is based on
quasi delict under Art 2180 in relation to
Art 2176 of the New Civil Code.
The civil case against Salazar should be
dismissed.
The extinction of the penal action does not
entail the extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in
the final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. Given the
facts of the case, the trial court pronounced
that jeepney driver Salazar cannot be held
liable for the damages sustained by
petitioner’s car.
Accordingly the civil action against Salazar
must be held to have been extinguished in
consonance with Section 3 (c) Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.
3. CULPA AQUILIANA DISTINGUISHED
FROM CRIME;
CRIMES:
1. Crimes affected the public interest.
2. Penal law punishes/ corrects the criminal
act.
3. Only acts covered by Penal Law are
punished (Barredo vs Garcia, 73 Phil 607;
J. Bocobo, 1940 : Taxi c lied with Carretela)
4. Guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Reservation to file separate civil action.
No reservation, civil action is impliedly
instituted in the criminal action.
6. Employer’s liability is subsidiary.
CULPA AQUILIANA:
1. Only private concern.
2. Repairs the damage by indemnification.
3. Covers all acts that are faulty or
negligent.
4. Preponderance of evidence. ARTICLES 101 TO 101, RPC;

5. No reservation – it’s independent from Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of
crime. (Andamo vs IAC, 191 SCRA 203) felony. — Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.
6. Employer’s liability is solidary (Fabre Jr.
vs CA, 259 SCRA 426, ‘ 96) Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in
certain cases. — The exemption from
CULPA criminal liability established in subdivisions
CRIMES 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in
AQUILIANA
subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does
1. Crimes affected 1. Only private not include exemption from civil liability,
the public interest. concern.
which shall be enforced subject to the
following rules:
2. Penal law 2. Repairs the
punishes/ corrects damage by First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of
the criminal act. indemnification. Article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age,
3. Only acts covered 3. Covers all acts or by one over nine but under fifteen years
by Penal Law are that are faulty or of age, who has acted without discernment,
punished (Barredo negligent. shall devolve upon those having such
vs Garcia, 73 Phil person under their legal authority or
607; J. Bocobo, control, unless it appears that there was no
1940 : Taxi c lied fault or negligence on their part.
with Carretela)
Should there be no person having such
insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship or control, or
4. Guilt proven 4. Preponderance if such person be insolvent, said insane,
beyond reasonable of evidence. imbecile, or minor shall respond with their
doubt. own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil
law.
5. Reservation to 5. No reservation
file separate civil – it’s independent Second. In cases falling within subdivision
action. No from crime. 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose
reservation, civil (Andamo vs IAC, benefit the harm has been prevented shall
action is impliedly 191 SCRA 203) be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit
instituted in the which they may have received.
criminal action.
The courts shall determine, in sound
discretion, the proportionate amount for
which each one shall be liable.
6. Employer’s 6. Employer’s
liability is liability is solidary When the respective shares cannot be
subsidiary. (Fabre Jr. vs CA, equitably determined, even approximately,
259 SCRA 426, ‘ or when the liability also attaches to the
96) Government, or to the majority of the
inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damages have been caused
with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in
the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5
and 6 of Article 12, the persons using
violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there
be no such persons, those doing the act
shall be liable, saving always to the latter
that part of their property exempt from
execution.
RULES 111, ROC;
Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce
civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than
actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees
shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these
Rules, no filing fees shall be required for
actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal
and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall
be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions. (cir. 57-97)
Section 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. — After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said
civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on
the merits is rendered in the civil action,
the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the
criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation,
the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to
cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the offended party in the criminal case and
of the parties to present additional
evidence. The consolidated criminal and
civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action,
the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict
shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.
(2a)
Section 3. When civil action may
proceeded independently. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil
actions. — The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of
the criminal action shall extinguish the civil
liability arising from the delict. However,
the independent civil action instituted
under section 3 of this Rule or which
thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation
may be continued against the estate or
legal representative of the accused after
proper substitution or against said estate,
as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the
appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period
of thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the
offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of
the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the
case shall be dismissed without prejudice
to any civil action the offended party may
file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not
a bar. — A final judgment rendered in a civil
action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is not a bar to a criminal action
against the defendant for the same act or
omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of
prejudicial question. — A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed
in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial
question. — The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (5a)
BARREDO vs. GARCIA; 73 PHIL 607
(1942);
FACTS:
1. At about 1:30 am on May 3, 1936, taxi
driver Fontanilla guided by Dimapilis
collided head on with a “kalesa” thereby
injuring and killing the 16 year old Faustino
Garcia.
2. Faustino’s parents, Garcia and Alamario,
filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and
reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit.
3. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
4. After the criminal suit, on March 7, 1939,
the parents of the deceased instituted a
civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the
Malate taxicab (employer of Fontanilla)
making him primarily and directly
responsible under culpa acquiliana of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
5. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the
civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees).
6. Barredo’s defense was that Fontanilla’s
negligence is punished by the Revised
Penal Code, but since Fontanilla was not
sued for civil liability, therefore, Barredo
claims that he cannot be held liable arguing
that his liability is only subsidiary and that
the separate civil suit should have been
filed against Fontanilla primarily and not
him.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Barredo, as employer, is civilly
liable for the acts of his employee,
Fontanilla?
2. W/N the parents of the deceased file civil
action against Fausto Barredo thus making
him primarily and directly responsible
under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla?
HELD:
Yes, Barredo is primarily liable under
Article 1903. The parents were well within
their rights in suing him.
1. Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil
Code of the Philippines and is entirely
distinct and independent from a delict or
crime under the Revised Penal Code.
In this jurisdiction, the same negligent act
causing damage may produce civil liability
(subsidiary) arising from a crime under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines; or create an action for quasi-
delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the
parties are free to choose which course to
take.
And in the instant case, the negligent act of
Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of
Barredo:
First, a subsidiary one because of the civil
liability of Fontanilla arising from the
latter’s criminal negligence under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, and
Second, Barredo’s primary and direct
responsibility arising from his presumed
negligence as an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
2. Barredo was held liable for damages.
It was also proven that Barredo is negligent
in hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired
him. He is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his driver’s
negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee
(Article 1903).
“Some of the differences between crimes
under the Penal Code are:
• “1. That crimes affect the public interest,
while quasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
• “2. That consequently, the Penal Code
punishes or corrects the criminal act, while
the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
• “3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-
delicts, because for the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-
delitos, include all acts in which any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes.
However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of
the game laws, infraction of the rules of
traffic when nobody is hurt.
ELCANO vs. HILL, 77 SCRA 98, (1977);
FACTS:
Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of
the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A
criminal complaint was instituted against
him but he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of
lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake.
Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint
for recovery of damages against defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time
of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was
living and getting subsistence, for the same
killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the
defendants. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City denied the motion.
Nevertheless, the civil case was finally
dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the present civil action for damages
is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case.
2. W/N Article 2180 (2nd and last
paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already
legally married.
HELD:
1. No, the present civil action for damages
is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a
distinction as regards the proof required in
a criminal case and a civil case. To find the
accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a
civil case for damages on the basis of
quasi-delict does is independently
instituted from a criminal act. As such the
acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a
bar to the instant action against him.
2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may
still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill.
Although parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child,
emancipation by marriage is not absolute,
i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only
with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. As in the present case, killing
someone else contemplated judicial
litigation, thus, making Article 2180 apply
to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
DULAY vs. CA, 243 SCRA 220, (1995);
FACTS:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation
between Benigno Torzuela and Atty.
Napoleon Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang
Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at the said carnival,
shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of
the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children,
filed an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and private respondents
Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action.
Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his
duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code. Superguard further alleged
that a complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code, such as the one filed by
petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil
liability under Article 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. In addition, the
respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of
the complaint is premature considering
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal
case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer’s subsidiary liability. Respondent
Safeguard also filed a motion praying that
it be excluded as defendant on the ground
that defendant Torzuela is not one of its
employees. Petitioners opposed both
motions, stating that their cause of action
against the private respondents is based on
their liability under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that
the complaint was one for damages
founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code as distinguished from those arising
from, quasi-delict.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of
shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176
of the New Civil Code;
2. Whether or not Article 33 of the New
Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed; and
3. Whether or not the liability or
respondents is subsidiary under the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
1. Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides that “whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private
respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting
from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional.
2. No. The term “physical injuries” in Article
33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide.
Although in the Marcia case, it was held
that no independent civil action may be
filed under Article 33 where the crime is the
result of criminal negligence, it must be
noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused
in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant in Marcia was
charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based
on Article 33 lies.
3. No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both. The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is direct
and immediate; it is not conditioned upon
prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it
is incumbent upon the private respondents
to prove that they exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.
PADILLA vs. CA, 129 SCRA 558,
(1984);
FACTS:
1. The information states that on February
8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused
prevented Antonio Vergara and his family
to close their stall located at the Public
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently
forcibly opening the door of said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and
destroying said stall and the furnitures
therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods,
wares and merchandise
Contentions:
Vergara Family
1. accused took advantage of their public
positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent
municipal mayor, and the rest of the
accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it
was committed with evident premeditation.
Roy Padilla, et al
1. finding of grave coercion was not
supported by the evidence
2. the town mayor had the power to order
the clearance of market premises and the
removal of the complainants' stall because
the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market
stall was a nuisance per se
3. violation of the very directive of the
petitioner Mayor which gave the stall
owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate
the market premise
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and
Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave
coercion, and hereby imposes upon them
to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5)
months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of
P500.00 each; to pay actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of
P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount
of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, jointly and severally,
and all the accessory penalties provided for
by law; and to pay the proportionate costs
of this proceedings.
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered
them to pay solidarily the amount of 9,000.
The petitioners were acquitted because
these acts were denominated coercion
when they properly constituted some
petitioners were acquitted because these
acts were denominated coercion when they
properly constituted some other offense
such as threat or malicious mischief
Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on
certiorari - grounds
1. where the civil liability which is included
in the criminal action is that arising from
and as a consequence of the criminal act,
and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, (no civil liability arising from
the criminal case), no civil liability arising
from the criminal charge could be imposed
upon him.
2. liability of the defendant for the return
of the amount received by him may not be
enforced in the criminal case but must be
raised in a separate civil action for the
recovery of the said amount
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent
court committed a reversible error in
requiring the petitioners to pay civil
indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge.
RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. A separate civil action is not required. To
require a separate civil action simply
because the accused was acquitted would
mean needless clogging of court dockets
and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it. The exceptions are when
the offended party expressly waives the
civil action or reserves his right to institute
it separately.
Civil liability which is also extinguished
upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the
defendant. That the same punishable act or
omission can create two kinds of civil
liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. 'There is the
civil liability arising from the act as a crime
and the liability arising from the same act
as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced
against the accused, However, the
offended party cannot recover damages
under both types of liability.
Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited,
that "when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a
civil action for damages is not precluded by
an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission.
The Civil Code provision does not state that
the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case
may be filed but there is no statement that
such separate filing is the only and
exclusive permissible mode of recovering
damages. Considering moreover the delays
suffered by the case in the trial, appellate,
and review stages, it would be unjust to the
complainants in this case to require at this
time a separate civil action to be filed.
PEOPLE vs. LIGON, 152 SCRA 419
(1987);
FACTS:
An appeal from te judgment of the RTC
convicting accused of the crime of robbery
with homicide sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales, a
17-year-old working student who was
earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He
was allegedly robbed of his cigarette box,
and the latter uon clinging to the window of
the accused, lost his grip and fell down the
pavement as the car sped up. On appeal.
The Cort held that it was not convinced with
moral certainty of the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, hence he was
acquitted.
ISSUE: W/N a person feed from criminal
liability is also freed from civil liability?
Ruling: Accused acquitted but held civilly
liable for his acts and omissions, there
being fault and negligence.
J: It does not follow that a person who is
not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. While the guilt must be established
beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal
prosecution, only preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action.
On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation
of the testimonies of both prosecution and
defense witness at the trial and applying
the quantum of proof required in civil
cases, We find that a preponderance of
evidence establishes that Gabat by his act
and omission with fault and negligence
caused damage to Rosales and should
answer civilly for the damage done.
MANIAGO vs. CA, 253 SCRA 674
(1996);
FACTS:
One of the shuttle buses owned by
petitioner Ruben Maniago, and driven by
Herminio Andaya, figured in a vehicular
accident with a passenger jeepney owned
by respondent Boado along Loakan Road,
Baguio City. A criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to
property and multiple physical injuries was
filed against petitioner’s driver. A month
later, respondent Boado filed a civil case for
damages against petitioner Maniago
himself. Petitioner moved that the civil case
be suspended citing that a criminal case
was already pending. The trial court denied
the motion on the ground that the civil
action could proceed independently of the
criminal action. On appeal to CA, petitioner
reiterated his contention adding that the
civil action could not proceed because no
reservation to bring it separately was made
in the criminal case. CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal action when
no reservation of right to bring it separately
was made?
HELD:
No.
*We have reached the conclusion that the
right to bring an action for damages under
the Civil Code must be reserved as required
by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be
dismissed.
To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that
a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery
of civil liability, otherwise they will be
deemed to have been instituted with the
criminal case. Such civil actions are not
limited to those which arise “from the
offense charged,” as originally provided in
Rule III before the amendment of the Rules
of Court in 1988. In other words the right
of the injured party to sue separately for
the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will
be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.
MANLICLIC vs. CALAUNAN, 512 SCRA
642 (2007);
FACTS:
1. The vehicles involved in this case are:
(1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by
petitioner PRBLI and driven by
petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2)
owner-type jeep owned by respondent
Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza
2. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the
North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided.
- The front right side of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of
the jeep causing the latter to move
to the shoulder on the right and
then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive
damage.
- Respondent suffered minor injuries
while his driver was unhurt.
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal
case was filed charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
 Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries.
4. Subsequently on 2 December 1991,
respondent filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI
5. The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case.
6. When the civil case was heard, counsel
for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) of the testimonies in the
criminal case be received in evidence in
the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not available to testify in
the civil case.
7. The versions of the parties are
summarized by the trial court as
follows:
Respondent’s version:
- According to the respondent and his
driver, the jeep was cruising at the
speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour on the slow lane of the
expressway when the Philippine
Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in
the process of overtaking the jeep,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
rear of the jeep on the left side.
- At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus
hit the jeep, it was about to
overtake the jeep. In other words,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at
the back of the jeep when the jeep
was hit.
- Fernando Ramos corroborated the
testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza.
He said that he was on another jeep
following the Philippine Rabbit Bus
and the jeep of plaintiff when the
incident took place. He testified that
the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the
right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Petitioner’s version:
- The petitioner explained that when
the Philippine Rabbit bus was about
to go to the left lane to overtake the
jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the
left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it.
- Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it
observed and exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of
its employee
8. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.
CA found no reversible error and
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal
case may be admitted in evidence for
the civil case.
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may
be held liable for the collision and be
found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the CA in the criminal
case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part.
3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI,
exercised due diligence and supervision
of its employee.
HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly
liable for the damages for his negligence or
reckless imprudence based on quasi-delict.
The PRBLI is held solidarily liable for the
damages caused by the petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.
1. Admissibility of the TSNs
Petitioner’s contention:
- The TSNs should not be admitted to
evidence for failure to comply with
the requisites of Sec. 47, Rule 130
of the ROC
- The petitioner, PRBLI, had no
opportunity to cross examine the
witnesses because the criminal case
was filed exclusively against
Manliclic.
- Admission of the TSNs will deprive
the petitioner of due process.
Court:
- The testimonies are still admissible
on the ground that the petitioner
failed to object on their
admissibility.
- Failure to object to the inclusion of
the evidence is a waiver on the
provision of the law.
- In addition, the petitioner even
offered in evidence the TSN
 containing the testimony of
Ganiban.
- The court disagrees that it would
deprive the petitioner of due
process. For the failure of the
petitioner to object at the proper
time, it waived its right to object for
the non compliance with the ROC.
2. Civil liability arising from crime v.
Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana
Petitioner:
- The version of the petitioner
deserves more credit as the
petitioner was already acquitted by
the CA of the charge of Reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries.
Court:
- From the complaint, it can be
gathered that the civil case for
damages was one arising from or
based on quasi-delict: Petitioner
Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence
in causing the collision, while
petitioner PRBLI was sued for its
failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father in the selection and
supervision of its employees
- it appears that petitioner Manliclic
was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is
not the author of the act complained
of which is based on Section 2(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
- In spite of said ruling, petitioner
Manliclic can still be held liable for
the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action
arising from crime or ex delicto and
not to a civil action arising from
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The extinction of civil liability
referred to in the quoted provision,
refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the
accused.
In sum, the court distinguished civil
liability arising from a crime and that
arising from quasi-delict:
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A
CRIME
(a) if an accused is acquitted based on
reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from the crime
may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the
basis that he was not the author of
the act or omission complained of
(or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist),
said acquittal closes the door to civil
liability based on the crime or ex
delicto.
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
QUASI-DELICT
- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime.
- The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. The acquittal
of the accused, even if based on
a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the
 extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict.
- civil liability arising from quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana, same will
not be extinguished by an acquittal,
whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that
there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not
exist).
- An acquittal or conviction in the
criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case based on quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioner’s contention:
- The petitioners urge the court to
give more credence to their version
of the story however, as they
constitute a question of fact, it may
not be raised as a subject for a
petition for review. Findings of the
trial court and appellate court are
binding on the Supreme Court.
- The testimony of the petitioner
about the jeep of the respondent
overtaking another vehicle in the
criminal case was not consistent
with what he gave to the
investigator which is evidently a
product of an after-thought
- If one would believe the testimony
of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic,
and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
already somewhat parallel to the
jeep when the collision took place,
the point of collision on the jeep
should have been somewhat on the
left side thereof rather than on its
rear. Furthermore, the jeep should
have fallen on the road itself rather
than having been forced off the
road.
3. PRBLI’s liability
- Under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, when an injury is caused by
the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both.
- The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such
employee. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.
- PRBLI maintains that it had shown
that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees
- In the matter of selection, it showed
the screening process that
petitioner Manliclic underwent
before he became a regular driver.
- As to the exercise of due diligence
in the supervision of its employees,
it argues that presence of ready
investigators is sufficient proof that
it exercised the required due
diligence in the supervision of its
employees
Court:
- In the selection of prospective
employees, employers are required
to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and
service records. In the supervision
of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof.
- As the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the
employer, the latter has the burden
of proving that it has been diligent
not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work.
 - The trial court found that decision of the Court of Appeals is
petitioner PRBLI exercised the AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1)
diligence of a good father of a the award of moral damages shall be
family in the selection but not in reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award
the supervision of its employees of exemplary damages shall be lowered
- it seems that the Philippine Rabbit to P50,000.00.
Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as
well as in the maintenance of its
vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the
supervision of its personnel.
o no evidence introduced that
there are rules promulgated by
the bus company regarding the
safe operation of its vehicle and
in the way its driver should
manage and operate the
vehicles
o no showing that somebody in
the bus company has been
employed to oversee how its
driver should behave while
operating their vehicles
o The presence of ready
investigators after the
occurrence of the accident is not
enough. Same does not comply
with the guidelines set forth with
regard to the supervision.
o Regular supervision of
employees, that is, prior to any
accident, should have been
shown and established.
o the lack of supervision can
further be seen by the fact that
there is only one set of manual
containing the rules and
regulations for all the drivers
- For failure to adduce proof that
it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its
employees, petitioner PRBLI is
held solidarily responsible for
the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

instant petition for review is DENIED. The
4. Culpa Aquiliana distinguished from
Culpa Contractual; (SEPARATE PRINT)
Presence of Contractual relations;
CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.,
38 PHIL 769 (1918);
FACTS:
Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila
Railroad Company as clerk. He lived in San
Mateo which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company. He used to
travel by trade to the office located in
Manila for free. On January 21, 1915, on
his way home by rail and when the train
drew up to the station in San Mateo, he
rose from his seat, making his exit through
the door. When he stepped off from the
train, one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons causing
him to slip off from under him and he fell
violently on the platform. He rolled and was
drawn under the moving car. He was badly
crushed and lacerated. He was hospitalized
which resulted to amputation of his hand.
He filed the civil suit for damages against
defendant in CFI of Manila founding his
action upon the negligence of the
employees of defendant in placing the
watermelons upon the platform and in
leaving them so placed as to be a menace
to the security of passengers alighting from
the train. The trial court after having found
negligence on the part of defendant,
adjudged saying that plaintiff failed to use
due caution in alighting from the coach and
was therefore precluded from recovering,
hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the negligence of the employees
attributable to their employer whether the
negligence is based on contractual
obligation or on torts?
HELD:
YES. It cannot be doubted that the
employees of defendant were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the
platform in the manner stated. It
necessarily follows that the defendant
company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the
plaintiff’s own contributory negligence. It is
to note that the foundation of the legal
liability is the contract of carriage.
However Art. 1903 relates only to culpa
aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as
the Court cleared on the case of Rakes v.
Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that
proof of diligence and care in the selection
and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability fro the latter’s act.
The fundamental distinction between
obligation of this character and those which
arise from contract, rest upon the fact that
in cases of non-contractual obligations it is
the wrongful or negligent act or omission
itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations the
vinculum exists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by
the parties when entering into the
contractual relation. When the source of
obligation upon which plaintiff’s cause of
action depends is a negligent act or
omission, the burden of proof rest upon the
plaintiff to prove negligence.
On the other hand, in contractual
undertaking, proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is suffient prima facie to
warrant recovery. The negligence of
employee cannot be invoked to relieve the
employer from liability as it will make
juridical persons completely immune from
damages arising from breach of their
contracts. Defendant was therefore liable
for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether
the breach of the duty were to be regarded
as constituting culpa aquiliana or
contractual. As Manresa discussed,
whether negligence occurs as an incident in
the course of the performance of a
contractual undertaking or is itself the
source of an extra-contractual obligation,
its essential characteristics are identical.
There is always an act or omission
productive of damage due to carelessness
or inattention on the part of the defendant.
The contract of defendant to transport
plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the
duty to carry him in safety and to provide
safe means of entering and leaving its
trains. Contributory negligence on the part
of petitioner as invoked by defendant is
untenable. In determining the question of
contributory negligence in performing such
act- that is to say, whether the passenger
acted prudently or recklessly- age, sex,
and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the
safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. It is to be noted that the place
was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was
his daily routine.
Our conclusion is there is slightly
underway characterized by imprudence
and therefore was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
The decision of the trial court is REVERSED.
DEL PRADO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.,
52 PHIL 900;
Facts:
Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s
motorman, was driving the company’s
street car along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff
Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to
catch the car. The motorman eased up but
did not put the car into complete stop.
Plaintiff was able to get hold of the rail and
step his left foot when the car accelerated.
As a result, plaintiff slipped off and fell to
the ground. His foot was crushed by the
wheel of the car. He filed a complaint for
culpa contractual.
Issues:
(1) Whether the motorman was negligent
(2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of
contract of carriage
(3) Whether there was contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff
Held:
(1) We may observe at the outset that
there is no obligation on the part of a street
railway company to stop its cars to let on
intending passengers at other points than
those appointed for stoppage.
Nevertheless, although the motorman of
this car was not bound to stop to let the
plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that
would have the effect of increasing the
plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to
board the car. The premature acceleration
of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of
this duty.
(2) The relation between a carrier of
passengers for hire and its patrons is of a
contractual nature; and a failure on the
part of the carrier to use due care in
carrying its passengers safely is a breach
of duty (culpa contractual). Furthermore,
the duty that the carrier of passengers
owes to its patrons extends to persons
boarding the cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom.
Where liability arises from a mere tort
(culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of
positive obligation, an employer, or
master, may exculpate himself by proving
that he had exercised due diligence to
prevent the damage; whereas this defense
is not available if the liability of the master
arises from a breach of contractual duty
(culpa contractual). In the case before us
the company pleaded as a special defense
that it had used all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage
suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish
this contention the company introduced
testimony showing that due care had been
used in training and instructing the
motorman in charge of this car in his art.
But this proof is irrelevant in view of the
fact that the liability involved was derived
from a breach of obligation.
(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's
negligence in attempting to board the
moving car was not the proximate cause of
the injury. The direct and proximate cause
of the injury was the act of appellant's
motorman in putting on the power
prematurely. Again, the situation before us
is one where the negligent act of the
company's servant succeeded the
negligent act of the plaintiff, and the
negligence of the company must be
considered the proximate cause of the
injury. The rule here applicable seems to
be analogous to, if not identical with that
which is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of "the last clear chance." In
accordance with this doctrine, the
contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the action if it be shown that
the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. The
negligence of the plaintiff was, however,
contributory to the accident and must be
considered as a mitigating circumstance.
VASQUEZ vs. DE BORJA, 74 PHIL 560
(1944);
Facts:
Francisco de Borja purchased from
Natividad-Vasquez Sabani Development
Co. (NVSD) , Inc. 4,000 cavans of palay at
PhP 2.10 per cavan to be delivered on
February 1932. On behalf of the company,
Antonio Vasquez executed the contract as
acting president and manager and
Fernando Busuegoas as corporate
treasurer. However, NVSD had only
delivered 2,488 cavans of palay of the
value of PhP 5,224.80 and refused to liver
the remaining balance of PhP 1,512 cavans
of the value of PhP 3,175.20. It also failed
to return 1,510 empty sacks owned by De
Borja amounting to PhP 377.50. Moreover,
the company became insolvent. De Borja
incurred damages resulting from the
undelivered cavans and that prompted him
to sue Vasquez and Busuegoas for the
damages.
Vasquez contends that he did not
enter the contract in his own individual and
personal capacity but as the manager at
the time of the transaction. As a
counterclaim, Vasquez alleged that he
suffered damages in the sum of PhP 1,000
on account of the complaint action.
CFI found Vasques guilty of
negligence in the performance of the
contract and held him personally liable on
that account. It ruled in favor of the
plaintiff and ordered Vasquez to pay De
Borja of the damages. The Court also
absolved Busuego from the complaint and
plaintiff from the counterclaim. CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC but reduced the
sum. It found Vasquez liable for gross
negligence under Articles 1102, 1103, and
1902 of the Old Civil Code and subsidiary
liable with NVSD. On the motion of
recommendation, CA set aside its
judgment and ordered the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
• WON the Antonio Vasquez entered
into the contract with the De Borja in his
personal capacity or as manager of the
Natividad-Vazquez Sabani Development
Co., Inc.
• WON Vasquez his personally liable
for the damages
Held:
Vasquez had entered the contract
as a manager of NVSD and not on his
personal capacity. It is well known that a
corporation is an artificial being invested by
law with a personality of its own, separate
and distinct from that of its stockholders
and from that of its officers who manage
and run its affairs. The mere fact that its
personality is owing to a legal fiction and
that it necessarily has to act thru its
agents, does not make the latter personally
liable on a contract duly entered into, or for
an act lawfully performed, by them for an
in its behalf. The legal fiction by which the
personality of a corporation is created is a
practical reality and necessity. Without it
no corporate entities may exists and no
corporate business may be transacted.
Such legal fiction may be disregarded only
when an attempt is made to use it as a
cloak to hide an unlawful or fraudulent
purpose. No such thing has been alleged or
proven in this case. It has not been alleged
nor even intimated that Vazquez personally
benefited by the contract of sale in
question and that he is merely invoking the
legal fiction to avoid personal liability.
Neither is it contended that he entered into
said contract for the corporation in bad
faith and with intent to defraud the
plaintiff. We find no legal and factual basis
upon which to hold him liable on the
contract either principally or subsidiarily.
SC also held that the CFI and CA
both erred in holding Vasquez liable for
negligence in the performance of the
contract. They have manifestly failed to
distinguish a contractual obligation from an
extracontractual obligation, or an
obligation arising from contract from an
obligation arising from culpa aquiliana. The
fault and negligence referred to in articles
1101-1104 of the Civil Code are those
incidental to the fulfillment or
nonfullfillment of a contractual obligation;
while the fault or negligence referred to in
article 1902 is the culpa aquiliana of the
civil law, homologous but not identical to
tort of the common law, which gives rise to
an obligation independently of any
contract. The fact that the corporation,
acting thru Vazquez as its manager, was
guilty of negligence in the fulfillment of the
contract, did not make Vazquez principally
or even subsidiarily liable for such
negligence. Since it was the corporation's
contract, its nonfulfillment, whether due to
negligence or fault or to any other cause,
made the corporation and not its agent
liable.
On the other hand, if Vasquez were
to be held liable for its negligence
independently of the contract by his fault
or negligence cause damaged to the
plaintiff, he would be liable to the latter
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. But
then the plaintiff's cause of action should
be based on culpa aquiliana and not on the
contract alleged in his complaint and
Vazquez' liability would be principal and not
merely subsidiary, as the Court of Appeals
has erroneously held.
As for the counterclaim filed by Vasquez
against De Borja, SC ruled that finding of
the CA does not warrant his contention that
the suit against him is malicious and
tortious. As a matter of moral justice, the
indignant attitude adopted by the
defendant towards the plaintiff for having
brought this action against him is in
estimation not wholly right. Thus, he does
not have a cause of action against the
plaintiff.
AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCO, 18 SCRA
155 (1966);
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of
a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air
France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff
a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at
Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant
airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first
class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the
seat. When asked to vacate his "first class"
seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that
his seat would be taken over his dead body.
After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly
gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to
pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages;
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the
complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of
refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm
the appealed decision "in all other
respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew
that he did not have confirmed reservations
for first class on any specific flight,
although he had tourist class protection;
that, accordingly, the issuance of a first
class ticket was no guarantee that he would
have a first class ride, but that such would
depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks
the contract may be also a tort". The stress
of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is
placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is
a violation of public duty by the petitioner
air carrier — a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. CA, 143 SCRA 657
(1986(;

RULING: CALALAS vs. SUNGA, 332 SCRA 356

Yes. The manager not only prevented (2000);
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary
will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, HUANG vs. PHIL. HOTELIERS, INC.,
made him suffer the humiliation of having G.R. NO. 18040, 2012;
to go to the tourist class compartment -
just to give way to another passenger
whose right thereto has not been
established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a
meaning different from what is understood
in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a
"state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's

manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore,

generates a relation attended with a public
duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, naturally, could give
ground for an action for damages.