Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331

DOI 10.1007/s11406-016-9779-7

Do Extraordinary Claims Require

Extraordinary Evidence?

David Deming 1

Received: 14 September 2016 / Accepted: 6 October 2016 /

Published online: 20 October 2016
# The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract In 1979 astronomer Carl Sagan popularized the aphorism Bextraordinary

claims require extraordinary evidence^ (ECREE). But Sagan never defined the term
Bextraordinary.^ Ambiguity in what constitutes Bextraordinary^ has led to misuse of the
aphorism. ECREE is commonly invoked to discredit research dealing with scientific
anomalies, and has even been rhetorically employed in attempts to raise doubts
concerning mainstream scientific hypotheses that have substantive empirical support.
The origin of ECREE lies in eighteenth-century Enlightenment criticisms of miracles.
The most important of these was Hume’s essay On Miracles. Hume precisely defined
an extraordinary claim as one that is directly contradicted by a massive amount of
existing evidence. For a claim to qualify as extraordinary there must exist overwhelm-
ing empirical data of the exact antithesis. Extraordinary evidence is not a separate
category or type of evidence–it is an extraordinarily large number of observations.
Claims that are merely novel or those which violate human consensus are not properly
characterized as extraordinary. Science does not contemplate two types of evidence.
The misuse of ECREE to suppress innovation and maintain orthodoxy should be
avoided as it must inevitably retard the scientific goal of establishing reliable
knowledge.

Keywords Sagan . Anomaly . Paranormal . Hume . Miracle

1 Introduction

Over the past few decades the aphorism Bextraordinary claims require extraordinary
evidence^ (ECREE) has been popularized. It has been called Ba fundamental principle
of scientific skepticism^ (Voss et al. 2014: 893) and Ban axiom of the skeptical

* David Deming
ddeming@ou.edu

1
College of Arts & Sciences, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019, USA
1320 Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331

movement^ (Goertzel and Goertzel 2015: 292). ECREE is frequently invoked to

discredit research dealing with scientific anomalies or any claim that falls outside the
mainstream. The statement is usually made without justification or explanation, as if the
mere invocation were enough to stifle debate and disqualify any legitimate opposition.
Pulverer (2015: 2723) explained, Bit is right to expect that particular papers that
promulgate extraordinary claims must also be based on the highest levels of evidence
and must be subjected to and rise to an extraordinary level of validation.^ ECREE has
become so ubiquitous that there are instances in the scientific literature where it has
been used as the title of a published article without any apparent relation to the content
of that article (Light and Warburton 2005; DeVorkin 2010; Hauser and Johnston 2011).
Although the modern roots of ECREE lie in the context of discussing paranormal
phenomena (Sagan 1979), it has also been used to discredit mainstream scientific
hypotheses. In 2007, a group of geologists hypothesized that a large-scale comet or
asteroid impact event in North America 12.9 ka caused the Younger Dryas cooling
event. The evidence for this event is significant. Sedimentary layers dating to 12.9 ka
contain glass and carbon spherules, are enriched in iridium, and have carbonized
material consistent with widespread wildfires (Dalton 2007). Despite the existence of
significant corroborating evidence, Pinter and Ishman (2008) characterized the impact
hypothesis as an Bextraordinary claim^ that required Bextraordinary evidence.^ They
concluded that serious consideration of Bspectacular stories^ would Bconsume the finite
commodity of scientific credibility^ (Pinter and Ishman 2008: 38). Yet the consider-
ation of alternative theories is not only allowed in science, but integral to the scientific
process itself (Chamberlin 1890).
In other instances, the invocation of ECREE has been virtually unintelligible.
Tressoldi (2011: 1) described ECREE as a statement that Bis at the heart of the scientific
method, and a model for critical thinking, rational thought and skepticism everywhere.^
Yet in the same paragraph the author conceded that it was impossible to objectively
define the term Bextraordinary.^ He admitted that Bmeasures of ‘extraordinary evi-
dence’ are completely reliant on subjective evaluation^ (Tressoldi 2011: 1). It is clearly
impossible to base all rational thought and scientific methodology on an aphorism
whose meaning is entirely subjective.
Invocation of the ECREE aphorism tends to confuse more than clarify. Pertinent
questions remain unanswered. What is the nature of an extraordinary claim? What
qualifies as extraordinary evidence? Should there be two standards of evidence in
science? Is there any context in which ECREE can be invoked correctly? In the
discussion that follows I argue that the true meaning and proper invocation of ECREE
can be understood if its historical roots are traced.

2 Carl Sagan and the Paranormal

The current popularity of ECREE originates with its appearance in the book Broca’s Brain
(1979: 62) by deceased astronomer Carl Sagan. Sagan’s original invocation of ECREE
was done largely in the context of discussing the validity of paranormal phenomena such
as levitation, visits to Earth by alien spacecraft, astral projection, and the claim that razor
blades stored in pyramids retain their edge longer. Unfortunately, Sagan did not define
explicitly what constitutes either an extraordinary claim or extraordinary evidence.
Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331 1321

The invocation of the term paranormal itself raises a quandary, as the difference
between normal and paranormal phenomena necessarily contains a degree of ambigu-
ity. The Oxford English Dictionary defines paranormal as Bdesignating supposed
psychical events and phenomena such as clairvoyance or telekinesis whose operation
is outside the scope of the known laws of nature or of normal scientific understanding.^
There is a profound difference between Bevents and phenomena^ that lay Boutside
the scope^ of the laws of nature and those that are merely beyond Bnormal scientific
understanding.^ Everything in nature was originally Bbeyond normal scientific
understanding.^ Furthermore, focusing on those aspects of phenomena that are not
completely understood is the key to scientific progress. In Thomas Kuhn’s words,
Bdiscovery commences with the awareness of anomaly^ (1996: 52). The history of
astronomy offers one example. The retrograde motion of Mars and changes in its
apparent diameter were, at one time, challenges to the Ptolemaic System. A consider-
ation of these anomalies was one factor that led to the eventual adoption of the
heliocentric model.
A claim of levitation or telekinesis apparently violates the established laws of nature.
But even this category contains ambiguity. The laws of nature are nothing more than
inductive generalizations based on the accumulated body of evidence available to
science. However we never have all the data. As our observations increase in accuracy
or number we may discover that nature operates differently from the manner we
formerly supposed.
For more than two centuries Newtonian mechanics was regarded as an accurate
description of nature. But in the twentieth century it was discovered that classical
mechanics breaks down at relativistic speeds. Unless he was otherwise informed, an
individual who had spent his entire life living in a tropical climate would regard a claim
that water could turn into a solid as an extraordinary claim that violated the laws of
nature as known to him. While it is relatively easy to assess the extent of our
knowledge, it is difficult to fathom the depths of our ignorance.
It is doubtful if Sagan would have approved of the use of ECREE to discredit
research into anomalous phenomena. He was open to the scientific investigation of
both anomalous and paranormal phenomena. Carl Sagan characterized Ian
Stephenson’s research on reincarnation as deserving of Bfurther inquiry,^ and
therefore must have considered the concept plausible (1979: 48). Sagan (1979:
59) considered Bscientific aloofness and opposition to novelty^ to be Bas much a
problem as public gullibility.^ He organized conferences of the American Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Science devoted to UFOs and evaluation of
Immanuel Velikovsky’s theories. Sagan (1979: 62) believed that Bthe extraordi-
nary should certainly be pursued,^ with Beach issue^ being Bjudged on its own
merits.^ But he also insisted on rigor in scientific method, concluding that Bthe
burden of proof should fall squarely on those who make…proposals^ (Sagan
1979: 62).

3 The Nature of Proof

A more extreme statement of ECREE was proposed by Marcello Truzzi. In a letter

published in the journal Parapsychology Review, Truzzi advanced the proposition that
1322 Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331

Ban extraordinary claim requires extraordinary proof^ (1975: 24). He later expounded
upon the implications of this statement in an article published in Zetetic Scholar (1978).
Truzzi’s definition of extraordinary is of little assistance. He stated Bsomething is
extraordinary when it is unexpected^ (Truzzi 1978: 14). But Bunexpected^ is not an
objective quantity that can be measured. It is a subjective psychological reaction
experienced by an observer. Truzzi conceded this when he concluded Bthe degree to
which each of us may be surprised by a strange event is rather relative to our own
experience and background^ (1978: 15). By defining Bextraordinary^ in terms of
Bexpectation^ Truzzi simply substituted one ambiguous term for another.
Truzzi’s demand for Bproof^ is also problematical. The word Bproof^ is usually not
used in the context of science. Science is concerned with corroboration and falsification
(Popper 1959). But the matter is not that clear. There is no standard handbook of
scientific procedure or clear methodological rules. Every scientist in effect makes up his
own rules. Acceptance or rejection of scientific knowledge ultimately depends not just
on repeatability or corroboration but a human process of social acceptance.
The meaning of the word Bproof^ depends on context. There are legal proofs,
mathematical proofs, and logical proofs. The gist of these is that the concept of proof
in various contexts is concerned with Bevidence or argument establishing a fact or the
truth of anything^ (Oxford English Dictionary 2016). A science is a method designed
to produce reliable knowledge. Scientists seek truth. But truth itself is difficult to
define. The concept of truth has been actively discussed and debated by epistemologists
for more than 2,000 years. As the Pyrrhonian skeptics argued in the third century BC,
every criterion of truth must itself be validated by a criterion of truth, ad infinitum
(Diogenes Laërtius 1905: 415). Every attempt to obtain an objective definition neces-
sarily opens additional doors and reveals new difficulties.
The concept of proof in a legal context may require no more than a probability, a
preponderance of the evidence. But when the word proof is invoked in a philosophical
sense, it usually connotes absolute certainty. A Bproof^ in natural philosophy is what
the ancient Greeks would have called a Bdemonstration,^ a deductive conclusion
derived by analogy from the technique employed in geometry (Deming 2010: 17).
The word Bproof^ is usually not employed in a scientific context because there can be
no certainty in an empirical system of knowledge. This was established by presocratic
Greek philosophers as early as the fifth or sixth century BC.
One reason that certainty is a logical impossibility in an empirical system is that we
can never be sure we have all the data. Another difficulty recognized by the ancient
Greeks is that perception is subjective: everyone observes things differently. Heraclitus
(c. 540–480 BC) originated the doctrine that there could be no reliable knowledge of
sensible things because the natural world was in a state of perpetual change (Deming
2010: 23–24). BThose who step into the same river have different waters flowing ever
upon them^ (Freeman 1966: 25). Describing the Heraclitean doctrine, Aristotle noted
that the followers of Heraclitus Bdescribe all sensible things as ever passing away,^ thus
there can Bbe no knowledge of things which were in a state of flux^ (Aristotle 1941a:
894). Aristotle concluded that Bscientific knowledge is not possible through the act of
perception^ (1941b: 154). Lacking the technology to make empiricism a practical
means of building reliable knowledge, Greek philosophers relied upon deductive logic
and the method of logical demonstration derived from geometry. They sought certainty,
not probable truth.
Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331 1323

Following the invention of the printing press c. 1450, it became possible to improve
the reliability of empirical knowledge through continual revision. With the advent of
typography, empirical claims and anecdotal data no longer had to either be accepted at
face value or immediately rejected. They could be exchanged, sifted, debated, criti-
cized, refined, corroborated, or falsified. BSteady advance implies the exact determina-
tion of every previous step; this now became incomparably easier^ (Sarton 1962: 66).
Thus the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was made
possible by technological innovation (Deming 2012). The printing press made it
feasible to adopt a criterion of repeatability. It became intellectually respectable to
accept a pragmatic system of knowledge that established mere probabilities instead of
certainties.
In the logical sense, there can be no Bproof^ in the sciences, extraordinary or
otherwise. Truzzi’s demand for Bextraordinary proof^ is impossible to fulfill for any
claim. The statement thus is unintelligible. If ECREE is to have any intelligible
meaning, it is best considered in the wording chosen by Carl Sagan.

4 Drawing Balls from Urns

One serious philosophical predecessor to Sagan was Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–

1827). In A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, first published in French in 1812,
Laplace noted that Bthe more extraordinary the event, the greater the need of its being
supported by strong proofs^ (1902: 17).
Laplace was more careful than Sagan, in that he foresaw the necessity of defining
what makes an event Bextraordinary.^ Laplace defined Bextraordinary^ events in a
probabilistic sense as Bthose classes which include a very small number^ (Laplace
1902: 17). He offered the example of an urn containing a million balls, all of which
were white in color except one which was black. If a random drawing from the urn
produced the black ball, this would qualify as an improbable and thus Bextraordinary^
event.
Drawing balls from urns is familiar to every student of probability theory. Mathe-
maticians use these examples because the calculation of probabilities is straightforward
and exact. But this is never the case in the empirical sciences. Our data are always
incomplete and imprecise. We don’t know the nature of the balls in the urn, or how the
process of extracting one may be influenced by factors beyond our ken. Characterizing
an observation or claim as Bextraordinary^ without supporting data merely presumes
what must be demonstrated. Thus Laplace does little to help us understand the proper
context of ECREE in the sciences.

5 Ordinary and Extraordinary Evidence

Repeatability is essential to science. It is the pragmatic means by which a system of

knowledge based on observations establishes provisional truths. Conceding that Bthe
senses deceive,^ Francis Bacon (1858b: 26) advocated reproducibility as a means of
overcoming the epistemological limitations of an experimental and inductive philoso-
phy. BWhenever I come to a new experiment of any subtlety (though it be in my own
1324 Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331

opinion certain and approved), I nevertheless subjoin a clear account of the manner in
which I made it; that men knowing exactly how each point was made out, may see
whether there be any error connected with it, and may arouse themselves to devise
proofs more trustworthy and exquisite, if such can be found^ (Bacon 1858b: 30).
Science as we know it today was largely defined by the activities of the Royal Society
during the seventeenth century. And the members of the Royal Society were aware that
any experimental result would have to corroborated. In History of the Royal Society
(1667: 99), Thomas Sprat noted that the results of experimental trials were subjected to
Bcritical and reiterated scrutiny^ until Bthe whole company has fully satisfied of the
certainty and constancy.^
Goertzel & Goertzel have pointed out that while claims deemed Bextraordinary^
may receive the heightened scrutiny of professed skeptics, Bscience has a troublesome
issue in not being demanding enough of ordinary claims^ (2015: 295). There is a
growing awareness of a Breproducibility crisis^ in science. A survey conducted by the
journal Nature found that 52 % of researchers agreed that there is Ba significant crisis of
reproducibility^ (Baker 2016: 452). Repeatability in particular is a critical issue in the
science of psychology. The Open Science Collaboration (2015: 943) found that only
47 % Bof original effect sizes were in the 95 % confidence interval.^ The poor
reproducibility rate in the psychological sciences was attributed in part to a prioritiza-
tion of Bnovelty over replication^ (Open Science Collaboration 2015: 943). Innovation
is highly valued because it is Bthe engine of discovery^ (Open Science Collaboration
2015: 943). Yet ECREE is often invoked to suppress innovation and support main-
stream concepts that themselves may be irreproducible.

6 Discrediting Miracles

The origin of ECREE lies in seventeenth and eighteenth-century debates concerning

the validity of miracles. Prior to the modern age, people living in Western Civilization
were profoundly religious and superstitious. The supernatural world was considered to
be real, demonstrable and ordered. Conversely, the phenomenological world revealed
by the senses was regarded as transitory, illusory and unworthy of serious study.
In a discussion of the Etymologies of Isidore of Seville (560–636), Ernest Brehaut
(1873–1953) explained that the intellectual viewpoint of the early Middle Ages in
Europe was a mirror image of the modern worldview.

The view held in the dark ages of the natural and supernatural and of their relative
proportions in the outlook on life, was precisely the reverse of that held by
intelligent men in modern times. For us the material universe has taken on the
aspect of order; within its limits phenomena seem to follow definite modes of
behavior, upon the evidence of which a body of scientific knowledge has been
built up…the attitude of Isidore and his time is exactly opposite to ours. To him
the supernatural world was the demonstrable and ordered one. Its phenomena, or
what were supposed to be such, were accepted as valid, while no importance was
attached to evidence offered by the senses as to the material....it is evident,
therefore, that if we compare the dogmatic world-view of the medieval thinker
with the more tentative one of the modern scientist, allowance must be made for
Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331 1325

the fact that they take hold of the universe at opposite ends. Their plans are so
fundamentally different that it is hard to express the meaning of one in terms of
the other (Brehaut 1912: 51).

For more than a thousand years in Christian Europe the reality of miracles
was unquestioned. The miracles of Jesus Christ were taken as substantive proof
of his divinity. Among other feats recorded in the Gospels, Jesus turned water
into wine (John 2.1–2.11), walked on water (Mark 6.45–6.52), and raised the
dead from the tomb (John 11.1–11.44).
The most influential of the Fathers of the Western Christian Church was
Augustine of Hippo (354–430). In City of God, Augustine affirmed that miracles
were not limited to the time of Jesus but were commonplace in his own time:
Beven now miracles are wrought in the name of Christ^ (Augustine 1899: 485).
Prodigies recorded by Augustine included miraculous cures of blindness, breast
cancer, gout, paralysis, and demonic possession (1899: 485–487). Augustine even
listed multiple instances of the dead being restored to life (1899: 488–489).
Before the Christian age, the Greeks and Roman were also remarkably
superstitious. George Sarton characterized their Bfirm belief in divination^ as
Bthe outstanding superstition of classical antiquity (1960: 464). The histories of
Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) by Arrian (c. 86–186 AD) and Diodorus
Siculus (fl. 1st century BC) are replete with repeated instances of important
people drawing serious inferences from superstitious omens.
Following a victory at the Battle of the Granicus River in 334 BC, Alexander
consolidated his position by marching down the coast of Ionia and conquering
city-states under the control of the Persian empire. At Miletus, Alexander was
unsure if he should attack by sea or land. The critical tactical decision was based
upon the subjective interpretation of a superstitious omen. BAn eagle had been
s e e n s i t t i n g u p o n t h e s h o r e , o p p o s i t e t h e s t e r n s o f A l e x a n d e r ’s
ships…[Alexander] admitted that the eagle was in his favor; but as it was seen
sitting on the land, it seemed to him rather to be a sign that he should get the
mastery over the Persian fleet by defeating their army on land^ (Arrian 1893: 47–
48).
Making important decisions on the basis of superstition could have devas-
tating consequences, even to the point of crippling an entire polity. On the
night of August 27, 413 BC, an eclipse of the Moon prevented the Athenian
navy from fleeing Syracuse. Subsequently, the Athenians suffered a complete
defeat at the hands of the Syracusans, and Athenian power was broken forever
(Grote 1899: 147–151).
Roman culture was similarly preoccupied with superstitious beliefs. In Decline and
Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon described the Romans as being possessed
by Ba puerile superstition that disgraces their understanding^ (1909: 318).

They listen with confidence to the predictions of haruspices, who pretend to read
in the entrails of victims the signs of future greatness and prosperity; and there are
many who do not presume either to bathe, or to dine, or to appear in public, till
they have diligently consulted, according to the rules of astrology, the situation of
Mercury and the aspect of the Moon (Gibbon 1909: 318).
1326 Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331

With the rise of empiricism during the Renaissance, superstitious beliefs began to
wane. The European embracement of empiricism was quite contrary to the viewpoint
common amongst the Greek philosophers. In Theaetetus, Plato quoted Socrates as
asserting Bno one knows whether what appears to him is the same as what appears to
another, and everyone knows that what appears to himself in one way at one time
appears to him differently at another^ (Burnet 1920: 239). In Plato’s view, nothing
related to the senses or dealing with observation could be an object of scientific
knowledge. BWhether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking
to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort
is [a] matter of science^ (Plato 1937: 789).
The experimental method was known to the ancient Greeks, but their experi-
ments tended to be limited and anecdotal rather than systematic. The subjugation
of reason to observation began in Europe during the thirteenth century. Roger
Bacon argued that Breasoning does not suffice, but experience does^ (Bacon 1928:
583). His Opus Majus contained an entire section devoted to experimental science.
One reason that Europeans turned to empiricism was their contemplation of the
properties of the magnet. The existence of lodestones suggested that nature
contained occult forces and properties that could never be apprehended by logical
reasoning alone. Bacon concluded that rational proofs alone were insufficient
because Ball things must be verified by experience^ (1928: 584).
In an age in which every serious European scholar was also a theologian, any
activity that from a presentist perspective would qualify as scientific had to
compatible with Christian orthodoxy. Observation of the natural world was not
only allowable, it was a virtual requisite for natural theology. The door had been
opened by Paul the Apostle (c. 0–60 AD). In Romans (1.20), Paul wrote that God
could be known through the study of nature. BFor the invisible things of him from
the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse.^
After the Bishop of Paris condemned metaphysical speculation in 1277, scholars
and theologians turned to empiricism partly out of necessity (Deming 2010: 156).
In the seventeenth century, experimental philosophy bloomed under the auspic-
es of the Royal Society in England (Deming 2012: 205–211). Aristotelean natural
philosophy withered. In Academiarum Examen (1654: 67) John Webster
condemned Aristotelean philosophy as Bmerely verbal, speculative, abstractive,
formal and notional, fit to fill the brains with monstrous and airy chimeras,
speculative, and fruitless conceits.^
As empirical evidence became the accepted standard of proof, people began to
question the validity of miracles. Among the first to openly question the reality of
the miraculous was the Dutch philosopher, Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677). In
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), Spinoza asserted that natural law had been
established by God and was therefore immutable. BNature cannot be contra-
vened…she preserves a fixed and immutable order^ (Spinoza 1887: 82). Spinoza
attributed miracles to human ignorance. BA miracle is an event of which the
causes cannot be explained by the natural reason through a reference to
ascertained workings of nature^ (Spinoza 1887: 84). In fact, a claim that the laws
of nature had been overcome was tantamount to an assertion Bthat God acted
against His own nature–an evident absurdity^ (Spinoza 1887: 83).
Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331 1327

Among those influenced by Spinoza was the Huguenot skeptic Pierre Bayle (1647–
1706). In Miscellaneous Thoughts on the Comet of 1680, Bayle (1708: 450) discounted
accounts of the miraculous. BWe must never have recourse to miracle, when we may
explain by natural reasons, B because ^our schools of theology, as well as those of
philosophy, teach us not to multiply beings or miracles without a necessity.^ In his
enormously influential Historical and Critical Dictionary, first published in 1697,
Bayle suggested that miracles were not genuine instances of the suspension of the laws
of nature, but rooted in human credulity and gullibility (1710: 1766).
Protestants embraced empiricism when it helped them discredit Catholicism. In A
Discourse Against Transubstantiation (1684), John Tillotson argued for the validity of
sense perception. BIf we be not certain of what we see, we can be certain of nothing^
(Tillotson 1684: 3). Tillotson concluded that the supposed miracle of transubstantiation
was Ba most self-evident falsehood^ (1684: 2). Others sought consilience between
science and religion. In A Discourse of Miracles, John Locke (1632–1704) acknowl-
edged that a miracle was necessarily defined to be an operation Bcontrary to the fixed
and established laws of nature^ (1824: 264). But then Locke warned that the laws of
nature were not completely known. Before a man could judge that an event was truly a
miracle Bhe must know that no created being has a power to perform it^ (Locke 1824:
264). Therefore it was possible, in effect, to preserve the validity of religion through
miraculous testament without violating natural law.
As the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century proceeded, revelation and the
miraculous came under attack and apologetics were proffered in their defense.
Writing in 1740, the Anglican latitudinarian Arthur Ashley Sykes conceded that
miraculous events required substantiation by Bextraordinary proof.^ BWhere there
is only an account of extraordinary facts related, without any extraordinary proof
of their being true, the credibility of them is lessened even by the extraordiness of
the facts^ (Sykes 1740: 206).
But Sykes was unwilling to conclude that the miracles recorded in the Bible were
fictions. He argued that the credibility of Christian miracles originated in the genuine
inspiration of the writers who recorded them. The best proof of this was the fulfillment
of Biblical prophecy. BProphecies…in Scripture do contain the foretelling of many
future events: the accomplishment of these events is the evidence to us of the truth of
the revelation itself^ (Sykes 1740: 208).
Sykes was not alone in his regard for the importance of Biblical prophecy. Isaac
Newton believed that the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy was evidence for God’s
providential rule of the world. Much of Newton’s time in theological research was
spent in trying to decipher prophecies in the Books of Daniel and Revelation. His
interpretation of these texts was published posthumously in 1733 as Observations
Upon the Prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John.
As the Age of Reason advanced, the apologetics became more strained. In 1749,
English clergyman Conyers Middleton conceded that Bordinary facts, related by a
credible person, furnish no cause of doubting from the nature of the thing: but if they
be strange and extraordinary; doubts naturally arise, and in proportion as they approach
towards the marvelous^ (1749: 217).
Middleton’s argument for preserving belief in miracles was that the age of the
miraculous had been closed. The miracles performed by Christ and his Apostles were
real, but there had been no genuine miracles since this time. BThere is no sufficient
1328 Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331

reason to believe, from the testimony of antiquity, that any miraculous powers did ever
actually subsist in any age of the Church, after the times of the Apostles^ (Middleton
1749: xci).
Middleton’s argument is apparently a special pleading. But closing the age of the
miraculous is consistent with closing the age of revelation. In Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam, the age of prophecy is considered to be over, and the revelations of the prophets
are regarded as final and complete. It was thus logically consistent to argue that the age
of miracles had also been concluded.
Among those who attacked the credibility of the miraculous was the editor of the
French Encyclopédie, Denis Diderot. Diderot embraced skepticism, questioned the
authenticity of Christianity, and leaned toward atheism. He dismissed the reality of
miracles, concluding Ball those who saw miracles there had made up their mind to see
them^ (Diderot 1916: 61).
The most significant of the Enlightenment attacks on the reality of miracles was the
essay On Miracles (1748) by the Scottish writer David Hume. It is in Hume’s essay that
we find a definitive characterization of ECREE as a balancing of the evidence. If Bthe
fact…partakes of the extraordinary and the marvelous…the evidence…received a
diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual^ (Hume
1748: 179).
Hume explained that there must be Ba contest of two opposite experiences^
(1748: 179). Miracles required extraordinary proof or evidence because, by defini-
tion, a miracle was Ba violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and inalterable
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very
nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be
imagined^ (Hume 1748: 180).
As an example of a miracle, Hume offered the claim that a piece of lead would
remain suspended in air when released. Because human beings had observed the
contrary innumerable times over the ages, in order for the claim to be believed, the
number of observations substantiating the supposed miracle must be greater. If people
had observed a million times that a piece of lead will fall to the ground when released,
then to establish the claim that a piece of lead will remain suspended in air requires a
million and one observations. A hundred-thousand testaments of the defiance of gravity
will be insufficient, because these must be weighed against a million contradictions.
Thus Hume defined precisely what is meant by Bextraordinary^ evidence or proof.
BExtraordinary^ means numerous. BExtraordinary^ evidence is not a separate category
or type of evidence, it is an extraordinarily large number of observations.
BExtraordinary^ evidence is only required when it must be balanced against a very
large number of contrary observations.
The crux of the matter is that in order to properly characterize a claim as
Bextraordinary,^ there must exist weighty evidence of the exact antithesis. A claim or
theory is not Bextraordinary^ solely because it is novel, unusual, or is in disagreement
with human consensus. The claim that a rock will remain suspended in air when
released from the hand is extraordinary because we have an extraordinary number of
observations to the contrary. But a claim that it is possible to construct and operate a
heavier-than-air flying machine is not Bextraordinary,^ even though we have over-
whelming evidence that objects heavier than air fall to the ground. The two instances
are not exactly comparable. A heavier-than-air flying machine is an object, but it is a unique
Philosophia (2016) 44:1319–1331 1329

object. Objects that we may have observed falling to the ground, such as stones, do not have
engines or wings. It does not matter that we may have observed falling stones ten million
times: a stone is not an airplane.
Similarly, a claim to achieve heat generation through cold fusion is not
Bextraordinary,^ simply because no one has done it before. The claim can only be
Bextraordinary^ if there have been a very large number of previous trials in which the
experiment has failed. And the experimental apparatus and circumstances in these
previous trials must have been not merely similar, but identical in all respects. If even
one parameter has changed, the balancing of the evidence is no longer a thousand-to-
one against heat generation, but one-to-zero in favor of heat generation.

7 Conclusion

The confusion regarding what is meant by an Bextraordinary claim^ arises in simple

carelessness. Carl Sagan did not define the term Bextraordinary.^ This allowed others to
arbitrarily characterize as Bextraordinary^ any idea or claim that violated majority
opinion. This unfortunate debacle could have been avoided if Sagan had simply been
more precise. As long ago as the fifth century BC, Socrates established the rule that
intelligible discussions of serious matters require exact definitions. Confusion arising
from ambiguities in language is one of Francis Bacon’s Four Idols, biases that hinder
objective science. Bacon explained Bthe ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully
obstructs the understanding…words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and
throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and
idle fancies^ (1858a: 55).
The proper origin and explanation of ECREE is found in David Hume’s essay On
Miracles. It is in this work that the exact definition of the term Bextraordinary^ is found.
An Bextraordinary^ claim is one that is contradicted by a massive amount of existing
evidence. However there must be an exact correspondence between experiences before
a claim can legitimately be characterized as Bextraordinary.^ Ideas, theories, or obser-
vations that are merely novel are not Bextraordinary,^ nor do they require an
Bextraordinary^ amount of evidence for corroboration. Science does not contemplate
two types of evidence. The misuse of ECREE to suppress innovation and maintain
orthodoxy should be avoided as it must inevitably retard the progress of science in
establishing comprehensive and systematic bodies of reliable knowledge.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

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