Article

European History Quarterly

2019, Vol. 49(3) 367–385
The Path to the ! The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0265691419853481
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States System and the End

of Peace in Europe in 1848

Miroslav Šedivý
Department of Historical Sciences, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic

Abstract
The aim of this article is to explain the long-term process leading to the decision of
Sardinian King Charles Albert to wage war against Austria in March 1848. Moving
beyond the normal stress on Italian national consciousness, the article focuses more
on the King’s attitude towards the conduct of European powers in Italian affairs and
attempts to prove that repeated illegal and aggressive actions of the European powers
after 1830 destroyed the King’s faith in the fairness of the political-legal system estab-
lished at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, leading also to his loss of faith in the strength
of law and increasing his belief in the power of armed force in international relations.
All this significantly contributed to his final decision to start a war of conquest against
Austria, which he regarded as weak and thus no longer respected, much like his attitude
towards the existing political-legal order in general.

Keywords
1848, Austria, Congress of Vienna, European states system, Piedmont, war

Historians and political scientists dealing with the history of the post-Napoleonic
European states system and the European Concert have focused on the fact that
peace among the great powers lasted from 1815 and came to an end only with the
onset of the Crimean War. Yet they have paid little attention to the first violation
of this peace by member states of the same system in March 1848 when the
Sardinian Kingdom (Piedmont) attacked Austria in northern Italy. This discrep-
ancy seems to be caused by their overriding interest in the impact of the Near

Corresponding author:
Miroslav Šedivý, Department of Historical Sciences, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic.
Email: mireksedivy@seznam.cz
368 European History Quarterly 49(3)

Eastern affairs on the state of European politics in comparison with the almost
non-existent attention paid to Italian affairs in this respect.1
On the other hand, experts on the Italian Risorgimento have dealt more closely
with the outbreak of the so-called first war for independence between Piedmont
and Austria in 1848. However, despite the fact that they have usually agreed on the
principal motive being Sardinian King Charles Albert’s traditional dynastic desire
to win Austria’s provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, they have failed in contex-
tualizing this decision as part of the long-term strategic planning of the Sardinian
monarch with regard to the functioning of the European states system. In their
publications dealing with pre-1848 Italian history, they have generally focused their
attention on the growing rapprochement of the King with the Italian nationalists
against Austria.2
The aim of this article is to find a midcourse between these two approaches: both
through a more detailed insight into Italian history and simultaneously through a
more systemic analysis, it will attempt to explain the evolution of Charles Albert’s
attitude towards the European states system that led to his decision to go to war
against Austria. As I set out to prove, the repeated illegal and aggressive conduct of
some of the great powers against Italian states after 1830 destroyed his and his
ministers’ and diplomats’ faith in the fairness of the political-legal system estab-
lished at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and with this also their trust in the force
of international law. The result of the abuse of power towards some Italian states
was the weakening reliance of the government in Turin on the strength of the law
and its greater reliance on the strength of armed force in international relations.
This shift was logically joined with an increased perception of other states’ power
and weakness, particularly ominous for Austria, which during the 1830s started to
be regarded as weak and, therefore, ripe for loss of its Italian provinces: Lombardy
and Venetia. This significantly contributed to Charles Albert’s decision to try to
obtain them by force in 1848.
There can naturally be no doubt of the traditional desire of the Savoyan
Dynasty to seize these territories. That said, Charles Albert’s ambition and
public pressure also played important roles in this decision. At the same time
one cannot ignore the fact that as the distrust of the Sardinian king and his advisors
towards the system increased, their loyalty to the same system, which meant the
preservation of peace and the territorial status quo in Italy, declined, and in the end
this backfired on Austria. The importance of this cause in Piedmont’s shift from a
normative to a realist approach to international affairs before 1848 is yet further
reinforced with identical processes in other European states – especially small ones
– where governments and people became irritated by the arrogance of the great
powers. With the conviction that legal arguments were fruitless, smaller nations
sought security in increasing their material strength. The Scandinavian and
German countries offer the best examples in this respect. Both the kings and
their subjects in the Swedish-Norwegian and Danish Kingdoms set out for rap-
prochement in the 1840s. They did so in order to be able to resist pressure from
Russia, Germany and even Great Britain, and argued that Scandinavian solidarity
Šedivý 369

formed the necessary prerequisite to become strong enough to survive in a preda-

tory world. A similar argument was used at that time for the same purpose in the
German Confederation and by the ruling elites, as well as people perceiving exter-
nal threats from almost all directions for unity or even unification. The German
Confederation also saw the hunger for a strong German army and navy and a
heightened desire for colonies and their crucial resources. That is why, in this
atmosphere of insecurity, Prussia’s increasing economic and military strength
made it effectively Germany’s valued protector; and for the same reason Austria
was losing respect among Germans for its weakening capability to defend the
Confederation owing to its increasing public debt and the tensions of numerous
nations living in its territory. In short, long before 1848 the belief in the law of the
more powerful slowly began to replace the post-Napoleonic international solidarity
in European society.3

The Need for Security

The decade following the July Revolution in France in 1830 witnessed conduct by
some European powers towards Italian states that can be regarded as not only
beyond the limit of propriety, but also in breach of the legal rules on which the
European states system was founded after the Napoleonic Wars. It was the French
July Monarchy that was primarily responsible for this at the beginning of the
decade. Pressed by public opinion demanding the revision of the 1815 treaties,
but not strong enough to repudiate them openly with the force of arms, the
King and his ministers tried to increase France’s influence and prestige by diplo-
matic means, in particular by the advocacy of the non-intervention principle.
The application of this principle was particularly firm in the Apennines, for control
over which France had struggled for centuries with Austria and continued to do so
after 1830. Since Piedmont was situated between the two great powers, it was by far
the most affected by this policy, the practical effect of which was the limitation of
its freedom of action: the cabinet in Paris tried to deprive the government in Turin
of the right to call on other states for military assistance and threatened to invade if
the government in Turin allowed the presence of Austrian troops on its territory.
In the spring of 1831, the French even contemplated such an invasion if the
Austrians entered the territory of the Papal States and Piedmont refused to
allow the passage of the French troops to Lombardy.4
France’s lack of respect for the independence of Italian states reached its climax
with the French occupation of the papal town of Ancona in February 1832.
This step was motivated by the presence of Austrian troops in the northern prov-
inces of the Papal States. Unlike the Austrians, however, the French had not been
invited by the Pope, who objected to the latter’s occupation of his territory.
France’s action thus signified a stark violation of its sovereignty and thereby
also of the law of nations.5 The same disregard for other states’ sovereignty was
repeated in late 1840 during the so-called Rhine Crisis when the Parisian cabinet
threatened Europe with a war not only on the Rhine but also on the Po.
370 European History Quarterly 49(3)

The French made it clear that they would not respect Piedmont’s desire for neu-
trality, and if a war broke out, Charles Albert would have just two choices:
active participation on France’s side or the unwanted presence of French troops
on his territory.6
It was not only France that disregarded the legal norms in Italy: Great Britain
violated them in no less serious a way during its so-called Sulphur War with the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the spring of 1840. The causes of this conflict can be
traced to 1838 when Ferdinand II gave a French company control over the export
of Sicilian sulphur. The British, who had effectively controlled the sulphur trade
before 1838, regarded the King’s step as not only detrimental to their commercial
interests but also a violation of the British-Neapolitan commercial agreement of
1816. Although European lawyers, including two British ones, European statesmen
and diplomats, as well as historians and legal experts later, almost unanimously
agreed on the legality of Ferdinand II’s action, the British government ordered its
fleet to capture any commercial ships sailing under the Neapolitan flag and hold
them in Malta until Ferdinand II revoked his agreement with the French. Since
other great powers refused to meet the King’s request for aid against the British
aggression, he was forced to surrender. Consequently, the force of arms and not the
force of law set the tone in this affair, and it was for this reason that Great Britain
finally gained the upper hand.7
Regarding its position as a buffer state between Austria and France and thus the
most threatened by an eventual war between these two great powers, Piedmont had
always been sensitive to the question of its own as well as Italy’s security in a world
that was, according to the Sardinian leaders, becoming more and more ruthless
after 1830. They attentively observed the abuse of power by some great powers,
especially France and Great Britain, not only in Italy but also in other parts of
Europe, with the fear that at some point in the future Piedmont could suffer the
same abuse of power. Consequently, it cannot be surprising that the government in
Turin rejected the application of the non-intervention principle for Piedmont and
loudly protested against obvious violations like the occupation of Ancona and the
Sulphur War, as well as the fact that these violations of sovereignty were allowed to
go unpunished by other great powers.8 Charles Albert himself labelled the aggres-
sion against the Pope in Ancona as ‘an act of aggression against the independence
of Italian sovereigns’,9 and his attitude towards the Sulphur War was the same, as
observed when he agreed with the words of his envoy in Vienna that ‘with each
successive precedent, it is to be feared that the great powers have just established
the abuse of power by law and will want to exercise this right wherever they are
able to do so with impunity’.10
The lack of trust in the security guarantees established at the Congress of Vienna
is clearly visible in Piedmont’s attempts to improve them through a more binding
commitment on the part of the great powers to defend the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of Italian states. At the start of 1830, the government in Turin
presented several plans whose common aim was to ensure a reciprocal collective
guarantee of the territorial integrity of all European countries against foreign
Šedivý 371

aggression, which at that time basically meant a security measure against France.
When these plans were rejected by the great powers, the government in Turin came
up with the idea of the application of a Swiss-style neutrality for Piedmont that
would be recognized by other European countries. However, since the attitude of
the great powers towards this proposal was restrained, and because it became clear
in early 1831 that France would hardly tolerate Piedmont’s neutrality should it go
to war with Austria, this plan was finally abandoned. A similar request addressed
at the same time by Turin to London for Britain to guarantee the inviolability of
Piedmont’s territory met with the same lack of success.11
What was left to Piedmont under the given circumstances were the traditional
weapons of a strong army and a bilateral military alliance with another state. Prior
to the summer of 1831, the Sardinian army was increased to from 30,000 to 70,000
soldiers; the number was beyond the financial means of the small kingdom but still
insufficient for the successful defence of such a small country against the French
giant. Therefore, in July 1831, soon after his accession to the throne, Charles Albert
established an Austro-Sardinian defensive alliance.12
The conclusion of the alliance was a reflection of Piedmont’s sense of insecurity,
leading it to feel the need for additional protection to that already offered by the
European states system. Thus this step was undertaken because the government in
Turin regarded the system as inadequate for the defence of the nation’s independ-
ence and territorial integrity. Although its traditional aversion towards Austria did
not diminish entirely, Piedmont felt so threatened by the French Italian policy after
the July Revolution that when attempts to improve the collective security situation
failed, it had no other choice than to seek diplomatic and military support in
Vienna. Much like the considerable strengthening of the Sardinian army, the defen-
sive alliance with Austria was just another attempt of the small Italian kingdom to
improve its position against external threats.13

The Desire for Strength

Even the Austro-Sardinian defensive alliance, however, did not give a sense of
security to Charles Albert and his advisors, especially Foreign Minister Marshal
Victor-Amédée Sallier de La Tour, who regarded France’s behaviour as so aggres-
sive and dangerous for the future that they became convinced that a stable peace
could only be established if France were beaten by force, and for this reason an
offensive war was advocated in Turin. It is true that this warmongering had existed
at the court already before Charles Albert’s accession to the throne and the young
prince had expressed the same desire for war in the summer of 1830, but it
increased dramatically only after the experience of France’s assertiveness in its
Italian policy in 1831 and 1832 and the failure of repeated requests for security
guarantees from the great powers.14
The Sardinian king and his ministers argued that nothing good could be
expected from the revolutionary regime in France, that this great power would
sooner or later wage a war of conquest and revolution and that the need to
372 European History Quarterly 49(3)

maintain strong armies for such a moment was ruinous for European states.15
On the other hand, a brief and victorious campaign aimed at the restoration of
the Bourbons would lead to the triumph of the conservative cause and strengthen
peace and order in Europe.16 Especially after the French occupation of Ancona,
Charles Albert and La Tour hoped that Austria would immediately start an offen-
sive war with France and were eager to participate in it because, as the King
claimed, an occupation ‘if tolerated once, would bring an end to the independence
of all small states’.17
There was an obvious link between this distrust and the Sardinian desire for war,
the latter being a response – which was seen as a kind of solution – to the problems
weighing upon the state of European politics. In other words, its distrust of the
political-legal system of Europe diminished the Sardinian government’s loyalty
towards it, which can be seen in its readiness to act beyond the legal limits of
the system by violating the law of nations established by the treaties. However,
there was no chance for a war against France since Piedmont’s ally, Austria, did
not want one. The Austrian Chancellor, Prince Clemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk
von Metternich-Winneburg, wished to preserve peace and order by diplomatic
means and was ready to go to war against France only if there was no other
solution. He constantly tried to persuade the government in Turin of the necessity
of preserving peace and avoiding an illegal act of aggression against France.18
Charles Albert and La Tour were sharply critical of Austria and other great
powers for their unwillingness to wage war with France and indeed their silence,
which seemed to sanction the use of armed force and, in the opinion of the two
men, actually made those countries accomplices in the crimes against the law of
nations. Therefore, Metternich’s desire for peace was regarded in Turin as a sign of
weakness or even cowardice. Already by 1832 Charles Albert labelled the policy of
this great power as such. Together with the decreasing faith in the fairness of the
great powers’ behaviour, which meant the conduct of the European Concert, and
with this also the doubtful security of those states who trusted too much in the
force of law, Charles Albert increasingly doubted Austria’s willingness to come to
his aid in the event of a French invasion. His doubts were heightened by the fact
that Austria refused to help the Pope in the Ancona affair or the Dutch king in the
Belgian Question. Austria’s refusal to use the occupation of Ancona by the French
and their military intervention in Belgium as a pretext for a ‘just war’ against
France particularly displeased the government in Turin and revived the traditional
suspicion that the Viennese cabinet wished to use Piedmont simply as an advance
guard for Austria’s defence of Lombardy-Venetia. If there was something that
started to sour the Austro-Sardinian relations after 1831, then it was, in the first
place, this difference of opinion on the matter of war and peace.19
Whereas the criticism of Austria for its weakness originally resulted from what
was regarded in Turin as an excessive indulgence towards France, after 1835 it was
linked more and more to the deteriorating internal situation of the empire.
This deterioration was caused by the lack of a strong central government after
Emperor Francis I’s death in 1835, increasing state debt with its negative impact on
Šedivý 373

the power of the army to fight a war and the slowly but constantly accumulating
national problems in, especially, Hungary, Galicia and Bohemia.20 The whole
empire began to resemble a colossus with feet of clay. Consequently, Charles
Albert and his ministers closely observed its fading power and did not fail to see
that Austria was not as strong in the late 1830s as it had been after 1815.21
The negative account of Austria’s strength was taken seriously in Turin since the
empire’s precarious situation was dangerous for Italy’s security as guaranteed by
this great power. This apprehension seemed to be confirmed by the economization
of its army, leading to the gradual decrease of the number of Austrian troops in the
Apennines. Together with Metternich’s desire to maintain peace, these military
rationalizations crucially contributed to Charles Albert’s political defection in
1835 because he distrusted Austria’s ability to defend Piedmont according to the
1831 convention.22
The change in Piedmont’s foreign policy in the mid-1830s manifested itself espe-
cially in the change of Sardinian foreign minister in 1835: the pro-Austrian La Tour
was replaced by Clemente Solaro della Margarita, who pursued a more independ-
ent course. Charles Albert shared this truly ‘Sardinian’ opinion, and when there
was no further need of the Austro-Sardinian alliance imposed on him by necessity –
in 1835 the likelihood of revolution in his kingdom as well as war with France more
or less disappeared – he shifted his foreign policy from one of cooperation to more
overt independence.23
For the same reason Charles Albert contemplated a pragmatic rapprochement
with stronger powers, namely Great Britain and even France, which he otherwise
greatly resented, because he thought that with regard to Metternich, he could
‘never expect of him any firm or noble conduct’.24 In April 1836 the King wrote
to Solaro in reaction to Austria’s disarmament that

it releases us from the military commitments that we have accepted by helping us to

better understand how we must defy this great power and not count on anyone other
than ourselves in [dangerous] events. This news that I have been waiting for proves to
us how much we must be in good standing with both England and France under
normal circumstances in order to make up our minds and examine our options.25

Later in August of that year he added that regarding the reduction in the number of
its troops in Italy, Austria would soon be unable to wage an offensive war against
France beyond the Alps, which could effectively protect Savoy and Nice: ‘Reducing
itself to the defence of just the Alps means the complete ruin of my country, which
is naturally far from my intentions. Consequently, this [1831] convention is almost
annulled by this fact’.26
Charles Albert’s unwillingness to fulfil his treaty obligations to Austria mani-
fested itself again four years later during the Rhine Crisis and was once more
caused by his doubts about the empire having sufficient strength to defend its
Italian allies, as seemed to be confirmed by the important affairs of that year.
The Neapolitan king had to bow under the British might in the Sulphur War
374 European History Quarterly 49(3)

because no European power helped him, including Austria, in spite of its having
vital interests in Italy and being bound with Naples through a defensive alliance
treaty, which moved Solaro to the gloomy prediction that in the case of war with a
third party Austria ‘would not do for us more than it did for Naples, it would
abandon us as soon as her interests differed from ours’,27 followed by this no less
pessimistic conclusion fittingly expressing the feelings prevailing at the Sardinian
court: ‘In all circumstances the king should not count on anybody except
himself’.28
This further increased the widespread doubt in Turin about Austria’s effective
powers of protection in the kingdom’s time of need. This presumption was proved
correct after the outbreak of the Rhine Crisis, when France threatened an invasion
of Italy. The reports of Sardinian and other Italian diplomats from Vienna depicted
the sorrowful state of the Austrian armed forces, which confirmed Charles Albert’s
belief in Austria’s inability to provide sufficient military assistance. He feared that
in a war with France there was very little he could expect from the empire and that
his kingdom would bear the brunt of the fighting. Therefore, he told his collabor-
ators that he regarded the alliance of 1831 as dead and he was prepared to go to
war with France only if new terms for an alliance were settled, which also meant a
territorial reward in Italy for Piedmont’s participation in the armed conflict.29
In the mid-1830s, virtually all members of the Sardinian political and diplomatic
elites supported a policy less dependent on Austria, including the traditionally pro-
Austrian La Tour, who soon after his recall from the foreign ministry in early 1835
agreed with the idea of an alliance with a great power that was strong enough to
grant Piedmont more efficient support.30 From Paris, Paolo Francesco di Sales
openly advocated a union with France, whose earlier threatening action in Italy
became unimportant for pragmatic reasons, as he argued in January 1836: when
the occupation of Ancona was not punished by war, the best defence against such a
revolutionary step was rapprochement with its architect.31 No new alliance with
France or any other power was ultimately concluded, since Charles Albert’s dis-
trust of all the great powers led him to the decision to keep them all at arm’s length;
as he wrote to Solaro in April 1836: ‘I always groan more and more whenever I
witness the proceedings of the great powers: it is necessary to do everything we can
to be on good terms with the whole world but rely on ourselves alone’.32

The Quest for Territorial Expansion

The consequence of this shift in Piedmont’s foreign policy in 1835 was to be dis-
astrous for Austria, and by far more than merely the factual loss of the defensive
alliance with their Italian neighbour: the ominous extent of the new policy lay in
Piedmont’s territorial aspirations in northern Italy, including those at Austria’s
expense. These aspirations can be regarded as traditional since they had existed
from the 18th century and were also apparent in expressions of Sardinian diplo-
macy after 1815: in 1818 a memorandum was sent from Turin to St Petersburg
condemning Austrian supremacy over Italy and demanding the transfer of
Šedivý 375

Lombardy-Venetia to Piedmont, which would become the protector of the penin-

sula and a loyal ally of Russia.33 The same can be said about Charles Albert’s
dream of territorial expansion in northern Italy, which was held long before 1848
and even before 1835.34
Nevertheless, 1835 witnessed an important step in Piedmont’s strategic plan-
ning. Although conservative and definitely no Italian nationalist, Solaro prepared
in a memorandum for the King, and, in compliance with the kingdom’s old terri-
torial ambitions, a plan for the eventual exploitation of Austria’s internal problems
and the seizure of Lombardy and Venetia. Solaro revealed the increasing internal
weakness of the Austrian Empire, which could enable Piedmont to fulfil its geo-
political aspirations. Charles Albert agreed with this plan, which completely cor-
responded with his own dream of rising up against Austria’s hegemony in Italy and
simultaneously with his desire for Piedmont’s greater security. He was firmly con-
vinced that it was impossible to trust the precepts of international law, the conduct
of the Concert members and even his Austrian ally, and that the security of his
kingdom entirely depended on its own resources. This reasoning on the matter of
his country’s security made him an expansionist ruler and he told his personal
secretary in June 1835 about his readiness to turn Austria’s internal problems
to his own advantage in terms of the invasion of its Italian domain because ‘if
we cannot count on any help from the people there, at least we must try to expand
our territory as much as possible’.35 And therefore he hoped to turn his country
into a ‘power’36 by extending its territorial extent, increasing its population and,
through all this, augmenting the state’s income – all necessary for sustaining a
strong army and navy. The conquest of the Habsburg duchies of Parma and
Piacenza and Austrian Lombardy, and eventually Venetia, would ensure all this,
and, moreover, would provide Piedmont with frontiers that could be better
defended against Austria.37
Regarding the King’s approval, Solaro’s memorandum of 1835 made the terri-
torial expansion of the kingdom a long-term but important, and in effect official,
goal of its foreign policy. Solaro explained the project in more detail in his instruc-
tions to the Sardinian representatives in Berlin, St Petersburg and Vienna in the
same year. These documents are of great importance since besides expressing ter-
ritorial aspirations they also explain the motivations of Charles Albert, who of
course approved their content, much like the strategies which were to be used at the
opportune moment. With regard to the King’s motives, the documents focus pre-
dominantly on Austria’s actions after the July Revolution and particularly on its
indulgent attitude towards the French occupation of Ancona. The considerable
attention paid to this 1832 affair shows clearly how influential the French aggres-
sion and Austrian moderation were for the political transformation of the govern-
ment in Turin in European politics:

It would be a fatal error for us to rely too heavily on the promises of the Austrian
court. The cabinet’s deeply feeble acceptance of the French seizure of Ancona, which
they perhaps even secretly sanctioned, has dispelled all illusions: Austria, who had
376 European History Quarterly 49(3)

pronounced itself to be an extremely conservative Power, has been seen to be far from
wanting to or being able to keep its promises for the general peace of all people and
the legitimacy of the rights of sovereigns.38

This, as the foreign minister emphasized, was exactly what ‘dictated to the
Sardinian cabinet a new course of action’.39
Regarding the question of how to deal with Austria, Solaro claimed that
Piedmont could take advantage of any eventual revolts in Galicia and Hungary
that would occupy Austrian forces and thus enable Piedmont to take Lombardy,
either with the agreement of the Viennese government in exchange for Piedmont’s
help with the maintenance of order in Venetia, or without it with the use of armed
force under the pretext of defeating a revolution that could spread to other Italian
states including Piedmont. Then the entry of the Sardinian army into Austria’s
Italian domain would not be an act of aggression but one of justifiable defence.
In this way Solaro tried to legitimize the fact that ‘the king aspires to extend the
limits of his dominion in Italy as his noble predecessors did’.40 He argued that
Piedmont’s territorial expansion under the conditions mentioned above had to be
regarded as the ‘triumph of a good cause and the principles of order, much like
the return to the traditional wisdom of European politics and the end of the revo-
lutionary era in Italy’.41
Austria’s weakness was an important motivating factor behind Piedmont’s hos-
tile designs since it clearly offered an opportunity. Lombardy was a traditional
object of the Savoyan dynasty’s territorial ambitions and after 1815, leaving
aside the small duchies neighbouring the kingdom, the only possible one, since a
conquest at the expense of France or Switzerland would be for various reasons less
profitable and more difficult, and in the case of France even suicidal. Solaro later
explained candidly in his memoirs: ‘We cannot desire or expect any expansion at
the expense of France, with regard to Switzerland it is difficult, but beyond the Po
and Ticino it is not impossible’.42 Shortly before the outbreak of the Rhine Crisis
he stated that Austria was in decline and its fall was inevitable; he believed that the
Savoyan Dynasty was predestined to seize Lombardy and Venetia, but he never
seriously contemplated war, not due to any respect for the existing treaties but
simply because Piedmont was too small and an alliance with France was too dan-
gerous. During the same crisis, Charles Albert wanted to obtain some territorial
compensation for his eventual participation in a war against France, but since he
could hardly expect to gain Lombardy, he explicitly mentioned only the territories
on the right bank of the Po – Parma, Modena and Piacenza – whose rulers were to
be recompensed with territory from the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which he
expected to be a French ally.43 Only the Sardinian minister of war, General
Emanuele Pes di Villamarina, a liberal who hated Austria, preferred an alliance
with France against Austria, a means by which he wanted to seize Lombardy-
Venetia during the Rhine Crisis. An interesting feature in Villamarina’s attitude
is that it contained no regard for the legal aspect of the affair, but, much as in the
case of the King and his diplomats after the mid-1830s, the distribution of material
Šedivý 377

force: Austria was weak and, despite the alliance of 1831, useless, while France was
strong and thus could be helpful.44
Villamarina’s option was unfeasible in late 1840 owing to the situation on the
international scene favouring Austria’s position: the empire was still too strong for
small Piedmont to attack and it was supported by the other three great powers. In
addition, Charles Albert was not completely sure of the loyalty of his subjects: he
feared that the dissatisfied liberals would take advantage of a war to instigate a
revolution. Consequently, the King disagreed with Villamarina with regard to
concluding an alliance with France and conquering Lombardy and Venetia with
its help. This was a calculation based on the balance of power during the crisis and
an awareness that the loss of Savoy and Nice would have been the price of an
alliance with France.45
The same calculation of the balance of power in the years following the Rhine
Crisis made Charles Albert search for allies in a war against Austria, which was
becoming weaker but was still too strong for Piedmont to risk taking on alone.
Since Piedmont could hardly expect effective military support from the other great
powers, it had to find allies in Italy. For this purpose the government in Turin was
ready to legitimize Piedmont’s territorial expansion as promoting Italy’s welfare –
its security, independence and peace – something that Solaro had already proposed
in his memorandum of 1835 and that also later served Italian nationalists as an
excuse for the creation of an Italian nation state to replace the European states
system in this part of the Continent. As Solaro suggested in the memorandum, the
kingdom’s allies were to be found among those capable of assisting Piedmont in a
war of conquest against Austria and, to win their support, the courts of Florence,
Rome and Naples were to be persuaded ‘to regard the expansion of the House of
Savoy as the only means for attaining the real independence of Italy, [and] as the
only guarantee of its future peace’.46
Solaro was definitely not alone among the Sardinian diplomats who played the
‘Italian card’ in support of Piedmont’s hostile designs against a weakening Austria.
For example, in 1839 Sardinian Envoy to Russia, Count Carlo Rossi, called
Piedmont ‘the only and genuine national power in Italy’47 because

it is indisputable that sooner or later and by the sheer force of circumstances the
supremacy of Austria must finally weaken in Italy, and it is no less evident to the
whole world that we are by virtue of our position the natural heirs of all that this great
power will lose there, of their territory as well as of their influence.48

As Rossi explicitly added, Austria’s weakness was to be exploited for its expulsion
from Italy, which was to be protected by Piedmont against foreign interference or
even aggression as had happened in Ancona.49 This so to speak pan-Italian con-
nection to Ancona, the moment when the states system was severely shaken at its
foundations, was also important in Charles Albert’s geopolitical considerations, as
is obvious from the remark made in his diary in reaction to Metternich’s refusal to
wage war over the French occupation of the town: ‘We learn from all over Italy
378 European History Quarterly 49(3)

that the hatred of Austria seems to be increasing a hundredfold and that the voices
of all honest men are calling to us: but the moment to show our intentions has not
yet come’.50
There were two principal ways in which Charles Albert attempted to improve his
own power base for the expected show of force. Shortly before the outbreak of war,
at the beginning of 1848, he tried to find allies from among the Italian states. The
Pope’s idea of an Italian league from that time, originally intended by the Holy
Father for the defence of Italy, met with little favour in Turin since Charles Albert
actually wanted to establish an offensive alliance that he could exploit for his own
aggressive plans against Austria. The King hungered for an offensive war and
disliked the idea of being restrained in his freedom of action by the chains of a
defensive coalition. In March, the government in Turin strove for such a league in
which Piedmont could gain control over the armed forces of all its members and
use them in conquering northern Italy. The negotiations failed owing to these
ambitions which provoked the distrust of other states.51
The second way to reinforce his own position towards his still more powerful
neighbour in the east was through the strength of public opinion. Although Charles
Albert did not wish to limit his absolute power by the promulgation of a modern
constitution, he was able to agree with the Italian liberal nationalists on their
geopolitical visions primarily aimed at the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy.
The same moderate liberal nationalists were also ready to see in the Sardinian king
the man who would lead the Italians in the war for independence against the
‘Austrian hydra’. Therefore, during the 1840s Charles Albert enticed the Italian
nationalists with displays of his anti-Austrian sentiment. With this tactic he wished
to win massive popular support in the Apennines. The fact that must be empha-
sized in this respect is that he was never an Italian nationalist and merely wished to
use pan-Italian sentiments for his own dynastic geopolitical aims. Consequently,
the role of the Italian national movement in his decision to wage war in 1848 was
merely instrumental in helping him to achieve his goal.52
Another reason Charles Albert tried to reconcile himself with Italian liberal
nationalists on a geopolitical basis was his intention to blunt the edge of their
requests for constitutional changes in his kingdom, something he still refused to
consider in the mid-1840s. He hoped that if they were occupied with Austria, they
would be less engaged in debates about political liberalization in their own nations.
This was, of course, another attempt to increase his power, in this case by placating
the internal opposition and thereby reducing the danger of an upheaval at home. In
the early 1830s, he was dependent on Austria owing to his fear of both France and
revolution. When both threats diminished in the middle of the decade, he was able
to change his political course and become less dependent on Austria. In the mid-
1840s, internal stability in his own country and massive popular support were the
fundamental preconditions for any success in an armed conflict with Austria.53
Charles Albert’s anti-Austrian attitude, which grew increasingly more out-
spoken after the early 1840s, became entirely obvious after the outbreak of the
salt-wine dispute between Turin and Vienna in the spring of 1846. Its origins are to
Šedivý 379

be found in the treaty of 1751 by which Piedmont gained Austria’s permission to

import salt from Lombardy in return for the pledge not to trade in this commodity
with the Swiss Canton of Ticino, which was to be supplied exclusively by Austria.
In 1844, however, a treaty was signed between Piedmont and Ticino allowing the
transport of salt from Genoa over the kingdom’s territory to the canton, with the
excuse made to Vienna that the 1751 treaty prohibited active commerce but not
transit. Since the Viennese cabinet disagreed with this legal interpretation and its
protests received no response from Turin, it imposed a surtax on Piedmontese
wines in April 1846. This retaliatory measure caused bitter resentment in
Piedmont and forced Charles Albert to publish a statement in the governmental
journal Gazetta piemontese on 2 May proclaiming the legality of his action and
condemning Austria’s abuse of power. With this step he immediately won the
sympathy of his own subjects as well as other Italians and became in their eyes a
hero defending the independence of not only Piedmont but the whole peninsula.
Although Piedmont’s resistance to Austria was compared to the fight between
David and Goliath, Charles Albert’s bold political move was calculated in the
knowledge that he actually had nothing to fear from the cabinet in Vienna. For
the same reason he remained firm in the whole affair since his unyielding attitude
made him popular, while at the same time it was damaging for Austria’s reputa-
tion. Consequently, he could do nothing but win with the prolongation of the
dispute and he was deaf to numerous concessions offered to him by the government
in Vienna.54
Austria’s attempts at conciliation had no chance of placating Charles Albert and
his ministers; in fact, they necessarily led to the very opposite outcome since the
whole dispute was perceived in Turin primarily as a matter of strength versus
weakness. Owing to the increasing number of reports on Austria’s worsening inter-
nal situation, the government in Turin had less respect for the empire’s strength
than ever before, which made the kingdom’s policy gradually more assertive
towards it, and Austria’s moderation was seen as a further sign of weakness. In
his memorandum of 2 June 1846, Solaro emphasized the Viennese cabinet’s existing
difficulties in Galicia, Hungary and Bohemia and anticipated that in the near future
it would be unable to effectively react to a revolution in Lombardy-Venetia.
Reiterating his opinion first expressed in 1835, he again recommended the King
should take advantage of such an event and conquer them, even at the cost of war
with Austria. The conciliatory gestures in the salt-wine affair were considered
by Solaro to be further validation of this low estimation of Austria’s power:
‘This proves that Austria is weak. Yes, it is’.55 Charles Albert agreed with his
foreign minister and decided on firmness. Finally, the King deliberately thwarted
any settlement with a policy of obstructions, since he had little respect for Austria’s
power and the continuation of the dispute was greatly advantageous for him.56
Charles Albert’s expressions of anti-Austrian feelings actually won him popu-
larity among the Italians, and the 1848 March revolutions in the Austrian Empire
in general and those in Milan and Venice in particular offered him the long-
yearned-for opportunity predicted by Solaro in 1835 for the expulsion of the
380 European History Quarterly 49(3)

Austrians from northern Italy. On 23 March 1848, at the moment when the
Austrians troops were expelled from Milan, Charles Albert decided to exploit
Austria’s internal problems and start a war of conquest. Although historians
have usually emphasized his hesitation during the days preceding the invasion
into Lombardy, the King had actually foreseen the likelihood of war during the
winter and along with his effort to win the support of Italian people and other
Italian rulers he was preparing his army for such an eventuality.57
As an excuse vis-à-vis other European states, Piedmont used Solaro’s argumen-
tation from 1835 about the defence of monarchic order in Italy. However, although
Charles Albert’s decision was in part influenced by his fear of the spread of repub-
licanism from Lombardy to Piedmont, his actions were in no way motivated by any
consideration for the order in Italy inherited from 1815. The pan-Italian argumen-
tation offered to the Italian nationalists to further the cause of war, something also
invented in Turin in the mid-1830s, was of similar little consequence to the King. In
fact, the welfare of Italy meant little to Charles Albert. His primary motivation was
the desire to increase the security of Piedmont by the creation of an Italian power in
the northern Apennines and thus improve the kingdom’s position against the other
great powers, in particular France bordering Piedmont in the west and Austria in
the east. The genuine perception of international politics as an arena dominated by
the law of the jungle, where only the strong survive, seemed to motivate as well as
sufficiently vindicate the King’s desire for war.58

Conclusion
Charles Albert’s decision to start a war against Austria was an obvious infringe-
ment of the post-Napoleonic states system in Europe since it was directed against
the territorial status quo established at the Congress of Vienna; it was also one of
the consequences of Charles Albert’s loss of loyalty to the same system. There is a
clear progression from the King’s, as well as his ministers’ and diplomats’, belief in
the inadequacy of the system to protect the kingdom against abuse by the great
powers after the July Revolution to their unsuccessful attempts to improve the
same system through treaty guarantees, to their fading allegiance to this system
and their reliance on the force of arms instead of public law, leading ultimately to
the exploitation of Austria’s weakness for Piedmont’s own territorial aims.
To explain this in a more explicit way: France’s violation of the law of nations
in Ancona, much like Britain’s in the Sulphur War, and the passivity of the con-
servative great powers, diminished Charles Albert’s confidence in the strength of
international law and increased his belief in the use of armed force. This went hand
in hand with his low esteem for the former and appreciation of the latter.
The loss of faith in the stability and security of the European states system and
in any justice in the actions of the Concert’s members together with the gamble on
the use of armed force had important consequences for Charles Albert’s attitude
towards both the European states system and Austria: he became less inclined to
show any loyalty to the political-legal order established in 1815 and more willing to
Šedivý 381

exploit Austria’s internal problems for his own benefit. It was then easy for him to
feel freed from any obligations towards the states system when he found it advan-
tageous to do so and, from a practical point of view, feasible, owing to the weak-
ness of Austria, which he attacked in 1848 not because it had violated any law or
threatened him with force but simply because he felt he could do so and since, as
Solaro once wrote, the Austrian Empire was the enemy of Piedmont’s glory and
territorial expansion.59
The role of the Italian national movement must be seen in this context not as an
impetus in the Sardinian king’s decision-making but as a necessary instrument in
his quest for power in the planned war with Austria. He wanted to win popular
support for the same reason he was willing to enter an Italian league in 1848, and in
both cases his attitude towards ‘pan-Italianism’ was in this respect pragmatic. This
is an important finding since it shows that for the destruction of the post-
Napoleonic states system in Italy, the traditional geopolitical interests of the con-
servative monarchs and their advisors cannot be underestimated, and the ‘new
force of destruction’ – nationalism – should not be overestimated.

Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation under Grant Metternich, Italy
and the European States System 1830–48 [number GA15-04973S].

Notes
1. For numerous scholars it is necessary to name those most representative in the English-
and German-speaking milieus: F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen, The Great Powers and the
European States System 1814–1914 (Harlow 2005); P. W. Schroeder, The
Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848 (Oxford 1994); M. Schulz, Normen
und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860
(Munich 2009).
2. This holds for all kinds of works, from general surveys on Risorgimento history, to
Italy’s position in international affairs, Piedmont’s history and Charles Albert’s biogra-
phies. From the extensive list, see older as well as more recent publications like G. F. H
Berkeley, Italy in the Making (Cambridge 1968); F. Boyer, La Seconde Re´publique.
Charles-Albert et l’Italie du Nord en 1848 (Paris 1967); F. J. Coppa, The Origins of
the Italian Wars of Independence (London 1992); J. A. Davis, Italy in the Nineteenth
Century, 1796–1900 (Oxford 2000); N. Nada, Dallo Stato assoluto allo Stato costituzio-
nale. Storia del Regno di Carlo Alberto dal 1831 al 1848 (Turin 1980); N. Rodolico, Carlo
Alberto negli anni di regno 1831–1843 (Florence 1936); A. J. P Taylor, The Italian
Problem in European Diplomacy 1847–1849 (Manchester 1970); C. Vidal, Charles-
Albert et le Risorgimento italien (1831–1848) (Paris 1927).
3. For the roles of smaller countries in the system of world politics, see G. Simpson, Great
Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order
(Cambridge 2004). For their response to insecurity in international relations around
1840, see M. Šedivý, Crisis among the Great Powers: The Concert of Europe and the
Eastern Question (London 2017), 174–240; on Scandinavian responses before 1848, E. I.
Kouri and J. E. Olesen, The Cambridge History of Scandinavia, Volume 2: 1520–1870
382 European History Quarterly 49(3)

(Cambridge 2016), 928–33, and M. Malmborg, Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden

(Basingstoke 2001); on Germany, J. Angelow, Von Wien nach Koniggratz. Die
Sicherheitspolitik des Deutschen Bundes im europaischen Gleichgewicht (1815–1866)
(Munich 1996), F. L. Müller, Britain and the German Question: Perceptions of
Nationalism and Political Reform, 1830–63 (Basingstoke 2002), J. Inauen, Brennpunkt
Schweiz. Die süddeutschen Staaten Baden, Württemberg und Bayern und die
Eidgenossenschaft 1815–1840 (Freiburg 2008), D. Laak, Über alles in der Welt.
Deutscher Imperialismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Munich 2005), 35–55, and F. L.
Müller, ‘Imperialist Ambitions in Vormärz and Revolutionary Germany’, German
History, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1999), 346–68.
4. N. Jolicoeur, ‘La politique étrangère de la France au début de la monarchie de juillet. De
la non-intervention à la contre-intervention (1830–1832)’, Revue d’histoire diplomatique,
Vol. 121 (2008), 11–29; P. Silva, La Monarchia di Luglio e l’Italia. Studio di storia
diplomatica (Turin 1917), 75–6.
5. F. Falaschi, ‘L’occupazione francese di Ancona del 1932’, Rassegna storica del
Risorgimento, Vol. 15 (1928), 118–42; G. Leti, ‘La Monarchia del luglio e la spedizione
francese del 1832 in Ancona’, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, Vol. 16 (1929), 55–78.
6. Šedivý, Crisis among the Great Powers, 177–86 and 221–30.
7. J. A. Davis, ‘Palmerston and the Sicilian Sulphur Crisis of 1840. An episode in the
Imperialism of Free Trade’, Risorgimento, Vols 1/2 (1982), 5–22; D. W. Thomson,
The Sulphur War (1840): A Confrontation between Great Britain and the Kingdom of
the Two Sicilies in the Mediterranean (PhD dissertation, Michigan State University,
1989); V. Giura, La Questione degli zolfi siciliani 1838–1841 (Geneva 1973).
8. Pralormo to La Tour, Vienna, 17 and 24 December 1833, Archivio di Stato di Torino,
Turin (henceforth: AST), Lettere ministri (henceforth: LM), Austria 132.2; La Tour to
Pralormo, Turin, 11 November and 14 December 1833, 4 January 1834, AST, LM,
Austria 156; S. Martino to La Tour, Berlin, 13 November 1833, AST, LM, Prussia
28; Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 28 February 1832, in N. Nada, Le relazioni diplo-
matiche fra l’Austria e il Regno di Sardegna, II serie: 1830–1848, vol. 1 (Rome 1972), 364;
Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 14 December 1833, in N. Nada, Le relazioni diplomat-
iche fra l’Austria e il Regno di Sardegna, II serie: 1830–1848, vol. 2 (Rome 1973), 94;
Solaro to Sambuy, [?] October 1835, in C. Lovera and I. P. Rinieri, Clemente Solaro
della Margarita, vol. 3 (Turin 1931), 377; Waldburg-Truchsess to Frederick William III,
Turin, 18, 21 and 28 December 1833, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz,
Berlin (henceforth: GStA PK), Hauptabteilung III (henceforth: HA III), Ministerium
des Auswärtigen I (henceforth: MdA I), 5494; Foster to Palmerston, Turin, 10 and 31
December 1833, The National Archives, London (henceforth: TNA), Foreign Office
(henceforth: FO) 67/89; Barante to Broglie, Genoa, 6 December 1833, Barante to
Rigny, Turin, 8 May 1834, in A. Saitta, Le relazioni diplomatiche fra la Francia e il
Regno di Sardegna, 1830–1848, vol. 1 (Rome 1974), 340 and 417; B. Allason, ‘Carlo
Alberto nel 1833. Attraverso il carteggio Metternich-De Bombelles’, Nuova Antologia,
Vol. 39 (1914), 406; N. Rosselli, Inghilterra e regno di Sardegna dal 1815 al 1847 (Turin
1954), 516–20; Šedivý, Crisis among the Great Powers, 221–30.
9. Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 18 February 1832, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1, 357.
10. Sambuy to Solaro, Vienna, 21 May 1840, in M. Alberti, La politica estera del Piemonte
sotto Carlo Alberto Secondo il carteggio diplomatico del Conte Vittorio Amedeo Balbo
Bertone di Sambuy ministro di Sardegna a Vienna (1835–1846), vol. 2 (Turin 1915), 261;
Šedivý 383

F. Lemmi, ‘Carlo Alberto e Francesco IV’, Lettere inedite, Il Risorgimento italiano, Vol.
20 (1927), 315.
11. San Martino to La Tour, London, 13 March 1831, AST, LM, Gran Bretagna 110; Sales
to La Tour, Paris, 21 December 1830, 22 March 1831, AST, LM, Francia 257; La Tour
to Pralormo, Turin, 23 October 1830, 9 February and 19 April 1831, AST, LM, Austria
156; Pralormo to La Tour, Vienna, 2 and 7 January, 19 and 28 February 1831, AST, LM,
Austria 132; Charles Felix to Francis I, 5 August 1830, Senfft to Metternich, Turin, 4 and
15 September, 30 December 1830, 19 January 1831, Metternich to Senfft, Vienna, 11 and
22 January 1831, Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 22 February 1831, Metternich to
Bombelles, Vienna, 26 February 1831, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1, 31–2, 52–8, 95–110,
125 and 131; Foster to Aberdeen, Turin, 15 September 1830, TNA, FO 67/81; Schoultz
von Ascheraden to Frederick William III, Turin, 6 April 1831, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I,
5491; Barante to Sébastiani, Turin, 20 January, 9 February and 16 March 1831, in Saitta,
Le relazioni diplomatiche, vol. 1, 105, 120, 182 and 242; Rosselli, 438–44 and 495–7.
12. La Tour to Pralormo, Turin, 20 March 1831, AST, LM, Austria 156; Bombelles to
Metternich, Turin, 28 March, 4 and 13 April 1831, The Austro-Sardinian Military
Convention, Turin, 23 July 1831, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1, 172, 183–4, 196 and
313–16; Nada, Dallo Stato assoluto allo Stato costituzionale, 41–4; D. Laven,
‘Austria’s Policy Reconsidered: Revolution and Reform in Restoration Italy’, Modern
Italy, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1997).
13. A. Viarengo, ‘Il mezzogiorno nella diplomazia piemontese da Carlo Alberto a Cavour’,
in G. Galasso, ed., Mezzogiorno, Risorgimento e Unità d’Italia. Atti del convegno Roma,
18, 19 e 20 maggio 2011 (Rome 2014), 191–2; Vidal, 14–25.
14. Senfft to Metternich, Turin, 19 August 1830, Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 18
February 1832, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1, 38 and 357; F. Lemmi, La politica estera di
Carlo Alberto nei suoi primi anni di regno (Florence 1928), 94–5.
15. Rodolico, Carlo Alberto negli anni di regno 1831–1843, 119 and 167.
16. La Tour to Pralormo, Turin, 13 September 1830, 11 February 1832, 14 February and 28
September 1833, AST, LM, Austria 156; Pralormo to La Tour, Vienna, 6 April 1832,
AST, LM, Legazioni 21; Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 29 September 1831, Turin, 1
June 1832, Genoa, 30 November 1832, Turin, 4 January 1833, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1,
333–5, 401, 434 and 455; Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 22 December 1834, in N.
Nada, Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l’Austria e il Regno di Sardegna, II serie: 1830–1848,
vol. 2 (Rome 1973), 195.
17. Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 29 February 1832, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1, 364.
18. Pralormo to La Tour, Vienna, 25 March 1832, AST, LM, Austria 132; Metternich to
Bombelles, Vienna, 7 October 1831, 11 June and 27 December 1832, in Nada, Sardegna,
vol. 1, 335–6, 403–5 and 445–51; Metternich to Bombelles, Vienna, 14 March 1834 and 5
August 1835, Metternich to Brunetti, Vienna, 31 August 1835, 13 April and 24
December 1836, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 2, 127, 268–70, 283–4 and 458.
19. Pralormo to La Tour, Vienna, 2 March 1832, AST, LM, Austria 132; Solaro to Sambuy,
[?] October 1835, in Solaro, Relazione al Re Carlo Alberto sulla politica estera per gli anni
1836–1837; Lovera and Rinieri, 277–9 and 395; Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 14
January 1833, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1, 457–8; Waldburg-Truchsess to Frederick
William III, Turin, 31 March 1833, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 5494; Nada,
Sardegna, vol. 1, xiii; Nada, Sardegna, vol. 2, x; Nada, Dallo Stato assoluto allo Stato
costituzionale, 44; Rodolico, Carlo Alberto negli anni di regno 1831–1843, 168–71.
384 European History Quarterly 49(3)

20. W. Siemann, Metternich. Stratege und Visionär: Eine Biographie (Munich 2016), 814–32.
21. Solaro to Sambuy, [?] October 1835; Lovera and Rinieri, 387; Sambuy to Solaro,
Vienna, 8 October 1836, 11 and 31 March 1838, in M. Alberti, La politica estera del
Piemonte sotto Carlo Alberto Secondo il carteggio diplomatico del Conte Vittorio Amedeo
Balbo Bertone di Sambuy ministro di Sardegna a Vienna (1835–1846), vol. 1 (Turin
1913), 170, 403 and 424–6; Sambuy to Solaro, Vienna, 29 November and 6 December
1839, 31 July 1841, in Alberti, vol. 2, 127–8, 131 and 520–1; Rodolico, Carlo Alberto
negli anni di regno 1831–1843, 408.
22. Sambuy to Solaro, Vienna, 11 December 1835, AST, LM, Austria 133; Sambuy to
Solaro, Vienna, 20 February and 15 April 1836, in Alberti, vol. 1, 114 and 160;
Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 20 February and 11 March 1835, Brunetti to
Metternich, Turin, 10 January, 3 and 4 May 1836, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 2, 213,
221–2, 326–7 and 385–9.
23. Solaro to Charles Albert, 23 February 1835, Solaro to Sambuy, [?] October 1835, in
Lovera and Rinieri, pp. 361–371 and 274–278; Nada, Dallo Stato assoluto allo Stato
costituzionale, 47; P. Renouvin, Histoire des relations internationales II: de 1789 à 1871
(Paris 1954), 395.
24. Charles Albert to Solaro, Nice, 15 April 1836, in Lovera and Rinieri, 27.
25. Charles Albert to Solaro, Nice, 23 April 1836, in Lovera and Rinieri, 28.
26. Charles Albert to Solaro, Rocconi, 16 August 1836, in Lovera and Rinieri, 34.
27. Solaro to Sambuy, Turin, 2 June 1840, AST, Raccolte Private, Carte Bianchi, Serie I, 8.
28. Ibid.
29. M. Šedivý, ‘Italy during the Rhine Crisis of 1840’, European Review of History/Revue
europe´enne d’histoire, Vol. 22 (2015), 491–5.
30. Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 20 July 1835, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 2, 264.
31. Sales to Solaro, Paris, 11 January 1836, in Lemmi, ‘Carlo Alberto e Francesco IV’, 369–70.
32. Charles Albert to Solaro, Nice, 14 April 1836, in Lovera and Rinieri, 26.
33. G. Berti, Russia e stati italiani nel Risorgimento (Torino 1957), 423; B. M. Buchmann,
Militär, Diplomatie, Politik. Österreich und Europa von 1815 bis 1835 (Frankfurt am
Main 1991), 254.
34. Bombelles to Metternich, Turin, 13 April 1831, in Nada, Sardegna, vol. 1, 200–1;
Barante to Argout, Paris, 5 September 1832, in A. Saitta, Le relazioni diplomatiche,
vol. 2 (Rome 1976), 208–10; Rodolico, Carlo Alberto negli anni di regno 1831–1843,
439; Rosselli, 488–9; F. Salata, Carlo Alberto inedito (Milan 1931), 203.
35. P. Gentile, Carlo Alberto in un diario segreto. Le memorie di Cesare Trabucco di
Castagnetto 1832–1849 (Turin 2015), 125.
36. Ibid., 41.
37. Solaro to Charles Albert, 23 February 1835, in Lovera and Rinieri, 361–373.
38. Solaro to Sambuy, 8 October 1835, AST, Raccolte Private, Carte Bianchi, Serie II, 18.
39. Ibid.
40. Solaro’s instructions for the Sardinian representatives in Berlin and St Petersburg, [?]
1835, in Lovera and Rinieri, 392.
41. Ibid., 393.
42. C. S. Margarita, Memorandum storico politico (Torino 1851), 563.
43. Lemmi, ‘Carlo Alberto e Francesco IV’, 312, 314 and 322.
44. B. Montale, Emanuele Pes di Villamarina (1777–1852) (Rome 1973), 216; Rodolico,
Carlo Alberto negli anni di regno 1831–1843, 433–4.
Šedivý 385

45. Vidal, 81; P. Notario, and N. Nada, Il Piemonte sabaudo. Dal periodo napoleonico al
Risorgimento (Turin 1993), 198.
46. Solaro to Charles Albert, 23 February 1835, in Lovera and Rinieri, 370.
47. Rossi to Solaro, St Petersburg, 24 November 1839, in N. Bianchi, Storia documentata
della diplomazia europea in Italia dall’anno 1814 all’anno 1861, vol. 4. Anni 1830–1846
(Turin 1867), 389.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 388.
50. Rodolico, Carlo Alberto negli anni di regno 1831–1843, 23.
51. Coppa, 29–38; A. Filipuzzi, Pio IX e la politica austriaca in Italia dal 1815 al 1848 nella
relazione di Riccardo Weiss di Starkenfels (Florence 1958), 164–9; D. Mack Smith,
Victor Emanuel, Cavour, and the Risorgimento (Oxford 1971), 14–15; F. Traniello and
G. Sofri, Der lange Weg zur Nation. Das italienische Risorgimento (Stuttgart 2012), 104.
52. C. M. Lovett, The Democratic Movement in Italy, 1830–1876 (Cambridge, MA 1982),
116; M. Rapport, 1848: Revolution in Europa (Darmstadt 2011), 100; L. Riall, The
Italian Risorgimento: State, Society and National Unification (London 1994), 26; S.
Woolf, A History of Italy, 1700–1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change
(London 1979), 349.
53. H. Hearder, Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790–1870 (London 1986), 202.
54. R. A. Austensen, ‘Metternich and Charles Albert: Salt, Tariffs, and the Sardinian
Challenge, 1844–1848’, in The Consortium of Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1850 (1986),
384–94; S. Bortolotti, Metternich e l’Italia nel 1846. Saggio di storia diplomatica (Turin
1944), 21–80; A. Colombo, ‘Carlo Alberto e la vertenza austro-sarda nel 1846’, Il
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55. Colombo, 22.
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Author Biography
Miroslav Šedivý is a senior lecturer at the Department of Historical Sciences at the
University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. He is the author of Metternich, the Great
Powers and the Eastern Question (Pilsen: ZČU, 2013) and Crisis among the Great
Powers: The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question (London: I.B. Tauris,
2017). His third English book, The Decline of the Congress System: Metternich,
Italy and European Diplomacy, was published in 2018 by I.B. Tauris.