FACTS:

This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR. .

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be
less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a
rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by
Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were
already covered. .

In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent
has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter
is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states
no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. .
.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who
dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if
the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. .

Hence this appeal. .

ISSUES:
o Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity
for acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
o Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code

HELD:

On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is
not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually
be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions. .

Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior
public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where
the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence.
In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the
constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32
of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith,
or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the
plaintiff. .

On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being
a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
.
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly,
in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that
civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of
the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the
rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the
act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), was a decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the Court reviewed whether
the use of wiretapped private telephone conversations, obtained by federal
agents without judicial approval and subsequently used as evidence,
constituted a violation of the defendant’s rights provided by
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that neither
the Fourth Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment rights of the defendant were
violated. This decision was later overturned by Katz v. United States in 1967.

Brief Fact Summary. The conversations of various individuals involved in

illegal liquor sales were tapped. .

Synopsis of Rule of Law. “A standard which would forbid the reception of

evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government
officials, would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity
than has been known heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation
by Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing offenders to
justice may well deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence should be
confined to cases where rights under the Constitution would be violated by
admitting it.”
Facts. Various individuals were convicted of liquor related crimes,
including conspiracy. The operation grossed a substantial amount of
money. The leading conspirator and the general manager of the business
was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the “Petitioner”). The main office of
the business was in Seattle and there were three telephones in the office,
each on a different line. There were also telephones in an office the
Petitioner had in his own home, at the home of his associates and various
other places in Seattle. A lot of communication occurred between Seattle
and Vancouver, British Columbia. .
“The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature
and extent was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the
telephones of the conspirators by four federal prohibition officers. Small
wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the residences
of four of the [suspects] and those leading from the chief office. The
insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the
defendants. They were made in the basement of the large office building.
The taps from house lines were made in the streets near the houses.”
Various conversations were taped and testified to by government
witnesses.

Issue. “[W]hether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations

between the defendants and others, intercepted by means of wire tapping,
amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments[?]”
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Skinner (Petitioner), was sentenced

to involuntary sterilization under Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act (the Act) and now alleges that the Act deprives him of equal protection
under the laws. .

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right to have offspring is a fundamental

right, requiring a compelling state interest to interfere with it.
Facts. Oklahoma defined a “habitual criminal” as a person who, “having
been convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies
involving moral turpitude’ either in Oklahoma or another State, is thereafter
convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in a Oklahoma penal institution.” Such habitual criminals
could be subject to forced sterilization. The Petitioner had been twice
arrested for theft offenses before being arrested and confined for armed
robbery. During his third incarceration, the Act was passed and
proceedings were instituted against him.

Issue. May the State sterilize an individual against his will for being
convicted of three felonies involving moral turpitude?
Held. No. Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruling reversed.
Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) notes that sterilization of habitual
offenders in no way guarantees that new offenders will not be born.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that habitual offenders would spawn
offenders themselves. .
J. Douglas cannot justify the distinction between larceny (involving moral
turpitude) and embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude) in the eyes of
the statute. This is clear discrimination in J. Douglas’s view. In terms of
fines and imprisonment the crimes are identical to the State. Only when it
comes to sterilization do the crimes differ. As such, equal protection is
violated.
Concurrence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Stone) concurs in the
judgment, but rests his decision on due process grounds, arguing that the
invasion of personal liberty is too great.
Discussion. Skinner represents the Supreme Court of the United States’
growing awareness of the right to reproductive autonomy. Unlike later
cases that focus on due process and a right to privacy, the majority in
Skinner holds that sterilization in the present situation violates equal
protection principles.
Valentin Tio vs Videogram
Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by
a Bill
Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers
to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said
law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a
need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the
movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that
such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10
of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is
a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to
deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the
VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently
complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar,
the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor
foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB
is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the
authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement,
and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a
“fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being
“subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”

People vs Marti
FACTS:

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to
the booth of the “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4)
wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could
examine and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of
Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and
that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to the NBI
and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried marijuana leaves were
found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in
admitting in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained in the
four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:

Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

 GMA NETWORK, INC. VS COMELEC

PONENTE: Peralta

TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime

limits

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue

the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to
an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such
restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom
of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their
right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose
who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime

instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns
or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.

9615 on airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and
of the press.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-

based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling
the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is
specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of
such a prohibitive measure.
 It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt
the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when
we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among
the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message
through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people
may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of
such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his
political speech.

ZULUETA VS. CA
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner
to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic
without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On

March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and
took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice
of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence;
Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from
a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for
any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by

making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this
has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Rhonda Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Right to Privacy –
Online Privacy (Social Media)

Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Writ of Habeas Data

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s

College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher,

Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and
downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and
banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in
March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order)
granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in
the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers

filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school.
They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at

“Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights
by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were
intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of

information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer
Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court
all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be
declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a
case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and

2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not
an entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing
data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party”.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing
in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available
only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like
Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools,
then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and
protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned

made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post
(status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s
posts on his “wall” (profile page):

(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends
can view the photo;

(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and

(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy,
then he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the
students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that
only five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their
classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In
fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher,
Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never
use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the
school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it
was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher
and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to
the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to
discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which
the students and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the
fact that they enrolled their children there).

Some notable foreign jurisprudence used by the Supreme Court in this

case:

1. United States v. Gines-Perez: “A person who places a photograph on

the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to
such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the
Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.”

2. United States v. Maxwell: “The more open the method of transmission

is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public
at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.”

3. H v. W, (South Africa Case dated January 30, 2013): “The law has to
take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also
socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is
imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting
cautiously and with wisdom.”

This case recognized this ability of Facebook users to “customize their

privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies
that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these
privacy settings are not foolproof.”
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the

privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated
8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation,
a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as
its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter,
but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive
that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%
of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section

10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to
or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however
does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions
have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When
the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also
refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case,
Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant
events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights,
privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony,
when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified
Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the
Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad,
and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and
thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849
(1967)
J. Fernando

Facts:

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its

members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670
on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila
City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory
powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement
that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city
authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The
petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of
the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of
police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the
stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted
to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication
and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view
of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard
to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for

an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to

the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to
license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees
the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of
cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining
the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice
every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term
is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority
in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle,
unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to
some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom
of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance
of establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is
no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province
of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to
remove their residence from their native habitat and to established
themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro,
and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped.
Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end
and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are
a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan,
solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for
habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of
the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor
of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being
deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the
doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine
whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is
optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances
may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial
governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed
the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given
a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to
relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said,
refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization.
In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the
reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle.
This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the
changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and
stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the
citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and
the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process
of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process
of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems
to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and

STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila
City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the
City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or
corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than
12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation

(TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and
operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in
turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty
of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.”
Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to
operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit
relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,

When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a

valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended
that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact
all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since

it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise
of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their
business.

CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the

constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate
the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners
or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having
a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the
ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse
effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:
 No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police
power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila
v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread
that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity
of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances
were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit
activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle
case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is
another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate
the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions

including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice
a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred
on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used
as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use
of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit
of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify
any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the
Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance
should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it
would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated
to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also
recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional
rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights
at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as
guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The
term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person
of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities
with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized

and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving

patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be

struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.

The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already

prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug
dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants.
Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely
paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates”
from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
 SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of
their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

mmda v. Garin
FACTS:

Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt and his driver’s
license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference
for case to be filed in Court. Without an immediate reply from the reply from the
Chairman, Garin filed a complaint for preliminary injunction assailing among
other that Sec 5(+) of

RA 7942 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation

of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and
unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rules in his favor directing MMDA to return
Garin’s driver’s license and for MMDA to desist from confiscating driver’s license
without first giving the driver to opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942 which authorizes MMDA to

confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic
constitutional.

RULING:
 The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA
is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative
power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested

in the legislative to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare
of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the same.

There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowers MMDA or its council to

“enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in
nature. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies, P.O., NGO’s and
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services.”
Bowers v. Hardwick
Brief Fact Summary. A male homosexual was criminally charged
for committing consensual sodomy with another male adult in the bedroom
of his home.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. There is no constitutional right to engage in

consensual homosexual sodomy.

Facts. The Respondent, Hardwick (Respondent), brought suit in a

federal district court challenging the constitutionality of a Georgia statute
insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy. The Respondent asserted
that he was a practicing homosexual, that the Georgia statute placed him
in imminent danger of arrest and that the statute violated his constitutional
rights. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the case for failure to
state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision ruling that the
statute violated the Respondent’s “fundamental rights because his
homosexual activity was a private and intimate association . . . .” The
Eleventh Circuit remanded the decision for trial ruling that the Georgia
statute must pass strict scrutiny before it can be upheld.

Issue. Whether the act of consensual homosexual sodomy is protected

under the fundamental right to privacy.
Held. Justice Byron White (J. White). No. The act of consensual
sodomy is not protected under the fundamental right to privacy or any right
protected under the United States Constitution (Constitution). There is no
precedent to support the Respondent’s claimed constitutional right to
commit sodomy. Fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States (Supreme Court) throughout history and through
its traditions have in no way set any foundation to include a case such as
this under the Constitutional umbrella of protection. “The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution. . . . There should be, therefore, great resistance
to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires
redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.” The judgment
of the Eleventh Circuit is reversed.

Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows:

Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). “[T]he right of an individual to
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home [as
seen in this case] seems . . . to be the heart of the Constitution’s protection
of privacy.”
Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens). “The Court orders the dismissal of
respondent’s complaint even though the State’s statute prohibits all
sodomy; even though that prohibition is concededly unconstitutional with
respect to heterosexuals; and even though the State’s post hoc
explanations for selective application are belied by the State’s own actions.
At the very least, . . . it [is] clear at this early stage of the litigation that
respondent has alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss.”
Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows:
Chief Justice Warren Burger (J. Burger). “I find nothing in the Constitution
depriving a State of the power to enact the statute challenged here.”
Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell). Even though the Respondent has no
fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy, he may “be protected
by the Eight Amendment of the Constitution” because the Respondent may
be imprisoned for his homosexual acts “for up to 20 years for a single
private, consensual act of sodomy.”
Discussion. The Supreme Court does not link this case with other
right to privacy cases because even though consensual homosexual
sodomy may be committed within the privacy of ones home, “[p]roscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots. . . . Sodomy was a criminal offense
at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original thirteen States
when they ratified the Bill of Rights.” Also, the Supreme Court states that
sodomy is not immune from being criminalized because it may occur in the
home. The Supreme Court has held other acts that may take place within
the home, such as illegal possession and/or use of drugs, as criminal.