THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 150762 January 20, 2006

COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision2 and the 7
November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
50 ("trial court") in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez
y Evangelista ("Abarquez") guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.

The Charge

The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide in two
Informations,5 as follows:

Criminal Case No. 94-135055

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of

HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has
already been charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under
Crim. Case No. 93-129891 and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon
and hitting him with a gun at the back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 94-135056

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of

ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has
already been charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila under Crim.
Case No. 93-129892 and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide directly by
overt acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and stabbing
him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm, but the said accused did not perform all
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as a consequence, by
reason of causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon
said JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is only slight and not fatal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly.

The Version of the Prosecution

On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz8 ("Paz"), Ricardo Quejong ("Quejong")
and their friends were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They
were drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyet’s son. About 7:45 p.m., Paz and
Quejong decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquez’s son Bardie and Sonito Masula ("Masula")
joined Paz and Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St.

Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyet’s house, Alberto Almojuela also known
as Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise drinking
liquor in front of Almojuela’s house. As the group of Paz was passing towards the main road,
Almojuela and his companions blocked their path.

Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela got angry and attacked
Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held
Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez, "What is
our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our way?" Abarquez answered, "Masyado
kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na."

Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz tried
to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong
fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached Quejong and
found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried
to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San Jose St.
to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your
companion already wounded!"

When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela and
Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital.
They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However, there was nobody
in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the WPD General Headquarters to
report the incident. At the WPD General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong died at the
UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his
left forearm.

About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the WPD Homicide Division,
his station received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of the death of Quejong. SPO1
Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the incident. They
learned that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn
statements by Paz and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and
frustrated homicide and prepared the referral letter to the inquest prosecutor.

Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to one
SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.

Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the
post-mortem examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong sustained
two stab wounds and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds to the
heart and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument probably caused the wound. Dr.
Rebosa also reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and contusions on the right upper body,
the wrist and on the lower extremities.

The Version of the Defense

Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363 San Jose St.,
Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuela’s wife informed him that the group of Paz was
challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded to
Almojuela’s house. Almojuela’s house was about twenty meters away from Abarquez’s house.
When he arrived at Almojuela’s house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled
by Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuela’s waist and boxing him at the stomach. Masula was near
Almojuela’s head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted
at the group to stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the
air. Still, the group did not heed Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong,
and Masula scampered away.

Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking
marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house while Abarquez went home. On his way home,
Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego
("Lego") advised him to report the incident to the police. They all proceeded to Precinct No. 4
where Lego reported the incident to the desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person had
been stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and media men with their
barangay chairman. He informed them that he had just reported the incident. Upon the request of
SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police station to shed light on the incident.

Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him that there was
marijuana smoke coming to their window. He went outside to look for the source of the smoke
and saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to move
away as there were children inside the house. He was on his way back to the house when
Quejong tried to strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez
shouting, "Tumigil na kayo." Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.

Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in front of his house when he
heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz
kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere.
Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot and the persons involved in the commotion ran away.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove that
Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez could not
be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez,
in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela
to pursue his criminal act without resistance.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the accused, Coverdale
Abarquez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only as accomplice and
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 94-135056, the accused is
hereby acquitted.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12

Abarquez appealed the trial court’s Decision before the Court of Appeals.

In its Decision13 of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. The
Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. The
Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided Almojuela
in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquez’s allegation that he was
merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties.

In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals denied Abarquez’s motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:

1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt;

2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

Abarquez alleges that the prosecution’s evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and
is not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a
misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their
conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the
credibility of the witnesses against him.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition is meritorious.

The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the
testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of
substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case.16 This case is an
exception to the rule.

Concurrence in Criminal Design

Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being
included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts."17
Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of
design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.18 Mere commission
of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough.19 Thus:

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist
without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore
required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation.20

Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene
cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged.21

Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the
testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing
him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:

q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations between Bitoy and Ricardo
Quejong?

a. They grappled with each other, sir.

q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do, if any?

a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.

q. And how this Dale hold you?

a. He held my two shoulders, sir.

PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:

I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused holding both shoulders,
your Honor.

q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what happened next, if any?

a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two

who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)

q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the course of grappling, if any?

You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what happened in the course of
grappling? (sic)

a. They fell to the ground, sir.

q. After that what happened next, if any?

a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the hold of Dale and I approach
the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying to pull him, sir. (sic)
q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)

a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.

q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or Ricardo? (sic)

a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches including the handle).

q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were trying to free yourself
from the hold Dale Abarquez, "Pinagalitan kayo", in what way or manner did Dale Abarquez
reprimanded you? (sic)

a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)22

xxx xxx xxx

q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?

a. Yes, sir.

q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong, is it not?23

a. They were just arguing, sir.

[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders by the accused [C]overdale
Abarquez?

a. Yes, sir.

q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not?

a. Yes, sir on my side.

q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from further quarrelling you, is it
not?

a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir.

q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by Abarquez?

ATTY. GASCON:

Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the witness while the witness act
as the accused demonstrating holding both hands of interpreter preventing the witness and
saying Joey tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na.

COURT:

q. How many times?

a. Twice, Your Honor.

ATTY. GASCON:
The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you were trying to attack
Bitoy, is it not?

a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)

q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you Joey tumigal ka na,
Joey tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?

a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.

COURT:

Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when the accused tried to hold
you and prevent you?

a. Yes, sir.

q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not pacifying you but to stop you
from helping the victim?

a. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was Joey, tumigil ka na, Joey
tumigil ka na, is it not?

a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na.24

Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela’s criminal design.
"Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray,
not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz
could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was
already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez’s action as an attempt to
prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and
sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him,
Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that
Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to
stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquez’s act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to
assistance to Almojuela.

In People v. Fabros, 25 the Court explained:

To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation in the
criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and
directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal
design.

xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principal’s) criminal design did
not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his
concurrence in the principal’s criminal intent.

Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that
Abarquez’s son Bardie, who was one of Paz’s companions, was the one trying to pacify
Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while Abarquez
was holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela.26

The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in not
extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show
concurrence in Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at him that he
left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejong’s
injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.

When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Thus:

Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both
constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact
establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The defense
of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this framework, the prosecution
must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The
presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.27

We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or
there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses.28 Hence:

xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the
needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.29

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7
November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed
the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in
the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Chairman

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 74259 February 14, 1991

GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February 27,1986,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and there
being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the provincial government of Nueva
Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, and to pay the
costs of this suit. Further, the accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the amount embezzled.

SO ORDERED.

As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the
petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he
received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to
government accounts.

On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April
22, 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor.
The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08.1

A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing amount
but he was able to pay only P10,159,50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated
October 12, 1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to the
petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his
dismissal from the service.2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent
to the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said
amount was filed against him with the respondent court on October 11, 1983.

The above facts are not denied by the petitioner.3

He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other persons.

His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the
unliquidated withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate
checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of absence. He avers he
was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer
Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no choice but to comply although he had not actually received
the said amount.

The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding vouchers dated
are described as follows:

1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of
P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December 22,1980.

2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. NS958525 dated December 23,1980.

3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the amount of
P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Cheek No. 956639J dated December 22,1980.

4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29,1980.

Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts
thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers,
paid vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all submitted as exhibits ).4

He added that the petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged but was in
fact the one who prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to the sick wife in the
hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on
December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came
back from the hospital.5

Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner
was not on official leave on the dates in question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had
already been encashed on December 23 1980, the encashment was not immediately recorded in
the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of temporarily hiding the early detection of a
shortage." It was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted
with it, the petitioner had no explanation to offer.6

Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's
cash book. He explained that after receiving the bank statement from the PNB for December
1980, he discovered that although the amount of P50,000.00 appeared to have been already
encashed, the encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he
required the petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn
was already part of the latter's accountability.7
After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q.
Alconcel, made the following findings:

The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the amount
of P595.87. Hence, the accused must be held answerable for the misappropriation of the
said amount.

As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim that
same has not been liquidated by the paymaster, for the following reasons:

First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the same
purpose, and that is, to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and wages of provincial
officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya covering the period, January to
December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on December 23, 1980, and in
fact, another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the same day. The
two (2) other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526) were issued and encashed on
December 22 and 29, 1980, respectively. Except for Check No. 958525, which was only
entered in accused's Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3) months after its
issuance and encashment, all the other three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No.
956639 which, as pointed out above, was issued and encashed on the same day as
Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on
time was a subtle way of camouflaging the embezzlement of its money equivalent.

Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks Nos. 956639 and 958525,
could not have been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to
pay salary differentials of government officials and employees of the province of Nueva
Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the same day.

Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that he
duly liquidated the proceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:

Q If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?

A I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the
vouchers paid by me or disbursed by me.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q So that your cash advances will be liquidated?

A Yes, Your honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In the absence of the cashier to whom do you give these documents?

A give them to the cashier only, no other person.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO

Q In his absence, do you keep these documents?

A Yes, Your Honor.

 Q For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give
these payrolls to the cashier?

A On December 29, sir.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q Duly accomplished?

A Duly accomplished, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?

A At the office, Your Honor.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:

Q At what time?

A In the afternoon, sir.

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?

A He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was
supposedly having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n.,
March 29, 1985, pp. 1618)

The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.

And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on December
22, 23 and 29, 1980. His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's
Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are indicated, shows that during the
month of December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days sick leave,
which is the same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly from
July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was absent on
December 23, 1980, the day when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the
other check which was issued and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.

The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason
to disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and
reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established point unmistakably
to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.

This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:

Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by

the following factors:
 First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not
make any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually received.

Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make any
certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.

Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he
did not file any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.

The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a
1âwphi1

preliminary requirement to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima
facie guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use.8 And what determines whether the crime of malversation has been committed is
the presence of the following requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:

(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment

or negligence, permitted another person to take them.

The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a
crime he has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for
his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat.
The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos
regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the
supposed injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is
reversed must be rejected as an warrant presumptuousness.

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties
is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution
is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence
he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110353 May 21, 1998

TOMAS H. COSEP, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and Development Coordination Officer of
Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987, the Municipality decided to construct an artesian well for
one of its localities. Hence, it secured the services of private complainant Angelino E. Alegre to
undertake the said project, under a "pakyaw" arrangement for the contract price of P5,000.00
payable after completion of the project. Petitioner, being the Planning Officer of the Municipality,
monitored the progress of the construction.

After the project was finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 from the Municipal
Treasurer. However, only P4,500.00 was given to the private complainant, the balance being
allegedly withheld by petitioner as reimbursement for his expenses in processing the papers in
the Municipal Treasurer's Office.

Aggrieved, private complainant filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan, First Division,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 17503 against petitioner for violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019. The information reads:

That on or about August of 1987, or immediately prior and subsequent thereto, in

Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused, a public officer, being the Municipal planning and Development Officer
of the said municipality, with the duty to administer and award government
projects and to prepare the necessary documents required for money claims
against the municipality of OLUTANGA, Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there,
wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive five hundred pesos (500.00) from a
certain Angelino Alegre as a consideration for awarding the construction of the
artesian well, Solar, Olutanga and for facilitation the necessary documents for the
money claims of the latter from the Municipality of Olutanga for constructing the
above mentioned Artesian Well.

Contrary to law.

On April 10, 1992, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
In an effort to escape liability, petitioner advances the theory that private complainant was never
a contractor, but was merely a laborer entitled to a daily rate of P20.00. Moreover, the amount of
P4,500.00 he gave to the private complainant represents the total salary of the other thirteen (13)
workers who constructed the artesian well. Hence, he could not have withheld the said P500.00
since there was none in the first place. To bolster his contention, petitioner presented as
evidence the Time Book and Payroll Sheet,1 and a Memorandum dated May 10, 1987, issued by
the Mayor of Olutanga indicating that private complainant was hired as the head laborer during
the construction of the artesian well.2

Apparently, not impressed with petitioner's defense, the Sandiganbayan, in a decision dated April
15, 19933filed against him, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Tomas Cosep y Hibayan, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime defined in Section 3, paragraph (b),
Republic Act 3019, as amended, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
imposes upon him the penalties of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years and twenty (20) days, as maximum,
and of perpetual disqualification from public office. The court orders him to pay
Angelino E. Alegre, the private complainant, P500.00 representing the amount
which the accused demanded and received from him.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner has filed the instant petition contending that: (a) he was not accorded an impartial trial
by the Sandiganbayan and (b) his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt to justify his
conviction.

Regarding the first assignment of error, petitioner bewails the fact that during his testimony the
Justices of the Sandiganbayan actively participated in the proceeding by propounding no less
than sixty-eight questions4 which, in his opinion, were indications of partiality or prejudgment of
guilt. Specifically, he cites the questions on pages 34 to 42 of the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes 5 as indications of the Justices' hostility against him.

We do not agree.

Admittedly, petitioner, like any other accused individual, is entitled to a fair trial before an
"impartial and neutral judge" as an indispensable imperative of due process.6 Judges must not
only be impartial, but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
the decision will be just. 7 However, this is not to say that judges must remain passive or silent
during the proceedings. Since they are in a better position to observe the demeanor of the
witness as he testifies on the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to ask questions to elicit
facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties. Questions designed to clarify points8 and to
elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. 9 Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of
time. 10

With the above doctrines serving as guidelines, we have scrutinized carefully the questions
propounded by the Justices, and none was indicative of their partiality for the prosecution in
proving its case against the petitioner. More precisely, on pages 34 to 35 of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes, the gist of the questions were on the monitoring procedure being
undertaken by the petitioner in supervising the project. While on pages 36 to 39, the questions
dealt with the identities and qualifications of the workers who participated in the construction of
the project. Those on pages 41 to 42, referred to queries which sought to clarify the facts and
circumstances of another case filed against the petitioner by a certain Mr. Macapala. All told,
these questions cannot be said to have crossed the limits of propriety. In propounding these
questions, the Justices merely attempted to ferret the the truth as to the facts to which the
witness was testifying.

In any case, if petitioner were under the impression that the Justices were unduly interfering in
his testimony, he was free to manifest his objection. 11 However, the records show that he
answered the questions freely and without any objection from his counsel on the alleged active
participation of the Justices when he gave his testimony.

While we do not see any merit in petitioner's first assigned error, we, however, agree with him
that his guilt was not adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

It is well settled that whether the accused is guilty or not of the offense charged is a question
which involves a determination of facts as presented by the prosecution and the defense. The
duty to ascertain which is more credible is lodged with the trial court which had the opportunity to
observe the witness directly and to test his credibility by his demeanor on the stand. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan's factual findings are generally accorded respect, even finality, unless: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the
inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts or premised on the absence of evidence on the record. 12 A
re-examination of the entire proceedings of the instant case compels us to take exception to the
aforementioned general rule.

It must be borne in mind that criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the
Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough review by this Court as criminal cases involving
ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence must be overcome
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 13

Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness or even the
absence of his defense 14 for any conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution's case
and not on the weakness of the defense.

Going over the records and the TSN of the private complainant, we entertain serious misgivings
about his testimony, especially after he had erred as regards important facts and information, not
to mention the questionable lapses of memory. Indeed, for evidence to be believed, it must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. 15

It is worthy to note that private complainant narrated that he was the one who paid the workers
their wages during the construction of the well. 16 However, it baffles us that in paying these
workers, he never bothered to have them sign any payroll or voucher receipt, 17 a practice which
is routine for those engaged in hiring workers for construction projects. At the very least, the
payroll or voucher receipts are necessary, not only for accounting purposes, but for protection
against spurious or unsubstantiated claims that may arise. Simply put, private complainant's
behavior was in total disregard of logic and usual management practice expected from a prudent
businessman.

What is incredible is the failure of private complainant to remember even a single name of his
workers. 18Since six of the thirteen (13) laborers bore his own surname Alegre, it strains credulity
that he could not remember any of them. Obviously, private complainant's claim that he is a
contractor is a falsehood.

If he were indeed one, he should have presented documentary evidence to support his claim. In
fact, the record is bereft of any project study, purchase order, delivery receipt, proofs of
procurement of materials and other evidence which would sustain the finding that he was indeed
a contractor engaged in his normal work. His testimony alone in this regard is grossly
inadequate, thus rendering the prosecution's cause inherently weak.

Likewise, in the Time and Book Payroll Sheet 19 issued by the Municipality, a document duly
signed by the private complainant stated that he was the head laborer during the construction. In
the early case of U.S. v. Carrington,20 we have asserted the public document character of the
municipal payroll; as such, it is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.21 The same can
only be rebutted by other competent evidence 22and cannot be overcome by the testimony of a
single witness. 23 As earlier stated, private complainant never even offered any evidence to
contravene the presumption that the recitals in the municipal payroll giving his status as a head
laborer were true. Besides, the Time and Payroll Sheet, having been signed by the Municipal
Treasurer, it is clothed with the presumption of regularity, particularly since it was not objected to
by the private complainant.

Aside from the foregoing considerations, private complainant signed the payroll sheet indicating
his status as a head laborer. Therefore, this representation is conclusive upon him and he cannot
deny or disprove the same without violating the principle of estoppel.

All these considerations taken together, it is clear that the prosecution failed to establish private
complainant's assertion that he is a contractor. Hence, we agree with the defense that private
complainant, as laborer, together with thirteen (13) other workers was entitled only to a total of
P4,475.00 and not P5,000.00 representing their salaries. This being the case, the P4,500.00 that
he received from petitioner was even in excess of the amount which he and the other workers,
was originally entitled to. Consequently, to affirm petitioner's conviction would result in a serious
injustice. It is axiomatic that in every criminal prosecution, if the state fails to discharge its burden
of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, it fails utterly. 24 Accordingly, when
the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, it is our policy of long standing
that the presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his exoneration be
granted as a matter of right. 25

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it
convicted and sentenced petitioner Tomas Cosep of violating Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 is
hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner Cosep is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. Costs
against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. and Kapunan, J., concur.

Purisima, J., is on leave.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 alleges
as follows:

That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7,
1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE
CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter
that they did not have sufficient funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the
check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver
the said check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks;
however, upon presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters
Bank, Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2

The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly
worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount of each check, that
is:

(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱12,730.00;3
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of
₱8,496.55.4

The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two
accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.5

The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in
1989, spouses Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular customers in his
pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;8 sometime in the last
week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an
additional loan of ₱12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July
26, 1990 issued by Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
third loan in the amount of ₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to
July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;10 the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason
"CLOSED ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.12

While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient
deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued
only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks
when they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation
in the issuance thereof.14

On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico Ladonga,
alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the aforesaid three (3)
criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences them
to imprisonment and fine, as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them,
and a fine in the amount of ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No.
284743;

2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year
and a fine of ₱12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,

3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them
and a fine of ₱8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;

4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual expenses
incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount
of ₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

With Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.15

Adronico applied for probation which was granted.16 On the other hand, petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for
conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is
a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
issuance thereof.17

On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.18 It held that the
provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in the decisions of
this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of
the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be supplementary to special laws
unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does
not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg.
22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not
exculpate her from criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct
part in every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals
underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution dated November 16, 1999.22

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER
OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND
UNDER THE LATTER’S ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR.

2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS

PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:

Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future
may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN

AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING
THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS
LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23

Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three checks subject of
the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to
violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of conspiracy would
enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations not provided for or intended by the
lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing
or issuance of checks.

The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the declaration of the
Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of
the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg.
22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.

The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are
made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the
second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are
contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.

The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling
with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule
of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones.24 Lex specialis
derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been
eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and
purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to
special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.

The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs.
Bruhez27 rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of principles under
the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of Article
2228 of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive
effect of penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article
1729 of the same Penal Code, with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of
the crime of misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs.
Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the
instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC.
Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC
which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the
recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 3932 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.

The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy
or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.33

All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.

Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as
a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt
act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.34 The overt act or acts of the accused may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral
assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.35

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness,
complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed
the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.36 With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070,
Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not specify the nature
of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a
direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance
of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was
issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal
design.

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive

evidence.37 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement
to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.39

As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs. Mandao:40

To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It
is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it must be
established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be positive and
convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by which the accused may be
ensnared and kept within the penal fold.

Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of

conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. The Court
ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-appellant
Franco, merely relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its sweeping theory of
conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.

The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of
the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The
proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted
to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defense could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted
to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.

Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt
in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility --
determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is
weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the
requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations omitted)41

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty. Its
evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the
constitutional presumption of the petitioner’s innocence must be upheld and she must be
acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated August 24, 1996, of
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of
Aliases". 1

Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato
requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other
officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to
report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and
hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.2

On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against
petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of
the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some
personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar
Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of
the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could
just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3

When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the
security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner
wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division
for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of
the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint,
receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez."4

Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo,
who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned
that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a
customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.

On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the
prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local
civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry
was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a
condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.

The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one
(1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to
pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the
penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as
maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.

Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He
contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used
any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which
connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he
has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and
it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential
requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been
complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his
registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.5

Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to
be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its
enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the
intended scope and purpose.6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where
a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear
purpose of the lawmakers.7

For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly
violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the
pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142,
which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is
entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any
name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has
been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name
and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a
change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each
new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use
 of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the
date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use
of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . .

The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As
amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads:

Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or

other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym
is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the
one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or
with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he
was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name
as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons
whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not
been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.

Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more
than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and
family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other
than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the
desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and
the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and
no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name
unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.

The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to
Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the
Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing
Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November
1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934.8 The pertinent provisions
of Act No. 3883 as amended follow —

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed
receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not
verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement
or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other
than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the
place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign
announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such
other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of
Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a
joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business
transaction, or business . . . .

For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the
common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime
of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against
the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A.
No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by
proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.9

In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill
effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled —

There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young"
in addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That
he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former
name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted
that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad,
Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the
fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with
government offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify
the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply
using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."

The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown
by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-
mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if
naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further
using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of
using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the
lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would
be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he can
easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng
Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng
Chiau Young."

All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not
shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the
grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.

Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by
his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user
intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar
Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter
to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of
his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no
question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing
that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real
name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction
where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified
himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of
the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him
because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by
anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an
offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The
confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes
seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those
contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover,
as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of
the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be
safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the
proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act
done by him.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.