QUIAO VS.

QUIAO

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring
the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided
equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido
is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than
nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define
the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly
argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of
forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this
case. – Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in
the absolute community? NO.

RULING:

1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current Family Code, the default rule is that In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.

Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in
the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article
129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant
to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband
and wife.”

While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law
and jurisprudence.

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory
of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never
questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus,
the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.

3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the
marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under
Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties,
what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal separation½share decision of Brigido states that
the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband
and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a
mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the
above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found
the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s
favor.

SSS VS. AGUAS

FACTS:

Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse,
Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was
likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Her claim for monthly pension was settled on February
13, 1997.

However, Pablo’s sister contested Rosanna’s claim alleging that Rosanna abandoned the family abode more than six years before Pablo’s
death and lived with another man, Romeo. She also presented a marriage certificate between Romeo and Rosanna showing that the
two were married in 1990. As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension. SSS denied
Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of P10,350
representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at P1,150.00 per month.

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo
dela Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. The SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from
Pablo prior to his death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo
as her father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn
was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the SSS. The CA relied on the birth
certificate of Jeylnn showing that she was the child of the deceased. According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes, this record
was binding upon the parties, including the SSS. The entries made in public documents may only be challenged through adversarial
proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no
evidence to show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not
properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña during her marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a
void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not dependent for support upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the
surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosanna and Jeylnn are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.

RULING:

Only the child, Jeylnn, is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy
of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry
showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977
and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and
Pablo’s marriage. It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents are legitimate.

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate
spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is
the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support.

In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which
was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on
Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, but whether one is
actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for
support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that
she is capable of providing for herself. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary
beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if
they were already living separately.

Dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member defined:

Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one
years of age provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.

Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence,
the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children
who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated by the covered employee
as secondary beneficiary.

MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ

FACTS:

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with
one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married,
he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage is valid under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.

RULING:

NO! Art. 34 of the Family Code provides that no license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found
no legal impediment to their marriage.

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March
1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior
existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the
subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would
have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano's and Payao's
subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1)
of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case
the... marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification
for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER, July 19, 2001

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married
with Erlinda Ilusorio for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner, Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin,
alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda
filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.

In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium
in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the
respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued and visitation rights should be granted.

RULING:

NO! Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the
writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still
has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence
and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices
which exclusively belong to Potenciano. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.

Also, The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction
therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was married
with Erlinda Ilusorio for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner, Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin,
alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda
filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.

In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium
in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the
respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued and visitation rights should be granted.

RULING:
NO! Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the
writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still
has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence
and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices
which exclusively belong to Potenciano. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.

Also, the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction
therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

SABALONES VS. CA

FACTS:

As a member of our diplomatic service, Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some
of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his
wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at Greenhills, San
Juan, belonging to the conjugal partnership. Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation and order
the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his adultery. She also informed the
court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was maintaining a separate residence in Don
Antonio Heights, Fairview with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.

RTC found that the Samson contracted a bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981, with Thelma. The court thus decreed the legal
separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the Samson's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled
to support from his respondent wife. Samson appealed to the CA.

Pendente lite, Remedios filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She also complained that Samson had disposed of one of their valuable
conjugal properties in the United States in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and children. The CA granted the
preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated because of joint administration
of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife as provided under Art. 124 of the Family Code.

RULING:

NO! The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in the Article 124 of
the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court
shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial
court denying Samson any share in the conjugal properties (and disqualifying him as administrator). That designation was in effect
approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the Remedios the preliminary injunction.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations
between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the
defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual
the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint
on the part of the petitioner. These allegations show that the injunction is necessary to protect the interests of Remedios and her children
and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome
of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation),
Remedios has a right to a share of the conjugal estate. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management.

ZULUETA VS. CA

FACTS:

Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while
he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph,
private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta
filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the RTC-Manila. the trial
court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s
Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding
marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

RULING:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity,
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom
of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with
the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

GO VS. CA

FACTS:

FACTS: Private respondents, spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong, were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video
coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to
claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their
honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be
ready upon private respondents’ return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and
therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding, private respondents filed on September 23,
1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners, which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,
hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alex Go is jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed.

RULING:

NO! Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage
in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered
into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded
below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.
 PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA

FACTS:

Sometime in 1979, the petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil and Erich Ekkehard Geiling were married in the Federal Republic of Germany
and establish residence in Malate, Manila. The marriage was troubled and Geiling filed for divorce in Germany while the Pilapil filed for
legal separation and support and separation of property before the RTC-Manila on 1983.

In January of 1986, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce. Five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints of adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while they are married Imelda “had an
affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

In 1987, Pilapil filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery,
which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio, since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent qualifies as an offended spouse after having obtained a final divorce.

RULING:

NO! In the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew
that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be
a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO, JR.

FACTS:

Alicia Reyes Van Dorn is citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at
Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the Alicia remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard filed suit against Alicia, asking that Alicia be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, and be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alicia moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where Richard acknowledged that they had no community property.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. Richard avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

RULING:
1. YES! As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is
still considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

2. NO! As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of Alicia. He would have no
standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

PANA VS. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE

FACTS:

Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and another person, were charged with murder before the RTC of Surigao City. On July 9, 1997, the RTC
rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the
penalty of death. The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to the heirs of the victim.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, it affirmed the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect
to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and damages with modification. Upon motion for execution
by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of
Efren and Melecia. Hence, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties
were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA
dismissed the petition.

Thus, Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given
that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.

On the other hand, the heirs argued that the regime of absolute community of property governs the marriage of Efren and Melecia since
the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, and that the
property relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988.

ISSUE:
Can the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the
murder case?

RULING:

YES! While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that
Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all
conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.

The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage.

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage,
subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.

Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to
1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.

Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was
dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;

(b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed... to revive their former property regime;

(c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with
his obligations to the family;

(d) there was... judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains

None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia. What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established
by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or
industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to
automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in
1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.

Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia
may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon
them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or
if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for
the purpose above-mentioned.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC's finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above applies. The civil indemnity
that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated
in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Those responsibilities are as follows:

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate
children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of
commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties.

Contrary to Efren's contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the
partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered."

No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the
partnership, such offending spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

CANO VS. CANO

FACTS:

Juan and Antonina Cano anchor their claim upon a donation propternuptias allegedly made by Feliza Baun in their favor in 1962. Arturo
and Emerenciana Cano, on the other hand, claim that they purchased the land from Feliza in 1982 and caused the annotation of the
Deed of Absolute Sale on the OCT covering the property.

On 16 November 1999, Spouses Arturo and Emerenciana filed a ejectment case against spouses Juan and Antonina on the basis of a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Spouses Arturo asserted that they allowed Spouses Juan to take actual possession of the property because the
parties were all blood relatives. Because of ingratuity, they demanded them to vacate the property. Spouses Arturo filed an ejectment
before the MTCC-San Carlos, Pangasinan. Spouses Juan denied the allegations and claimed ownership of the property on the basis of
a donation propternuptias executed in their favor by Feliza on 30 May 1962 and their continuous possession of the land since they were
born, or for more than 63 years at the time of the filing of the suit for ejectment.
MTCC dismissed the case for lack of merit. RTC initially affirmed the MTCC Decision. However, it subsequently reversed its own ruling.
and declared spouses Arturo as the true owners of the property on account of the registered Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor.

On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC ruling and declared that the registered transaction should prevail over the earlier unregistered right.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the CA erred in nullifying the donation propter nuptias executed by Feliza in favor of petitioners because of the absence of
an express acceptance by the donee

RULING:

YES! Written acceptance and notification to the donor are not required for donations propter nuptias executed under the Civil Code. It is
settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto. The donation propter nuptias in this case
was executed on 30 May 1962, while the provisions on such donations under the Civil Code were still in force and before the Family
Code took effect on 3 August 1988.. The formal requisites for the validity of the donation should therefore be determined in accordance
with the following provisions of the Civil Code:

ARTICLE 126. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in
favor of one or both of the future spouses.

ARTICLE 127. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III, except as to their form
which shall be regulated by the Statute of Frauds; and insofar as they are not modified by the following articles.

ARTICLE 129. Express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations.

In Valencia v. Locquiao,80 we explained the effect of these Civil Code provisions on the formal requirements for donations propternuptias:

Unlike ordinary donations, donations propternuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations
are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propternuptias are regulated by
the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder
need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of
these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.

Given that this old rule governs this case, it is evident that the CA erroneously invalidated the donation propternuptias in favor of
petitioners. The absence of proof that the gift was accepted in a public instrument is not controlling, since implied acceptance - such as
the celebration of marriage and the annotation of this fact in the OCT82 - must be deemed sufficient.

We must clarify that the foregoing rule applies only to donations propternuptias made prior to the Family Code (as in this case). At the
time, Article 129 of the Civil Code allowed acceptance of those donations to be made impliedly. Since that provision is no longer part of
the current Family Code, donations propternuptias made thereafter are now subject to the rules on ordinary donations83 including
those on the formal requisites for validity. As a result, donations of immovables under the Family Code, including those made by reason
of marriage, must now be expressly accepted by the donee in a public instrument.84

The validity of the donation propter nuptias executed by Feliza, however, does not detract from our ultimate conclusion that Spouses
Arturo are the rightful owners of the property. On this point, we agree with the CA that the prior unregistered donation does not bind
respondents, who are innocent purchasers for value. Hence, it correctly declared them the rightful owners of the subject property. The
unregistered donation propter nuptias does not bind third persons.

Pursuant to Article 709 of the Civil Code, all rights over immovable property must be duly inscribed or annotated on the Registry of
Deeds before they can affect the rights of third persons. The provision states:

Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry of
Property shall not prejudice third persons.

In this case, Spouses Juan do not deny that the donation propter nuptias was never registered. We emphasize, however, that in order
for prior unregistered interest to affect third persons despite the absence of registration, the law requires actual knowledge of that
interest. Nothing less would suffice. As we explained in Pineda v. Arcalas,89 mere possession of the property is not enough:

VALENCIA VS. LOCQUIAO

FACTS:

On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano
dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his prospective bride, respondent
Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a
male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.

The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.

Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively, leaving as heirs their six (6) children, namely:
respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria, Anastacia, and petitioner Romana, all surnamed Locquiao. With the permission of
respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana) took possession and cultivated the subject land.
When respondent Romanas husband got sick sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia took over, and since then, has been
in possession of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not acceptance of the donation by the donees is required in donations propter nuptias.

RULING:

NO! Acceptance is not necessary for the validity of such gifts. As provided in Article 129, implied acceptance is sufficient. Unlike ordinary
donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those "made before its celebration, in consideration of the
same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses." The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed
by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts".
In otherwords, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was
enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by
the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder
need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of
these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.

The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal requirements should be applied with respect to the donation propter nuptias at hand.
Those under the Old Civil Code or the New Civil Code?

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter
are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.46 Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation
propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the Philippines
was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-
distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This Court specifically held that during the
Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the
determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The
validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.

Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied. However, they invoked the wrong provisions thereof.

Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown,
even implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code.

ARCABA VS. BATOCAEL

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of lot located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since
Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and
Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another
niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere
helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having
sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco
who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and
lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the
rentals from his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-
A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his
name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. In Octoer 1991, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value
of P28,550. Francisco died and in 1993. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila
was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

RULING:

NO! The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was
based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business
permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she
was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in
sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the
deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

AGAPAY VS. PALANG

Doctrines:

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required
by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded
as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

● Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations
between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt
would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

● Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment
when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements.

● Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the
latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot
be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession.

FACTS:

Miguel Palang married Carlina in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in
1950. When Miguel returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina.

In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they
jointly purchased a riceland. A house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.

1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter.
The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia.

In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia
instituted a case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the house
and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the
decision.

Erlinda claimed that: (1) The Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and
the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel and Erlinda and the second, in favor of Erlinda alone. (2) The CA erred in not declaring
Kristopher as Miguel’s illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel’s estate. (3) The CA erred “in not finding that there is
sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristoffer should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court
and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.

ISSUES:
1. Who owns the riceland?
2. Who owns the house and lot?
3. Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of
property between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership?
4. Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership
and possession?

RULING:

1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148
of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting
and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required
by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded
as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store
but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of
the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in
the purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an
afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the
precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland
was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before
cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.

2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22
years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone
be placed as the vendee.

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision
of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies
to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial
conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’ compromise
was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should not be so inferred.

4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of
the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and
cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession. Kristopher, not having been
impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the
case at bar.

NOBLEZA VS. NUEGA

FACTS:

Shirley B. Nuega was married to Rogelio A. Nuega on September 1, 1990. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money for the
purchase of a residential lot in Marikina where they had planned to eventually build their home. The following year, or on September 13,
1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for P102,000.00 from Rodeanna Realty Corporation. Shirley claims that upon her
arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject property with the developer through
SSS8 financing. She likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations.

On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The following year, Shirley returned to Israel
for work. While overseas, she received information that Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family
home. She also learned and was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been introducing
Escobar as his wife.
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another
for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that
Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers one of whom was their neighbor and
petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) – of the existence of the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against
buying the subject property until the cases are closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29,
1992, Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of P380,000.00, including petitioner’s
undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on the property with the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation and to pay the real
property taxes due thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale is null and void for lack of the consent of the wife.

RULING:

YES! The petitioner is not a buyer in good faith. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT
of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.

The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s financial contribution in the purchase of the subject
property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines
what constitutes community property.

Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property
owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded
by the marriage settlement.

Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it
is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well
as the income, if any, of such property.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it, therefore, forms part of the absolute
community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite
the fact that only Rogelio’s name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio.

SUNGA-CHAN VS. CA

FACTS:

In 1977, Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite). After Jacinto's death in 1989,
his widow, Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua's consent.
Chua's subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file a Complaint for Winding Up
of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua, and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan solidarily liable for any and all claims of Chua. RTC‘s
judgment was upheld by the CA. Then the sheriff levied upon and sold at public auction Sunga-Chan‘s property in Paco, Manila, over
which a building leased to PNB stood. Sunga-Chan questions the levy on execution of the subject property on the ground that it is an
absolute community property with her husband Norberto Chan.

ISSUE:
Whether the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the
liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment.

RULING:

YES! The records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married after the effectivity of the Family Code. Withal, their
absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code
pertinently provides: Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted during
the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family
may have been benefited. Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite
even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband's
benefit.

Principles:

Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator- spouse for the benefit of the community, or
by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other.

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited.

DOMINGO VS. MOLINA

FACTS:

The spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an
18,164 square meter parcel of land.During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
Molina. On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after Flora's death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer
for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject property

In 1986, Anastacio died. In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered and transferred the entire one-half undivided
portion of the land to the spouses Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the
subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly
sold the interest over the subject property without Flora's consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.

Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have falsified the document transferring Anastacio and Flora's one-half undivided interest
over the land. Finally, Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject property from the time of Anastacio's death up to the time he filed the
Complaint.

The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for his debts and told the spouses
Molina that they already own half of the land. The spouses Molina have been in possession of the subject property before the title was
registered under their names and have religiously paid the property's real estate taxes.

The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow
money. The last loan was even used to pay for Melecio's wedding. Finally, the spouses Molina asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on
the subject property only in 1999, without their knowledge and consent. Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the
case and were substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio Molina.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora's consent who already died at the time of sale, is
valid and legal.

RULING:

YES!Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora's death. There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo
married before the Family Code's effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership. The conjugal
partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died in 1968

Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition
or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation. Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage
by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If
no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or
extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made,
any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. x x x

While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the
partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora's surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora's share of the conjugal
partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties
as his share, but this is an undivided interest.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides: Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an actual partition being first
done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest
in the subject property.

The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.

At the time of the sale, Anastacio's undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of the entire conjugal properties;
and (2) his share as Flora's heir on the conjugal properties. Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio's sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of
the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the
spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.

OCAMPO VS. OCAMPO

FACTS:

On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio Ocampo as null and
void from the beginning under Article 36 of the Family Code (on the ground of psychological incapacity).

On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties. Having failed to agree
on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued and the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the
properties declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and psychological
perversity and the seed money was provided by the parents of one party.

RULING:

NO! The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage but without the benefit
of marriage or whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 states that their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on CO-
OWNERSHIP.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of Article 147, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of one or both of the spouses."
Since as a rule, even a plain housewife who stays all the time in the house and take[s] care of the household while the husband indulges
in lucrative and gainful activities is entitled to a share in the same proportion the husband is, to the property or properties acquired by the
marriage.

Petitioner's claim that the seed money was provided by her mother and had it not been for that the properties could not have been
acquired. The Court is not prone to believe because of insufficient evidence to prove such contention but petitioner's self-serving
allegations. Of course, attempts to establish respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well as family man were made
but the testimonies adduced failed to fully convince the Court that respondent should be punished by depriving him of his share of the
conjugal property because of his indiscretion.

LAVADIA v HEIRS OF LUNA

FACTS:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the law firm Sycip Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein Eugenia Zaballero Luna. After almost 2 decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart
from each other and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT", whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property.

ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Dominican Republic. On the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until
1987. ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named LUPSICON where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner. LUPSICON through
ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project at Makati City. Said condominium unit was to be used as
law office of LUPSICON.

LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common. The
parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established
and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said
law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN. After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the law books,
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became
the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC.

The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts ruling that the 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit
is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry; that Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna".

Both parties appealed to the CA. The CA promulgated decision, holding and ruling EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of
ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic
did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and
WON the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property.

RULING:

1. NO! Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death. The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule, which the Civil Code continued to follow. From the time of the celebration of the
first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both
of the spouses are residing abroad.

2. NO! Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during their marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law.

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore,
it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.

GO VS. SERVACIO

FACTS:

Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of sale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go) who purchased the said property.
Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2,
2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the annulment
of sale of the property. The contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property became conjugal
property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and
Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of
the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as
heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.

The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the petitioners went all the way up to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 130 of the FC was applicable and that the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation.

RULING:

NO! Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal
partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio,
Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert
or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.

Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for
the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article
105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is “without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common
from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property
as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the
meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly
sold to her.

Principles:

The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130
of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of
the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.

DE LEON VS. DE LEON

FACTS:

On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional
Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon.
They had two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22, 1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio upon full payment
of the price of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, “single.” On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the
lot to his sister, Lita, and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On
February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.

Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit allegeing that
Bonifacio was still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property because
he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. They further alleged that they were not aware of the marriage between Bonifacio and
Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.

The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al stating that the lot in question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property that Bonifacio has purchased on installment before the marriage although some installments were paid during
the marriage would be considered conjugal property

RULING:

YES! The subject lot which was once owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the
marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the property was only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on June
22, 1970. This full payment was made more than 2 years after his marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage. Hence, ownership to the property is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property
is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and
the properties will still be considered conjugal.

In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to
sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening
of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place,
the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the
seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the
thing sold.

Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The conditional contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and PHHC on July
20, 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest on Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale which,
in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price. . .

The Supreme Court also ruled that the fact that the transfer certificate of title was in the name of Bonifacio did not change the conjugal
nature of the property:

Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio’s exclusive property, since it was registered solely in his name, is untenable.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired.

As Anita never gave consent to the sale, the Supreme Court ruled that the sale was void:

. . . the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as
a rule, be with the wife’s consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated,
under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the
mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory
provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity.

Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.

The Supreme Court held that Bonifacio cannot sell his portion of the conjugal partnership:

Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy,
which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido”
(haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband or wife
to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the
marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between
the spouses or their respective heirs.

Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for,
as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.

Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the Tarrosas should be reimbursed for the amount they paid to purchase the property.

MATTHEWS VS. TAYLOR

FACTS:

On June 30, 1988, Benjamin Taylor, a British subject, married Joselyn Taylor, a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage
was subsisting, Joselyn bought a 1,294 square-meter lot in Boracay, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly
financed by Benjamin. They constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort,
also using Benjamin’s funds.

All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. However,
Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease
and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an
annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took
possession of the property and renamed the resort.

Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his
funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband,
any transaction involving said property required his consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wife bought during their marriage.

RULING:

NO! The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt
to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another.

In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where
aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their father’s estate; that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing
a property titled in the name of another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens’) favor; and that a contract of sale be nullified for
their lack of consent.

Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited
from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed
of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds
for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement
for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property
of the spouses.

In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord
the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

BORROMEO VS. DESCALLAR

FACTS:

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live together. They bought a house and
lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it
was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his
name was erased but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.

Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he
sold some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the
Petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed
a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner as the successor-in-interest of Jambrich, who is a resident alien, has validly obtained the right over the
subject property without violating the prohibition under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of respondents make his the owner thereof.

RULING:

1. YES! The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to
acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the
three parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but his name was deleted in the
Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.

Nevertheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his
rights, interest and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the
disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to a
man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to
marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.
In such an adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his
or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.

While the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were]
contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino
citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

The rationale behind the Court‘s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,32 is this – since
the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation‘s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the
acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens.
As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be
protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

2. NO! It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the existence with notice to
the world at large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent
has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.

A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions
to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.
This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no
income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.

Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private
land may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus,
as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only
by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would
have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church
Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

MULLER VS. MULLER

FACTS:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller got married and lived in Germany owned by the respondent parents
but then they decided to reside in the Philippines permanently. The respondent had inherit the house in Germany from his parents which
he sold and used to proceeds for purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and he registered it in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and maltreatment of respondent to the petitioner, the spouses eventually separated. The respondent filed a
petition for separation of properties before RTC Quezon City. The court granted said petition and ordered equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property
the court ruled that he cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

RULING:

NO! Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement. There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines. Art.
XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with
that constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law
bars him to do directly. With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has
been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly.

VILLEGAS VS. LINGAN

FACTS:
Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the
DBP, Isaac constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and mortgage was subsequently
transferred by the DBP to HMDF. When Isaac failed to settle his loan, the real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was
foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder. By virtue of a power of attorney
executed by Isaac’s wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, Marilou’s mother, the latter redeemed the property from the
HMDF. On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Lingan.

Isaac claims that there is principal-agent relationship only between his wife, Marilou as principal, and Catral, as agent, and then only for
the latter to administer the properties of her wife and he never authorized Catral to administer his properties, particularly, herein subject
property.

On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint. On appeal, CA denied Isaac’s petition. The CA ruled that when the redemption
of the property had been made by Catral by virtue of a General Power of Attorney executed in her favor by Marilou, it follows that Isaac
is no longer the owner of the subject property but his wife, Marilou.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Isaac lost his ownership of the property after it was extra-judicially foreclosed and sold to HMDF.

RULING:

YES! Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.

Isaac could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this case do not
show that petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property.
All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is
made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property
acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property. Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner,
had the right to sell the property to another.

It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised
the right of redemption in her own right as successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, should there be any right
violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption.

Divested of all interest over the property, Isaac has ceased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover,
since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting parties, then only the parties, as well as the third
person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions
found therein. This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest.

IMANI VS. MBTC

FACTS:

On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metrobank, with Cesar P.
Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they
bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory
notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans.

Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against
CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for
execution, which was granted on December 7, 1999. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff
levied on a property covering a lot registered in the name of petitioner. Petitioner argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal
partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on
execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the
certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank.

ISSUE:
WON or not the property in question is conjugal, thus, it cannot be made to answer for her obligation with Metrobank.

RULING:

NO! Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there
is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.

Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner‘s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in
the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses‘ coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.

MUÑOZ VS. RAMIREZ

FACTS:

Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street,
Mandaluyong City (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City in the name of the petitioner. The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name of
Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged
TCT No. 1427, with Erlinda‘s consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan,
payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a thirty-six
(36)square meter, two-story residential house on the lot.

On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30,
1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00. On September 24,
1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but
only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner‘s name were falsified.

The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage; the
petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, and made her sign a document purporting to be the
mortgage contract; the petitioner promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS
mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property; with the
P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered
to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseo‘s affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseo‘s affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner
refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance; since
Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title; and in
1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner‘s name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name.

The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he
refused their offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges;
the sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year, during which period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the
respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly rental of P500.00; when the respondents failed to repurchase the subject
property within the one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14, 1993.

In a Decision dated January 23, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the subject property was Erlinda‘s exclusive
paraphernal property that was inherited from her father.

The CA decided the appeal on June 25, 2002. Applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v.
Hon. Fortun, the CA held that the subject property, originally Erlinda‘s exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it
was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds – Eliseo‘s monthly salary deductions; the subject property,
therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseo‘s consent, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA declared
void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is conjugal.

RULING:

NO! As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.

In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of
conjugal ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during
the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The residential lot, therefore,
is Erlinda‘s exclusive paraphernal property.

The court held that they cannot subscribe to the CA‘s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.

As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to
189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code
provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105
to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states: x x x x

The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 256. Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family
Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already vested.

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall
be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.

In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to
April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced
the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.
Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is
considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.

Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the
written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo‘s signatures in the special power of attorney
and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.

MBTC VS. PASCUAL

FACTS:

Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from
spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. The
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) covering the purchased lot (Lot no. 156283) was issued in the name of Florencia married to Nelson
Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.

In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC, w/c was granted by the Quezon City RTC in
1995. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains,
w/c the latter failed.

On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages
(REMs) on their properties, including one lot no. 156283. Due to the failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros to pay their loan obligation,
MBTC foreclosed the property.
Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property,
alleging that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.

MBTC alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia‘s name, was paraphernal. Florencia was declared in default. The RTC
rendered judgment finding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award moral damages and attorney‘s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal partnership property under Article 116 of the Family Code.

RULING:

YES! The disputed property is conjugal.

While Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since
the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally
presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Art. 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.

As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption
of conjugal ownership applies. Proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that
a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

FERRER VS. FERRER

FACTS:

Petitioner id the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a half- brother of Respondents. She filed a Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements,
sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction and damages. She alleged that before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired
a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon,
including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was
made using the couple‘s conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover,
petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September
1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed
by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued
and registered in the names of respondents.

According to petitioner, that when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she
had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo‘s lot. She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted
to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo‘s
lot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner has the right to be reimbursed for the cost of improvements under Article 120 of the Family Code?

RULING:

NO! Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate her right. The
right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation
to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser
of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner spouse.

Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of
the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the
improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise
subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of
Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.

What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject
premises, are not petitioner‘s spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner
for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended
the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner‘s right to be
reimbursed.

BORLONGAN VS. BDO

FACTS:

In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property. In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City
to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an annotation
that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale in a Civil Case pending before Makati RTC. Petitioner immediately
procured a copy of the records and found out that BDO, formerly Equitable PCI Bank, filed a complaint for sum of money against Tancho
Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several persons, including
Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security agreements totaling ₱13.5 million to guarantee the obligations of Tancho Corporation.

On July 2, 2003, the Makati RTC issued an Order directing the service of summons to all the defendants at the business address of
Tancho Corp. and IT appears that BDO already foreclosed the said Fumakilla Compound as early as August 21, 2000, following Tancho
Corporation's failure to pay its obligation. BDO already consolidated its ownership of the property on November 16, 2001.

On December 20, 2005, BDO moved for the motion be served against Carmelita at the property. The Makati RTC granted the motion.
On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff filed a return stating that no actual personal service was made as Carmelita "is no longer residing at the
given address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per information gathered from the security guard on duty." The Makati RTC declared
the defendants including Carmelita, in default. On November 29, 2007, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision holding the defendants liable
to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33 plus 12% interest per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees.

Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City alleging
in his Complaint that the subject property is a family home that belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains he established with his wife.
He further averred that the alleged surety agreements upon which the attachment of the property was anchored were signed by his wife
without his consent and did not redound to benefit their family.
BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's complaint and the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. The Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing lack of jurisdiction.

On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification. Relying on Buado v. Court of Appeals,
the Pasig RTC held that since majority of Eliseo's causes of action were premised on a claim that the obligation contracted by his wife
has not redounded to their family, and, thus, the levy on their property was illegal, his filing of a separate action is not an encroachment
on the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, which ordered the attachment and execution in the first place. The Pasig RTC clarified, however,
that it cannot annul the surety agreements supposedly signed by Carmelita since Eliseo was not a party to those agreements and the
validity and efficacy of these contracts had already been decided by the Makati RTC. Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's
Decision to the CA.

Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate court. Hence, he elevated the matter to the SC via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 218540. The Court issued a Resolution denying Eliseo's
petition. Meanwhile, on an ex-parte omnibus motion filed by BDO, the Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the
issuance of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of the respondent bank. Arguing that the Makati RTC had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person as the service of the summons and the other processes of the court was defective, Carmelita filed a Petition
for Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) which
was denied by the appellate court. Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA's November 12, 2014
Resolution but was again denied. Thus, on April 27, 2015, Carmelita filed a Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 217617 ascribing
to the appellate court the commission of serious reversible errors. Hence, Carmelita interposed a Motion for Reconsideration urging the
Court to take a second hard look at the facts of the case and reconsider its stance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal property maybe subject to Surety Agreement.

RULING:

NO! It is not disputed that the conjugal property was attached on the basis of a surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and
in behalf of Tancho Corporation. In Spouses Ching v. CA, the Court ruled that there is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is
benefited when a spouse enters into a contract of surety, holding thusly:

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-
husband's act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The
contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred
from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership
would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own business or profession.

Besides, BDO's reliance on Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals16 (2003) is improper. In the present case, Eliseo and his wife discovered
the attachment of their conjugal property only after the finality of the decision by the RTC Makati. There was, therefore, no opportunity for
Eliseo to intervene in the case before the RTC Makati which attached the conjugal property, as a motion to intervene can only be filed "at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court." This spells the whale of difference between the case at bar and the earlier
Spouses Ching. Unlike in the present case, the debtor in the case cited by BDO was properly informed of the collection suit and his
spouse had the opportunity to question the attachment of their conjugal property before the court that issued the levy on attachment, but
simply refused to do so. Thus, to now deny Eliseo the opportunity to question the attachment made by the RTC Makati in a separate and
independent action will be to, again, refuse him the due process of law before their property is taken.

PNB VS. REYES

A spouse’s consent is indispensable for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal properties.

FACTS:

Three parcels of land owned by spouses Lilia and Venancio Reyes were mortgaged to Philippine National Bank to secure a loan. When
the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the loan obligations, Philippine National Bank foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.

Venancio assailed the validity of the real estate mortgage and claimed that his wife undertook the loan and the mortgage without his
consent and his signature was falsified on the promissory notes and the mortgage. He averred that since the three (3) lots involved were
conjugal properties, the mortgage constituted over them was void. The Trial Court ordered the annulment of the real estate mortgage and
directed Lilia to reimburse PNB.

Aggrieved, Philippine National Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. It was denied. A Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.

In this petition, the PNB insists that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court. It argues that the real estate
mortgage is valid, that the conjugal partnership should be held liable for the loan, and that respondent Venancio C. Reyes, Jr.’s cause of
action should be deemed barred by laches.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the real estate mortgage void;
2. Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes; and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of laches and his claim is now barred by estoppel.

RULING:

1. NO! The Court of Appeals did not err in its ruling. It committed no reversible error in affirming the ruling of the Regional Trial Court that
the real estate mortgage over the conjugal properties is void for want of consent from respondent. The Family Code is clear: the written
consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary before any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can
be valid.

2. YES! The conjugal partnership can be held liable. The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void, but the principal obligation
is not affected. It remains valid.

The Regional Trial Court found that the loan was used as additional working capital for respondent’s printing business. As held in Ayala
Investment, since the loaned money is used in the husband’s business, there is a presumption that it redounded to the benefit of the
family; hence, the conjugal partnership may be held liable for the loan amount.

3. NO! The respondent is not guilty of laches. Laches does not apply where the delay is within the period prescribed by law.

As found by the trial court, records show that upon learning about the mortgage, respondent immediately informed the bank about his
forged signature. He filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage against petitioner within the
prescribed period to redeem a mortgaged property; and since respondent filed the Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and
Real Estate Mortgage within the period of redemption prescribed by law, petitioner fails to convince that respondent slept on his right.

BUADO VS. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite,
which originated from Erlinda Nicol‘s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. RTC rendered
a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. It became final and executory and later on issued a a writ of execution. Finding Erlinda
Nicol‘s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution
addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Eventually, a notice of sheriff‘s sale was issued. Two (2) days before the public auction
sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners
to put up a sheriff‘s indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued
in favor of petitioners.

Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale
and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the
defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties
of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent
claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a ―very low price‖ of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment
obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.

In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ
of execution. Citing De Leon v. Salvador, petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where the
judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff‘s sale. RTC dismissed
respondent‘s complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership

RULING:

NO! There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of
personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable
to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage
is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments
for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by
Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or
benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.

SBTC VS. MAR TIERRA CORP.

FACTS:

Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with
petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with
respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J.
Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. The
respondent corporation finally availed of its credit line and received P9M. Out of that amount, it was able to pay about P4M while the
remaining balance remained outstanding as the corporation suffered business reversals and eventually ceased operating. To enforce its
claim against the corporation on the remaining balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC
rendered a decision holding respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the
remaining balance of the loan including interest and attorney‘s fee. It, however, found that the obligation contracted by individual
respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and
lot of the spouses Martinez.

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s decision in toto. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party?

RULING:

NO! Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for the benefit
of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?

We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia 9 that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does
not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party.

In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 10 we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls
within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on
behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding
to the conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of
the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter‘s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership
of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.

To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect
the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. [16]
Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.

CHING VS. CA

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue
of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising
to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo
Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and
severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00.
On December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount ofP13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at
16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan
maturing on June 29, 1981.

PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans, hence ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-
defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the properties subject to surety agreement are conjugal properties, thus, cannot be subjected to levy.

RULING:

YES! Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. The presumption of the conjugal nature
of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the
same.

In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines
were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated
on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus,
presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.

The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The
barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of
the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. The ruling
of this Court in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court buttresses the case for the petitioners. In that case, we ruled that he who claims
that property acquired by the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but belongs to one of them as his personal
property is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the same. In this case, the private respondent claimed that
the petitioner-husband acquired the shares of stocks from the Citycorp Investment Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof. It
was, thus, the burden of the private respondent to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks
was that of the petitioner-husband alone. As held by the trial court, the private respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove this
assertion.

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to
one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of
the conjugal partnership.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitionerhusband‘s
act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract
of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty
stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated
through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husband‘s career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of
fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those directly
resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted
merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.

CARLOS VS. ABELARDO

FACTS:

Respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached the petitioner requesting the same to advance the amount of
US$25,000.00 (P625,000.00) for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life
independently, petitioner issued a Banker’s Trust check in the name of certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged its
receipt. The amount was in full payment of the property.

When petitioner inquired from the spouses as to the status of the amount loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but
pleaded they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to
petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. Petitioner, then, made a formal
demand for the payment.

Respondent claimed that the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan. It was his share of income on contracts obtained by him
from H.L. Carlos Construction Inc., a firm owned by petitioner. He further averred that he did not sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by his wife.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not US$25,000.00 amount to a loan.
2. Whether or not Abelardo is solidarily liable with his wife despite lack of consent of the former.

RULING:

1. YES! Respondent cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US$25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of
the corporation and not as a loan. Firstly, respondent does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation,
H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc., thus, he has no right to participate in the income of profits thereof nor has he a right to receive any salary
or commission therefrom. Secondly, the amount advanced for the purchase of the house and lot came from the personal account of the
petitioner, not from the corporation’s. Hence, the US$25,000.00 is a loan.

2. YES! Article 121 of the Family Code explicitly provides that conjugal partnership shall be liable for “debts and obligations contracted
by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited.”

“While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded
to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his
family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his
wife.”

Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied
that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal
home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal
partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan.

While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to
the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his
family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable
for such loan together with his wife.

AIDC VS. CA

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the
credit line extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable
with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the court rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
Pending appeal and upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution and the Deputy Sheriff caused the issuance and
service upon spouses Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction
to enjoin the auction sale alleging that the judgment cannot be enforced against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among
others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.

Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured
by the husband Alfredo Ching.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his
employer.

RULING:

YES! If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for
his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "... obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here,
no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the
very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business
or profession of the husband.

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can
be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the
family. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety
is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.

ALEJO VS. CORTEZ

FACTS:

The property belonged to the conjugal property/absolute community of property of the respondent Spouses Jorge and Jacinta Leonardo
and upon which their residential house was built.

It appears that sometime in March 1996, Jorge's father, Ricardo, approached his sister, Dolores Alejo to negotiate the sale of the subject
property. On March 29, 1996, Jacinta executed a Kasunduan with Dolores for the sale of the property. for P500,000. The Kasunduan was
signed by Jacinta and Ricardo as witness. Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement.

Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores denying knowledge and consent to the Kasunduan. Jorge further informed Dolores that Jacinta was
retracting her consent to the Kasunduan due to Dolores' failure to comply with her obligations. Dolores tendered the balance of
PhP200,000 but Jorge refused to accept the same. Instead, Jorge filed cases for ejectment and annulment of sale, reconveyance and
recovery of possession against her which was dismissed by the court on technical grounds.

During the pendency of said cases, the property was sold by Jorge and Jacinta to Spouses Cortez for P700,000. A new transfer certificate
of title was Issued in the latter's names. At the time of said sale, Dolores was in possession of the subject property. Dolores filed the case
a quo for annulment of deed of sale and damages against the Spouses Cortez and the Spouses Leonardo. RTC ruled in favor of Dolores
which was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Kasunduan for the sale of a conjugal real property between Jacinta and Dolores has been converted to a perfected
and binding contract.

RULING:

NO! Sale by one spouse of conjugal real property is void without the written consent of the other spouse. Any alienation or encumbrance
of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 thereof which provides:

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.

The law is therefore unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal property of one spouse sans the written consent of the
other is void. Here, it is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta and signed by her alone. By plain terms
of the law therefore, the Kasunduan is void.

AGGABAO VS. PARULAN

FACTS:

Respondent Ma. Elena allegedly made a sale of two parcels of land with their improvements considered as conjugal property by
presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent husband Dionisio in her favor. The sale by Ma.
Elena was made in favor of the spouses vendees/petitioners, who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price, despite
the showing by the husband that his signature on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence
from the country and while he and Ma. Elena have been estranged from one another. When Dionisio learned about the alleged sale, he
filed for an action for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title
issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. The RTC ruled in his favor and declared that the SPA was forged. The decision of the RTC
was affirmed by the CA. Hence the present case filed by petitioners imputing error to the CA for not applying the ―ordinary prudent man‘s
standard‖ in determining their status as buyers in good faith. The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of
the Family Code, governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration
over the conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration of the
conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code
properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan‘s counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.

ISSUE:
WON Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without
the consent of Dionisio.

RULING:

NO! Article 254 of the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which
the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.

Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is,
therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the
effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly.

In case of disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.

Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights
are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez,[30] the Court rejected the petitioner‘s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the
acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided
that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity
of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that
exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.

Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had
delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting
to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.

Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict
ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only
be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).

Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did
not include or extend to the power to administer the property.

Lastly, the petitioners‘ insistence that Atty. Parulan‘s making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits
no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court
order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.

On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had
the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of
the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouse‘s consent, the
transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.

RAVINA VS. VILLA ABRILLE

FACTS:

Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to
the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann. In 1982, the spouses acquired a lot situated in Matina, Davao City, and
registered in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from DBP, the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro‘s lot. The house was
finished in the early 1980‘s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex. In 1991, Pedro
got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the
studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected
and notified them of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann‘s consent.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from
the house to an apartment. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They
waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to
intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so
much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against Pedro
and the Ravinas in the RTC-Davao City.

During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and
lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not sale of lot in favor of spouses Ravina is null and void for Mary Ann’s lack of consent.

RULING:

YES! Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, ―All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

There is no issue with regard to the adjacent lot which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his
marriage to Mary Ann. However, the subject lot was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. The presumption of
the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.

Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed
by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the
wife, or (b) in case of one spouse‘s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the
assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over
to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void.

Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement,
such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the
husband to institute the case. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date
of sale and execution of the deed, except the property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary
Ann‘s consent.

DE LA CRUZ VS. SEGOVIA

FACTS:

Sometime in July 1985, Florindala wanted to purchase the Lot 503 and 505 located in Sta Mesa Manila for P180,000.00. Short of fund,
she asked her sister Leonila to take the Lot 503 for P80,000. But Leonila with only P36,000 hard=earned savings, Florinda advanced her
P64,000 for the full payment of the said lot. It was only on September 1991, did these sisters entered a payment scheme agreement.
However, Florinda filed with RTC on March 1996, a complaint annulling said agreement on the ground, among others that since her
husband, Renato did not sign, it is void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not subject Agreement is void absent the husband‘s signature.
RULING:

NO! The absence of Renato‘s signature in the agreement bears little significance to its validity.

Art 124 of the FC provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife, in
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or
encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. It requires the WRITTEN consent of the other spouse, of authority of the court
for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property, without which the disposition is void. The foregoing provision finds no application
in this case because the transaction between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve any disposition of property belonging to
Florinda.

At the outset, by paying the P36,000, Leonila shall have the Lot 503 and remaining balance be paid subsequently. Clearly, the transaction
between sisters is that of a loan and not a sale of property. Though the lots are named under Florinda and her husband, it merely served
as a security over the P64,000 advanced by Florinda. Even assuming that the transaction involves disposition of asset, the mere fact of
Renato ,not signing on the agreement cannot negate the fact of his consent. First, he was present when the agreement was drawn by
his wife and Leonila. Second, it was in fact presented to him for signature, but Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that
of her husband.

JADER-MANALO VS. CAMAISA

FACTS:

Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, Norma Camaisa.
After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of the property to be paid on installment basis. Such
agreement was a handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties,
Edilberto assured her of his wife‘s conformity and consent to the sale.

The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner. She and Edilberto met for the formal signing of the
typewritten Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks. The contracts were given to
Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife‘s signature.

The following day, petitioner received a call from Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. During the
meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for
the formal signing of the contracts.

When petitioner met again with respondent spouses for the formal affixing of Norma‘s signature, she was surprised when respondent
spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration.
Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma‘s refusal to sign the same
would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance
and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a perfected contract to sell of the conjugal property.

RULING:

NO! There is no perfected sale. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband
as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Article 124 of the Family
Code provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for
its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been
aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
 JARDELEZA VS. JARDELEZA

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family Code took effect. The
union produced five children, namely: petitioner, Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando, all surnamed L. Jardeleza. On 25 March
1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and lapsed into comatose condition. Thereafter, petitioner
commenced with the RTC a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over the person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed
for the issuance of letters of guardianship to his mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza.

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of guardianship to him, rather than to his mother. This
was opposed by respondents. On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for guardianship. The trial court
concluded, without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit
provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 124 of the Family Code renders ―superfluous the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person and estate of an
incompetent married person.

RULING:

NO! Very recently, in a related case Uy vs. Jardeleza, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code was not applicable to the situation of
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure was an application for appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court.

Uy vs. Jardeleza where the court ruled:

―ART. 124. xxx In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. ―

The situation contemplated under Art. 124 is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent
is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to
give consent. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

UY VS. JARDELEZA

FACTS:

Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece
of real property belonging to the latter spouses was about to be sold. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental
incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties, in order to prevent the loss and
dissipation of the Jardeleza’s real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said properties.

Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole
powers of administration of conjugal properties and authorization to sell the property. She alleged that her husband’s medical treatment
and hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece of real property and its improvements. She prayed for
authorization from the court to sell said property.

RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was convinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties. However, Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing
that a decision has already been rendered on the case. He also questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements
thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor
and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose
a parcel of land with improvements.

RULING:

NO! SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In cas e of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)."

In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law provides that wife
who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell
real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an
opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

GUIANG VS. CA

FACTS:

The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the
sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.

Plaintiff Gilda and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses and have three children, namely: Junie, Harriet and Jodie or Joji, 18, 17 and
15 years old respectively. The couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot
located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a
conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was payable in installment, with right of cancellation
in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three successive installments.

Gilda and Judie sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda
Guiang, who have since then occupied the one-half portion and built their house thereon and are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda left for Manila in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in the Middle East, with the consent of her hus band.
Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in
Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, on March 11, 1990.

After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work at
Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at King's College, Bo. 1,
Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her
brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money.

January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their homelot
to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her, who then replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet,
however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would advise
her father. However, Judie pushed through and sold to Luzviminda on March 1, 1990 thru a document known as "Deed of Transfer of
Rights" the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of which
P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witness. 4 days
after the deed of transfer, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred, Luzviminda as
vendee executed another agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408, this time with Manuel Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the
original registered owner from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot, who signed as vendor for a consideration
of P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale. The new sale describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-
165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the
couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz.

March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home and found her children staying with other households. Gilda gathered her children together and
stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a wife already. For
staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio
Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General Paulino Santos, for trespassing. On March 16, 1990, the parties thereat
signed a document known as "amicable settlement". In full, the settlement provides for, to wit:

That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs.
Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any charge, on or before April 7, 1990.

Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to question
her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred however to the Officer-In-Charge, Mr. de la Cruz, who in turn told her that he
could not do anything on the matter. This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda
Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement.
He merely said he forgot whether Mrs. Corpuz had approached him. We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the Barangay
Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was void.

RULING:

YES! The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disgreement,
the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and
void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of
Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which
tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)

This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried
over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect
by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the
document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document
through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the
husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's
consent.

In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the
Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably
absent in the case at bar.

ESPINOSA VS. OMANA

FACTS:

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on
whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document
entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay".

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started
implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the
property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by
Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay." Is valid.

RULING:
NO! This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also
ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza, the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as
the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and
allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other; ratifying a document entitled "Legal Separation" where the
couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other
to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple who
had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other;7 and preparing
a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.

DIÑO VS. DIÑO

FACTS:

Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in
1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they
were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the
trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage. On a motion for reconsideration, the Trial court rendered a decision that A
DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:

YES! For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:

Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

MBTC VS. PASCUAL

FACTS:

Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from
spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. The
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) covering the purchased lot (Lot no. 156283) was issued in the name of Florencia married to Nelson
Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.

In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC, w/c was granted by the Quezon City RTC in
1995. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains,
w/c the latter failed.

On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages
(REMs) on their properties, including one lot no. 156283. Due to the failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros to pay their loan obligation,
MBTC foreclosed the property.

Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property,
alleging that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.
MBTC alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia‘s name, was paraphernal. Florencia was declared in default. The RTC
rendered judgment finding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award moral damages and attorney‘s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal partnership property under Article 116 of the Family Code.

RULING:

The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. The disputed property is conjugal.

While Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since
the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally
presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Art. 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.

As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption
of conjugal ownership applies. Proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that
a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

RELUCIO VS. LOPEZ

FACTS:

Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for ―Appointment as Sole Administratix of Conjugal Partnership of Properties, Forfeiture, etc.‖
against Alberto Lopez and herein petitioner Imelda Relucio. It was alleged by herein private respondent that Alberto Lopez is legally
married to her, abandoned the latter and their legitimate children, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner
and that he arrogated unto herself full and exclusive control of administration of the conjugal property.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party. On the Court of Appeals, the petition on
certiorari filed by the Petitioner assailing the trial courts denial of her motion to dismiss was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

[1]: Whether respondent‘s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property accounting etc. against her husband
Alberto Lopez established a cause of action against the petitioner.
[2]: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest. Whether the RTC correctly denied the petition of herein petitioner on the ground
that she is imleaded as a necessary or indispensable party.

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It is well settled that a cause of action is an act or omission of one party, the defendant in
violation of the legal right of the other. The elements of the cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; (3)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff as constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

A perusal of the ―Nature of the Complaint‖ filed by the respondent reveals that it is a complaint by an aggrieved party wife against her
husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. The causes of action filed by respondent
showed that petitioner is a complete stranger to the causes of action as regards judicial appointment, accounting by respondent husband,
forfeiture of share of husband and support. Clearly, there is no rightduty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly
support a cause of action.

2. A real party in interest if one who stands ―to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.‖ In this case, petitioner would not be
affected by any judgment in the special proceedings filed by the respondent. It petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom no there can be no final determination of an action. Nor can petitioner
be a necessary party in the case below. A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to b joined as party if complete
relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the
foregoing, the trial court can issue a judge and accord complete relief as such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against
Alberto Lopez. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the motion to dismiss of the petitioner on ground of lack of cause of action.

ALIPIO VS. CA

FACTS:
Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14.5 hec fishpond in Barito,Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. Lease was for 5 yrs ending on Sep. 12, 1990.
In June 19, 1987 til the end of the lease period, Jaring subleased the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps Manuel. The stipulated rent is
P485,600.00 payable in 2 installments of P300k and P185,600.00. The second installment due on June 30, 1989.

Sublessees failed to pay entire second installment, leaving a balance of P50,600.00 w/c they failed to pay despite Alipio‘s demands.
Thus, he filed a case against said sublessees asking for payment of the balance or rescission of the contract should they fail to pay the
balance.

Purita Alipio petitioned for the dismissal of the case invoking Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court claiming that such was applicable
since her husband and co-sublessee passed away prior tothe filing of this action. Said rule has been amended by Rule 3, Sec. 20,1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Trial court denied Alipio‘s petition because she was a party to the contract & should be independently impleaded together w/the
Manuel sps. Death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. Petitioner & Manuels were ordered to pay balance and
P10k atty‘s fees and costs of suit.

On appeal, the CA dismissed the case and held that the rule invoked is not applicable. The action for recovery of a sum of money does
not survive the death of the defendant, thus the remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming thatsuch death totally
extinguished their obligation. When the action is solidary, creditor may bring his action against any of the debtors obligated insolidum.
Alipio‘s liability is independent of & separate from her husband‘s.(Climaco vs. Siy Uy, Imperial vs. David, and Agacoili vs.
Vda de Agcaoili)

ISSUE:

W/N a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in anordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money
chargeableagainst the conjugal partnership.

RULING:

NO. Proper remedy would be to file aclaim in the settlement of the decedent‘s estate or if none has beencommenced, he can file a petition
either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will, depending on whether itstestate/intestate. No shortcut by
lumping claim against Alipios with those against the Manuels.

CC Art. 161 (1) provides that the obligation of the Alipios is chargeable against their conjugal partnership since it was contracted by the
spouses for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. When petitioner‘s spouse died, their CPG was dissolved & debts chargeable against
it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance w/ Rule 73, Sec.2 w/c provides that the community property will
be inventoried, administered, & liquidated and debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.

In Calma vs.Tanedo the Court held that no complaint for collection of indebtedness chargeable to the CPG can be brought against the
surviving spouse. Claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation & settlement of the CPG. Surviving spouse‘s powers of
administration ceases & is passed on to court-appointed administrator. This was affirmed in Ventura vs. Militante where Court held that
lack of liquidation proceedings does not mean that the CPG continues. Creditor may apply for letters of admin in his capacity as a principal
creditor.

Note that for marriages governed by CPG, obligations entered into by sps are chargeable against their CPG & the partnership is primarily
bound for the repayments. They‘ll be impleaded as representatives of the CPG and concept of joint/solidary liability does not apply. At
best, it will not be solidary but joint.

VENTURA VS. MILITANTE

FACTS:

Militante for collection of Sum of Money and Damages against Ventura. Ventura moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground
that "the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality," the same being "neither a natural nor legal person in contemplation of law".
Ventura opposed that since "the money claim subject of this case actually represents the costs of automotive spare parts/replacements
contracted by deceased Carlos Ngo during his lifetime for the benefit/business of the family, the conjugal partnership shall be accountable
for the payment thereof." Militante opposed that Ventura, being the wife of the deceased Carlos Ngo, is liable to pay the obligation which
benefited their family.

Ventura answered that the unsecured debt was contracted by her husband alone or as a charge against the conjugal partnership of gains,
it cannot be denied that her husband was now deceased, the said debt does not survive him, the conjugal partnership of gains is
terminated upon the death of one of the spouses, and the debts and charges against the conjugal partnership of gains may only be paid
after an inventory is made in the appropriate testate or intestate proceeding.

Militante amended the complaint and named the defendant as Sulpicia Ventura from the “Estate of Carlos Ngo”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sulpicia Ventura may be named as defendant from the collection case involving her deceased spouse.

RULING:
NO! Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity
as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by
a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity
and a motion to amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to
be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be
named a party defendant in a court action.

Also, it is clear that the original complaint of Militante against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was
already dead at the time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As
such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate.

To cure this fatal defect, Militante amended his original complaint. In his amended complaint, Militante deleted the estate of Carlos Ngo
and named Ventura as the defendant. When petitioner, in her comment to the amended complaint, reasoned that the conjugal partnership
of gains between her and Carlos Ngo was terminated upon the latter's death and that the debt which he contracted, assuming it was a
charge against the conjugal property, could only be paid after an inventory is made in the appropriate testate or intestate proceeding,
private respondent simply reiterated his demand that petitioner pay her husband's debt which, he insisted, redounded to the benefit of
everyone in her family.

The conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to
sell any portion of the conjugal property in order to pay outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner
and with the formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Where a complaint is brought
against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment obtained
thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse.

In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This
does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And Militante cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule
78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased
Carlos Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be granted to
some other person.

UY VS. ESTATE OF FERNANDEZ

FACTS:

Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Lopez Jaena Street, Jaro, Iloilo City. Vipa and her
husband, Levi Lahaylahay, have two children –Grace Joy and Jill Frances. Sometime in 1990, a contract of lease was executed between
Vipa and Rafael Uy over the subject property and the improvements thereon, pursuant to which, Rafael bound himself to pay Vipa, as
consideration for the lease of the property, the amount of P3,000.00 per month, with a provision for a 10% increase every year thereafter.

Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever. Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. After Vipa's death,
Levi lived in Aklan. In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, on June 12, 2003, the Estate of Vipa, through
Grace Joy, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTCC-Iloilo City against Rafael. It was alleged therein that, as of June 1998,
Rafael was already bound to pay rent at the amount of P3,300.00 per month and that his last payment was made in May 1998. Accordingly,
at the time of the filing of the Complaint, Rafael's unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00. The Estate of Vipa claimed that despite repeated
demands, Rafael refused to pay the rents due.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the sale of Levi to Rafael of ½ of the conjugal property corresponding his share without the actual partition of the estate
is valid.

RULING:

YES! Rafael's ownership of the one-half undivided share in the subject property would necessarily affect the property relations between
the parties herein. Thus, the CA should have exerted efforts to resolve the said issue instead of dismissing the same on the flimsy ground
that it was not raised during the proceedings before the MTC. The system of conjugal partnership of gains governs their property relations.
It is presumed that the subject property is part of the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi considering that the same was acquired during
the subsistence of their marriage and there being no proof to the contrary

Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00 evidenced by the Deed of Sale. At that time,
the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition, notwithstanding the absence of
liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily void.

Upon Vipa's death, one half of the subject property was automatically reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the
conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa's share, was transmitted to Vipa's heirs – Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and her husband
Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.
Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim
title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest.
Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof
was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property.

Otherwise stated, prior to his acquisition of Levi's one-half undivided share, Rafael was a mere lessee of the subject property and is thus
obliged to pay the rent for his possession thereof. The sale of the one-half undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was
consummated only on December 29, 2005, more than two years after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the complaint for unlawful
detainer on July 18, 2003. Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his acquisition of Levi's share in the subject property as an affirmative
defense in the answer he filed with the MTCC.

Principles:

Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual and
vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and
partition of the conjugal partnership. With respect, however, to the deceased spouse's share in the conjugal partnership properties, an
implied ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.

BARRIDO VS. NONATO

FACTS:

In the course of the marriage of Leonardo V. Nonato and Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco,
Bacolod City. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more
reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29,
2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the MTCC-Bacolod City,

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the property had already been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph
Leo. The Bacolod MTCC decided in favor of Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to
remain. On appeal, the Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the subject lot is conjugal after being even it was sold to their children and in holding that
Art.129 of the FC has no application in this case.

RULING:

NO! Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in
case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property
relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed tohave been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall beowned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively
live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to
operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present.13 The term
"capacitated" inthe first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.14 Any impediment to
marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and
wife. However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.16 Efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.

In the analogous case of Valdez, it was likewise averred that the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition
of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initiobecause of psychological incapacity on the part of either or
both parties in the contract of marriage.The Court held that the court a quodid not commit a reversible error in utilizing Article 147 of the
Family Code and in ruling that the former spouses own the family home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property that they owned in common, the provisions on coownership under the Civil
Code should aptly prevail.19 The rules which are set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spousesor spouses of void marriages.20

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido,
however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside
from the title to the property still being registered in the names of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization
of a notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and cannot be converted into a public
document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless properly authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

PAZ VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

On November 29, 2000, the Luciano Paz brought a petition for the cancellation of OCT. The petition, ostensibly made under Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529, impleaded the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), Filinvest Development Corporation (FDC), and Filinvest
Alabang, Inc. (FAI) as respondents.

The petition averred that the Paz was the owner of two parcels of land under OCT No. 684 and TCT No. 185552 which were registered
in the name of the Republic; that FDC and FAI developed Lot 392 into a subdivision based on their joint venture agreement with the
Government; that pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Lot 392 was further subdivided, causing the cancellation of TCT No. 185552,
and the issuance of TCTs for the resulting individual subdivision lots in the names of the Republic and FAI; and that the subdivision lots
were then sold to third parties.

On January 19, 2001, FDC and FAI moved to dismiss the petition for cancellation on the grounds that the dispute spawned by the Petition
for cancellation of title is litigable in an ordinary action outside the special and limited jurisdiction of land registration courts. Also, the
Petition is thus removed from the ambit of Sec. 108 of the Property Registration Decree which requires, as an indispensable element for
availment of the relief thereunder, either unanimity of the parties or absence of serious controversy or adverse claim. It authorizes only
amendment and alteration of certificates of title, not cancellation thereof. Further, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the respondents who
were not validly served with summons but only a copy of the Petition. Furthermore, docket fees for the Petition have not been paid and
the petition does not contain the requisite certificate of non-forum shopping.

To counter this, the petitioner asserted that his petition for cancellation was not an initiatory pleading that must comply with the regular
rules of civil procedure but a mere incident of a past registration proceeding; that unlike in an ordinary action, land registration was not
commenced by complaint or petition, and did not require summons to bring the persons of the respondents within the jurisdiction of the
trial court; and that a service of the petition sufficed to bring the respondents within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 108 of P.D. 1529 is applicable to the present case thereby exempting the same from the requirements of paying
docket fees, of service of summons, and of the certification against forum shopping due to its not being an initiatory pleading.

RULING:

NO! Based on the provision, the proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a certificate of title under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529
is applicable in seven instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the
certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate
certificate; (d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been married, or,
registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a
corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution;
and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
Here, Luciano Paz was in reality seeking the reconveyance of the property covered by OCT No. 684, not the cancellation of a certificate
of title as contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, his petition did not fall under any of the situations covered by Section 108
of PD 1529, and was for that reason rightly dismissed by the lower courts.

MACQUILAN VS. MACQUILAN

FACTS:

Virgilio and Dita Macquilan are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their
once sugar coated romance turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus,
prompted Virgilio to file a case of adultery against Dita and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime
charged.

Thereafter, Dita, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership
of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of Virgilio. During the pre-trial of the said case, Virgilio and Dita
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, Virgilio filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Virgilio then filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of Dita of the crime of adultery disqualify her from
sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of Dita of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property?

RULING:

NO! The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority,
or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right
to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.

Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333
should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:

Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction
which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

SALGADO VS. ANSON

FACTS:

Luis Anson is the husband of Severina de Asis-Anson. They had 1 daughter, Maria Luisa and she was wed to Gaston Maya. Severina
had an older daughter to a previous relationship, Jo ann Diaz and she was also wed to Gerard Salgado. Luis and Severina acquired
several real properties and according to him, since there was no marriage settlement, the properties pertain to their conjugal partnership.
But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed 3 Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring then properties in favor of Jo ann.
When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judcial Settlement of Estate Deceased Severina adjudicating herself as the
sole heir. Due to these acts, Luis filed a complaint for the annulment of these Deeds against Sps Salgado and Sps Maya. The latter
countered that they were not aware of any marriage between Luis and their mother Severina but they knew they cohabited as common-
law couple and that after their cohabitation, Luis went to the US and married one Teresita. And due to Partition Agreement that divided
their properties without court intervention, both Sps claim that the properties herewith are separate and exclusive properties of Severina.

ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage between Severina and Luis is valid and the subject lands as conjugal partnership.

RULING:

NO! The Court finds that their marriage is void ab initio for lack of marriage license. Luis asserted that their marriage was an exceptional
one but he failed to justify the lack of marriage license. He admitted that they did not seek to apply for it. No marriage license was exhibited
to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices
of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification
made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly.
In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices.
Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious
ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already
be married to each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Also, the Partition agreement between Luis and Severina which divided their properties between them without court intervention, is valid.
Valdez v RTC Quezon City held that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147 or Art 148 as the case may be, of the Family Code. Art. 147 of the Family
Code provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
.ioint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering
that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 147 of
the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license." "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."'91

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and
Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing
held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly
done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x
x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly
done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. It also remains uncontroverted that he
already received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement
declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
officer, coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are
circumstances which cannot be disregarded. "The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that
the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.

VENTURA VS. ABUDA

FACTS:

Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married on 9 June 1980. Socorro and Esteban never had common children, but both of
them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda, and Socorro had a son, who was the father
of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr.

Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas when she married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This
marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban. Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other
hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot
situated at Vitas, Tondo, Manila originally registered in the name of "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."
The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father’s behalf sometime in 1970. Edilberto also claimed that
starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments located at Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila.

On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband. Esteban passed away on 11
September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999. Sometime in 2000, Leonora, the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale.
Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that
the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Esteban’s signature on the deeds of sale was forged. Evangeline, on the other hand,
argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. RTC-Manila dismissed
the petition. On appeal, CA upheld RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is a conjugal property

RULING:

NO! In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired
during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners
to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of
co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

Article 148 of the Family Code provides that in cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during
the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro
because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2)
title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres." We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas
property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show
that Socorro co-owned the property.

The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the
certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does
not vest title. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the
property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that
the title is quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.

SALAS VS. AGUILA

FACTS:

On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. and respondent Eden Villena Aguila were married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave
birth to their daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated with
Aguila or their daughter. On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever."

On 7 May 2007, the RTC granted the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila and provides for the "dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, if any." On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation that she discovered: (a) two 200-sqm parcels of land
located in San Bartolome, Quezon City and (b) a 108-square-meter parcel of land located in Tondo, Manila. The registered owner of the
Discovered Properties is "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." Aguila testified that Rubina C. Salas is Salas' common-law wife.

On 8 February 2008, Salas opposed that there is no conjugal property to be partitioned based on Aguila's petition. According to Salas,
Aguila's statement was a judicial admission and was not made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to
the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived in favor of Aguila, to wit: (1) parcels of land with
improvements located in Sugar Landing Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. 176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Samaniego
Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Batangas; and Batangas City, financed by Filinvest; (2) cash amounting to P200,000.00; and (3) motor
vehicles, specifically Honda City and Toyota Tamaraw FX. Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.

RTC ruled in favor of Aguila and found that the Discovered Properties are among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and distributed
between Salas and Aguila. On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a
widow and unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute money to
purchase the Discovered Properties as he... had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her as she was
not a party in the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to purchase the Discovered Properties but because he was not well-versed
with legal documentation, he registered the properties... in the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Salas. The CA affirmed the order of the RTC

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the partition of the parcels of land located in Quezon City and Manila between Salas and Aguila.

RULING:

NO! Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed that
the Discovered Properties registered in Salas' name were acquired during his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered
Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and Aguila's marriage.

On both Salas and Rubina's contention that Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The
TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is
generally a... conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to, because there is a strong presumption that it is valid and
regularly issued.

The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the
ownership of the Discovered Properties in his opposition to the manifestation. It was only when Rubina intervened that Salas supported
Rubina's statement that she owns the Discovered Properties.

Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this
case.

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of... the Family Code, as in this case. Article 147 of the
Family Code provides:

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the...
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant...
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple's
joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where
the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties,
as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.

SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS

FACTS:

This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971,
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States
of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, Felicidad
sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Petitioners, the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss contending that the venue was improperly laid and
that the respondent‘s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter‘s
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

RTC dismissed the two motions to dismiss filed by the Petitioners. CA affirmed. Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration which were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

RULING:

YES! Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad‘s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the
issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad‘s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving
this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity
of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus, in this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court‘s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo‘s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as
a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership,
it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of
the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described the property regime under
this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of
the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent‘s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

MERCADO-FEHR VS. FEHR

FACTS:
The marriage between Elna D. Mercado and Bruno F. Fehr on March 14, 1985 is declared null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Accordingly,
the conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation of
property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the
rights previously acquired by creditors.

Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is awarded to Elna, being the
innocent spouse.

On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving the various motions filed by respondent after the case had been decided.
After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following properties to be excluded
from the conjugal properties, namely:

a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that the same is owned by petitioner‘s
parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and
b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, considering that the same was
purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell
dated July 26, 1983. xxx

Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondent shall be distributed in the following manner:

TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:

a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 sq. m., covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14734; and
b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)

TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:

a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180.81 sq.m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and
b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)

Thereafter, the parties shall own and enjoy their respective share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties adjudicated to them
as stated above. Elna and Bruno are further enjoined to jointly support their minor children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education,
uniforms, food and medical expenses.

Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of
the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner further claimed that it would not be in the best interests of the children if she
would be made to demand periodically from respondent his share in the support of the children. She instead proposed that the Upper
Basement and the Lower Ground Floor of the LCG Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she could use the income from the lease
of said premises for the support of the children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code should apply in the case at bar

RULING:

YES! It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebu
City and moved in with Bruno in the latter‘s residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr,
was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a
condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as
the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna
Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner.

In light of these facts, we give more credence to Elna‘s submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties‘ cohabitation.
Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code
provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the former‘s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants.

Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire
during their cohabitation.

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the
case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively
with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their
marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent‘s psychological incapacity to comply
with essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner
and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.

As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership
should apply. There is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide the
properties into three—1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition before
this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way division of the properties—1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and
1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover, respondent‘s argument that the three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void marriages under
Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void.

In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and respondent
and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.

CARIÑO VS. CARIÑO

FACTS:

The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages: the first, on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second, on November 10, 1992, with respondent
Susan Yee Cariño (Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became ill and passed away in 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies. Petitioner
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from ―MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,‖ while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from ―GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).‖ In 1993, Susan Yee filed the
instant case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the P146,000.00 ―death benefits‖ which she (petitioner) received. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her
answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She
claimed that she became aware of the first marriage only at the funeral, where she met petitioner. Respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00,
half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Cariño, plus attorney‘s fees and
costs of suit.

ISSUE:

Whether the second wife of SPO4 Cariño, given that the first marriage was contracted without a marriage license and void ab initio, is
entitled to receive ―death benefits.

RULING:

NO! It does not follow that because the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the ―death benefits‖ under
scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject
to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. Therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
But the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate
the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

One effect of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses. Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
―Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.‖ Under Article 148, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
multiple alliances of the same married man: the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care
of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.

The disputed P146,000.00 ―death benefits‖ are renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the
deceased as a police officer. Respondent Susan Yee could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition
of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone
and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said ―death benefits‖ of the deceased shall
pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs which applies to unions
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the
wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed ―death benefits were earned by the deceased alone
as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, one-half of the subject ―death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as
her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

VALDES VS. RTC-QC

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition,
dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code. After the hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court granted the petition directing the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the
same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.
She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their
father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court correctly applied the law.

RULING:

YES! The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively
live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband
and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal.