[G.R. No.

172690 : March 03, 2010]

HEIRS OF JOSE LIM, REPRESENTED BY ELENITO LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. JULIET VILLA LIM,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated June 29, 2005, which reversed and set aside the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, dated April 12, 2004.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Jose Lim (Jose), namely: Jose's widow Cresencia Palad (Cresencia); and
their children Elenito, Evelia, Imelda, Edelyna and Edison, all surnamed Lim (petitioners), represented by
Elenito Lim (Elenito). They filed a Complaint[4] for Partition, Accounting and Damagesagainst respondent
Juliet Villa Lim (respondent), widow of the late Elfledo Lim (Elfledo), who was the eldest son of Jose and
Cresencia.

Petitioners alleged that Jose was the liaison officer of Interwood Sawmill in Cagsiay, Mauban, Quezon.
Sometime in 1980, Jose, together with his friends Jimmy Yu (Jimmy) and Norberto Uy (Norberto), formed a
partnership to engage in the trucking business. Initially, with a contribution of P50,000.00 each, they
purchased a truck to be used in the hauling and transport of lumber of the sawmill. Jose managed the
operations of this trucking business until his death on August 15, 1981. Thereafter, Jose's heirs, including
Elfledo, and partners agreed to continue the business under the management of Elfledo. The shares in the
partnership profits and income that formed part of the estate of Jose were held in trust by Elfledo, with
petitioners' authority for Elfledo to use, purchase or acquire properties using said funds.

Petitioners also alleged that, at that time, Elfledo was a fresh commerce graduate serving as his father's
driver in the trucking business. He was never a partner or an investor in the business and merely supervised
the purchase of additional trucks using the income from the trucking business of the partners. By the time
the partnership ceased, it had nine trucks, which were all registered in Elfledo's name. Petitioners
asseverated that it was also through Elfledo's management of the partnership that he was able to purchase
numerous real properties by using the profits derived therefrom, all of which were registered in his name
and that of respondent. In addition to the nine trucks, Elfledo also acquired five other motor vehicles.

On May 18, 1995, Elfledo died, leaving respondent as his sole surviving heir. Petitioners claimed that
respondent took over the administration of the aforementioned properties, which belonged to the estate of
Jose, without their consent and approval. Claiming that they are co-owners of the properties, petitioners
required respondent to submit an accounting of all income, profits and rentals received from the estate of
Elfledo, and to surrender the administration thereof. Respondent refused; thus, the filing of this case.

Respondent traversed petitioners' allegations and claimed that Elfledo was himself a partner of Norberto and
Jimmy. Respondent also claimed that per testimony of Cresencia, sometime in 1980, Jose gave Elfledo
P50,000.00 as the latter's capital in an informal partnership with Jimmy and Norberto. When Elfledo and
respondent got married in 1981, the partnership only had one truck; but through the efforts of Elfledo, the
business flourished. Other than this trucking business, Elfledo, together with respondent, engaged in other
business ventures. Thus, they were able to buy real properties and to put up their own car assembly and
repair business. When Norberto was ambushed and killed on July 16, 1993, the trucking business started to
falter. When Elfledo died on May 18, 1995 due to a heart attack, respondent talked to Jimmy and to the
heirs of Norberto, as she could no longer run the business. Jimmy suggested that three out of the nine
trucks be given to him as his share, while the other three trucks be given to the heirs of Norberto. However,
Norberto's wife, Paquita Uy, was not interested in the vehicles. Thus, she sold the same to respondent, who
paid for them in installments.

Respondent also alleged that when Jose died in 1981, he left no known assets, and the partnership with
Jimmy and Norberto ceased upon his demise. Respondent also stressed that Jose left no properties that
Elfledo could have held in trust. Respondent maintained that all the properties involved in this case were
purchased and acquired through her and her husband's joint efforts and hard work, and without any
participation or contribution from petitioners or from Jose. Respondent submitted that these are conjugal
partnership properties; and thus, she had the right to refuse to render an accounting for the income or
profits of their own business.

Trial on the merits ensued. On April 12, 2004, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Ordering the partition of the above-mentioned properties equally between the plaintiffs and heirs of Jose
Lim and the defendant Juliet Villa-Lim; and

2) Ordering the defendant to submit an accounting of all incomes, profits and rentals received by her from
said properties.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CA.

On June 29, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision, dismissing petitioners' complaint for
lack of merit. Undaunted, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration,[5] which the CA, however, denied
in its Resolution[6] dated May 8, 2006.

Hence, this Petition, raising the sole question, viz.:

IN THE APPRECIATION BY THE COURT OF THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES, CAN THE
TESTIMONY OF ONE OF THE PETITIONERS BE GIVEN GREATER WEIGHT THAN THAT BY A FORMER PARTNER
ON THE ISSUE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE OTHER PARTNERS IN THE PARTNERSHIP?[7]

In essence, petitioners argue that according to the testimony of Jimmy, the sole surviving partner, Elfledo
was not a partner; and that he and Norberto entered into a partnership with Jose. Thus, the CA erred in not
giving that testimony greater weight than that of Cresencia, who was merely the spouse of Jose and not a
party to the partnership.[8]

Respondent counters that the issue raised by petitioners is not proper in a petition for review
on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as it would entail the review, evaluation,
calibration, and re-weighing of the factual findings of the CA. Moreover, respondent invokes the rationale of
the CA decision that, in light of the admissions of Cresencia and Edison and the testimony of respondent, the
testimony of Jimmy was effectively refuted; accordingly, the CA's reversal of the RTC's findings was fully
justified.[9]

We resolve first the procedural matter regarding the propriety of the instant Petition.

Verily, the evaluation and calibration of the evidence necessarily involves consideration of factual issues --
an exercise that is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides
that the parties may raise only questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Generally, we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by
the tribunals below.[10] When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the
following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.[11]

We note, however, that the findings of fact of the RTC are contrary to those of the CA. Thus, our review of
such findings is warranted.

On the merits of the case, we find that the instant Petition is bereft of merit.

A partnership exists when two or more persons agree to place their money, effects, labor, and skill in lawful
commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a proportionate sharing of the profits and
losses among them. A contract of partnership is defined by the Civil Code as one where two or more persons
bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing
the profits among themselves.[12]

Undoubtedly, the best evidence would have been the contract of partnership or the articles of partnership.
Unfortunately, there is none in this case, because the alleged partnership was never formally organized.
Nonetheless, we are asked to determine who between Jose and Elfledo was the "partner" in the trucking
business.

A careful review of the records persuades us to affirm the CA decision. The evidence presented by
petitioners falls short of the quantum of proof required to establish that: (1) Jose was the partner and not
Elfledo; and (2) all the properties acquired by Elfledo and respondent form part of the estate of Jose, having
been derived from the alleged partnership.

Petitioners heavily rely on Jimmy's testimony. But that testimony is just one piece of evidence against
respondent. It must be considered and weighed along with petitioners' other evidence vis-Ã -vis
respondent's contrary evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered synonymous with the term "greater weight of
the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." "Preponderance of evidence" is a phrase that, in
the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[13] Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus:

SECTION I. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

At this juncture, our ruling in Heirs of Tan Eng Kee v. Court of Appeals[14] is enlightening. Therein, we cited
Article 1769 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 1769. In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:

(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners as to
third persons;

(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners or co-
possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;

(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons
sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived;

(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is a prima facie evidence that he is a
partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise;
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the business;
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by installments or
otherwise.

Applying the legal provision to the facts of this case, the following circumstances tend to prove that Elfledo
was himself the partner of Jimmy and Norberto: 1) Cresencia testified that Jose gave Elfledo P50,000.00, as
share in the partnership, on a date that coincided with the payment of the initial capital in the
partnership;[15] (2) Elfledo ran the affairs of the partnership, wielding absolute control, power and authority,
without any intervention or opposition whatsoever from any of petitioners herein;[16] (3) all of the
properties, particularly the nine trucks of the partnership, were registered in the name of Elfledo; (4) Jimmy
testified that Elfledo did not receive wages or salaries from the partnership, indicating that what he actually
received were shares of the profits of the business;[17] and (5) none of the petitioners, as heirs of Jose, the
alleged partner, demanded periodic accounting from Elfledo during his lifetime. As repeatedly stressed
in Heirs of Tan Eng Kee,[18] a demand for periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to adduce any evidence to show that the real and personal properties
acquired and registered in the names of Elfledo and respondent formed part of the estate of Jose, having
been derived from Jose's alleged partnership with Jimmy and Norberto. They failed to refute respondent's
claim that Elfledo and respondent engaged in other businesses. Edison even admitted that Elfledo also sold
Interwood lumber as a sideline.[19] Petitioners could not offer any credible evidence other than their bare
assertions. Thus, we apply the basic rule of evidence that between documentary and oral evidence, the
former carries more weight.[20]

Finally, we agree with the judicious findings of the CA, to wit:

The above testimonies prove that Elfledo was not just a hired help but one of the partners in the trucking
business, active and visible in the running of its affairs from day one until this ceased operations upon his
demise. The extent of his control, administration and management of the partnership and its business, the
fact that its properties were placed in his name, and that he was not paid salary or other compensation by
the partners, are indicative of the fact that Elfledo was a partner and a controlling one at that. It is apparent
that the other partners only contributed in the initial capital but had no say thereafter on how the business
was ran. Evidently it was through Elfredo's efforts and hard work that the partnership was able to acquire
more trucks and otherwise prosper. Even the appellant participated in the affairs of the partnership by
acting as the bookkeeper sans salary.

It is notable too that Jose Lim died when the partnership was barely a year old, and the partnership and its
business not only continued but also flourished. If it were true that it was Jose Lim and not Elfledo who was
the partner, then upon his death the partnership should have

been dissolved and its assets liquidated. On the contrary, these were not done but instead its operation
continued under the helm of Elfledo and without any participation from the heirs of Jose Lim.

Whatever properties appellant and her husband had acquired, this was through their own concerted efforts
and hard work. Elfledo did not limit himself to the business of their partnership but engaged in other lines of
businesses as well.

In sum, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and the ruling of the CA as they are amply
supported by the law and by the evidence on record.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated June 29, 2005
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Corona, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta per Special Order No. 824 dated
February 12, 2010.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-31.

Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 83331; penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios
[2]

(deceased), with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; id. at 57-69.

[3]
Particularly docketed as Civil Case No. 97-60; rollo, pp. 49-55.

[4]
Records, pp. 1-9.

[5]
CA rollo, pp. 116-128.

[6]
Id. at 157-158.

[7]
Petitioners' Memorandum; rollo, pp. 271-295, at 285.

[8]
Id.

[9]
Respondent's Memorandum; id. at 204-234.

Francisco Madrid and Edgardo Bernardo v. Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez, G.R. No.
[10]

150887, August 14, 2009. (Citations omitted.)

[11]
Ontimare, Jr. v. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 257, 265.

[12]
Litonjua, Jr. v. Litonjua, Sr., G.R. Nos. 166299-300, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 576, 584.

[13]
Perfecta Cavile, Jose de la Cruz and Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc. v. Justina Litania-Hong, accompanied
and joined by her husband, Leopoldo Hong and Genoveva Litania, G.R. No. 179540, March 13, 2009,
citing Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).

[14]
396 Phil. 68 (2000).

[15]
TSN, June 8, 1999, pp. 4, 8 and 9-10.

[16]
TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 17.

[17]
Id. at 15-16.

[18]
Supra note 14, at 83, citing Estanislao, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 830, 837 (1988).

[19]
TSN, September 15, 1999, p. 8.

SPO2 Yap v. Judge Inopiquez, Jr., 451 Phil. 182, 192 (2003), citing Romago Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of
[20]

Appeals, 333 SCRA 291, 302 (2000), further citing Ereñeta v. Bezore, 54 SCRA 13 (1973) and Soriano v.
Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 18 SCRA 999 (1966); and Government Service Insurance
System v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 685, 696 (1993), further citing Marvel Building Corporation, et al. v.
David, 94 Phil. 376 (1954).