Krivenko vs Register of Deeds, GR No.

L-630, November 15, 1947; 79

Phil 461
(Land Titles and Deeds – Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)

Facts: An alien bought a residential lot and its registration was denied by the Register of Deeds on the ground
that being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case to the CFI,
the court rendered judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds.

Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.

Held. No. “Public agricultural lands” mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court stated:
‘Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,’ and with respect to
public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose
conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.

Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be transferred or assigned except
to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.

Camilo Borromeo v. Antonietta Descallar

G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009
Puno, C.J..:

FACTS:

Petitioner appealed the reversal by the CA of the trial court’s ruling in his favor which declared the
titles of respondent as null and void.

Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, and respondent fell in love and decided to live together. Eventually,
however, they went their separate ways as respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live
with another woman. Jambrich met petitioner who was engaged in the real estate business and built and
repaired speedboats as a hobby. Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from
petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in
the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." When
petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.

Petitioner imputes error on the judgment of the CA for holding that Jambrich has no title to the titles
in question and may not therefore transfer and assign any rights or interests in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
 Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich,
what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

HELD:

In the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an
Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to
petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. While the acquisition and the purchase by Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation were void ab initio since they were contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines,
the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. As the property in dispute is already in the hands
of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective
of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. v. The Land Registration Commission and
the Register of Deeds of Davao City, G.R. No. L-8451, December 20,1957

Facts:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed
of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.,(RCADI) is corporation sole organized and existing in accordance
with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. Registry of Deeds
Davao (RD) required RCADI to submit affidavit declaring that 60% of its members were Filipino Citizens. As the
RD entertained some doubts as to the registerability of the deed of sale, the matter was referred to the Land
Registration Commissioner (LRC) en consulta for resolution. LRC hold that pursuant to provisions of sections 1
and 5 of Article XII of the Philippine Constitution, RCADI is not qualified to acquire land in the Philippines in the
absence of proof that at leat 60% of the capital, properties or assets of the RCADI is actually owned or controlled
by Filipino citizens. LRC also denied the registration of the Deed of Sale in the absence of proof of compliance
with such requisite. RCADI’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved, the latter filed a petition for
mandamus.
Issue:
Whether or not the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines, or better still, the
corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private
agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
RCADI is qualified.
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the
supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the
faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it
cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said that the political
and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by that
relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every country springs from that
society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities and
receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these branches.
Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of “radiation”. We have to realize that although
there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and the dioceses therein all over the globe, the universality
that the word “catholic” implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the practice and the
interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of their belief, but certainly they are separate and independent
from one another in jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which they are incorporated, and entirely
independent on the others in the management and ownership of their temporalities. To allow theory that the
Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father,
would lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic faith and become
members of that religious society, likewise citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We consider
that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of the world. The same thing be said
with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under the laws of the Philippines,
which is not altered by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of said corporation sole.
 We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in
accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights
and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the
personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which
are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.

It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which are
formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the
diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever; (2)
the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory
comprised by said corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful
residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and the
citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of
the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or
corporation sole.

In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the specific
provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under
consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular form of corporation.
If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable
conclusion would be that this requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply
to corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes unquestionably immaterial.

ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions
of Article XIII of the Constitution
HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in
some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages,
particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had.
In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters
corporation sole
composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to
expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever
only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said
corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese
or territory of the corporation sole
has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has nothing to do with the
operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful
connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be
composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)
 undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao
are predominantly Filipino citizens
presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the
percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution
fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of real
properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish
regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent,
or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection
against the revitalization of religious landholdings.
as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES
and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust

RURAL BANK OF ANDA VS ARCH OF LINGAYEN

FACTS:
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739
also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda’s Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for
commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road.
In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation
on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley

In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736 from
the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was already
bothering the priests living in the seminary. The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east,
west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was
being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley,
Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta
and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.

On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and restore
the concrete fence. On20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the construction of the
building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve
the problem concerning Lot 736.

On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24
August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.
HELD:
The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not
have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management
Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.
Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has
never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains
part of the public domain and is owned by the state

RATIO:
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and waters
of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: “All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.”
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without prior grant
from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded
its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and
consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over
a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT

FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect
title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even
the government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the
title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition
to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on
the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable
and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject
land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.

RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.

There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and
disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and
exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945.
 There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the intention
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render the
paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain which were not
declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from
enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now
over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-
in-interest of the land since 1945.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio,
Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-
A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco
to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable
land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO
4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling
and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

1. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled
to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to
the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence
to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to
their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot
avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. v. BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

FACTS:
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent more than
2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985
"in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously."

On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending Proclamation
No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open for
disposition.

Now charging the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) of wrongfully asserting title to
Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions
among the residents, on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its
assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property, which they claimed is within Lot 1 of
Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been occupying the
area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously for several years,"
and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational
and religious facilities. Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA under
R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land
Management Bureau (LMB).

On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a blueprint copy of
the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No.
3 of the DENR report states:
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1,
Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square
meters. Likewise, the area actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.

On the basis of the DENR’s verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies
outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process
the applications of Dream Village’s members for sales patent, noting that in view of the length of time that they
"have been openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property in the concept of an owner, x
x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and
730 in relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act."

The CA in its Decision dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as available for disposition
in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even as the land in dispute has been under a
private title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the BCDA, in contrast to the case
of Bañaga relied upon by Dream Village, where the disputed land was part of the public domain and the
disputants were applicants for sales patent thereto.
Dream Village’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate court’s Order of July 13, 2010, thus the
petition for Review in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the area occupied by Dream Village, on the basis of the DENR’s verification survey
report, that sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the area of BCDA, declared in Proclamation Nos.
2476 and 172 as alienable and disposable.

HELD:
NO. The petition is DENIED.
The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating
it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment by the
government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They remain
under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of
30.5 has. was to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that
Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the
south, making them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government
has abandoned them to Dream Village.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there
is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that
the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.

REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL

FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol, Misamis Oriental. On
1963, he filed an application for saltworkpurposes for the said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the
same.Sometime in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed aresolution reserving a certain lot as
a school site. This lot unfortunatelyincluded the lot of Doldol.Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a
complaint for accionpossessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on school’s power.On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision of teh court ruling that Doldolwas entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same
for 32years (1959-1991).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land indispute?

HELD:
No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) thatthe land is alienable public land
and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusiveand notorious possession and occupation of the same must either
be sincetime immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. Whenthe conditions set by law are
complied with the possessor of the land, byoperation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant,
without thenecessity of title/certificate of tile being issued. The evidence presented shows that the land in
dispute is alienable anddisposable in accordance with the District Forester’s Certification. Doldolthus meets the
first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to thedisputed land since his occupation
of the same started only in 1955, muchlater than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set
forthby law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a rightto assert a right superior to the
school given that then Pres. Aquino hadreserved the lot for Opol National School.“The privilege occupying public
lands with a view of pre-emptingconfers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authorityof
the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public,or to reserve them for public use, prior
to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of
settler.Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawfulsettlement on them can be acquired”
(Solicitor General)In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over theland in dispute

OH CHO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly,
continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this
land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was
an alien.

ISSUEs:
Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration
Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even
before the Spanish conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an
alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied
for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied
with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was
what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to
ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

Republic vs Remman Enterprises

Revisiting Property Rights and Vested Rights under IPRA
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (“IPRA”), was
signed into law on 29 October 1997. Hailed as landmark legislation, the Act recognizes the Indigenous Cultural
Communities’/Indigenous Peoples’ (“ICCs/IPs”) rights to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Some of
the significant provisions in the Act involve the delineation between ancestral domain and ancestral land, and a
concept of “ownership” different from that under the Civil Code.
IPRA defines Ancestral Domain as all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, communally or individually since time immemorial. It covers the total environment, including the
spiritual and cultural bonds to the areas which the ICCs/IPs possess, occupy and use and to which they have
claims of ownership.
On the other hand, Ancestral Land is defined under the IPRA as land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial. Ancestral lands include
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These may be found within
ancestral domains.
IPRA, in recognition of the rights and ownership of the ICCs/IPs over ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, provides for the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) and Certificates of Ancestral
Lands Title (CALT). These titles are based on Native Title, referring to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains
which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs. These
CADT and CALT, however, are different from the Torrens titles issued under the Property Registration Decree.
While Torrens titles may be freely conveyed, mortgaged, leased or charged, CADT and CALT may only be
transferred or conveyed under certain circumstances specifically provided in the IPRA.
Moreover, as owners of ancestral domains, ICCs/IPs enjoy priority rights to develop the land and natural
resources found therein. The concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs significantly differs from ownership rights under
the Civil Code. While ownership of property under the Civil Code vests in the owner the right to freely dispose
of his property to any person, unless otherwise prohibited by law, ancestral domains under the IPRA are
considered as private, and at the same time, community property of ICCs/IPs. These lands and natural resources
are deemed to belong to all generations and serve as the material bases of the cultural integrity of the ICCs/IPs,
and therefore, cannot be sold, disposed of, or destroyed. Interestingly though, while IPRA strictly prohibits the
alienation and disposition of ancestral domains, it nonetheless allows for the transfer of ancestral lands to, and
among members, of the same ICC/IP, subject to the customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
The same Act nevertheless respects property rights within the ancestral domains, vested prior to its
enactment in 1997. A vested right is defined as a right or interest in property which has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of IPRA
provides that existing contracts, licenses, concessions, leases and permits for the exploitation of natural
resources within the ancestral domain may continue to be in force and effect until they expire. Thereafter, such
contracts, licenses, concessions, leases and permits shall not be renewed without the free and prior informed
consent of the IP community members and upon renegotiation of all terms and conditions thereof.
Moreover, IPRA also respects Torrens certificates of title covering ancestral lands or areas within the
ancestral domains which were acquired in good faith prior to its enactment. It must be noted, however, that
only claims made before the enactment of IPRA can ripen into valid claims. All other claims made after the
passage of IPRA cannot claim good faith because IPRA expressly provides for the non-alienability of ancestral
domain and conditional transfer of ancestral lands.
The enactment of IPRA strengthens the ownership claims of ICCs/IPs over the vast lands they have
occupied and possessed since time immemorial. In fact, over a hundred applications for CADT and CALT have
been granted since 1997. The more recent ones include the CADTs granted to the B’laan-Manobos of Molmol,
Jose Abad Santos, Davao Del Sur, and to the Atis of Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. However, given the economic
value and great demand for lands, IPRA needs more support and stronger advocates from various sectors in
order for it to realize its purpose of truly protecting and upholding the property rights of the ICCs/IPs.

Director of Lands vs. CA [G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to
respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of
the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that
the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of the notice of initial
hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory.
HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO:
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice
of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have
rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room
only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.

Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 SCRA 22)
Facts:
This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA reversing the
CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the issuance of the Original Cert. of Title
to the respondents Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the
absolute owner of the land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that she
is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land since time immemorial;
respondents have never been in possession of the land as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of
Registration of said land by fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioner’s father occupied the land in
dispute since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some improvements on the land
such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was
able to secure a title in favor of his children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and
improves and when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not embraced
in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.
The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that there is already a
survey plan of the said land in the name of the respondents and that a title was already issued to them.
Petitioner now contends that being an adjacent owner of the land in question they were not notified of the
survey. The Surveyor’s Certificate reveals that notice was given to the following: Jose Cruz, Diego Francisco
(petitioner’s father), and Santol Creek. It is noted that both Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco were already dead
from the date of the notice and Santol Creek is not a person or entity. It was established that the petitioner
and her brother and sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent land of the land in question were
not notified of the survey. Petitioner did not read the publication in the Official Gazette and the former mayor
of Teresa who is the owner of the property across the Santol Creek testified that Diego Francisco was in
possession of the land throughout his lifetime and after his death his heirs and not the respondents. By
virtue of this continuous, adverse, and open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years
now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of this parcel of land.
 Respondent contends that the petitioner’s claim for ownership of the land in question is insufficient
in form and substance failing to explain under what color of title she acquires ownership of the land in
question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid petition for reopening and review of a decree should be
made by a person who is deprived of the land or interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 of Act
496 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement
of the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained
under the Land Registration Act. The mere claim of ownership of petitioner lacks this requisite to merit in
granting of their petition. They claim that Toribio Santos, the respondent’s father owns the land and Alejandro
Santos inherited it from him and occupied the land in 1920 and has been in possession thereof for more
than 30 years.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332
2. Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.

Ruling:
It appears that Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco are both dead when the alleged notice was served and
that Santol Creek could not appear for the hearing because it is not a person. The court finds it absurd that
the respondent claims that they complied with the requisite of serving notice to interested parties on the
land in question. It is clear that the petitioner and her brothers and sisters who are the actual occupants of
the adjacent lots were not notified of the registration proceeding applied for by the petitioner. It is clear that
no notice was sent to the actual owner and possessor of the land in question allowing the respondents to
successfully register the land in their name. It was also established that respondents did not state the true
adjoining owners of the North, East and West of the land in question. On the North side it is no longer Diego
Francisco who is the owner of the lot but it is the petitioner by virtue of transfer of the homestead patent of
their father to them as his heirs. On the East, it is no longer Jose Cruz who owns the land but it was already
by a different person after his death. On the West, it is no longer Eugenio Francisco who is the owner but it
is Paula Francisco, petitioner’s sister who is in actual possession of the land.
The court find that the respondents have the motive of concealing their application for registration
from the real owners of these said lands by not sending them the actual notice of their application for
registration to prevent them from filing their opposition. The court cited the failure of the surveyors of the
respondent to comply with the requirement of finding out the actual occupants and boundary owners of the
said land. The court held that the registration of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter
bad faith. Thus it reverses the decision of the CA and affirmed the decision of the lower court without
prejudice to petitioner and the trial court complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the
corresponding title in favor of petitioner.
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF TITLE
FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION, represented by KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G.R. No. 147359
March 28, 2008
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. (FATCO), through Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr., appeals by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the October 23, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52366, and the March 7, 2001 Resolution[2] denying its reconsideration.
On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application for
confirmation of title to parcels of land, described as Lots No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030,[3] with an aggregate
area of 8,463 square meters, situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The application was docketed as
LRA REC. No. N-63835.
FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land which it openly,
exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of
ownership, tacking its possession with that of its predecessors-in-interest. It allegedly acquired these lots in the
following manner:
a) Lot No. 1505 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20304 was acquired by a Deed of Exchange executed by
and between the Brgy. Council of Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, represented by its Brgy. Capt. Honesto Alcid
and Brgy. Sec. Teofilo Descargar, and the applicant, at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing
as Doc. No. 415, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon,
Jr., and registered with the Registry of Deeds for the Province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
b) Lot No. 1234 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20305 was acquired by a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
with the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between Ceferino Bucago, Ildefonso Bucago, Victoria Bucago,
Felomina B. Higoy, Elizabeth B. Espejo, Ernesto B. Dacanay, Maria Bucago, Reinerio P. Dacanay and the applicant
at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 411, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of
1988 in the notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Registry of Deeds for
the province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
c) Lot No. 47030 covered by Tax Declaration No. 21971 was acquired by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by and between Ernesto Adman, Amparo Carino Adman, and the applicant at San Fernando, La Union, on August
27, 1990 appearing as Doc. No. 235, Page No. 47, Book No. II, Series of 1990, in the notarial register of Notary
Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Register of Deeds for the Province of La Union on September
25, 1990.[4]
FATCO, thus, prayed for the registration or confirmation of its title over these parcels of land.
On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance, as counsel for
the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union to
appear in the case.[5]
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order setting the application for initial hearing on February
28, 1995. The Order was published in the January 23, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette,[6] and the February 18-
24, 1995 issue of the Guardian.[7] The notice of hearing was, likewise, posted in a conspicuous place in each
parcel of land included in the application, and on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Bacnotan, La
Union.[8] The Provincial Prosecutor of La Union was furnished with a copy of notice of hearing on November 18,
1994.[9]
At the scheduled initial hearing on February 28, 1995, Atty. Marita Balloguing entered her appearance
as collaborating counsel for FATCO, and requested the resetting of the marking of exhibits.[10] The RTC granted
the request and issued an Order resetting the hearing to April 19, 1995, viz.:
As prayed for by Atty. Balloguing, who entered her appearance in collaboration with Atty. Ungria as
counsel for the applicant, this case is reset to April 19, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose of establishing
jurisdictional facts.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Republic, through the Provincial Prosecutor, was duly informed of the resetting.[12]
On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic and once more
deputized the Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case.[13] On the same date, the
Republic filed its Opposition to FATCOs application for registration on the following grounds: (1) neither FATCO
nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title and tax
declarations of the applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for, and do not appear to be genuine; (3) applicant (and
its predecessors-in-interest) can no longer claim ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant,
since they failed to file the appropriate application for registration within the period of six months from February
16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; (4) the parcels of land applied for forms part of the
public domain and are not subject to private appropriation; and (5) the application was belatedly filed as it was
filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1073.[14]
During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan appeared for the Republic. FATCO,
through counsel, offered in evidence the following documents to establish jurisdictional facts:

Exhibit A - Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 of Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030

Exhibit B - Technical Description
Exhibit B-1 - Certification in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate
Exhibit C - Notice of Initial Hearing from LRA
Exhibit D - Affidavit of Publication by publisher of The Guardian
Exhibit D-1 - Clipping of Publication
Exhibit E - Whole issue of The Guardian for February 18 to 24, 1995;
Exhibit E-1 - Section A of publication of said issue;
Exhibit F - Certificate of Publication from the Official Gazette/ National Printing Office;
Exhibit G - Certificate of Notification sent to Adjoining Owners (Reserved);
Exhibit H - Certificate of Publication from LRA
Exhibit I - Sheriffs Certificate of Posting
Exhibit J - Certificate of Assessment[15]

The RTC then issued an Order[16] setting the case for the reception of evidence on May 25, 1995 at 8:30
in the morning.
In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other documents and testimonial evidence to prove its title to the
parcels of land applied for. The Republic, on the other hand, did not submit evidence to controvert FATCOs
assertion.
 In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a finding that FATCO had sufficiently established its
ownership of the lands in question, ordered the registration thereof in its name, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the application and orders that the
parcels of land identified as Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030, Bacnotan Cadastre Pls-1050-D, containing an area of
EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (8,463) square meters, more or less, located at Poblacion,
Bacnotan, La Union, covered by Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 (Exh. A), and more particularly described
in the technical description, Exh. B shall be registered in the name of the applicant Fieldman Agricultural Trading
Corporation, with address at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, under the provisions of the Property Registration
Decree.
The encumbrance/mortgage of the property to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, San Fernando, La
Union Branch in the amount of Seventeen Million (P17,000,000.00) Pesos, shall accordingly be annotated at the
back of the title to be issued in the name of the applicant.
Once this decision shall become final, let a decree of registration be issued.[17]
From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the CA. It faulted the RTC for giving due course to
FATCOs application arguing that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same in view of the non-publication of
the notice of actual initial hearing. It also claimed that FATCO failed to prove open, continuous and notorious
possession of the subject properties for more than thirty (30) years, as required by law.
On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA agreed with the Republic that the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over FATCOs application because the publication of initial hearing was fatally
defective. The notice that was published in the Official Gazette and in the Guardian was the hearing set on
February 28, 1995, but no hearing was conducted on the said date. The actual initial hearing was held on April
19, 1995, a date different from what was stated in the notice, thereby defeating the very purpose of the
publication requirement.

The CA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated February
5, 1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[18]
FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 7, 2001.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by FATCO theorizing that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.[19]
In its Comment on the petition, the Republic, through the OSG, argues that:
I. NO ACTUAL HEARING WAS HELD BY THE TRIAL COURT ON FEBRUARY 28, 1995 WHICH WAS THE
PUBLISHED DATE OF INITIAL HEARING;
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION DUE TO PETITIONERS FAILURE TO PUBLISH THE NOTICE OF ACTUAL HEARING SET ON APRIL 19,
1995 AND TO POST SAID NOTICE IN CONSPICUOUS PLACES AND TO SERVE THE SAME TO ADJOINING OWNERS.
III. NO TRACING CLOTH PLAN WAS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE IN THE COURT A QUO.
IV. PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ITS OPEN, CONTINUOUS, ADVERSE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[20]
 We will deal first with the jurisdictional issue.
Section 23[21] of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, explicitly provides that before the
court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof
by means of publication, mailing, and posting.
FATCO insists that it complied with all the jurisdictional requirements, specifically the publication of the
notice of initial hearing. It, therefore, faulted the CA for reversing the RTC and, accordingly, dismissing its
application for registration.
The Republic, on the other hand, asserts that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over FATCOs
application because the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. It points out that the initial hearing
set on February 28, 1995 was reset to April 19, 1995. The actual initial hearing, therefore, took place on a date
different from what was stated in the published notice of initial hearing. Hence, re-publication of the new notice
of hearing was necessary, but FATCO failed to publish the notice of hearing set on April 19, 1995, thus, preventing
the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the application.
The Republic is correct that in land registration case, publication of the notice of initial hearing is a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith affects the jurisdiction of the court. The purpose of
publication of the notice is to require all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property
applied for, to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the application should not be
granted. [22]
It is not disputed that there was publication, mailing, and posting of the notice of the initial hearing set
on February 28, 1995. FATCO, thus, complied with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with
sufficient notice of the registration proceedings. Accordingly, as of that date, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over
FATCOs application.
Even if, at the February 28, 1995 hearing, FATCOs counsel requested a resetting, and the RTC granted
said request, the Republic and all interested parties were already fully apprised of the pendency of the
application. When the hearing was reset to April 19, 1995, interested parties, the Republic included, may be
deemed to have been given notice thereof.[23] There was, thus, no need for the re-publication of notice of
hearing, for clearly, the avowed purpose of Section 23 had already been accomplished. We, therefore, find that
the application for registration was rightfully given due course by the RTC. The CA, thus, committed reversible
error in holding otherwise.
Be that as it may, we cannot grant FATCOs plea for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision granting its
application for registration or confirmation of its imperfect title.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree explicitly states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to the land, whether personally or through their authorized representatives.
(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: first, he, by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation thereof under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, and second, the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[24]
 To prove its length of possession, FATCO offered the testimonies of Antonio Casugay, its division
manager, Emilio Paz, owner of the adjacent lot, and of Ernesto Adman and Cifirino Bucago, its predecessors-in-
interest. It also presented deeds of conveyance and several tax declarations covering the lands in question.
Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its witnesses do not serve to prove the validity of its cause.
Antonio Casugay and Emilio Paz merely stated that FATCO acquired the subject lots and had taken possession
of the same in 1988 or 1989.[25] FATCOs predecessor-in-interest, Ernesto Adman, on the other hand, testified
that he acquired ownership and possession of Lot No. 4703, also described as Lot No. 1504-A, from Victor
Dacanay only in 1983 or 1984.[26] Similarly, Cifirino Bucagos testimony[27] did not establish the period of
possession required by law over Lot No. 1234. His testimony consists merely of general statements with no
specifics as to when he began occupying the land. He did not introduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his
allegation that he possessed Lot No. 1234 for the length of time prescribed by law.
Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCOs assertion. The earliest tax declarations presented for Lot
No. 1505 and Lot No. 47030 were issued only in 1948,[28] while the earliest tax declaration for Lot No. 1234 was
issued in 1970.[29] We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it
may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.[30]
Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements which are mere conclusions of law
and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[31]
In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous and adverse possession of the subject lots since June 12, 1945. At best, FATCO can only prove
possession of Lots No. 1505 and No. 47030 since 1948, and of Lot No. 1234 since 1970. But as the law now
stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty (30) years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown too that
possession and occupation had started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the prescribed period and occupation not only as required
by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree but also by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land
Act, which states:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, even if FATCOs case is considered as one for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land
Act (CA No. 141), as amended, it would still meet the same fate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for registration of title filed by Fieldman Agricultural
Trading Corporation is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic v Batingue Development Corporation

Facts:
Respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the RTC an application for original
registration of title over a parcel of land. Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition. Thereafter, the RTC Clerk of
Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC because the assessed value of the
property was allegedly less than ₱100,000. The MTC awarded the land to respondent. On appeal, the CA
ruled that since the former had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to
raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the lower court on appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the Republic is estopped from questioning the court’s jurisdiction

Held:
The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot
be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of
the court. Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.

G.R. No. 191531 March 6, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE

AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF CECILIO AND MOISES CUIZON, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 dated 30
October 2009 rendered by the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals (L/1) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108085,
dismissing without prejudice the petition filed by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) for the
review of the 14 October 2008 Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 07-C-081.2

The Facts
On 19 September 2001, the counsel of Cecilio and Moises Cuizon (the Cuizons) wrote PEZA Director
General Lilia B. De Lima, offering said agency the priority to buy Lot Nos. 4522 and 4525 of the Opon
Cadastre, with an aggregate area of 12,124 square meters.3 Although presently situated within the Mactan
Economic Zone (MEZ), the subject lots were previously registered in the names of the Cuizons’
predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Pedro and Eugenia Tunacao, under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) Nos. RO-2428 and RO-2429 of the Lapu-Lapu City registry.4 By means of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale executed by the Heirs of the Spouses Tunacao on 11 June 1975,5 it appears that the
subject parcels were transferred in favor of the Cuizons, in whose names the same were subsequently
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 42755 and 50430.6

In a letter dated 17 October 2001, PEZA declined the offer on the ground that, in 1958, the same lots were
sold by Eugenia Tunacao in favor of the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), the predecessor of
the Bureau of Air Transportation (BAT) and the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).
Maintaining that the titles to the property were not transferred to CAA because OCT Nos. RO-2428 and
RO-2429 were reported lost or destroyed, PEZA informed the Cuizons that the deeds of sale executed in
favor of CAA were nevertheless registered under Act

3344, as amended.7 In their 8 November 2001 reply, the Cuizons, in turn, called PEZA’s attention to the
fact, among other matters, that BAT was considered to have abandoned its opposition to the reconstitution
of said OCTs. On the strength of the opinion issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) in Consulta
No. 2887 that CAA’s registration of the sale in its favor produced no legal effect, the sale of the subject
parcels to the Cuizons was registered8 and served as basis for the issuance of TCT Nos. 42755 and
50430.9

In the face of PEZA’s insistence on the government’s ownership of Lot Nos. 4522 and 4525 as well as its
refusal to heed their claim for just compensation for the use of the land, respondents Heirs of Cecilio and
Moises Cuizon brought the matter to the attention of the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industries (DTI)10 and the Office of the Ombudsman.11 Stymied by PEZA’s 10 April 2006 reply which
reiterated its position, respondents eventually wrote a letter dated 20 September 2006, apprising the Office
of the President of their claim. Docketed as O.P. Case No. 07-C-081,12 respondents’ letter was treated as
an appeal by the Office of the President which, accordingly, directed PEZA to file its Comment.13 On 14
October 2008, the Office of the President rendered a decision directing PEZA to recognize respondents’
rights over the subject parcels and to negotiate for the just compensation claimed by the latter.14 PEZA’s
motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied for lack of merit in the 9 March 2009 Resolution
issued in the case.15

On 1 April 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in representation of PEZA, filed with the CA a
motion for an extension of fifteen days or until 16 April 2009 within which to file a petition for review under
Rule 43.16 Instead of the OSG, however, it was the lawyers from PEZA’s Legal Affairs Group who, on 16
April 2009, filed the Rule 43 petition for review which was docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No.
108085.17 Served with a copy thereof, respondents moved for the denial of the petition on the ground,
among others, that PEZA’s lawyers failed to state the material dates18 and to secure authorization from the
OSG as the "principal law officer and legal defender of the government."19 Directed to do so in the CA’s 2
July 2009 Resolution,20 respondents filed their 4 August 2009 Comment reiterating their objections to and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.21 In its 7 September 2009 reply, however, PEZA asserted, that as
members of its Legal Affairs Group, its lawyers not only had legal authority to file the petition but were
constrained to do so on account of the "different position taken by the handling OSG lawyers."22

On 30 October 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, dismissing PEZA’s petition on the
ground that its lawyers had no authority to file the same absent showing that they were so authorized
under the PEZA Charter, Republic Act No. 791623 and that they were duly deputized by the OSG. The CA
ruled that, as "the statutory counsel of the government, its agencies and officials who are in the
performance of their official functions, the OSG is the only law firm, save those for the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel, who can represent the government to the exclusion of others." Brushing
aside PEZA’s claim of a stand contrary to that taken by the OSG, the CA likewise enunciated that the OSG
is "endowed with broad perspective that spans the legal interest of virtually the entire government
officialdom" and "may transcend the parochial concerns of a particular client agency and instead, promote
and protect the public weal."24 Aggrieved, PEZA filed a motion for reconsideration25 which was duly
opposed by respondents.26

On 18 January 2010, the OSG filed a manifestation informing the CA that it differed with PEZA only with
respect to the remedy to be taken from the 14 October 2008 decision in O.P. Case No. 07-C-081. While it
was in accord with the substance of the petition, the OSG maintained that, as opposed to the Rule 43
petition for review filed by PEZA, it believed that a mere administrative clarification was appropriate since
the decision rendered by the Office of the President was "not based on a prior decision/order/resolution of
an administrative agency in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions."27 On 4 March 2010, the CA issued its
Resolution denying PEZA’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit,28 hence, this petition.

The Issue

Dissatisfied, the OSG filed the petition at bench,29 seeking the reversal of the CA’s assailed decision and
resolution on the following ground:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED [PEZA’S] PETITION ON THE
GROUND THAT THERE WAS NO EXPRESS AUTHORITY FROM THE OFFICE OF THE

SOLICITOR GENERAL ALLOWING THE PEZA DIRECTOR GENERAL OR ANY OF ITS LAWYERS TO
SIGN THE PETITION OR REPRESENT PEZA BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS. 30

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

As correctly ruled by the CA, the OSG, as principal law officer and legal defender of the
government,31 possesses the unequivocal mandate to appear for and in its behalf in legal
proceedings.32 Described as an "independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of
Justice" under Sec. 34, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Executive Order 292,33 the OSG, with the Solicitor
General at its helm, is vested with the following powers and functions, among others, to wit:

SECTION 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government
of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or
head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his
official capacity is a party.

xxxx

8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor
General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought
before the courts, and exercise supervision and control over such legal Officers with respect to such
cases." (Italics supplied)
 xxxx

Unlike a practicing lawyer who can decline employment, it has been ruled that the Solicitor General cannot
refuse to perform his duty to represent the government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents
without a just and valid reason.34 Resolving a challenge against the Solicitor General’s withdrawal of his
appearance from cases involving the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in Gonzales v.
Chavez,35 the Court traced the statutory origins and transformation of the OSG and concluded that the
performance of its vested functions and duties is mandatory and compellable by mandamus.36 The Court
ratiocinated that, "sound management policies require that the government's approach to legal problems
and policies formulated on legal issues be harmonized and coordinated by a specific agency."37 Finding
that that the Solicitor General’s withdrawal of his appearance was "beyond the scope of his authority in the
management of a case," the Court enunciated that the enjoinment of the former’s duty is not an
interference with his discretion in handling the case but a directive to prevent the failure of justice.38

Considering that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, the rule is settled that actions filed in the name of the latter not initiated by the OSG are
susceptible to summary dismissal.39 Extended to include actions filed in the name of agencies or
instrumentalities of the government,40 the rule admits of an exception under Section 35 (8) Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code which empowers the OSG to "deputize legal officers of
government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or
represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases."41 In Civil Service
Commission v. Asensi,42 the Court clarified, however, that this exception should be strictly construed and is
subject to the following conditions precedent: "First, there must be an express authorization by the Office
of the Solicitor General, naming therein the legal officers who are being deputized. Second, the cases must
involve the respective offices of the deputized legal officers. And finally, despite such deputization, the
OSG should retain supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to the cases."43

Another exception is also recognized when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it is
duty bound to represent. As an independent office, after all, the OSG is "not shackled by the cause of its
client agency" and has, for its primordial concern, the "best interest of the government" which, in its
perception, can run counter to its client agency’s position in certain instances.44 The exception is traced to
the following pronouncements handed down by this Court in Orbos v. Civil Service Commission,45 to wit:

In the discharge of this task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is
upheld within the limits set by law. When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an
adverse position against another government agency, as in this case, the Solicitor General should not
refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the
court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government although it may run
counter to a client's position. In such an instance the government office adversely affected by the position
taken by the Solicitor General, if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear in its own behalf
through its legal personnel or representative.46 (Italics supplied)

While the OSG primarily invokes the second of the above-discussed exceptions in seeking the reversal of
the CA’s 30 October 2009 Decision, the record shows that it was said office which filed on 1 April 2009 a
motion for extension of time within which to file a Rule 43 petition for review on behalf of PEZA. On the last
day of the period of extension sought by the OSG, however, it was the lawyers from PEZA’s Legal Affairs
Group who, without being deputized to do so, eventually filed the petition for review assailing the 14
October 2008 Decision in O.P. Case No. 07-C-081. Confronted with respondents’ challenge of the
unexplained change of representation and prayer for dismissal of the petition, PEZA filed a 7 September
2009 reply, claiming that its lawyers had authority to represent the agency under its organizational chart.
Without any elaboration, PEZA also alleged for the first time that the OSG’s non-participation in the case
was attributable to the "different position taken by the handling OSG lawyers."
Given the lack of authorization from the OSG and the absence of a specific provision in PEZA’s Charter
authorizing the agency’s representation by lawyers from its Legal Affairs Group, we find that the CA cannot
be faulted for rejecting PEZA’s bare assertion of the contrary stand supposedly taken by the handling OSG
lawyers. Even in cases of disagreement with its client agency, it cannot be over-emphasized that it is still
incumbent upon the OSG to present to the Court the position that will legally uphold the best interests of
the Government.47 In the Orbos case which the OSG now cites as justification for PEZA’s filing of its own
petition before the CA, the Court significantly stated that it "appreciates the participation of the Solicitor
General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task. He should not therefore desist
from appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the
Government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. The Court must be advised of his position
just as well."

After signifying its intention to file a Rule 43 petition for review with its filing of a motion for extension of
time to file the same, however, the OSG did not advise the CA of its alleged difference in opinion with
PEZA. It was only after the CA had rendered the herein assailed 30 October 2009 decision and with
PEZA’s motion for reconsideration therefom already pending that, on 18 January 2010, the OSG filed its
manifestation to the effect that it actually agreed with the substance of the petition filed by PEZA’s lawyers.
The OSG belatedly clarified that it was of the belief that a Rule 43 petition for review was not the proper
remedy from the 14 October 2008 decision in O.P. Case No. 07-C-081. On the theory that said decision
was not "based on a prior decision/order/resolution of an administrative agency in the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions," the OSG maintained that a mere administrative clarification was, instead, proper under
the circumstances. 1âwphi 1

Considering that a petition for review under Rule 43 is the prescribed mode for appeal from a decision
rendered by the Office of the President, the OSG’s stand is, to say the least, incomprehensible. Aside from
the fact that respondents’ 20 September 2006 letter was clearly treated by said office as an appeal, the
record shows that PEZA actively participated in the proceedings conducted in connection therewith by
complying with the directive to file its comment and by filing its motion for reconsideration of the 14 October
2008 Decision rendered in the case. While it may be true that PEZA was not exercising a quasi-judicial
function in rejecting the Cuizons’ offer to sell the subject lots and claim of just compensation, it cannot be
gainsaid that the Office of the President was exercising a quasi-judicial function when it rendered its
decision. Having initially filed a motion for extension of time within which to file a Rule 43 petition on behalf
of PEZA, the least that the OSG could have done was to immediately inform the CA of its supposed
change of position for the same to be properly considered by the Court.

In arguing that its filing of the aforesaid manifestation on 18 January 2010 effectively cured the PEZA
lawyers’ lack of authorization, the OSG clearly espouses a procedural shortcut egregiously contrary to the
Court’s pronouncement in the Asensi case. Granted that the case before the CA involved PEZA,
deputation of its lawyers not only requires express authorization from the OSG but also its retention of
supervision and control over the lawyer deputized. In Republic v. Hon. Aniano Desierto,48 this Court
admittedly gave due course to the petition filed by the PCGG despite the initial lack of participation by the
OSG, on the ground that the latter’s subsequent signature as co-counsel in the Consolidated Reply filed in
the case effectively cured the defect of authorization. Without belaboring the fact that the OSG’s
manifestation in this case was filed after the CA already dismissed PEZA’s petition, said ruling cannot,
however, detract us from the principle that exceptions made to the OSG’s mandate should be strictly
construed.

To Our mind, the fact that OSG now finds itself in the queer position of defending a mode of appeal it
priorly claimed to be improper in the premises only serves to emphasize the importance of strict adherence
to its statutory mandate and compliance with the requirements for exceptions thereto. By and of itself, even
the OSG’s very act of filing of the petition at bench is, in fact, a telling commentary on the PEZA lawyers’
lack of authority to represent said agency. Owing to the mandatory character of the exercise of its
functions, it stands to reason that the OSG cannot arbitrarily abdicate the same in the course of
proceedings involving a client-agency and only insist on the performance thereof in the event that the
handling of the case by the lawyers of the client agency results in an adverse decision. As with the
allowance of the OSG’s withdrawal from a case without justifiable reason, for such an action to remain
unchallenged could well signal the laying down of the novel and unprecedented doctrine that the
representation by the Solicitor General of the Government enunciated by law is, after all, not mandatory
but merely directory.49

At any rate, it bears pointing out that the dismissal of PEZA’s petition was specifically characterized by the
CA to be without prejudice. Contrasted from a dismissal with prejudice which disallows and bars the filing
of a complaint or initiatory pleading,50 a dismissal without prejudice - while by no means any less final51 -
plainly indicates that the re-filing of the petition is not barred.52 While it is true that the petition for review
under Rule 43 is required to be filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order
or resolution x x x or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo,"53 we find that the OSG, in the interest of
substantial justice, may be granted a fresh period of fifteen ( 15) days within which to re-file the petition
before the CA. In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may, after all, relax the stringent
application of the technical rules where, as here, strong considerations of substantial justice are
manifest. 54 We find this pro hac vice pronouncement necessary if only to emphasize the fact that the
OSG's performance of its functions is mandatory.

In fine, the Solicitor General is the government officer mandated to "represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Comi, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party." 55 Absent showing of authority under the PEZA Chmier and or proper deputation from the OSG, we
find that the petition for review filed by the lawyers from PEZA's Legal Affairs Group was correctly
dismissed, albeit without prejudice, by the CA. The fact that the OSG and PEZA differed with respect to the
choice of remedy to be pursued in the premises Heitl1er automatically excused the former's non-
involvement in the case nor authorize the latter to pursue the same on its own. Even if it differs with its
client-agency anent the substance of case or the procedure to be taken with respect thereto, the OSG is
nevertheless duty bound to present its position to the Court as an officer thereof and in compliance with its
ineluctable mandate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The OSG is given a fresh
period of fifteen ( 15) days from notice within which to file its petition before the CA.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

REPUBLIC v. SPS. CASTUERA

G.R. No. 203384; January 14, 2015

FACTS:
Valiente sold a parcel of land to Sps. Castuera. Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an application for original
registration of title over the property which was granted by the RTC for they have shown preponderantly that
they are the lawful owners in fee simple and thus entitled to judicial confirmation of their imperfect title on said
land, but was opposed by the Solicitor General alleging that CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. CA affirmed RTC’s decision on appeal, subsequent MR was denied.
ISSUE:
WON the advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable
character of the property.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious. The advance plan and the CENRO certification are insufficient proofs of the alienable
and disposable character of the property. The Spouses Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must
present a certified true copy of the DENR Secretary’s declaration or classification of the land as alienable and
disposable.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana

Republic of the Philippines vs. Zenaida Guinto-Aldana
G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of land, professing
themselves to be co-owners of these lots having acquired them by succession from their predecessors.
That until the time of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of an owner
and that they had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate
taxation. In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the pertinent tax
declarations, together with the receipts of payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application for the
reason that the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition in good faith or of prior possession in the concept of an owner.

ISSUE:

WON respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously, exclusively
and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership.

HELD:

Respondents’ possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates back to as early as

1937 when the property had already been declared for taxation by respondent’s father. Respondents
could have produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, the relevant portions of
the tax records on file with the Provincial Assessor had been burned when its office was razed by fire in
1997. With the tax assessments therecame next tax payments. Respondents’ receipts for tax
expenditures were likewise in therecords and in these documents the predecessors of respondents were
the named owners of the property. Tax declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence
ofownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of an owner. No one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. Indeed, respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the government or
from any private individual. Itself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving
of protection under the law.