FIRE AS A WEAPON

InfoBrief

International Public Safety Association

February 2019

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ABOUT
This document, the International Public Safety Association InfoBrief: Fire as a Weapon, was
developed by members of the IPSA’s Rescue Task Force Committeei. This document is meant to serve
as a resource to help facilitate inter-departmental conversations, training, exercises and policies.

FIRE AS A WEAPON EXPLAINED

Most first responders have a keen understanding of the devastation, urgency, lethality and
complexity connected to incidents involving fire. These characterizations are magnified when the fire,
whether intentional or not, is a component of an act of violence or terror.

In general terms, fire as a weapon is the incorporation of fire or the effects of fire as part of a
complex act of aggression against innocent victims. Examples include using fire as one component in
an offensive attack to harm others or using fire as a defensive weapon to deny access to hostages or
victims.

As a tool of terror, fire is cheap, simple, effective and dramatic.

FIRE IMPACTS TACTICAL RESPONSE

Fire complicates access, limits resource allocation and hampers the ability to maintain tactical
dominance in the target area. Additionally, fires grow quickly and intensely, weaken structural
integrity, and diminish tenability of the affected environment. All these factors combine to
accelerate the strategic and tactical decision-making timeline, reduce the opportunities available to
effect rescue, and ultimately limit options for optimal mitigation of the situation.

Simply stated, first responders must decide quicker, act faster and may not be able to use all options
normally available to the scenario if fire were not involved. Terrorism is theater, and fire can certainly
steal the show.ii

ESTABLISHING A FIRE ATTACK TEAM

Fire as a weapon continues to be referenced and promoted in foreign terrorist organization literature
and messaging. Given this, public safety agencies are beginning to seriously assess their preparation
for, response to and mitigation of fire as a weapon incident. If not already, “fire departments and law
enforcement agencies, regardless of size or capacity, should find ways to coordinate appropriate and
effective responses to [fire as a weapon incidents].”iii

While each jurisdiction may have different resources, political and economic considerations, target
hazards, critical infrastructure and other factors that influence their specific tactics, techniques and
procedures, there are some common factors to consider, both operational and jurisdictional, when
developing these response protocols.

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The make-up of the fire attack team and how to integrate force protection is a basic operational
consideration.

• Is it ever necessary for law enforcement to enter the immediately dangerous to life or health
(IDLH) areas with fire personnel? If so, they must have the same PPE, communications
capabilities and be trained to use their weapons in such an environment.
• Is law enforcement only operating peripheral to the IDLH environment, using fire personnel to
keep the fire danger in check while still maintaining the capability to reach their objective?
• Consideration needs to be given to an overwatch of the incident. A sniper and spotter
occupying an elevated position would be an example of overwatch, protecting exposed water
supply and fire attack lines.
• Incident overwatch dovetails with another operational consideration – avenues of
approach. Determining an appropriate avenue of approach to the involved structure mean
considering team vulnerability during movement, fire attack options and preferences, and the
tactical plan for law enforcement operations. Using cover and concealment for advancing law
enforcement officers is one thing, but adding the slower movement of firefighters in bunker
gear and SCBA and stretching hose lines and breaching adds a completely different dynamic.
• How vulnerable is the water supply source? Understanding that a sudden, unanticipated loss
of water supply could result in death or serious bodily injury to interior personnel is a critical
consideration for personnel deployment.

DOCUMENTING FIRE AS AN INCIDENT OBJECTIVES

Identifying the incident objectives necessary to bring the situation to a successful conclusion is a key
operational consideration when it comes to fire as a weapon incidents. By starting with these
ultimate incident objectives, backwards planning ensures that fire and law enforcement personnel
are not inadvertently inserted into no-win situations or geographical areas, including having entry
teams in environments misaligned to their training and PPE.

At a minimum, emergency personnel face a complex risk assessment, which at a minimum

include: the fire, heat and smoke; the fire’s effect on the structure; and the human threat.

Responders need to be trained to ask themselves:

• Where are the life hazards located?

• What tactics are we using to affect a rescue?
• Are we seeking containment or total extinguishment?
• Do entry teams need to split up to simultaneously address multiple tasks and/or geographical
areas?
• How much ventilation is needed and what options are available?
• Considering the environment, what is the best route to this location?
• What entry and access options are available?
• Where is the best place for apparatus and water supply placement?

Taking the time to work backwards helps to prevent wasted time, effort, movement and
casualties. Incorporated into these incident objectives will be the jurisdiction’s priorities of work.

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• Is it life safety and incident stabilization?

• Is there a distinction between innocents, bad guys, fire and law enforcement personnel in that
life safety consideration?
• What about when the threats have been eliminated?
• Do the incident objectives and priorities of work then change?

Consider the differences in addressing a fire that resulted from the deployment of a gas canister into
a structure during a hostage situation versus a lone barricaded person with no other life safety
hazards. The variables involved in a fire as a weapon environment may often be more unpredictable
than, for example, a residential structure fire. Adding the human element to any threat matrix
creates an entirely new level of unpredictability, which necessitates a higher degree of adaptability.

EQUIPMENT
In addition to operational considerations at fire as a weapon incidents, there are considerations
specific to jurisdictions and available resources. For example, equipment issues need to be
addressed.

• Is there a plan for communications between fire and law enforcement? This communications
plan is critical especially for interior crews.
• What environments do you want your responders to be able to operate in?
• Do fire crews need to use ballistic gear?
• Does law enforcement need SCBA and bunker gear?
• Does the fire department need an armored vehicle equipped for fire operations?
• Or, if needed, are they able to operate from a law enforcement armored vehicle?

JOINT FIRE AS A WEAPON TRAINING

Fire and law enforcement personnel increasingly work together in various joint operations, including
civil unrest environments, active shooter and hostile event responses incorporating rescue task forces
and unified command. While these incident types are excellent foundations for combined operations,
they do not take the place of deliberate planning and training for fire as a weapon incidents.

Joint training and cross-training are imperative, as is learning the appropriate times to implement
each strategy or tactic. To start, law enforcement must understand the dynamics of fire, the
difficulties of advancing hose lines and the different options for water supply.

Firefighters must understand tactical response considerations, priorities and movement. How is
overall command and control of the incident assigned? If there is a hostile human element to the
incident, law enforcement should be in command. However, does operational and tactical control
change depending on the specific threat confronting personnel, and does everyone understand when
those transitions occur?

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SUMMARY

Society will always have to balance consumer access against defending violent crimes. As we harden
our defenses, the incendiary threat becomes even more attractive. Recognizing that each jurisdiction
may address fire as a weapon issues differently, it is very challenging to comprehensively identify
every strategic or tactical approach that address all possible variables and possibilities. Just as law
enforcement and fire operations independently can be complex and multi-faceted, fire as a weapon
is a topic requiring a depth of consideration that is beyond this report; however, answering the
questions addressed herein is a good starting point to find the operational model best suited to the
needs of your jurisdiction.

Leon Panetta, who has served as Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, and the White House
Chief of Staff, states that, “In a democracy, you can govern either by leadership or by crisis.”iv The
same also holds true in public safety – you can either lead with vision or by crisis.

Fire as a weapon is not a distant thought, it is a threat, and one for which we need to be
prepared. Perfecting public safety response to new threats generally does not happen very fast. We
are many years into the realization that active shooter and hostile events have permanently shifted
public safety response paradigms, yet we still have a lot to learn and progress to make.

Use this report to start the discussion for preparing for fire as a weapon now, instead of waiting to
react.

REFERENCES
i
A subgroup of the IPSA’s Rescue Task Force Committee was created to develop this document. The members included
Fire Lieutenant Michael Lugo, Fire Lieutenant George Steiner, Battalion Chief J. Scott Quirarte, Senior Patrol Officer Ean
Esposito, Assistant Fire Chief Michael Armanini and Executive Director Heather R. Cotter.
ii
Brian Jenkins; International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare; June 1974;
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P5261.pdf
iii
Urban Fire Forum Position Statement: Fire and Smoke as a Weapon, September 2014;
https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/Membership/member-sections/Metro
iv
http://www.ppic.rg/blog/Leon-panetta-on-leadership-and-crisis/

© Copyright 2019. International Public Safety Association, a 501(c)3 non-profit.

www.joinipsa.org