CASE DIGEST: People v. Genosa, GR No.

135981
Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal
Code

Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which ultimately led to
his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was her
husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and
abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant,
after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The
appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of
parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from
battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life,
and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual –
grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument that
preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first
year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of
a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the
case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome”
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman
syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,” which has three
phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent)
phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between
the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of
Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill
her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the
rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-
defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -
- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not
arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2)
mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as
appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless
she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
CASE DIGEST: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852
Title: Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852
Subject Matter: Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code to
R.A. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004)

Facts:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two female children were
born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan
filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy
with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included in the petition
for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

Held:

Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the offender be ralted
or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provides for the
suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on
a particular matter.
Conspiracy and the Anti-VAWC law
Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against her husband Steven
and her parents-in-law, spouses Pecto Yan and Ramona Yan before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
her parents-in-law, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.”

However, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.”
Are parents-in-law covered by R.A. No. 9262?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The SC ruled that “while RA 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
RPC.

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

“The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.”

"Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, fellester.blogspot.com the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals."

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the
present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best
ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius” finds no application here. It
must be remembered that this maxim is only an “ancillary rule of statutory construction.” It is not of universal application.
Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest
and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. (Tan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 168852,
September 30, 2008)
Ang vs CA
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

Facts: Irish Sagud and Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora. They became “on-and-
off” sweethearts towards the end of 2004. Irish learned that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his
wife), whom he had gotten pregnant. Irish broke up with Rustan.

Before Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish to elope with him. Irish rejected the proposal. Irish
changed her cellphone number but Rustan managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan
used two cellphone numbers. Irish to ask him to leave her alone.

Irish received a multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with
Irish’s face superimposed on the figure. The sender was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan
used.

Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly
scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture through the internet.

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used. Irish asked Rustan to meet her
at a resort. When Rustan was walking towards Irish, police officers intercepted and arrested him. They
searched him and seized his cellphone and several SIM cards.

Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at as she needed his help in
selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone
and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.

Rustan further claims that Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious
text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan
claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his
cellphone. This is why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from him. Rustan claims that it
was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish.

RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On appeal CA affirm the RTC decision.

Issue: Whether or not Rustan is guilty of the violation of RA 9262.

Held: The provisions of RA 9262 indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the
woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Section 3(e) provides that a “dating relationship” includes a situation where the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Rustan claims that, being
“romantically involved,” implies sexual relations. R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against
women refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. The law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a
dating relationship.

Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment. The law punishes “any act or series of acts” that constitutes violence against women. A single
act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect
women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one
could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress.
He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized
by them.

Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced. What is obscene and injurious to an offended
woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman
on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and,
to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade,
would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is
that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see.

Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish. His defense was that he himself received
those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to
her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who
sent the messages to him to authenticate the same.
 GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013

FACTS:

The petitioner, George Bongalon, was charged of child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act
No. 7610. He allegedly struck Jayson, a minor, with his hand and slapped him on the face after the latter threw stones at
George's daughter.

The RTC found George guilty as charged. This was affirmed by the CA, but the said court modified the penalty.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the SC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, ROC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy.

2. Whether the petitioner is guilty of child abuse, under RA 7610.

RULING:

1. No. The SC held that the petitioner adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction.
His proper recourse from the affirmance of his conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed
a petition for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari.

The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy
designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive.

Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision–not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. The
proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in his petition. The
allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if
appeal was available as a proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his petition
indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant
during the commission of the crime that he claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and
specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt for the crime charged.
The errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and assessment of the evidence on
record, which really are errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

2. No. The SC held that petitioner is not guilty of child abuse, but rather of the crime of slight physical injury only.

Despite the procedural transgression, the court continued to rule on the substantive issue. According to the SC, the
records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the laying of hands by George on Jayson had been intended to
debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and
in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters
who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse. Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner
was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic
Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse.
Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS: On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening
procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s
house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him “sissy”; that the petitioner
confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like “strangers” and “animals”; that the petitioner struck Jayson at
the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and
challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner;
that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent
medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two
medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered contusions.

Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan
after his minor daughters had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning
Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.

Crime charged: child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610

RTC: found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged

CA: affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was guilty of the crime charged and that even assuming that he was guilty, his liability
should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect her two minor daughters (ONLY SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES;
PENALTY IS MITIGATED)

HELD: Although the Court affirms the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, it disagrees with their holding that his acts constituted
child abuse within the purview of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610.

The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the
“intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of
his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just
suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his selfcontrol, he lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child
abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo, every doubt is resolved in favor of the
petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. Considering that
Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries
under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. In
imposing the correct penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation
under Article 13(6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing
the exercise of his will power. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent.

Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the
penalty imposed not exceeding one year, the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
Olivares VS. CA GR 163866

FACTS:

Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and kissing the lips of Cristina Elitiong,
a 16-year old high school student employed by the former in making sampaguita garlands during weekends. The trial
court found him guilty; affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him was violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense
for which he is being charged.

Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610.

Held:

Yes.

The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and
touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental
circumstances. The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, is likewise present.

Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated
by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred only
once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that
Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” because Congress really intended
to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse.

As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the information, the SC ruled that:
Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information, hence he was adequately
informed of the age of the complainant.