Case Brief: Echegaray vs.

Secretary of Justice

JANUARY 23, 2018JEFF REY

G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty
Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the
court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition.

RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of
execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the
rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to
prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and
Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of
execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to mantain
status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until
resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading
citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty
and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection
is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE :

WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an undue
delegation of legislative power

HELD:

THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each department
has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In
Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.” (what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is “
Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task
of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in
the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final and executory, still has
jurisdiction over the case

Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the
finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even
after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute andenforce it.

The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essentialaspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot
be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether
civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
comform to law and justice.

The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO, the Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can
be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence
is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In
the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by
reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be
considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. To contend
that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate
the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government.