Without the necessity of inquiring into
FELOBELLO V. PALATINO
72 PHIL. 441
G.R. No. L-48100
FACTS:
Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo
warranto proceedings in the CFI
against respondent Palatino, the
mayor-elect of Torrijos, Marinduque.
He alleged that the respondent, having
been criminally convicted bi final
judgment in 1912 and sentenced to
imprisonment, was disqualified from
voting and being voted upon for the
contested municipal office, such
disqualification not having been
removed by plenary pardon granted
by the President on Dec. 25, 1940.
From the records, it is admitted that
the respondent committed the offense
more than 25 years ago; that he had
already been merited conditional
pardon from the Gov. General in 1915;
that thereafter he had exercised the
right of suffrage, was elected councilor
for the period of 1918-1921; was
elected municipal president of
Torrijos three times in succession
(1922-1931) and finally elected mayor
in the 1940 local elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absolute pardon
had the effect of removing the
disqualification incident to criminal
conviction under Sec. 94 of Election
Code, the pardon having been granted
after the election but before the date
fixed by law for assuming office.
RULING:
the historical background of the
benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt
the broad view expressed in Cristobal
vs. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941,
promulgated December 7, 1940, that
subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action; that an absolute
pardon not only blots out the crime
committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction, and that
when granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the
consequences of conviction.
While there may be force in the
argument which finds support in well
considered cases that the effect of
absolute pardon should not be
extended to cases of this kind, we are
of the opinion that the better view in
the light of the constitutional grant in
this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily
restrict or impair the power of the
Chief Executive who, after inquiry into
the environmental facts, should be at
liberty to atone the rigidity of the law
to the extent of relieving completely
the party or parties concerned from
the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction. In
the case at bar, it is admitted that the
respondent mayor-elect committed
the offense more than 25 years ago;
that he had already merited
conditional pardon from the
Governor-General in 1915; that
thereafter he had exercised the right
of suffrage, was elected councilor of
Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period
1918 to 1921; was elected municipal
president of that municipality three
times in succession (1922-1931); and
finally elected mayor of the
municipality in the election for local
officials in December, 1940.
Under these circumstances, it is
evident that the purpose in granting
him absolute pardon was to enable
him to assume the position in
deference to the popular will; and the
pardon was thus extended on the date
mentioned hereinabove and before
the date fixed in section 4 of the
Election Code for assuming office. We
see no reason for defeating this
wholesome purpose by a restrictive
judicial interpretation of the
constitutional grant to the Chief
Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy
to executive action and disregard
what at bottom is a technical o
GARCIA-PADILLA V ENRILE
FACTS:
Nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees
herein were arrested when three (3)
teams of the PC/INP of conducted a
raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora
Parong who were having a conference.
4 other detainees were arrested the
next day
The (14) detainees were all detained
at the PC/INP Command
Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya until their transfer to an
undisclosed place.
Petition for the writ of habeas corpus
and mandamus filed by Josefina
Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained
petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.
The mandamus aspect of the instant
petition has, however, become moot
and academic, the whereabouts of
petitioners having already become
known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-
Padilla.
Petitioner: “arrest of petitioners was
patently unlawful and illegal since it
was effected without any warrant of
arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team
which made the arrest were only
armed with a search warrant”.
Nowhere in said warrant was
authority given to make arrests, much
less detention; that the search warrant
which authorized respondents to seize
"subversive documents, firearms of
assorted calibers, medicine and other
subversive paraphernalia" in the
house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong
was a roving and general warrant and
is, therefore, illegal per se because it
does not state specifically the things
that are to be seized
No criminal charges have as of yet
been filed against any of the detainees;
there is no judgment, decree, decision
or order from a court of law which
would validate the continued
detention of the petitioner; that while
it is true that a purported telegram
stating the issuance of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was shown
to the detainees on or about July 11
and 12, 1982, but counsel and the
detainees have not yet been given a
copy of such PCO, nor notified of its
contents, raising a doubt whether such
commitment order has in fact been
issued.
Respondents are denying the
detainees their constitutional right to
counsel, averring that the detainees
were allowed regular visits by counsel
and relatives during their period of
detention
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not petitioners'
detention is legal
2.Whether or not the issuance of a
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
has provided the legal basis of the
detention of herein detainees
following their arrest for Proclamation
No. 2045 covered offenses
RULING:
(1) Yes. Prior thereto to the arrest, the
detainees were identified as members
of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CCP) engaging in
subversive activities and using the
house of detainee Dra. Aurora Parong
in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their
headquarters.
Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine
(9) detainees mentioned scampered
towards different directions leaving
on top of their conference table
numerous subversive documents,
periodicals, pamphlets, books,
correspondence, stationaries, and
other papers, including a plan on how
they would infiltrate the youth and
student sector (code-named YORK).
Also found were one (1) .38 cal.
revolver with eight (8) live bullets,
nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition
for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand
six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00)
cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds,
assorted medicine packed and ready
for distribution, and sizeable quantity
of printing paraphernalia, which were
then seized.
There is no doubt that circumstances
attendant in the arrest of the herein
detainees fall under a situation where
arrest is lawful even without a judicial
warrant as specifically provided for
under Section 6(a), Rules 113 of the
Rules of Court and allowed under
existing jurisprudence on the matter.
As provided therein, a peace officer or
a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when the
person to be arrested has committed
or actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence.
The arrest of persons involved in the
rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing
non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an
armed conflict, to quell the rebyellion,
than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense
is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a
judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of
violence against goarrest and
detention of persons ordered by the
President through the issuance of
Presidential Commitment Order (PCO)
is merely preventivevernment forces,
or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious
movement.
 the suspension of the writ was a
(2) No answer. Political Question political question to be resolved solely
by the president. It was also noted
Reverting to the ruling of Montenegro that the suspension of the privilege of
vs. Castañeda that the President's the writ of habeas corpus must,
decision to suspend the privilege of indeed, carry with the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus is "final and the right to bail, if the government’s
conclusive upon the courts, and all campaign to the rebellion is to be
other persons." enhanced and rendered effective. If
the right to bail may be demanded
Under LOI 1211, a Presidential during the continuance of the
Commitment Order, the issuance of rebellion, and those arrested, captured
which is the exclusive prerogative of and detained in the course thereof will
the President under the Constitution, be released, they would, without the
may not be declared void by the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in
courts, under the doctrine of "political the field thereby jeopardizing the
question," as has been applied in the success of government efforts to end
Baker and Castañeda cases, on any the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
ground, let alone its supposed
violation of the provision of LOI 1211,
thus diluting, if not abandoning, the
doctrine of the Lansang case. The
supreme mandate received by the
President from the people and his
oath to do justice to every man should
be sufficient guarantee, without need
of judicial overseeing, against
commission by him of an act of
arbitrariness in the discharge
particularly of those duties imposed
upon him for the protection of public
safety which in itself includes the
protection of life, liberty and property.
This Court is not possessed with the
attribute of infallibility that when it
reviews the acts of the President in
the exercise of his exclusive power, for
possible fault of arbitrariness, it would
not itself go so far as to commit the
self-same fault.

The questioned power of the

president to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus was once
again held as discretionary in the
president. The SC again reiterated that