Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:

xxxx

(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;

xxxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in
every civilized and democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to
abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded
against. As the Code Commission noted,
xxxx

(3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms
named are not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not
come within the pale of the penal law. It is in these cunning devices of suppressing
or curtailing freedom, which are not criminally punishable, where the greatest
danger to democracy lies. The injured citizen will always have, under the new Civil
Code, adequate civil remedies before the courts because of the independent civil
action, even in those instances where the act or omission complained of does not
constitute a criminal offense.[24]
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but
also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32
of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under
this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its
main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights.[25] It suffices
that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

In the present case, as priorly stated, petitioners had, by their own claim, already
received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union
office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning
of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched
the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain
one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay.
The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling under
any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by law.
Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against
unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code.

In MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[26] a case for unfair competition, the
progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the
stores of the therein private respondents’ premises showed that there was sufficient
time for the therein petitioners and the raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant.
Yet they did not apply for one. They went on with the raid and seized the goods of
the therein private respondents. Under the circumstances, this court upheld the
grant of damages by the trial court to the therein private respondents for violation
of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

As for petitioners’ contention that property rights justified the search of the union
office, the same does not lie. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the
office, had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.[27]

Neither does petitioners’ claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to
enter the union office lie. Babay’s account of why petitioners and company went to
the union office – to consider Panlilio’s suggestion to settle the mauling incident is
more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they
were armed with a search warrant.

While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication
cannot be presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual
intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof.[28] There must be proof of
the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other words, the waiver
must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The evidence shows
otherwise, however.

That a violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can
be the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article
2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code, there is no doubt. Since the complaint[29]
filed before the trial court was for damages due to malicious prosecution and
violation of constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, the award by the
trial court of actual damages to respondent union was correctly set aside by the
appellate court.
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person “directly or indirectly”
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32;
the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.[30] Such being the case, petitioners, together with
Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly
and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual
respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32,
in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxxx

(6) Illegal search;

xxxx

(10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners magnify the citation by the appellate court of Aruta allegedly “to justify
[their] liability” under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which petitioners allege is
erroneous as said case did not involve Article 32.

Aruta was, however, cited by the appellate court, not to justify petitioners’ liability
but to rule out the legality of the search in the union office as the search was not
done as an incident of a lawful arrest.

Petitioners cite People v. Marti[31] to support their thesis that the determinants in
the validity of the constitutional right against searches and seizure cannot be
invoked against private individuals.

But the ruling of this Court in Marti, a criminal case, bears on the issue of whether
“an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of [one’s] constitutional rights,
[may] be invoked against the State.” In other words, the issue in that case was
whether the evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
without the participation of the State, is admissible.

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. AND JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO,

PETITIONERS, VS. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA
BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, AND GLOWHRAIN-
SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, RESPONDENTS.
The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III
of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Sec. 3. xxx

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Said constitutional provisions are safeguards against reckless, malicious and
unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. The Court, in Villanueva v.
Querubin,[14] underscored their importance:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily
one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to be guarded is a
man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called
upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his
life. In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work could fitly characterize
this constitutional right as the embodiment of "a spiritual concept: the belief that to
value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and
that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and
then only under stringent procedural safeguards."[15]

A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of the constitutional provision.[16] Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the
"fruits" of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding."[17]

The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority
prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are
several instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of
the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search;[18] when the owner of the
premises waives his right against such incursion;[19] when the search is incidental to
a lawful arrest;[20] when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs
laws;[21] when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws;[22] when it involves prohibited articles in plain
view;[23] when it involves a "stop and frisk" situation;[24] when the search is under
exigent and emergency circumstances;[25] or in cases of inspection of buildings and
other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations.[26] In
these instances, a search may be validly made even without a warrant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO

COMPACION Y SURPOSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution.[16] Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.[17] Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may
choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is
against transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court
in the case of People v. Marti,[18] “[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.”[19] The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.[20]

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee
and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BASHER
BONGCARAWAN Y MACARAMBON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights
only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any
aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its
agencies.[16] Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this
case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant
at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures. The search was done pursuant
to the usual practice of Roque whenever appellant was absent.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. JOHN PETER HIPOL, APPELLANT.

But this claim is belied by the overwhelming evidence pointing to accused-appellant

as the possessor of the fatal weapon. Charmaine testified that the fatal gun, when
exhibited in court, was the gun she saw on the night her mother was shot. And
weeks earlier, she said, it was the same gun which she saw with his father.
Defense witness, Antonio Gabac, when asked by the Las Piñas police investigators
to surrender the gun, claimed that the same was surrendered to him by accused-
appellant shortly after the shooting incident. The possession of the fatal gun by
accused-appellant is further established by the memorandum receipt signed by
accused-appellant himself and a mission order authorizing him to carry the said
weapon (p. 66, Rollo). But accused-appellant claims that these documents were
illegally procured in grave violation of his constitutional right to privacy of
communication and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and
seizure (p. 154, ibid.).

The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies. The case in point is People
vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the occasion to rule that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the
immunity of one’s person from interference by government and it cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion.

In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered by
accused-appellant’s father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private citizen. Certainly, a
search warrant is dispensable.

[ G.R. No. 109279-80, January 18, 1999 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
OCTAVIO MENDOZA Y LANDICHO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual.[17] It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain
rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant,
rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government
has the duty to protect.[18] Governmental power is not unlimited and the
Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against
aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies [ G.R. No. 132154, June 29,
2000 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
PACITO ORDOÑO Y NEGRANZA ALIAS ASING AND APOLONIO
MEDINA Y NOSUELO ALIAS POLING, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

The Court in the landmark case of People v. Marti[39] clarified the proper dimensions
of the Bill of Rights.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law
of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom?
Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the
query which he himself posed, as follows:
"First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence
of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state.
The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and
other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in
the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder." (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas; Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674;
July 17,1986; Italics supplied)[40]
I do not doubt that requiring notice and hearing prior to termination for just cause
is an admirable sentiment borne out of basic equity and fairness. Still, it is not a
constitutional requirement that can impose itself on the relations of private persons
and entities. Simply put, the Bill of Rights affords protection against possible State
oppression against its citizens, but not against an unjust or repressive conduct by a
private party towards another.

Juxtaposed with Article 32[19] of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into
the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on
account of an act or omission that violates a constitutional right only if it results in
a particular wrong or injury to the former. This is consistent with this Court's
pronouncement in its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for "tort for
impairment of rights and liberties."[20]

It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff, meaning a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing
it. Indeed, central to an award of tort damages is the premise that an individual
was injured in contemplation of law.[21] Thus, in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,[22] we
granted the petitioner's claim for damages because he, in fact, suffered the loss of
his motor launch due to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,[23] we upheld the right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there
was an injury sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding of his
horserace prize winnings.

42 U.S. Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
presents a parallel to our own Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper
proceeding for redress.
This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many petitioners
intending to win liability cases against government officials when they violate the
constitutional rights of citizens.

Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of

Investigation,[36] has emerged as the leading case on the victim's entitlement to
recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and
unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. In this case, federal narcotics
officers broke into Bivens' home at 6:30 a.m. without a search warrant and in the
absence of probable cause. The agents handcuffed Bivens, searched his premises,
employed excessive force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a visual
strip search in the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated
and booked him. When Bivens was brought before a United States Commissioner,
however, charges against him were dismissed. On the issue of whether violation of
the Fourth Amendment "by a federal agent acting under color of authority gives rise
to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his constitutional conduct," the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for injuries he
suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance, in Scheuer v.

Rhodes,[37] a liability suit for money damages was allowed against Ohio Governor
James Rhodes by petitioners who represented three students who had been killed
by Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State University as they protested against
U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In Wood v. Strickland,[38] local school board members
were sued by high school students who argued that they had been deprived of
constitutional due process rights when they were expelled from school for having
spiked a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a full hearing. In
Butz v. Economou,[39] Economou, whose registration privilege as a commodities
futures trader was suspended, without prior warning, by Secretary of Agriculture
Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action, alleging that the suspension was aimed at
"chilling" his freedom of expression right under the First Amendment. A number of
other cases[40] with virtually the same conclusion followed.

However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax

officials and employees may prosper, if we consider the pronouncement of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,[41] that a Bivens remedy will not be allowed
when other "meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated
as (is the plaintiff)" are available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not
appropriate in the civil service system[42] or in the military justice system.[43]

In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States

of America,[44] petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action against agents of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he (Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax
liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment, confiscated Vennes' business, forced a
total asset sale, and put Vennes out of business, when in fact he owed not a dime.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled:
The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayer's remedies
under the Internal Revenue Code preclude such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us
no contrary authority, and we have found none. Though the Supreme Court has not
addressed this precise question, it has strongly suggested that the district court
correctly applied Bivens:
When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided
what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that
may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens
remedies.
/