WILLS (Ilagan & Taleon) Full Text 01 Arts. 774-803

WILLS
(Wills and Succession)

Atty. Ilagan | 3D | A.Y. 2018-2019
ARTS. 774-803
No. Case Title Pages Page
1 Alvarez v. IAC, G.R. No. 68053, May 7, 1990 9 2
2 Gevero v. IAC, G.R. No. 77029, August 30, 1990 6 11
3 Locsin v. CA, G.R. No. 89783, February 19, 1992 10 17
4 Opulencia v. CA, G.R. No. 125835, July 30, 1998 9 27
5 Emnace v. CA, G.R. No. 126334, November 23, 2001 12 36
6 Rabadilla v. CA, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000 16 48
7 Tañedo v. CA, G.R. No. 104482, January 22, 1996 7 64
8 Sps. Santos v. Sps. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007 12 71
9 NHA v. Almeida, G.R. No. 162784, June 22, 2007 9 83
10 People v. Umali, G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 6 92
11 Torres v. Lopez, G.R. No. 24569, February 26, 1926 32 98
12 Aluad v. Aluad, G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 8 130
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 68053. May 7, 1990.]
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ ,

petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO
YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES , respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioners.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
DECISION
FERNAN , C.J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the
decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court
dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr.
Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay
jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing
the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the
sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages
and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court
dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision. llcd
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identi ed as Lot 773-A
and Lot 773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of
Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was
registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certi cate of
Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of
Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Ru no, Felipe and Teodora.
Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of
Ru no who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario
Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito)
Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three
hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots
which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show
whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is
established that Ru no and his children left the province to settle in other places
as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the
"Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question
but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar
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produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella
(Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued
Transfer Certi cate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area
of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of
Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT
No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was
also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 under
TCT No. RT-2695 (28192). 4 Said transfer certi cate of title also contains a
certi cation to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No.
8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B.
Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on
February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's
name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the
administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) led in Special
Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a
motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B 7 By virtue of a court
order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold
said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958. TCT Nos. T-
23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to
Rosendo Alvarez. 1 0
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her
brother Ru no, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, led in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia
Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for
the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also
prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the ling of
the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said
accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them,
and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form
of attorney's fees. 1 1
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez
sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 1 2
Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 1 3 who, thereafter,
declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 1 4
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in
behelf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, led a manifestation in
Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and
quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia
Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above entitled case." 1 5
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which
reads: cdll
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo

Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral
Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certi cates
of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and
thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED." 1 6
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was
not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to
Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he
discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they
were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and
that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per
writ of execution." 1 7
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance,
herein private respondents (the Yaneses) led on July 31, 1965, in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certi cate
of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to
Rosendo Alvarez. 1 8 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the
certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason led a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-
A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable
consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said
propert(ies)"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 1 9 could not be
enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the decision in Civil
Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not
a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become nal and executory. 2 0
Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of
September 4, 1965, nulli ed its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the
certificates of title mentioned therein. 2 1
In 1968, the Yaneses led an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 2 2 In its order of
September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the
Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question,
ruled that the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was
not a party in the case. 2 3
The action led by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of
real property with damages. 2 4 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo
Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds
of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-
19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a
new certi cate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriff's
return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot
773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the
issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarezes and Siason jointly and
severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason
render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the
ling of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the
Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00
plus attorney's fees of P4,000.00. 2 5
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to
Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of
September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped
from questioning said order. 2 6 On their part, the Alvarezes stated in their answer
that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of
limitation and estoppel." 2 7
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason,
who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico
pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable
consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a
notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order
to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity
demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof
executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 2 8 The
dispositive portion of the decision states: LexLib
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby

rendered in the following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the
Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismissed.
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed
Alvarez being the legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual
damages suffered by the plaintiffs; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral
damages and the sum of P2,000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of
interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim led by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason
against the defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is
hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed
Alvarez, are hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED." 2 9
The Alvarezes appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which, in
its decision of August 31, 1983, 3 0 af rmed the lower court's decision "insofar as
it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-
appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A
and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed
insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual
damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 3 1
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is af rmed insofar as it
ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-
appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and
is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,
respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 3 2
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants' motion for reconsideration, said
appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition.
In their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whether or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had
been timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower
court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the
private respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated
February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case
No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or
prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil
Case No. 5022, supra, and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or
party to the waiver (Exhibit "4"-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474,
supra, where the private respondents had unquali edly and absolutely
waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if
ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as
appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits
"4"-Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly
denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez
arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted
by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due
process." 3 3
The petition is devoid of merit. prcd
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that

matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022
ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said
decision had long become nal and executory and with the possible exception of
Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is
the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs
failed to appeal the decision against them. 3 4
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed,
it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate. 3 5 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end.
Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's
right has been adjudicated in a valid nal judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing
party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to
be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the
administration of justice. 3 6
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in
question have been nally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the
lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been
illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 3 7 In fact,
Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case
No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents
Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the
petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there
being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond
question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser-in-good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by
Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The
trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to
pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00
representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order
defendant Siason to pay said amount. 3 8
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the
sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 3 9 "It is one thing to protect an
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justi cation
if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his
nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming
from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded
against." 4 0
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been nally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now
be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription
and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners
could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have therefore
foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another
case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has long become
final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No.
773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the
sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death. llcd
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this

jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code state:
"Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law.
"Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
"Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent."
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the
case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 4 1
"The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party
is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a
deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is
distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment
is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or
reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
"Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual
rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a
consequence of the progressive 'depersonalization' of patrimonial rights and
duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of
these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to
person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position,
barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is
contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a
specific person and by no other. . . ."
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape
the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present
claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is
of no moment because by legal ction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved
into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the
hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of
the estate. 4 2
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent
of the value of their inheritance. With this clari cation and considering petitioners'
admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are suf cient
to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. LibLex
WHEREFORE, subject to the clari cation herein above stated, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1. TSN, October 17, 1973, pp. 4-5.
2. TSN, December 11, 1973, pp. 11 & 55.

3. Exhibits 26 and 28.
4. Exhibit 27.
5. Exhibit B-Alvarez.
6. Exhibits 23 and 24-Siason.

7. Exhibits 1-Alvarez: Exh. 17-Siason.
8. Exh. 2-Alvarez.
9. Exh. 3-Alvarez.
10. Exh. 2-Siason.
11. Civil Case No. 5022; Exhibit B.
12. Exhibit F.
13. Exhibits 12 and 13.
14. Exhibits 10, 11, 14 and 15.

15. Exhibit 4-Alvarez.
16. Record on Appeal, p. 25.
17. Exhibit E.
18. Cad. Case No. 6; Exhibit 3.

19. Cad. Case No. 6.
20. Exhibit 5.
21. Exhibit 6.
22. Exhibit 78.
23. Exhibit 9.
24. Civil Case No. 8474.
25. Record on Appeal, pp. 8-9.
26. Record on Appeal, p. 36.
27. Ibid., p. 63.
28. Ibid., pp. 95-99.
30. Por rio V. Sison Jr. J., ponente Abdulwahid A. Bidin, Marcelino R. Veloso and
Desiderio P. Jurado , JJ. concurring.
31. Rollo, p. 32.
32. Rollo, p. 32.
33. Rollo, p. 119.
34. Rollo, p. 27.

35. Miranda v. C.A., 141 SCRA 302 [1986].
36. Ngo Bun Tiong v. Judge Sayo, G.R. No. 45825, June 30, 1988.

38. Rollo, p. 27.
39. Quiniano et al. v. C.A., 39 SCRA 221 [1971].
40. Ibid.
41. 100 Phil. 388.
42. Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil. 336 (1910).

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 77029. August 30, 1990.]
BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and

CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO , petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,
respondents.
Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.

Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.
DECISION
PARAS , J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del
Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision 2 of
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring
the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the
Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450,
containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters
more or less.
As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:
"The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-
37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis
Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of
plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued
to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel
from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo
Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original
Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in
the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto,
Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share
of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.
"Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six
children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17, 1966
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica
Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the
extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica
Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among
others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-
judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed
an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul
the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
"Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a
portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first
investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the same to be
intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same
with the subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh.
"P") and the Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero — all of which were found
to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the
land in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over
from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly
entered the property." (Rollo, p. 23).
After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No.
2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot
No. 2476 are hereby adjudicated as follows:
"Lot No. 2476 — B — to the heirs of Elena Gevero;
"Lot No. 2476 — C — to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;
"Lot No. 2476 — E — to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and Francisca
Aquino;
"Lot No. 2476 — F — to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia Merida
Rumohr;
"Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 — G — to defendant spouses Enrique Abada
and Lilia Alvarez Abada.
"No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the
said lot is the subject of a civil case between the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one
hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand,
which case is now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. No
pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22).
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the
IAC (now Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision
appealed from.
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but was
denied on April 21, 1986.
Hence, the present petition. LLjur
This petition is devoid of merit.

Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or not the deed of
sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or
not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no.
2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of sale; and 3) whether or not the private
respondents' action is barred by laches.
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto,
such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2)
Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed the
document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children
remained in the property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is
2470 instead of the correct number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the
share of Eustaquio Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated
the area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without the
consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without
the consent of the Geveros' to bring about the segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot
from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the issuance of his title T-1183 and to
DELCOR's title T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per
document is 20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area covered by TCT No. T-
1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters (Petitioners Memorandum, pp.
62-78).
As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of
Lancero was forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be
observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities of a
public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the
notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the regularity
of the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No.
77423, March 13, 1989). In fact it has long been settled that a public document executed
and attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear,
unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to
contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed,
it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners
allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under Art. 1354
of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952
deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo,
p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule
is embodied in the maxim `res inter alias acta alteri ' non debet.' Under Section 31, Rule
130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration,
or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence
against the former." It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a
property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such
admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil.
227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of
executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the
land having passed to DELCOR in 1964. LLpr
Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the alleged sale by
Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. 71) involves a question of fact already raised and passed
upon by both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals:
"Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found that Luis
Lancero had taken possession of the land upon proper investigation by plaintiff
the latter learned that it was indeed Luis Lancero who was the owner and
possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . ." (Decision, C.A., p. 6).
As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595
[1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967];
Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 SCRA 737 [1970];
Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]).
Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly invalidated
the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised before the trial court nor before the appellate
court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint
nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v.
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A.,
157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and
Development Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5,
1989).
Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476
under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely
to Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six
(6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of
Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was
deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of the 'causante' or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De
Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession
were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it
was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the
lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot
2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly
excluded in the deed of sale. Cdpr
Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale
considering that a paragraph of the aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of
Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).
It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to the different provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc.,
34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, its entirety
must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The
interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of
sale, would not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught
the entire provisions thereof.
Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners
have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at
present (Rollo, p. 17).
An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument
(Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its
execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13
Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108
Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397 [1975]).
Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers
the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the
property is a registered land, the purchaser in good faith has a right to rely on the
certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws (Mallorca v. De
Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v.
C.A., G.R. No. 77427, March 13, 1989).
Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with
registered land may generally rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law
will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739,
January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding,
DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The Court of
Appeals found that it had first investigated and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the
name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding
technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis
Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis
Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had
therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question. llcd
Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.

The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues appear
unnecessary.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Crisolito
Pascual, Serapin Camilon and Desiderio P. Jurado.
2. Penned by Judge Benjamin K. Gorospe.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 89783. February 19, 1992.]
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B.

LOCSIN, MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL
V. DEL ROSARIO , petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN
ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO
JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN , respondents.
Aytona Law Office and Syquia Law Offices for petitioners.

Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; A CO-OWNER IS ESTOPPED FROM

ASSAILING THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF SALE OF A PORTION OF A LOT
IN HIS FAVOR. — On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 was partitioned by and among Doña
Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. At least Vicente Jaucian,
among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and
due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito
Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners
of Lot 2020.
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; SALE AND DONATION;
CIRCUMSTANCES MANIFESTING MENTAL CAPACITY OF SELLER/DONEE IN MAKING
DISPOSITIONS IN CASE AT BAR. — Among Doña Catalina's last transactions before she
died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and
Mariano Locsin in 1975. There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña
Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. From 1972 to
1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other
persons. In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to
Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin II, but also to her niece,
Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed
his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the
implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her
parents, flies in the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that
"items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic)
part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to
42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." The inventory was signed by her
under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 138 of the
Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew
and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory
that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to
inherit from her eventually. Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that
among Doña Catalina's nephews and nieces, those closest to her, did not join the suit to
annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins,
although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively
demonstrates that Doña Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the
conveyances in favor of the petitioners. The sales and donations which she signed in favor
of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been
anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PRESCRIPTION; ACTION BASED ON FRAUD PRESCRIBES
IN FOUR YEARS; CASE AT BAR. — Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action for annulment and
reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions
had been consummated, and six (6) years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four
(4) years after the subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, whether
considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the
plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because
the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world.
DECISION
NARVASA , C. J : p
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 — affirming with
modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case NO. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for
recovery of real property with damages — is sought in these proceedings initiated by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. prcd
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however
reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the
respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due
course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with
the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all
surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the
provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three
(3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated
to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners
Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares
of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to
his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908.
Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited
from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other
properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not
blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System.
Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and
registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin married to Catalina Jaucian." 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the
sole and universal heir of all his properties 3 . The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew
and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the
spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall
have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties
would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and
those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives. 4 "
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due
time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any
opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doña Catalina was
appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceedings was Attorney
Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate
court for approval, 6 Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the
private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage
with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her nephew,
Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria
Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando Velasco.
8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles of her
properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal
documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her nieces
Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece,
Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house. llcd
Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine
(9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant
that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or
assignment, Don Mariano's, as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and
nieces. She made the following sales and donations of properties which she had received
from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/ PRICE WITNESSES
SQ.M.
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale 962 P481
in favor of Mariano
Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale 430,203 P20,000
in favor of Jose
R. Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale 5,000 P1,000 Hostilio Cornelio
in favor of (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian
Julian Locsin
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation 26,509
in favor of Aurea
Locsin, Matilde L.
Cordero and Salvador
Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation 34,045
in favor of Aurea
Locsin, Matilde L.
Cordero and Salvador
Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation (Lot 2059) Hostilio Cordero
in favor of Aurea Fernando Velasco
Locsin, Matilde L.
Cordero and
Salvador Locsin
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute 1,424 P5,750 Hostilio Cornelio

Sale in favor of Elena Jaucian
Aurea B. Locsin
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute 1,456 P5,720 -ditto-
Sale in favor of
Aurea B. Locsin.
Sale in favor of
Aurea B. Locsin.
Sale in favor of
Aurea B. Locsin.
15 Nov. 26, 1974 Deed of Sale in 261 P2,000 Delfina Anson
favor of Aurea M. Acabado
Locsin.
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in 533 P1,000 Leonor Satuito
favor of Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in 373 P3,000 -ditto-
favor of Aurea
Locsin.
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional 1,130
Donation in favor
of Mariano Locsin.
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of 1,510.66 P1,000 Delfina Anson
Reconveyance (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel
V. del Rosario
whose maternal
grandfather was
Getulio Locsin.
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of 319.34 P500 Antonio Illegible
Reconveyance (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
in favor of Manuel V.
del Rosario but
the rentals from
bigger portion of Lot
2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were
assigned to Maria
Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and
nieces and others:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in 5,000 P1,000
favor Vicente (lot 2020)
Jaucian (6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute 100 P1,000
Sale in favor of
Francisco Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute 130 P1,300
Sale in favor of
Francisco Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute 100 P1,000
Sale in favor of
Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute 75 P750
Sale in favor of
Zenaida Buiza.
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute 150 P1,500
Sale in favor of
Felisa Morjella.
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute 31 P1,000
Sale in favor of
Inocentes Moticinos.
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute 150 P1,500
Sale in favor of
Casimiro Mondevil
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute 112 P1,000
Sale in favor of
Juan Saballa.
25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute 250 P2,500
Sale in favor of
Rogelio Marticio
Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her
own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need
to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will
had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some
legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to
distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and
nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed
action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to
recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging
that the conveyances were in officious, without consideration, and intended solely to
circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did not join
the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, 1985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian),
and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads: cdll
"WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
"(1) declaring the plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo
Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal
portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by
right of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-
blood brothers of Catalina;
"(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and
all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de
Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of known properties
(Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
"(3). ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legaspi City to cancel all
certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case,
in the name of defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the
plaintiffs;
"(4) ordering the defendant's, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and
possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of
title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by
the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of
this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons
that might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the
value of such properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal
interest from the filing of this case;
"(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as
moral damages; and
"(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between
plaintiffs and counsel.
"Costs against the defendants." 9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its
now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties
which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those
properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession." 1 0 The rights to a person's
succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until
such time. 1 1 Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her
heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at
the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and
all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn and
compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 1 2
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and
nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her
succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any
transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an
expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached,
the respondents may not invoke: cdrep
"Art 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor,
or part thereof, provided he reserves, in, full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient
means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor.
Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person
affected. (634a).
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old when
she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have
been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews
and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited
from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957 , or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina
had already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which
she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his
nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 1 3 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she
passed away, she also sold a 43-hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin.
1 4 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to
Julian Locsin. 1 5
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 1 6 was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian
Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 1 7 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other
respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution of
the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the
partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doña Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 1 8
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be
made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she
was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians?
She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-
half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another
5,000 sq.m. of the same lot to Jualian Locsin. 1 9
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and
other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella,
Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 2 0 None of
those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don
Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin II, 2 1 but also to her niece,
Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 2 2 If she was competent to make that conveyance to
Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her
other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife,
from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate
consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of
Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private
properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of
the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties,
acquired during the marriage." She would have known better than anyone else whether the
listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in
fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the
probate court in Special Proceedings No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It
was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes,
who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to
his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
LibLex
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don
Mariano died, he and his wife (Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their
respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the
trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he would
not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's
nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador
Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian; (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco
and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio
Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she
made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their advantage to do so.
Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doña Catalina acted as a completely free
agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their
closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to
employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate
her properties to them. Doña Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother,
Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the
custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor
of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November 29, 1974 2 3 in favor of Aurea
Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 2 4 in favor of Matilde Cordero,
and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 2 5 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were
all witnessed by Hostillo Cornelio (who is married to Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes)
and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria Olbes. 2 6 The sales which
she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 2 7 were witnessed by Hostillo Cornelio
and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been
anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription.
Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years
after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were
recorded in the Registry of Property, 2 8 whether considered an action based on fraud, or
one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not
feign ignorance of said transactions because the registration of the deeds was
constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 2 9
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil
Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with
costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Exhibit S.
2. p. 3, Annex A, RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 7152.
3. Exhibit A.
4. p. 5, Ibid.
5. Exh. 20.
6. Exh. 20-A.
7. p. 4, Ibid.
8. p. 4, Ibid.
9. pp. 83-84, Rollo.
10. Art. 781, Civil Code; emphasis supplied .

11. Art. 777, Civil Code; Mijares vs. Nery , 3 Phil. 195; Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530;
Edades vs. Edades, 99 Phil. 675.
12. Art. 752, in relation to Arts. 1061, et seq., Civil Code.
13. Exh. 23.

14. Exh. 1-JRL.
15. Exh. 1-JJL.
16. Exh. 3-JJL.
17. Exhs. 1-JJL and 2-JJL.
18. Exhs. 16, 17 and 19.

19. Exh. 1-JJL.
20. Exhs. 1-MVRJ, 2-MVRJ, 24-32 .
21. Exhs. 16, 17 & 19.
22. Exhs. S-9 and S-10.
23. Exh. 1.
24. Exh. 2.
25. Exh. 3.
26. pp. 35-38, Rollo.
27. Exhs. 4 to 7 .
28. Art. 1146, Civil Code; Alarcon vs. Bidin, 120 SCRA 390; Esconde vs. Barlongay , 152
SCRA 613.
29. Heirs of Maria Marasigan vs. IAC, 152 SCRA 152; Board of Liquidators, et al. vs. Roxas,
179 SCRA 809 (1989)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998.]
NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS,

ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN , respondents.
Padlan, Sutton & Associates for petitioner.

Gilbert S. Obmina for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Opulencia executed in favor of private respondents a "Contract to Sell" covering

a piece of land, for which petitioner received P300,000.00 as downpayment. Petitioner
having failed to comply with her obligations under the contract, private respondents filed a
complaint for specific performance. Petitioner put forward the defense that the property
subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena, petitioner's father,
in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the RTC of Biñan, Laguna.
The trial court dismissed the complaint because the Contract to Sell was null and void for
want of approval by the probate court, in violation of Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's dismissal of the complaint.
Hence, this petition.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Sec. 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an
heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented
herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. These representations
clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she
entered into the Contract to Sell.
Although the Contract to Sell was perfected during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale is subject to the full payment of the purchase
price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Hence, there is no
basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature
partition and distribution of the estate.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACT; SALES; CONTRACT TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY

PETITIONER AS HEIRESS, NOT AS AN EXECUTRIX OR ADMINISTRATRIX. — As correctly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable,
because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an
executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the
"lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the
sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions and consequent "need of cash." These
representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under
probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell.
2. ID.; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; HEREDITARY RIGHTS ARE VESTED IN THE HEIRS
FROM THE MOMENT OF THE DECEDENT'S DEATH. — We emphasize that hereditary rights
are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner,
therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the
lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has
the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.
3. ID.; ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE NOT PREJUDICED BY THE CONTRACT TO
SELL. — The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the
"complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently,
although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private
respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the
sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is
subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of
the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the
Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the
estate.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
Is a contract to sell a real property involved in testate proceedings valid and binding
without the approval of the probate court? cda
Statement of the Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review before us, assailing the Decision
1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 41994 promulgated on February 6, 1996 and
its Resolution 3 dated July 19, 1996. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing the
complaint is SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
CONTRACT TO SELL executed by appellee in favor of appellants as valid and
binding, subject to the result of the administration proceedings of the testate
Estate of Demetrio Carpena.
SO ORDERED." 4
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challenged Resolution. 5

The Facts
The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals, are:
"In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private
respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner]
Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a "CONTRACT TO SELL" Lot
2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of
P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed that
[petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay
damages, attorney's fee and litigation expenses.
In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of
plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward
the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract
formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's father), in respect of
which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24,
Biñan, Laguna; that at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware
of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not
approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner]
had offered to return the downpayment received from [private respondents], but
the latter refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to provide
funds for the tenant who demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights
on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract.
At the pre-trial conference the parties stipulated on [sic] the following facts:
1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents] and [petitioner]

entered into a contract to sell involving a parcel of land situated in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, otherwise known as Lot No. 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate.
2. That the price or consideration of the said sell [sic] is P150.00 per
square meters;
3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already been received by

[petitioner];
4. That the parties have knowledge that the property subject of the
contract to sell is subject of the probate proceedings;
5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not yet issued an order
either approving or denying the said sale. (p. 3, appealed Order of
September 15, 1992, pp. 109-112, record).
[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of the material
allegations of the complaint. In addition to testimonies of witnesses, [private
respondents] presented the following documentary evidences: (1) Contract to Sell
(Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last will and testament of Demetrio Carpena
(defendant's father) to show that the property sold by defendant was one of those
devised to her in said will (Exh B); (3) receipts signed by defendant for the
downpayment in the total amount of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4)
demand letters sent to defendant (Exhs F & G).
It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a Demurrer to

Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained that the contract to sell was null and
void for want of approval by the probate court. She further argued that the
contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will
of defendant's father Demetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by [private
respondents]. It appears further that in an Order dated December 15, 1992 the
court a quo granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint. It
justified its action in dismissing the complaint in the following manner:
It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no
petition was filed in the Court with notice to the heirs of the time and place
of hearing, to show that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A sale of
properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties must comply
with the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89, Rules of Court) which
are mandatory, and without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself, and
the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. (Arcilla vs. David, 77
Phil. 718, Gabriel, et al., vs. Encarnacion, et al., L-6736, May 4, 1954;
Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 Phil. 755) Besides, it is axiomatic that where the estate
of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it
without prior approval of the probate Court. (Estate of Obave, vs. Reyes,
123 SCRA 767).
As held by the Supreme Court, a decedent's representative (administrator)
is not estopped from questioning the validity of his own void deed
purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil, 755). In the case at bar,
the [petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the transaction[,] has interposed
the nullity of the contract as her defense, there being no approval from the
probate Court, and, in good faith offers to return the money she received
from the [private respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not
estop[ped] from doing so and the action to declare the inexistence of
contracts do not prescribe. This is what precipitated the filing of
[petitioner's] demurrer to evidence." 6
The trial court's order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private
respondents who alleged:
"1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell is null and
void, there being no approval of the probate court.
2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good faith offers to
return the money to [private respondents].
3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not under estoppel to
question the validity of the contract to sell.
4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of the contract to
sell which is tantamount to plain unjust enrichment of [petitioner] at the expense
of [private respondents]." 7
Public Respondent's Ruling

Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the testate proceedings on
Demetrio Carpena's estate, the appellate court set aside the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint and correctly ruled as follows:
"It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court treated the contract to
sell executed by appellee as one made by the administratrix of the Estate of
Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the estate. Hence, its main reason for voiding
the contract in question was the absence of the probate court's approval.
Presumably, what the lower court had in mind was the sale of the estate or part
thereof made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate, as authorized
under Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires the approval of the
probate court upon application therefor with notice to the heirs, devisees and
legatees.

However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to sell in question
is not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court since it was made by
appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that was devised to her under the
will sought to be probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated that
appellee executed the contract in her capacity as "executrix and administratrix" of
the estate, a cursory reading of the entire text of the contract would unerringly
show that what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of the "other
properties given to her by her late father," and more importantly, it was not made
for the benefit of the estate but for her own needs. To illustrate this point, it is
apropos to refer to the preambular or preliminary portion of the document, which
reads: cdasia
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a certain parcel of land,

which is more particularly described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in her living and has forced to
offer the sale of the above-described property, "which property was only
one among the other properties given to her by her late father," to anyone
who can wait for complete clearance of the court on the Last Will
Testament of her father.
WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her need of cash, has offered for
sale the said property at ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (150.00) Philippine
Currency, per square meter unto the BUYERS, and with this offer, the latter
has accepted to buy and/or purchase the same, less the area for the road
and other easements indicated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2125 duly confirmed after the survey to be conducted by the BUYER's
Licensed Geodetic Engineer, and whatever area [is] left. (Emphasis added).
To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the contract that
appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her capacity as executrix of the will or administratrix
of the estate of her father, but as an heir and more importantly as owner of said
lot which, along with other properties, was devised to her under the will sought to
be probated. That being so, the requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised
Rules of Court which refer to a sale made by the administrator for the benefit of
the estate do not apply.
xxx xxx xxx
It is noteworthy that in a Manifestation filed with this court by appellants, which is
not controverted by appellee, it is mentioned that the last will and testament of
Demetrio Carpena was approved in a final judgment rendered in Special
Proceeding No. B-979 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 Biñan, Laguna. But
of course such approval does not terminate the proceeding[s] since the settlement
of the estate will ensue. Such proceedings will consist, among others, in the
issuance by the court of a notice to creditors (Rule 86), hearing of money claims
and payment of taxes and estate debts (Rule 88) and distribution of the residue to
the heirs or persons entitled thereto (Rule 90). In effect, the final execution of the
deed of sale itself upon appellants' payment of the balance of the purchase price
will have to wait for the settlement or termination of the administration
proceedings of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena. Under the foregoing premises,
what the trial court should have done with the complaint was not to dismiss it but
to simply put on hold further proceedings until such time that the estate or its
residue will be distributed in accordance with the approved will.
The rule is that when a demurrer to the evidence is granted by the trial court but
reversed on appeal, defendant loses the right to adduce his evidence. In such a
case, the appellate court will decide the controversy on the basis of plaintiff's
evidence. In the case at bench, while we find the contract to sell valid and binding
between the parties, we cannot as yet order appellee to perform her obligations
under the contract because the result of the administration proceedings of the
testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena has to be awaited. Hence, we shall confine our
adjudication to merely declaring the validity of the questioned Contract to Sell."
Hence, this appeal. 8

The Issue
Petitioner raises only one issue:
"Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the
[p]etitioner and [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate court
approval is valid."
The Court's Ruling

The petition has no merit.
Contract to Sell Valid
In a nutshell, petitioner contends that "where the estate of the deceased person is already
the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the Probate Court." 9 She maintains that
the Contract to Sell is void because it was not approved by the probate court, as required
by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:
"SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber estate. — The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased
may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears
necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:
xxx xxx xxx"
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner argues that the
stipulations in the Contract to Sell require her to act in her capacity as an executrix or
administratrix. She avers that her obligation to eject tenants pertains to the administratrix
or executrix, the estate being the landlord of the said tenants. 1 0 Likewise demonstrating
that she entered into the contract in her capacity as executor is the stipulation that she
must effect the conversion of subject land from irrigated rice land to residential land and
secure the necessary clearances from government offices. Petitioner alleges that these
obligations can be undertaken only by an executor or administrator of an estate, and not by
an heir. 1 1
The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule
89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to
Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the
contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of
land. 1 2 She also explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions
and consequent "need of cash." 1 3 These representations clearly evince that she was not
acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell.
Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application to the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedent's death. 1 4 Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the
moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract
to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her
share in the estate of her late father. 1 5 Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 1 6 the Court resolved
an identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:
"Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that 'the possession of hereditary property
is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the
death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted.' And Manresa with
reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which
might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed
among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided.' . . . And according
to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part
in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the
dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the heirs, without the
concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court,
speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was
valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to
the vendors upon the partition of the estate."
Administration of the Estate Not

Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell
Petitioner further contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a
partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate
proceedings." 1 7 This becomes all the more significant in the light of the trial court's
finding, as stated in its Order dated August 20, 1997, that "the legitime of one of the heirs
has been impaired." 1 8
Petitioner's contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's
offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will
Testament of her father." 1 9 Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected
between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of
land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to
the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for
petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and
distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an
heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands
in the way of such administration." 2 0
Estoppel
Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract
to Sell with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial
payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and
representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them. 21
Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an
unwise or undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and
with full awareness of its consequences. 2 2
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. LexLib
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 21-27.

2. Sixteenth Division composed of J . Godardo A. Jacinto, ponente; with the concurrence of
J . Salome A. Montoya, chairman; and J . Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, member.
3. Rollo, p. 29.
4. Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 27.
5. Rollo, p. 29.
6. Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 21-23.
7. Appellants' Brief before the Court of Appeals, p. 1.

8. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on December 1, 1997 when the Court
received Petitioner's Memorandum.
9. Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 7; Rollo, p. 81.

10. Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 79-80.
11. Ibid., p. 6; Rollo, p. 80.
12. Contract to Sell, p. 1; record, p. 5.
13. Ibid.
14. Art. 777, Civil Code, provides:
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent."
15. Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 270, 276-277, September 24, 1987; and De
Borja vs. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577, 589, August 18, 1972.
16. 73 Phil. 628-629 (1942), per Moran, J .
17. Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 7; Rollo, p. 81.
18. Ibid.
19. Record, p. 5.
20. Go Ong vs. Court of Appeals, per Paras, J ., supra, p. 277; citing Jakosalem vs. Rafols,
73 Phil 628 (1942).
21. Laureano Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA
253, 263, May 6, 1997; citing Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA
448, 457, August 10, 1992.
22. Esguerra vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 380, 393, February 3, 1997, citing Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314, September 10, 1993.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001.]
EMILIO EMNACE , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF

VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM
TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO
VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT TABANAO , respondents.
Mirano Mirano & Associates for petitioner.

Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners
in a business known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. In 1986, they decided to dissolve their
partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership
properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracia's withdrawal from the
partnership. When petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the agreement and also on
his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of
the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, respondents, Tabanao's heirs, led an
action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages against
petitioner. Petitioner led a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the action because the prescribed docket fee was not
paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim. The trial court, however, noted that
a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership may be
ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be paid. Petitioner questioned the order
of dismissal through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon a nding
that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was
committed by the trial court in issuing the questioned orders denying petitioner's motions
to dismiss. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin. According to the
Court, the trial court does not have to employ guesswork in ascertaining the estimated
value of the partnership's assets, for respondents themselves voluntarily pegged the worth
thereof at Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00). Respondents cannot claim that they are
unable to make an estimate and avoid paying the initial docket fees by conveniently
omitting the said amount in their amended complaint. The estimated partnership's total
assets can be made the basis for the initial docket fees that respondents should pay. Even
if it were later established that the amount proved was less or more than the amount
alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court speci cally provides that
the court may refund the excess or exact additional fees should the initial payment be
insu cient. Accordingly, the trial court was ordered to determine the proper docket fee
based on the estimated amount that respondents seek to collect from petitioner, and
direct them to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period has not yet expired. The other issues pointed out by petitioner were
likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF COURT; LEGAL FEES; PAYMENT OF DOCKET

FEES; VALUE OF THE SUBJECT ASSETS OR AMOUNT DEMANDED IN CASE AT BAR IS
PECUNIARILY DETERMINABLE. — The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in
ascertaining the estimated value of the partnership's assets, for respondents themselves
voluntarily pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00). Hence, this
case is one which is really not beyond pecuniary estimation, but rather partakes of the
nature of a simple collection case where the value of the subject assets or amount
demanded is pecuniarily determinable. While it is true that the exact value of the
partnership's total assets cannot be shown with certainty at the time of ling, respondents
can and must ascertain, through informed and practical estimation, the amount they
expect to collect from the partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order to determine
the proper amount of docket and other fees. It is thus imperative for respondents to pay
the corresponding docket fees in order that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over the
action.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INITIAL AMOUNT OF DOCKET FEES BASED ON THE
ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF THE CLAIM MUST BE PAID SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE FILING
OF THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. — The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a)
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which de nes the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which
are immediately ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot be immediately ascertained as
to the exact amount. This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be
nally determined by the courts based on evidence presented, falls squarely under the
third paragraph of said Section 5(a), which provides: In case the value of the property or
estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the
difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. Court of Appeals , this Court pronounced that the above-quoted provision
"clearly contemplates an initial payment of the ling fees corresponding to the estimated
amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved." Moreover, we
reiterated therein the principle that the payment of ling fees cannot be made contingent
or dependent on the result of the case. Thus, an initial payment of the docket fees based
on an estimated amount must be paid simultaneous with the ling of the complaint.
Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the ling fees should the judgment later turn out
to be adverse to any claim of the respondent heirs.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; ESTIMATE OF THE PARTNERSHIP'S TOTAL
ASSETS CAN BE MADE THE BASIS OF THE INITIAL DOCKET FEES. — Applied to the instant
case, respondents have a speci c claim — 1/3 of the value of all the partnership assets —
but they did not allege a speci c amount. They did, however, estimate the partnership's
total assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00), in a letter addressed to
petitioner. Respondents cannot now say that they are unable to make an estimate, for the
said letter and the admissions therein form part of the records of this case. They cannot
avoid paying the initial docket fees by conveniently omitting the said amount in their
amended complaint. This estimate can be made the basis for the initial docket fees that
respondents should pay. Even if it were later established that the amount proved was less
or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court
speci cally provides that the court may refund the excess or exact additional fees should
the initial payment be insu cient. It is clear that it is only the difference between the
amount nally awarded and the fees paid upon ling of this complaint that is subject to
adjustment and which may be subjected to a lien.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIBERAL APPLICATION OF THE RULE ALLOWS THE PLAINTIFF
TO PAY THE PROPER DOCKET FEES WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME BEFORE THE
EXPIRATION OF THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE OR REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. — The
trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint outright despite their failure to pay the
proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other procedural rules, it may be liberally construed
in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of an action. While the rule
is that the payment of the docket fee in the proper amount should be adhered to, there are
certain exceptions which must be strictly construed. In recent rulings, this Court has
relaxed the strict adherence to the Manchester doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to pay the
proper docket fees within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should
determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated amount that respondents seek to
collect from petitioner, and direct them to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired. Failure to comply
therewith, and upon motion by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the complaint shall
issue on jurisdictional grounds. TSEHcA
5. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VENUE OF ACTIONS; PROPERLY LAID IN CASE AT

BAR; RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT SEEKING THE LIQUIDATION AND PARTITION OF THE
ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP WITH DAMAGES IS A PERSONAL ACTION WHICH MAY BE
FILED IN THE PROPER COURT WHERE ANY OF THE PARTIES RESIDE. — The action led by
respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner. It also seeks the enforcement of,
and petitioner's compliance with, the contract that the partners executed to formalize the
partnership's dissolution, as well as to implement the liquidation and partition of the
partnership's assets. Clearly, it is a personal action that, in effect, claims a debt from
petitioner and seeks the performance of a personal duty on his part. In ne, respondents'
complaint seeking the liquidation and partition of the assets of the partnership with
damages is a personal action which may be led in the proper court where any of the
parties reside. Besides, venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction for venue touches more
upon the substance or merits of the case. As it is, venue in this case was properly laid and
the trial court correctly ruled so.
6. ID.; ID.; A PRIOR SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE, OR EVEN THE
APPOINTMENT OF AN EXECUTRIX OR AN ADMINISTRATRIX IS NOT NECESSARY FOR ANY
OF THE HEIRS TO ACQUIRE LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE; AS SUCCESSORS WHO STEPPED
INTO THE SHOES OF THE DECEDENT UPON HIS DEATH, RESPONDENTS CAN
COMMENCE ANY ACTION ORIGINALLY PERTAINING TO THE DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. —
Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to
sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate. Petitioner's
objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed
as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can le the action. She and her
children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the
very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had
against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of
law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares
from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the
appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any
of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of
their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the
decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand ful llment
of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to
respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to
compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
7. CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; A PARTNERSHIP CONTINUES TO
EXIST UNTIL IT COMPLETES ITS WINDING UP PROCESS INCLUDING THE PARTITIONING
AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE NET PARTNERSHIP ASSETS TO THE PARTNERS;
PRESCRIPTION STARTS TO RUN ONLY UPON DISSOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP WHEN
THE FINAL ACCOUNTING IS DONE. — Petitioner contends that the trial court should have
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, arguing that respondents' action
prescribed four (4) years after it accrued in 1986. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
gave scant consideration to petitioner's hollow arguments, and rightly so. The three (3)
nal stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and (3) termination. The
partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist and its legal personality is retained, at
which time it completes the winding up of its affairs, including the partitioning and
distribution of the net partnership assets to the partners. For as long as the partnership
exists, any of the partners may demand an accounting of the partnership's business.
Prescription of the said right starts to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership
when the final accounting is done. cHaICD
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION SINCE
NO ACCOUNTING HAS YET BEEN MADE ON THE PARTNERSHIP'S BUSINESS AND
ASSETS. — Contrary to petitioner's protestations that respondents' right to inquire into the
business affairs of the partnership accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) years thereafter,
prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a nal accounting. Article 1842 of
the Civil Code provides: The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner,
or his legal representative as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or
the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the
absence of any agreement to the contrary. Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809,
which also deal with the duty to account, the above-cited provision states that the right to
demand an accounting accrues at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement
to the contrary. When a nal accounting is made, it is only then that prescription begins to
run. In the case at bar, no nal accounting has been made, and that is precisely what
respondents are seeking in their action before the trial court, since petitioner has failed or
refused to render an accounting of the partnership's business and assets. Hence, the said
action is not barred by prescription.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners
in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986,
they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and
distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto
Divinagracia's withdrawal from the partnership. 1 Among the assets to be distributed were
ve (5) shing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño and
Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's
untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of
assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's
nances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the
deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00,
or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof. 2
Consequently, Tabanao's heirs, respondents herein, led against petitioner an action
for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. 3 In their complaint,
respondents prayed as follows:
1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all the assets and
liabilities of the partnership at bar; and
2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to

pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs the following:
A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties, dividends,
cash, land(s), shing vessels, trucks, motor vehicles, and other
forms and substance of treasures which belong and/or should
belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the partnership;
B. No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages;
C. Attorney's fees equivalent to Thirty Percent (30%) of the entire
share/amount/award which the Honorable Court may resolve the
plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00 for every appearance in
court. 4
Petitioner led a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper

venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the
estate of Tabanao to sue. 5 On August 30, 1994, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid because, while realties were involved, the
action was directed against a particular person on the basis of his personal liability; hence,
the action is not only a personal action but also an action in personam. As regards
petitioner's argument of lack of jurisdiction over the action because the prescribed docket
fee was not paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim, the trial court noted
that a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership
may be ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be paid. Finally, the trial court
held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their own names, in view of the
provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. 6
The following day, respondents led an amended complaint, 7 incorporating the
additional prayer that petitioner be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's) assets and
thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs" their corresponding share in
the proceeds thereof. In due time, petitioner led a manifestation and motion to dismiss, 8
arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due to the plaintiffs'
failure to pay the proper docket fees. Further, in a supplement to his motion to dismiss, 9
petitioner also raised prescription as an additional ground warranting the outright
dismissal of the complaint.
On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an Order, 1 0 denying the motion to dismiss
inasmuch as the grounds raised therein were basically the same as the earlier motion to
dismiss which has been denied. Anent the issue of prescription, the trial court ruled that
prescription begins to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when the nal
accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set in the absence of a nal accounting.
Moreover, an action based on a written contract prescribes in ten years from the time the
right of action accrues.
Petitioner led a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, 1 1 raising the
following issues:
I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a case despite the failure to
pay the required docket fee;
II. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in insisting to try the case which involve (sic) a parcel
of land situated outside of its territorial jurisdiction;
III. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in allowing the estate of the deceased to appear as
party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and led by one who was
never appointed by the court as administratrix of the estates; and
IV. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription.
On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, 1 2

dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon a nding that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the trial court in issuing the
questioned orders denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.
Not satis ed, petitioner led the instant petition for review, raising the same issues
resolved by the Court of Appeals, namely:
I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;
II. Parcel of land subject of the case pending before the trial court is outside
the said court's territorial jurisdiction;
III. Lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of Vicente Tabanao;
and
IV. Prescription of the plaintiff heirs' cause of action.
It can be readily seen that respondents' primary and ultimate objective in instituting
the action below was to recover the decedent's 1/3 share in the partnership's assets.
While they ask for an accounting of the partnership's assets and nances, what they are
actually asking is for the trial court to compel petitioner to pay and turn over their share, or
the equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets. They
also assert that until and unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the
partnership's assets, as well as their corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained.
Consequently, they feel justi ed in not having paid the commensurate docket fee as
required by the Rules of Court.
We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in ascertaining
the estimated value of the partnership's assets, for respondents themselves voluntarily
pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is one
which is really not beyond pecuniary estimation, but rather partakes of the nature of a
simple collection case where the value of the subject assets or amount demanded is
pecuniarily determinable. 1 3 While it is true that the exact value of the partnership's total
assets cannot be shown with certainty at the time of ling, respondents can and must
ascertain, through informed and practical estimation, the amount they expect to collect
from the partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order to determine the proper amount
of docket and other fees. 1 4 It is thus imperative for respondents to pay the corresponding
docket fees in order that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over the action. 1 5
Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 1 6 where there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay
the correct docket fees, we see no attempt to cheat the courts on the part of respondents.
In fact, the lower courts have noted their expressed desire to remit to the court "any
payable balance or lien on whatever award which the Honorable Court may grant them in
this case should there be any de ciency in the payment of the docket fees to be computed
by the Clerk of Court." 1 7 There is evident willingness to pay, and the fact that the docket
fee paid so far is inadequate is not an indication that they are trying to avoid paying the
required amount, but may simply be due to an inability to pay at the time of ling. This
consideration may have moved the trial court and the Court of Appeals to declare that the
unpaid docket fees shall be considered a lien on the judgment award.
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
condoning the non-payment of the proper legal fees and in allowing the same to become a
lien on the monetary or property judgment that may be rendered in favor of respondents.
There is merit in petitioner's assertion. The third paragraph of Section 16, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court states that:
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor
of the pauper-litigant.
Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it speci cally
applies to pauper-litigants. Nowhere in the records does it appear that respondents are
litigating as paupers, and as such are exempted from the payment of court fees. 1 8
The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, which de nes the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately
ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot be immediately ascertained as to the exact
amount. This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be nally
determined be the courts based on evidence presented, falls squarely under the third
paragraph of said Section 5(a), which provides:
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or
more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be
refunded or paid as the case may be. (Italics ours)
I n Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 1 9 this Court
pronounced that the above-quoted provision "clearly contemplates an initial payment of
the ling fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment
as to what later may be proved." 2 0 Moreover, we reiterated therein the principle that the
payment of ling fees cannot be made contingent or dependent on the result of the case.
Thus, an initial payment of the docket fees based on an estimated amount must be paid
simultaneous with the ling of the complaint. Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the
ling fees should the judgment later turn out to be adverse to any claim of the respondent
heirs.
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are
necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to
avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of
docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the
claimant is a pauper-litigant.
Applied to the instant case, respondents have a speci c claim — 1/3 of the value of
all the partnership assets — but they did not allege a speci c amount. They did, however,
estimate the partnership's total assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00),
in a letter 2 1 addressed to petitioner. Respondents cannot now say that they are unable to
make an estimate, for the said letter and the admissions therein form part of the records
of this case. They cannot avoid paying the initial docket fees by conveniently omitting the
said amount in their amended complaint. This estimate can be made the basis for the
initial docket fees that respondents should pay. Even if it were later established that the
amount proved was less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court speci cally provides that the court may refund the excess or
exact additional fees should the initial payment be insu cient. It is clear that it is only the
difference between the amount nally awarded and the fees paid upon ling of this
complaint that is subject to adjustment and which may be subjected to a lien.
In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance O ce, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion , 2 2
this Court held that when the speci c claim "has been left for the determination by the
court, the additional ling fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment and it shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien
and assess and collect the additional fee." Clearly, the rules and jurisprudence contemplate
the initial payment of ling and docket fees based on the estimated claims of the plaintiff,
and it is only when there is a de ciency that a lien may be constituted on the judgment
award until such additional fee is collected.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint outright
despite their failure to pay the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other procedural
rules, it may be liberally construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy
disposition of an action. While the rule is that the payment of the docket fee in the proper
amount should be adhered to, there are certain exceptions which must be strictly
construed. 2 3
In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to the Manchester
doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to pay the proper docket fees within a reasonable time
before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2 4
In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 2 5 this Court held that:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the ling of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are
not paid at the time of the ling of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of
the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the
complaint for failure of private respondent to pay the correct amount of docket
f ees. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same
within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply within this requirement, the
defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be
considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between the appropriate
docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien
or any award he may obtain in his favor. (Italics ours)
Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket fee
based on the estimated amount that respondents seek to collect from petitioner, and
direct them to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period has not yet expired. Failure to comply therewith, and upon motion
by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the complaint shall issue on jurisdictional
grounds.
On the matter of improper venue, we nd no error on the part of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals in holding that the case below is a personal action which, under the
Rules, may be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiffs reside, at the election of the latter. 2 6
Petitioner, however, insists that venue was improperly laid since the action is a real
action involving a parcel of land that is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
co ur t a quo. This contention is not well-taken. The records indubitably show that
respondents are asking that the assets of the partnership be accounted for, sold and
distributed according to the agreement of the partners. The fact that two of the assets of
the partnership are parcels of land does not materially change the nature of the action. It is
an action in personam because it is an action against a person, namely, petitioner, on the
basis of his personal liability. It is not an action in rem where the action is against the thing
itself instead of against the person. 2 7 Furthermore, there is no showing that the parcels of
land involved in this case are being disputed. In fact, it is only incidental that part of the
assets of the partnership under liquidation happen to be parcels of land.
The time-tested case of Claridades v. Mercader, et al., 2 8 settled this issue thus:
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the partnership,
including the shpond in question, did not change the nature or character of the
action, such sale being merely a necessary incident of the liquidation of the
partnership, which should precede and/or is part of its process of dissolution.
The action led by respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner. It also
seeks the enforcement of, and petitioner's compliance with, the contract that the partners
executed to formalize the partnership's dissolution, as well as to implement the liquidation
and partition of the partnership's assets. Clearly, it is a personal action that, in effect,
claims a debt from petitioner and seeks the performance of a personal duty on his part. 2 9
In ne, respondents' complaint seeking the liquidation and partition of the assets of the
partnership with damages is a personal action which may be led in the proper court
where any of the parties reside. 3 0 Besides, venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction for
venue touches more upon the substance or merits of the case. 3 1 As it is, venue in this
case was properly laid and the trial court correctly ruled so.
On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao
has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix
of his estate. Petitioner's objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does
not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the
action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente
Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao's death, his rights insofar as the
partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. 3 2
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and
petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. 3 3
Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the
moment Vicente Tabanao died. 3 4
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as
executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to
sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can
commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. 3 5 From the moment of his
death, his rights as a partner and to demand ful llment of petitioner's obligations as
outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore,
had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to compel petitioner to ful ll his
obligations.
Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint
on the ground of prescription, arguing that respondents' action prescribed four (4) years
after it accrued in 1986. The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave scant consideration
to petitioner's hollow arguments, and rightly so.
The three (3) nal stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and
(3) termination. 3 6 The partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist and its legal
personality is retained, at which time it completes the winding up of its affairs, including
the partitioning and distribution of the net partnership assets to the partners. 3 7 For as
long as the partnership exists, any of the partners may demand an accounting of the
partnership's business. Prescription of the said right starts to run only upon the
dissolution of the partnership when the final accounting is done. 3 8
Contrary to petitioner's protestations that respondents' right to inquire into the
business affairs of the partnership accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) years thereafter,
prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a nal accounting. Article 1842 of
the Civil Code provides:
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his
legal representative as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners
or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in
the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, which also deal with the duty to
account, the above-cited provision states that the right to demand an accounting accrues
at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. When a nal
accounting is made, it is only then that prescription begins to run. In the case at bar, no
final accounting has been made, and that is precisely what respondents are seeking in their
action before the trial court, since petitioner has failed or refused to render an accounting
of the partnership's business and assets. Hence, the said action is not barred by
prescription.
In ne, the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion when it denied
petitioner's motions to dismiss. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible
error in upholding the trial court's orders. Precious time has been lost just to settle this
preliminary issue, with petitioner resurrecting the very same arguments from the trial court
all the way up to the Supreme Court. The litigation of the merits and substantial issues of
this controversy is now long overdue and must proceed without further delay. HAaECD
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit, and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60,
which is ORDERED to determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated amount
that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said plaintiffs to pay the same within a
reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet
expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings in
Civil Case No. 416-C.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Record, pp. 30-31.
2. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

3. Civil Case No. 416-C before the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60.
4. Rollo, p. 41.
5. Ibid., pp. 44-47.
6. Id., pp. 108-112.
7. Appendix "H", Rollo, pp. 93-100.
8. Appendix "I", Rollo, pp. 101-104.
9. Appendix "J", Rollo, pp. 105-107.
10. Appendix "L", Rollo, pp. 113-115.

11. CA-G.R. No. 37878, Records, pp. 2-18.
12. Rollo, pp. 119-126.

13. Colarina v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 647, 652-653 (1999).
14. Gregorio v. Angeles, 180 SCRA 490, 494-495 (1989).
15. Ballatan v. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 34, 42 (1999).
16. 149 SCRA 562 (1987).
17. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Records, p. 60.
18. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 674, 681 (1989).
19. Supra.
20. Ibid., p. 680.
21. Record, p. 32.
22. 170 SCRA 274, 285 (1989).
23. Colarina, supra, p. 654.

24. Colarina, supra; De Zuzuarregui v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 54, 59 (1989); Pantranco
North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 224 SCRA 477, 491 (1993); Talisay-Silay Milling
Co. v. Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc., 247 SCRA 361, 384-385 (1995).
25. 302 SCRA 522, 531 (1999).
26. Section 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
27. Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 552 (1998).
28. 17 SCRA 1, 4 (1966).
29. Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 637, 645 (1999).
30. La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, 264 SCRA 540, 545 (1996).
31. Philippine Banking Corp. v. Tensuan, 228 SCRA 385, 396 (1993).
32. Coronel v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 15, 34 (1996); Article 777 of the Civil Code.
33. Civil Code, Art. 774.
34. Opulencia v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 385, 394 (1998).
35. Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 345, 354 (1998).
36. Idos v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 194, 205 (1998).
37. Sy v. Court of Appeals , 313 SCRA 328, 347 (1999); Ortega v. Court of Appeals , 245
SCRA 529, 536 (1995).
38. Fue Leung v. IAC, 169 SCRA 746, 755 (1989).

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000.]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, 1 petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA

MARLENA 2 COSCOLLUELA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
Romeo S. Perez for petitioner.

Benjamin Santos & Ofelia Calcetas-Santos Law O ces collaborating counsel for
respondent Marlene C. Villacarlos.
Garcia Ines Villacarlos Garcia and Recina Law Offices for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil of Aleja Belleza, was instituted devisee of Lot No.
1392 with an area of 511,855 square meters with the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of
sugar to herein private respondent every year during the latter's lifetime. The codicil
provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but also to his
successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants." Dr. Rabadilla
died and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is herein petitioner. Private
respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to comply with their obligation, filed a complaint
with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the subject property to the surviving heirs
of the testatrix. During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement was concluded between
the parties wherein the lessee of the property assumed the delivery of 100 piculs of
sugar to private respondent. However, only partial delivery was made. Thereafter, the
trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals, on
appeal, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the
nature of a modal institution and a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose
when petitioner failed to comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering
the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of testatrix. Aggrieved, petitioner availed of this
recourse.
Successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death and compulsory
heirs succeed the decedent not only to all the property but also to his rights and
obligations. Hence, the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla is also obliged under the codicil to deliver 100
piculs of sugar to private respondent every year.
There is no substitution of heir where no substitute was provided by the testatrix in
case the instituted heir predecease her or in case of the latter's incapacity or renunciation
nor was the instituted heir mandated to preserve the property and to transmit it to the
second heir.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS

TRANSMITTED FROM MOMENT OF DEATH OF DECEDENT. — It is a general rule under the
law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The
legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow
or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by
operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were
transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
2. ID.; ID.; INHERITANCE INCLUDES ALL PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
NOT EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH. — Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise
transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
3. ID.; ID.; SUBSTITUTION, DEFINED. — Substitution is the designation by the
testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs rst instituted. Under
substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her,
renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2)
leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted
subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. dctai
4. ID.; ID.; SIMPLE SUBSTITUTIONS DIFFERENT FROM CODICIL; CASE AT BAR. —

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the rst heir by
reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the
provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to
predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute
him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not ful ll the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over
the testatrix's near descendants.
5. ID.; ID.; FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION DIFFERENT FROM CODICIL; CASE
AT BAR. — Neither is there a deicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner
is correct. In a deicommissary substitution, the rst heir is strictly mandated to preserve
the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a deicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the rst heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by
the testator in his will, there is no deicommissary substitution." Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to
them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not ful ll the obligation to deliver part of the
usufruct to private respondent. Another important element of a deicommissary
substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
deicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree
from the rst heir or the duciary. A deicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the
rst heir is not related by rst degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the
near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

6. ID.; ID.; MODAL INSTITUTION DISTINGUISHED FROM CONDITIONAL
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION. — The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in
Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a
modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution,
(2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge
imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or
legatee but it does not affect the e cacy of his rights to the succession. On the other
hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be ful lled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does
not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extend, it is similar
to a resolutory condition.
7. ID.; ID.; OBLIGATION IMPOSED ON HEIRS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A
CONDITION UNLESS IT CLEARLY APPEARS FROM THE WILL ITSELF THAT SUCH WAS THE
INTENTION OF THE TESTATOR. — Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of
liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless
it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of
doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.
8. ID.; ID.; UNCERTAINTY ON APPLICATION OF ANY PROVISION, INTERPRETED
ACCORDING TO TESTATOR'S INTENTION. — In the interpretation of Wills, when an
uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will
sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
9. ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF COMPROMISE. — A Will is a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect
after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his
properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed.
Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat
the very purpose of making a Will.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; SUBSTITUTION; KINDS. — Substitution
is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the
heir originally instituted. Substitution is simple when the testator designates one or more
persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case the latter should die before him, or
should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance, and a substitution
without a statement of the cases to which it refers shall comprise all said three cases.
There is no simple substitution that takes place where the heir originally instituted is able
to succeed. Fideicommissary substitution, on the other hand, occurs when the duciary or
rst heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second
heir the whole or part of the inheritance. Every deicommissary substitution should be
expressly made in order that it may be valid. The term " deicommissary substitution" need
not, however, be used in the will; it is enough that there is a clear and unequivocal
statement that one shall enjoy usufructuary or other rights, short of naked ownership or
title, over certain property of the testator with the obligation to preserve the property and
to transmit it to a second heir. It is essential for the validity of a deicommissary
substitution that both heirs are living and quali ed to succeed at the time of death by the
testator and that the substitute does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted.
2. ID.; ID.; MODE DISTINGUISHED FROM CONDITION. — A mode is distinguished
from a condition contemplated in the rules on succession in that the latter dictates the
e cacy, either in a suspensive or resolutory manner, of a testamentary disposition while
the former obligates the instituted heir to comply with the mandate made by the testator
but does not prevent the heir from at once claiming the inheritance provided he gives a
security to ensure compliance with the will of the testator and the return of the thing
received together with its fruits and interests, "should (the heir) disregard the obligation."
The obligation imposed upon the heir or legatee is deemed not to be a condition for his
entry forthwith into the inheritance unless a contrary intention of the testator is evident. In
case of doubt, the institution is considered modal, rather than conditional. Much of the
variance in the legal effects of the two classes, however, is now practically theoretical and
merely conceptual. Under the old Civil Code an institucion sub modo could be said to be
more akin to an institution sub demonstratione, or an expression of a wish or suggestion
of the testator that did not have any real obligatory force, that matter being left instead to
the discretion of the heir, i.e., whether to abide by it or not. The amendatory provisions of
the new Civil Code now hardly differentiates between the principal effect of the non-
compliance with the mode and that of the occurrence of a resolutory condition expressed
in the will. In both instances, the property must be returned to the estate of the decedent
to then pass on under the rules on intestacy.
DECISION
PURISIMA , J : p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of
the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511,855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in
Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certi cate
of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the
records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned
property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and
acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx xxx xxx

FOURTH
(a) It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die
and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the
said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every
year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. Cdpr
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392
of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. RT-4002
(10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as speci ed in the
Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the
month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event
that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE
(75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria
Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not
have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and
the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter
shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar
until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that
my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that
should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than
my near descendants and my sister." 4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Ru na and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in
Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the
conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and
the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's speci c instruction to
sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one

hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic
sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years
1985 up to the ling of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite
repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil
which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the
buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs
of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to

reconvey/return Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the
issuance of a new certi cate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28,
1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who
filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin,
son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-
in-fact of defendant heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to
the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of
TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more speci cally,
to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in

any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during
December of each sugar crop year; in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is
considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same
manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop
years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and
1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as
mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year,
which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a
staggered cash installment, payable on or before the end of December of
every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;

and
(P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."
5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement

except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year
1988-1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing ndings, the Court nds that
the action is prematurely led as no cause of action against the defendants has
as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there may be the non-performance of the
command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children
of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant
the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being
in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate
the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in
order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing ndings, the Complaint being prematurely
filed is DISMISSED without prejudice. LexLib
SO ORDERED." 6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's
right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392;
defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the
modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of
seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of
such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title
over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja
Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-
open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and
distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right,
reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year
out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one
entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja
Belleza.
SO ORDERED." 7
Dissatis ed with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found
his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis
of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating
from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action.
Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not nd application as there was no modal
institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution — i.e., the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the
obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And since
the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason
that the substituted heirs are not de nite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as
"near descendants" without a de nite identity or reference as to who are the "near
descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 8 and 845 9 of the New Civil Code, the
substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the
Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no
such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of
action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to
stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with
law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent 1 0 and compulsory heirs are called
to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to
their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. 1 1 Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings,
and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. dctai
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the
estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the
herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his
compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over said property, and they also
assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein
private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the
right of private respondent over the usufruct, the ful llment or performance of which is
now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions
is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution — Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be non-
compliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the
place of the heir or heirs rst instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may
either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in
case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, 1 2 or (2) leave his/her property to one
person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others,
as in a fideicommissary substitution. 1 3 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the
two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the rst
heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. 1 4 In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not ful ll the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred
to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a deicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is
correct. In a deicommissary substitution, the rst heir is strictly mandated to preserve
the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. 1 5 In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a deicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the rst heir the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by
the testator in his will, there is no deicommissary substitution." 1 6 Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to
them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not ful ll the obligation to deliver part of the
usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a deicommissary substitution is also missing here.
Under Article 863, the second heir or the deicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the rst heir or the duciary. A
deicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the rst heir is not related by rst degree
to the-second heir. 1 7 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related
to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the
New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code
provide:
ARTICLE 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall
not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided
that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of
the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
ARTICLE 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred
to in the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the
testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in
conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in
the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
upon the heir. 1 8 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the e cacy of his rights to the succession. 1 9 On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be ful lled in order for the heir to
be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the
mode obligates but does not suspend. 2 0 To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
condition. 2 1
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that
the testatrix intended that the subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir
and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution
as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly
appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt,
the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. 2 2
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from
the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the
buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to
the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from
the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
made. 2 3 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted. 2 4
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved.
The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not
respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the
instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix
in case of non-ful llment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and
his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable
settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee,
and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner
is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation
through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and
having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private
respondent is the ful llment of the obligation under the amicable settlement and not the
seizure of subject property.
Su ce it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. 2 5 Since the Will expresses
the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
Pronouncement as to costs. prcd
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., I concur as well in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opininon (concurring in result).
Panganiban, J., I join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VITUG , J., concurring :
By virtue of a codicil appended to her will, Aleja Belleza devised a 511,856-square

meter parcel of land in Bacolod City, denominated Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastral
Survey, to Jorge Ravadilla (predecessor-in-interest of petitioner), 1 carrying with it an
obligation to deliver to private respondent, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza, one
hundred piculs of sugar per crop year during her lifetime. The portions of the codicil,
pertinent to the instant controversy, read:
"FIRST
"I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
"(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certi cate of Title No. RT-4002(10942), which is registered in my name according
to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
"b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned
property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and
acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx xxx xxx

FOURTH
"(a) It is also my command, in this my addition (codicil), that should I

die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. RT-
4002(10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito Guanzon of the said
lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year
to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export
sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
"FIFTH
"(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title No. RT-
4002 (10942), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as speci ed
in the Fourth paragraph of this testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
on the month of December of each year.
"SIXTH
"I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event
that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE
(75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria
Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee, or the mortgagee of this lot, not
have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and
the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near descendants, 2 and the latter
shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar
until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that
my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that
should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than
my near descendants and my sister." 3
Pursuant to the above provisions of the codicil, ownership of Lot No. 1392 was
transferred to Jorge Rabadilla and Transfer Certi cate of Title No. T-44498 was issued
in his name. LexLib
Sometime in 1983, Jorge Rabadilla died, survived by his wife, Ru na, and their
children Johnny, Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida.
On 21 August 1989, on account of the failure of the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla to
comply with the obligation under the codicil, private respondent led an action, docketed
Civil Case No. 5588, against the Rabadilla heirs before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
of Bacolod City for the reconveyance of Lot 1392 to the heirs of Aleja Belleza and the
cancellation of Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 44498 covering the property in the name of
Jorge Rabadilla.
The trial court dismissed the complaint "without prejudice." 4 On appeal taken by
private respondent to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court set aside the appealed
decision and held:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's
right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392;
defendants-appellees' obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the
modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant;
defendants-appellees' admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985;
and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of
seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of
such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title
over Lot No. 1392 from the estate of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja
Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-
open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and
distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right,
reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year
out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
"Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one
entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja
Belleza.
SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner, in the instant petition for review, submits that the appellate court has
erred in: (1) ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of Aleja Belleza on the basis
of paragraph six of the codicil, and (2) in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the Civil Code.
Additionally, he avers that respondent court has improvidently deviated from the sole issue
raised which is the prematurity of the action before the court a quo. Upon the other hand,
respondent would have this Court sustain the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
contending that the appellate court is completely justi ed in delving into the nature of the
institution in the codicil, the same having a direct signi cance on the issue of whether or
not the complaint before the trial court has been prematurely led. Private respondent
adds that the institution in question is modal within the context of Article 882 of the Civil
Code which gives her the right to seize the subject property.
I agree with my colleagues that "substitution" is not here apropos. Substitution is the
appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir
originally instituted. 6 Substitution is simple when the testator designates one or more
persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case the latter should die before him, or
should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance, and a substitution
without a statement of the cases to which it refers shall comprise all said three cases. 7
There is no simple substitution that takes place where the heir originally instituted is able
to succeed. 8 Fideicommissary substitution, on the other hand, occurs when the duciary
or rst heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a
second heir the whole or part of the inheritance. 9 Every deicommissary substitution
should be expressly made in order that it may be valid. 1 0 The term " deicommissary
substitution" need not, however, be used in the will; It is enough that there is a clear and
unequivocal statement that one shall enjoy usufructuary or other rights, short of naked
ownership or title, over certain property of the testator with the obligation to preserve the
property and to transmit it to a second heir. 1 1 It is essential for the validity of a
deicommissary substitution that both heirs are living and quali ed to succeed at the time
of death by the testator and that the substitute does not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted. The term "one degree" has been the subject of varied
interpretation. One view is to the effect that the term means one transfer, citing the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain and as advocated by eminent civilists as Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
R. Puno, E. Caguioa, and D. Jurado. In Ramirez vs. Ramirez, 1 2 decided on 15 February 1982,
the Court, however, adopted the literal view that "one decree" means relationship or
generation as so advanced by equally eminent writers Dr. A. Padilla, Justice E. Paras and
Dr. A. Tolentino. In the subsequent case of the Testate Estate case of Fr. Aranas, 1 3
however, the Court upheld the usufructuary right of the Roman Catholic Church under a
legacy that now renders doubtful the continued validity of the Ramirez doctrine. dctai
The institution of Jorge Rabadilla in the Belleza codicil partook the nature of an
institution sub modo, rather than one of substitution, governed by the provisions of Article
882 of the Civil Code. This law provides:
"ARTICLE 882. The statement of the object of the institution, or the
application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by him, shall
not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
"That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided
that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of
the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its
fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation." (Italics
supplied)
A mode is distinguished from a condition contemplated in the rules on succession

in that the latter dictates the e cacy, either in a suspensive or resolutory manner, of a
testamentary disposition while the former obligates the instituted heir to comply with the
mandate made by the testator but does not prevent the heir from at once claiming the
inheritance provided he gives security to ensure compliance with the will of the testator
and the return of the thing received together with its fruits and interests, "should (the heir)
disregard this obligation." The obligation imposed upon the heir or legatee is deemed not
to be a condition for his entry forthwith into the inheritance unless a contrary intention of
the testator is evident. In case of doubt, the institution is considered modal, rather than
conditional. Much of the variance in the legal effects of the two classes, 1 4 however, is now
practically theoretical and merely conceptual. Under the Old Civil Code 1 5 an institucion
sub modo could be said to be more akin to an institution sub demonstratione, or an
expression of a wish or suggestion of the testator that did not have any real obligatory
force, that matter being left instead to the discretion of the heir, i.e., whether to abide by it
or not. The amendatory provisions of the New Civil Code now hardly differentiates
between the principal effect of the non-compliance with the mode and that of the
occurrence of a resolutory condition expressed in the will. In both instances, the property
must be returned to the estate of the decedent to then pass on under the rules of
intestacy.
ACCORDINGLY , I also vote for the dismissal of the instant petition.
Panganiban, J., concurs.
Footnotes
1. Was spelled interchangeably in Rollo as Ravadilla.
2. Was spelled interchangeably in Rollo as Marlina.

3. Penned by Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (Chairman) and concurred in by Justices
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and Eduardo G. Montenegro, (Members).
4. Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 34-35.
5. Rollo, pp. 65-66.

6. RTC Decision, pp. 8-9.
7. CA Decision, p. 14.
8. Art. 843. The testator shall designate the heir by his name and surname, and when there
are two persons having the same names, he shall indicate some circumstance by which
the instituted heir may be known.
Even though the testator may have omitted the name of the heir, should he designate
him in such manner that there can be no doubt as to who has been instituted, the
institution shall be valid.
9. Art. 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void, unless by some
event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a disposition in favor of a
definite class or group of persons shall be valid.
10. Article 777, New Civil Code.
11. Ibid., Article 887.

15. Arturo Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Volume III, p. 212.
16. Ibid., p. 212.

17. Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramos, 111 SCRA 704.
18. Tolentino, supra, pp. 241-242.
19. Ibid., p. 242.

20. Ibid.
21. Jottings and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Ruben Balane, p. 249.
22. Tolentino, supra, p. 242.
23. Article 789, NCC.

24. Tolentino, supra, p. 34.
25. Art. 783, NCC and Tolentino, p. 28-29.

VITUG, J., concurring:
1. The will, along with the codicil, was probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No.
4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
2. Relative to the intimation that the term "near descendants" of the testatrix is too
indefinite and opposed to the requirement of Article 843 of the Code, attention might be
invited to the provisions of Article 845, in relation to Article 959, of the Code that can
permit proper identification by some means other than the given name and surname of
the intended testate heirs enough to render the institution valid and effective. The
ponencia, in any case, states that the testatrix "died single and without issue."
3. Rollo, pp. 34-35.
4. The trial court opined that the action was premature since no cause of action had as yet
arisen in favor of private respondent and noted that the banking institutions,
mortgagees, of the property, were not privies to the obligation of Jorge Rabadilla under
the Belleza codicil.
5. Rollo, p. 73.
8. The Codicil indicates that the testatrix clearly intended Jorge Rabadilla to have the
ownership of the lot in question pass on to him upon her death.
11. See Crisologo vs. Singson, 4 SCRA 491.

12. 111 SCRA 704.
13. 29 May 1987.
14. Morente vs. De la Santa, 9 Phil. 387; Chiong vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. 119.
15. See Article 797.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996.]
BELINDA TAÑEDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers

and sisters, and TEOFILA CORPUZ TAÑEDO, representing her minor
daughter VERNA TAÑEDO , petitioners, vs . THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAÑEDO AND TERESITA BARERA TAÑEDO ,
respondents.
Atty. Jose T. Bartolome, for petitioners.

Joselito L. Lum, for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; SALE; MAY NOT BE ENTERED INTO UPON FUTURE
INHERITANCE; EXCEPT IN CASES EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW. — Pursuant to
Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law." Consequently, said contract made in 1962
conveying one hectare of his future inheritance is not valid and cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties. Hence, the "af davit of
conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962
sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same
infirmity." Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF VENDEES IN CASE OF DOUBLE SALE. —
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered
his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF EXISTENCE OF GOOD
FAITH, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. — There are indeed many con icting documents
and testimonies as well as arguments over their probative value and signi cance. Suf ce it
to say, however, that all the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of
evidence and credibility of witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent any
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for the
conclusions made by the lower courts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not
disturb their ndings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their evidence
was not believed by both the trial and the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended
to give more credence to the evidence presented by the private respondents. But this in
itself is not a reason for setting aside such ndings. We are far from convinced that both
courts gravely abused their respective authorities and judicial prerogatives.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
Is a sale of future inheritance valid? In multiple sales of the same real property, who has
preference in ownership? What is the probative value of the lower court's nding of good
faith in registration of such sales in the registry of property? These are the main questions
raised in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set
aside and reverse the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV NO. 24987
promulgated on September 26, 1991 af rming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63, Third Judicial Region, Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No. 6328, and its Resolution
denying reconsideration thereof, promulgated on May 27, 1992. cdtai
By the Court's Resolution on October 25, 1995, this case (along with several others) was
transferred from the First to the Third Division and after due deliberation, the Court
assigned it to the undersigned ponente for the writing of this Decision.
The Facts
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor
of his eldest brother, Ricardo Tañedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private
respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, "one
hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona,
Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the
said property being his "future inheritance" from his parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his
father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Af davit of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980 (Exh.
3) to "re-af rm respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962." On January 13,
1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents
covering his "undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . ." (Exh.
4). He acknowledged therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In
February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children,
petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 (Exh. E). On June 7,
1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in their favor in the Registry
of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certi cate of Title No.
166451 (Exh. 5).
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 led a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds
of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited
by Lazaro from his father. cdasia
Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated
December 29, 1980 (Exh. E), conveying to his ten children his allotted portion under the
extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the land in
litigation (Lot 191).
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and
signed by Matias dated December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever
inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaro's) children (Exh.
A); (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed by Lazaro in the presence of
two witnesses, wherein he con rmed that he would voluntarily abide by the wishes of his
father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaro's) children all the property he would inherit from the
latter (Exh. B); and (3) a letter dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter Carmela,
stating that his share in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was
intended for his children, petitioners herein (Exh. C).
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of
Sale" dated March 12, 1981 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners
for the reason that it was "simulated or ctitious — without any consideration whatsoever".
cdtai
Shortly after the case a quo was led, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G) which
virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale (Exh. 6) and
the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private respondents. However, Lazaro testi ed that he
sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced him to execute a deed
of sale in favor of his children after giving him ve pesos (P5.00) to buy a "drink" (TSN
September 18, 1985, pp. 204-205).
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to
adduce a preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of
Appeals af rmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January
13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said
respondents.
The Issues
Petitioners raised the following "errors" in the respondent Court, which they also now
allege in the instant Petition: cdt
"I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962
(Exhibit 7, Answer) is merely voidable or annullable and not void ab initio
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the New Civil Code involving as it does
a 'future inheritance'.
"II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants-appellees acted in good faith in
registering the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 (Exhibit 9) with the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac and therefore ownership of the land in question passed on to
defendants-appellees.
"III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and
documentary evidence of plaintiffs-appellants which clearly established by
preponderance of evidence that they are indeed the legitimate and lawful owners
of the property in question.
"IV. The decision is contrary to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions
drawn from the established facts are illogical and off-tangent." cdtai
From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:

1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?
2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the
Registry of Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same
buyers valid?
3. May this Court review the ndings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the
buyers acted in good faith in registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b)
in "failing to consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the conclusions of the
respondent Court "illogical and off-tangent"? cdta

The Court's Ruling
At the outset, let it be clear that the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court in this
petition for review on certiorari are only those allegedly committed by the respondent
Court of Appeals and not directly those of the trial court, which is not a party here. The
"assignment of errors" in the petition quoted above are therefore totally misplaced, and for
that reason, the petition should be dismissed. But in order to give the parties substantial
justice we have decided to delve into the issues as above re-stated. The errors attributed
by petitioners to the latter (trial) court will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to
the appellate court's assailed Decision and Resolution.
The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the
assailed Decision conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated
future inheritance is null and void." 3
But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the
Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law." cdasia
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any
right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
Hence, the "af davit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to
validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court,
"suffers from the same in rmity." Even private respondents in their memorandum 4
concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of
sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided
inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered
on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners
covering the same property. These two documents were executed after the death of
Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate
was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words, these
dispositions, though con icting, were no longer infected with the in rmities of the 1962
sale. cdtai
Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was only one-half hectare out
of Lot No. 191, citing as authority the trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is
on review in these proceedings by this Court is the Court of Appeals' decision — which
correctly identi ed the subject matter of the January 13, 1981 sale to be the entire
undivided 1/12 share of Lazaro in Lot No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of
on December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration
of the sale in favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of
multiple sales, as follows: cdt
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have rst taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was rst in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith."aisadc
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law,
ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it rst in the registry of
property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the
one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed
fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at
all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private
respondents never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered
his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property. 5
As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless
contended that it was done in bad faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled: cdta
"Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that

defendants-appellees acted in bad faith when they registered the Deed of Sale in
their favor as appellee Ricardo already knew of the execution of the deed of sale
in favor of the plaintiffs; appellants cite the testimony of plaintiff Belinda Tañedo
to the effect that defendant Ricardo Tañedo called her up on January 4 or 5, 1981
to tell her that he was already the owner of the land in question 'but the contract
of sale between our father and us were (sic) already consummated' (pp. 9-10, tsn,
January 6, 1984). This testimony is obviously self-serving, and because it was a
telephone conversation, the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 was not
shown; Belinda merely told her uncle that there was already a document showing
that plaintiffs are the owners (p. 80). Ricardo Tañedo controverted this and
testified that he learned for the first time of the deed of sale executed by Lazaro in
favor of his children 'about a month or sometime in February 1981' (p. 111, tsn,
Nov. 28, 1984). . . ." 6
The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's ndings, refused to overturn the latter's
assessment of the testimonial evidence, as follows:
"We are not prepared to set aside the nding of the lower court upholding Ricardo
Tañedo's testimony, as it involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the
trial judge, who presided at the hearing, was in a better position to resolve." (Court
of Appeals' Decision, p. 6.)cdt
In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by petitioners, both in their
basic petition and in their memorandum, as follows:
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact that respondent
Ricardo "by fraud and deceit and with foreknowledge" that the property in
question had already been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro execute the deed of
January 13, 1981;
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of the purchase
price of P10,000.00 was paid at the time of the execution of the deed of sale,
contrary to the written acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith; aisadc

3. There is allegedly suf cient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of
the sale in favor of petitioners "was tainted with fraud or deceit."
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private respondents "took
undue advantage over the weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of
Lazaro Tañedo. . ." and that respondent Ricardo Tañedo "exercised moral
ascendancy over his younger brother he being the eldest brother and who reached
fourth year college of law and at one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while
his younger brother only attained first year high school . . .";
5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners' evidence,

especially Lazaro Tañedo's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating
that Ricardo Tañedo deceived the former in executing the deed of sale in favor of
private respondents. cdtai
To be sure, there are indeed many con icting documents and testimonies as well as
arguments over their probative value and signi cance. Suf ce it to say, however, that all
the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence and credibility of
witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the
lower courts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not disturb their ndings. At
most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their evidence was not believed by both
the trial and the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended to give more credence to
the evidence presented by private respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting
aside such ndings. We are far from convinced that both courts gravely abused their
respective authorities and judicial prerogatives.
As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock
Construction and Development Corp. 7 :
"The Court has consistently held that the factual ndings of the trial court, as well
as the Court of Appeals, are nal and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. Among the exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts
found by the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a nding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when the inference
made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; when the ndings went beyond the issues of the case
and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. After
a careful study of the case at bench, we nd none of the above grounds present
to justify the re-evaluation of the findings of fact made by the courts below."
cdtai
In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company,
Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. 8 is equally applicable to the present case:
"We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. .
. . (I)t is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, particularly
where, such as here, the ndings of both the trial court and the appellate court on
the matter coincide." (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED. cdtai
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 58-64.

2. Thirteenth Division, composed of J. Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes ponente, and JJ. Arturo B.
Buena, Chairman, and Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr., member.
3. CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 62. cdasia
4. At pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 145-146.
5. Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 213 (March 13, 1989).
6. Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 63. cdtai
7. G.R. No. 112130, March 31, 1995; J. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, ponente.
8. G.R. No. 102253, June 2, 1995; J. Jose C. Vitug, ponente.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169129. March 28, 2007.]
SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.

VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS,
and TADEO F. SANTOS , petitioners, vs . SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and
PROSERFINA LUMBAO , respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose
Lumbao and Proser na Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses
Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos , dated
8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal led by herein
respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proser na Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and
ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses
Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to
reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter
attorney's fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for lack of merit.
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are
the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20
October 1985. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the
daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proser na Lumbao are the alleged
owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought
from Rita during her lifetime. aEHADT
The facts of the present case are as follows:

On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased
mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the rst
occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother's estate through
a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 4 Respondents
Spouses Lumbao claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures a xed therein. On the second
occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a
document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981. 5
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as
exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property,
respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime,
and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to
effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as
the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her
death, Rita informed respondent Proser na Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the
subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria
had not yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently
and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, 6
adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by
Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao
and now covered by TCT No. 81729 7 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal
demand letter 8 to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still
failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Consequently, the latter led a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages 9 before the
RTC of Pasig City. AHCaES
Petitioners led their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had
been sold to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was duly
published as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to
comply with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which repealed Presidential
Decree No. 1508 1 0 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint
because they discovered that on 16 February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum of
P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No.
PT-81729 on 26 April 1991. Also, in answer to the allegation of the petitioners that they
failed to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the Complaint was led directly in court in order
that prescription or the Statute of Limitations may not set in.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proser na Lumbao and
Carolina Morales as their witnesses, while the petitioners presented only the testimony of
petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of
merit. DaHcAS
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect

their interest, [respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay
[petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, and 2) costs of the suit. 1 1

Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8
June 2005, the appellate court rendered a Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 square
meters of the subject [property] covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao]
the sum of P30,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs. 1 2
Dissatis ed, petitioners led a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision
but it was denied in the Resolution of the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of
merit.
Hence, this Petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, THEREBY CREATING A
VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY]
TO THE RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT
THEY ARE GUILTY OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT
ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING
THE "DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY
WITH THE SUPPOSED BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND
[9 JANUARY 1981] THAT WERE SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE
RITA CATOC. HCITcA
V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO'S] ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE WITH DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN
UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED
[17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT

FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO'S] COMPLAINT FOR
RECONVEYANCE IS DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE
MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508, AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.
VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD
LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS' CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[']S
FEES. STIHaE

Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because
they claim that the factual ndings of the trial court and the appellate court are con icting.
They allege that the ndings of fact by the trial court revealed that petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo did not witness the execution of the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa"; hence,
this nding runs counter to the conclusion made by the appellate court. And even
assuming that they were witnesses to the aforesaid documents, still, respondents
Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to the reconveyance of the subject property because
they were guilty of laches for their failure to assert their rights for an unreasonable length
of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on their rights for a period of more
than 12 years reckoned from the date of execution of the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it would
be unjust and unfair to the petitioners if the respondents will be allowed to recover the
subject property.
Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement because even respondents Spouses Lumbao's witness, Carolina Morales,
testi ed that neither petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the
execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners
a rm that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a newspaper of general
circulation to give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of partition to contest the
same within the period prescribed by law. Since no claimant appeared to interpose a claim
within the period allowed by law, a title to the subject property was then issued in favor of
the petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good faith and therefore cannot
be barred from entering into any subsequent transactions involving the subject property.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as
"Bilihan ng Lupa" because the same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for
being falsi ed documents because one of those documents made it appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared
personally before the notary public, when in truth and in fact they did not; 2) the identities
of the properties in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in
relation to the subject property in litigation were not established by the evidence
presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right of the respondents Spouses
Lumbao to lay their claim over the subject property had already been barred through
estoppel by laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbao's claim over the subject
property had already prescribed. THIcCA
Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages led by
respondents Spouses Lumbao was dismissible because they failed to comply with the
mandate of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by Republic Act No. 7160,
particularly Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160.
Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may be restated as
follows:
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages led by
respondents spouses Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply
with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under
R.A. No. 7160.
II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and
enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the respondents spouses
Lumbao's action for reconveyance with damages.
III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the
"Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and
consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein respondents spouses
Lumbao. cDAEIH
It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the
court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that
the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. 1 3 But,
the rule is not without exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions 1 4 in which
factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these exceptions is when the ndings
of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. This exception is present in
the case at bar.
Going to the rst issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the petitioners
that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages led by respondents Spouses
Lumbao should be dismissed for failure to comply with the barangay conciliation
proceedings as mandated by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic
Act No. 7160. This argument cannot be sustained.
Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-93 1 5 provide
that all disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are
subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before ling a
complaint in court or any government o ces. Non-compliance with the said condition
precedent could affect the su ciency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but
the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to such exercise
of jurisdiction. 1 6
While it is true that the present case should rst be referred to the Barangay Lupon
for conciliation because the parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig
City) and the dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute should
have been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy,
is located, which happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside. In the
event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition
precedent, their Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case,
however, respondents Spouses Lumbao's non-compliance with the aforesaid condition
precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners alleged in their answer that the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages led by respondents spouses Lumbao should
be dismissed for their failure to comply with the condition precedent, which in effect, made
the complaint prematurely instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the
case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint. DHSaCA
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the
trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case had they led a Motion to Dismiss.
However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by ling an answer
seeking an a rmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of
the case by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented
by the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active participation of a
party in a case pending against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that
court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar
said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. 1 7 It is also well-settled that the
non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not
jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss. 1 8 Hence, herein petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-
compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the
complaint led by the respondents Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the
said defense when they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated
17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are null and void for being falsi ed documents as it is
made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the
said documents and that the identities of the properties in those documents in relation to
the subject property has not been established by the evidence of the respondents
Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those documents is
barred by prescription of action and laches.
It is the petitioners' incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were falsi ed because it was made to appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and their allegation
that even respondents Spouses Lumbao's witness Carolina Morales proved that said
petitioners were not present during the execution of the aforementioned documents. This
is specious. ITEcAD
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court nds that in the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared
thereon. Moreover, in petitioners' Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that
indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August
1979. 1 9 However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner
Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and
claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary
public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not
categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in
support thereof, his testimony in the cross-examination propounded by the counsel of the
respondents Spouses Lumbao is quoted hereunder:
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Now, you said, Mr. Witness. . . Virgilio Santos, that you don't know about
this document which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the [respondents
spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING:
The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that
he does not have any knowledge but not that he does not know.
ATTY. CHIU:
Q. Being. . . you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?
WITNESS:
A. No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand
margin of this document Virgilio Santos, will you please go over the same
and tell the court whose signature is this?
A. I don't remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed. EDACSa
Q. But that is your signature?

A. I don't have eyeglasses. . . My signature is different.
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?

A. I don't remember. 2 0
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that
party and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and in exible rule. An answer is
a mere statement of fact which the party ling it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. 2 1
And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is
still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. 2 2 However, in the case at bar, as
the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners] had not adduced any
other evidence to override the admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they
were just misled as to the purpose of the document, . . . ." 2 3 Virgilio's answers were unsure
and quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are
binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case. IcTEaC
On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbao's witness Carolina Morales, this

Court adopts the findings made by the appellate court. Thus —
[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-
examination if the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with her and the
vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must be pointed out that earlier in the direct
examination of said witness, she con rmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao]
actually bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan") . Said witness positively
identi ed and con rmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of
[respondents spouse Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does
not automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at any time
sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their mother's voluntary act
of selling a portion of her share in her deceased mother's property. The rule is that
testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not
by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein. 2 4
Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9

January 1981 were duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document 2 5 that enjoys the presumption
of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a
conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. 2 6 To overcome this
presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such
evidence, the presumption must be upheld. 2 7 In addition, one who denies the due
execution of a deed where one's signature appears has the burden of proving that contrary
to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged
the deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners' denials without
clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not su cient
to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and
the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject
property were not established by respondents Spouses Lumbao's evidence is likewise not
acceptable.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as
"Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet
divided among her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only
description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981" because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does
not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid
because both the law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an estate
remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or
undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. 2 8 The co-owner,
however, has no right to sell or alienate a speci c or determinate part of the thing owned in
common, because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion
without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer
a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with
respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the
results of the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership. 2 9
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986
by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107-square meter lot sold by the mother
of the petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot,
inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures
467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no longer part
of their inheritance as it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.
IaCHTS
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa"
documents was described as "a portion of a parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No.
A-018-01674," while the subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the
property described in Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds
of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no moment because in the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only one estate
left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the
property described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT
No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, and
almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in
Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.
The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjusti able. In an
action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What
is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one
with a better right. It is, indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered
property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription. However, when
the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed, prescription cannot
set in . Such an exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings could not
be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another. 3 0
In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek
reconveyance does not prescribe because the latter have been and are still in actual
possession and occupation as owners of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact
has not been refuted nor denied by the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses
Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from the very start that they bought the
107-square meter lot from the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly asked for
the transfer of the certi cate of title into their names but Rita, during her lifetime, and the
petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the imsy excuse that the lot had not
been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire estate of Maria,
petitioners still included the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance which they divided
among themselves despite their knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother
and the respondents Spouses Lumbao. cSCTEH
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the
basis of the respondents Spouses Lumbao's action for reconveyance. The failure of
respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said documents registered does not affect its
validity and enforceability. It must be remembered that registration is not a requirement
for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves
chie y to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other
persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property had been
entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. 3 1 Hence, the "Bilihan ng
Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, being valid and enforceable,
herein petitioners are bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such documents are
absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 3 2 of the NCC is the
basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations
the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a
mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the
value of the inheritance of the heirs. 3 3 Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they
have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being
heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only
succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance
of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder
pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not
excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the
subject matter of the contract. 3 4
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners' mother, they are still bound to
comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-
square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners' mother. And as correctly ruled
by the appellate court, petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney's fees
and litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect
their interest. 3 5 On this matter, we do not find reasons to reverse the said findings. DTEcSa
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorney's fees
and litigation expenses. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P.
Bersamin and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring, rollo, pp. 47-62.
2. Id. at 64.
3. Penned by Judge Ma. Cristina C. Estrada, rollo, pp. 103-114.
4. Id. at 73-74.
5. Id. at 77-78.
6. Id. at 80-82.
7. Id. at 83.
8. Id. at 84-86.
9. Id. at 66-72.
10. A decree, "Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level."
11. Rollo, p. 114.
12. Id. at 61.
13. Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
14. Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the finding of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the
appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion [ Langkaan Realty
Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December 2000,
347 SCRA 542; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil. 1228, 1243
(2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries
(Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275,
282-283 (1998); Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA
311, 322].
15. Guidelines on the Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Procedure to Prevent

Circumvention of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Sections 399-442,
Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991] issued by the Supreme Court on 15 July 1993.
16. Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65072, 31 January 1984, 127 SCRA
470, 473-474.
17. Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, G.R. No. 112526, 16 March 2005,
453 SCRA 432, 477.
18. Bañares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 50-51.
19. Rollo, pp. 87, 97.
20. TSN, 12 September 1996. Records, pp. 13-14.
21. Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053, 23 January 1997, 266 SCRA 596, 604.
22. Id. at 605.
23. Rollo, p. 55.
24. Id. at 55-56.
25. Rule 132, Section 19 (b) of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
26. Id., Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence; Medina v. Greenfield Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 140228, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 150, 160; Agasen v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 115508, 15 February 2000, 325 SCRA 504, 511.
27. Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation, id.
28. Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 593, 610-611.
29. Heirs of the Late Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite v. Lim, G.R. No. 152168, 10
December 2004, 446 SCRA 56, 71.
30. Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128254, 16 January 2004,
420 SCRA 51, 56-58. HATICc
31. Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125585, 8 June 2005, 459
SCRA 412, 426.
32. Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except
in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible
by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the
value of the property he received from the decedent.
33. Tanay Recreation Center and Development Corp. v. Fausto, G.R. No. 140182, 12 April
2005, 455 SCRA 436, 446
34. DKC Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118248, 5 April 2000, 329 SCRA
666, 674-675.
35. Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs cannot be recovered, except:
(1) ...
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) ...

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162784. June 22, 2007.]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY , petitioner, vs . SEGUNDA ALMEIDA,

COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31 ,
respondents.
DECISION
PUNO , C.J : p
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 led by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) against the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro
Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita
Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.
The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. 1 By virtue of Republic Act No.
3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31,
1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757. 2 NHA
as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
(the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. 3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita
Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining
relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the
exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October
7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as
follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo,

kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente,
San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at kusang loob kong
isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan

(SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong
PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG PARISUKAT ang laki,
humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng
Land Tenure Administration;CEcaTH

2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng
paghuhulog sa Land Tenure Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang
Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at
pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C.
Tolosa, at lumalabas sa kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13,
Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay,

ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at
ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng kaniyang
sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y

bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking
ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, nasa
katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa
kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga

ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN
ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang loteng
nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong

kamay sa ibaba nito at sa kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng
Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960. 4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses
signed at the left-hand side of both pages of the document with the said document having
2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark 5 above her name in the second
page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado led a case for annulment of the
Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in
Biñan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment was docketed
as Civil Case No. B-1263. 6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of
Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and void. 7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication,
Francisca Herrera led an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting
therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private
respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution 8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by
Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we
gathered the following facts: the lots in question are portions of the lot awarded
and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land
Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera
Mercado who was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of
the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos.
45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47,
with an area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant
occupied the lots in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a
resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the lots in
question; protestee left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot situated
in the same Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been
occupying the lots in question; he has been there even before the death of the late
Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights
and interest over the lots in question in favor of the protestee ; and
protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966 with the defunct
Land Tenure Administration. DCESaI
This O ce nds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase

the lots in question. 9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the O ce of the President. 1 0 The NHA

Resolution was a rmed by the O ce of the President in a Decision dated January 23,
1987. 1 1
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was
approved by the NHA. 1 2 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of
Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor. 1 3 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca
Herrera directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was
occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the O ce of the President and the resolution of
the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the
titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She led a Complaint on February 8, 1988,
for "Nulli cation of Government Lot's Award ," with the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of
the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-
adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The
defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and
that the decision of the O ce of the President was already nal and executory. 1 4 They
also contended that the transfer of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the
same was supported by a consideration and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property
with the use of her own money. 1 5 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of the
property was by mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes thereon. 1 6
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction. 1 7 The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed
and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving
"title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction." 1 8 The case was then
remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the
resolution of the NHA and the decision of the O ce of the President awarding the subject
lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of
Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was
ordered to cancel the Transfer Certi cate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also
awarded to private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It
then held that the said document must rst be submitted to probate before it can transfer
property. ECDAcS
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera led their respective motions for
reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied
admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon
copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals a rmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was
awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that Margarita
executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims
that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and
interest over the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed
to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita
Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take
effect after her death. Clearly the Court nds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a
will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to
merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should
have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca
Herrera for submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the
purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is
apparent that she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not
an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution would want to make it
appear. The intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca
Herrera who after the former's demise executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of
Self-Adjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when
said deed was questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's
other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca Herrera led an application to
purchase the subject lots and presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that
it is a deed of assignment of rights. 1 9
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the
heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall
take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must rst be determined by
probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION
OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF
SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RES
JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER DETERMINING WHO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER
THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE
AWARD ON THE SUBJECT LOTS; AND
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS
ARBITRARY.SHAcID
We rule for the respondents.

Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance
with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of
administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts
of public, executive or administrative o cers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as
to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that
whenever nal adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and
rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari,
such nal adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." 2 0 To be sure, early jurisprudence
were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to
decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably
circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension
of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals , 2 1 the Court held
that the rule prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the
absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-
judicial agencies.
In ne, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to
true judicial power — that which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is de ned as
that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a nal
order." 2 2 This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public
administrative o cers or bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
o cial action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. 2 3 However, administrative
agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of
powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branches — the legislative, the
executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in
its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own at, impose the
judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." 2 4 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987
Constitution in the resolution of societal con icts under the grave abuse clause of
Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of government
committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. 2 5
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 2 6 where it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of
Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all nal judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution. . ." 2 7 and contends
that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA. CSHEAI
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003,
already ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case
has already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989
(which has become nal and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated
October 10, 1989). 2 8 We nd no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to
put an end to controversies. The system of judicial review should not be misused and
abused to evade the operation of a nal and executory judgment. 2 9 The appellate court's
decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by reason
of policy. 3 0
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious
grounds when it considered the application for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that
it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who led her application on the subject lot; that it
considered the respective application and inquired whether she had all the quali cations
and none of the disquali cations of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner
that private respondent possessed all the quali cations and none of the disquali cations
for lot award and hence the award was not done arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a
will, it could not bind the NHA. 3 1 That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence
that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to
Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before it." 3 2
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it
should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of
death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng
aking buhay. . ." Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be
hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by
virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance,
of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law. 3 3
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original
applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.
3 4 The NHA issued its resolution 3 5 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the
application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death
would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever
interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest
that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita
Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her
demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs — in accordance with
a will or by operation of law.

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell 3 6 with NHA as the seller. Upon
Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nulli ed nor revoked. This
Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties — Margarita Herrera and NHA.
Obligations are transmissible. 3 7 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became
transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the
interests of the decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue
of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to
other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act
contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations. 3 8
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the
decedent as the next "person" 3 9 likely to stand in to ful ll the obligation to pay the rest of
the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera
should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the
said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the
deed therein null and void 4 0 should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the
interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or
intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the
lots. aITECA
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to
determine. We a rm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it
has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property;
(2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker. 4 1
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, a rming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780
dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, at 8.
2. A Decree Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the Existing Housing
Agencies, Defining Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes, Presidential Decree No. 757, promulgated July 31, 1975.
3. Rollo, at 70.
4. Id.
5. It should be noted that a thumbmark is considered a valid signature. As held in Payad v.
Tolentino, 62 Phil. 848 (1936): "The testator's thumbprint is always valid and sufficient
signature for the purpose of complying with the requirement of the article. While in most
of these cases, the testator was suffering from some infirmity which made the writing of
the testator's name difficult or impossible, there seems to be no basis for limiting the
validity of thumbprints only to cases of illness or infirmity."
AcISTE
6. Rollo, at 49.
7. Vol. 1, Original Record, at 11-14.
8. Rollo, at 39-43.
9. Id., at 41-42 (emphasis supplied).
10. Id., at 9.
11. Id., at 9, 44-47.
12. Id., at 9.
13. Id., at 25-26. Francisca Herrera left behind her husband, Macario Berroya, and children:
Ramon, Antonio, Alberto, Rosita, Pacita, Bernabe, Gregorio, Josefina and Rustica. In the
extra judicial settlement made by the said heirs, Rosita, Pacita, Bernabe, Gregorio,
Josefina and Rustica waived all their rights, interest and participation therein in favor of
their siblings Macario, Alberto, Ramon and Antonio. Deeds of sale involving the subject
lots were executed by the NHA in favor of Alberto, Antonio and Macario. Hence, TCT Nos.
T-173557, T-173579, T-173578 and T-183166 were issued to Macario, Alberto and
Antonio, respectively.
14. Id., at 27. EaIcAS
15. Id., at 27-28.

16. Id., at 28.
17. Id., at 5.
18. Id., at 6; see Annex "F."
19. Id., at 71-72.
20. Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497, 503 (1956).
21. G.R. No. L-14791, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 75.
22. Administrative Code of 1987, Executive Order No. 292, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, Section 2 (9).
23. Midland Insurance Corp. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-71905, August 13, 1986, 143 SCRA 458, 462.
24. 1987 PHIL. CONST., art. VIII, Section 1 as explained in United Residents of Dominical
Hills, Inc. v. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March 7,
2001, 353 SCRA 783, 797-798.
25. 1987 PHIL. CONST., art. VIII, Section 1 ¶ 2.
26. An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, promulgated August 14, 1981.
27. Id. Section 9 (3). CAaEDH
28. Records, vol. 1, at 80.

29. Buaya v. Stronghold Insurance, Corp., 396 Phil. 739 (2000).
30. Ayala Corp. v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Dev't. Corp., 400 Phil. 511 (2000).
31. Rollo, at 17.
32. Id.
33. Civil Code, art. 774 (emphasis supplied).
34. Rollo, at 70.
35. Id., at 39-43.
36. Id., at 24; C.A. G.R. No. 68370 citing Agreement No. 3787, dated July 28, 1959.
37. Araneta v. Montelibano, 14 Phil. 117 (1909).
38. Civil Code, arts. 1544 (which prohibit double sales) and 1165 (which established the
obligation of the seller to the buyer respecting a thing which is determinate in nature).
39. Because the estate acquires juridical personality to continue the transmissible
obligations and rights of the decedent.
40. Vol. 1, Original Record, at 11-14. TIaCAc
41. Rollo, at 34.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 84450. February 4, 1991.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLORIA UMALI y

AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO , defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for defendants-appellants.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA , J : p
In Criminal Case No. 85-473 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Gloria
Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 under an information which reads:
"That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, at Recto Street, Poblacion,
Municipality of Tiaong, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give 'marijuana' or Indian
Hemp, a prohibited drug to one Francisco Manalo y Arellano, without authority of
law.
Contrary to law." (Rollo, pp. 7-8)
Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali
remained at large. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on September 9, 1987,
the dispositive portion thereof states:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Gloria Umali guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused being a detention prisoner is
entitled to enjoy the privileges of her preventive imprisonment. The case against
Suzeth Umali, her co-accused in this case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be
revived until the arrest of said accused is effected. The warrant of arrest issued
against her is hereby ordered reiterated.
LLjur
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 30)
Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the following assignment of errors:
"I
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE BIASED TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MANALO.
"II
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF ACCUSED'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
"III
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED NEVER

DISPUTED THE CLAIM THAT SHE WAS THE SOURCE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES
FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF FRANCISCO MANALO ON APRIL 5, 1985 AND
THAT WHICH WAS USED BY PIERRE PANGAN RESULTING TO THE LATTER'S
DRUG DEPENDENCY.
"IV
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GLORIA UMALI
GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 ON THE BASIS OF
MERE CONJECTURES AND NOT ON FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES PROVEN.
"V
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED DID NOT PASS THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY." (Rollo, p. 49)
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court are as follows:
"On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino
Noguerra for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of robbery. In the course
of the investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of
committing crime against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As
Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his
parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police
headquarters and was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked
the police investigators if something could be done to determine the source of the
marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other minors in the
community. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan was the case of Francisco
Manalo, who was likewise investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon
Police Department and for which a case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act
was filed against him, covered by Criminal Case No. 85-516 before Branch 60 of
the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said case, accused Francisco
Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly
weapon and other crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the
Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and told him the
social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like marijuana being peddled to
minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by
the appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to help in the identification
of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in
some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for violating the
dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before
the sala of Judge Eriberto Rosario.
cdrep
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation
Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources
known to him. The serial numbers of the money was entered in the police blotter.
The instruction was (sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased
by him to the police headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic), Manalo returned
with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which he allegedly bought from the accused
Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a
statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two
(2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco
Manalo, supported by the two (2) foils of marijuana, the Chief of the Investigation
Division petitioned the Court for the issuance of a search warrant as a
justification for them to search the house of Gloria Umali located at Rector (sic)
Street, Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing the same, the police operatives,
went to the house of Gloria Umali and served the search warrant on her.
Confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali were the four (4) P5.00 bills with
serial numbers BA26943, DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively, as
reflected in the police blotter. Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00 bills were the
letters T which were placed by the police investigators to further identify the
marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic) in the house was made in the
presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan. The search resulted in the confiscation of a
can of milo, containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which were
placed in a tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was being stored. The
return of the search warrant reads as follows:
"DATE: 22 April 1985
WHAT: "RAID"
WHERE: Residence of Dr. Emiliano Umali
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon
WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP
TIME STARTED/ARRIVED AT SAID PLACE:
221410H Apr '85
SERVED TO: MRS. GLORIA UMALI
MR. EMILIANO UMALI
PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY SEIZED/RECOVERED

Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of
Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves

TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85
WITNESSES (sic) BY:
1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal

2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan
3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion

4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino
Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were submitted to the PC Crime

Laboratory for examination. Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC Crime Laboratory
took the witness stand, testified and identified the marijuana submitted to her and
in a written report which was marked as Exhibit "G" she gave the following
findings:
"Qualitative examination conducted on the specimen mentioned
above gave POSITIVE result to the tests for marijuana."
"In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was charged of having in his
possession Indian Hemp on April 5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article II of
Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The Court in rendering judgment against him disposed the case as follows:
"In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of "Indian Hemp" penalized
under Sec. 8 of Article 6425 (sic); as amended otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972" and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional to six
(6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six Thousand
Pesos (P6,000.00) Let the period of detention of the accused be credited to his
sentence."
"Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo that the marijuana found
in his possession on April 5, 1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold
to him by the accused Gloria Umali. The defense also did not dispute the claim of
the prosecution that in the investigation of Pierre Pangan, the police investigator
came to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the marijuana leaves which he
used and smoked resulting in his present drug dependency." (Rollo, pp. 22-27)
The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said
court committed reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco
Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be
taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in
court and because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell
falsehood. LLjur
However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco
Manalo was then facing several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any
way disqualify him as a witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but
more so, it was also corroborated in its material respect by the other prosecution
witnesses, especially the police officers." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the marijuana were
confiscated for no other purpose than using them as evidence against the accused in the
proceeding for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act and therefore the search warrant issued
is illegal from the very beginning. She stressed that there can be no other plausible
explanation other than that she was a victim of a frame-up.
In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is not true that the
evidences submitted by the prosecution were obtained in violation of her constitutional
right against illegal search and seizure.
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the crime of which
she was charged were never established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the
findings of the court a quo. She also stressed that the court's verdict of conviction is
merely based on surmises and conjectures.
However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and categorical testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who had personal knowledge of the happening together with the
physical evidence submitted clearly prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-
appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or
rejecting the trial court's factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's
assessment of the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded with great
respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand
observing and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented at the trial
and is therefore better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the
basis thereof (See People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, 29 December, 1989, 180 SCRA 694,
699). The findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight, and should not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of
weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard
the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v.
Alvarez y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R.
No. L-23464, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708, December
19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the absence of any showing that the trial court had
overlooked certain substantial facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and
indeed are binding even on this Court.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
"Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving can make known their perception to others may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a

crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification."
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account
Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."
(Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes
to disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule
that the fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not
in any way disqualify him as a witness. prcd
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence
that he was actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268, 29 January
1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco
Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.
Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is devoid of merit. "Courts
must be vigilant. A handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police
attempted to extort from the accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in appreciating
such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as a frame-up. At all times the police, the
prosecution and the Courts must be always on guard against these hazards in the
administration of criminal justice (People v. Rojo, G.R. No. 82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA
119).
The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot also be given any merit.
"Where marked peso bills were seized by the police as a result of the search made on the
appellant, the admissibility of these marked peso bills hinges on the legality of the arrest
and search on the person of the appellant (People v. Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 27 February
1989, 170 SCRA 681). Since the search is predicated on a valid search warrant, absent any
showing that such was procured maliciously the things seized are admissible in evidence.
Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on surmises and conjectures,
hence the essential elements of the crime were never established by clear and convincing
evidence.
Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. A conviction for a
criminal offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere
presumptions (Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA
20). The prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimony of witness Manalo and the law
enforcers as well as the physical evidence consisting of the seized marked peso bills, the
two (2) foils of marijuana purchased and the can containing sixteen (16) aluminum foils of
dried marijuana.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of
testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their
duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21 February
1989, 170 SCRA 497). Hence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, full credence should
be accorded to the prosecution's evidence. The evidence on record sufficiently established
that Umali gave two (2) foils of marijuana to witness Manalo for which she was given and
received four (4) marked five peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for drug
pushing in violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. prLL
Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did not err in finding, on the
basis of the evidence on record, that the accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which
raised the penalty for selling prohibited drugs from life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos (People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 65349, October
31, 1984, 133 SCRA 132) Thus, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment but failed to impose a fine.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that a fine of
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 24569. February 26, 1926.]
MANUEL TORRES , petitioner and appellant, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO ,

appellant, vs . MARGARITA LOPEZ , opponent-appellee.
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.

Marcaida, Capili & Ocampo and Thomas Cary Welch for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WILLS; TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; DEFINITION. — Testamentary

capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the
testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the
persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty. (Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163; Bagtas vs. Paguio t1912],
22 Phil., 227; and Jocson vs. Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701.)
2. ID; ID.; TIME AS OF WHICH CAPACITY TO BE DETERMINED. — The mental
capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will.
3. ID.; ID.; TESTS OF CAPACITY. — Neither old age, physical in rmities,
feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor
eccentricities are su cient singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. The
nature and rationality of the will is of some practical utility in determining capacity. Each
case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
4. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE. — On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence
should be permitted to take a wide range in order that all facts may be brought out
which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses
to a will concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled to great weight where
they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the
will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon.
5. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTIONS. — The presumption is that every adult is sane.
But where the question of insanity is put in issue in guardianship proceedings, and a
guardian is named for the person alleged to be incapacitated, a presumption of the
mental in rmity of the ward is created; the burden of proving sanity in such case is cast
upon the proponents of the will.
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN. — The effect of an order
naming a guardian for an incapacitated person is not conclusive with respect to the
condition of the person, pursuant to the provisions of section 306 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The decree does not conclusively show that the testamentary capacity of a
person under guardianship is entirely destroyed. The presumption created by the
appointment of a guardian may be overcome by evidence proving that such person at
the time he executed a will was in fact of sound and disposing mind and memory.
7. ID.; ID.; MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE; INSANITY. — A will to be valid must,
under sections 614 and 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be made by a testator of
sound mind. The question of mental capacity is one of degree. There are many
gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy. (Bagtas vs. Paguio
[1912], 22 Phil., 227, and Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163.)
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties. The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory
possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? (Buswell on Insanity, sec.
365; Campbell vs. Campbell [1889], 130 Ill., 466, and Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil.,
227.)
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "SENILE DEMENTIA." — Senile dementia is childishness. In
the first stages of the disease, a person may possess reason and have will power.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE CASES ON TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
EXAMINED. — An examination of the Philippine cases on testamentary capacity
discloses a consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the deceased whenever it be
legally possible. These decisions also show great tenderness on the part of the court
towards the last will and testament of the aged.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — On January 3, 1924, when the testator,
Tomas Rodriguez, made his will, he was 76 years old, physically decrepit, weak of
intellect, suffering from a loss of memory, had a guardian of his person and his
property, and was eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason and of life, that
strength of mind to form a xed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to
enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary capacity." Two of the
subscribing witnesses testi ed clearly to the regular manner in which the will was
executed, and one did not. The attending physician and three other doctors who were
present at the execution of the will expressed opinions entirely favorable to the
capacity of the testator. Three other members of the medical profession expressed
opinions entirely unfavorable to the capacity of the testator and certi ed that he was of
unsound mind. Held, That Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possessed su cient
mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary
capacity; that the proponents of the will have carried successfully the burden of proof
and have shown him of sound mind on that date; and that it was reversible error on the
part of the trial court not to admit his will to probate.
12. ID.; UNDUE INFLUENCE; DEFINITION. — Undue in uence as used in
connection with the law of wills, may be de ned as that which compels the testator to
do that which is against the will from fear, the desire of peace, or from other feeling
which he is unable to resist.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Field, That the theory that undue in uence
was exercised by the persons bene ted in the will in conjunction with others who acted
in their behalf, and that there was a preconceived plan on the part of the persons who
surrounded Tomas Rodriguez to secure his signature to the testament, must be
rejected as not proved.
DECISION
MALCOLM , J : p

This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y
Lopez.
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, on February 25,
1924, leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter, Manuel Torres, one of the
executors named in the will, asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition
was entered by Margarita Lopez, the rst cousin of the deceased, on the grounds: (1)
That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of the execution of the
supposed will he was suffering from senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2)
that undue in uence had been exercised by the persons bene ted in the document in
conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas
Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit. After a prolonged
trial, judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will. In the decision of the
trial judge appeared, among others, these findings:
"All this evidence taken together with the circumstance that before, and at,
the time Tomas Rodriguez was caused to sign the supposed will, Exhibit A, and
the copies thereof, there already existed a nal judgment as to his mental
condition, wherein he was declared physically and mentally incapacitated to take
care of himself and manage his estate, shows in a clear and conclusive manner
that at the time of signing the supposed will, Tomas Rodriguez did not possess
such mental capacity as was necessary to enable him to dispose of his property
by the supposed will.
"But even supposing, as contended by petitioner's counsel, that Tomas
Rodriguez was at the time of executing the will, competent to make a will, the
court is of the opinion that the will cannot be probated, for it appears from the
declaration of the attesting witness Elias Bonoan that when the legatee Luz
Lopez presented the supposed will, Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez, she told him to
sign said Exhibit A because it was a document relative to the complaint against
one Castito, which is Exhibit 4, then pending in the justice of the peace court, and
for the further reason that said Tomas Rodriguez was then under guardianship,
due to his being mentally and physically incapacitated, and therefore unable to
manage his property and take care of himself. It must also be taken into account
that Tomas Rodriguez was an old man 76 years of age, and was sick in the
hospital when his signature to the supposed will was obtained. All of this shows
that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez appearing in the will was obtained through
fraudulent and deceitful representations of those who were interested in it."
(Record on Appeal, p. 23.)
From the decision and judgment above-mentioned, the proponents have
appealed. Two errors are speci ed, viz: (1) The court below erred in holding that at the
time of signing his will, Tomas Rodriguez did not possess the mental capacity
necessary to make the same; and (2) the court below erred in holding that the
signatures of Tomas Rodriguez to the will were obtained through fraudulent and
deceitful representations, made by persons interested in the execution of said will.
The record is voluminous — close to two thousand type-written pages, with a
varied assortment of exhibits. One brief contains two hundred seventy-four pages, the
other four hundred fteen pages. The usual oral argument has been had. The court
must scale this mountain of evidence more or less relevant and of argument intense
and prolific to discover the fertile valleys of fact and principle.
The topics suggested by the assignments of error — Testamentary Capacity and
Undue In uence — will be taken up separately and in order. An attempt will be made
under each subject, rst, to make ndings of fact quite separate and apart from those
of the trial judge, and, second. to make ndings of law. Finally, it is proposed to
consolidate the facts and the law by rendering judgment.
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
A. Facts. — For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in
feeble health. His breakdown was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing
years, and to an accident which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6). Ultimately, on August 10,
1923, on his own initiative, Rodriguez designated Vicente F. Lopez as the administrator
of his property (Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of
Manila to name a guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his old age and
pathological state. This petition was opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta acting on
behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that while Rodriguez was far from strong on
account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after his property with the
assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The deposition of Tomas Rodriguez
was taken and a perusal of the same shows that he was able to answer nearly all of the
questions propounded intelligently (Exhibit 54-G). A trial was had at which considerable
oral testimony for the petitioner was received. At the conclusion of the hearing, an order
was issued by the presiding judge, declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take
care of himself and to manage his property, and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his
guardian. (Exhibit 37.)
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee make much of one incident which occurred
in connection with the guardianship proceedings, it may as well be mentioned here as
later. This episode concerns the effort of deputy sheriff Joaquin Garcia to make service
on Tomas Rodriguez on October 31, 1923. We will let the witness tell in his own words
what happened on the occasion in question:
"I found him lying down on his bed . . . And when it (the cleaning of his
bed) was nished, I again entered his room and told him that I had an order of the
court which I wanted to read as I did read to him, but after reading the order he
asked me what the order meant; 'I read it to you so that you may appear before
the court, because you have to appear before the court' — 'I do not understand,'
then I read it again, but he asked what the order said; in view of that fact I left the
order and departed from the house." (S. R., p. 642.)
To return to our narrative possibly inspired by the latter portion of the order of
Judge Diaz, Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on
November 27, 1923. There he was to remain sick in bed until his death. The physician in
charge during this period was Dr. Elias Domingo. In the clinical case record of the
hospital under the topic "Diagnosis (in full)," we nd the following: "Senility; Hernia
inguinal; Decubitus" (Exhibit 8).
On the door of the patient's room was placed a placard reading — "No visitors,
except father, mother, sisters, and brothers." (Testimony of head nurse Carmen
Baldonado, S. R., p. 638.) By order of the attending physician, there were permitted to
visit the patient only the following named persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez,
Romana Lopez, Luz Lopez de Bueno, Remedios Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad Vizcarra,
Apolonia Lopez, Antonio Haman, and Gregorio Araneta (Exhibit 9). The list did not
include the names of Margarita Lopez and her husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last
named persons experienced considerable di culty in penetrating into the room of
Rodriguez.
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas
Rodriguez in the hospital, Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a will and
suggested that the matter be taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p. 550). This
information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F. Lopez, who then interviewed
Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of Manila, for the purpose of securing
him to prepare the will. In accordance with this request, Judge Mina conferred with
Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital on December 16th and December 29th. He
ascertained the wishes of Rodriguez and wrote up a testament in rough draft. The
attorney expected to return to the hospital on December 31st to have the will executed
but was unable to do so on account of having to make a trip to the provinces.
Accordingly, the papers were left with Santiago Lopez.
In corroboration of the above statements, we transcribe a portion of Judge
Mina's testimony which has not been challenged in any way:
"ARANETA:
Q. Will you please tell your motive for holding an interview with Vicente
Lopez?
"MAXIMINO MINA:
"A. When I arrived in the house of Vicente Lopez, after the usual greetings and
other unimportant things, he consulted me or presented the question as to
whether or not D. Tomas could make his will, having announced his desire
to do so. I told him that it seemed that we were not called upon to decide or
give an opinion as to whether or not he can make a will; it is a question to
be submitted to the court, but as he had announced his desire, it is our duty
to comply with it. Then he requested me to do what was necessary to
comply with his wishes; I told him I was to see him; then we agreed that on
the morning next to the following evening, that is, on the 16th, I should go
to the General Hospital, and so I did.
"Q. Did you go to the hospital in the evening of the 16th?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you meet D. Tomas.? — A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did D. Tomas tell you his desire to make a will?
"OCAMPO: Leading.
"ARANETA: I withdraw. What, if anything, did D. Tomas tell you on that occasion
when you saw him there?
"A. He told me that.
"Q. Please tell us what conversation you had with D. Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. The conversation I had with him that evening — according to my best
recollection — I cannot tell the exact words and perhaps the order. After the
usual greetings, 'Good evening, D. Tomas,' 'Good evening,' 'How are you,'
'How do you do?' 'Very well, just as you nd me.' Then I introduced myself
saying, 'I came here in the name of D. Vicente Lopez, because according to
him you stated your desire to make a will.' 'Yes,' he said, 'and where is
Vicente Lopez, why does he not come.' 'He cannot come because he has
many things to do, and besides it is hard for him and makes him tired, so
he told me to come.' Then he asked me, 'Who are you?' 'I am Maximino
Mina, your tenant, attorney.' 'Are you an attorney?' 'Yes.' 'Where do you
live?' 'I live in Quiapo.' 'Oh, in Quiapo, a good district, it is gay, a commercial
place, you must have some business there because that is a commercial
place.' 'Unfortunately, I have none, D. Tomas.' 'Well, you must have
because the profession alone does not give enough. Where is your o ce?'
'I work in the o ce of Mr. Chicote.' 'That-Mr. Chicote must be rich, it seems
to me that he is.' 'The profession gives almost nothing, it is better to have
properties. I am an attorney but do not depend upon my profession.' I
interrupted D. Tomas saying, 'since you want to make a will, when and to
whom do you want to leave your fortune?' Then he said, 'To whom else?
To my cousin Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez.' 'Which
properties do you want to give to your cousin and niece?' 'All my
properties.' 'Won't you specify the property to be given to each of them?'
'What for?, all my property.' 'Don't you have any other relatives?' 'Yes, sir, I
have.' 'Won't you give any to those relatives?' 'What for?,' was his answer.
'Well do you want to specify said properties, to say what they are?' and he
again said, 'What for?, they know them, he is my attorney-in-fact as to all
my property.' I also said, 'Well and as a legacy, won't you give anything to
other persons?' The answer, 'I think, something, they will know it.' After
being asked, 'Whom do you think, whom do you want to be your executor?'
After hesitating a little, 'This Torres, Manuel or Santiago Lopez also.' Then I
asked him, 'What is your religion?' He answered, 'Roman Apostolic
Catholic,' and then he also asked me, 'And yours?' 'Also Roman Apostolic
Catholic.' 'Where have you studied ?' 'In the University of Santo Tomas.' 'It
is convenient to preserve the Catholic religion that our ascendants have left
us.' 'And you, what did you study in the university,' he asked. I said, 'Do you
have anything more to say as to your testamentary dispositions ?' 'No,' he
answered. Then I reminded him, 'You know that Vicente Lopez has sent me
to get these dispositions of yours,' and he said, 'Yes, do it.' I asked him,
'When do you want it done?' 'Later on, I will send for you.' After this,
believing to have done my duty, I bade him good-bye.
"Q. Did you have any other occasion to see him?
"A. Yes.
"Q. When?
"A. On December 29, 1923, also in the evening.
"Q. Why did you go to see him?
"A. Because as I had not received any message either from Vicente Lopez or
from Tomas Rodriguez, and as I had received notices in connection with
the few cases I had in the provinces, particularly in Tayabas, which
compelled me to be absent from Manila until January 1st at least, for I
might be there for several days, so I went to the General Hospital of my
own accord — since I had not received any message from them — with a
rough draft which I had prepared in accordance with what he had told me
in our conversation. After the greetings, I told him, 'Here I am, D. Tomas;
this is the rough draft of your will in accordance with your former
statements to me in order to submit it to you. Do you want to read it?'
'Please do me the favor of reading it.' I read it slowly to him in order that he
could understand it. After reading, 'It is all right, that is the way, — few
words — you see it takes only a few minutes; now I can execute the will.'
'We can do it, it takes only a few minutes.' In view of that statement of his, I
called his attention, 'But we don't have witnesses, D. Tomas.' I looked out
through the door to see if I could call some witnesses, but it was late then
and it was thought better to do it on the 31st of December, and so I told D.
Tomas that I would be coming on the 31st of December. Then we talked
about other things, and he -again asked, 'Where were you born?' I told him
in Quiapo. 'Ah, good district, and especially now that the esta of Quiapo is
coming near,' and then I interrupted him, 'Yes, the estas of the Holy Child
and of Our Lady of Mount Carmel' because we also talked about the esta
of San Sebastian. I again reminded him that we could not do it because
the witnesses were not there and he explained, 'Good Christmas present,
isn't it ?' I did not tell him anything, and in view of that I did not deem it
necessary to stay there any longer.
"Q. With whom did you make the arrangement to make the will on the evening
of the 31st of December — you said that it was agreed that the will be
executed on the evening of December 31st?
"A. With Santiago Lopez and Don Tomas.
"Q. Was the will executed on the 31st of December?
"A. What happened is this: In view of that agreement, I xed up the rough
draft which I had, dating it the 31st of December, putting everything in
order; we agreed that Santiago Lopez would meet me on said 31st day
between ve and six in the evening or a little before, but it happened that
before the arrival of that date Santiago Lopez came and told me that I
need not trouble about going to the General Hospital because it could not
be carried out for the reason that certain requisites were lacking. In view of
this and bearing always in mind that on the following day I had to go to the
provinces, I told Santiago Lopez that I would leave the papers with him
because I might go to the provinces.
"Q. What may be the meaning of those words good Christmas present?
"A. They are given as a Christmas present when Christmas comes or on the
occasion of Christmas.
"Q. I show you this document which is marked Exhibit A, tell me if that is the
will or copy of the will which you delivered to Santiago Lopez on December
31, 1923?
"A. With the exception of the words '3 de enero de 1924' it seems to be literally
identical." (S. R., pp. 244-249.)
As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with that
signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses with the single exception of the
change of the date from December 31, 1923, to January 3, 1924. Two copies besides
the original of the will were made. The will is brief and simple in terminology.
For purposes of record, we copy the will as here translated into English:
"ONLY PAGE
"In the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, this January 3, 1924, I, Tomas
Rodriguez, of age and resident of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, do freely
and voluntarily make this my will and testament in the Spanish language which I
know, with the following clauses:
"First. I declare that I am a Roman Apostolic Catholic, and order that my
body be buried in accordance with my religion, standing, and circumstances.
"Second. I name my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez
de Bueno as my only and universal heirs of all my property.
"Third. I appoint D. Manuel Torres and D. Santiago Lopez as my executors.
"In witness whereof I sign this typewritten will, consisting of one single
page, in the presence of the witnesses who sign below.

(Sgd.) "TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
(Left marginal signatures:)
"TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
"ELIAS BONOAN
"V L. LEGARDA
"A. DE ASIS"
"We hereby certify that on the date and in the place above indicated, Don
Tomas Rodriguez executed this will, consisting of one single typewritten page,
having signed at the bottom of the will in the presence of us who saw as
witnesses the execution of this will, and we signed at the bottom thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
(Sgd.) "V. L. LEGARDA

"ELIAS BONOAN
"A. DE ASIS"
(Exhibit A.)
On the afternoon of January 3, 1924, there gathered in the quarters of Tomas

Rodriguez in the Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez, his relative; Mr. V. L.
Legarda, Dr. Elias Bonoan, and Dr, A. de Asis, attesting witnesses; and Dr. Fernando
Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo, and Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for purposes
of observation. (Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8; testimony of V. L. Legarda, S. R.,
p. 34.) Possibly also Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at
least they were hovering in the background.
As to what actually happened, we have in the record two absolutely contradictory
accounts. One emanates from the attesting witness, Doctor Bonoan. The other is the
united testimony of all the remaining persons who were there.
Doctor Elias Bonoan was the rst witness called at the trial. He testi ed on direct
examination as to formal matters, such as the identi cation of the signatures to the
will. On cross-examination, he rather startled the proponents of the will by stating that
Luz Lopez de Bueno told Tomas Rodriguez to sign the document because it concerned
a complaint against Castito and that nobody read the will to the testator. Doctor
Bonoan's testimony along this line is as follows:
"QUESTIONS.
"MARCAIDA:
"Q. Why were you a witness to the will of Tomas Rodriguez?
"ARANETA:
I object to the question as being immaterial.
"COURT:
Objection overruled.
"ARANETA:
Exception.
"Dr. BONOAN:
"A. Because I was called up by Mrs. Luz by telephone telling me to be in the
hospital at 3 o'clock sharp in the afternoon of the 3d of January.
"Q. Who is that Luz whom you have mentioned?
"A. Luz Lopez, daughter of Vicente Lopez.
"Q. What day, January 3, 1924?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When did Luz Lopez talk to you in connection with your going to the
hospital?
"A. On the morning of the 3d she called me up by telephone.
"Q. On the morning?
"A. On the morning.
"Q. Before January 3, 1924, when the will of Tomas Rodriguez was signed,
did Luz Lopez talk to you?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How many days approximately before was it?
"A. I cannot tell the day, it was approximately one week before, — on that
occasion when I was called up by her about the deceased Vicente Lopez.
"Q. What did she tell you when you went to the house of Vicente Lopez one
week approximately before signing the will?
"A. That Tomas Rodriguez would make a will.
"Q. Don't you know where the will of Tomas Rodriguez was made?
"A. In the General Hospital.
"Q. Was that document written in the hospital.?
"A. I have not seen it.
"Q. When you went to the General Hospital on January 3, 1924, who were the
persons you met in the room where the patient was?
"A. I met one of the nieces of the deceased Tomas Rodriguez, Mrs. Nena
Lopez, and Dña. Luz Lopez.
"Q. Were those the only persons?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What time approximately did you go to the General Hospital on January
3d?
"A. A quarter to 3.
"Q. After you, who came?
"A. Antonino de Asis, Doctor Herrera, later on Doctor Calderon arrived with
Doctor Elias Domingo, and lastly Santiago Lopez came and then Mr.
Legarda.
"Q. When you entered the room of the patient, D. Tomas Rodriguez, in the
General Hospital in what position did you find him?
"A. He was Lying down.
"Q. Did you greet D. Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. I did.
"Q. Did D. Tomas Rodriguez answer you?
"A. Dña. Nena immediately answered in advance and introduced me to him
saying that I was the brother of his godson.
"Q. Did other persons whom you have mentioned, viz, Messrs. Calderon,
Herrera, Domingo, De Asis, and Legarda, greet Tomas Rodriguez?
"ARANETA:
I object to the question as being improper cross-examination. It has not been
the subject of the direct examination.
"COURT:
Objection overruled.
"ARANETA:
Exception.
"A. No, sir, they joined us.
"Q. What was D. Tomas told when he signed the will?
"A. To sign it.
"Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the Will?
"A. Luz Lopez.
"Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas Rodriguez in order that he should sign the
Will?
"A. She told him to sign the document; the deceased Tomas Rodriguez before
signing the document asked what that was which he was to sign.
"Q. What did anybody answer to that question of D. Tomas?
"A. Luz Lopez told him to sign it because it concerned a complaint against
Castito. D. Tomas said, 'What is this?' And Luz Lopez answered, 'You sign
this document, uncle Tomas, because this is about the complaint against
Castito.'
"Q. Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the will?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Who had the will? Who was holding it?
"A. Mr. Vicente Legarda had it in his own hands.
"Q. Was the will signed by Tomas Rodriguez lying down, on his feet, or
seated?
"A. Lying down.
"Q. Was the will read by Tomas Rodriguez or any person present at the time
of signing the will, did they read it to him?
"A. Nobody read the will to him.
"Q. Did not D. Tomas read the will?
"A. I have not seen it.
"Q. Were you present?
"A. Yes, sir." (S. R., p. 8.) As it would be quite impracticable to transcribe the
testimony of all the others who attended the making of the will, we will let
Vicente L. Legarda, who appears to have assumed the leading role, tell
what transpired. He testified in part:
"ARANETA:
Q. Who exhibited to you those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2?
'LEGARDA:
"A. Santiago Lopez.
"Q. Did he show you the same document?
"A. First, that is to say the rst document he presented to me was a rough
draft, a tentative will, and it was dated December 31st, and I called his
attention to the fact that the date was not December 31, 1923, and that it
was necessary to change the date to January 3, 1924, and it was done.
"Q. And it was then, was it not, when Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were written?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you know where it was written ?
"Q. Did any time elapse from your making the suggestion that the document
which you delivered to Santiago Lopez be rewritten until those three
exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were presented to you?
"A. About nine or ten minutes approximately.
"Q. The time to make it clean.?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Where were you during that time?
"A. In the room of D. Tomas Rodriguez.
"Q. Were you talking with him during that time?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. About what things were you talking with him?
"A. He was asking me about my health, that of my family, how my family
was, my girl, whether we were living in Pasay, he asked me about the
steamer Ildefonso, he said that it was a pity that it had been lost because
he knew that my father-in-law was the owner of the steamer Ildefonso.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. When those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2, that is, the original and
the two copies of the will signed by D. Tomas Rodriguez were written
clean, will you please tell what happened?
"A. When Santiago Lopez gave them to me clean, I approached D. Tomas
Rodriguez and told him: 'Don Tomas, here is this will which is ready for
your signature'
"Q. What did D. Tomas do when you said that his will you were showing to
him was ready?
"A. The rst thing he asked was: 'the witnesses ?' Then I called the witnesses
— 'Gentlemen, please come forward,' and they came forward, and I handed
the documents to D. Tomas. D. Tomas got up and then took his
eyeglasses, put them on and as he saw that the electric lamp at the center
was not su ciently clear, he said: 'There is no more light ;' then somebody
came forward bringing an electric lamp.
"Q. What did D, Tomas do when that electric lamp was put in place?.
"A. The eyeglasses were adjusted again and then he began to read, and as he
could not read much for a long time, for he unexpectedly felt tired and took
off the eyeglasses, and as I saw that the poor man was tired, I suggested
that it be read to him and he stopped reading and I read the will to him.
"Q. What happened after you had read it to him?
"A. He said to me, 'Well, it is all right. It is my wish and my will. Don't you have
any pen?' I asked a pen of those who were there and handed it to D.
Tomas.
"Q. Is it true that Tomas Rodriguez asked at that time 'What is that which I am
going to sign?' and Luz Lopez told him: 'It is in connection with the
complaint against Castito?'
"A. It is not true, no, sir.
"Q. During the signing of the will, did you hear Luz Lopez say anything to
Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. No, sir, she said nothing.
"Q. According to you, Tomas Rodriguez signed of his own accord?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did nobody tell him to sign?
"A. Nobody.
"Q. What happened after the signing of the will by Tomas Rodriguez?
"A. I called the witnesses and we signed in the presence of each other and of
Tomas Rodriguez.
"Q. After the signing of the will, did you have any conversation with Tomas
Rodriguez?
"A. Doctor Calderon asked D. Tomas Rodriguez some questions.
"Q. Do you remember the questions and the conversation held between
Doctor Calderon and D. Tomas after the signing of the will?
"A. I remember that afterwards Doctor Calderon talked to him about business.
He asked him how the business was going on, — 'everything is going
wrong, except the business of making loans at 18 per cent.' It seems that
Tomas Rodriguez answered: 'That loan at 18 per cent is illegal, it is usury.'
" (S. R., p. 38.)
In addition to the statements under oath made by Mr. Legarda, an architect and
engineer in the Bureau of Public Works and professor of engineering and architecture in
the University of Santo Tomas, su ce it to say that Luz Lopez de Bueno denied
categorically the statements attributed to her by Doctor Bonoan (S. R., p. 568). In this
stand, she is corroborated by Doctor De Asis, an attesting witness, and by Doctors
Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera, the attending physicians. On this point, Doctor
Calderon, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dean of the College of
Medicine in the University of the Philippines, testified:
"Mr. ARANETA:
"Q. What have you seen or heard with regard to the execution of the will?
"Dr. CALDERON:
"A. Mr. Legarda handed the will to D Tomas Rodriguez. D. Tomas asked for
his eyeglasses, wanted to read, and it was extremely hard for him to do so.
Mr. Legarda offered to read the will, it was read to him and he heard that in
that will Vicente Lopez and Luz Lopez were appointed heirs; we also saw
him sign that will, and he signed not only the original but also the other
copies of the will and we also saw how the witnesses signed the will; we
heard that D. Tomas asked for light at that moment; he was at that time in
a perfect mental state. And we remained there after the will was executed. I
asked him, 'How do you feel, how are you?' 'Well, I am well,' he answered.
'How is the business ?' 'There is a crisis, but there is one good business,
namely, that of making loans at the rate of 18 per cent,' and he answered,
'That is usury.' When a man answers in that way, 'That is usury,' it shows
that he is all right.
"Q. Were you present when Mr. Legarda handed the will to him?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did any person there tell Don Tomas that that was a complaint to be led
against one Castito?
"A. No, sir, I have not heard anything of the kind.
"Q. It was said here that when the will was handed to him, D. Tomas
Rodriguez asked what that was which he was to sign and that Luz Lopez
answered, 'That is but a complaint in connection with Castito.' Is that true?
"A. I have not heard anything of the kind.
"Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Was Luz Lopez there?
"A. I don't remember having seen her; I am not sure; D, Santiago Lopez and
the three witnesses were there; I don't remember that Luz Lopez was there.
"Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did D. Tomas sign of his own accord?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you remember whether he was given a pen or he himself asked for it?
"A. I don't know; it is a detail which I don't remember well; so that whether or
not he was given a pen or he himself asked for it, I do not remember.
"Q. But did he sign without hesitation?
"A. With no hesitation.
"Q. Did he sign without anybody having indicated to him where he was to-
sign?
"A. Yes, without anybody having indicated it to him.
"Q. Do you know whether D. Tomas Rodriguez asked for more light before
signing?
"A. He asked for more light, as I have said before.
"Q. Do you remember that detail?
"A. Yes, sir, they rst lighted the lamps, but as the light was not su cient, he
asked for more light.
"Q. Do you remember very well that he asked for light?
"A. Yes, sir." (S. R., p. 93.)
A clear preponderance of the evidence exists in favor of the testimony of Vicente
Legarda, corroborated as it is by other witnesses of the highest standing in the
community. The only explanation we can over relative to the testimony of Doctor
Bonoan. is that possibly he may have arrived earlier than the others with the exception
of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and that Luz Lopez de Bueno may have made some sort of an
effort to in uence Tomas Rodriguez. There is, however, no possible explanation of the
statement of Doctor Bonoan to the effect that no one read the will to Rodriguez, when
at least ve other persons recollect that Vicente Legarda read it to him and recall the
details connected with the reading.
There is one curious occurrence which transpired shortly after the making of the
will which should here be mentioned. It is that on January 7, 1923 (1924), Luz Lopez de
Bueno signed a document in favor of Doctor Bonoan in the amount of one thousand
pesos (P1,000). This paper reads as follows:
"Be it known by these presents:
"That I, Luz Lopez de Bueno, in consideration of the services which at my
instance were, and will when necessary be, rendered by Dr. Elias Bonoan in
connection with the execution of the will oF my uncle, Don Tomas Rodriguez, and
the due probate thereof, do hereby agree to pay said doctor, by way of
remuneratory donation, the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000), Philippine
currency, as soon as said services shall have been fully rendered and I shall be in
possession of the inheritance which in said will is given to me.
"In witness whereof, I sign this document which was freely and
spontaneously executed by me in Manila, this January 7, 1923.
(Sgd.) "LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO"
(Exhibit 1)
There is a sharp con ict of testimony, as is natural, between Doctor Bonoan and
Luz Lopez de Bueno relative to the execution of the above document. We shall not
attempt to settle these differences, as in the nal analysis it will not affect the decision
one way or the other. The most reasonable supposition is that Luz Lopez de Bueno
imprudently endeavored to bring over Doctor Bonoan to her side of the case by signing
and giving to him Exhibit 1. But the event cannot easily be explained away.
Tomas Rodriguez passed away in the Philippine General Hospital, as we have
said, on February 25, 1924. But even prior to his demise, the two factions in the Lopez
family had prepared themselves for a ght over the estate. The Luz Lopez faction had
secured the services of Doctor Domingo, the physician in charge of the Department of
Insane of the San Lazaro Hospital and Assistant Professor of Nervous and Mental
Diseases in the University of the Philippines, as attending physician; had associated
with him for purposes of investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital, and Dr. Florentino Herrera, a physician in active practice in
the City of Manila; and had arranged to have two members of the medical fraternity,
Doctors De Asis and Bonoan, as attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had
taken equal precautions by calling as witnesses in the guardianship proceedings Dr.
Sixto de los Angeles, Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal Medicine in the
University of the Philippines, and Dr. Samuel Tietze, with long experience in mental
diseases; thereafter by continuing Doctors De los Angeles and Tietze to examine
Tomas Rodriguez, and by associating with them Dr. William Burke, a well-known
physician of the City of Manila. Skilled lawyers were available to aid and abet the
medical experts. Out of such situations, do will contests arise.
An examination of the certi cates made by the two sets of physicians and of
their oral testimony shows that on most facts they concur. Their deductions from these
facts disclose a substantial divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task to try to
reconcile the views of these distinguished gentlemen who honestly arrived at de nite
but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can do under the circumstances is to
set forth the ndings of the Calderon committee on the one hand and of the De los
Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez individually
and jointly before the date when the will was executed. All of them, as we have noticed,
were present at the signing of the will to note the reactions of the testator. On the same
day that the will was accomplished, the three doctors signed the following certificate:
"The undersigned, Drs. of Medicine, with o ces in the City of Manila, and
engaged in the practice of their profession, do hereby certify:
"That they have jointly examined Mr. Tomas Rodriguez, con ned in the
General Hospital, oor No. 3, room No. 361, on three different occasions and on
different days, and have found that said patient is suffering from anaemia, hernia
inguinal, chronic dyspepsia, and senility.
"As to his mental state, the result of the different tests to which this patient
was submitted is that his intellectual faculties are sound, except that his memory
is weak, which is almost a loss for recent facts, or events which have recently
occurred, due to his physical condition and old age.
"They also certify that they were present at the time he signed his will on
January 3, 1924, at 3.25 p. m., and have found his mental state in the same
condition as was found by the undersigned in their former examinations, and that
in executing said will the testator had full understanding of the act he was
performing, and full knowledge of the contents thereof.
"In testimony whereof, we sign in Manila this January 3, 1924.
(Sgd.) "FLORENTINO HERRERA

"Tuberias 1264
"Quiapo
(Sgd.) "Dr. FERNANDO CALDERON

"General Hospital
"Manila
(Sgd.) "Dr. ELIAS DOMINGO

"613 Remedios
"Malate"
(Exhibit E in relation with Exhibits C and D.)

Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a de nite opinion as to
the mentality of Tomas Rodriguez. What follows is possibly the most signi cant of the
doctor's statements:
Dr. CALDERON testifying after interruption:
"A. I was naturally interested in nding out the true mental state of
Tomas Rodriguez, and that was the chief reason why I accepted and gave my
cooperation to Messrs. Elias Domingo and Florentino Herrera because had I
found that Tomas Rodriguez was really insane, I should have ordered his transfer
to the San Lazaro Hospital or to other places, and would not have left him. in the
General Hospital. Pursuant to my desire, I saw Tomas Rodriguez in his room
alone twice to have interviews with him, he being a person whom I knew since
several years ago; at the end of the interviews I became convinced that there was
nothing wrong with him; I had not seen anything indicating that he was insane
and for this reason I accepted the request of my companions and joined them; we
have been on ve different occasions examining Tomas Rodriguez jointly from
the physical standpoint, but chie y from the standpoint of his mental state; I have
been there with Messrs. Herrera and Elias Domingo, examining Tomas Rodriguez
and submitting him to a mental test on the 28, 29, 30 and 31 of December and the
2d of January, 1924 — ve consecutive days in which we have been together
besides my particular visits.
"Q. Will you please state the result of the observation you made alone before
those made by the three of you jointly?
"A. I asked Tomas Rodriguez some questions when I went alone there, I asked
him where he was living formerly and he well remembered that in
Intramuros, Calle Real; I asked him whether he remembered one Calderon
who was living in the upper oor of the house, and then he told me yes;
then I asked him about his tenant by the name of Antonio Jimenez and he
told me yes, — now I remember that he had two daughters, Matilde and
Paz. Then I told him that I had been living in the house of that gentleman,
Antonio Jimenez, already dead — in the upper story of the house which
belonged to Tomas Rodriguez; I told him that Antonio Jimenez was his
tenant of the upper story, that is, that he was living on the ground oor and
Antonio Jimenez upstairs, and he remembered all of this; I also began to
talk of my brother, Felipe Calderon, whom he said of course that he knew;
he remembered him because he was his companion and was a successful
attorney. This was when I had an interview with him. Then in order to
observe better and to be sure of my judgment or opinion about the mental
state of Tomas Rodriguez, I saw him again and we began to speak of
something which I don't remember now. In ne, we talked of things of
interest and as I had nally accepted the request of Drs. Elias Domingo
and Florentino Herrera to join them, the rst and second time that Herrera,
Domingo and myself went there, no stenographic notes were taken of what
happened there.
"Q. So that before joining Doctors Herrera and Domingo you had already paid
two visits to the patient?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. From the result of the conversation you had with Tomas Rodriguez on
those two visits, what is your opinion as to his mental capacity?
"A. That he was sick; that he was weak, but I have found absolutely no
.incoherence in his ideas; he answered my questions well, and as I was
observing him, there were times when he did not remember things of the
present — because this must be admitted — but on the other hand he had a
wonderful memory for past events; in talking with him, you would not
notice in the conversation any alteration in his mind nor that that man had
lost the reasoning power or logic.
"Q. Did you notice any loss of memory, or that his memory was weakening
about things of the past?
"A. About things of the past, I mean that you talk to him now about speci c
matters, and after about ve or ten minutes he no longer remembers what
had been talked of.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Do you remember the conversation you had with him for the rst time
when the three of you paid a visit to the patient?
"A. I don't remember the details, but I do remember the questions I put to him.
I asked D. Tomas Rodriguez: 'You are an old man, aged, sick, why don't
you think of making your will?' and he said: 'Yes, I am thinking to make a
will.' 'But why don't you decide?' 'There is no hurry, there is time to make a
will,' he said. 'Then in case you decide to make a will, to whom are you
going to leave your property? Don't you have any relatives?' 'I have a
relative, Vicente Lopez, my rst cousin, and Margarita Lopez, my rst
cousin, they are brothers.' 'In that case, to whom do you want to leave your
property?' 'Why, I don't have much, very little, but I am decided to leave it to
my cousin, Vicente Lopez, and his daughter Luz Lopez.' 'Why would you
not give anything to Margarita Lopez?' 'No because her husband is very
bad,' to use his exact language, 'is very bad.'
"Q. Did you talk with him on that occasion about his estate?
"A. Yes, sir, he told me that he had three estates, — one on Calle Magallanes,
another on Calle Cabildo, and the third on Calle Juan Luna, and besides he
had money in the Monte de Piedad and Hogar Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. From the questions made by you and the answers given by Mr. Tomas
Rodriguez on that occasion, what is your opinion as to his mental capacity.
"A. The following: That the memory of Tomas Rodriguez somewhat failed as
to things of the present, but is all right with regard to matters or facts of the
past; that his ideas were coherent; that he thought with logic, argued even
with power, and generally in some of the interviews I have arrived at the
conclusion that Tomas Rodriguez had an initiative of his own, did not need
that anybody should make him any suggestion, because he answered in
such a way that if you permit me now to show you my stenographic notes,
they will prove to you conclusively that he had an initiative of his own and
had no need of anybody making him any question." (S. R. p. 72.)
Doctor Elias Domingo, who was the attending physician for Tomas Rodriguez
throughout all the time that Rodriguez was in the hospital and who even prior to the
placing of Rodriguez in the hospital had examined him, was likewise certain that
Rodriguez possessed su cient mentality to make a will. Among other things, Doctor
Domingo testified:
"ARANETA:
"Q. Have you known D. Tomas Rodriguez?
"Dr. DOMINGO:
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Did you attend D. Tomas Rodriguez as physician?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. When did you begin to attend him as physician?
"A. On November 28, 1923, until his death.
"Q. Where did you attend him?
"Q. On November 28 or October 28, 1923, do you remember?
"A. I had been attending him as physician from November 28th although it is
true that I had had opportunity to see and examine him during the months
of October and November.
"Q. What was the object of your visits or attendance during the months of
October and November?
"A. It was for the purpose of observing his mental state.
"Q. Did you really examine his mental condition or capacity during the
months of October and November?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How many times did you visit him?
"A. I don't remember exactly but I visited him about five or six times.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Please tell us the result of your examination during those months of
October and November?
"A. I examined him physically and mentally; I am not going to tell here the
physical result but the result of the mental examination, and that is:
General Conduct: In most of the times that I have seen him, I found him
Lying on his bed, smoking a cigarette and asked for a bottle of lemonade
from time to time; I also observed that he was very careful when throwing
the ash of the cigarette, seeing to it that it did not fall on the blankets; he
also was careful not to throw the stub of the cigarette in any place to avoid
re; I made more observations as to his general conduct and I found that
sometimes Don Tomas could move within the place although with certain
di culty. On two occasions I found him seated, once seated at the table,
seated on the chair, and the other on a rocking-chair. I also examined his
manner of talking and to all questions that I put to him he answered with a
fair coherence and in a relevant manner, although sometimes he showed
meagerness and certain delay. I based these points of my declarations on
the questions which are usually asked when making a mental examination,
for instance I asked him, 'What is your name,' and he correctly answered
Tomas Rodriguez; I asked him if he was married and he answered 'No;' I
asked him his profession and he answered that formerly he was an
attorney but that at the time I was making the examination he was not
practicing the profession; I asked him with what he supported himself and
he said that he lived upon his income, he said verbatim, 'I live on my
income.' I also asked him what the amount of his income was and he
answered that it was about P900; I asked him what the source of this
income was and he said that it came from his property.
"Q. Did you ask him about his property?

"A. No, at that time.
"Q. Proceed.

"A. I also observed his emotional status and affectivity. I found it rather
super cial, and he oftentimes got angry due to his physical disease; I
asked him if he had any relatives and he answered correctly saying that he
had. He mentioned Vicente Lopez, Margarita Lopez, and Luz Lopez. As to
h i s memory . His memory for the past. He very easily remembered past
events and when he described them he did it with such pleasure that he
used to smile afterwards — if it was a fact upon which one must smile. His
memory for recent facts was very much lessened. I say this because on
various occasions and not having known me when he had a better
memory, after I had seen him thrice he remembered my name and he
recognized me. Insight and judgment. I arrived at the conclusion that he
had fair knowledge of himself because he knew that he was sick and could
not be moving with ease, but he believed that he could perform with
su cient ease mental acts; his judgment was also all right because I
asked him this question: 'Supposing that you should nd a bill of P5 in the
vestibule of a hotel, what would you do with it?' He told me that he would
take the bill and give it to the manager in order that the latter may look for
the owner if possible. His reasoning. I found that he showed a moderate
retardation in the ow of his thought, especially with regard to recent
events, but was quite all right as to past events. His capacity . He believed
that he was capable of thinking properly although what did not permit him
to do so was his physical decrepit condition. The conclusion is that his
memory is lost for recent events tho not totally and diminution of his
intellectual vigor. This is in few words the result of my examination." (S. R.,
p. 345.)
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles,
Tietze, and Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a witness in the guardianship
proceedings and had seen the patient on November 6 and 7, 1923. Doctor Tietze had
also been a witness in the guardianship case and had visited the patient on November 9
and 12, 1923, and on January 15, 1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined
Rodriguez on January 17, 20, and 24, 1924. The three physicians conducted a joint
examination on January 27 and 28, and February 10, 1924. As a result, on March 15,
1924, they prepared and signed the following:
"MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
"In the Matter of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, male, 76 years of age, single
and residing or being confined in the Philippine General Hospital.
"We, the undersigned Doctors, Sixto de los Angeles, W. B. Burke, and
Samuel Tietze, do hereby certify as follows:
"1. That we are physicians, duly registered under the Medical Act, and
are in the actual practice of the medical profession in the Philippines.
"2. That on January 27th and 28th and February 10th, 1924, at the
Philippine General Hospital, we three have with care and diligence jointly and
personally examined the person of said Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez; and previous
to these dates, we have separately and partly jointly observed and examined said
patient on various occasions; Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, at the patient's home, 246
Magallanes St., Manila, on November 6th and 7th, 1923; Dr. Samuel Tietze, at the
patient's home on November 9th and 12th, 1923, all at the Philippine General
Hospital on January 15th, 1924; and Dr. W. B. Burke together with Dr. Samuel
Tietze at the Philippine General Hospital on January 17th, 20th, and 24th, 1924;
and as a result of the medical examinations and the history of the case we found
and hereby certify to the following conclusions:
"(a) That he was of unsound mind suffering from senile dementia, or
of mental impairment exceeding to a pathologic extent the usual conditions and
changes found to occur in the involutional period of life.
"(b) That he was under the in uence of the above condition
continuously, at least from November, 1923, till the date of our joint
reexamination, January 27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924; and that he
would naturally have continued without improvement, as these cases of insanity
are due to organic pathological changes of the brain. This form of mental disease
is progressive in its pathological tendency, going on to progressive atrophy and
degeneration Of the brain, the mental symptoms, of course, running parallel with
such pathological basis.
"(c) That on account of such disease and conditions, his mind and
memory were so greatly impaired as to make him unable to know or to appreciate
su ciently the nature, effect, and consequences of the business he was engaged
in; to understand and comprehend the extent and conditions of his properties; to
collect and to hold in his mind the particulars and details of his business
transactions and his relations to the persons who were or might have been the
objects of his bounty; and to free himself from the in uences of importunities,
threats, and ingenuities, so that with a relatively less resistance, he might had
been induced to do what others would not have done.
"3. We have diagnosed this case as senile dementia of the simple type,
approaching the deteriorated stage upon the following detailed mental
examinations:
"(a) Disorder of memory. — There was almost an absolute loss of
memory for recent events, to the extent that things and occurrences seen or
observed only a few minutes previously were completely forgotten. Faces and
names of persons introduced to him were not remembered after a short moment
even without leaving his bedside. He showed no comprehension of the elemental
routine required in the management of his properties, i. e.: who were the lessees of
his houses, what rents they were paying, who was the administrator of his
properties, in what banks he deposited his money or the amount of money
deposited in such banks. Regarding his personal relations, he forgot that Mr.
Antonio Ventura is the husband of his nearest woman cousin; that Mrs. Margarita
Lopez was married, saying that the latter was single or spinster, in spite of the
fact that formerly, during the past twenty- ve years, he was aware of their
marriage life. He did not know the names of the sons and daughters of Mr.
Vicente Lopez, one of his nearest relatives, even failing to name Mrs. Luz Lopez
de Bueno, a daughter of said Vicente Lopez, and who now appears to be the only
living bene ciary of his will. He also stated that Mr. Vicente Lopez frequently
visited him in the hospital, though the latter died on January 7th, 1924. He did not
recognize and remember the name and face of Doctor Domingo, his own
physician. However, the memory for remote events was generally good, which is a
characteristic symptom of senile dementia.
"(b) Disorientation of time, place, and persons. — He could not name
the date when asked (day or month); could not name the hospital wherein he was
confined; and failed to recognize the fact that Doctor Domingo was his physician.
"(c) Disorders of perception. — He was almost completely indifferent to
what was going on about him. He also failed to recognize the true valle of objects
shown him, that is, he failed to recognize the 'Saturday Evening Post' nor would
he deny that it was a will when presented as such. He also failed to show normal
intellectual perception, making no effort to correlate facts or to understand
matters discussed in their proper light.
"(d) Emotional deterioration. — The patient was not known during his
time of physical incapacity to express in any way or lament the fact that he was
unable to enjoy the happiness that was due him with his wealth. As a matter of
fact, he showed complete indifference. He showed loss of emotional control by
furious outbreaks over tri ing matters and actually behaved like a child; for
example, if his food did not arrive immediately or when his cigar was not lit soon,
he would become abusive in his language and show marked emotional outburst.
If the servants did not immediately answer his call, he would break down and cry
as a child.
"(e) Symptoms of decreased intellectual capacity. — There was a laxity
of the internal connection of ideas. The patient has shown no insight regarding
his own condition. He did not appreciate the attitude of the parties concerned in
his case; he would on several occasions become suspicious and fail to
comprehend the purpose of our examination. He was inconsistent in his ideas
and failed to grasp the meaning of his own statements. When questioned whether
he would make 1 will, he stated to Doctor Tietze that he intended to bequeath his
money to San Juan de Dios Hospital and Hospicio de San Jose. When he was
informed, however, that he had made a will on January 3d, 1924, he denied the
latter statement, and failed to explain the former. Although for a long time
con ned to bed and seriously ill for a long period, he expressed himself as sound
physically and mentally, and in the false belief that he was fully able to
administer his business personally.
"His impairment of the intellectual eld was further shown by his inability,
despite his knowledge of world affairs, to appreciate the relative value of the
statement made by Doctor Tietze as follows: 'We have here a cheque of P2,000
from the King of Africa payable to you so that you may deposit it in the bank. Do
you want to accept the cheque?' His answer was as follows: 'Now I cannot give
my answer. It may be a surprise.' Such answer given by a man after long
experience in business life, who had handled real estate property, well versed in
the transaction of cheques, certainly shows a breaking down of the above eld.
No proper questions were asked why the cheque was given by the King who the
King was, why he was selected by the King of Africa, or if there is a King of Africa
at present. He further shows doubt in his mental capability by the following
questions and answers:
"MARCAIDA:
"P. Tiene ustedactualmente algun asunto en los tribunales de justicia de
Manila?
"R. No recuerdo en este momento.
"P. De tener usted algun aslnto propio en los tribunales de justicia de Manila,
¿a que abogado confiaria usted la defensa del mismo? — R. Al Sr.
Marcaida, como conocido antiguo.
"P. ¿ Ha hablado usted y colferenciado alguna vez o varias veces en estos
dias, o sea desde el 25 de octubre de 1923 hasta hoy, con algun abagado
para que le defendiera algun asunto ante el Juzgado le Primera Instancia
de Manila?
"R. Con ninguno, porque en caso de nombrar, nombraria al Sr. Marcaida. (p. e,
deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
"ARANETA: P. ¿ No recuerda usted que usted me ha encomendado como
abogado para que me oponga a que le declaren a usted loco o
incapacitado? — R. Si, senor, quien ha solidtado? (P. 9, deposition, Nov. 19,
1923.)
"Dr. DOMINGO:
"P. ¿ Don Tomas, me conoce usted? ¿ Se acuerda usted que soy el Doctor
Domingo?
"R. Si. (P. 7, sten n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. ¿ Quien soy, Don Tomas, usted me conoce?
"R. No se. (P. 6, sten. n., Feb. 10, 1924.)
"Dr. ANGELES:
"P. ¿ Me conoce usted, D. Tomas?
"R. Le conozco de vista. (P. 6, sten. n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Nos vamos a despedir ya, Don Tomas, de usted. Yo soy el Doctor Angeles,
¿ me conoce usted?
"R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿ le conoce usted?
"R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Domingo, ¿ le conoce usted?
"R. De vista.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿recuerda usted su nombre?
"R. No. (P. 10, sten. n., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. ¿Usted conoce a este Doctor? (Senalando al Doctor Burke).
"R. De vista; su nombre ya lo he olvidado, ya no me acuerdo.
"P. ¿Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores Angeles, Burke y Tietze).
"R. Ya lo creo.
"Dr. BURKE:
"P. ¿ Que profesion tenemos? (Senalando a los Sres. Angeles, Burke y Tietze).
"R. Yo creo que son doctores.
"P. ¿Y los dos? (Senalando a los Doctores ~ngeles y Tietze).
"R. No. se.
"P. ¿Y este senor? (Senalando al Doctor Angeles).
"R. No me acuerdo en este momento. (Pp. 4 and 5, sten. n., Feb. 10, 1924.)
"(f) Other facts bearing upon the history of the case obtained by
investegation of Doctor Angeles:
"I. Family history. — His parents were noted to be of nervous temper
and irritable.
"II. Personal history. — He was a lawyer, but did not pursue his practice,
devoting the greater part of his life to collecting antiquities. He was generally
regarded by his neighbors as miserly and erratic in the ordinary habits of life. He
lead a very unhygienic life, making no attempt to clean the filth or dirt that was
around him. He was neglectful in personal habits. On April, 1921, he suffered an
injury to his forehead, from which he became temporarily unconscious, and was
confined in the Philippine General Hospital for treatment. He frequently
complained of attacks of dizziness and headache, following this injury; suffered
from a large hernia; and about two years ago, he was fined for failure in filing his
income tax, from which incident, we have reason to believe, the onset of his
mental condition took place. This incident itself can most probably be considered
as a failure of memory. His condition became progressively worse up to his
death.
"4. The undersigned have stated all the above facts contained in this
certificate to the best of our knowledge and belief.
"Manila, P. I., March 15, 1924.
(Sgd.) "SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES
"W. B. BURKE, M. D.
"SAMUEL TIETZE"
(Exhibit 33 in relation with Exhibits 28 and 29.)

Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is
disclosed by the treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear the nurse's
remarks. (Exhibits 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C.) In this connection, the testimony of the nurses is
that Rodriguez was in the habit for no reason at all of calling "Maria, where are my 50
centavos, where is my key." In explanation of the observations made by the nurses, the
nurse Apolonio Floreza testified:
"Direct questions of Attorney OCAMPO:
"Q. Among your observations on the 1st of January, 1924, you say 'with pains
all over the body, and uttered some incoherent words of the same topics
whenever is awakened.' How could you observe that he had pains all over
the body?
"APOLONIO FLOREZA, nurse:
"A. I observed that by the fact that whenever I touched the body of the patient
he complained of some pain.
"Q. On what part of the body did you touch him?
"A. On all the parts of his body.
"Q. How did you touch him, strongly or not?
"A. Slightly.
"Q. When you touched him slightly, what did he do?
"A. He said that it was aching.
"Q. What words did he say when, according to your note, he uttered incoherent
words whenever he awakes?
"A. As for instance, 'Maria,' repeating it 'Where are my 50 centavos, where is
my key?'
"Q. Did you hear him talk of Maria?
"A. Only the word 'Maria.'
"Q. How long approximately was he talking, uttering the name of 'Maria,'
'Where are my 50 centavos,' and 'where is my key?'
"A. For two or three minutes.
"Q. Can you tell the court whether on those occasions when he said the name
of 'Maria' he said other words and was talking with somebody?
"A. He was talking to himself.
"Q. This remark on Exhibit 8-B, when was it written by you?
"A. On January 2, 1924.
"Q. In the observation corresponding to January 2, 1924, you also say, 'With
pains all over the body,' and later on, 'talked too much whenever patient is
awakened.' How did you happen to know the pain which you have noted
here?
"A. The pains all over the body, I have observed them when giving him baths.
"Q. Besides saying that it ached when .you touched the body, do you know
whether he did any extraordinary thing?
"A. You mean to say acts?
"Q. Acts or words?
"A. Yes, sir, like those words which I have already said which he used to say —
'Maria, the key, 50 centavos.'
"Q. You say that he called Maria. What did he say about Maria on that date,
January 2, 1924?
"A. He used to say, 'Maria, where is Maria?'
"Q. On that date January 2j 1924, did you answer him when he said 'Maria?'
"A. No, sir.
"Q. In this observation of yours appearing on page 8-C, you say, among other
things, 'with pains all over the body and shouted whenever he is given
injection.' Did you really observe this in the patient?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. How did he shout?
"ARANETA: Objection as being immaterial.
"COURT: Overruled.
"ARANETA: Exception.
"A. In a loud voice.
"Q. Besides shouting, do you remember whether he said anything?
"A. He repeated the same words I have said before 'Maria, the 50 centavos,
the key.'
"Q. When did this observation occur which appears on page 8-C?
"A. On January 3, 1924." (S. R., p. 595.)
On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez, there is no
dispute. On January 3, 1924, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He
was suffering from anaemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dyspepsia, and senility. Physically
he was a wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors
Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera admit that he was senile. They, together with Doctors
De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare that his memory was almost an
absolute loss for recent events. His memory, however, for remote events was generally
good. He was given to irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.
While, however, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera certify that the
intellectual faculties of the patient are "sound, except that his memory is weak," and that
in executing the will the "testator had full understanding of the act he was performing,
and full knowledge of the contents thereof," Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke
certify that Tomas Rodriguez "was of unsound mind" and that they "diagnosed his case
a s senile dementia of the simple type, approaching the deteriorated stage." Without
attempting at this stage to pass in judgment on the antagonistic conclusions of the
medical witnesses, or on other disputed points, insofar as the facts are concerned, a
resolution of the case comes down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924,
possess su cient mentality to make a will, or had he passed so far along in senile
dementia as to require the court to nd him of unsound mind? We leave the facts in this
situation to pass on to a discussion of the legal phases of the case.
B. Law. — The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance
of a will that the testator be of "sound mind" (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 614). A
"sound mind" is a "disposing mind." One of the grounds for disallowing a will is "If the
testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution of such an
instrument at the time of its execution." (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634 [2].)
Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following
de nition of testamentary capacity: " 'Testamentary capacity is the capacity to
comprehend me nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time,
to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which
the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.' " (Bugnao
vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, followed in Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227, and
Jocson vs. Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental capacity of the testator is
determined as of the date of the execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).
Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only
later to be rejected as incomplete. Of the speci c tests of capacity, neither old age,
physical in rmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a
guardian, nor eccentricities are su cient singly or jointly to show testamentary
incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of
some practical utility. This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will
simple or complicated ? Is it natural or unnatural ? The mere exclusion of heirs will not,
however, in itself indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound mind.
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take

a wide range in order that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining
the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator's
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. The
evidence of those present at the execution of the will and of the attending physician is
also to be relied upon. (Alexander on Wills, vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton & Stille's
Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I, pp. 100 et seq.)
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the
courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document. (Hernaez vs. Hernaez
[1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas vs. Paguio, supra.)
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at
the time he made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain
authorities, they insist that the effect of the judgment is conclusive with respect to the
condition of the person. To this statement we cannot write down our conformity. The
provisions of the cited section were taken from California, and there the Supreme Court
has never held what is now urged upon us by the appellee. The rule announced that in
some states, by force of statute, the linding of insanity is conclusive as to the existence
of insanity during the continuance of adjudication, is found to rest on local statutes, of
which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. (32 C. J., 647; Gridley vs. Boggs
[1882], 62 Cal., 190; In the matter of the Estate of Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.) Even
where the question of insanity is put in issue in the guardianship proceedings, the most
that can be said for the nding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a
will but does not invalidate the testament if competency can be shown. The burden of
proving sanity in such case is cast upon the proponents.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of
senile dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which wills are most
often contested. A Newton, a Paschal, a Cooley suffering under "the variable weather of
the mind, the ying vapors of incipient lunacy," would have proved historic subjects for
expert dispute. Had Shakespeare's King Lear made a will, without any question, it would
have invited litigation and doubt.
Senile dementia, usually called childishness, has various forms and stages. To
constitute complete senile dementia, there must be such failure of the mind as to
deprive the testator of intelligent action. In the rst stages of the disease, a person may
possess reason and have will power. (27 L. R. A., N. S. [1~310], p. 89; Wharton & Stille's
Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I, pp. 791 et seq.; Schouler on Wills, vol. I, pp. 145 et seq.)
It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have
gone forth from this court, relating to the testator having a sound and disposing mind,
and which have been brought to our notice by counsel, every one of them has allowed
the will, even when it was necessary to reverse the judgment of the trial court. A study
of these cases discloses a consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the deceased
whenever it be legally possible. These decisions also show great tenderness on the
part of the court towards the last will and testament of the aged. (See Hernaez vs.
Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689, per Arellano, C. J.; In the matter of the will of Butalid [1908],
10 Phil., 27, per Arellano, C. J.; Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, per Carson, J.;
Macapinlac vs. Alimurong [1910], 16 Phil., 41, per Arellano, C. J.; Bagtas vs. Paguio
[1912], 22 Phil., 227, per Trent, J.; Galvez vs. Galvez [1913], 26 Phil., 243, per Torres, J.;
Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin [1923], 44 Phil., 573, per Ostrand, J.; and Jocson vs.
Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701, per Villamor, J.) Because of their peculiar applicability, we
propose to make particular mention of four of the earlier cases of this court.
In the case of Hernaez vs. Hernaez, supra, the subject of the action was the will
executed by Doña Juana Espinosa. The annulment of the will was sought, rst, upon the
ground of the incapacity of the testatrix. She was over 80 years of age, so ill that three
days before she executed the will she received the sacraments and extreme unction,
and two days afterwards she died. Prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude, and
gave contradictory orders, "as a result of her senile debility." The Chief Justice reached
the conclusion that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the
documents presented "can the conclusion be reached that the testatrix was deprived of
her mental faculties." The will was held valid and efficacious.
In the case of In the matter of the will of Butalid, supra, the will was contested for
the reason that Dominga Butalid at the date of the execution of the document was not
in the free use of her intellectual powers, she being over 90 years of age, lying in bed
seriously ill, senseless, and unable to utter a single word, so that she did not know what
she was doing when she executed the will, while the document was claimed to have
been executed under the in uence and by the direction of one of the heirs designated in
the will. Yet after an examination of the evidence, the Chief Justice rendered judgment
reversing the judgment appealed from and declaring the will presented for legalization
to be valid and sufficient.
In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra, the court gave credence to the testimony
of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that at the time of the execution of
the will the testator was of sound mind and memory. Based on these and other facts,
Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for the court, laid down the following legal principles:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been held
that 'mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory
su cient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to whom he is
disposing of his property' (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2 Houst. [Del.], 418); that, 'To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind should
be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise' (Sloan vs.
Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that 'It has not been understood that a testator must
possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the
highest degree . . . Few indeed would be the wills con rmed, if this is correct. Pain,
sickness, debility of body, from age or in rmity, would, according to its violence or
duration in a greater or less degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind,
but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties
common to man' (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680); and, that 'Sound mind does
not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree'
(Boughton vs. Knight, L. R., 3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has
been held that 'testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person
shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it
arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great bodily in rmities or suffering,
or from all these combined, may render the testator in — capable of making a
valid will, providing such weakness really disquali es her from knowing or
appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in'
(Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302)."
In the case of Bagtas vs. Paguio, supra, the record shows that the testator for
some fourteen or fteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis
of the left side of his body, that a few years prior to his death, his hearing became
impaired, and that he had lost the power of speech. However, he retained the use of his
sight hand and could write fairly well. Through the medium of signs, he was able to
indicate his wishes to his family. The will was attacked on the ground that the testator
lacked mental capacity at the time of its execution. The will was nevertheless admitted
to probate. Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for the court, announced the following pertinent
legal doctrines:
". . . There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show
that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body,
induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will.
The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and
use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will If
such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could
meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are
universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree,
and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness
to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity
and idiocy.
"The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred
as any other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be
nulli ed unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive
manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in
volume 28, page 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that —
" 'Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind
is not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may be a icted with a
variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in
law of executing a valid will.' (See the numerous cases there cited in support of
this statement.)
"The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity,
section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as
follows:
" 'To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or
otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning
faculties.'
"In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
" 'The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed
by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the
property he was about to bequeath, the manner of distributing it, and the objects
of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory su ciently sound to enable
him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged at the time
when he executed his will.' (See authorities there cited.)
"In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon
the trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early
years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About seven years prior to his
death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory
were much enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the
shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total
blindness. He became lthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was
observant of the proprieties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
" 'Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will
affect the capacity to make a will, if su cient intelligence remains. The failure of
memory is not su cient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to
his immediate family or property . . .
xxx xxx xxx
" 'Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made
the will, and his physical and mental weakness and defective memory were in
striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind; not
deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful of recent
events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation; and
sometimes, when aroused from sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not
singular that some of those who had known him when he was remarkable for
vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he
was incapable of making a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational
expression.'
"In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw
the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the case just quoted . . ."
The particular differences between all of the Philippine cases which are cited and
the case at bar are that in none of the Philippine cases was there any declaration of
incompetency and in none of them were the facts quite as complicated as they are
here. A case in point where the will was contested, because the testator was not of
sound and disposing mind and memory and because at the time of the making of the
will he was acting under the undue in uence of his brothers, and where he had a
guardian when he executed his will, is Ames' Will ( [1902] 40 Ore., 495). Mr. Justice
Moore, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
"It is contended by contestant's counsel that, on the day said pretended -
will purports to have been executed, Lowell was declared incompetent by a court
which had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, and that the decree
therein appointing a guardian of his person and estate raises the disputable
presumption that he did not possess su cient testamentary capacity at that
time, to overcome which required evidence so strong as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to his capacity to make a valid will, and, the testimony introduced by the
proponent being insu cient for that purpose, the court erred in admitting it to
probate . . .
"The appointment of a guardian of a person alleged to be non compos
mentis, by a court having jurisdiction, must necessarily create a presumption of
the mental in rmity of the ward; but such decree does not conclusively show that
the testamentary capacity of the person under guardianship is entirely destroyed,
and the presumption thus created may be overcome by evidence proving that
such person at the time he executed a will was in fact of sound and disposing
mind and memory: Stone vs. Damon, 12 Mass., 487; Breed vs. Pratt, 18 Pick., 115;
In re Slinger's Will, 72 Wis., 22 (37 N. W., 236). . . .
". . . The testimony shows that the testator retained a vivid recollection of
the contents of the books he had read and studied when he was young, but that
he could not readily recall to his mind the ordinary incidents of his later life. The
depth and intensity of mental impressions always depend upon, and are
measured by, the degree of attention given to the perception of facts, which
requires observation, or to the conception of truths, which demands re ection;
and hence the inability of a person to recollect events occurring recently is
evidence of mental decay, because it manifests a want of power of concentration
of the mind. The aged live in the past, and the impressions retained in their minds
are those that were made in their younger days, because at that period of their
lives they were able to exercise will power by giving attention. While the inability
of a person of advanced years to remember recent events distinctly undoubtedly
indicates a decay of the human faculties, it does not conclusively establish senile
dementia, which is something more than a mere loss of mental power, resulting
from old age, and is not only a feeble condition of the mind, but a derangement
thereof. . . The rule is settled in this state that if a testator at the time he executes
his will understands the business in which he is engaged, and has a knowledge of
his property, and how he wishes to dispose of it among those entitled to his
bounty, he possesses su cient testamentary capacity, notwithstanding his old
age, sickness, debility of body, or extreme distress.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is contended by contestant's counsel that if Lowell, at the time he
executed the pretended will, was not wholly lacking in testamentary capacity, he
was, in consequence of age, ill health, debility of body, and in rmity of will power,
susceptible to persuasion by his friends, and that his brothers, Andrew and
Joseph, having knowledge thereof, took advantage of his physical and mental
condition, and unduly in uenced him to devise and bequeath his property in the
manner indicated, attempting thereby to deprive the contestant of all interest
therein except such as was given her by statute. . . Assuming that he was easily
persuaded, and that his brothers and the persons employed by them to care for
him took advantage of his enfeebled condition and prejudiced his mind against
the contestant, did such undue in uence render the will theretofore executed
void? . . . When a will has been properly executed, it is the duty of the courts to
uphold it, if the testator possessed a sound and disposing mind and memory, and
was free from restraint and not acting under undue in uence, notwithstanding
sympathy for persons legally entitled to the testator's bounty and a sense of
innate justice might suggest a different testamentary disposition.
"Believing, as we do, that the findings of the circuit court are supported by
the weight of the testimony, its decree is affirmed."
Insofar as the law on testamentary capacity to make a will is concerned, and
carrying alone one step further the question suggested at the end of the presentation
of the facts on the same subject, a resolution of the case comes down to this: Did
Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess su cient mentality to make a will which
would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity, and have the proponents of
the will carried successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on
that date?
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A. Facts. — The will was attacked on the further ground of undue in uence
exercised by the persons bene ted in the will in collaboration with others. The trial
judge found this allegation to have been established and made it one of the bases of
his decision. It is now for us to say if the facts justify this finding.
Tomas Rodriguez voluntarily named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The
latter subsequently became his guardian. There is every indication that of all his
relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the most con dence in Vicente F. Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez who, on the suggestion of
Rodriguez, secured Maximino Mina to prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno
who appears to have gathered the witnesses and physicians for the execution of the
will. This faction of the Lopez family was also shown a favor through the orders of
Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed "a preconceived plan on
the part of the persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez" to secure his signature to
the testament. The trial judge may be correct in this supposition. It is hard to believe,
however, that men of the standing of Judge Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, Herrera,
and De Asis, and Mr. Legarda would so demean themselves and so sully their
characters and reputations as to participate in a scheme having for its purpose to
delude and to betray an old man in his dotage. Rather do we entertain the opinion that
each of the gentlemen named was acting according to the best of his ability to assist in
a legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover, considering the attitude of Tomas
Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her husband and his apparent enmity toward
them, it seems fairly evident that even if the will had been made in previous years when
Rodriguez was more nearly in his prime, he would have prepared somewhat a similar
document.

B. Law. — One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and in uence on the part of the bene ciary or some other
person for his bene t (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 634[4]). Undue in uence, as here
mentioned in connection with the law of wills, and as further mentioned in the Civil Code
(art. 1265), may be de ned as that which compels the testator to do that which is
against the will from fear, the desire of peace, or from other feeling which he is unable
to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.
III. JUDGMENT
To restate the combined issue of fact and law in this case pertaining to
testamentary capacity: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess su cient
mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary
capacity, and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of proof
and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician, testi ed clearly to
the regular manner in which the will was executed and to the testator's mental
condition. The other subscribing witness, also a physician, on the contrary testi ed to a
fact which, if substantiated, would require the court to disallow the will. The attending
physician and three other eminent members of the medical fraternity, who were present
at the execution of the will, expressed opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the
testator. As against this we have the professional speculations of three other equally
eminent members of the medical profession who, however, were not included among
those present when the will was executed. The advantage on these facts is all with
those who offer the will for probate.
The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress.
It was reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account the evident
prejudice of the testator against the husband of Margarita Lopez.
With special reference to the de nition of testamentary capacity, we may say
this: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez, in our opinion, comprehended the nature of
the transaction in which he was engaged. He had had two conferences with his lawyer,
Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will was read to him by Mr.
Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at the bottom and
on the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be disposed of
and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him. While for
some months prior to the making of the will he had not managed his property, he
seems to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income.
Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives.
Ordinarily, he knew who they were. He seemed to entertain a predeliction towards
Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest to his own age. The
testator comprehended the manner in which the instrument distributed the property
among the objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed an
insistence on giving all of his property to the two persons whom he specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may
have been physically decrepit, may have been weak of intellect, may have suffered a
loss of memory, may have had a guardian, and may have been extremely eccentric, but
he still possessed that spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a xed
intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the
law terms "testamentary capacity." That in effect is the de nite opinion which we reach
after an exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the
evidence carefully and conceding all good faith to the witnesses for the oppositors, and
after giving to the case the serious consideration which it deserves.
The judgment of the trial court will be set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez y
Lopez will be admitted to probate, without special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Villamor,. Johns, Romualdezand Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinion s
STREET and OSTRAND , JJ., dissenting:
We are of the opinion that the judgment which is the subject of appeal in this
case is in all respects correct and should be a rmed. The testator was clearly
suffering from senile dementia and lacked the "disposing mind and memory" the
possession of which is a condition precedent to the exercise of testamentary power.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 176943. October 17, 2008.]
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO

ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD , petitioners, vs . ZENAIDO ALUAD ,
respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES , J : p
Petitioners' mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were
raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin). ISADET
Crispin was the owner of six lots identi ed as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680,
and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the
lots to herself. 1
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation
of Real Property Inter Vivos" 2 (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners' mother Maria 3
covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed of
Donation provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
[Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been
brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY
WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be
deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that
anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should
survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the
parcels of land herein donated. 4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On September 30, 1986, Original Certi cates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676
were issued in Matilde's name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. footx 676 to respondent by a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property. 5
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament,
6 devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties"
including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same
year. 7
On August 21, 1995, Maria's heirs-herein petitioners led before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint, 8 for declaration and recovery of ownership
and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, alleging:
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-
described until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two
(2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to
give back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the
possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs
of the enjoyment of said parcels of land . . .; AcISTE
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by

inheritance by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad
who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.] 9
To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer. 1 0
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to
him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad . . . while Lot 676 was
purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as
true owners thereof. 1 1 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners later led a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to
Conform to Evidence 1 2 to which it annexed an Amended Complaint 1 3 which cited the
donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15
of the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint. 1 4
Respondent led an Amended Answer 1 5 contending, inter alia, that the Deed of
Donation is forged and falsi ed and petitioners' change of theory showed that "said
document was not existing at the time they led their complaint and was concocted by
them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only daughter of
Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by them"; 1 6 and that if ever said
document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde "when [she] exercised
all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant and until
her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria Aluad." 1 7
The trial court, by Decision 1 8 of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not
have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having
previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots
Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots
to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:
a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the
income from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time
said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest
thereof at the legal rate until fully paid;cSaCDT
c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income

from the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time
said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof
at the legal rate until fully paid; and
d. The costs of the suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 1 9

On petitioners' motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal. 2 0 Possession of the subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by
petitioners.
By Decision 2 1 of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not
inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus,
it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no
attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will
is written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in
the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them. ITaESD
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No.
footx 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matilde's last will and
testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE , nding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is
hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of
ownership, recovery of ownership and possession, and damages is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE .
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the
lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffs-
appellees are directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendant-
appellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to
defendant-appellant as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED . 2 2 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration 2 3 having been denied, 2 4 petitioners led the
present Petition for Review, 2 5 contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
I
. . . WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW (RTC,
Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS' MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS
CAUSA.
II
. . . WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF
LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY
THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME. AISHcD
III
. . . WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER
OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT
CANNOT BE DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.
IV
. . . WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION
PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2, RULE 39,
OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN
POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING PETITIONERS
TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT. 2 6
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners' mother one
of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee. 2 7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did
not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners' mother during her
(Matilde's) lifetime. 2 8
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of
the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or
even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated " 2 9 means
that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose
them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law is an attribute of ownership. 3 0 The phrase in the Deed of Donation
"o r anyone of them who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of
Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence,
said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves
concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus: cSATEH
. . . [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the
disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she
was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14
November 1981, as her husband — Crispin Aluad [—] had long been dead as
early as 1975. 3 1
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
. . . The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period
when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor provides that
should the "DONEE" . . . die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be
deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical construction
thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation, the same became
effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force
and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the
donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of
this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and
effect a donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what
donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect
upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no donation which
was already effective at the time when the donee died? 3 2 (Underscoring
supplied)
A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
. . . [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case
petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition
that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit. 3 3
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners predecease [the donor] Conchita
Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics
of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the
donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in
her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during
her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would not have expressed
such proviso in the subject deeds. 3 4 (Underscoring supplied) EaCSHI
As the Court of Appeals observed, ". . . [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is
forti ed by Matilde's acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said
properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for
free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name". 3 5
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed 3 6 but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more
witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. 3 7
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause 3 8 the execution of
which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the a xing
of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. So the Court has
emphasized:
. . . Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the
instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite that the will
be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective
intents behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other.
The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that
the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On
the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause
itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition
of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will .
Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses' undertakings in the clause, since the signatures
that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
. . . It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article
805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact
that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
3 9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public,
40 which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that
every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed. 4 1
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not
having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to
petitioners' mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed,
since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.
4 2 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and
testament, subject of course to the quali cation that her (Matilde's) will must be
probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by
Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991. CASIEa
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in
favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to
respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had
acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted,
adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner
since 1978. 4 3
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower
courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their
mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the rst time on appeal. 4 4 For a
contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to
present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it
been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 4 5
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Exhibit "G", Records, pp. 172-173. EHTISC

2. Exhibit "A", id. at 164-165.
3. Maria Aluad, as donee, accepted the donation as expressly stated in the deed and confirmed
by her signature thereon (Exhibit "A-3", [vide note 2]).
4. Exhibit "A-1", id. at 164.

5. Exhibit "1", id. at 221.
6. Exhibit "2", id. at 222-223.
7. Exhibits "B"-"C", id. at 166-167.
8. Id. at 1-6.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 15-21.
11. Id. at 18-19.
12. Id. at 102-104.
13. Id. at 105-110.
14. Id. at 121-122.

15. Id. at 132-139.
16. Id. at 134. TDaAHS
17. Id. at 136-137.
18. Id. at 238-247.

19. Id. at 246-247.
20. Id. at 260-261.
21. Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Marlene Gonzales-Sison, CA
rollo, pp. 130-146.
22. Id. at 145-146.
23. Id. at 155-159.
24. Id. at 166-167.
25. Rollo, pp. 18-50.
26. Id. at 29-30.

27. Maglasang v. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, 432 Phil. 548, 554 (2002); Reyes v. Mosqueda,
G.R. No. 45262, July 23, 1990, 187 SCRA 661, 670-671; Bonsato, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 487 (1954).
28. Ibid.
29. Exhibit "A-1", records, p. 164.
30. Vide CIVIL CODE, Article 428: "The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law . . . ."
31. Rollo, p. 37. ATcaHS
32. Records, pp. 242-243.

33. Maglasang v. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, supra note 27 at 553-554.
34. Id. at 556.
35. CA rollo, p. 140.
36. CIVIL CODE, Article 728:
Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on
Succession.
Alejandro v. Judge Geraldez, 168 Phil. 404, 414-415 (1977).
37. CIVIL CODE, Article 805.
38. Exhibit "A", records, p. 165.
39. Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 119, 141-142. Vide
Cagro v. Cagro, 92 Phil. 1032, 1033-1034 (1953).
40. Exhibit "A", records, p. 165.
41. Id. at 164-165. Vide CIVIL CODE, Article 805.
42. RULES OF COURT, Rule 75, Section 1.
43. Rollo, p. 43.

44. Vide General Credit Cooperation v. Alsons Development and Investment Corporation, G.R.
No. 154975, January 29, 2007, 513 SCRA 225, 235-236 (citations omitted).
45. Vide Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 934 (2003) (citation omitted).
EICSTa

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WILLS

(Wills and Succession)

[G.R. No. 68053. May 7, 1990.]

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ ,

Francisco G. Banzon for petitioners.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that

Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this

1. TSN, October 17, 1973, pp. 4-5.

2. TSN, December 11, 1973, pp. 11 & 55.

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14. Exhibits 10, 11, 14 and 15.

18. Cad. Case No. 6; Exhibit 3.

34. Rollo, p. 27.

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[G.R. No. 77029. August 30, 1990.]

BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and

Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.

"Lot No. 2476 — B — to the heirs of Elena Gevero;

"Lot No. 2476 — C — to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;

"SO ORDERED." (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22).

This petition is devoid of merit.

Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.

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[G.R. No. 89783. February 19, 1992.]

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B.

Aytona Law Office and Syquia Law Offices for petitioners.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; ESTOPPEL; A CO-OWNER IS ESTOPPED FROM

4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute 1,424 P5,750 Hostilio Cornelio

Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

10. Art. 781, Civil Code; emphasis supplied .

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18. Exhs. 16, 17 and 19.

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[G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998.]

NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS,

Padlan, Sutton & Associates for petitioner.

Petitioner Opulencia executed in favor of private respondents a "Contract to Sell" covering

1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACT; SALES; CONTRACT TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY

Statement of the Case

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challenged Resolution. 5

1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents] and [petitioner]

3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already been received by

It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a Demurrer to

Public Respondent's Ruling

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WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a certain parcel of land,

Hence, this appeal. 8

The Court's Ruling

Administration of the Estate Not

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.

1. Rollo, pp. 21-27.

7. Appellants' Brief before the Court of Appeals, p. 1.

9. Memorandum for the Petitioner, p. 7; Rollo, p. 81.

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[G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001.]

EMILIO EMNACE , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF

Mirano Mirano & Associates for petitioner.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF COURT; LEGAL FEES; PAYMENT OF DOCKET

5. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; VENUE OF ACTIONS; PROPERLY LAID IN CASE AT

2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to

Petitioner led a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper

WILLS (Ilagan & Taleon) Full Text 01 Arts. 774-803

WILLS (Ilagan & Taleon) Full Text 01 Arts. 774-803