PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et.al v.
Aside from being a vital step in
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et.al
G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, EN BANC
(Carpio, J.)
The conversion of internal waters into
archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines
because an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends to the waters enclosed by
the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their
depth or distance from the coast.
R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress
in March 2009 to comply with the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines
ratified on February 27, 1984. Such
compliance shortened one baseline, optimized
the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories such as the Kalayaan Island Ground
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as “regimes
of islands” whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, in their capacities as
“citizens, taxpayers or legislators” assail the
constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their
arguments contending that the law
unconstitutionally “converts” internal waters
into archipelagic waters, thus subjecting these
waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes
passage under UNCLOS III, including
overflight. Petitioners have contended that
these passage rights will violate the
Constitution as it shall expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazard.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9522 is
unconstitutional for converting internal waters
into archipelagic waters
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional
and is consistent with the Philippine’s national
interest.
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones, the
law also allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s
maritime zones and continental shelf.
The Court also finds that the conversion
of internal waters into archipelagic waters will
not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article
49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State
has sovereign power that extends to the waters
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast. It is further stated that the regime of
archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect
the status of its archipelagic waters or the
exercise of sovereignty over waters and air
space, bed and subsoil and the resources
therein.
Furthermore, due to the absence of its
own legislation regarding routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
sea lanes passage, the Philippines has no
choice but to comply with the international law
norms. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS
III, which grants innocent passage rights over
the territorial sea or archipelagic waters,
subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions
for their exercise, thus, the right of innocent
passage, being a customary international law,
is automatically incorporated in the corpus of
Philippine law. If the Philippines or any country
shall invoke its sovereignty to forbid innocent
passage, it shall risk retaliatory measures from
the international community. With compliance
to UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A.
9522, the Congress has avoided such conflict.
Contrary to the contention of the
petitioners, the compliance to UNCLOS III
through the R.A. 9522 will not expose
Philippine internal waters to nuclear and
maritime pollution hazard. As a matter of fact, if
the Philippines did not comply with the
baselines law, it will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from
where the breadth of its maritime zones and
continental shelf is measured and which will
produce two-fronted disaster: (1) open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters
and submarine areas around the archipelago
and (2) it shall weaken the country’s case in
any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. Such disaster was avoided
through the R.A. 9522.
Province of North Cotabato-vs- GRP
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines (GRP),
represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
(PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) were scheduled to sign the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MOA-AD included, among others, a
stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants
the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral
domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro
—defined as the present geographic area of
the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and
Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of
Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in
the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is
then granted the power to build, develop, and
maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also
described the relationship of the GRP and the
BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. It further provides
that its provisions requiring “amendments to
the existing legal framework” shall take effect
upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.
Before the signing, however, the
Province of North Cotabato sought to compel
the respondents to disclose and furnish it with
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as
well as to hold a public consultation thereon,
invoking its right to information on matters of
public concern. A subsequent petition sought to
have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the
BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008,
directing the public respondents and their
agents to cease and desist from formally
signing the MOA-AD.
Issues and Ruling:
1. W/N the President has the power to
pursue reforms that would require new
legislation and constitutional
amendments.
YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD
that virtually guarantees that necessary
changes shall be effected upon the legal
framework of the GRP must be struck down as
unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the
limits of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments. Because although
the President’s power to conduct peace
negotiations is implicitly included in her powers
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief,
and, in the course of conducting peace
negotiations, may validly consider
implementing even those policies that require
changes to the Constitution, she may not
unilaterally implement them without the
intervention of Congress, or act in any way as
if the assent of that body were assumed as a
certainty.
2. W/N there is a violation of the people’s
right to information on matters of public
concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec.
7) under a state policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public
interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec.
28), including public consultation under
RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
YES. At least three pertinent laws animate
these constitutional imperatives and justify the
exercise of the people’s right to be consulted
on relevant matters relating to the peace
agenda:
a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the
functions and responsibilities of the
 PAPP, is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both
national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building.
In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to
conduct regular dialogues to seek
relevant information, comments, advice,
and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of
society;
b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national
offices to conduct consultations before
any project or program critical to the
environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people,
which could pervasively and drastically
result to the diaspora or displacement of
a great number of inhabitants from their
total environment;
c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-
cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which
entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior
informed consent of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples (ICC/IP).
3. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP
committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by
EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary,
and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions, but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes
that the associated entity is a state and implies
that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating
that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective
until that framework is amended, the same
does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government is, itself, a violation of
the Memorandum of Instructions From The
President addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it
virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws
will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP
Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through
an undue influence or interference with that
process.
5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive
privilege.
NO. Respondents effectively waived such
defense after it unconditionally disclosed the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD,
for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Carpio-Morales, J.
The people’s right to information on matters of
public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the
state policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest under
Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.
The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while the
policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty
of officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands.
The IPRA does not grant the Executive
Department or any government agency the
power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
An association is formed when two states of
unequal power voluntarily establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to
the other, the principal, while maintaining its
international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence.
The recognized sources of international law
establish that the right to self-determination of
a people is normally fulfilled through internal
self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its
political, economic, social, and cultural
development within the framework of an
existing state. A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially
takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession) arises only in the most
extreme of cases and, even then, under
carefully defined circumstances.
That the authority of the President to conduct
peace negotiations with rebel groups is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does
not mean that she has no such authority.
The President has authority, as stated in her
oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not,
however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend
proposed amendments or revision. As long as
she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure
for constitutional amendments and revision,
her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.
Public statements of a state representative
may be construed as a unilateral declaration
only when the following conditions are present:
the statements were clearly addressed to the
international community, the state intended to
be bound to that community by its statements,
and that not to give legal effect to those
statements would be detrimental to the security
of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral
declarations arise only in peculiar
circumstances.
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondent. [Reagan vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968(1969)
Facts: Petitioner William Reagan, a citizen of
the United States and an employee of Bendix
Radio, Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation,
which provides technical assistance to the
United States Air Force, was assigned at Clark
Air Base, Philippines. Petitioner questioned the
payment of income tax assessed on him by
respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
on a sale of his 1960 Cadillac car to PFC
William Johnson, Jr., US Marine Corps
executed at Clark Air Base. It is the contention
of the petitioner, that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and
hence outside of our jurisdiction. Petitioner
seeks to refund the amount P2,979.00 of
income tax he paid.
Issue: Whether or not Clark Air Base is outside
of Philippine territory therefore excluded from
the jurisdictional powers of the Philippines to
tax.
Held: No.
According to jurisprudence, People v.
Acierto ,“By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it
should be noted, the Philippine Government
merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The
consent was given purely as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part
of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein."
The Clark Air Force Base is not a foreign soil or
territory for purposes of income tax legislation.
There is nothing in the Military Bases
Agreement that lends support to such
assertion, It has not become foreign soil or
territory. The Philippine's jurisdictional rights
therein, certainly not excluding the power to
tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax
matters, an appropriate exemption was
provided for.
People v Gozo, 53 SCRA 476
Facts: Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of
Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from
the municipal mayor for the construction or
erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition
thereof. She questions its validity on the
pretext that her house was constructed within
the naval base leased to the American armed
forces. While yielding to the well-settled
doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be
Philippine territory, she in effect seek to
emasculate the State's sovereign rights by the
assertion that the latter cannot exercise therein
administrative jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the State can exercise
administrative jurisdiction within the naval base
leased by the Philippines to the American
armed forces.
Held: The Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as
part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein. Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior
or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of
such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional lights not granted,
but also all such ceded rights as the United
States Military authorities for reasons of their
own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine
sovereignty over the bases; the second from
the express provisions of the treaty." There was
a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus:
"Nothing is better settled than that the
Philippines being independent and sovereign,
its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is
beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees
are supreme, its commands paramount. Its
laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it
applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be
exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of it sovereignty." Then came this
paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-
limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state
may, by its consent, express or implied, submit
to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There
may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is
a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation,
which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is
the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-
determination and self-restriction.' A state then,
if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise
of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16
The opinion was at pains to point out though
that even then, there is at the most diminution
of jurisdictional rights, not it appearance. The
words employed follow: "Its laws may as to
some persons found within its territory no
longer control. Nor does the matter end there.
It is not precluded from allowing another power
to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
right over certain portions of its territory. If it
does so, it by no means follows that such
areas become impressed with an alien
character. They retain their status as native
soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease
to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not
and cannot be foreign territory."