B.
Institutions, Enforcement, and the UN
1. The United Nation Human Rights Council
The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations
system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe and for addressing situations of human rights violations and make
recommendations on them. It has the ability to discuss all thematic human rights
issues and situations that require its attention throughout the year. It meets at the UN
Office at Geneva.
The Council is made up of 47 United Nations Member States which are elected by the
UN General Assembly. The Human Rights Council replaced the former United
Nations Commission on Human Rights.
2. UN Special Procedures
The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council serves several functions, one of which
is to promote and monitor human rights worldwide through the establishment of special
procedures. Special procedures are individual independent human rights experts, or
groups of such experts, who report and advise on human rights issues. They are called
by many names, including Special Rapporteurs, Special Representatives, Working
Groups, and Independent Experts.
Special procedures have either thematic or country-specific mandates. As of
September 2017, the Human Rights Council oversees 44 thematic mandates and
12 country-specific mandates. The combined work of the special rapporteurs is broad
enough to encompass civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.
Special procedures mandate holders serve in their personal capacities, meaning they
are not UN staff, are not paid a salary for their work, and do not represent their countries
of citizenship. Each mandate holder may serve for a maximum of six years. This
independent status is intended to allow these experts to carry out their functions with
impartiality.
In fulfilling their responsibilities, mandate holders enjoy the support of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and, in the case of mandate holders
in academia, may also benefit from institutional support from their universities.
The Human Rights Council assumed oversight of the special procedures created by its
predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights, upon its establishment in 2006.
The Human Rights Council has since created or extended the mandates of many
country-specific and thematic special procedures.
Principal Functions
As described in greater detail at the links below, each special procedure’s
responsibilities are defined in the Human Rights Council resolution(s) that create or
extend its mandate. Generally, in the process of carrying out their mandates, special
procedures may:
 undertake in-person country visits to assess human rights violations,
 communicate directly with States on alleged human rights violation by sending
urgent appeals or letters of allegation,
 make recommendations to States for preventing, ending, or remedying
violations,
 convene expert consultations,
 conduct thematic studies,
 raise awareness of human rights issues,
 provide advice for adherence to human rights standards,
 receive information from individuals and civil society,
 engage in advocacy, and
 contribute to the overall development of human rights standards.
After the special procedures mandate holders assess a specific human rights situation,
they may report their findings or thematic studies to the Human Rights Council or
the UN General Assembly and release public statements to the media.
As of January 2018, 170 States have been visited by at least one special procedure
mandate holder, while 23 States have never been visited. Over 100 countries have
extended standing invitations to all thematic special procedures.
Annual Reports
Special procedures mandate holders report to the Human Rights Council annually.
Most special procedures also report to the UN General Assembly. The Human Rights
Council reviews country-specific mandates annually and thematic mandates every
three years.
Nomination & Appointment
Appointment of special procedures mandate holders takes place before the Human
Rights Council. Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 details the criteria for their
selection and appointment. General eligibility criteria include the nominee’s expertise,
experience in the field of the mandate, independence, impartiality, personal integrity,
and objectivity. Specific criteria necessary to ensure all mandate holders are “highly
qualified individuals” include the nominee’s established competence, relevant
expertise, and professional experience in the field of human rights. The Human Rights
Council also considers gender balance, geographic representation, and representation
of different legal systems when appointing mandate holders. Conflicts of interest, such
as holding a position in government, will disqualify an individual from consideration.
The OHCHR maintains a public list of eligible candidates for the position of special
procedures mandate holder.
Governments, regional groups operating within the UN human rights system,
international organizations or their offices, such as the OHCHR, nongovernmental
organizations, other human rights bodies, and individuals may nominate candidates to
be special procedures mandate holders. Resolution 16/21 adds national human rights
institutions that comply with the Paris Principles to the list of entities able to nominate
candidates.
Next, the Human Rights Council appoints a Consultative Group to review all
applications and propose a list of candidates to the President of the Council. In doing
so, the Consultative Group takes into account the views of stakeholders, including the
current or outgoing mandate holder, in deciding the particular requirements for each
mandate.
Following the Consultative Group’s recommendations, the President of the Council
appoints an appropriate candidate for each vacant mandate, with approval by the
Council’s Member States.
3. Treaties and Treaty Bodies
a.) Individual Complaints: CEDAW, Communication No. 18/2008, Karen Vertido v.
Philippines (16 July 2010)
4. Regional Systems
a.) Inter-American System
The Inter-American System for the protection of human rights is a regional human rights
system, and is responsible for monitoring, promoting, and protecting human rights in
the 35 independent countries of the Americas that are members of the Organization of
American States (OAS).
The Inter-American System is composed of two principal entities: the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR). Both bodies can decide individual complaints concerning alleged human
rights violations and may issue emergency protective measures when an individual or
the subject of a complaint is in immediate risk of irreparable harm. The Commission
also engages in a range of human rights monitoring and promotion activities, while the
Court may issue advisory opinions on issues pertaining to the interpretation of the Inter-
American instruments at the request of an OAS organ or Member State.
Additional bodies within the Inter-American System focus on specific rights or groups.
These include the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM, by its Spanish initials),
the Working Group on the Protocol of San Salvador, and the various rapporteurships
of the IACHR.
(i) Inter-American Court on Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is the judicial organ of the Inter-
American human rights system. The Court’s mandate is more limited than that of the
Commission because the Court may only decide cases brought against the OAS
Member States that have specifically accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction and
those cases must first be processed by the Commission. Additionally, only States
parties and the Commission may refer contentious cases to the Court.
The seven judges of the Court are independent, but are chosen by States through the
OAS General Assembly. Judges are elected for a six-year term, once renewable. The
Court and its judges convene several times per year for sessions lasting up to two
weeks, but its staff works year-round.
Currently, 23 OAS Member States are States parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights, and 20 have opted to accept the Court’s contentious jurisdiction in
accordance with Article 62 of the American Convention. The 20 States over which the
Court may exercise its contentious jurisdiction are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and
Uruguay. Previously, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela had both accepted the
Court’s jurisdiction, but withdrew from that jurisdiction when they denounced the
American Convention, in 1998 and 2012, respectively.
The Court began operating in 1979, and soon issued several advisory opinions, but did
not begin exercising its contentious jurisdiction until 1986, when the Commission
submitted the first contentious case: Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, regarding
which the Court issued a judgment on the merits in 1988.
Over the Court’s first several decades in operation, its annual case load has more than
doubled; many more States have found themselves before the Court; and the Court
has adjudicated a significant range of rights protected by the American Convention and
ancillary agreements, from extrajudicial execution and forced disappearance cases, to
labor, land, and freedom of expression rights.
The Court’s Statute and Rules of Procedure outline its structure, objectives, and
procedures.
View the Court’s judgments, as well as its annual reports and other publications on its
website. Videos of the Court’s hearings are available on its Vimeo page. The Audio
Library of the Court, which includes audio files of the public hearings that have been
held in the 40 years of the Court’s existence, can be accessed via Soundcloud.
(ii) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) addresses human
rights conditions and violations in the 35 Member States of the OAS. Established by an
OAS resolution in 1959, the IACHR began operating in 1960, observing human rights
conditions via on-site visits, and in 1965 was authorized to begin processing specific
complaints of human rights violations. OAS Member States recognized the IACHR as
the region’s principal human rights body through a protocol to the OAS Charter which
was adopted in 1967 and entered into force in 1970.
The Commission is composed of seven members who are elected by the OAS Member
States and who serve part-time and in their individual capacities for four-year terms
that may be renewed once. The commissioners are supported by the staff of the
Executive Secretariat. In June 2019, four seats on the Commission will be filled in an
election. To read about the candidates and election process, see our two-page
overview.
In addition to carrying out country visits and receiving complaints, the Commission also
holds thematic hearings on specific topical areas of concern, publishes studies and
reports, requests the adoption of precautionary measures to protect individuals at risk,
and has established several thematic rapporteurships to more closely monitor certain
human rights themes or the rights of specific communities in the hemisphere.
Individuals, groups of individuals, and non-governmental organizations recognized in
any OAS Member State may submit complaints (“petitions“) concerning alleged
violations of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, American
Convention on Human Rights, and other regional human rights treaties (listed below).
The Commission receives approximately 1,500 petitions every year.
The Commission’s Statute and Rules of Procedure outline its structure, objectives, and
procedures, although some aspects of the day-to-day processing of cases are
determined by the legal staff of the Executive Secretariat.
The Commission’s website contains its published cases (reports on admissibility,
merits, friendly settlements and decisions to archive), decisions on requests
for precautionary measures, and applications to the Inter-American Court, in addition
 to its annual reports, thematic reports, and country reports. The IACHR publishes video
and audio recordings of the hearings held during each Period of Sessions; these are
also organized by theme.
b.) African System
(i) The African Union
The African Union (AU) is a continental body consisting of the 55 member states that
make up the countries of the African Continent. It was officially launched in 2002 as a
successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, 1963-1999).
History:
In May 1963, 32 Heads of independent African States met in Addis Ababa Ethiopia to
sign the Charter creating Africa’s first post-independence continental institution, The
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was the manifestation of the pan-African
vision for an Africa that was united, free and in control of its own destiny and this was
solemnised in the OAU Charter in which the founding fathers recognised that freedom,
equality, justice and dignity were essential objectives for the achievement of the
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples and that there was a need to promote
understanding among Africa’s peoples and foster cooperation among African states in
response to the aspirations of Africans for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity
transcending ethnic and national
Differences. The guiding philosophy was that of Pan-Africanism which centred on
African socialism and promoted African unity, the communal characteristic and
practices of African communities, and a drive to embrace Africa’s culture and common
heritage
The main objectives of the OAU were to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of
colonisation and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity amongst African States; to
coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation. The
OAU Charter spelled out the purpose of the Organisation namely:
 To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
 To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the
peoples of Africa;
 To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
 To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
 To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Through the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, the Continent
worked and spoke as one with undivided determination in forging an international
consensus in support of the liberation struggle and the fight against apartheid. The OAU
had provided an effective forum that enabled all Member States to adopt coordinated
positions on matters of common concern to the continent in international fora and
defend the interests of Africa effectively.
On 9.9.1999, the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU) issued the Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of an African Union,
with a view, to accelerating the process of integration in the continent to enable Africa
to play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social,
economic and political problems compounded as they were by certain negative aspects
of globalisation.
The launch of the African Union:
The African Union (AU) was officially launched in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa,
following a decision in September 1999 by its predecessor, the OAU to create a new
continental organisation to build on its work. The decision to re-launch Africa’s pan-
African organisation was the outcome of a consensus by African leaders that in order
to realise Africa’s potential, there was a need to refocus attention from the fight for
decolonisation and ridding the continent of apartheid, which had been the focus of the
OAU, towards increased cooperation and integration of African states to drive Africa’s
growth and economic development.
The AU is guided by its vision of “An Integrated, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa,
driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.”
The Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol on Amendments to the
Constitutive Act of the African Union lay out the aims of the AU which are:
 Achieve greater unity and solidarity between African countries and their the people
 Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
 Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
 Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent
and its peoples;
 Encourage international cooperation
 Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
 Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good
governance;
 Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
 Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in
the global economy and in international negotiations;
 Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well
as the integration of African economies;
 Promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African
peoples;
 Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and future Regional
Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;
 Advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in
particular in science and technology
 Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and
the promotion of good health on the continent.
 Ensure the effective participation of women in decision-making, particularly in the
political, economic and socio-cultural areas;
 Develop and promote common policies on trade, defence and foreign relations to
ensure the defence of the Continent and the strengthening of its negotiating positions;
 Invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora as an important part
of our Continent, in the building of the African Union.
The work of the AU is implemented through several principal decision making organs:-
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council,
the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), Specialised Technical
Committees (STCs), the Peace and Security Council and The African Union
Commission. The AU structure promotes participation of African citizens and civil
society through the Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social & Cultural
Council (ECOSOCC).
Organs that handle judicial and legal matters as well as human rights issues
include:- African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR), AU Commission on International
Law (AUCIL), AU Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) and the African Committee
of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The AU is also working towards the
establishment of continental financial institutions (The African Central Bank, The
African Investment Bank and the African Monetary Fund)
The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Peer Review
Mechanism are also key bodies that that constitute the structure of the African Union.
To ensure the realisation of its objectives and the attainment of the Pan African Vision
of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, Agenda 2063 was developed as a
strategic framework for Africa’s long term socio-economic and integrative
transformation. Agenda 2063 calls for greater collaboration and support for African led
initiatives to ensure the achievement of the aspirations of African people.
(ii) African Court of Human and People’s Rights
The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (the Court) is a continental court
established by African countries to ensure the protection of human and peoples’ rights
in Africa. It complements and reinforces the functions of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights.
The Court was established by virtue of Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, (the Protocol) which was adopted by Member States of the then
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in June 1998. The
Protocol came into force on 25 January 2004.
As of now, only nine (9) of the thirty (30) States Parties to the Protocol had made the
declaration recognizing the competence of the Court to receive cases from NGOs and
individuals. The nine (9) States are; Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia,
Ghana, Mali, Malawi , Tanzania and Rep. of Tunisia. The 30 States which have ratified
the Protocol are: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte
d’Ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho, Mali,
Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda.
The Court has jurisdiction over all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the
interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
(the Charter), the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by
the States concerned. Specifically, the Court has two types of jurisdiction: contentious
and advisory.
The Court is composed of eleven Judges, nationals of Member States of the African
Union. The first Judges of the Court were elected in January 2006 in Khartoum, Sudan.
They were sworn in before the 7th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
African Union on 2 July 2006, in Banjul, the Gambia. The Judges of the Court are
elected, after nomination by their respective States, in their individual capacities, from
among African jurists of proven integrity and of recognized practical, judicial or
academic competence and experience in the field of human rights. The Judges are
elected for a six year term, renewable once. The Judges of the Court elect from among
themselves, a President and Vice-President of the Court who serve a two year term.
They can be re-elected only once. The President of the Court resides and works on a
full time basis at the seat of the Court, while the other ten (10) Judges work on a part-
time basis. In the accomplishment of his/her duties, the President is assisted by a
Registrar who performs registry, managerial and administrative functions of the Court.
The Court officially started its operations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in November 2006,
and in August 2007 it moved to its seat in Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania.
Between 2006 and 2008, the Court dealt principally with operational and administrative
issues, including the development of the structure of the Court's Registry, preparation
of its budget and drafting of its Interim Rules of Procedure. In 2008, during the Court's
Ninth Ordinary Session, the Court adopted the Interim Rules of Court, pending
consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, in order to
harmonize their rules. This harmonization process was completed in April 2010, and in
June 2010, the Court adopted its Final Rules of Court.
The Court may receive cases filed by the African Commission of Human and Peoples’
Rights, State parties to the Protocol or African Intergovernmental Organizations. Non-
Governmental Organizations with observer status before the African Commission and
individuals can also institute cases directly before the Court as long as the state against
which they are complaining has deposited the Article 34(6) declaration recognizing the
jurisdiction of the Court to accept cases from individuals and NGOs.
(iii) African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
The African Commission is tasked with promoting and protecting human rights by
interpreting the African Charter and considering individual complaints. Established in
1986 and located in Banjul, The Gambia, the commission hears cases from the 53
Member States of the African Union (all except South Sudan).
Establishment: The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
(“Commission”) was established under Article 30 of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”), and became operational on 21 October
1986. The Commission reports to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the African Union (AU)
Members: The 11 Commissioners serve in their personal capacities for six-year
terms that may be renewed once. There are two ordinary sessions each year, usually
in March/April and October/November, and also extraordinary sessions
Jurisdiction: The Commission has jurisdiction over the rights set out in the African
Charter. Its duties include examining national reports on the situation of human rights
which each State is required to submit every other year, adopting resolutions and
declarations, country visits, and adjudicating communications (complaints) submitted
by Member States, individuals, and NGOs.
The Commission has also developed a system of “Special Measures,” consisting of:
(1) Special Rapporteurs to whom specific allegations of human rights violations in
specific areas may be brought, and (2) Working Groups that monitor and investigate
specific questions linked to the Commission’s work.
With the creation of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (under a
protocol to the Charter adopted in 1998 which entered into force in January 2004), the
Commission can also submit cases to the Court.
Admissibility: State Parties, individuals, or NGOs may bring communications to the
Commission, alleging that a State Party has violated a provision of the Charter. When
an individual or NGO submits a complaint to the Commission, they must first exhaust
any domestic remedies which exist, “unless it is obvious to the Commission that the
procedure of achieving these remedies would be unduly prolonged.” Communications
must be submitted within a reasonable time after local remedies were exhausted,
must not be based exclusively on news from the mass media, and must not written in
a way which insults or disparages the State or the U. Individuals may request
confidentiality.
Procedure: Applicants initiate a case through a letter of introduction. The
Commission may decide to seize itself of the case, at which point the applicant is
invited to provide submissions on admissibility, the State is given an opportunity
to respond, and the applicant may file a reply. The Commission will then issue a
decision on admissibility, and if the case is held to be admissible, the parties provide
similar submissions and responses on the merits of the case.
Decisions on admissibility are usually made based solely on the written submissions,
although the Commission may schedule an oral hearing. Oral hearings are more
common at the merits stage, when they may be called by the Commission or
requested by a party, although cases may be decided based solely on the written
submissions.
Remedies: The African Charter does not specify the remedies which the Commission
may recommend; rather, it empowers the Commission to make any recommendations
it considers “useful” in a particular case. The Commission has made a wide range of
recommendations, including publishing the Commission’s decision locally, the return
of expelled from their country, the protection of natural resources, urging the
withdrawal of troops, urging changes in a State Party’s law, and urging the release of
detainee. The Commission has also recommended provision of compensation to the
victims of the violations; however, when it does so it does not specify the sum to be
paid, but rather recommends that the State provide “adequate compensation."
Enforcement: The African Charter does not contain any provision for enforcement of
the Commission’s findings and recommendations, which are not formally binding on
AU Member States. However, the Chairman publishes a record of the Commission’s
activities, including its Views, which is then submitted to the Assembly
(Activity Reports). Special Rapporteurs may also instigate a dialogue with the relevant
governments, approach the press, and collaborate with their UN counterparts to help
implement the Commission’s recommendations. Finally, the Commission can refer
cases to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
c.) European System
(i) European Union
Goals
The goals of the European Union are:
 promote peace, its values and the well-being of its citizens
 offer freedom, security and justice without internal borders
 sustainable development based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a
highly competitive market economy with full employment and social progress, and
environmental protection
 combat social exclusion and discrimination
 promote scientific and technological progress
 enhance economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among EU countries
 respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity
 establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.
Values
The EU values are common to the EU countries in a society in which inclusion,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination prevail. These values are an
integral part of our European way of life:
 Human dignity
Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected, protected and constitutes the real
basis of fundamental rights.
 Freedom
Freedom of movement gives citizens the right to move and reside freely within the
Union. Individual freedoms such as respect for private life, freedom of thought,
religion, assembly, expression and information are protected by the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights.
 Democracy
The functioning of the EU is founded on representative democracy. Being a European
citizen also means enjoying political rights. Every adult EU citizen has the right to
stand as a candidate and to vote in elections to the European Parliament. EU citizens
have the right to stand as candidate and to vote in their country of residence, or in
their country of origin.
 Equality
Equality is about equal rights for all citizens before the law. The principle of equality
between women and men underpins all European policies and is the basis for
European integration. It applies in all areas. The principle of equal pay for equal work
became part of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Although inequalities still exist, the EU
has made significant progress.
 Rule of law
The EU is based on the rule of law. Everything the EU does is founded on treaties,
voluntarily and democratically agreed by its EU countries. Law and justice are upheld
by an independent judiciary. The EU countries gave final jurisdiction to the European
Court of Justice which judgements have to be respected by all.
 Human rights
Human rights are protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. These cover
the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex, racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, the right to the protection of your
personal data, and or the right to get access to justice.
These goals and values form the basis of the EU and are laid out in the Lisbon
Treaty and the EU Charter of fundamental rights.
In 2012, the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for advancing the causes of
peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.
From economic to political union
The European Union is a unique economic and political union between 28 EU
countries that together cover much of the continent.
The predecessor of the EU was created in the aftermath of the Second World War.
The first steps were to foster economic cooperation: the idea being that countries that
trade with one another become economically interdependent and so more likely to
avoid conflict.
The result was the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958, and
initially increasing economic cooperation between six countries: Belgium, Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Since then, 22 other members joined and a huge single market (also known as the
'internal' market) has been created and continues to develop towards its full potential.
What began as a purely economic union has evolved into an organization
spanning policy areas, from climate, environment and health to external relations and
security, justice and migration. A name change from the European Economic
Community (EEC) to the European Union (EU) in 1993 reflected this.
Stability, a single currency, mobility and growth
The EU has delivered more than half a century of peace, stability and prosperity,
helped raise living standards and launched a single European currency: the euro.
More than 340 million EU citizens in 19 countries now use it as their currency and
enjoy its benefits.
Thanks to the abolition of border controls between EU countries, people can travel
freely throughout most of the continent. And it has become much easier to live, work
and travelabroad in Europe. All EU citizens have the right and freedom to choose in
which EU country they want to study, work or retire. Every EU country must treat EU
citizens in exactly the same way as its own citizens for employment, social security
and tax purposes.
The EU's main economic engine is the single market. It enables most goods,
services, money and people to move freely. The EU aims to develop this huge
resource to other areas like energy, knowledge and capital markets to ensure that
Europeans can draw the maximum benefit from it.
Transparent and democratic institutions
The EU remains focused on making its governing institutions more transparent and
democratic. Decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to
the citizen.
More powers have been given to the directly elected European Parliament, while
national parliaments play a greater role, working alongside the European institutions.
The EU is governed by the principle of representative democracy, with citizens
directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament and Member States
represented in the European Council and the Council of the EU.
European citizens are encouraged to contribute to the democratic life of the Union
by giving their views on EU policies during their development or suggest
improvements to existing laws and policies. The European citizens'
initiative empowers citizens to have a greater say on EU policies that affect their lives.
Citizens can also submit complaints and enquiries concerning the application of EU
law.
The EU in the world
Trade
The European Union is the largest trade block in the world. It is the world's biggest
exporter of manufactured goods and services, and the biggest import market for over
100 countries.
Free trade among its members was one of the EU's founding principles. This is
possible thanks to the single market. Beyond its borders, the EU is also committed to
liberalising world trade.
 Humanitarian aid
The EU is committed to helping victims of man-made and natural disasters worldwide
and supports over 120 million people each year. Collectively, the EU and its
constituent countries are the world's leading donor of humanitarian aid.
Diplomacy and security
The EU plays an important role in diplomacy and works to foster stability, security and
prosperity, democracy, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law at international
level.
(ii) Council of Europe: The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR and ECtHR) was established in 1959.
The Court has 47 judges, one from each Member State.
The object of the Court is to ensure observance of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) by members of the Council of Europe. The Court examines
applications from both individual citizens and states alleging human rights violations.
In recent years, the Court has passed more than 1,000 judgments annually.
A state is obligated not only in relation to the rulings passed against the state itself; all
European states that have signed up to the Convention are under obligation to keep
abreast of the rulings passed by the Court. In this way, the states are required to
adjust their legislation and case law to bring them into line with the Court's rulings.
Denmark has been ruled against in several cases before the European Court of
Human Rights, which sits in Strasbourg.
You have the right to complain to the European Court of Human Rights
Complaints may not be brought directly before the ECHR as a first instance.
Cases must first be closed by all of the state's own national complaint and appeal
bodies. If a case is then brought before ECHR it must be described. This description
must contain:
 a brief presentation of the complaint
 citation of the rights and/or freedoms alleged to have been violated
 a listing of the administrative and/or legal rulings passed by national authorities on the
case.
The Court's central office acknowledges receipt of all applications. When the central
office replies, it may request further information on the case. If the central office finds
that the complaint (known as an 'application') is not admissible for examination by the
Court, the applicant will be notified.
There is no requirement for legal representation when lodging a complaint, but if a
case is found admissible for examination by the Court, the applicant must as a rule be
represented by a lawyer.
Court procedure
When a complaint is received, it is registered with the ECHR as a formal complaint
(application). From then on, the case is accessible to the public unless the ECHR
decides that the case or parts of it should be subject to non-disclosure. An applicant
may, however, request that their identity not be disclosed.
If the case is not dismissed, it will be examined by a so-called Chamber. The
Chamber, composed of seven judges, requests the opinion of the Government
concerned on the case. It may also summon the applicant and the state to a public
hearing where the parties may put their positions forward.
In most cases, the Chamber will seek to bring about a 'friendly settlement' between
the applicant and the Government. If this can be achieved, the Chamber closes the
case by making a decision which describes the case and its resolution.
If settlement proves impossible, the Chamber must deliver a judgment. The case may
also be sent before the Grand Chamber if the case raises an important question
concerning interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, although this
may be denied by the state or the applicant.
Appealing judgments by the Chamber
If the state or complainant assert that the Chamber's judgment is incorrect, they may
each within three months after the judgment request that the case be sent before the
Grand Chamber. A panel of five of the Grand Chamber's seventeen judges then
decide whether to examine the case.
For citizens seeking to lodge a complaint, the Danish Institute for Human Rights
recommends consulting the guidelines on the Danish Ministry of Justice website (in
Danish) or the notes for applicants and the admissibility checklist in English on the
website of the ECHR.
d.) What about in Asia?
(i) ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)
History
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) is an ASEAN
regional human rights institution established in 2009.
Discussion on AICHR’s formation can be traced back to the World Conference on
Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action (VDPA) the world leaders, including the ASEAN Member States of reiterated,
 "the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and subregional
arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights where they do not
already exist".
That same year, during the 26th ASEAN Summit in Singapore, the ASEAN Foreign
Minister’s meeting adopted a Joint Communiqué reaffirming the VDPA and agreeing
that ASEAN should consider the establishment of a regional human rights
mechanism.
It was not until 2007, fifteen years later, that ASEAN incorporated human rights into
its institutional structure.
Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter states that:
1) In conformity with the purposes and the principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to
the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom, ASEAN shall
establish an ASEAN human rights body.
2) This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of
reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.
In July 2008, a High Level Panel (HLP) was established to draft a Terms of Reference
(TOR) that would specify the mandate and structure of an ASEAN human rights body.
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers endorsed the Terms of Reference on 20 July 2009
during the 42nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Thailand.
A year after AICHR’s Terms of Reference (TOR) were adopted, the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers inaugurated the ten AICHR country representatives during the 15th ASEAN
Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand. The 23 October 2010 is now recognized as the
AICHR's “birth date”.
Mandate
AICHR’s TOR defines AICHR’s purpose, mandate and functions. AICHR’s primary
purpose is to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms of the
peoples of ASEAN. AICHR is mandated to, among other things:
1. Develop strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms
2. Develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
3. Enhance public awareness of human rights through education, research, and
dissemination of information
4. Undertake capacity building for the effective implementation of ASEAN Member
States’ inter- national human rights treaty obligations and ASEAN human rights
instruments
5. Encourage ASEAN Member States to ratify international human rights instruments
6. Provide ASEAN with advisory services and technical assistance on human rights
matters upon request
7. Engage in dialogue and consultation with other ASEAN bodies and entities
associated with ASEAN, including civil society organizations and other stakeholders
8. Obtain information from ASEAN Member States on the promotion and protection of
human rights
9. Develop common approaches and positions on human rights matters of interest to
ASEAN
10. Prepare thematic human rights studies
11. Perform any other tasks assigned by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting
Complaints of Human Rights Violations
AICHR’s mandate does not contain explicit provision for receiving and investigating
complaints of human rights violations. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting will
review AICHR’s TOR in 2014. This review is a compromise between ASEAN Member
States who felt that AICHR’s protection mandate was too weak, and those who felt
AICHR’s role should be restricted to only the promotion of human rights.
In March 2012, human rights advocates attempted to submit six complaints of human
rights abuses to AICHR. AICHR initially refused to accept the documents, arguing
that it had neither the mandate nor any internal mechanism to receive complaints.
AICHR subsequently relented and the documents were submitted.
Communications and complaints can now be submitted to AICHR via the ASEAN
Secretariat. Submission can be via email, the online query form on AICHR’s website,
or in person at the Secretariat in Jakarta. The Secretariat will take note of the
complaint and pass it on to the AICHR Chair. The Chair is then responsible for
circulating the complaint amongst the other AICHR Representatives and tabling it for
consideration during an AICHR meeting. Discussions of complaints take place during
closed meetings so it cannot be confirmed if and what cases have been discussed by
AICHR. AICHR has not yet taken any public action to respond to a human rights
situation or complaint.
Composition
AICHR is comprised of ten government representatives; one per ASEAN Member
State. Selection processes of AICHR Representatives differ amongst the ten Member
States but they must, at a minimum, take into account the individual’s integrity and
competence in the field of human rights, and ensure gender equality within the
Commission. Member States are not obliged to have a transparent or consultative
selection process.
AICHR Representatives are not full-time and serve on a voluntary basis. Each AICHR
Representative serves a term of three years and may be re-appointed for a second
term. The government may decide at any time to replace its AICHR Representative
without notice or explanation.
AICHR Chairmanship
The Chair of the AICHR rotates yearly and is the Representative of the Member State
holding the ASEAN chairmanship for that year.
2009 Thailand 2015 Malaysia
2010 Vietnam 2016 Lao PDR
2011 Indonesia 2017 Philippines
2012 Cambodia 2018 Singapore
2014 Myanmar 2019 Thailand
Decision Making Process

AICHR must meet at least twice a year and can hold additional meetings if required.
Decision making in the AICHR shall be based on consultation and consensus in
accordance with Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter. This means that AICHR cannot act
without the full agreement of all ten Representatives.

Line of Reporting
AICHR reports to the ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting, submitting an annual report
and other reports as required. These reports are not made public. AICHR falls within
the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint, unlike the ASEAN Commission for the
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) which falls
within the Socio-Cultural Blueprint.

Public Information
AICHR is obliged, by its Terms of Reference, to keep the public periodically informed
of its work and activities. So far, AICHR has done this by issuing press releases,
publishing an information brochure, and creating a website.

Relationship with Other Human Rights Bodies within ASEAN

AICHR is the overarching human rights institution in ASEAN with overall responsibility
for the promotion and protection of human rights in ASEAN. However, AICHR must
work with other ASEAN bodies dealing with human rights and ensure that their work
aligns with the AICHR’s work.

Funding and Secretariat Support

ASEAN Member States contribute in equal amounts to AICHR’s budget. AICHR
activities are also funded by international donors such as the European Union.

AICHR is supported by a small unit of three staff within the Community and Corporate
Affairs Department of the ASEAN Secretariat. This unit also supports the ASEAN
Inter-Parliamentary Secretariat, the ASEAN Foundation and “Other ASEAN
Associated Entities” (meaning those organizations accredited to ASEAN).
 [ G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019 ]
INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY:
VENANCIO A. ROXAS, SATURNINO V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL,
HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P.
MONDEJAR, ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR
ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO, JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND CRISENCIO
NERI, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS.
ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND ARESENIO C.
CABANILLA, PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS,
[G.R. No. 214637]
REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. ACLAO, WILFREDO V.
OMERES, PASCUA B. GALLADAN, VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C.
TRABUNCON, WILFREDO A. PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, AND ROMEO R.
MACOLBAS, PETITIONERS, VS. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ACTING DIRECTOR FRANKLIN
JESUS B. BUCAYU, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS; AND JAIL CHIEF
SUPERINTENDENT DIONY DACANAY MAMARIL, BUREAU OF JAIL
MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases [1] is the legality of Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10592,[2] which states:
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new
procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance
as provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management,
Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same
Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall
be prospective in application.
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time
allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are
likewise subject to the management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.[3]
The Case
On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No.
10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).[4] For reference, the modifications are underscored as follows:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. —
Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the
full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof
and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times
of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to
surrender voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of
a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the
time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be deducted from thirty (30) years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to
the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if
the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes
of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the
accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court
may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That
recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous
crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty
to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.
ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal liability is extinguished
partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing
preventive imprisonment orserving his sentence.
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any offender qualified
for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of
any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center
or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of
his sentence:
1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of twenty-threedays for each month of good behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he
shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another
deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each
month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above
allowances for good conduct.
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth of the period of
his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive
imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in
Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following
the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his
sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe
enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive
imprisonment or serving sentence.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be
revoked. (Emphases ours)
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26,
2014 and became effective on April 18, 2014.[5] Petitioners and intervenors assail the
validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application of the grant of
good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and
mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the
ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.[6]
G.R. No. 212719
On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction)[7]was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary
De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J. Evangelista acting as the
attorney-in-fact[8] of convicted prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely:
Venancio A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras, Edgardo G. Manuel, Herminildo V. Cruz,
Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito P. Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang,
Jonathan O. Crisanto, Edgar Echenique, Janmark Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and
Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas et al.). Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-interest
and as representatives of their member organizations and the organizations'
individual members, as a class suit for themselves and in behalf of all who are
similarly situated. They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in
nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in
accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it
implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of Corrections
(BUCOR) and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) to retroactively
apply the law when the prisoners' records are complete and the distinctions between
the pertinent provisions of the RPC and R.A. No. 10592 are easily identifiable.
Petitioners submit that the simple standards added by the new law, which are matters
of record, and the creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee
(MSEC) should not override the constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and
due process of law aside from the principle that penal laws beneficial to the accused
are given retroactive effect.
Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. filed a
Petition (In Intervention).[9] He incorporates by reference the Roxas et al. petition,
impleads the same respondents, and adds that nowhere from the legislative history of
R.A. No. 10592 that it intends to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014, the
Court resolved to grant the leave to intervene and require the adverse parties to
comment thereon.[10]
Another Petition-in-Intervention[11] was filed on October 21, 2014. This time, the Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) served as counsel for William M. Montinola,
Fortunato P. Visto, and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola et al.), who are also inmates
of the NBP. The petition argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for
being contrary to the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it discriminates,
without any reasonable basis, against those who would have been benefited from the
retroactive application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the
authority of respondents to promulgate. In a Resolution dated November 25, 2014,
We required the adverse parties to comment on the petition-in-intervention.[12]
On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Comment[13] to the Petition of Roxas et al. and Petition-in-Intervention of Atty.
Saguisag, Sr. More than two years later, or on July 7, 2017, it filed a Comment[14] to
the Petition-in-Intervention of Montinola et al.
G.R. No. 214637
On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[15] was filed by Reynaldo
D. Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E. Aclao, Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan,
Victor M. Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and
Romeo R. Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the Maximum Security
Compound of the NBP, against DOJ Secretary De Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas,
BUCOR Acting Director Franklin Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent
(Officer-in-Charge) Diony Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as
follows:
A.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE
 ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
AND THEREBY VOID AND ILLEGAL FOR BEING CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA
TO R.A. 10592.
a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have prospective application.
b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code providing that penal laws that are beneficial to the accused shall have
retroactive application.
c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and the intent of Congress
when it enacted R.A. 10592.
B.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
BECAUSE IT IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
b. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due process. [16]
Per Resolution[17] dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered to file their
comment to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief Mamaril filed a Comment[18] on
December 10, 2014, while the OSG did the same on February 9, 2015[19] in behalf of
all the respondents.
Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File and Admit
Reply,[20] attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015, We granted the motion and
noted the Reply.[21]
The Court's Ruling
The petition is granted.
Procedural Matters
Actual case or controversy
Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the
elements of justiciability as the requirement of an actual case or controversy vis-a-
vis the requirement of ripeness has not been complied with. For them, the claimed
injury of petitioners has not ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's
intervention: First, the MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is effectively no
authority or specialized body to screen, evaluate and recommend any applications for
time credits based on R.A. No. 10592. Second, none of petitioners has applied for the
revised credits, making their claim of injury premature, if not anticipatory. And third,
the prison records annexed to the petition are neither signed nor certified by the
BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting from alleged extended
incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately filed this case after obtaining
their prison records and computing the purported application of the revised credits for
GCTA under R.A. No. 10592.
We disagree.
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[22] As to the requirement of
actual case or controversy, the Court stated in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v.
Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al.:[23]
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline
to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere
academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence, x x x.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a
result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[24]
There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant
of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such
provision violates the Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is
ripe for adjudication as the challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on
petitioners and those detained and convicted prisoners who are similarly situated.
There exists an immediate and/or threatened injury and they have sustained or are
immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the act complained of.
In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are languishing in jail. If their assertion
proved to be true, their illegal confinement or detention in the meantime is oppressive.
With the prisoners' continued incarceration, any delay in resolving the case would
cause them great prejudice. Justice demands that they be released soonest, if not on
time.
There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC.
Petitioners Edago et al.correctly invoked Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Aguirre.[25] There, We dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the
implementing evil to befall on them before they could question acts that are illegal or
unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue
in this case is whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section 4,
Rule 1 of the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. Concrete
acts are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe.[26] An actual case may
exist even in the absence of tangible instances when the assailed IRR has actually
and adversely affected petitioners. The mere issuance of the subject IRR has led to
the ripening of a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. If this Court
cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention,[27] the same can be said for an
IRR. Here, petitioners need not wait for the creation of the MSEC and be individually
rejected in their applications. They do not need to actually apply for the revised
credits, considering that such application would be an exercise in futility in view of
respondents' insistence that the law should be prospectively applied. If the assailed
provision is indeed unconstitutional and illegal, there is no better time than the
present action to settle such question once and for all. [28]
Legal standing
We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress which may
claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative function to
amend, modify or repeal laws and that the challenged acts of respondents have no
direct adverse effect on petitioners, considering that based on records, there was no
GCTA granted to them.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest,
as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of
the right sought to be enforced."
"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The
concept has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only
that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he has been,
or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that
he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of.[29]
In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because
they are prisoners currently serving their respective sentences at the NBP. They have
a personal stake in the outcome of this case as their stay in prison will potentially be
shortened (if the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their
dates of release will be delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is
erroneous to assert that the questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on
petitioners since there were no GCTAs granted to them. There is none precisely
because of the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act
complained of rather than an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further,
the submission of certified prison records is immaterial in determining whether or not
petitioners' rights were breached by the IRR because, to repeat, the possible violation
was already fait accompli by the issuance of the IRR. The prison records were merely
furnished to show that respondents have prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and
that petitioners will be affected thereby.
Propriety of legal remedy:
Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the
petitions-in-intervention, should be dismissed because such petitions are proper only
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR is an administrative issuance of respondents made in the
exercise of their rule-making or quasi-legislative functions.
True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to assail the
validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the exercise of respondents' rule-making
or quasi-legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that
"petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials."[30] In Araullo v. Aquino III,[31] former Associate Justice, now Chief Justice,
Lucas P. Bersamin, explained the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
may be determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These
are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by
Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is
expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are
aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ
of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or
officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so
as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the
superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior
court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature
that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to
whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the
record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was
limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or
was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to
review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same
as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances
or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ
of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz.:
xxxx
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a
corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal,
and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court
itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and
is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the
writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or
person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative
or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep
a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration
of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate
remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may
be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application
is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any
act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from
making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or
affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary
implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases,
the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is
consistent with the republican system of checks and balances. [32]
In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised
herein so as to finally resolve the question on the validity of Section 4, Rule 1 of the
IRR, which is purely legal in nature. This is also because of the public importance of
the issues raised,[33] and the interest of substantial justice,[34] not to mention the
absence of any dispute as to any underlying fact.[35]
Hierarchy of courts
Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the
petitions-in-intervention, should still be dismissed for failure to observe the rule on
hierarchy of courts. According to them, this Court's jurisdiction over actions assailing
the validity of administrative issuances is primarily appellate in nature by virtue of
Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution.[36] An action assailing the validity of an
administrative issuance is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, which,
under Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has
exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed before the
RTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper remedy to question
the validity of the IRR.[37]
Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented here is a matter
incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively and originally pertained to the
proper RTC.[38] Fundamentally, there is no doubt that this consolidated case
captioned as petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality and illegality of Section 4 Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the
nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which We only have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. In accordance
with Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, the special civil action of declaratory relief falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to this Court in
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, and those of transcendental importance and of first
impression.[39] As the petitions clearly and specifically set out special and important
reasons therefor, We may overlook the Rules. Here, petitioners Edago et al. are
correct in asserting that R.A. No. 10592 and its IRR affect the entire correctional
system of the Philippines. Not only the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
convicts and detainees are involved but also their victims and their own families, the
jails, and the society at large. The nationwide implications of the petitions, the
extensive scope of the subject matter, the upholding of public policy, and the
repercussions on the society are factors warranting direct recourse to Us.
Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense substantive justice
on the numerous affected inmates. It is a must to treat this consolidated case with a
circumspect leniency, granting petitioners the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of their case rather than lose their liberty on the basis of technicalities. [40] It
need not be said that while this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the
line. An extended period of detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law
violates the accused person's right to liberty.[41] Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the
rules of procedure so as not to deprive such birthright. [42] The Court zealously guards
against the curtailment of a person's basic constitutional and natural right to
liberty.[43] The right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of
constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.[44] At its core, substantive due
process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly constricted,
except through valid causes provided by law.[45]
Substantive Issues
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a
penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive
effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the
exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.[46]
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal
laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well
entrenched.[47] It has been sanctioned since the old Penal Code.[48]
x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands
until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the
accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be
retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried
over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article
22 x x x. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not
retrospective, variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non
respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex defuturo, judex de proeterito (the
law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form
with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify
this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt
amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the exception
was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science. [49]
According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the
offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish
and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception
based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice."[50]
Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC
applies to said Code[51] and its amendments,[52] as well as to special laws,[53] such as
Act No. 2126,[54] Presidential Decree No. 603,[55] R.A. No. 7636,[56] R.A. No.
8293,[57] R.A. No. 8294,[58] R.A. No. 9344,[59] and R.A. No. 10586,[60] to cite a few.
But what exactly is a penal law?
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as
follows:
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.[61]
Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining
offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation.[62]
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense
committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the
power to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include
within the term "penal statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts,
and establish penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly
prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission.[63]
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
provide for their punishment.[64]
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not
procedural rules.[65] Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does
not make it penal in nature.[66]
In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A.
No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the
RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al.further argue that if an
amendment to the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the
accused cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that
makes the penalties lighter should be considered penal laws in accordance with
Article 22 of the RPC.
We concur.
While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish
a penalty[67] as it addresses the rehabilitation component[68] of our correctional
system, its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment
attached to the crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of
imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted
prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually
works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It
precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and
lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes
they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a
practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their
punishment.[69] Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the
RPC.
In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL,
respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need for
"new procedures and standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the
BUCOR (as to persons serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to
accused who are under preventive detention). It is alleged that the amendments
introduced are substantial and of utmost importance that they may not be
implemented without a thorough revision of the BUCOR and the BJMP operating
manuals on jail management. In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is said to
be an administrative mechanism to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR
superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must follow uniform guidelines in
managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of prisoners prior to their
recommendation to the heads of the two bureaus on who may be granted time
allowances.
Respondents fail to persuade Us.
Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to
stay in the place of his confinement despite the existence of a calamity or catastrophe
enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere
modifications of the RPC that have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the
issuance of the challenged IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new procedures and
standards of behavior" for the grant of time allowances is untenable.
It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was
enacted,[70] prisoners have already been entitled to deduct the period of preventive
imprisonment from the service of their sentences. In addition, good conduct time
allowance has been in existence since August 30, 1906 upon the passage of Act No.
1533.[71] Said law provided for the diminution of sentences imposed upon convicted
prisoners in consideration of good conduct and diligence. [72] Under Act No. 1533 and
subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time allowance may also apply to
detention prisoners if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be
assigned to them.[73] Such prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. 10592.
Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge of
Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records
and take such further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Act
No. 1533.[74] When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932,[75] the Director of Prisons
was empowered to grant allowances for good conduct whenever lawfully
justified.[76] With the effectivity of R.A. No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is
now vested on the Director of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden
of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail.[77]
Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the
recommending body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM.[78] They are tasked to
manage, screen and evaluate the behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted
prisoner and to monitor and certify whether said prisoner has actually studied, taught
or performed mentoring activities.[79] The creation of the MSEC, however, does not
justify the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law
was its formation set as a precondition before its beneficial provisions are applied.
What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG
are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for
good conduct and time allowances, as may be necessary to implement its
provisions.[80] Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of their legal mandate
when they provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law to be
enforced.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government
under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The
law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.[81]
The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the
assailed IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. No. 10592, a Classification
Board had been handling the functions of the MSEC and implementing the provisions
of the RPC on time allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize and/or
institutionalize existing set-up, the administrative and procedural restructuring should
not in any way prejudice the substantive rights of current detention and convicted
prisoners.
Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in
granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, the definition of what
constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable through the years, thus:
Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the
prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all such tasks as have been
assigned to him."[82]
BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good behavior and who
has no record of breach of discipline or violation of prison rules and regulations."[83]
IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of a detention or
convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs,
productive participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary
deeds coupled with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations" [84]
Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or
conduct while in prison.[85]Likewise, the certificate/diploma issued upon successful
completion of an educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and
college education as well as vocational training) forms part of the record. [86] These
considered, the Court cannot but share the same sentiment of Roxas et al. It is
indeed perplexing why it is complex for respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No.
10592 when all that the MSEC has to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior
for the grant of time allowances and refer to existing prison records.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides for
the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for
study, teaching and mentoring, and special time allowance for loyalty. The Director General of
the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with reasonable dispatch the time allowances due to
petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate
release from imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being confined
thereat for any other lawful cause. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.